The concept of self (atman) in Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy

Thesis

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The Concept of Self (ätman) in Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy
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Abstract of Thesis: The Concept of Self (ätman) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy.

Nyāya, one of Hinduism's six orthodox schools of philosophy has been of interest to western philosophers largely because of its sophisticated analysis of logical and linguistic problems. In India, the purpose of the orthodox school (or darśana - "view") has been to lead the student toward liberation (mokṣa). Hence Nyāya's preoccupation with logic should not in itself preclude a real concern with mokṣa. The broad aim of my thesis therefore, is to determine how Nyāya functions as a complete darśana, to see if indeed the various aspects of the system stand together as a coherent mokṣamārga (way to release). Because Hindus conceive of salvation as the realization of a transcendental Self (ätman), and because the nature of such a Self has been a prime focus for Indian philosophical debate, this thesis will concentrate on the Nyāya understanding of ātman, and the logical arguments for its existence.

Nyāya philosophers played a leading role in arguing against their Buddhist opponents in India who denied the existence of any such transcendental Self. The debate, which endured for many hundreds of years, culminated in the eleventh century A.D. with the works of Udayana, a leading Nyāya philosopher, and his Buddhist opponents, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, after which time the Buddhist challenge waned in India, and the Nyāya school, known in its later phase as Navya-Nyāya, became more concerned with the method rather than the substance of the arguments.
In this thesis I concentrate on one particular text of Udayana, the *Atmatattvaviveka* (The Discrimination of the Reality of the Self), for in this text Udayana arranged most of the major disputes that had engaged Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers in the preceding centuries in such a way as to clearly display their relevance for the debate about ātman. The main body of my thesis consists of translations from this hitherto largely untranslated work, and discussions of some of the important arguments found therein. The concluding part of my thesis uses my findings for the broader discussion of the importance of ātman in Nyāya, and the place of Nyāya within the wider spectrum of Indian soteriological thought.
Acknowledgements

In this thesis I discuss an important Indian philosophical text in a way which I hope will be illuminating to contemporary philosophers, both specialists and non-specialists in the Indian tradition. In this task I am indebted to those who were pioneers in this field, most notably to the translations of Ganganatha Jha and to Theodore Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic*. Amongst contemporary scholars I am deeply indebted to Professor Matilal, Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford University, who, with his fluency in both the Indian and Anglo-American traditions, has been a major force in demonstrating the relevance of Indian philosophy for contemporary philosophical debate. His works have set a standard of excellence in the field of comparative philosophy.

I would like to thank the Open University for their award of a full-time research grant for the years 1980-1983, and for their continuing support since. My supervisor at the Open University has been Dr. Terry Thomas, Head of the Open University in Wales, and I would like to thank him for his help with my project. Dr. Paul Williams of Bristol University has been my academic supervisor and I would like to thank him for his patience and his always clear, detailed criticism of my work, which has been immensely helpful in guiding me towards a finished thesis. I was able to study Sanskrit at Oxford University from 1980-1982 and I am grateful to them for making their facilities available to me.
My classes with Alexis Sanderson and Professor Richard Gombrich were invaluable in introducing me to the Sanskrit language. I am also deeply indebted to Mr. Venugopalan of Deccan College, Pune, India, with whom I worked from September 1987 to February 1988. We read passages from the Ātmatattvaviveka together, and his rich knowledge of Indian philosophy was both invaluable in the preparation of the translations contained in this thesis and an immensely stimulating and enjoyable experience. I would also like to thank Ellen Gunderson who had the unenviable task of processing the final manuscript. Finally, but not least, I would like to thank my family for their patience and support, who have had to live with this thesis for many years, especially to my children, Maria and Patrick, and to my husband Dr. James Laine, for his intellectual support, his practical help with family duties, but most of all for his unerring faith in my project.

I have had the benefit of many fine teachers in my philosophical education and only I can take responsibility for any shortcomings of this manuscript.
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Introduction

Can one accept, as such, the distinction between the major types of discourse, or that between such forms or genres as science, literature, philosophy, religion, history, fiction, etc., and which tend to create certain great historical individualities? We are not even sure of ourselves when we use these distinctions in our own world of discourse, let alone when we are analyzing groups of statements which, when first formulated, were distributed, divided, and characterized in a quite different way.

Michel Foucault (1972) p. 22

According to Indian tradition, a fundamental purpose of philosophy is the discovery of a means by which the individual can achieve release (mokṣa) from the limitations of this world.¹ A philosophical system is known as a "darśana" or "view" (from the Sanskrit verb दर्श - to see), a darśana being a branch of knowledge which deals especially with the quest for mokṣa. Since about the twelfth century A.D. the brahmanical orthodoxy has classified the different schools of Indian philosophy into orthodox (āstika) and non-orthodox (nāstika) darśana. The Buddhist, Jain and Cārvāka schools were among those rejected by the brahmanical orthodoxy, whilst six schools, the so-called saṅdarśana (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāākhyā, Yoga, Purva-Mīmāṃśā and Vedānta) were accepted as orthodox. The question of orthodoxy was a much debated issue² and in other ways Indian philosophy, both orthodox and non-orthodox, was far more complex than this simple classification would suggest.³ Yet the saṅdarśana classification did exert a powerful influence on orthodox thinkers who would often align
themselves with one or other of these schools. Each school viewed itself as a complete system and superior guide to reality in which the realization of mokṣa often played an important role. Thus, although the six schools were united in their opposition to certain aspects of non-orthodox thought, all the schools vigorously debated with each other. Hence the philosophical arguments of all the schools, orthodox and non-orthodox alike, were developed in relation to the counter-arguments of rival schools. So, while each school might have developed its own distinctive terminology, such close rivalry indicates a common philosophical platform. In addition to this, all the schools developed within a common cultural milieu (see Chapter One, below). Thus, the philosophical arguments of all the schools are understandable only in the context of their philosophical rivalry with each other and their shared cultural presuppositions.

My intention in this thesis is to present:

(1) A study of the concept of ātman (Self) in just one of the saṃkṣaṇa, the Nyāya system, focusing on the arguments articulated in its defence in one particular work, the Ātmatattvaviveka, written by Udayana in the eleventh century A.D.

This study is the major concern of my thesis, but in order to achieve a comprehensible account of ātman in Udayana's work it has been necessary to consider two further questions:

(2) How Nyāya functions as a complete darsaṇa, i.e. as a system whose function is to lead the
aspirant towards moksha and provide him with an overall view of reality.

(3) The place of Nyāya in the broader cultural context of Indian religious and philosophical thought.

I address these three issues in the belief that the comparative philosopher needs to understand the significance of the arguments within their original context in order to present them accurately and interestingly to a contemporary western audience. A philosopher trained in the western analytical tradition, such as myself, is likely to encounter several problems when he or she undertakes a study of an Indian darśana. A brief look at the way in which Nyāya thought has fared with a western audience is particularly illustrative of some of the central methodological concerns of comparative philosophy.

In recent times the Nyāya system has been the focus of considerable interest for philosophers trained in the western analytical tradition because it is considered to be more technically "philosophical" than some of the other systems, and is especially noted for its contributions to logic and inferential reasoning. This interest of philosophers trained in the western tradition in the more technical literature of Indian philosophy has already proved valuable since it has helped to counteract the tendency of the West to view Indian philosophy as something purely "mystical". This stereotype was the result, firstly, of the fact that the West largely sought the mystical in
India and secondly, that few of the technical texts were widely available in translated form to western philosophers without training in such languages as Sanskrit.

Yet ironically this interest in the logical aspects of Nyāya has led some scholars to claim that Nyāya lacks a genuine concern for soteriological matters, and scant attention is paid to those passages which are not concerned with logic and epistemology. These scholars discount any references to mokṣa as resulting from the fact that, in India, philosophical legitimacy was wedded to a concern with spiritual enlightenment, and hence the Nyāya philosophers sought to gain greater acceptability for their system by this kind of window-dressing. But the preoccupation of Nyāya with logic and epistemology should not in itself lead us to the conclusion that this system has little to do with mokṣa. Rather, what is needed here is an understanding of the role which logical reasoning plays in this particular philosophical system. The exposition of the more technical philosophy of Nyāya needs to proceed hand in hand with a discussion of the place of those ideas within the wider context of Nyāya's claim to be a complete darsāna. In this sense, a fundamental purpose of my thesis is to determine whether the Nyāya system is truly a mokṣamārga (way to release) or whether this is purely a lip-service ideal, while the true structure of the system serves some non-soteriological socio-religious purpose.

Whilst I present this thesis as a philosophical study and will use the tools of modern western philosophical analysis
where this helps to clarify the ideas of the Nyāya philosophers, I intend to be cautious about the ability of such tools to show clearly the full significance of Nyāya thought. A brief survey of comparative philosophy in this century shows the need for such caution.

In this century western philosophers have been especially self-conscious about defining the nature of their discipline, and as they have changed their minds about "what constitutes the proper business of philosophy" their perception of how the study of Indian philosophy should proceed has also changed. Hence scholars of various persuasions have approached the Nyāya system in ways illustrative of their attitude to philosophy and its nature in general, an attitude forged by a century of self-conscious reflection on western philosophical problems. In the earlier part of this century some philosophers set out to "purify" philosophy of its cultural and historical accretions. Bertrand Russell declared that the purely philosophical attitude is one in which:

> without regard to dates or influences, we seek simply to discover what are the great types of possible philosophies, and guide ourselves in the search by investigating the systems advocated by the great philosophers of the past ... And since the philosophies of the past belong to one or another of a few great types — types which in our own day are perpetually recurring — we may learn, from examining the greatest representative of any type, what are the grounds for such a philosophy. (Russell (1937) p. xii Preface)

Later on Russell states that, "Philosophic truth and falsehood, in short, rather than historical fact, are what primarily demand attention in this enquiry" (As above). The argument
that it is possible to abstract philosophical thought from all cultural context, that philosophical problems are somehow "universal", was one reason why many philosophers in the west concentrated on problems in logic, language and epistemology, and turned away from metaphysical speculations in the belief that these were more dependent upon culturally bound theological and cosmological propositions. We see this especially in the work of the logical positivists. Such philosophers, whether examining their own philosophical past or that of another culture, tended to concentrate on those ideas which were felt to contribute to contemporary analytical debate. As a result, Indian philosophy was at first largely ignored by this type of philosopher, leaving its study to those who retained a professional interest in more religious, metaphysical and existential problems. Once it became widely known, however, that Indian philosophy too contained a great deal of rigorous, "hard-core" philosophical analysis, a new interpretive danger arose, the danger that analytical philosophers would take an interest in Indian philosophy but once again study it in light of their own understanding of what constitutes legitimate philosophical debate. Put simply, we can say that Indian philosophy has been mistakenly characterized as "mystical" and "metaphysical" by western idealist philosophers of the nineteenth century and their successors, and is now perhaps being interpreted for its interest in logical and linguistic questions which are currently raised in western philosophical circles. In this approach there is little regard for
understanding Indian philosophy in terms of its own intrinsic values and concerns.

In very recent times there has been a change of attitude in the western tradition and once again the interests of philosophy have broadened to include historical and cultural issues. In such works as Barry Stroud's recent study of David Hume [Stroud (1977)] we have a good example of how philosophers are adopting a broader approach to their subject. The philosophical study of our own past in the West is similar to the philosophical study of another culture since both studies take the philosopher into an alien intellectual environment. Stroud's study has resulted in a significant departure from the standard interpretation of Hume, and his methodological considerations contain important lessons for the cross-cultural philosopher.

In the first place, he points out that the reasoning behind the positivists' distinction between a priori and empirical analysis is itself now philosophically suspect, being "based on an epistemological and semantical theory that is now largely discredited" [Stroud (1977) p. 8]. Hence the programme of the positivists:

rests on the questionable assumption of a clear and recognizable distinction between a priori and empirical investigations, and on the further contention that philosophy falls on the a priori side of the line. Only the positivists' confidence in that distinction allowed them to make such sweeping claims about the history of philosophy. It is true that Hume himself distinguishes between knowledge based on 'relations among ideas' and knowledge of 'matters of fact', and that was taken as precursor of the positivists' distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. But Hume would
certainly deny that philosophy, or what he is writing in the Treatise and Enquiries, is a priori, or is based on 'relations among ideas' alone. A purely a priori mode of philosophizing is precisely what he is trying to supplant in recommending the experimental method of reasoning for investigating the nature of man. [Stroud (1977) p. 7]

In the second place, because many philosophers have used this distinction between a priori and empirical analysis to be selective in their reading of Hume, they have mistakenly characterized him as arch skeptic and a purely negative philosopher. Stroud argues that we should take seriously Hume's self proclaimed interest in giving a general empirical theory of human nature, rather than dismiss large portions of his work as being amateur attempts at psychology and hence of no interest to the professional philosopher. In the eighteenth century when Hume was writing there was no clear demarcation between philosophy and psychology, and Stroud argues that for a philosopher to impose such a distinction now is both arbitrary and misguided. He therefore includes the more psychological portions of Hume's work in his study, and by doing so draws our attention to a more positive and hitherto largely ignored side of Hume's philosophy. Stroud demonstrates convincingly that Hume's scepticism represents only the initial phase of his philosophy for, once Hume has undermined the role of reason in human life as traditionally understood, he then proceeds with the more positive side of his philosophy which is to explain our most fundamental beliefs about the world on the basis of the nature of our experience and natural dispositions of the human mind. In
this way Stroud has given us an account of Hume's philosophy more in accord with Hume's original intentions and clearly his broader approach is a better tool for understanding Hume's work as a whole. Even if the positivists' distinction between a priori and empirical analysis could be defended, their characterization of Hume as a sceptic cannot. This would be to confuse the "doing" of philosophy, according to a particular view of what constitutes legitimate philosophizing, with the historical study of a major philosophical thinker where the aim is to present a comprehensive survey of the person's ideas. The presence of certain arguments in Hume's work similar to those employed by the positivists does not therefore justify them taking these arguments out of context and using them to include Hume among their philosophical number.

Philosophers who work with more than one culture are now beginning to encounter problems similar to those that Stroud found in many of the contemporary studies of Hume. The first problem, Stroud's disenchantment with analytical philosophy, is paralleled by a more general disenchantment on the part of philosophers working across traditions who are beginning to realize that the tools used in western philosophical analysis may be flawed. Stroud's difficulty with analytical philosophy is but a specific illustration of a broader problem — that philosophy is not a static discipline but is constantly evolving new ways of "philosophizing", some of which may prove to be fallible or limited in their usefulness.
In a sub-discipline, such as logic for example, there has been a continuous development in the way in which logical analysis is done. Such changes in a discipline obviously influence the way in which philosophers working in the field engage in cross-cultural studies. Unfortunately, as Douglas Daye has pointed out, developments that take place in western philosophy often take longer to filter through to cross-cultural studies:

My first hypothesis is that there is at least a 15-year lead time between certain developments in Western logic and their subsequent incorporation in interpretations of Buddhist logic. For example, interest in ideal-language methodology stemming from analyses such as those of Russell and Carnap, were not "picked up" in the studies of Buddhist logic until 1950 although the machinery was available in the 1920's and 1930's: it was only incorporated by Indological studies in the 1950's and the middle 1960's. However, during the 1930's with such writers as Randle, Keith and Stcherbatsky, all were still using the (so-called) "Post Classical" Syllogistic logic with which to describe the Indian schemas. Also there was very little discussion of the philosophies of logic on either side of the comparison in such studies. [Daye (1981) p. 63]

Daye goes on to point out that in the literature of contemporary cross-cultural studies there is little sign of the demise of the ideal language methodology which took place over ten years ago in western philosophy. Comparative scholars need a rigorous training if cross-cultural studies are to avoid the air of being "old-fashioned". In addition to a philosophical training that includes an understanding of the latest developments in the field, the scholar also needs specialized language skills as well as a more general knowledge of the cultures involved. Acquiring these necessary skills can be
problematic especially in the context of western academic institutions, and until such time as there are enough adequately trained individuals, the collaboration between Indologists and philosophers may be a possible solution.\textsuperscript{12}

Stroud's second point is that even if the presuppositions of analytical philosophy were well-founded, this does not mean in itself that Hume's work is fully explicable in these terms. This point is also applicable to cross-cultural studies. Just as in Hume's day there was no clear demarcation between philosophy and psychology, so too in Indian thought there is no clear demarcation between philosophy, religion and psychology.

A philosopher who insists on such a clear demarcation will be unable to give a satisfactory account of Indian thought. However sophisticated a philosopher's training in western philosophy, he or she needs to be fully considerate that the "divergent developments in the sociology of knowledge in India and the Anglo-European-Greek lineage" \cite{Daye1981} may limit the usefulness of such training in an analysis of Indian thought. Again, the field of cross-cultural logic provides us with a good example. Unlike modern western logic, in India the division between logic and mathematics was severe\textsuperscript{13} and it is difficult to translate the psychologism and metaphysical assumptions which are part of Indian logic into a formal mathematical language. Such attempts often obscure the point of the argument\textsuperscript{14} or are disappointing in their results inasmuch as they do little to help the philosopher appreciate the real significance of a particular argument. In her book
An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of "Exists", Charlene McDer-mott presents the arguments of Ratnakīrti (a Buddhist opponent of the Nyāya philosophers) in a formal manner resulting in the following comment from David Seyfort Ruegg, one of her reviewers:

While it would seem that the means brought to bear in this volume may not wholly suffice for an explicit philosophical 'defense of the Buddhist position', it does not seem either that the formal problem was per se particularly obscure and in need of being explicated by the 'utilization of formal logical structures'. What is on the contrary in need of explication is the systematic context .... and also the historic context in which the systematic problems fit. [Ruegg (1970 p. 307]

In his recent work, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge, Bimal K. Matilal has noted just such a puzzlement on the part of a contemporary western philosopher unfamiliar with the Indian tradition. He was asked by Arthur Danto in private correspondence as to the exact relationship between the quest for mokṣa, supposedly the main goal of the ancient Indian philosophers, and the highly technical arguments which Matilal had brought to his attention. When Indian philosophy is discussed out of context, "sanitized" as if it were just one more view being presented at some contemporary philosophical conference, it might be all too easy to overlook such questions. When, however, the cultural milieu of those philosophers is recalled, this kind of puzzlement becomes very real. As Matilal himself says, "How do these questions become relevant here at all?" [Matilal (1986) p. 17]. Hence philosophers working with different traditions need a broad conception of their task if
they are to understand Indian thought in terms which are intelligible to the western intellectual tradition but which do not distort the material. In my thesis I have always tried to trace the roots of the arguments back to the Upaniṣadīc tradition, and indeed begin my thesis with an introductory chapter on Upaniṣadīc philosophy. I have included such passages not just for the benefit of readers unfamiliar with Indian philosophy but because only by relating the later technical developments to the much earlier Upaniṣadīc speculations can we begin to understand the meaningfulness of the debate for the original protagonists.

In cross-cultural philosophy Stroud's approach is mirrored by those who insist that in order to understand Indian thought philosophers have to broaden their intellectual base. This is clearly illustrated in the work of Steven Collins who argues at the beginning of his book on the Buddhist notion of the person that:

...philosophical reflection should not proceed in abstraction from intellectual history and anthropology, from the investigation and comparison of cultures. Just as anthropology hopes, by means of the ethnographic study of other societies, eventually to illuminate both the specific nature of our own society and the general nature of all societies, so I think that philosophy should hope eventually to illuminate both the specific nature of its own inherent concerns and presuppositions and perhaps the general nature of human thought (if such exists) by studying the intellectual history of its own, and other traditions. [Collins (1982) p. 1]

This type of approach is particularly important when the subject of investigation is a concept such as ātman which is so closely bound up with the beliefs and institutions of a
particular society. There are certain concepts in any society, those which Geertz calls "experience-near concepts", which people use so naturally and spontaneously that "they do not, except fleetingly and on occasion, recognize that there are any 'concepts' involved at all" [Geertz (1983) p. 58].

Philosophers are often accused of presuming that the categories with which they operate are somehow natural:

No doubt, in so far as the philosophers suppose themselves to be working a priori, purely by means of reasoning from first principles, they exemplify the characteristic error of non-sociologists who, unaware of the history and pre-history of the fundamental notions with which they operate, naively regard them as natural. [Allen in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1985) p. 30]

Philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists have pondered the question of whether there are any categories which are necessary and hence universal to human thought, but to naively presuppose that the western categories of thought such as "person", "self", "individual" et cetera are universal can lead to a great deal of ambiguity and confusion when investigating a culture other than one's own. These concepts are very much rooted in our culture and its history and we should not presume their direct equivalents in other societies. This is especially the case when studying Indian culture where the organization of its society into castes, for example, is so different from our societal institutions. The work of Louis Dumont has shown that a true understanding of the caste system is possible only when we leave behind our preconceived notions of what it means to be an individual.15
Although a western philosopher may detect something of a Cartesian element in the Nyāya view of the Ātman ("self") or a Humean element in the Buddhist view of anātman ("no-self"), a philosopher who presumes from the outset that "Ātman" and "self" are direct equivalents is liable to make comparisons in which the supposed Indian concept of "self" is a chimera. The concept of self is not a fixed entity that "pops up" in different cultures where thinkers can affirm or deny it, but rather it is a culturally determined idea, an organic part of the presuppositions and concerns of a particular culture. Hence a broader understanding of the cultures from which such notions as "self" and "Ātman" derive is a task prior to valid comparative philosophy.

Given the critical nature of the philosophical discipline, it is only to be expected that the study of Indian philosophy is often wedded to a critical assessment of the views found therein. Indeed, it is this which makes such studies attractive to most contemporary philosophers. Whilst in the preceding comments I have been concerned to show the complexities involved in treating this subject matter and the need for caution in the application of tools of contemporary philosophical analysis, it seems inevitable that a philosopher with an analytical background will engage upon the tasks of comparison and criticism:

For while the basic philosophical motivation of the ancients might have been very different from those of present-day philosophers, several important questions do seem to coincide to a considerable extent with those discussed today. [Matilal (1968) p. 2]
There will always be a tension between the accurate presentation of the classical theories of Indian philosophy and their critical assessment and comparison with modern theories. Obviously before a philosophical system can be assessed it must be understood and hence the balance should be weighted heavily towards a careful analysis of the texts. It would be unrealistic to expect a philosopher to transcend his or her intellectual background and in my thesis it is obvious, I think, that my training in analytical philosophy has been central for my understanding of the texts involved. I have also engaged in some comparative work and I hope this has served to present the material in a way which makes it interesting for the western philosopher yet is fair to the material involved.
Chapter One

THE UPANIŚADIC BACKGROUND

In the last decade, some of us have become increasingly aware that modern individualism, when seen against the background of the other great civilizations that the world has known, is an exceptional phenomenon.
Louis Dumont (1985) p. 93

The Nyāya philosopher, in common with most of the other philosophers of India, accepted as fundamental a world view which can be mapped out by means of the following three ideas:

(1) saṁsāra, the round of rebirth; the cycle of temporal existence, usually associated with the experience of suffering.

(2) karma, a significant action; actions, both good and bad, result in appropriate retribution, a principle which provides fuel for the saṁsāric process.

(3) mokṣa, liberation from the plane of existence circumscribed by the saṁsāra/karma dyad.

Together these ideas form a view of man's place in the world which became the sine qua non for nearly all post-Upaniṣadic religious speculation. The problems of existence to which philosophers addressed themselves, such as how to escape an endless cycle of birth and death were generated by this framework of beliefs. There were some schools of thought, such as the materialist Cārvāka school, that rejected this bedrock of beliefs, and posited a radical alternative in which the traditional problems of existence made no sense. Such schools, however, did not ultimately survive. So crucial was this set of beliefs to Indian thought that Weber declared it to be one of
"the rare dogmatic beliefs of Hinduism". Its acceptance went beyond the boundaries of the orthodox schools of Hinduism, for it lies at the heart of non-orthodox schools such as Buddhism and Jainism too. Dumont's comment on the Buddha's teaching that "without transmigration the liberation or extinction which he recommends would lose all meaning" [Dumont (1980) p. 277] would also hold true of most Indian religious thought.

The ideas that together make up this world view which seems so much part of Indian thought were formed in northern India during the first millennium B.C. This was a period of great upheaval associated with the breakdown of the old tribal institutions of the Aryans, as society became increasingly urbanized and specialized. Such major societal changes led to an upsurge in religious creativity which resulted not only in the transformation of the sacrificial Vedic religion of the Aryans into something more recognizably "Hindu", but also in the formation of two new major religious traditions in India, Buddhism and Jainism.

The Upaniṣads, texts composed over a period of several hundred years from about 800 B.C., record the major changes which took place in Vedic thought during this time from a sacrificial and mythological idiom to one which was more speculative and "philosophical". Although the Upaniṣads introduce important new ideas into Indian speculation, at the same time they show a significant continuity with the Brāhmaṇas (Vedic texts composed by the orthodox priests which dealt specifically with ritual performance and meaning). Certainly the Upaniṣads include
The Upaniṣadic Background

important contributions made by thinkers other than the orthodox priests — kings such as Jaivali Pravahana (B.U. VI ii), women such as Gārgī Vacaknavī (B.U. III viii), ascetics such as the wandering vrātyas — but a careful reading of the Upaniṣads and Brāhmaṇas shows that such material was incorporated into changes that were already developing from the logic of the Vedic sacrificial world view.

This cultural heritage provided the framework against which Nyāya activity took place. We have also seen that some contemporary commentators, such as Daya Krishna (see Introduction footnote 7), question the relevance of this complex of ideas to the actual philosophy of the Naiyāyikas. Whilst the interests of the Nyāya philosophers sometimes seem to stray from this cultural heritage, I intend to show that this world view forms an integral and important aspect of their system. The Upaniṣads, though still tied to a sacrificial idiom, developed a conceptual apparatus crucial to our understanding of Indian philosophy in general, and the Nyāya system in particular. The Upaniṣadic categories of saṁsāra, karma, and mokṣa were especially important in shaping the intellectual vocabulary of the Nyāya and other Indian philosophers. I shall now discuss each of these in turn.

Saṁsāra

The Upaniṣads introduce to Indian philosophy the view that an individual's destiny is to be one of repeated rebirth into the world unless some means of escape is found.

In the Brāhmaṇas the correct performance of the sacrifice
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could win for the practitioner firstly, amṛtam (non-dying, which in the case of human beings means a full life) and secondly, rebirth into the devaloka (world of the gods) after death. Just as worldly life had to come to an end, so too did life in the devaloka, and we find the development of the idea that the end of man's sojourn in that world was brought about by his return to earth. In the B.U. and C.U., where the idea of saṃsāra is first introduced, its manner of presentation is full of allusions to the brahmanical sacrifice (C.U. V x verses 1-10 and B.U. VI ii verses 13-15). The Upaniṣadic doctrine of transmigration is a development out of brahmanical sacrificial thought itself and thus represents a transition from the Brāhmaṇas to the fully fledged doctrines of classical Hinduism. The exact mechanism of the process, just what it is that transmigrates and the attainment of a final state which transcends all spatio-temporal context are still not clearly articulated. These are all options left open which were taken up and made more precise by the later Indian schools such as Nyāya.

Karma

Another central belief of Indian thought, the idea that the quality of future lives is governed by present actions, is one which makes its appearance from the time of the Upaniṣads, onwards. In the B.U., when Yājñāvalkya is questioned by Ārtabhāga as to the whereabouts of a man after his death and dissolution, Yājñāvalkya introduces him to the idea that by good works a man becomes good and by evil works he becomes evil (B.U.
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III ii verse 13).  

Again, the relevance of ideas already present in the Brāhmaṇas should not be overlooked. In the Brāhmaṇas, karma is a central idea but its meaning there is much more specific, being confined to ritual actions performed during a sacrifice. Such actions were believed to have great power since the correct performance of the sacrifice sustained the order of the universe —this power being an automatic consequence dependent only on the ritual being carried out correctly. The re-creation of the individual after his death in another loka is also an important theme in the Brāhmaṇas —an example of future life being governed by actions in the present, although in this case by a priest on the individual’s behalf (Kausitaki Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad II vi).

The broader meaning that karma has in classical Hinduism represents an extension of the power associated with ritual action to all actions, or conversely, all our actions become ritualized. This extension came about partly as a result of developments in sacrificial thought which placed more emphasis on the interior aspects of the sacrifice and partly as a result of the attempt by brahmanical priests to incorporate various ascetic practices into the schema of sacrificial thought (see pp. 40-41 below). The teachings of the Buddha with their ethical emphasis were also an important influence on brahmanical thought. His ethical interpretation of karma gave it a more universal meaning in contrast to the physicalist understanding found in the Brāhmaṇas and early Upaniṣads, where karma was bound up with the
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sustaining power of the sacrificial mechanism.

In later Indian philosophy the concept of karma became a crucial point of debate, especially between the Buddhist and orthodox schools. Although both parties accepted karma as an operative principle and needed to accommodate it within their respective systems, they dealt with the questions left unanswered by the Upaniṣads —such as how karma is actually carried forward from one life to the next— in markedly different ways. The arguments between the Nyāya school and the Buddhists were particularly vigorous on this issue. The Nyāya philosophers saw karma to be a crucial element in the defence of their particular anthropology —an anthropology wedded to the beliefs of an eternal ātman and the discreteness of personal identity— against the Buddhist contention that ethical causality and retribution could be explained without relying on a concept of "self". Indeed, according to the Buddhists, not only was this a possible explanation but also an ethically superior one.

Mokṣa

Whilst the Vedic hymns celebrated the joys of life, the Upaniṣads increasingly developed a disdain for things of this world, culminating in the extreme worldly pessimism of the Maitrī Upaniṣad (I verses 1-4). Although we read of the Upaniṣadic sages competing against each other in verbal contests for gold and cattle (B.U. III i verse 1), more and more, such worldly possessions are characterized as being merely transitory and of no ultimate worth —a reflection, perhaps, of the tumultuous
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changes taking place in society at that time. The doctrine of transmigration which was developing alongside this increasing pessimism hence condemned the individual to an endless repetition of suffering and disappointment with death offering no solution.

The main concern of the Upaniṣads was therefore to find a solution to the problem generated by this world view, and repeatedly we see individuals, in search of release from their worldly condition, passing-up the offer of worldly goods in favour of spiritual instruction.⁶

The worldly pessimism pervading the Upaniṣads was taken up with varying degrees by later Indian philosophers. The urgency of the spiritual quest which we see in the Upaniṣads was balanced against the need for the preservation of order in society and the value of the worldly life. In later texts, such as the Laws of Manu, we see an attempt to counter the urgency of the Upaniṣadic teachings by making the individual's quest for mokṣa subservient to the needs of society as a whole.⁷ I aim to demonstrate that the "intellectualism" of the Nyāya school was another such attempt to contain the potential anarchy and spiritual egalitarianism implied by the Upaniṣadic teachings.

The Upaniṣadic teachings concerning the nature of mokṣa and the means by which to attain it are again typically fluid, showing a speculative rather than a dogmatic approach. At first, the logic of sacrificial thought governed their approach to the problem, but gradually we see the Upaniṣadic thinkers evolving new ways of thinking which took them further from the sacrificial idiom. This can be seen from an examination of some of the
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elements crucial to the Upanisadic understanding of mokṣa.

Knowledge in the Upaniṣads

In the fully fledged doctrine of the Upaniṣads, the escape from repeated birth and death, or any kind of temporally bound existence, is declared to be man's final goal. Just as we see elements of the transmigratory doctrine in the development of the Vedic sacrifice, so we can discern in the Upaniṣadic conception of final release ideas which have also evolved out earlier Vedic thought.

The way in which final release is to be attained is by means of knowledge, knowledge of brahman, the abiding principle underlying the changing universe. Moreover, and this is one of the great Upaniṣadic insights, in equating brahman, the underlying principle of the universe, with ātman, the underlying principle of the individual, this saving knowledge is brought within human grasp. These beliefs in the power of knowledge, the possibility of knowing one thing through knowing another, reveal the strongest possible link between the Upaniṣads and Brāhmaṇas, not only in matters of specific doctrine but also the wider sense of sharing the same epistemological framework.

The importance of knowledge in Upaniṣadic thought and understanding of the specialized nature of the knowledge involved were points first emphasized by Franklin Edgerton:

What I am now concerned with is a more general and more fundamental matter, and one which has been commonly ignored by modern writers, both Hindu and western. The
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I refer to the instinctive and unquestioning belief in the inherent power of knowledge, as such, which underlies the whole intellectual fabric of the Upaniṣads, as it appears to me, and furnishes the motive force behind their speculations. Typical passages found constantly in all parts of them seem to me to make it abundantly clear that the reason why they seek the "truth", any truth, is precisely this, that by knowledge of the truth they expect to master their destiny, wholly or partly; and not by any course of action dictated by that knowledge itself; in brief we may say magically. [Edgerton (1929) pp. 97-98]

By the time of the Brāhmaṇas, the Vedic sacrifice had developed from a ritual whose successful outcome depended upon propitiating the gods to one in which success was assured by the ritual's correct performance. The sacrifice could either compel the gods to do what the sacrificer desired or could produce the desired result directly without any supernatural intermediary. The gods themselves merely became part of a spatio-temporal world whose order and enduring existence were dependent upon and manufactured by the regular performance of the sacrifice. This was because the sacrifice was thought to emulate the original act of creation, which was itself a sacrifice. In the myth of the Puruṣa Sūkta (Ṛg Veda X xc), we are told of the sacrifice of the Primal Man performed by the gods, from which the world arose. Creation therefore, coming originally from a sacrificial act, was regenerated only through repeated performances of the sacrifice at the human level. Hence, for example, the performance of the fire sacrifice at both dawn and dusk, in correspondence with the rising and setting of the sun, was carried out in order to ensure the orderly progression of days and nights.
In what way did the brahmanical priests think that the sacrifice achieved its end? A closer look at the Puruṣa Śūkta reveals the kind of reasoning involved. There, appropriately enough, we find that in answer to the question, "When they divided Primal Man into how many parts did they divide him?", it is said:

The Brahman was his mouth, The arms were made the Prince, His thighs the common people, And from his feet the serf was born./ From his mind the moon was born, And from his eye the sun, From his mouth Indra and the fire, From his breath the wind was born./ From his navel arose the atmosphere, From his head the sky evolved, From his feet the earth, and from his ear the cardinal points of the compass: So did they fashion forth these worlds. (Ṛg Veda X xc verses 12-14)

This hymn, having identified puruṣa with the universe, goes on to systematically correlate the various features of the universe with the different parts of puruṣa. The puruṣa is an appropriate reference point by means of which identities established between him and the universe can at the same time be ranked into some kind of hierarchy. Thus, for example, the hierarchical nature of society is appropriately reflected in a symbolism which relates the śūdras (the servile class) to his feet, the vaiśyas (the artisan class) to his thighs, the kṣatriyas (the warrior class) to his arms, and the brāhmans (the priestly class) to his mouth.

Although the idea of creation as sacrifice is one which appears repeatedly throughout the Vedas, the symbolism of this hymn is important for its all-embracing logic which relates the natural, human and divine aspects of creation to the phenomenon of the sacrifice. The linking by systematic identities of the different orders of creation was not thought to be merely a matter of
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convention, but rather the discovery of some natural and essential connection. Those who knew the analogues between the sacrifice and other levels of reality had a method whereby they could bring creation under their control. This analogical basis to the efficacy of the sacrifice became the basis of an increasing priestly power. The priests were not just officials performing the sacrifice on behalf of wealthy patrons, but were the custodians of ritual secrets, knowledge of which made them the powerful masters of the cosmos. Knowledge became imbued with a magical power, to know the sacrificial equivalent of any phenomenon was to have power over it. This explains why in the Brāhmaṇas we see such a preoccupation with establishing the ritual's equivalences. Also, it must be remembered that this interpretation of the sacrifice was part of a more widespread pattern of belief which made use of spells and incantations for the achievement of every kind of human desire. These formulae were recorded in the fourth book of the Vedas, the Atharva Veda, and it is interesting to note that this was also the most speculative book of the Vedas. The speculative nature of the Atharva Veda is no mere accident since it represents an extension of the logic underlying the belief in the efficacy of spells and incantations to more metaphysical areas. A large portion of Upaniṣadic thought is very clearly prefigured in the speculations of the Atharva Veda and on closer inspection the doctrines of the Upaniṣads also reveal a pattern of thought whose logic is the same as that which underlies the magical thought of the Atharva Veda.
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As Franklin Edgerton has cogently argued, the rationale behind this pattern of thought is based upon a belief in the power of knowledge. This power which was attributed to knowledge is often called "magical" because it is the very act of knowing that is effective rather than being able to do something because of that knowledge:

The knowledge of a procedure, its psychic image, is magically connected to the procedure. The knower, precisely thru the fact that he knows, — not because thru his knowledge he acts skillfully and correctly, but by reason of the power of the knowledge itself .... possesses power over the entity known. [Oldenberg (1919) p. 5 quoted in Edgerton (1929) p. 98]

This belief is the basis of those Vedic incantations whose efficacy lies in grasping the name of the object to be manipulated (for example Atharva Veda VII xii verse 2). Yet it is also operative in those early metaphysical speculations which seek to identify the underlying principle of the universe. The sacrifice, the use of spells, and the metaphysical quest are all therefore connected. Just as the relationship between the sacrifice and the world was considered to be a natural efficacious connection, so was the relationship between language and the world. They are all based on a logic of equivalences which gives power to those who know the identities to control one of the pair by means of their knowledge of the other. Hence those who know the sacrificial analogues have power to control the natural world through their knowledge of the sacrifice, and those who know the "real" name of an object have power over that object in virtue of knowing its name. Moreover, this power of language became important in the sacrifice itself and increased
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the importance of the use of sound in the sacrifice. The hymns became fixed formulae to be sung according to a strict meter and they became chants imbued with an efficacious power all of their own.

This emphasis on knowledge pushed to its extreme implication would have endangered the actual performance of the sacrifice for, when knowledge becomes the all-important element, a mental re-enactment of the ritual would of itself be efficacious. Although the physical performance of the sacrifice wasn't usurped in this way, we constantly read in the Brāhmaṇas that he who performs the ritual "knowing thus" (evāṁ vidvān) obtains the benefit. This is an idea that is also ever present in early Upaniṣadic thought (B.U. IV i verse 2). Conversely, the performance of the ritual without the appropriate knowledge becomes a dangerous enterprise (C.U. I xi verse 4). Elsewhere, in the B.U., we read of the unfortunate Śākalya whose ignorance resulted in his head falling off and robbers making away with his bones (B.U. III ix verse 26).

We conclude then, that the philosophy underlying the Vedic sacrifice became increasingly "magical":

Here is, if you like, a true "blend"; but not a blend between magic and philosophy. Rather, a blend between ritual religion on the one hand and magical philosophy or philosophic magic on the other. And in this blend, ritualistic religion is the moribund element. Magical philosophy constantly tends to get the upper hand. [Edgerton (1929) pp. 107-108]

Many aspects of Upaniṣadic thinking are essentially a continuation of the earlier Vedic sacrificial thought. We find in the early Upaniṣads the same belief in the power of knowledge:
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Now, there are verily, three worlds, the world of men, the world of the fathers, and the world of the gods. The world of men is to be obtained through the son alone, .... the world of the fathers by works (rites), the world of the gods by knowledge. The world of the gods is verily the best of the worlds. Therefore they praise knowledge. (B.U. I v verses 16-17)

We find in many places the same belief in the special power of language, of knowing the identity of something:

_Brahman_, indeed, this was in the beginning. It knew itself only as "I am Brahman". Therefore it became all .... This is so even now. Whoever knows thus, "I am Brahman", becomes this all. (B.U. I iv verse 10)

and:

Whoever knows that this quarter of brahman is in four parts and that it is called the "luminous", whoever reveres it as such, himself becomes luminous in this world. Yes, whoever thus knows that this quarter of brahman is in four parts and that it is called the "luminous", whoever reveres it as such, wins for himself luminous states of being (loka). (C.U. IV v verse 3)

The same belief in the theory of equivalences persists also into the early Upaniṣads. Yājñavalkya, when defending his right to drive away king Janaka's cows, gave instructions on the ritual equivalences:

"Yājñavalkya" said he, "since everything here is pervaded by death, since everything is overcome by death, by what means does the sacrificer free himself from the reach of death?" (Yājñavalkya said) "By the hotṛ priest, by speech. Verily speech is the hotṛ of sacrifice. That which is this speech is this fire. This fire is hotṛ. This is freedom, this is complete freedom." (B.U. III i verse 3)

The Upaniṣadic thinkers in their quest for release from the temporal world sought knowledge of the identity of that which transcended that world, something which was not subject to birth or death, not subject to suffering and something which was not
subject to change. The basic logic underlying such a quest represents an extension of the logic underlying the quest for the correct sacrificial analogues.

The identification of this entity as brahman is again something which evolved out of Vedic thought. The term "brahman" seems originally to have meant a sacred utterance or incantation, and gradually came to signify the power residing in the utterance which was responsible for its efficacy. Brahman was thus the natural choice for those seeking some unifying principle underlying the whole of creation.

It is at this point that the Upaniṣadic tradition begins to break away from Vedic sacrificial thought. One would expect that the final identification of the underlying principle of the universe as "brahman" would yield power over all to those who know this identification. The seekers of such knowledge, however, do not stop their search at this point but go on to identify brahman with an equivalent entity. The further identification of brahman with ātman, the underlying principle of every individual (C.U. III xiv verses 3-5 for example), is also obviously an extension of Vedic analogical reasoning. Yet what this does is to introduce a new experiential dimension into Upaniṣadic thought. When, for example, Yājñavalkya is discoursing to an assembly of priests in a bid to win a herd of cows, we can detect a new insistent desire for a more immediate kind of knowledge among some of his questioners. Uṣasta Cākrāyana asked him:

"explain to me the brahman that is immediately present
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and directly perceived who is the self in all things." (B.U. III iv verse 1)

The equating of brahman with ātman is not therefore just a theoretical proposition but one which suggests the possibility of experiencing brahman. From this time onwards we find a great deal of Upaniṣadic thought is concerned to identify just exactly which experiential aspect of the individual is equivalent to brahman—it is not enough to know brahman, the aim is rather to know that one is brahman:

...But the man who does not desire, he who is without desire, who is freed from desire, whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is the self, his breaths do not depart. Being brahman, he goes to brahman (brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti). (B.U. IV iv verse 6)

Thus we find in the Upaniṣads long discourses on sleeping, dreaming and death, since these seem to be states of being that in some way transcend the limitations and sufferings of the world. Eventually in the Māndūkya Upaniṣad, a fourfold classification of states of consciousness is arrived at, namely: waking, dreaming, deep sleep and turīya or fourth state in which brahman is directly realized. Once the experience of brahman is taken out of the range of normal everyday states of consciousness the need for specialized yogic practice becomes necessary. Hence the immediacy lies in the fact that knowledge of brahman is experiential but it is now an experience which is hard to attain.

Thus we see in the Upaniṣads a shift away from the ritualistic knowledge of the Vedas to an experiential knowledge. The adept is not so much one who knows as one who experiences. This distinction is obviously not a clear one, for sacrificial
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thought still informs these later developments. The reason for this shift in the Upaniṣads probably came from factors external to the Vedic sacrifice (previously alluded to on p. 18) namely the social changes of the newly urban world of northern India in the sixth century B.C. which conspired to reduce the group solidarity of the old tribal units. This meant that there was a demand for solutions which helped the aspirant transcend the limitations of this newly created social order where each person faced the problems of the world alone rather than as part of a larger unit. With the breakdown of the old world of meaning, individual persons (used here descriptively) sought psychologically satisfying answers to perennial problems in terms of religious experience and metaphysical propositions capable of standing up to the sort of criticisms more cosmopolitan thinkers might level. For any solution to be satisfactory the aspirant would need to experience something that did indeed take him beyond the limitations of the social world. This was the impetus behind the quest to "be brahman".

Because of this, ritualistic knowledge becomes in the Upaniṣads more of an experiential knowledge. To know that brahman was the unifying principle of the universe, and to know that brahman was the equivalent to the ātman, was insufficient unless these formulae were realized at the experiential level. One might see here a similarity to Russell's distinction between "knowing that" and "knowledge by acquaintance". Brahman was to be known in the same way that one can know other things in the range of personal experience, that is, it was to be known by
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acquaintance. The analogy does not completely hold, however, because of the very nature of mokṣa. To experience the equivalence of ātman and brahmaṇ is to enter into a state of being in which the preconditions for what would normally constitute knowing do not exist, that is, the distinction between knower and object of knowledge. As Yājñavalkya says in his final answer to Uśasta Cākṛāyana:

"How should you see the seer of seeing? How should you hear the hearer of hearing? How should you think on the thinker of thought? How should you understand (vijñā-) the understander of understanding? This Self that indwells in all things is in you. What is other than it suffers". Then Uśasta Cākṛāyana held his peace. (B.U. III iv verses 1-2)16

Language

To characterize the Upaniṣadic belief in the power of knowledge as "magical" implies that Upaniṣadic thinkers were fundamentally mistaken about the nature of the world, given the common interpretations of magical thought. Hence we need to be aware of our own presuppositions about magical thought and examine more closely the nature of this Upaniṣadic belief.

Most modern anthropologists have rejected the Frazerian account of magic which reduced the practice of magic to two principles, those of homeopathy and contagion,17 both of which are empirical beliefs about the world which happen to be false but which might have been true. More recent interpretations of magical thought base it upon a misconception about the relationship between nature and culture. In this analysis, magical thought is seen to be based upon a misunderstanding of
the relation between language or symbolism and the world. There are two versions of this so-called symbolic account of magic, the first of which still seems Frazerian in nature. According to this version, the magician sees the symbolic action and the resulting event as two distinct entities, in which the former has some kind of causal power to produce the latter. On this account the symbolic enactment in the sacrifice brings about a corresponding change in the world. According to the second version, known as the identificationist version, there is no such distinction for it takes:

its ultimate logic to be that of identification, so that the ideal-typical magician takes himself to be really performing the action which he symbolically enacts. He does not therefore, envisage two distinct events, the rite and the effect, with some kind of causal relationship between them. [Skorupski (1976) p. 141]

In this interpretation the symbol participates in the reality which it represents; symbols are taken to be their objects, and there is no clear distinction between the symbol and the thing symbolized. On this account the symbolic enactment is itself the creative act. John Skorupski, who offers an account of this identificationist version of the symbolic theory of magic, thinks it offers some understanding of why a symbolic enactment might be thought to be efficacious:

We think and speak in words about things: symbols in contrast stand in for their objects - they make them present to perception and action. The picture associated with the first of these two relationships is one of language which mirrors the world, but remains independent of it. Such pictures are notoriously misleading, but in this case it is precisely the misleading character of the picture which is suggestive. Words in language refer to objects in the
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world. But symbols are objects in the world - which stand in for other objects. The relation between words and things is of conventional reference, in which words somehow got hooked onto things, and the things 'are brought to mind'. The relation between symbols and things is that of conventional identification: symbols are taken to be their objects. The final piece of the jigsaw is an often noted point: namely, that traditional cultures are relatively insensitive to the distinction between the conventionally constituted and the naturally given ... [Skorupski (1976) p. 143]

This type of explanation may seem to provide the correct analysis of Vedic sacrificial thought. The sacrifice was surely based on the belief that the elements of the sacrifice are symbols which stand in for objects symbolized. The use of language, which becomes more and more important in the performance of the ritual, was but an extension of this belief, for words were seen as symbols of the objects to which they referred. Indeed, much earlier than Skorupski, Herman Oldenberg had written of sacrificial thought in the Vedas that:

We should import something foreign into these plays of thought if we attempted to trace in them any sharply defined line of demarcation between the being and the signifying, between the reality and its representative, the one overlaps the other. [Oldenberg (1928) p. 21]

To stop short with this explanation, however, still presupposes that Vedic sacrificial thought rests on an unconscious mistake. The fault in this kind of explanation is that it analyzes so-called magical thought in isolation from any kind of supporting metaphysical context there might be. In Vedic sacrificial thought the blurring of the distinction between nature and convention was not an unconscious confusion. Rather, it was based upon a self-consciously held belief about the nature of the Sanskrit language. Sanskrit was considered to be a perfect
language in which the word and the object were thought to share the same essential nature. They well recognized the conventional nature of the vernacular languages and only favoured Sanskrit with having some essential connection to the world. This belief in the power of the Sanskrit language and its natural relation to the world persists in Upaniṣadic thought. Yet more and more, as interpretations of the Upaniṣads came to favour some form of monistic idealism, this provided a philosophical basis for identities between words and things and for the brahman/ātman equivalence.

Psychology

We have already seen that the Upaniṣads became increasingly concerned with psychological questions once mokṣa was located within the range of human experience.

Sometimes the quest for mokṣa was framed in terms of reaching a particular state of consciousness and earlier Upaniṣadic thinkers were concerned with exploring the range of experiences common to individuals in their everyday life. This led to a threefold classification of human experience into waking, dreaming and deep sleep states of consciousness (B.U. IV iii verses 7-22; C.U. viii-xi). These three were arranged in a hierarchy that conferred greater reality on the dreaming over the waking state, with the greatest reality of all being conferred on the deep sleep state which was seen to resemble most closely the condition of mokṣa. This demotion of the external world was an important theme which was to strongly influence some, but not
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all, of the later Indian systems. Finally, the Upaniṣadic thinkers rejected all three of these states in their quest for the experiential equivalent of mokṣa (C.U. VIII xi verse 2) and postulated a further fourth state of consciousness (turiya). Because of the specialized nature of turiya, mokṣa was removed from the range of experiences easily accessible to the ordinary individual:

Conscious of neither within nor without, nor of both together, not a mass of wisdom, neither wise nor unwise, unseen, one with whom there is no commerce, impalpable, devoid of distinguishing mark, unthinkable, indescribable, its essence the firm conviction of the oneness of itself, bringing all development to an end, tranquil and mild, devoid of all duality, such do they deem this fourth to be. (Māndūkyya Upaniṣad verse 7)\(^{18}\)

At other times the quest was seen more in terms of identifying that entity in each individual which transcended all spatio-temporal limitations and was equivalent to brahman, the underlying principle of the cosmos (B.U. III iv verses 1-2; C.U. III xiv verses 3-5). This meant that the Upaniṣadic thinkers were interested in the individual as a composite entity made up of different elements, one of which was crucial for the attainment of mokṣa. Perhaps the best known analysis is that which occurs in the Katha Upaniṣad where the individual is analyzed as consisting of body (śarīra), senses (indriya), mind (manas), will (buddhi) and the all important transcendental Self (ātman) (Katha Upaniṣad III verses 3-4).

Obviously these two approaches are intimately connected for it is the experience of that transcendental aspect in the individual that constitutes mokṣa:
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the fourth is beyond all letters: there can be no commerce with it; it brings all development to an end; it is mild and devoid of duality. Such is ॐ, the very Self indeed. He who knows this merges of his own accord into the Self, — yes, he who knows this. (Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad verse 12) 

All these speculations were enormously influential for later Indian thought, for they develop a psychological vocabulary and understanding which became a common currency for subsequent philosophers. In a more general way too, Upaniṣadic psychology is considered crucial for the development of classical Hinduism. Following Mauss, many anthropologists have seen a general pattern in the emergence of the great religious traditions of the world:

"... in the evolution of prayer and other religious phenomena the two great currents were spiritualisation (i.e., interiorisation) and individualisation. [Mauss in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1985) p. 35]" These "two great currents" are an important part of the development of Upaniṣadic psychology.

We have already seen that in the development of the Vedic sacrifice the key to its success came to be associated with knowledge, knowing the sacrificial equivalents and knowing how to perform the ritual. Although the rituals continued to be actually performed, this emphasis on knowledge made the "interior" aspects of the sacrifice all important. Logically it would seem that the mental performance of the sacrifice should itself be efficacious. We can see this emphasis at work in the emergence of a new priestly role, that of the brāhman. His role was essentially that of a supervisor, and he had no active part in the ceremony. He performed his role of correction through the
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recitation of appropriate mantras from his place near the main fire altar.  

Once the emphasis was shifted away from the manual portion of the sacrifice, the idea of the inner sacrifice allowed for the assimilation of asceticism into the sacrificial tradition. Indeed, asceticism was no stranger to Vedic thought and had an important role in the sacrifice. In order to prepare for the ritual, the sacrificer had to undergo a period of fasting and meditation, known as the dikṣā ceremony [Hubert and Mauss (1964) p. 20-21]. The practice of asceticism was thought to bestow great power on the ascetic, and the association of asceticism with power (tapas) was a widespread belief which persisted far beyond the time of the Vedas. During the time of the Upaniṣads it seems that many ascetics practiced various forms of austerity, such as breath control, and these were gradually incorporated into the sacrificial idiom. In addition to the interiorisation of the sacrifice, the myth of the Puruṣa Sūkta also aided this process since it provided a mediating link between the Vedic sacrifice and the performance of bodily austerities. The Puruṣa Sūkta had already formulated the body as a site of sacrifice and hence it was natural to replace the physical elements of the sacrifice with the physiological functions of the body (C.U. V xix-xxiv). Yet once again, there is in the Upaniṣads a further development for the role of asceticism beyond the knowledge/power complex that was at the root of the sacrificial idiom. The practice of asceticism was given a new experiential importance once it became part of the psychological framework developed in
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The Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads had moved towards a psychology in which mokṣa was equated with some state of consciousness or transcendental entity that had no discourse with the world. Hence for an individual to achieve mokṣa it was necessary for him to cut the ties that bound him to the world. Asceticism was the means by which the aspirant could overcome the constitutional attraction his senses felt for worldly things, leaving him free to turn his senses inwards and pursue his goal of mokṣa. Asceticism and its role in world renunciation were to remain important themes in later Indian thought.

Regarding the second of the "two great currents", Mauss believed that India was one of the earliest civilizations to intellectually express the idea of individuality. In his essay, "A category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self" he states:

India appears to me indeed to have been the most ancient of civilizations aware of the notion of the individual, of his consciousness — may I say, of the 'self' (moi). Ahaṁkāra, the creation of the 'I' (je), is the name of the individual consciousness, aham equals 'I' (je): It is the same Indo European word as 'ego'. [Mauss in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1985) p. 13]

What we have to be careful of in this discussion is to distinguish between the different connotations of the word "individual": it can be used to refer to the empirically distinct biological organism and in this sense the term carries no cultural baggage and is universally applicable to all societies. It is clear, however, that Mauss is concerned in his essay with examining the concept of the individual which is
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embodied by the institutions and value systems of any particular society. His remarks on ancient India propose that Indian thinkers formulated notions of the individual similar to those found in modern western society. Mauss then goes on to make the further point that India "... invented it, only to allow it to fade away almost irrevocably" (Ibid). Mauss believed that the Upaniṣads denied the value of the individual, "esteeming that the 'self' (moi) is the illusory thing" (Ibid). Because this theme was taken up by later systems (he cites Sāṅkhya, Buddhism and Upaniṣadic monism), Mauss proposed that individualism as an ideal was never allowed to become the basis of Indian civilization - a fact made apparent in the organization of Indian society into castes.

The Upaniṣads do indeed develop the notion of the ego consciousness but if we look at the soteriological teachings of the Upaniṣads the same point is made time and time again, that liberation can only come about when the aspirant transcends this ego consciousness. There are several cosmogonic myths in the Upaniṣads that describe the creation of the manifold world coming about when the undifferentiated brahman or Being calls itself "I" (C.U. VI ii verses 1-3; C.U. VI iii verses 1-3).

For the first time Being calls itself aham, "I", and enters the created elements through the individual self; the jīvātman is the Ātman of the living being, that is as being made individual and separated from other beings. It is eternal as one with Being or Brahman, but not as being individual. At the same time its individualizing function is taken into account: the individual self is what will differentiate names and forms, that is, the empirical world. [Biardeau (1965) p. 75]
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Hence liberation from the spatio-temporal world comes about by reversing this process, overcoming one's individuality, one's sense of I-ness:

Implicitly, it means that liberation from the empirical world, liberation from rebirth, must come through the negation of empirical individuality. (Biardeau Ibid)

This relationship between the creative process and the path to liberation is seen clearly in a passage from the C.U. where Uḍḍālaka Ārunī gives instruction to his son Śvetaketu. First, he explains to his son that the empirical world rests upon the separation of an individual consciousness:

That same primal substance had this thought: "Come, let me enter into these three secondary substances with this my living Self and thereby differentiate name and form. (C.U. VI iii verse )

He then goes on to teach him by a series of metaphors that in truth there is no separation between him and the primal substance of the universe. The following is just one example:

As bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of many trees and reduce this juice to a unity, yet those juices cannot perceive any distinction there so that any of them might know: "I am the juice of this tree," or "I am the juice of that tree," so too, my son, all these creatures here, once they have merged into Being do not know that they have merged into Being ... This finest essence, - the whole universe has as its Self; That is the Real: That is the Self: That you are (tat tvam asī), Śvetaketu. (C.U. VI ix verses 1-2 & 4)

Biardeau believes that all the metaphors employed by Uḍḍālaka point to one truth, that one's personal identity and sense of ego have to be shed in order to achieve mokṣa:

there is no reality apart from Being and the individual self must realize this truth even in the wakeful state in order to merge with Being forever at the time of death, and thus never be born again. Śvetaketu must forget even his personal identity if he wants to become
one with Brahmā. Conversely the empirical beings that are reborn again and again forget that they have come out of Being once they are born as such and such an individual being with its own name. But this must not hide the truth of their common origin, of their fundamental unity and identity in Brahmā. [Biardeau (1965) p. 74]

There is no doubt that this way of thinking has an important place in Indian thought but the relationship between the speculative thought of India and the organization of its society into castes is more complex than Mauss's work suggests.

Firstly, it would seem that Mauss is proposing a direct correlation between the metaphysical denial of the individual and its denial in the caste oriented society. Louis Dumont also examines this issue and notes firstly that "what one is in the habit of calling Indian thought is for the very great part the thought of the samnyāsī, that is to say of someone who has denied society ..."[Dumont (1970)]. Dumont then goes on to locate the idea of the individual in the institution of world renunciation:

now if we bring together society on the one hand and the renouncer on the other, we have a whole containing an equilibrium between quite different things: on the one hand a world of strict interdependence, in which the individual is ignored, and on the other hand, an institution which puts an end to interdependence and inaugurates the individual. [Dumont (1982) pp. 231-232]

Dumont therefore locates the idea of the individual with those responsible for the speculative thought which Mauss has characterized as being destructive of that idea. Without wishing to decide the issue at this point, since this will be the subject of my concluding chapters, I would suggest that Dumont's thesis certainly indicates a more subtle relationship here than is
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Contained in Mauss's thesis.

Secondly, Mauss's overview of Indian Philosophy has been criticized for being oversimplistic:

Mauss recognizes India as the scene of man's first formal conception of the self as an individual conscious entity. Seeing that this discovery was not followed by the developments which lead in his evolutionist scheme to the perfection of the category of the person in the minds of Europeans, he seeks an explanation for this failure and finds it in the influence of the Samkhya dualists, Buddhist impersonalists and Upanishadic monists. Since these doctrines belong to the earliest accessible stratum of Indian metaphysics, gaining prominence in the middle of the first millennium B.C., it appears to Mauss that the proper growth of the Indian self was prevented at its birth by views which recognized it only to reject it as a fiction constitutive of an undesirable worldly consciousness. What is striking in his cursory treatment is not so much his evolutionism as the inadequacy of his evidence and his lack of sociological and historical perspective. Firstly the relevant intellectual culture of India was much more than these three renunciationist doctrines. They were important but they were also vigorously opposed. [Sanderson in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1985) p. 190]

Indian philosophy is certainly far more complex than the three early systems alluded to by Mauss and it is important to remember that not all systems were so clearly renunciationist as the ones which he mentions. Inevitably Indian thought became more complex as the areas of debate became more clearly defined.

The style of Upaniṣadic thought is poetic and metaphorical. It would be inaccurate to impute to the Upaniṣads a single dogmatic position since their spirit was so much one of enquiry and speculation. It was this open-mindedness that allowed for subsequent philosophers to draw different interpretations from the texts to support their viewpoints.

Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the Upaniṣadic
teachings concerning the relationship between the individual consciousness and the attainment of mokṣa and we need to be aware of some of the finer distinctions that are not laid bare in the Upaniṣads. For example, the declaration by Uḍḍālaka to his son Śvetaketu, "tat tvam asi" became known as one of the great sayings of the Upaniṣads (mahāvākya) and became the focus of much heated debate in the later philosophical schools. Śaṅkara's advaita-vedānta school posited just one cosmic self from the point of view of absolute reality and hence the point of this saying is to identify tvam (you) with tat (that, i.e., the cosmic brahman). Ramānuja's viśiṣṭādvaita-vedānta school posited that even from an absolute point of view there is still some distinction between the individual self and the cosmic self and hence the references to tat and tvam in this saying were not exactly coterminous. In the Sāmkhya system the individual consciousness is absolutely discreet and is known as puruṣa. In the passages from the Upaniṣads used to illustrate the necessity of transcending the "separated" consciousness in order to attain mokṣa the distinction between individual consciousness and the ego or "I" consciousness is not always clear. In the Sāmkhya system the individual consciousness or puruṣa stands in isolated purity on the attainment of liberation but it is an individual consciousness free of any consciousness of "I".

This is not to say that Upaniṣadic thought was muddled or incoherent. Its nature was essentially enigmatic and we have seen that there is a definite pattern in the evolution of a whole complex of ideas relating to language, knowledge, psychology and
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soteriology. Hence it is possible to speak in general terms of an Upaniṣadic world view.

The transition from the classical Upaniṣads to the clearly demarcated philosophical schools of a later period was obviously a complex process. Broadly speaking, the emergence of systematic thought in India may be seen as a consequence of such a milieu of variant soteriological and metaphysical speculation as is found in the Upaniṣads. Out of the need for apologetic defence, traditions became more sharply defined schools, developing rational systems whereby their claims to religious understanding could be justified and the claims of others refuted. The move towards distinct schools, in both orthodox and non-orthodox traditions, was an inevitable transition when the original ideas of the enigmatic sages of the Upaniṣads fell prey to later thinkers concerned to clarify those ideas. The Nyāya system was one such school to emerge out of this crystallization of ideas.

The Nyāya system is counted as one of those systems which is less closely associated with the Upaniṣads than some of the others, such as Sāmkhya and Advaita Vedānta. Indeed, the early Nyāya philosophers themselves seemed concerned to distance themselves from the Upaniṣadic tradition. For example, in his commentary of the Nyāya Sūtras, Vātsyāyana wants to make clear that the Nyāya system is dealing with a branch of knowledge that is something more than the ātmavidya (knowledge of ātman) of the Upaniṣads. Yet in some areas it will be seen that the Nyāya system continued to be influenced by the Upaniṣads in ways which went beyond the samsāra/mokṣa complex of ideas. There is the
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same concern with developing a coherent framework of ideas relating to ontology, language, epistemology, psychology and soteriology, and in each of these areas the Upaniṣads continued to exert their influence. By examining Nyāya thought in each of these areas we will be able to arrive at an understanding of the Nyāya world-view.
Chapter Two

INTRODUCTION TO UDAYANA'S ĀTMATATTVAVIVEKA

The Nyāya school opted for a belief in a plurality of Selves (ātmānāḥ), thus rejecting an interpretation of the Upaniṣads in which, from an absolute point of view, there was only one, universal ātman, an interpretation taken up later by the Advaita Vedānta school. The main opposition to the Nyāya school, however, came from the Buddhist philosophers in India who rejected completely the idea of an enduring Self—a thesis known as anātma-vāda. So crucial was this Nyāya/Buddhist debate that it became the focus for a wide range of philosophical argumentation and it is, in effect, possible to examine Nyāya thought in all of its important aspects—ontology, language, epistemology, psychology and soteriology—by looking at the arguments the Naiyāyikas1 used to defend their belief in an enduring ātman against the anātman theory of their Buddhist opponents. Hence a study of the Nyāya view of ātman is an appropriate window through which to view the various aspects of Nyāya thought and, given the traditional soteriological significance of ātman in Indian thought, it is also a possible means by which to assess the soteriological intentions of the Nyāya system. One text in particular illustrates the way in which this Nyāya/Buddhist controversy concerning the existence of ātman permeates almost every area of debate. This is the Ātmatattvaviveka (Discernment of the Reality of Ātman) also known as Bauddhadhikārarahasya (The Secret of Defying the Buddhists), written by Udayana in the
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eleventh century A.D.

Traditionally *Nyāya* texts were modelled closely after the *Nyāya Sūtras*, either in whole or part, and purported to be commentaries on this work, a collection of terse aphorisms upon which the school was founded. Udayana himself wrote such a commentary, the *Pariśuddhi*, which marked the end of the era of works based on the *Nyāya Sūtras*. In the *ATV*, Udayana broke completely with this mould and instead created a work whose structure was governed specifically by his desire to introduce and systematically arrange all the arguments relevant to the *Nyāya* defence of ātman. In this text, Udayana draws on all the major disputes between the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists and articulates them in such a way as to clearly show their relevance to the ātman/anātman debate. He attacks the Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism in the course of this work, and he is credited with producing a work of such great power that the Buddhists lost their foothold in India and retreated to Tibet. The demise of Buddhism in India was certainly a product of more than just this one polemic, the loss of grassroots support and the Islamic invasions having a great deal to do with it, but after this work Buddhism suffered a decline in India and was unable to produce any scholar capable of refuting Udayana. Thus, a period of fruitful and intense debate which had lasted for hundreds of years between the *Nyāya* and Buddhist thinkers came to an end, and Udayana was the last of the *Nyāya* thinkers to enjoy the stimulus of a powerful Buddhist opposition.
After Gautama, the legendary author of the Nyāya Sūtras, Udayana is probably "the most revered" of all the Nyāya philosophers. Tradition has it that Udayana came from Mithilā in northeast India which was a centre of great learning, especially for the Nyāya school. His skill in debate was of great repute and was celebrated in mythic tales of his victories in philosophical disputation, in which he is portrayed as a figure with almost supernatural powers. In one such tale we read of his contest with a Buddhist scholar concerning the existence of ātman which took place at the royal court at Mithilā. The debate was settled by a final contest in which they both flung themselves from a palm tree. Udayana's views were vindicated since he survived the fall whereas the Buddhist died. Udayana was honoured for his victory over the Buddhist by Viṣṇu at Puri (Lord Jagannātha). Several versions of this story exist: in one Udayana is shunned because of his responsibility for the death of another human being and the doors of the temple at Puri were closed to him. Udayana killed himself by self-burning, rebuking the god for his ingratitude. Another great victory is recorded in which he defeated the Advaita Vedānta philosopher, Śrīhīra, in debate. Śrīhārṣa wrote the famous Khānḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā in which he vehemently attacks Udayana's views supposedly to avenge the death of his father, Śrīhīra. The picture of an academic contest held at a royal court is one which has been familiar since Upaniṣadic times.

Udayana holds an important place in the Nyāya system not just because of his brilliance but because his work is an
important landmark in the evolution of Nyāya thought. In its later period Nyāya thought became characterized by an increasing subtlety of argument and a greater preoccupation with the method rather than the content of the argument. Navya-Nyāya, as the school in its later period is known, is usually said to date from the fourteenth century with the ground-breaking Tattvacintāmani of Gaṅgeśa. The subtlety of Udayana's work, however, is such that many critics regard him as the real source of Navya-Nyāya.7 Certainly Udayana's style and rigour look forward to Navya-Nyāya but at the same time his work brings to fruition arguments that had been developed by traditional Nyāya philosophers over a period of several hundred years in their efforts to defeat the Buddhist opposition.

Although in the ATV Udayana sets out to refute the major schools of Buddhism, his arguments are directed specifically against one philosopher, Jñānaśrīmitra, whose ideas supplied the key objections (pūrvapakṣa) for most of Udayana's arguments. The close links between Jñānaśrīmitra's works and the ATV help us to arrive at a date for Udayana since scholars have been able to determine fairly precisely dates for Jñānaśrī.

Jñānaśrī was one of the leading Buddhist philosophers of his time and worked in the great Buddhist monastic university at Vikramaśīlā where he was one of the "Two Great Pillars of Wisdom". Vikramaśīlā had been founded in the eighth century by Dharmapāla, and by the time of Jñānaśrī it had become a major centre for Buddhist learning, attracting scholars from all over the Buddhist world and exporting its own brand of Buddhism beyond
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the boundaries of India. It was such an interchange that gives us a precise date for Jñānaśrī. Aṭiśa, another of Vikramāśīlā's noted scholars, had been asked to go to Tibet to revitalize Buddhism there. The members of a second Tibetan mission to Vikramāśīlā recorded a reception there for the famous Bengali adept, Naropant. Jñānaśrī and Aṭiśa were noted helping the old man down from his carriage, implying his seniority to both of them. Aṭiśa finally left for Tibet at the age of fifty-nine in 1041 A.D. and we can presume from the evidence that Jñānaśrī was his near contemporary. Bhattacharya has used this and other evidence to argue convincingly that the date given in the Lākṣaṇāvalī (See below p. 54) is mistaken and that Udayana was active in the latter part of the eleventh century A.D. Jñānaśrī had a younger contemporary in Ratnakīrtī who was the author of many texts in which he was responsible mainly for presenting Jñānaśrī's teachings in a clearer form. Ratnakīrtī is also frequently criticized and quoted by Udayana in his ATV. It was with these three scholars that a great era of debate between the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists came to an end. The exchange had been beneficial to them both in that it had injected each side with rigour and creativity, and pushed Indian philosophy to ever increasing levels of insight and sophistication.

The Texts of Udayana

Udayana wrote commentaries on both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Sūtras as well as independent treatises such as the ATV. His works in order of composition are: 10
Introduction to Udayana's Átmatattvaviveka

(1) The Lakṣaṇāvalī (The Garland of Definitions): A manual on the categories of the Vaiśeṣika school. In one manuscript of the Lakṣaṇāvalī its date of composition is given as 906 Śaka, that is, 984-5 A.D., a date which has to be disputed.

(2) The Lakṣaṇaṁālā (The Wreath of Definitions): A manual on the categories of the Nyāya school.

(3) The Átmatattvaviveka

(4) The Nyāyakusumāṇjali (A Handful of Nyāya-tree Flowers): an independent treatise to prove the existence of God. It remains a classic work on the subject in India.

(5) The Nyāyapariśiṣṭa (The Nyāya Appendix): a commentary on the fifth chapter of the Nyāya Sūtras.


(7) The Kirāṇāvalī (The Garland of Rays): A commentary on the Padārthadhammasamgraha, an early work of the Vaiśeṣika system upon which the system was built.

Udayana's Átmatattvaviveka

The structure of this thesis is based loosely on that of the
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_ATV._ This text was chosen because:

1. Udayana's position in the Nyāya school is such that his work is an ideal vantage point from which to review the thought of the traditional Nyāya philosophers. He stands at the end of the era in which I am interested and he is its culmination.

2. The *ATV* serves admirably to carry out my stated intentions of studying the concept of ātman and understanding how Nyāya functions as a complete dārṣṇa. Because of its breadth of conception it treats its subject matter in such a way as to give us an overview of Nyāya in all its aspects, as is shown in the following brief survey of the work.

Udayana opens the *ATV* with a short statement concerning the importance of the study of the ātman:

>iha khalu nisargapratikūlasvabhāvam sarvajana- saṃvedinasiddham dubhām jihāsavah sarva eva taddhānopayamavidvāmso'nusarantaśca sarvādhyātma videkāvākyatayā tattvajñānānameva tadupāyam- ākarpayanti na tato'nyām, pratiyogyanuyogeita ā ca ātmaiva tattvato jñeyah, tathāhi yadi nairātmyam yadi vātmāsti vastubhūtaḥ, ubhayathāpi naisargikamātmajñānāmtattvajñānānameva ityatāpy- ekavākyataiva vādināmata ātmatattvām vivicyate.

In this world surely, all people, desiring to abandon and overcome misery, which is in its very nature adverse to human nature and well established in human experience, and not knowing how to discard it, yet seeking a way to do so, hear through the unanimous statements of all those who have knowledge of the ātman that the means of avoiding suffering is by knowledge of
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its real nature and none other than that. Hence the ātman alone is to be known in its real aspect in order to counter and overcome suffering. Whether there is no ātman or whether there is an ātman which is a real entity, both sides are unanimous in saying that the knowledge of the ātman current amongst the ordinary people is never the real knowledge. Hence the true nature of the ātman is being expounded in this work.

In India philosophical enquiry was meant to have a rational purpose (prāyojana), and in this opening statement Udayana is presenting the purpose of his enquiry — to know the truth about ātman since this is essential in order to escape the suffering of life. Given that this is the purpose of the ATV, the legitimacy of Udayana's work also requires there to be a very real doubt concerning this issue. Here we see that philosophical debate should not be argument for argument's sake but rather, according to the rules of traditional Indian logic, should proceed on the basis of an initial doubt (saṃsāya) and have a clear purpose.

The idea of an enduring ātman is thus presented at the beginning as a thesis which is yet to be ascertained because the Buddhists' counter-arguments to it create a doubt concerning its truth. Hence Udayana establishes the propriety of his text in the opening passage by stating clearly the nature of both the prāyojana and the saṃsāya.

There are four main obstacles or counter-arguments (bādhakas) with respect to establishing the existence of an enduring ātman:¹²
tatra bādhakām bhavadātmanī kṣaṇabhaṅgo vā bāhyārthabhaṅgo vā guṇagunibhedabhaṅgo vā anupalambho veti.

In respect to the existence of ātman, the thesis of universal momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅga), or the thesis
that there are no objects external to our judgements (bāhyārthabhāṅga), or the thesis that there is no difference between an object and its qualities (gunagupibhedabhāṅga), or the thesis that the ātman is not perceived (anupalambha), constitutes a counter-argument.

Until these counter-arguments are refuted, the doubt concerning the existence of the ātman will remain. It is in the course of refuting these four counter-arguments of the Buddhists that Udayana has cause to consider most of the important philosophical debates of his time. This is because, as we shall see, each of the bādhakas has a wider significance than its relevance to the specific debate concerning the existence of the ātman.

Hence the ATV falls into four main sections, each one respectively discussing one of the bādhakas. The remaining chapters of my thesis broadly correspond to the structure of the text itself:

(1) Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda. In this first chapter Udayana attacks the Buddhist thesis that everything which exists is momentary. This is the first bādhaka of the Buddhists—that if everything which exists is momentary then ātman, being one such existent, cannot be counted as enduring (nityam). Udayana's refutation of this thesis would not itself prove the existence of an enduring ātman, but it is necessary to remove this bādhaka in order to allow for the possibility of such an entity. Udayana therefore, attempts to remove this bādhaka by demonstrating in general its falsity. In doing this he establishes a pattern which is repeated in his treatment of the other three bādhakas. It is this which gives his work such a breadth of scope: he first
establishes the relevance of the bādhaka for the specific question of the ātman, and then argues against the bādhaka in general terms. In the course of this section Udayana is concerned to defend not only the Nyāya view of ātman but also the realism of the school in general which was similarly threatened by the Buddhist thesis of momentariness. The sequence of arguments is long (See below pp. 61-66) and I have chosen to treat this section in two chapters. In Kṣaṇabhaṅga I, I shall examine those arguments dealing with the nature of existence and causality, using it as an opportunity to discuss in general the ontology of the Nyāya system. In Kṣaṇabhaṅga II, I shall examine the arguments relating to theories of meaning, and will use this as an opportunity to discuss more generally the Nyāya understanding of language.

(2) Bāhyārthabhaṅga. The bādhaka here is that no objects exist apart from judgements. Specifically, this bādhaka is an obstacle to the Nyāya view of ātman inasmuch as ātman is considered to be separate from and external to our judgements. The more general issue here which Udayana discusses is how we can know the existence of an external world separate from our judgements, indeed whether it makes sense at all to talk of an external world. His specific targets here are (i) the idealism of the Yogācāra school and their thesis that the separation of subject and object is merely a mental construction arising out of ignorance, and (ii) the scepticism of the Mādhyamika school concerning the possibility of knowledge about an external world.

(3) Gupagunibhedabhaṅga. The bādhaka here is that there is
no difference between a quality and the thing which has that quality. If this were admitted, then there will be no ātman over and above its qualities, that is, the ātman will no longer be posited as the locus of judgements. All that will remain is a stream of momentary judgements:

\[
\text{astu tarhi gunaguninorabhedānānairātmyam, kṣaṇikajñānamātrapariśedāditi.}
\]

Let then, the absence of an ātman be due to there being no difference between the quality and that which possesses the quality, because this results in the momentary cognition alone.

In this chapter Udayana examines the idea that there is no guṇa (quality possessor) over and above the guṇas (qualities). Again his arguments continue to be directed against the Yogācāras but also the Sautrāntikas who, despite accepting the existence of an external world, were also phenomenalists.

The arguments in these two chapters, that is Bāhyārthabhaṅga and Guṇagunibhedaḥbhaṅga, are related inasmuch as Udayana in both chapters is concerned to examine the nature of our perception and its relationship to the external world. Hence I have chosen to treat these two sections together in one chapter. (Guṇagunibhedaḥbhaṅga is a very short chapter, forming almost an addendum to the very long Bāhyārthabhaṅga chapter to which it constantly refers. Interestingly enough, there is also no corresponding section in Jñānaśrī's works). In discussing these two chapters my concern will be with the epistemology of the Nyāya system.

(4) Anupalambhavāda. The bādhaka here is that there is non-perception of the ātman. In the Upaniṣads, it should be
remembered, mokṣa consisted in just that, a direct perception or realization of the ātman. In this section we find the first arguments specifically connected with the Nyāya understanding of ātman. These positive arguments give us an opportunity to examine the psychology of the Nyāya system.

(5) Conclusion. Udayana ends the ATV with more general reflections on the nature of ātman, mokṣa, Īśvara (God) and the authority of the Vedas. Like Udayana, I end my study of the Nyāya system with reflections on its soteriology. Hence the ATV is an admirable vehicle for studying the Nyāya system in its various aspects—ontology, language, epistemology, psychology and soteriology. In this concluding chapter of my thesis I will look at the ways in which these complement each other and assess how Nyāya functions as a complete darśana.

The Style of Argument

The presentation of arguments in the ATV conforms to a set of precise rules which governed such discourse. One argument follows another in a carefully ordered sequence that has its own rationale and, rather like chess, one false move can result in defeat. This reveals the close relationship between public debate and philosophical discourse in India. For those unfamiliar with such discourse it can often seem overly complex and empty, but it was the role of a skilled philosopher to make sure there were no loopholes in his own arguments and to look for flaws in those of the opposition. Some familiarity with Indian logic is essential in order to appreciate the manner in which the
arguments are presented.

First of all, the overall structure of any chapter can be shaped by the form of the Indian syllogism, as is clearly seen in the first chapter of the ATV, the kṣaṇabhaṅgaparicchedaḥ (the chapter on the thesis of momentariness). An explanation of this type of inference will therefore provide the key to understanding the rationale behind the presentation of Udayana's arguments here.

The standard form of the Nyāya syllogism can be illustrated by the following example:

There is fire on that hill,
For there is smoke there.
Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen.
There is smoke on that hill, accordingly.
Therefore there is fire there.

In our everyday reasonings we often employ an argument whose general form is: A is B because of C. For example: "the kitchen is on fire because there is smoke pouring through the window". The middle term C or reason (hetu), which in this case is smoke, can be either adequate or inadequate, and the soundness of the argument depends on the adequacy of C. In our example the soundness of the argument and the adequacy of the reason given, smoke, would depend on the truth of the universal proposition that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It may appear then that this is after all a deductive argument whose form is:

There is smoke in the kitchen.
Wherever there is smoke there is fire.
Therefore there is fire in the kitchen.
But consider:

There is smoke in the kitchen.
Wherever there is smoke there is absence of fire.
Therefore there is absence of fire in the kitchen.

Both of the above arguments are well-formed deductive inferences and hence, from a logical point of view, valid. Which conclusion is true depends not on logical form but on the truth of the premises involved. In assessing these two arguments we turn our attention away from matters of logical form and judge the truths of the conclusions on the basis of experience. The point to be made here is that an argument of the form, "A is B because of C" may be turned into a deductive type argument by the introduction of the universal proposition "wherever there is C there is B". From a formal point of view this may seem to tighten up the argument, but it merely shifts the problem because it raises the question of how the truth of the universal proposition can itself be established.

It was with this problem that Indian logicians became chiefly preoccupied and hence they did not concern themselves with developing a purely deductive logic. Rather, the Indian form of inference is concerned to give grounds for the assertion of the universal proposition.

The Buddhist proof of kālatva opens with the universal proposition that whatever exists is momentary (yat sat, tat kṣaṇikam). Here "existence" is given as the reason (hetu) for the inferable property (sādhyā) of "momentariness". According to the rules of Buddhist logic, the universal proposition cannot be asserted unless it is supported by both an agreeing example
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(sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) and a disagreeing example (vaidharmya-
dṛṣṭānta). In the sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta the reason (hetu) and the
inferable property are both present, and in the vaidharmya-
dṛṣṭānta the reason and the inferable property are both absent.
Thus the correct form of the proof, when presenting the case to
other people, would have the form:

\[ A \text{ is } B \text{ because of } C. \]
Wherever there is C there is B. \( (1) \)
Like x. \( (2) \)
Unlike y. \( (3) \)

This kind of proof was formulated by the great Buddhist logician,
Dignāga, and is characterized by the threefold logical mark
(trīrūpaliṅga), inasmuch as the hetu must be concomitantly
present with the sādhya, present in the similar example and
absent in the dissimilar example. The differences to modern
western logic lie in the use of empirical examples and in the
metaphysical assumptions which play a role in the argument.\(^16\)

The exigencies of this type of proof give rise to further
logical problems, and both the Buddhists and Naiyāyikas in
discussing kṣaṇatva were very much concerned with the
difficulties generated by the proof itself. Udayana then begins
his refutation of kṣaṇatva by examining the first part of the
proof:

\[ \text{yat sat, tat kṣaṇikam. } \quad \text{That which exists, that is} \]
\[ \text{momentary.} \]
\[ \text{yathā ghaṭah. } \quad \text{Like a pot.} \]

This is the positive form (anyaya) of the proof, which seeks to
establish an invariable concomitance (pratibandha) between
existence and momentariness. In this section Udayana examines
the Sautrāntika/Yogacārā notion of existence, especially the
metaphysical assumption which equates existence with the capacity
to produce an effect (arthakriyākārita). Udayana counters this
idea with the Nyāya account of causality where change and
endurance are not seen as incompatible properties. In the anvaya
form of the inference Udayana is concerned to defend the Nyāya
belief in enduring substances which may perdure through surface
changes. It is essentially an argument with the Buddhists "on
what there is", that is an ontological argument. Hence I devote
one chapter to this first step in the argument, and use it as an
opportunity to examine the ontology of the Nyāya system.

Having dealt with the positive form of the inference,
Udayana then turns to the negative form (vyatīreka). The
citation of a negative example would support a contraposed form
of the thesis:

Whatever is non-momentary does not exist.
Like a [?].

This form of the thesis gave rise to a major Nyāya/Buddhist
controversy, namely the status of expressions which purport to
refer to unreal entities. The Naiyāyikas contend that it is
impossible for the Buddhist to give an example here for, in
citing an example of something which is non-momentary, he would
be contradicting his own position. Udayana considers the
arguments put forward by the Buddhists to defend their position
on this matter and this forms the second major portion of this
chapter on kṣanatva.

Udayana’s examination of the negative form of the argument
eventually leads him to consider a much wider topic, the nature of language. He argues against a Buddhist theory of meaning known as *apohavāda*. This characteristically Buddhist theory of meaning claims that, since words are bound up with mental conceptualization, they cannot be directly associated with external reality. The very nature of external reality composed of unique point instants (*svalakṣānas*) eludes linguistic categorization. *Apohavāda* associates the meaning of word with the corresponding mental concept whose range is determined by its distinctness from all other concepts. This theory of meaning clearly seeks to avoid any commitment to the hypostatization of dubious entities such as permanent objects, universals, Selves, *et cetera*. Such a brief exposition of *apohavāda* indicates why Udayana moves onto this subject immediately after his consideration of empty subject terms. According to the Buddhist opposition here, all the entities referred to by language are, in some sense, fictitious. Hence *apohavāda* is a theory of meaning which the Buddhists claim is adequate to explain how we manage to talk about unreal entities whether they be Selves, pots or the non-momentary entities necessary for the *vyatireka* portion of their argument for *ksanatva*. Thus, the second part of Udayana's *ksanabhaṅga* chapter is a discussion about how words get their meaning and the relationship between language and the world. I devote one chapter to the *vyatireka* portion of the argument and use it as an opportunity to examine the Nyāya theory of language.

The structure of the Indian inference governs the overall shape of the *ksanabhaṅgapariccheda*. Within this overall
structure, however, there is a second operative element which works on a smaller scale to govern the order of the sub-arguments. This component is known as tarka, which is a type of argument designed to demonstrate some absurdity in the opponent's thesis. We shall see this clearly in the opening passages of the kṣaṇabhaṅgapariccheda where the Buddhist opposition employs a form of argument known as prasaṅga to show the absurd consequences of the Nyāya supposition that there are enduring entities.

Hence we can see that the structure of the ATV, from Udayana's statement of purpose and doubt in the opening passages to its conclusion, conforms to a precise set of rules which governed philosophical debate in India. A complete description of these rules would be too lengthy here, but wherever a particular rule governing fallacious argument is invoked I indicate this in the footnotes supplied with the translations.17

Related Texts
(I) Jñānaśrīmitra

Jñānaśrī's works were lost to western scholars until fairly recently, which made the task of interpreting the ATV especially difficult. Fortunately, in the 1950's texts written by Jñānaśrī became available, providing a key for understanding the development of Nyāya philosophy from Vācaspati Miśra to Udayana. Jñānaśrī was concerned to defend the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti (c. 600–700 A.D.) from the attacks of Vācaspati Miśra, Trilocana, the Naiyāyika Śāṅkara and Bhāsarvajña, who were
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known as the "Four Pillars" of the Nyāya school. Since there are no extant works of Śaṅkara and Trilocana, Jñānaśrī's references to them in his texts provide valuable information on this period of Nyāya philosophy.

Jñānaśrī belonged to the Yogācāra school, supposedly founded on a vision Asaṅga received of the future Buddha, Maitreya. He followed Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of the Pramāṇavārttika and was also influenced by the Tāntrikas who were active in his monastery. It was, however, a tantra imbued with an academic discipline in accordance with the ideals of his monastery. From our point of view, Jñānaśrī's most important works are:

(1) Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya. Despite its name, this work does not seem to be a chapter in a larger work, but itself consists of four chapters (adhiṅkāra). These are:

(i) paksadharmaḍhikāra - a discussion on the relationship between the justification property, existence, with that which is to be proved, impermanence.

(ii) anvayāḍhikāra - the conclusion drawn through positive concomitance.

(iii) vyatirekāḍhikāra - the conclusion drawn through negative concomitance.

(iv) ahetukaṁśadhiṅkāra - the Buddhist theory of automatic destruction.

(2) Apohaprakaraṇa. In this work Jñānaśrī defends the apoha theory of meaning from such philosophers as Vācaspati Miśra. All of these works have been collected together along with his other works by Ananatalal Thakur and are published collectively as the Jñānaśrīmitranibhandāvalī.
Especially relevant for us are three works:

(1) *Kṣapabhaṅgasiddhi Anvayātmikā*. In this work the relationship between existence and momentariness is drawn through positive concomitance.

(2) *Kṣapabhaṅgasiddhi Vyatirekātmikā*. In this work the relationship between existence and momentariness is drawn through negative concomitance.

(3) *Apohasiddhi*. In this work Ratnakīrti defends the apoha theory of meaning.

Once more, all of Ratnakīrti's works have been edited and published collectively by Anantalal Thakur as the *Ratnakīrtinībhandāvalī*. 
Chapter Three

Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda I: On the Nature of Causality

If you are already in possession of a 'given' world, with isolable, identifiable objects such as people, physical environment and actions, then quite clearly you have already solved, or prejudged any issues in the theory of knowledge. You already know the world, you possess a world-home and an identity. Gellner (1974) p. 41

The Philosophical Background

Since the world of change, saṃsāra, was a place of suffering, of repeated births and deaths, only by positing an entity such as brahman, which totally transcended the plane of temporal existence and yet was potentially accessible to the individual by means of the brahman/ātman equivalence, could the Upaniṣadic seer envisage mokṣa. His was a quest for something different in kind, not merely in degree, from all other objects in the world. Knowledge of brahman was salvific, the central goal in the quest for mokṣa only because brahman was unchanging and abiding. It was by assuming these qualities that the seer could find release from the vagaries of saṃsāric existence.

Brahman was the "Real of the real", and to be continuously preoccupied with worldly affairs was to invite worldly suffering.

As portrayed in the Pāli Canon, the Buddha wrestled with many of the same problems that were central to the Upaniṣads, yet his solutions were strikingly different from the magico-metaphysical solutions found therein. He too saw the changing world to be a place of suffering. Rather than postulate a substantive, transcendental, unchanging reality beyond the
phenomenal world, he saw that freedom from suffering would come about only by absolute acceptance of the fact that everything does indeed change. It was only when the aspirant absorbed this realization into every level of his being that his desires would be extinguished and his sufferings cease. Thus from the beginning, Buddhism embraced the ideas of impermanence and non-substantiveness as an important part of its soteriological teachings.

Both the Buddha and the Upaniṣadic seers presented descriptions of the world that were radical departures from the common sense view. Inevitably the philosophical ramifications of their teachings were enormously complex and it was left to later, more scholastic-minded thinkers to unravel and debate their consequences. The Buddha taught that existence is characterized by impermanence (anitya), the Upaniṣads that there is an absolute existence which is eternal (nitya) and unchanging — thus initiating a controversy that was to preoccupy successive generations of Indian thinkers. The notion of change versus permanence became as important a problem in the Indian tradition as it had been in the western tradition since the time of the Greek philosophers. In India though, the roots of the debate went back to the differing responses of the Buddha and the Upaniṣadic seers to the problem of the saṃsāric world of suffering.

The arguments which Udayana presents in the ATV against Jñānaśrīmitra's thesis of momentariness represent just one aspect of a complex debate between the Buddhists and the Hindus on this
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda I

subject. The thesis of momentariness which had developed from the Buddha's teaching of the world as impermanent (anitya) had become increasingly diverse and sophisticated, as had the orthodox response to it. Jñānaśrī, no doubt, saw himself as a legitimate heir and defender of the Buddha's proclamation that all existence is marked by impermanence, although Jñānaśrī's thesis of momentariness represents but one strand in the diverse treatment that the Buddhist tradition subsequently gave to the Buddha's original teaching. For his part too, as we have already seen (See pp. 55-56), Udayana saw himself to be defending an authentic Upaniṣadic notion of the enduring Ātman. Yet the Nyāya school in general, and Udayana in particular, held one amongst several interpretations of Upaniṣadic thought.

Udayana's Predecessors

In the Upaniṣads a two-fold distinction is eventually made between the unchanging brahman and the spatio-temporal world of change. This raises further questions: What then is the relationship between brahman and the changes which take place in the world? What is the status of the world as we see it? Typically fluid and exploratory in nature, the Upaniṣads only suggest possible answers. We read that the world is created out of brahman just as a web is created from a spider (B.U. II i verse 20); that the world is fixed onto brahman like the spokes of a wheel onto the hub and felloe (B.U. II v verse 15); and that brahman is a fine essence pervading the universe, invisible but real, like salt dissolved in water (B.U. iv verse 12, see also
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda I

C.U. ix—xvi). The Upaniṣads make a distinction eventually between the unformed and the formed brahman:

Assuredly there are two forms of brahman, the formed (mūrta) and the unformed, the static and the moving, the actual and the beyond.³

It was left to later thinkers, though, to replace metaphor with a more critical discussion of the problem of change and continuity, to deal with the further questions raised by these metaphors: How can an unchanging brahman be reconciled with the evolution of the created world out of that supposedly unchanging brahman? Is the apparent change in the world real or illusory? In the terminology suggested by the Upaniṣads, what is the relationship between the formed and the unformed?

As Indian thought crystallized into the different schools, each school adopted a different resolution of the problem concerning creation and causation. Two rival theories emerged in ancient India, both offering proposed solutions to this dilemma:

1. satkāryavāda: the theory that the effect pre-exists in the cause.
2. asatkāryavāda: The theory that new effects can be created which were not pre-existent before.

The philosophers of the Sāmkhya school were strong advocates of the satkāryavāda position. For Sāmkhya thinkers, change does not result in the creation of a new substance but rather, is a change in form of an enduring substratum (a theory of change known as parināma-vāda). Vedāntic philosophers also subscribed to the satkārya-vāda, but they went one step further in holding that change is illusory (a theory of change known as vivarta-vāda).
Kṣanabhaṅgavāda I

In the terminology of Advaita Vedānta, from the absolute point of view, **saguṇabrahman** (brahman with qualities, that is, the phenomenal world) would be unreal; **nirguṇabrahman** (brahman without qualities) alone would be real. Opposing these schools of thought were the philosophers who upheld the **asatkāryavāda**. This theory holds, in opposition to the above, that the production of an effect from a cause represents the creation of something new. Both Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers upheld this position, yet despite this were bitter opponents regarding the nature of change and the status of the phenomenal world.\(^4\)

The idea of an unseen substance (brahman) pervading the universe was one Upaniṣadic option not taken up by the Nyāya system. Rather, they tried to establish a position midway between this and the extreme anti-substantialism of their Buddhist opponents. They defended vigorously the idea of substance (dravya), not the all pervading substance of the Upaniṣads but rather, they developed a theory of substance which lent itself to the realism of the school. The Nyāya theory of substance is the basis of their defence of a stable external world against the Buddhist thesis of momentariness.

The ontology of the Nyāya system relied heavily on that developed by the closely related Vaiśeṣika system. Included in the category of substance are three kinds of objects. Firstly, there are the invisible, indivisible atoms which are the basic constituents of "middle-sized" material objects. There are five kinds of atoms: earth (prthivi), air (vayu), fire (tejas), water (apas) and the internal organ (manas), which is also considered
Kṣapabhaṅgavāda I

to be atomic. Secondly, at the other end of the spectrum, there are the substances which are "ubiquitous" or immaterial. There are four substances of this type: time (kāla), place (diś), ātman and a substance known as ākāśa, which is often translated as "ether". All of these substances, both the immaterial and the atomic are not subject to decay, and are classified as the eternal substances. The third type of substance includes such everyday objects as pots and pieces of cloth (stock examples used by Nyāya philosophers). These substances, unlike the previous two categories, are not eternal. They are effect substances (kāryadṛavya) inasmuch as they are produced, they have a duration and will ultimately be subject to decay. These "middle-sized" substances are constructed from the basic elements of matter, the atoms. Although constituted from the atomic substances, this type of object cannot be fully analyzed in such terms. This is the most original and important aspect of the Nyāya theory of substance, that an object such as a pot is considered to be an entity in its own right. The reason for this is an important Nyāya doctrine which holds that an object such as a pot is more than the sum of its parts —it exists as a whole (avyayavina), distinct in essence from the mere aggregate of its parts. The pot resides in its parts by means of a relation which the Naiyāyikas call inherence (samanavāya), and its existence as a distinct entity is thought to be based in objective reality and is not just the product of a mental synthesis on our part. According to Nyāya, change is compatible with continuity because a whole is something which can persist through certain
The Nyāya school shows a continuity with the Upaniṣads in its upholding the notion of ātman as an eternal substance present in each individual. According to the Nyāya interpretation of the Upaniṣads, there is a plurality of ātman, one for each individual, and there is no equivalence postulated between the ātman and some underlying cosmic essence (brahman). The Nyāya system does not develop the idealist tendencies of the Upaniṣads. Nyāya philosophers maintain that the everyday world of pots et cetera is a real world, and this is a world in which real change is possible. In this respect the Nyāya (and Vaiṣeṣika) system is distinctive among the Indian schools and it will be the task of a later chapter to discuss this realism in the context of their soteriological theory.

By characterizing existence as impermanent (anītya) and without Self (anātman), the Buddha had denied not just the notion of the ātman in the human individual, but also the substantiality of external objects. Hence this theory of the Buddhists, in its wider application, strikes at the very basis of the realism of the Nyāya school. The arguments in Udayana's kṣaṇabhaṅga section are only related indirectly to the argument over the existence of ātman, for obviously, since the ātman is posited as an enduring entity, it would have no existence in a world where everything is impermanent. Although the refutation of momentariness (kṣaṇatvā) is essential to the proof of the existence of ātman, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for that proof, since two
separate questions need to be distinguished:

(1) The more general question — Is everything in the world impermanent?

(2) The more specific question which follows from (1) — Given that there are permanent entities in the world, is the Ātman to be counted among them? The proof of a stable external world is not a sufficient condition to prove that the Ātman is to be counted as part of that world.

The more general question is logically prior to the more specific question and it is this issue which Udayana tackles first. Hence in the first part of the kṣaṇabhaṅgapariccheda he is not concerned specifically with Ātman but rather he examines the general arguments put forward by the Buddhist opposition for the momentary nature of the world (the positive arguments to establish the existence of Ātman come towards the end of the ATV). One may wonder at the role of Nyāya realism within the soteriology of orthodox thought (that seems to fit more naturally with an idealist understanding of the world), but Udayana harnesses his defence of realism here with the defence of Ātman. In establishing his brand of realism as against the Buddhist thesis of kṣaṇatva he is at the same time overthrowing one bādhaka cited to refute the existence of an eternal Ātman.
The history of kṣapātvā in Buddhist thought is extremely complicated and its evolution cannot be traced here without a great deal of generalization. There is no doubt that kṣapātvā is a concept central to the Buddhist tradition although it was given different forms by various schools. Two important responses can be mentioned before we look specifically at Udayana’s opponents. The teachings of the Buddha were given a more precise formulation in the canonical Abhidharma literature (from about the fourth century B.C.) where they were explicated with the rigour of scholasticism. The main concern of the Abhidharmic thinkers was to construct a language which would be less distorting than the language of the community. Their aim was not a linguistic revision in the sense that their language would replace the natural language spoken by the community but rather, training in Abhidharmic language would aid the individual in resisting the metaphysical and ontological presuppositions of ordinary language. As they correctly perceived, ordinary language seemed to imply concepts such as permanence, individual persons, et cetera, which Buddhists rejected. And whereas ordinary language sees change as the interaction of relatively stable objects, Abhidharma language attempts to portray the world as a sort of staccato process of point instants in continual flux. From the point of view of conventional truth, ordinary language was adequate, but dharmic analysis (dharma-vicaya) was an important soteriological device in aiding the individual to
experience the world as momentary in nature. The basic epistemes of this new language, dharmas, were to correspond to the basic elements of reality, and using them, they claimed, it was possible to construct an alternative but complete description of the world as it really is.

A different response to the Buddha's teaching is seen in the Mahāyāna school of Mādhyamika, especially in the writings of Nāgārjuna (c. 150 A.D.). Nāgārjuna did not accept the ultimate reality of phenomenal pluralism whether it be the radical pluralism of the Abhidharmists or the pluralism of common experience and thought. The ontologies of both these conceptual systems contain only objects which are dependent for their existence on external conditions. Nāgārjuna is only stating here the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of "dependent origination" (pratītya-samutpāda) but he uses it to stress the mutual interdependence of all things. In Nāgārjuna's thought this relativity means that from an absolute point of view all things must be considered empty (śūnya) since they lack "own-being" (svabhāva), an existence that is inherent to the object. In Nāgārjuna's opinion the opposition hold views which already carried within them the seeds of their own downfall and Nāgārjuna saw his task to be that of bringing his opponents to a point where they too could see this. In the Mādhyamikakārikās, Nāgārjuna systematically examines such general concepts as time, agent, action, motion and causation as well as specifically Abhidharmic terms such as elements of existence (dhātu), the components of the individual (skandhas) and momentariness. In
each case he sets out to demonstrate that logical inconsistency will be the result of assuming the enduring or substantive reality of any of these objects.

In Abhidharmic thought, the elements were related but real. This interdependence of dharmas (dharmānām pratītyasamutpāda) in Mādhyamika becomes the basis for their unreality. The radical pluralism of the Abhidharmists is superceded in Mādhyamika and with it the idea of the momentary entity, the dharma, so central to early Buddhist thought. Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika did not permanently disable the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, but it was not until the time of Dignāga (c. 5th century A.D.) that it again became an important Buddhist philosophical concept. (This is not to say that Abhidharma disappeared from India.) It is with the work of Dignāga that we really see a complete reworking of the doctrine of kṣanatva and a renewed effort to establish momentariness on a firm logical foundation. Perhaps in response to the danger inherent in Nāgārjuna's system, namely that his conceptual emptiness (śūnyatā) be interpreted in metaphysical rather than critical-analytical terms, Dignāga returned to the more characteristically Buddhist concept of momentariness. Kṣanatva is more than a critical tool of analysis; it does lend itself to the construction of a characteristically Buddhist ontology. Unlike in the case of śūnyatā, one is not tempted to interpret kṣanatva in the language of metaphysical non-dualism.7

Udayana is concerned with refuting this doctrine of momentariness that had its origins in Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya.
In Dignāga's system, each momentary particular is self-sustained and self-destructive, and their very uniqueness and momentariness means that they are not amenable to expression in language, not just conventional language but any kind of language. The momentary particular is cognized only by means of perception. This departure from Abhidharma theory means that Dignāga was not subject to Nāgārjuna's criticisms of that theory. Dignāga's work was communicated to later generations of philosophers largely through the commentary of Dharmakīrti, the Pramāṇavārttika, in which the momentary particular is known as the svalakṣaṇa. As well as commenting on Dignāga's ideas, Dharmakīrti was also an innovator and he defined existence as causal efficacy. For Dharmakīrti the very notion of existence implied change. Once an object ceased to be effective it ceased to exist, and this implied constant change since causal efficacy was, according to this position, an immediate capacity. In opposition to this, the Naiyāyikas were concerned to reconcile change with continuity. Udayana argues against the doctrine of momentariness as presented in the works of the Buddhist philosophers Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti who were the intellectual descendants of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (see pp. 52-53).
TEXT A: Jñāṇaśrīmitra’s proof of universal momentariness examined by Udayana

(This text is translated on pp. 106-127. As in all the translations included in this thesis, the footnotes for the translation are supplied separately at the end of each text and should be read in conjunction with the translation in order to make sense of Udayana’s terse method of argumentation.)

Jñāṇaśrīmitra was responsible for the most comprehensive version of the Buddhist thesis of momentariness. His strategy is summed up in the opening lines of his Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya thus:

yat sat, tat kṣaṇikām vathā jaladharāḥ, santastu bhāvā ime. sattā śaktir ihārthakarmaṇi. [Jñāṇaśrīmitra Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya p. 1, edited by Thakkur (1959)]

That which exists is momentary, like a cloud, and things around us are all existents. Existence here lies in the power to produce effects.

Ratnakīrti states his teacher’s position in the opening of his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi thus:

yat sat, tat kṣaṇikām, vathā ghaṭaḥ; santaścāṃśi vivādāśpadībhūṭāḥ padārthā iti svabhāvahetuḥ. [Ratnakīrti Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi p. 62, edited by Thakkur (1957)]

That which exists is momentary, like a pot; and the objects being disputed are existents. Thus the proof is by means of svabhāvahetu.¹⁰

It is this version of the thesis that Udayana alludes to at the beginning of his chapter on momentariness:

yat sat, tat kṣaṇikām, vathā ghaṭaḥ; saṃśca vivādādhyāsitaḥ śabdādiriti cet.

That which exists is momentary, like a pot; and whatever is an object of dispute, such as sound and so on, is an existent.
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Udayana's strategy at the beginning of his chapter on momentariness is to examine this proof more closely in order to declare it obsolete in its very formulation.

Jñānāśrī's opening lines contain the metaphysical kernel of his proof which rests on three main theses arranged sequentially thus:

(1) There is a universal concomitance between existence and momentariness.
(2) Existence is the power to produce effects.
(3) Causal potency is equivalent to the immediate production of the effect.

It can be seen from this sequence of argument that existence is equated with a capacity which must be discharged immediately. Hence any entity's existence will immediately be extinguished along with the immediate production of the effect. Jñānāśrī, in equating existence with the power to produce effects (sattā śaktir ihārthakarmani), was incorporating the connection made by Dharmakīrti between existence and causal efficacy:

That which has real existence is that which has the capability to produce effects.

arthaḥkriyāsamartham yat tad atra paramārthasat
(Prabhāṣāntika 2 verse 3)

Udayana declares immediately that there is no concomitance between existence and momentariness (na, pratibandhāsiddheḥ). His attack on momentariness (kṣaṇatvā) concerns itself not so much with this definition of existence, but rather concentrates on the subsidiary idea, that of causal efficacy. It is only when causal efficacy is also understood to mean the immediate
production of the effect that the concomitance between existence and momentariness is established (or as Jñānaśrī states, an enduring entity is incapable of causal efficacy and so lacks existence).

In reply to Udayana's declaration that there is no concomitance between existence and momentariness, the Buddhist, or at least the Buddhist as portrayed by Udayana, replies that indeed there is, and this can be established through the association of opposite properties, capability (sāmarthyam) and incapability (asāmarthyam). The idea is that an object cannot be incapable at one moment and capable the next. Both the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas upheld some form of the law of contradiction, that an entity cannot be associated with contradictory properties. The Buddhist statement of this law is thus:

[We say that] an object is different because [otherwise there would be] the ascription of contradictory properties [to one object].

\[
\text{viruddhadharmaṁsargādhyanyadvastu}
\]

[Dharmottara, Nyāyabinduṭīkā (1929) p. 5]

Yet the idea that \( p \) and \( \neg p \) cannot be asserted of the same object can be subject to all sorts of qualifications, and indeed this is the case in the Nyāya treatment of the law of contradiction. Nyāya philosophers make a distinction between an object and its attributes and hence it can at different times enter into relationships with other entities, without itself changing. There is no contradiction in one thing being related to many different things, just as one thread may be related to many different jewels (see Chapter Five). The claim that an
enduring cause would have a contradictory nature gives Udayana reason to look more closely at the nature of contradiction, and he distinguishes between different ways in which pairs of properties may be opposed to each other.\textsuperscript{12} Despite the distinction between an object and its attributes, it would be impossible for an object to enter into relations with certain contradictory attributes. Udayana cites the example of eternal/non—eternal as a pair of such mutually exclusive attributes. This pair of properties are mutually exclusive irrespective of time, since if an object is eternal then that rules out for all time the possibility of that object becoming non—eternal. Distinct from this pair, there are pairs of properties, like hot/cold, which are only mutually exclusive with regard to a specific time and place. An object being hot at time \( t_1 \) rules out the possibility of it being cold at time \( t_1 \). Unlike the previous example, however, that same object may become cold at time \( t_2 \). Udayana would like to present the causal efficacy of an object in these terms. He sets up the pair of properties \textit{samartha/asamartha} with the intention of showing that an object which is dormant (\textit{asamartha}) one moment may become efficacious (\textit{samartha}) at another time according to its association with outside conditions.

The Buddhists hold a stricter interpretation of the law of contradiction but the argument on momentariness is not so much about the correct formulation of that law but rather on the nature of causal efficacy.\textsuperscript{13} The Buddhist understanding of causal efficacy is such that it is impossible for an object to be
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causally impotent one moment and potent the next. For the Buddhist the samartha/asamartha dichotomy is akin to Udayana's eternal/non-eternal dichotomy. Hence the metaphysical argument which Jñānaśrī offers aims to prove that an enduring cause would have a contradictory nature, even on the basis of the Nyāya formulation of the law of contradiction.\textsuperscript{14}

The Buddhist argument, as presented by Udayana, is in the form of a prasaṅga, that is, an argument designed to demonstrate an absurd consequence of the opponent's position: if an object is efficacious, then it will produce. The example of a seed, which is used throughout their long dispute, illustrates this point for them. If the seed in the granary (kusūlasthabīja) were efficacious (with regard to the sprout) then it would produce a sprout, and it does not. On the other hand, the seed in the field (kṣetra-bīja) does produce a sprout. With reference to the production of a sprout the granary seed is non-efficacious (asamartha) and the field seed is efficacious (samartha). Hence they are two different entities.

Udayana focusses his argument on the nature of sāmarthyam, understanding that the Buddhist argument is dependent upon a particular view of causal efficacy (sāmarthyam). For the Buddhist argument to succeed, the nature of causal efficacy must be such that it creates a difference in identity between the non-sprouting granary seed and sprout producing field seed. Udayana proposes and will argue for an interpretation of causal efficacy which will uphold the continuity of the granary seed with the field seed. Udayana examines and rejects several possible
interpretations of causal efficacy. Finally the dispute between Udayana and his Buddhist opponent is reduced to two different interpretations of this term.

One possible interpretation of sāmartṛyam sees causal efficacy to be a combination of the object plus the accessorial causes (sahakārins) which are necessary for the production of the effect. In the case of the seed, it will be the seed in an environment of earth, light, water and so on which will produce the sprout. This is the interpretation of sāmartṛyam which Udayana finds acceptable, an interpretation which of course would be inimical to the Buddhist position since it destroys the basis for their opposition (virodha) between the granary and the field seed. The difference between the granary and the field seed is now a product of the presence or absence of factors external to the seed itself, rather than something intrinsic to the respective seeds.

The other interpretation of sāmartṛyam is that one which is representative of the Buddhist position. Here causal efficacy is intrinsic to the object itself. The sprout, for example, is produced only from the seed ripe for production, in possession of some special excellence known as the kurvadṛūpa. When the seed is productive then that productivity is intrinsic to it and is no longer dependent on any external factors. At this point in time the seed has to produce the sprout without delay and nothing can stop it. Obviously, on this interpretation, the productive field seed, being in possession of some special excellence, is a different entity from the granary seed.
TEXTS B AND C: Udayana's attack on kurvadrūpa and his own account of causality

(The texts discussed below can be read in full in the translations of TEXTS B and C found at the end of this chapter, pp. 128-182.)

In the remaining portion of this section of the ATV which deals with the nature of causality Udayana is concerned to criticize more closely the idea of kurvadrūpa whilst at the same time giving his own account of causality. As we have seen, Udayana's account of causality takes note of the fact that the production of an effect depends on other factors beside the main cause. The seed, for example, will not produce its sprout without the full complement of necessary accessories (sāmagrī). The idea of necessary accessories is the basis for Udayana's attack on his Buddhist opponent, that to be causally potent does not mean that the cause need produce its effect immediately but rather that it has the potentiality to do so given the presence of the right accessories. Hence a full account of causality needs to encompass potentiality (svārūpayogyatā) as well as actuality (phalopadhayakatā). Although such views are found in the works of Nyāya philosophers prior to Udayana, his account of causation and his detailed critique of kurvadrūpa or causal excellence were accepted as definitive by subsequent Nyāya philosophers.

Udayana's arguments against the possession of a special causal excellence have as a common theme the purpose of exposing the unacceptable consequences which follow from a Buddhist
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position in which seedness is divorced from the production of the
sprout. Udayana's most important arguments are discussed below.

(1) Naming a 'seed' a "seed"

The question here concerns the basis on which we call a seed
a "seed". Ratnakīrti argues that the basis of such a
nomenclature must be the production of the sprout. On the basis
of this argument Ratnakīrti must account for the undeniable fact
that we do actually refer to the non-sprouting seeds in the
granary as "seeds". Ratnakīrti argues that they are only
referred to as such in a secondary sense because of their
continuity with the field seeds in virtue of belonging to the
same series of point instants (saṁtāna). Only the productive
field seeds can really be the referents of an expression of
capability. Udayana would agree with Ratnakīrti that the naming
of a seed must have some basis otherwise we might as well refer
to a piece of stone as such. Even if Udayana and Ratnakīrti
could agree that the production of the sprout is the basis on
which a seed is to be called a "seed", this would revive the
basic argument of whether or not such a production has to be an
immediate production. Udayana, of course, denies at this point
that the Buddhist has established his position of causal efficacy
as immediate production. For Udayana, a granary seed is a "seed"
in a primary sense because it too, as well as the field seed, is
related to the production of the sprout. The granary seed, when
taken out of storage and placed under suitable conditions, will
indeed produce a sprout. It is because of this very fact that
granary seeds are "seeds". Udayana will attempt to establish that this capability of the granary seed to produce a sprout is due to the presence of seedness in each individual seed.

(2) The cause of the sprout

We store seeds in the granary, not stones. This is an undeniable fact accepted by both parties. The disagreement is over the role played by the granary seed in the production of the effect, and by the so-called accessorial or co-causes (sahakārins). For Udayana, the seed in the field is the same seed as when it was stored in the granary. The production of the sprout is brought about by the accessorial causes which are responsible for activating a pre-existing nature present in both granary and field seed.

Udayana attacks the obvious Buddhist retort that 'seeds' are stored in the granary because of belonging to the same seed-series (saṃtāna). He demands that the Buddhist explain why the sprout is produced when it is, that is, when the seed is placed in the right environment. Udayana argues that when the kurvadrūpa alone is invested with the full responsibility for the production of the sprout then this destroys the very notion of accessorial causes. We can imagine the Buddhist position thus:
The idea is that the kurvadrupa, as the efficacious seed-moment, has to go ahead and produce the sprout. Once the kurvadrupa comes into being then the immediate production of the sprout becomes inevitable. The question which Udayana persistently asks is why the kurvadrupa makes its appearance in the seed-series when it does. It cannot be the action of the accessorial causes on the seed-moment prior to the coming into being of the kurvadrupa, for then the kurvadrupa becomes an unnecessary postulation and this position would be to concede Udayana’s main point, that it is the seed along with the accessorial causes which is responsible for the production of the sprout.
The questions which concern Udayana here is why the kurvadrūpa should appear at this particular moment along with the accessorial causes, the role of the accessorial causes in the production of the sprout and the role of the seed (or series) in the production of the sprout. Udayana objects to the random nature of this Buddhist account of causality. The kurvadrūpa is not caused by the accessorial causes. Rather it just is the case that the sprout appears in the moment following the conjunction of kurvadrūpa and accessorial causes (sahakārins). Hence the accessorial causes are no longer accessorial causes in the sense that they are responsible for triggering the production of the sprout from the seed. Rather, they just appear alongside the kurvadrūpa prior to the production of the sprout. The seed is no longer a seed in the sense of having some particular nature which is inherently responsible for and related to the production of the sprout, which is common to all seeds and made actual by the accessorial causes. Rather, it seems that the seed or seed-moments in the series prior to the appearance of the kurvadrūpa are divorced from the production of the sprout.

Udayana brings this out even more clearly when he examines the relationship between kurvadrūpatvam and aṅkuratvam (sprout-ness). The framework of Udayana's argument obscures the very different theory of universals which would have been held by his Buddhist opponent but I do not believe that this affects the main point of his argument. Udayana aims to demonstrate that if sprouts are related to kurvadrūpas rather than seeds then it would be possible for a sprout to appear even in the absence of
the seed. Udayana argues strongly against all the attempts of his Buddhist opponent to tie the kurvādraṇā in some way to the seed (see pp. 148-153 of the translation of TEXT C).

(3) The nature of the seed

Most of the same points are made when Udayana looks at the argument not from the perspective of the production of the sprout but from the perspective of the nature of the seed. If it is not the nature of the seed to produce a sprout then it must be efficacious in some way given that an existent is defined as an arthakhriyākāraṇa, that is, as something which produces an effect.

Udayana argues against all the suggestions which his Buddhist opponent offers as suitable effects from the seed—moment. If the Buddhist contends that the 'seeds' in the granary are not stored there because of their efficacy in producing sprouts then, Udayana argues, they are not really seeds. The essence of Udayana's argument here is that it is with reference to the production, whether real or potential, of sprouts that all seeds are seeds. The nature of seedness is common to all seeds and when it is associated in some cases with the relevant accessories then it will result in the production of the sprout.

According to Udayana's account of causality, the seed in the granary has the capacity for producing a sprout. To say of a seed that it has such a capacity commits one to accepting as true, statements about what that seed will do or would have done in circumstances that have not yet occurred, statements such as, "If you plant this seed and water it, then it will produce a
spout". Statements of the above form are known as contrary-to-
fact conditionals, statements which are used to explicate terms of disposition or capability. Such statements have been problematic for western philosophers inasmuch as a purely truth-
functional analysis of them does not bring out their full import.
In the example of the seed producing the sprout, both of the following statements would be true:

(1) If $x$ is a seed, then it will grow in soil and water, warmth and light.
(2) If $x$ were a seed then it would grow in soil and water, warmth and light.

Compare this with the following two statements;

(3) If $x$ is a shoe in my closet then it will be brown.
(4) If $x$ were a shoe in my closet then it would be brown.

The relationship between seeds and sprouts seems to be such that it can sustain both the indicative and the subjunctive conditional. The relationship between being a shoe in my closet and being brown, however, is not such that it can sustain both types of conditional statement. Contemporary philosophers have drawn a distinction between law-like and accidental relationships where only law-like relationships can sustain the subjunctive type of conditional. Hence the relationship between seeds and sprouts is law-like, whereas the relationship between shoes in my closet and being brown is accidental.

Now, according to Udayana, the capacity of a seed to produce a sprout ultimately depends on the universal "seedness" which must be present in all objects called "seeds". The law-like
relationship between seedness (bījatvam) and sproutness (añkuratvam) is, according to Nyāya thought, a real and not mind-dependent relationship, which is discovered through a process of observation of their regular connection:

Therefore, that, which being of a particular nature, makes something else of a particular nature, through its own presence and absence, that one has sāmarthyam (capability) with reference to that effect.
(See p. 153 of TEXT C)

Udayana's Buddhist opponent challenges this basic assumption, that seeds per se are related to the production of the sprout. Udayana had attempted to demonstrate the absurdity of the Buddhist position with a prasaṅga type of argument (see p. 155 of TEXT C). Using the following:

(5) If x were a seed it would be productive of a sprout

he claims the Buddhist will have to accept as a consequence of his position that the 'seeds' in the granary are not, after all, really seeds. The Buddhist, of course, will claim that this is not at all the case. He has two responses available to him to counter Udayana's prasaṅga. Firstly, he can respond as Udayana says he must or secondly he can respond with the following statement:

(6) It is not the case that if x were a seed it would be productive of a sprout.

Udayana's prasaṅga therefore, forces a choice, that x (the granary seed) is not a seed or, that there is not an invariable concomitance between seeds and sprouts. It is this second response that the Buddhist chooses. Hence Udayana and the Buddhist respectively support the following pair of contradictory
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statements:

(5) If x were a seed, it would be productive of a sprout.
(6) It is not the case that if x were a seed, it would be productive of a sprout.

Compare this to the following two statements:

(7) If wood were denser than water, it would not float.
(8) If wood were denser than water, it would float.

In the above example, (7) would be preferred over (8) because the law-like statement, "Nothing denser than water floats in water" is preferred over the statement, "All wood floats in water". Our response in this case is governed by the fact that whenever our "web of belief" is challenged in any way we make changes to our set of beliefs in such a way as to cause the least disturbance and least disastrous consequences to those beliefs. The Buddhist responds to Udayana's prasaṅga not by relinquishing his belief that 'seeds' in the granary are indeed seeds but rather, by challenging the relationship between seeds and sprouts which Udayana is so concerned to uphold. Udayana's arguments are concerned to show the disastrous consequences which would ensue if this belief were incorporated into our beliefs. Udayana has already attacked the attempt by his Buddhist opponent to relate the production of the sprout to some other cause (kurvadrūpa) (see pp. 146-153 TEXT C). He concludes his argument against the Buddhist here by challenging him to say what the nature of a seed can consist in, if not sprout production. For Udayana, the Buddhist position represents a lapse into chaos where sprouts can be produced with or without seeds, and where seeds are deprived
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of their very nature (see p. 165 TEXT C).

Concluding Remarks

Let us now discuss the original problem of change versus continuity. The Ājñāvikas were, on the one hand, concerned to refute the Buddhist thesis that all existence is momentary, and, on the other hand, were concerned to demonstrate that real change is possible in accordance with the asatkāryavāda theory (see p. 72). Irving Copi has stated the problem very succinctly thus:

If an object which changes really changes, then it cannot literally be one and the same object which undergoes the change. But if the changing thing retains its identity, then it cannot have really changed.
Copi in Schwartz (1977) p. 177

The Buddhist maxim that existence is momentary depends on an all-embracing theory concerning the nature of causality and existence that decides the issue for every particular case. Without such an all-embracing theory, the problem of change is different for different types of objects and hence it is not surprising that Nyāya philosophers, who supposedly accept the world as it is, developed a complex theory in response to considering the notion of change in relation to a variety of objects. I shall examine three of their main responses below.

(1) Natural kinds

In western philosophy, since the time of Aristotle, a distinction between accidental and essential properties has been made in order to adjudicate questions of identity. The identity of an object can survive if it changes with respect to properties which are accidental. If it changes with respect to some
property which is considered essential then its identity will also be destroyed. Naturally the problem then arises as to how we can distinguish between accidental and essential properties. As C.I. Lewis says:

Traditionally any attribute required for application of a term is said to be the essence of the thing named. It is of course meaningless to speak of the essence of a thing except relative to its being named by a particular term.

Lewis (1946) p. 41

Irving Copi has defended the essence/accident distinction with his version of scientific naturalism. According to Copi, science seeks to discover real essences and is in a position today in which this is becoming increasingly possible. He admits that, to some extent, what constitutes a real essence is relative to the particular science of our day, but in Copi's view, this relativity is different from the relativity implied in criticisms such as that by Lewis. The real essence is seen to be that property which is fundamentally responsible for all the other properties of the object. For Copi this helps to resolve the problem of change:

The real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties. An essential change in a thing will involve the replacement of some of its dispositions or powers by other dispositions or powers. But a change which is nonessential or accidental would involve no such replacement; it would rather consist in differently actualized manifestations of the same dispositional property or power.

Copi in Schwartz (1977) p. 191

I believe that we can see something akin to this in Udayana's account of causality in relation to the seed.
If we consider a science such as chemistry, it is easy to understand the nature of Copi's thesis. The essence of a substance will consist in its chemical formula, for example water as \( \text{H}_2\text{O} \), which would be the root cause for the range of possible behaviour associated with that substance. We can detect something akin to the scientific naturalism of Copi in Udayana's examination of the nature of a seed. Firstly, there is the idea that for each object there is a range of possible effects, which effect becoming actual being dependent on which accessorial causes come into play:

for, as in the case of a pot, from the time it was created until being struck with a hammer, what we see is the creation of many effects, of the same or of different types, in succession, due to the variety of accessorial causes, and not an association with another \( \text{jāti} \) (that is, through a change in its essential nature). [ATV (1939 edition) p. 81; (1940 edition) p. 24; translated TEXT C p. 147]

Secondly, like Copi, Udayana places great importance on the idea of a dispositional property in his account of causality and indeed, his proof of stability in the world hinges on this notion. For Udayana, a dispositional property is one in which the absence of the relevant effect is solely due to the absence of accessorial causes and not to some deficiency in the object itself:

The seed which is the object of dispute (the granary seed) is one which has the absence of the effect, sprout \( \text{et cetera} \), brought about by the absence of the accessorial causes, because it belongs to the species of "seed" which is within the cause and effect relationship. That one which is not an instance where the absence of the effect, sprout \( \text{et cetera} \), is brought about by the absence of accessorial causes is not a member of the seed species of this nature. [ATV (1939 edition) p. 111; (1940 edition) p. 36; translated TEXT C p. 165]
Hence a granary seed possesses the dispositional property of being able to produce a sprout whereas a stone does not. There is nothing lacking in the granary seed, rather, the non-production of the sprout is due to an external deficiency.

This is said in the case of the granary seed - there is some excellence favourable to the production of a sprout which makes it different from a piece of stone. [ATV (1939 edition) p. 68; (1940 edition) p. 20; translated TEXT C p. 137]

Thirdly, like Copi, Udayana understands that change without loss of identity can occur in those cases where it is not the dispositions themselves which are being changed but rather, the change is a matter of a dispositional property being made actual. Hence for Udayana (and maybe for Copi too), the seed in the field is the same seed as when it was in the granary, because all seeds have the capability of producing a sprout:

Therefore, that one which is in the absence of the accessorial causes, that one does not produce the sprout, but in the presence of the accessorial causes will produce the sprout. And it is this fact which is at the root of the proof of permanence and this is the heart of the matter. [ATV (1939 edition) p. 57; (1940 edition) p. 16; translated TEXT A p. 119]

Of course, one must not push this analogy too far and there are some important differences between Udayana and Copi to be noted. First of all, one might regret the choice of a seed as the object to be featured in this dispute because of the complexity of the process of biological change. I do not think though that this affects the logic of the argument between Udayana and his Buddhist opponent, and to wish that Udayana had chosen something more easily comparable to the science of chemistry is to wish the Periodic Table onto the world hundreds
of years prior to its eventual evolution.

Secondly, one can detect a greater degree of essentialism in Udayana's account of causality than in Copi's. Although a seed can produce a range of effects (a sprout, fodder for animals, counting beads for children and so one), Udayana sees that the seed has an essential nature (svabhāva) which is to produce a sprout, an essential nature which must be common to all seeds. Hence the essence of a seed becomes bound up with the production of just one effect rather than a range of effects (see TEXT C pp. 156-165). This may well be due to the nature of the seed, that the production of a sprout does indeed seem to be its primary function. It is worth noting that when he discusses the idea that an object can be associated with a range of effects according to its nature, he chooses a pot as his example (see p. 147).

To conclude — for Udayana the capacity of a seed to produce a sprout ultimately depends on the presence of the jāti "seedness" which must be present in all those objects called seeds. According to Nyāya thought, some universals at least are real, and it is the presence of the jāti inhering in each individual object that is responsible for the regular way in which objects behave, a behaviour which we can acquire the knowledge to predict as we, through a process of observation, come to discover the pattern of causal relationships which bind these jātis together. In my next chapter, I discuss Nyāya views concerning the nature of language, particularly the so-called problem of the universal. "jāti" is often translated as
"universal", but in doing this I think we should be careful not to confuse the role which jāti plays in Udayana's account of causality and proof of a stable world with the Nyaya account of the universal in relation to the problem of resemblance. The Naiyāyikas are often called realists inasmuch as they hold a theory of the reality of the universal. I hope it will become clear in my next chapter that Udayana was a realist with respect to the jāti just because of its role in explaining causality and in this I think it is clear he had in mind an idea similar to the contemporary notion of the natural kind (see Chapter Four). When Udayana comes to discuss the logical problem of how we come to form the idea of resemblance, he was not necessarily a realist. For Udayana "seedness" is akin to a natural kind (giving credence to Copi's idea that our understanding of real essences will be relative to the science of the day). An individual seed is the cause of an individual sprout but what any individual seed can do is governed by its essential nature, that of "seedness":

Therefore, that which being of a particular nature makes something else of a particular nature, through its own presence and absence, that one has efficacy with reference to that effect. And we find it proper that the particulars of that one, such as in the case of being rice seeds and so on, are productive of particular effects. [ATV (1939 edition) p. 94; (1940 edition) p. 28; translated TEXT C p. 153]

(3) Identity of Artifacts (kāryadravya)

An examination of Nyāya doctrine in this respect shows that change is less tolerated than the common sense understanding of such artifacts as tables and chairs. It was also in regard to
artifacts that the Nyāya philosophers ran into their greatest problems trying to reconcile change with continuity. I believe this came from confusing an important insight into the way in which language functions with certain physical facts about the world.

We have already encountered the Nyāya thesis that the whole (āvayavīn) is something over and above the parts out of which it is made. Thus, a piece of cloth inheres in the threads out of which it is composed and is something more than just the sum of its parts out of which it is woven. Consider the following passage from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*:

> Then does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really mean: the broom is there and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed to the brush? —If he were to ask anyone if he meant this he probably would say that he had not thought specially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer for he meant neither to speak of the stick nor of the brush in particular.
> Wittgenstein (1972 edition) p. 29

The fact that a particular arrangement of a stick and a brush creates a new artifact is less a matter of physics than of a convention which reflects human interests. We do not have a name for a random bundle of threads because there is not much use for us in such a bundle whereas once woven they become a piece of cloth. The manufacture of a piece of cloth involves rearrangement of the threads rather than any change in "substance". Wittgenstein's point here is that such objects are not necessarily better understood when analyzed into their component parts — a broom is a broom. Too much analysis can actually lead to confusion as, for example, when people claim
that solid artifacts such as tables are really mostly space, a statement made on the basis of discoveries in quantum physics. In the case of artifacts, our vocabulary clearly reflects human interests and it is with regard to such objects that Lewis's dictum regarding changes seems applicable. The distinction between essence and accident here is a matter of terminology and definition. In the case of an object such as a table its identity depends upon it conforming to a set of descriptions rather than on any underlying essential "substance". The relevant descriptions govern what we would say regarding whether a particular object survives some change. Thus, for example, we would usually say that a table survives a new coat of paint since its identity is not dependent on it being a particular colour. It is not that we don't recognize that a change has occurred, but we regard the change as unimportant. There are cases where we would not be sure what to say — what of a table lying in pieces in our attic?

The Nyāya view on change with respect to these objects takes us far from this common sense view. Their position here is reminiscent of the Buddhists inasmuch as they equate physical change with a change in identity. The first question the Nyāya philosopher needs to settle is — when does an arrangement of parts produce a new whole (avayavin) as opposed to a mere aggregate (samudāyamātra)? The only answer given seems to be that a new whole is produced when the resulting conglomerate is able to perform a new function. Experience here will tell us whether or not a new whole has been produced. Hence it is not so
Kṣanabhaṅgavāda I

much a matter of physics as conventions which reflect our human interests. Yet at the same time the Naiyāyikas equate the smallest physical changes with loss of identity. For example, the addition of every new thread to a piece of cloth results in the destruction of the old piece and the creation of a new piece. In stating this, they are accepting a basic premise of the Buddhist position, that change in such objects implies destruction. The common sense view would be to agree with the Buddhists in concurring that the world is in a constant state of physical change but to disagree with them by expressing the view that the identity of many objects at least can tolerate such minute physical changes. According to the Nyāya theory of avayavin, this is not the case, and physical change, however minute, becomes the criteria for a change in identity. The result will be that only those objects with unchanging underlying substances will retain an enduring identity. It can be seen that this is a result of not clearly seeing the role which convention plays in determining which arrangements of elements constitute the formation of a new whole. These ideas create a source of tension for the overall consistency of the Nyāya system inasmuch as they undermine the idea of a stable external world.

(3) Personal Identity

In what does a person's personal identity subsist? Like a seed, a person changes considerably in his/her lifetime, passing through various stages from babyhood to old-age, changes which are, on the surface at least, quite dramatic. Questions of
personal identity centre on questions concerning what it is which makes someone who they are. We have already seen that a person on a Buddhist analysis is no more than a series of momentary events. There is no abiding entity which can be the carrier of personal identity. Rather, a person is a series of related events and the idea of personal identity becomes like a continuum, the links between babyhood and old-age being rather tenuous. In this theory personal identity becomes an idea which is subject to degrees —my relationship to 'myself' as a baby is more tenuous than my relationship to 'myself' yesterday. According to Nyāya thought, personal identity is wholly discrete since an eternal ātman is postulated as the carrier of an individual's identity. The ātman is an eternal substance and hence subsists through all surface changes. There are a plurality of ātman in the Nyāya system, as opposed to the idea of one cosmic ātman or brahman. Each individual is possessed of one ātman which remains the same through all the other changes that occur in a person's life, and is the carrier of identity of that person. We shall see that this was an important element of the soteriological aspects of Nyāya thought (see Chapter Six).
Statement of the Proof

yat sat tat kṣaṇikaṁ, yathā ghaṭaḥ, saṁśca vīvādādhyāsiṁtaḥ
śabdādiriṁ ti cet.

na, pratibandhāsiddheḥ.

sāmarthyasāmarthyalakṣaṇaviruddhadharmasaṁsargena
bhedasiddhau tatsiddhirīti cet.

na, viruddhadharmasaṁsargāsiddheḥ.

prasaṅgaviparyayābhyaṁ tatsiddhirīti cet.

na, sāmarthyam hi karaṅatvaṁ vā yogyatā vā.

First alternative (karaṅatvaṁ) considered

nādyāḥ, sādhyāviśiṣṭatvaprasaṅgāt
Statement of the Proof

"Whatever exists is momentary, like a pot, and whatever is an object of dispute, such as sound and so on, is an existent." 3

No, there is no proof for this concomitance.

"Through the association of opposite properties in the form of capability (sāmarthyam) and incapability (aśāmarthyam), difference is established, and that is the proof."

No, the association of opposite qualities cannot be established. 4

"The proof of that (association of opposite qualities) is by means of the prasaṅga and prasaṅgaparyaya types of argument." 5

No, for sāmarthyam is here either active productiveness (karapātva) or productive capability (vṛgyatā).

First alternative (karapātva) considered

It is not the first, because otherwise there is the
Kaṇḍabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

vyāvṛtti bheda daya mandosa iti cet.

na, tadanupatthe, vyāvartyabhedena virodho hi
tamūlam.

sa ca na tāvanmitho vyāvartyapratikṣepād gotvāśvatvavat,
tathā sati virodhādanyatarāpye bādhāsiddhāyoranyatarā-
prasaṅgāt.

nāpi tādākṣepapratiṣepābhyaṃ vṛksatvaśiśapātvavat,
parāparabhāvānabhyupagamāt. abhyupagame vā
samarthasyāpyakaraṇamasamarthasyāpi vā karaṇām
prasaṭyeta.

nāpyupādhibhedāt kāryatvānītyatvavat, tadbhāvāt. na ca
śabdamātraṃupādhiḥ, yathārthaśabdocchedaprasaṅgāt.
contingency of the non-distinction of the sādhyā
(sādhyavisīṣṭa).  

"There is no mistake because of the difference in the
exclusions (vyāvṛttis)."

No, that is illogical, for the basis of that difference
in the vyāvṛttis is the opposition between that which
is to be excluded (vyāvartyas).

Such an opposition is not at all through the opposition
of things to be excluded mutually, like "cowness" and
"horseness". Because, if this were so, the possibility
that in absence of any one of the two the other will be
there, on account of the mutual opposition, is not established
and is contradictory.

Nor is it possible through the inclusion and exclusion
(of vyāvṛttis), as in the case of "tree-ness" and
"śimśapa-ness", for there is no acceptance in this
case of inclusion and exclusion. Or, in the event of
acceptance here, in the presence of efficacy (sāmarthyā) there
will be non-productivity, or in the non-presentation of
sāmarthyā there will be productivity.

Nor can it be because of a difference in properties
(upādhi), as in the case of being an effect and being
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda I

nāpi vikalpabhedāḥ, svarūpakṛtasya tasya vyāvṛttibhedakatve' samarthavyāvṛttterapi bhedaprasāṅgāt, viṣayakṛtasya tu tasya bhedakatve' nyonyāśrayaprasāṅgāt. na ca nirmimitta evāyaṁ vyāvṛttiḥ bhedavyavahāro, atiprasāṅgāt.

Second alternative (Yogyatā) considered

nāpi dvitīyāḥ, sa hi sahakārisākalyām vā prātisvikiṃ vā.

First option (sahakārisākalyam) of second alternative

na tāvadādyāḥ pakṣāḥ, siddhasādhanāt, parānabhyupagamena
non-eternal. There is no possibility of that, for the property is not merely the word itself, because then the possibility of synonyms will be destroyed.\textsuperscript{10}

Nor can a difference in ideas (vikalpas) [constitute a difference for the exclusions (vyāvṛttis)]. In the case of the difference in the ideas being brought about by the mental episode itself, when this becomes the differentiating factor, then there will be an unwanted difference in the case of asamarthanāvyāvṛtti itself.\textsuperscript{11} In the case of the difference in ideas being brought about by the objects themselves, when this is responsible for the difference, it will lead to a mutual dependency. And the statement of difference concerning the exclusions cannot be based on nothing at all, for then anything could count as the basis for it.\textsuperscript{12}

Second alternative (yogyatā) considered

Nor can it be the second possibility (yogyatā), for that is either the totality of the accessorial causes (sahakārisākalyam) or something specific to that particular thing (prātisviktī).

First option (sahakārisākalyam) of second alternative

The first position is not possible, because (1) that
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

hetvasiddheśca.

(1) yat sahaṅkārisaṁadadānavat taddhi karotyeveti
   ko nāma nābhupaiti yamuddiśya sādhyaṃ

(2) na cākaṇaṇakāle sahaṅkārisaṁadadānavattvam-
   asmābhīrabhyupayete yataḥ prasaṅgaḥ pravarteta.

Second option (prātisvīkī) of second alternative

prātisvīkī tu yogyatā anvayaavittere kāvīśayībhūtām
bījatvāṃ vā svāt tadavāntarajātibhedo vā,
saḥaṅkāri vaikalyapravuktakāryābhāvavattvām vā.

(1) na tāvadādyah, akurvato'pi bījajātīrasya
   pratyakṣasiddhatvāt, tavepi tatrāviperatipatteḥ.

(2) na dvītyayaḥ, tasya kurvato'pi mayānabhyupagamena
   drsṭāntasya sādhanavikalatvāt.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

leads to the establishment of what is already proved and (2) the reason (hetu) is not established and is not accepted for argument's sake by the opponent. (1) That which has the presence of all the accessoriel causes, that alone definitely produces. In this case, who does not accept this? You are arguing with someone who already accepts this point.13 (2) And at the time of not producing, its possession of all the accessoriel causes is not accepted by us.14 Therefore, you cannot proceed with the prasaṅga type of argument.

Second option (prātisvikiṣṭ) of second alternative

And the productive capability (vogyatā) as some excellence specific to that thing (prātisvikiṣṭ) could be (1) seedness, which is known through concomitance and difference, or (2) it could be some different genus subsidiary to it15 or (3) it could be possession of the absence of a product brought about by the absence of the accessoriel causes. (1) The first position is not possible, because of a proof by perception — in the case of [a seed] which does not produce but possesses "seedness". Even with you, there is no difference of opinion here.16 (2) The second alternative is not possible, because even in the case of [a seed] which produces, I do not accept
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

ko hi nāma susthātmā pramāṇaśūnyamabhyaupagacchet?
sa hi na tāvat pratyakṣenānubhūyate, tathānavasāyāt.
napranumānena, liṅgābhāvāt.

yadi na kaścidviśeṣaḥ kathaṁ tarhi karaṇākaraṇe iti cet?

ka evamāha neti?
paraṁ kīṁ jātibhedarūpaḥ sahaṅkarilābhālābhārūpo veti,
niyāmakaṁ pramāṇamanusaranto na paśyāmāḥ.

tathāpi yo' yaṁ sahaṅkarīmadhyamadhyāśīno'kṣepakaraṇasvabhāvo bhāvāḥ sa yadi prāgapyāsīt tadā prasahya, kāryaṁ kuryaṇo
gīrvāṇaśūpaśātenāpyapahastayituṁ na ākhyate iti cet.
the example, because of the absence of a reason. 17
Who of sound mind will accept something which is without a proper epistemological basis? It is not subject to perception, thus there is no basis for it. Nor can it be by means of inference, because of the absence of a reason (liṅga) for you. 18

"If there is no difference, how can there be production and non-production?"

Who says in this matter [there is no difference]? Whether this in the form of a separate genus (jāti), or whether it is of the form of the presence and absence of the accessorial causes, we who are searching for the epistemological basis do not see the deciding factor (niyāmakam).

"Even then, this [seed in the field], when present along with all its accessorial causes, is an entity whose nature is producing an effect without delay and this [seed] is such that, even if it were existent earlier, then, because of the sheer force of it, it is not possible, even with hundreds of oaths made by gods, to prevent the bringing about of the effect." 19

This can only be stated if the entity's possessing the
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

yuktam etat yadyakṣepakaraṇasvabhāvatvāṃ bhāvasya
pramāṇagocaraḥ svāt, tadeva tu kutaḥ siddhamiti
nādhiṣgacchāmaḥ.

prasaṅgatadviparyābhhyām iti cet.

na, parasarāyaprasaṅgāt. evaṁsvabhāvatvasiddhau hi
tayoḥ pravrttih, tatpravrttau caivaṁsvabhāvatvasiddhiriti.

svād etat, kāryajanmaiva śminnarthe pramāṇam,
vilambakārisvabhāvānuvrṛttau kāryānupattih sarvadeti cet.

na, vilambakārisvabhāvasya sarvadaivākaraṇe
tattvavyāghatāt.

tataśca vilambakārītyasya yāvatsahakāryasannidhānaṁ
tāvannakarotītyarthah.
nature of immediate production were within the scope of one of the instruments of knowledge. How that can be established, we do not know.

"That can be by prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya."

No, because there will be a mutual dependence. Their employment rests on the establishment of the entity having a particular nature, and the establishment of its having this nature rests on the employment [of the prasaṅga].

"Let this be, but in this matter the instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) is the production of the effect itself, because of the continuance of the nature of delayed production, there will never be production of an effect at all."

No, because there will be contradiction in your statement that something can be of the nature of producing an effect with delay and not being productive at all.

And so the meaning of the expression "delayed productivity" is, "so long as there is absence of all the accessorial causes, so long will it not produce".
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

evaṁ ca kāryajanma sāmagryāṁ pramāṇayituh śakyate na tu jātibhede.

te tu kīṁ yathānubhavāṁ vilambakārisvabhāvaḥ parasparaṁ pratyāsannāḥ kāryāṁ kṛtavantaḥ, kīṁ vā yathā tvaparikalpanam ksiprakārisvabhāva ityatra kāryajananaṁmajāgarūkameveti.

nāpi trētvāḥ, virodhāt. sahakāryabhāvapravuktakāryābhāvavāṁśca sahakārivirahe kāryaṁāśceti vyāhatam.

tasmād yad yadabhāve eva yanna karoti tat tattsadbhae tat karotyeva iti tu syāt, etacca sthairyasid hereva paraṁ bījam sarvasvamiti
And so, in this way, it is possible for the production of an effect to be an instrument of knowledge for the totality of the accessorial causes (sāmagṛī), but not for a separate genus (jāti).

But whether [the accessorial causes], according to experience, having the nature of delayed effectiveness, come together at a particular place and produce the effect, or whether, according to your assumption, they are of the nature of producing without delay, in this matter the production of the effect is irrelevant.

(3) Nor is it the third alternative because of the resulting contradiction between the possession of the absence of the effect brought about by the absence of the accessorial causes and the possession of the effect in the absence of the accessorial causes.22

Therefore, that which is in the absence [of accessories] that alone does not produce [the sprout], and that one in the presence of [the accessories] will produce the sprout. And it is this fact which is at the root of the proof of permanence, and this is the heart of the matter.
I have tried to present the translations as a dialogue between Udayana and his Buddhist opposition. Quotation marks in the translation signify that it is the Buddhist position which is being presented, a grammatical device which corresponds to the construction "....iti cet" in the Sanskrit original. Of course, this dialogue should not be seen as a discussion between a Buddhist and Udayana, but rather, between a theoretical Buddhist position, as constructed by Udayana, and Udayana himself.

The Sanskrit text is based on two editions of the ATV, the 1939 Bibliotheca Indica edition (pp. 22-57), and the 1940 Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition (pp. 1-17). Where important discrepancies occur this will be indicated in the footnotes. The punctuation is mostly taken from the 1940 edition. I have tried to arrange the Sanskrit text, as closely as possible, parallel to the English translation so that an easy comparison is possible. The sub-titles in the translation are my own and I hope they make it easier for the reader to follow the thread of the argument. (See also the end of the footnotes for a plan of the argument.)

This opening verse of Udayana's is similar to the thesis of the momentariness as presented by Jñānaśrīmitra in the opening of his Kṣanabhaṅgādhyāya:

\[
yat sat tat kṣaṇikaṁ yathā jaladharak santastu bhāvā ime.
sattā śaktir ihārthakarmapi. miteḥ siddheṣu
diddāh na sā/
\]

\[
nāpyekaiva vidhāṇyadāpi parakṛṣṇnaiva kriyā
vā bhaved
dvedāpi kṣanabhāṅga saṁgatir atah sādhya ca
tvā śrāmyati//
\]

p. 1 in Ed. Thakur (1956)

This position is also stated by Ratnakirti in the opening of his Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi:

\[
yat sat tat kṣanikaṁ / yathā ghaṭah /
santaścāmī vivāḍāspādhūṭāḥ padārtha iti
svabhāvahetu /
\]

p. 78 in Ed. Thakur (1957)

The Buddhist thesis of momentariness will therefore rest on the idea that a capable object is different from an incapable object. One and the same object cannot be associated with both of these qualities, namely, capability and incapability. Hence a samarthaghaṭa (a capable pot) is different from an asamarthaghāṭa (an incapable pot), whereas Udayana would want to say that a pot can be carrying water one moment and not the next, but it is still the same pot. The argument between Udayana and his Buddhist opposition
settles on the question of whether the seed in the granary (kusūlasthāṁ bijam) is the same seed as when it is thrown into the field (kṣetra-patita) and produces a sprout (āṅkura). The Buddhist will argue that the granary seed is a different entity from the field seed, whereas Udayana will argue that the granary seed is to be counted as the same seed as that which eventually produces the sprout when sown in the field.

5. Here the dual case ending indicates that both the prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya types of argument are to be used here. The prasaṅga will be as follows:

If something is capable then it produces.

And the prasaṅgaviparyaya will be:

If something is not capable then it does not produce.

So, a seed in the granary, if it were capable would produce a sprout, and conversely, a seed in the field, if non-capable, would not produce.

"tathāhi kusūlasthāṁ bijam yadāṅkura samarthāśa
syād āṅkuraṁ kuryāt, na ca karoti, tasmāna
samarthamevaṁ; kṣetrapatita yadāsamarthāṁ syānna
kuryāt, karoti ca, tasmānna-samarthamiti
prasaṅgābhāyāṁ viparyayābhāyāṁ ca; kusūlasthakṣetra-
patitabijayor bhedaḥ / tathā kṣanikatvameva
paryavasyedīti bhāvah /" Saṃkara Miśra's Commentary on the
ATV p. 34 (1939)

"For, if the seed in the granary were capable of producing a sprout it would produce a sprout, and it does not. Therefore it is not capable in this matter; and if the seed fallen in the field were not capable it would not produce [a sprout], and it does. Therefore it is not incapable in this matter. These two arguments are the prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya respectively. There is thus a difference between the granary seed and the seed in the field, and this is a proof of momentariness."

This prasaṅga used in the proof of momentariness has become a classic model to illustrate this type of argument. For example, in the Tarkabhāṣā we read: "We have said before that the vyāpti [concomitance] between 'existence' and 'momentariness' is to be understood by prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya. What is here meant by prasaṅga? Prasaṅga is reasoning for bringing out an absurd conclusion which is undesirable to the opponent by means of a statement based on a vyāpti established by proof. For example, if a jar (at the present moment) were admitted to maintain one and the same nature that subsisted in the past and will continue to do so in the future, then we could point out (the absurdity) that it is (at the present moment) capable of producing the effects belonging to the past and future (moments of the jar)." Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta translated by Kajiyama (1966) pp. 114-115.

In his translation of the Tarkabhāṣā, Kajiyama notes that: "Prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya are used in order to establish the vyāpti of another independent syllogism
(svatantraprayoga). In our present context the independent inference concerned is:

yat sat tat kṣaṇikām, yathā ghaṭaḥ; santscāmi vivādaśpadibhūṭāḥ padārthāḥ.

Thus the vyāpti to be proved by prasaṅga is: whatever exists is momentary. We have to keep in mind that since Dharmakīrtī's time, Buddhist logicians had defined 'existence' as 'being making effective action' (arthakriyākāritva)." Kajiyama (as above), p. 116.

6. Udayana's point here is that, if you take sāmarthyam to mean karapratvam, your prasaṅga will have the following form:

If something is producing then it produces.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{prasājaka} & \to & \text{prasājya} \\
\text{sādhana} & \leftrightarrow & \text{sādhya}
\end{array}
\]

In this form there is no difference between the sādhana and the sādhya (sādyayāvisista).

7. Udayana here has the opposition evading his previous criticisms by invoking their particular theory of meaning, apohavāda, which states that the meaning of a word is given through what is excluded by that word (see Chapter Four). A difference between the sādhyā and the sādhana can be maintained, so their argument goes, because of a difference in their exclusions. Udayana then proceeds to examine the four possibilities opened up by this line of argument in order to show the fallaciousness of each one.

8. The point here is that, in the example given, there is a mutual exclusion. "Horseness" (according to the apoha theory of meaning) is all that is not non-horse and "cowness" is all that is not non-cow. Wherever "horseness" is, then this will exclude "cowness". Hence in the prasaṅga, if the difference in their vyāvṛttis is of this type, then "sāmarthyam" and "karapratvam" would exclude each other, a situation which Udayana well knows to be unacceptable for the Buddhists. The situation would be that the absence of the sādhyā could bring about the presence of the sādhana.

9. (Note: Āśīśapā is a type of tree.)

Here the example given is that of a 'higher' and 'lower' genus (jāti). The concomitance (vyāpti) would be as follows:

Where there is āśīśapā-ness there is tree-ness.

(Where there is smoke there is fire.)

This vyāpti is not reversible: the presence of the vyāpaka (āśīśapā-ness) implies the presence of the vyāpaka (tree-ness), but the reverse is not true.

Hence:

Where there is tree-ness there is āśīśapā-ness is not a valid concomitance. If we take the vyāpti in our example, it will be as follows:
Where there is karagatvam there is sāmarthyam and then it will be possible for sāmarthyam to be present without karagatvam. If the vyāpti is reversed, then it will be possible for karagatvam to be present without sāmarthyam. Both possibilities would be unacceptable.

10. Here Udayana has the Buddhist reverting to the idea of samavyāpti (symmetrical concomitance) having just been previously refuted on the basis of asamvyāpti (asymmetrical concomitance). The properties of being an effect and being non-eternal are given as examples of properties which always are present together yet which do not have the same meaning.

The Naiyāyika makes the point here that the difference in upādhis can be described and explained. Saṅkara Miśra explains the difference between kāryatvam and anityatvam in the following manner, that being an effect (kāryatvam) refers to a prior non-existence before coming into being, whereas being non-eternal (anityatvam) refers to the termination of existence after coming into being. ("praṅgabhāva-vicchinnasattāyogitvāṃ kāryatvam dhvamsāvicchinnasattāyogitvamanityatvamityupādher-bhinnatvamastu prakṛte tu natathopādhirastītyāha." ATV (1939) p. 43)

It would therefore be incumbent on the Buddhist to introduce such a difference for the case in question namely, for karanatvam and sāmarthyam. Udayana then goes on to point out that if the Buddhists attempt to locate the difference merely in the fact that here there are two different words used, then this would have the unfortunate result that synonyms would no longer be possible, that is, it would not be possible ever to have two different words which have the same meaning. (It might be noted that a distinction between sense and reference might have been useful here.)

11. Udayana is here making a logical point. In the standard Nyāya syllogism the reason or justification (hetu) appears in two different ways namely, in the pakṣa (There is smoke on the hill.), and then again in the statement of the concomitance (vyāpti) (Wherever there is smoke there is fire.). Because the hetu (smoke in this case) appears in the pakṣa and in the statement of concomitance with the sādhya (fire in this case), this will give rise to two different types of knowledge concerning the hetu. This accordingly will mean that there are two different conceptions (vikalpas) concerning the hetu, and the inference (anumāna) will be completely destroyed because the basis for the inference is that the hetu should be the same in both of its appearances. This would also hold true for the Buddhist form of inference.
12. Udayana points out here that the difference in the conceptions (vikalpas) cannot be based on a difference between the objects themselves, because this is the very thing which needs to be demonstrated here.

13. This section is by way of an explanation of siddhasādhanāt, that is, the establishment of what is already proved. If yogyatā or productive power is to be explained with reference to the presence of all the accessorial causes, then the Naiyāyika has no argument with this position. Of course the acceptance of this interpretation of yogyatā by the Buddhists in their original prasaṅga would be fatal in its usefulness for establishing momentariness:

That which is in the presence of all the accessorial causes produces,
That which is not in the presence of all the accessorial causes does not produce.

It can be seen from the above substitution that the difference between the granary seed and the field seed could not be substantiated.

("yadā sahakārīsākalyarūpasya hetob siddhiḥ tadā karṇāḥbhupagamāti siddhasādhanam ityarthāḥ." Nārāyaṇa's Commentary on the ATV (1940 edition) p. 11.)

14. This section is by way of an explanation of hetvasiddha, that is, the non-establishment of the hetu or reason. In the previous section, the capability of the field seed rested on the presence of all the accessorial causes. In this section the Naiyāyikas are rejecting the idea that the granary seed is incapable because they point out that in this case all the accessorial causes are not present, that is, the hetu is not established.

15. Although Udayana doesn't refer to it as such it would seem that by 'some other different quality' (tadavāntara-jātibheda) he is referring to the Buddhist idea that an effect is brought about by the possession of some special causal excellence (kurvadrūpavattvam) in the object.

("tadavāntara-jātibhedah kurvadrūpavattvam parābhupagatamityarthāh." Saṃkara Miśra's Commentary on the ATV (1939 edition) p. 48.)

This will be the main position of the Buddhists which Udayana will be concerned to attack —that the effective seed, that is, the seed which produces the sprout, possesses some exceptional quality (kurvadrūpavattvam) which sets it apart from the granary seed.

16. Thus "seedness" cannot be the feature responsible for capability (yogyatā). Even the seeds in the granary possess "seedness", are called seeds, yet they are not at that time capable of producing sprouts:

"If [the seed] in the granary were a seed then it would produce. This is the argument (prasaṅga), and [the granary
seed] does not produce. Therefore in the reverse of this argument [we would say that the granary seed] is not a seed.

"yadi kuśūlasthasyaṁ bījaṁ syāt tadā kuryāditi prasaṅga na ca karoti; tasmānna bījamiti viparyayaśca." Saṅkara Miśra's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 49. This same argument is found in Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali I.16

17. The argument here now concerns the field seed. Udayana just seems to be stating flatly that he doesn't accept any special additional quality in the field seed. The Buddhist has every right to ask here, "Why not?" — a rejoinder which has to be supplied by the reader, since Udayana does indeed go on to defend his rejection. In the example (drśtānta), which in this case is the field seed, Udayana does not accept the presence of the kurvadrūpatvam or special excellence, and hence he rejects the prasaṅga upon which the Buddhists' argument is based:

"If the seed in the granary were in possession of the special causal excellence then it would produce, as in the case of the seed in the field."

"kuśūlasthasā bījamāyadi kurvadrūpatvajñātimat syāt kuryāt kṣetrapatitabājaval." To which Udayana would reply:

"In the case of the field seed also there is no possession of any causal excellence."

"kṣetrapatite pi bīje kurvadrūpatvam nāsti." Saṅkara Miśra's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 51.

18. Udayana points out first that this causal excellence is not perceived. Neither can it be by means of inference because there is no reason (liṅga) upon which to base the inference, as in the case of the inference of fire from smoke.

19. The Buddhist would want to say here that the production of the effect should itself be the reason. If there is no difference in the field seed, so they would want to argue, how can you account for the production of the sprout? Udayana counters this argument by saying that of course there must be some difference in the circumstances of the field seed, but sees no reason why this should be attributed to some special kurvadrūpatvam rather than just the presence of the accessorail causes. The Buddhist emphasizes his position with regard to the kurvadrūpatvam thus — that a seed possessed of kurvadrūpatvam cannot brook delay and must produce its effect immediately, nothing can prevent it, not even the oaths of the gods. The kurvadrūpatvam is inherent to the efficient seed moment. The Naiyāyika will only admit the existence of such a kurvadrūpatvam if the Buddhist can produce an instrument of knowledge (pramāga) for it, which so far they have failed to do to Udayana's satisfaction.

20. Udayana continues to argue that he can see no way for the Buddhist to establish his case — that production takes place because of some additional quality essential in the field
seed (svabhāva). Hence the argument between the Buddhist and Udayana is over whether there is some 'svabhāva' which is responsible for the productivity. The Buddhist once again turns to a prāsaṅga type of argument to prove his case:

"If the [field] seed were not of the nature of production without delay, it would not produce and it does produce. Therefore its nature is of production without delay."

"bījam yadi akṣepakaranaśvabhāvaḥ na śyāt na kuryāt karoti ca, tasmād akṣepakārisvabhāvam."

Saśkara Miśrā's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 51.

As Udayana points out, this prāsaṅga fails to accomplish what it sets out to do since the svabhāva is already assumed in the prāsaṅga, rather than the prāsaṅga proving the existence of the svabhāva.

21. Here Udayana is making a logical point, "splitting hairs" some might say, in pointing out that the Buddhist is contradicting himself in his very use of the phrase "production by delay" in the same breath as saying that there is no possibility of this.

22. The idea of this third alternative is to distinguish between the absence of an effect in say, a piece of stone, and the seed in the granary. In a piece of stone there is no sprout just because of the fact that it is a piece of stone (because of "stone-ness"), whereas in the granary seed the absence of the sprout is due to the absence of the accessorical causes. This much is true, but you cannot define yogyatā or productive capability in these terms because then, as Udayana is here pointing out, you are ascribing yogyatā to the granary seed as well as to the seed in the field. Hence the granary seed would supposedly produce the sprout even though the accessorical causes are not present because, according to this definition, it is yogyatā and herein lies the contradiction:

"For otherwise [if productive capability] was defined as that in which the absence of the effect was brought about by the absence of the accessorical causes, then the seed in the granary would produce and it does not."

"nanu kuśūlasthaṁ bījam yadi sahhārīviraha-prayuktakāryābhāvavatsyāt kuryāt na ca karoti." Saśkara Miśrā's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 57.

"In the case of a piece of stone, the absence of the effect is not brought about by the absence of the accessorical causes, but rather by stone-ness. In the case of a seed, in the presence of the accessorical causes, however, there is no absence of the effect."

"śilāśakale kāryābhāvo na sahhārīvaiṣkalyapravuktāṁ kiṁ tu śilāṭvaprayukta eva bije sahhārisākalye kāryābhāvo na bhavatyāva." Saśkara Miśrā's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 48
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT A CONT'D.

Plan of the argument in Text A

THE BUDDHIST

Statement of proof
"That which exists is momentary."

UDAYANA

No, no concomitance

THE BUDDHIST

It depends on what you mean by capability

UDAYANA

It depends on what you mean by capability
karaṇatvam (active productiveness)
rejected by Udayana as resulting in a tautology

UDAYANA

yogatā (productive capability)

THE BUDDHIST

Yes, because something enduring will have capability and non-capability associated with it. Prasaṅga: "If capable then will produce."

prātisviki (something specific to that particular thing)

(1) seedness

(2) kurvadrūpatvam (possession of some special excellence)

(3) absence of effect caused by absence of accessorial causes

totality of sahakāris (accessorial causes)
(Udayana has no argument with this position.)
TEXT B

PARALLEL Sanskrit Text

The seed as an object of a statement of causal efficacy

etena samarthavyavahāragocaratvaḥ hetur iti

nirastam. tādṛṣṭaḥ vyavahāragocarasyāpi bījasyāṅkurākaraṇadarśanāt.

nāsaṃ mukhyastadvyavahāraḥ, tasya janananimittakatvāt,
anyathā tvaniyamaprasaṅgāditi cet.

na, kīḍaṃ punarjananām mukhyasamarthavyavahāranimittam.
na tāvadakṣepakaraṇaṃ tasyāsiddheḥ.

niyamasya ca sahakārisākalye satya eva karaṇaṃ karaṇamevyety-
evaṃsvabhāvatvenāpyupapatteḥ, tataśca janananimitta
evāyaṃ vyavahāro na ca vyāptiśiddhirītī.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The seed as an object of a statement of causal efficacy

"The reason [for the difference between the granary and the field seed] is by means of [the field seed] being an object of a statement of causal efficacy."²

No. The reason is not there, because of the observation that in the case of a seed which does not sprout it is still yet an object of such a statement.³

"That statement is not really such a statement, because the production of the effect is the basis for [such a statement], otherwise there will be no concomitant connection."⁴

No. What kind of production would be the basis of a statement of real capability. It cannot be bringing about the effect without delay because that has not been established by you.

And in respect of this concomitance, the cause only in the presence of the accessorial causes is the cause, and so because of this feature there is the applicability of the statement [of capability]. Consequently, such a statement is only the basis for the production and not the proof of a concomitance.⁵
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT B

1. ATV pp. 16-17 (1940 edition)  
   ATV pp. 58-61 (1939 edition)

2. This refers to an argument put forward by Ratnakirti in his Kṣapabhaṅgasiddhi (1957 edition) p. 63. The argument here is that there must be some basis for calling something "samartha" (capable). Being an object of a statement of capability (samarthavyavahāragocaratvam) is for Ratnakirti based on the production of the effect by that object. Hence there is a concomitance between samarthavyavahāragocaratvam and jananam or production of the effect. Śaṅkara Miśra states the Buddhist argument thus:
   "For surely, if the seed in the granary were an object of a statement of capability it would produce, and it does not produce. Therefore it cannot be the object of a statement of capability."
   nanu kuśulasthāṁ yadi samarthavya vaḥāragocaraḥ syāt kuryāṇa ca karoti tasmāṁna samarthavya vaḥāragocara iti prasaṅgaviparyayau.
   Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 59.

3. Udayana disagrees with this because of the plain fact that we just do call seeds in the granary "seeds". This fact must overrule the prasaṅga.

4. The Buddhist counters by saying that such statements are not really statements of capability (mukhyasamarthavyavahāra). Granary seeds are only called "seeds" in a secondary sense. (For the Buddhist opponent the granary seed would be in the same seed series or saṁtāna as the field seed.) There must be some basis for calling something as samartha and this is the production of the effect; otherwise we might as well call a piece of stone a seed. The production of the sprout in the case of the seed has to be the basis for a statement of real capability.

5. Udayana then asks what kind of production it would be, even if the concomitance is accepted. It cannot be immediate production because that has not yet been proved by the Buddhists. Seeds are just called "seeds" because of their ability to produce sprouts under the right conditions. The actual production of the sprout can be the basis for calling a particular seed as such but it does not establish the concomitance put forward by the Buddhist.
The nature of karaṇam considered

tathāhi karaṇam pratyavilamba iti ko'arthāḥ?
kimutpatteranantarameva karaṇam, sahakārisamavadhānān-
antarameva vā. vilamba ityapi ko'arthāḥ? kiṁ yāvanna
sahakārisamavadhānam tāvadakaraṇām, sarvathaivākaraṇam
iti vā.
Introduction

This section begins with a challenge from the Buddhists who demand to know what kind of entity has been established so far by the Naiyāyikas: "Apart from delay and non-delay in bringing about the effect, no other nature is possible." Udayana points out that up until now their role has been to refute the Buddhist position and only now is it time for him to consider the nature of the seed in the granary.

The nature of karāṇam considered

What do you mean by production (karāṇam) with reference to non-delay? Do you mean (1) production immediately after the moment of the previous cause coming into being? or, (2) does it mean production immediately after the presence of all the co-causes? Is this what you mean by delay in production? (3) Does it mean that so long as the co-causes are not present, so long will there be non-production? or, (4) does it mean production never at all?

Though in respect of the first and fourth alternatives
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

tatra prathamacaturthayoh pramāṇābhāvādaniścaye'pi
dvitiyatīryanayoḥ pratyakṣameva pramāṇam.

bījajātīrasya hi sahakārisamavadhānānantarameva
karaṇam karaṇameveti pratyakṣasiddhameva. tathā
sahakārisamavadhānārāhitasāyakaraṇamityapi, 2 atra ca
bhavānapi na vipratipadyata eva, pramāṇasiddhatvāt,
viparyaye bādhakācca.

tathāhi yadi sahakārivirahe' kurvāṇastatsamavadhāne
'pi na kuryāt tajjātīyamakaranameva syāt,
samavadhānāsamavadhānāyorubhavorapyakaranāt.

evaḥ tatsamavadhānavirahe' pi yadi kuryāt sahakāriṇo
na kāraṇam syuh tānantaṃapi karanāt.

tathā cānanyathāsiddhānvayavyatirekavatāmapyakāragatve
kāryasyāksamikatvaprāsāṅgah, tathā ca kādācītkatva-
there is no conclusiveness due to lack of proof, in respect of
the second and third alternatives, there is proof by perception
(pratyakṣa).

And in respect of the universal "seedness" (bījajāti), only when
present with all the co-causes is there production, and there is
surely a production, a fact established by perception. Likewise,
when the co-causes are not present, there is no production. And
here you too do not have any opposite notion because there is an
instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) established [for these cases],
whereas in the opposite there is contradiction.

And so, if without co-causes something is non-productive, then,
even when present with co-causes, it will not produce. That
which is of the same type would be non-productive, because of the
ineffectiveness of both presence and absence of co-causes.

Likewise, even if in the absence of the co-causes it will
produce, then the co-causes will not be the cause because they
are no longer the cause for the production.

And so, when this concomitance (anvayavyatireka) [with
reference to the co-causes], which is not otherwise
vihatiriti

evaṁ ca dvitīyapakṣavivakṣāyāmakṣepakāritvameva bhāvasya svabhāvaḥ. tṛtīyapakṣavivakṣāyāṁ tu kṣepakāritvameva bhāvasya svarūpamiti nobhayapraṇārāṇīvṛttiriti.

tathāpi kimasamarthasyaiva sahaṅgirivirahāḥ,
svarūpalabhāntaraṁ kartureva vā sahaṅgārisamavadhānām anyathā veti. kiṁ nityāmakam iti cet.

idamucyate - kuśūlasthabṛjasya aṅkurāṅukūlahśilāśakalādviśeṣaḥ kaścidasti na vā? na cenniyamenaikatra pravṛttiḥ anyasmāṇīvṛttiśca tadarthino na syāt.
established, is not a causal factor then you cannot say how the production comes about. There will be the loss that the effect comes at a particular time.\textsuperscript{3}

And so, taking the second case, the essential nature of the entity will be immediate production. But, taking the third case, the essential nature of the object will be delayed production. And thus there is no absence of both natures.\textsuperscript{4}

"Even though you have established that the seed has both natures, do you mean to say that the absence of the co-causes (sahakārins) is only related to the non-productive (asamartha) seed or, that the co-causes come to the [seed] after attaining its effective nature or, do you mean something else? Where is the decisive factor?"

This is said in the case of the granary seed - there is some excellence favourable to the production of a sprout which makes it different from a piece of stone. Do you accept this or not? If not, there would not be, as a rule, movement to the one and not the other in the case of one [who wants a harvest].
Kṣapabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL Sanskrit TEXT

paramparavāṅkuraprasavasamarthhabhījakṣapajananād
asty eteti cet.

kādā punah paramparayāpi tathābhūtaṃ kariṣyatīti?

tatra sandeha iti cet.

sa punah kimākāraḥ? kim sahaṅkāriṣu samavahātesvapi
kariṣyati na veti, utāsamavahātesvapi tēgu kariṣyati
na veti, atha yadā sahaṅkārisamavadhānaṃ tadaiva
kariṣyatryeva param kādā tēṣām samavadhānamiti
sandhyāḥ.⁵

na tāvat pūrvaḥ, sāmānyataḥ kāraṇatvāvadhāraṇe
tasyānavakāśāt, avakāśe vā kāraṇatvānavadhāraṇāt.

nāpi dvītiyāḥ, sahaṅkāriṣaṃ tattvāvadhāraṇe
tasyānavakāśāt, avakāśe vā tēṣām tattvānavadhāraṇāt.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

"That movement (pravṛtti) is because of the production of the seed moment which is capable of production of the sprout in a sequence."

How does he know when, from the point of view of sequence, it will produce the seed moment?

"There, there is doubt."⁶

What is the nature of that doubt? Is it that (1) Even in the presence of the co-causes, will it produce or not? or, (2) Even in the absence [of the co-causes] will it produce or not? or else (3) Given that there is the presence of the co-causes and at that time alone it will surely produce, whether these co-causes will be present or not is the cause of the doubt.

(1) It is not the first possibility. Generally, when there is a conclusive notion of the seed being the cause (kārana), then there is no occasion for doubt or, if you have doubt, then it means that you don't know what is the cause of the sprout.

(2) Nor can it be the second possibility. There is no scope for doubt once there is a conclusion about the co-causes being just that, or, if you think that there
Kṣapabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

trtīye tu sarva eva tatsantānāntah pātino bījakṣanāh
samānaśilāḥ prāpnuvanti, yatra tatra sahakārisamavadhāne
sati karaṇaniyamāt, sarvatra ca sahakārisamavadhāna-
sambhavāt.

samartha eva kṣaṇe kṣītyādisamavadhānāmāti cet.

tat kimasamarthe sahakārisamavadhānāmeva nāsti,
samavadhāne satyapi vā tasmāna kāryajanma?

nādvāḥ, śilāśakalādāvapi kṣitisalilatejāḥ
pavanayogadarśanāt.

na dvitiyaḥ, śilāśakalādiva kadācit sahakārisakālyavato
'pi bījādaṅkurāṅuptīprasaṅgāt.
is an occasion for doubt, then you don't know the co-causes (sahakārins) to be such.

(3) In the third alternative, all these seed moments which are in the same series are of the same nature. According to the rule, somewhere and at some moment, when the co-causes are present, it will become productive. Hence in all the previous moments there will be the presence of these co-causes everywhere.

"When the [seed] moment (kṣaṇa) is productive (samartha) then there is the presence of the co-causes, such as ground et cetera."

If you say that, then do you mean to say that, when the moment is non-productive, there is not at all the presence of the co-causes or, do you mean, even in spite of the presence of the co-causes, there is no production of the effect from that seed moment?

The first position is not possible, because we observe the association of ground, water, warmth and wind in the presence of a piece of stone.

The second position is not possible either. Just as in the case of a piece of stone, even in respect of
Kṣapabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

evamapi syāt. ko doṣa iti cet?

na tāvadidamupalabdham.

āśāṅkyata iti cet.

na, tatra satyapi akaraṇavat tadvirahe'pi
karaṇamapyaśāṅkyeta.

āśāṅkyatāmi ti cet.

tarhi bījavirahepyāśāṅkyeta. tathā ca sati, sādhvi, pratyakṣanupalambhapariśuddhiḥ.

svādetat, na bījādīnāṃ parasparasamavadhānavatāmeva
kāryakaraṇamaṅgīkrtyāśāṅkyate yena samavadhānāniyamāt
sarveśāmeva tajjātīyānāme karasatāniścayah syāt, nāpi
yatra tatra samarthotpattimaṅgīkrtya, yena vikalebhyo'pi
kadācit kāryajana sambhāvanāyāṃ pratyakṣanupalambha- virodhaḥ syāt.
a [seed moment] which is present with its co-causes, there will be the contingency of a sprout not arising from the seed.8

"Let this be so. Where is the defect?"

Well, this has never been observed.

"I have a doubt."

No, if there is non-production even though the co-causes are present, then, even in the absence of the co-causes you can have a doubt in respect of production.

"Let there be doubt."

Then even without a seed there could be doubt [about the production of a sprout]. When this is the case, good fellow, there is no law of concomitance (anvayavyatireka).

"Let it be. I have not doubted the production of the effect with respect to the seed and so on, which are come together in one and the same place, so that you can say that, by accepting such a position, there will be a conclusion of similarity in nature in respect of all seeds belonging to the same species, because of the restriction of the presence of the co-causes.
Udayana's refutation of kurvadrūpa

na, dṛṣṭasamavadhānānāmātreśaivopapatτau tatkalpanāyām
(1) pramāṇābhāvāτ, (2) kalpanāgauravaprāsāṅgaprati-
hatatvāτ, (3) atīndriyādīvīlopaprāsāṅgāτ,
(4) vikalpānupatteb, (5) viśesāyā viśesām prati
pravojakatvācceptī.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Nor have I had all these doubts by accepting the production of capability at any one place, even in a seed without its co-causes, so that if I accept it there is the possibility of the effect coming into being even from those seeds which have the absence of the co-causes at that particular moment.9

What do you mean?

"When the seed et cetera (that is, the co-causes are all present), then there is arisal of the effect (karyajanma), accepting also the kurvadrūpa at that moment."10

Udayana's refutation of kurvadrūpa

No, when the arisal of the effect can be explained merely by the presence of things which you can see (that is, the seed plus the co-causes), then (1) there is no basis (pramāṇa) for the postulation of that other thing (kurvadrūpa); (2) there is the contingency of unnecessary postulation; (3) the postulation of an imperceptible sense organ is completely annulled; (4) there is untenability of alternatives (with respect to the kurvadrūpa); (5) there must be a particular cause for a particular effect.11
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

(1) There is no pramāṇa for the kurvadrūpa

(2) There is no need to postulate the kurvadrūpa

(3) The postulation of an imperceptible sense-organ must be abandoned.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(1) There is no pramāṇa for the kurvadrūpa

For, as in the case of a pot, from the time it was created until being struck with a hammer, what we see is the creation of many effects of the same type or of different types in succession due to the variety of accessorial causes. When everything can be explained in this way, on what pramāṇa do you base your postulation of many unseen universals?13

(2) There is no need to postulate the kurvadrūpa

For what purpose do you do it since it results in the unnecessary postulation of some factor? You yourself have said that if something is posited for the sake of explaining something else, which is otherwise explicable, then that postulation is unnecessary.14

(3) The postulation of an imperceptible sense-organ must be abandoned.

And if in the matter of producing an effect, the special causal efficacy (kurvadrūpa) is accepted, having rejected the specific universal (jātibheda) [seedness] which is perceptible, yet somehow or other retaining the accessorial causes because they are seen, then the postulation of a sense-organ which is imperceptible is completely annulled.15
(4) The untenability of alternatives

vikalpānupapateśca. sa khalu jātivīśeṣaḥ śālitva
saṃgrāhako vā syāt, tatpratikṣepako vā? ādye
kuśulasthasyāpi śāleḥ katham na tadrūpatvam? dvītīye
tvabhimatasyāpi śāleḥ katham tadrūpatvam?

evām śālitvamapi tasya saṃgrāhakaṁ pratikṣepakaṁ vā.
ādye 'śāleratattvapaṃsaṅgaḥ, dvītīye tu
śāleravatattvapaṃsaṅgaḥ. na ca nobhayaṃpi ti vācyam
virodhāvirodhayoh prakārāntarābhāvāt.

vyaktibhedena saṃgrahapratikṣepāvapi na viruddhāviti cet

vilīnamidāṇīm tatajātiyētāvirodhena,
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(4) The untenability of alternatives

And there is an untenability of alternatives [with respect to the kurvadrūpa]. For is that property of being efficacious (kurvadrūpatvam) concomitant with rice-seedness (śālītvam) or does it exclude it? In the first case, how can there not be that kurvadrūpa in the rice seed which is kept in the granary? Or, in the second case how can that kurvadrūpa be present in that which you have accepted as a rice seed [in the field]?

Likewise, in the case of rice-seedness itself as pervading or excluding that [property of being efficacious] it is the same situation. In the first case there will be the contingency of the non-production of a sprout from whatever is not a rice seed, and in the second case, the rice seed itself will be non-productive. And you cannot say that it needn't be either because apart from opposition (pratikṣepaka) and non-opposition (saṅgrāḥaka) there is no other position.16

"From the point of view of being two different instances there is no opposition."

If you say that, then in this position, the opposition of belonging and not belonging to a universal (jāti) is now
Kṣapabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

paridṛṣṭvamānakatipayāvyaktipratikṣepe'pi mithah
kvacit turagaviḥagayorapi sambhedaṃ sambhavāt.

yaśca yasya jātiviśeṣāḥ sa cet tām vyabhicared,
vyabhicaredapi śiśśapā pādāparaviśeṣāḥ, tathā ca
gataṃ svabhāvaḥhetunā.

viparyaye bādhakaṃ viśeṣa iti cet.

na, tasyehapi sattvāt, tadabhāve svabhāvatvānupapatteḥ,
upapattau vā kim bādhakaṇusaraṇavyasaneneti.

(5) There must be a particular cause for a particular effect.

viśeṣasya viśeṣāṁ prati prayojakavācca.

tathāḥi kāryagatamaṅkurtvam prati bijatvasyāprayojakatve
'bijādapi tadutpattiprasaṅgaḥ.

bijasya viśeṣaḥ kathamabīje bhaviṣyatīti cet?
completely gone, for there will be some cases where there is the possibility of a horse and a bird coming together, even where it is seen that there is an opposition in respect of certain individuals.

And that, which is a particular distinction (jāti) of something else, if it could stray from that, then "śimśapā" could also stray from the distinction "tree". In that case your svabhāvahetu will no longer be possible. 17

"In the opposite case the difference lies."

No, because the position here is the same. The non-existence of that means that it cannot be a svabhāva, or in the case of accepting that svabhāva, why do you bother to introduce your restriction (bādhaka)? 18

(5) There must be a particular cause for a particular effect.

For a particular thing should be the cause of a particular effect.

Otherwise, with respect to the production of the sprout, "seedness" not being the cause, there would be the possibility of a sprout arising out of a non-seed. 19

"It being a special distinction of seed, how can it be linked with a non-seed?"
Parsa 'Sālerviśeṣaḥ kathamaśālau svāditi.

aśāleraṅkurānutpattiprasaṅgaḥ.

aśālivadabīje'pyasau bhavatu viśeṣaḥ, tathāpi

bījatvaiśārthasamaveta evāsāvāṅkuraṁ prati prayojaka

iti cet.

na, śālitvavyabhicāre śālitvaiśārthasamavāyavad

bījatvavyabhicāre bījatvaiśārthasamavaiyenāpi

niyantumaŚakyatvādaviśeṣāt.

tasmād yo yathābhūto yathābhūtamātmano

'nvayavyatirekāvanukārayati tasya tathābhūtasyaiva
tathābhūte sāmarthyam.

tadviśeṣāstū kāryaviśeṣaṁ prayojayanti śālyādivādīti

yuktamutpaśvāṁaḥ.
If you say that, then I'll say, "It being a special feature of rice seed, how can it be linked with a non-rice seed?" There will be the contingency of a non-rice seed never sprouting.

"Let this special feature [that is, kurvadrūpatvam] be in the non-seed also, even as it exists in a non-rice seed. For it is this [kurvadrūpatvam] existing inherently in the same thing in which seedness exists (bījatvaikārthasamaveta), and only as such, which is the cause for the sprout."

No, that is not possible. For, just as the property of being efficacious (kurvadrūpatvam) in straying away from rice-seedness cannot be restricted by its co-presence with rice-seedness, so too it cannot be restricted by its co-presence with seedness in its straying away from seedness.

Therefore, that which being of a particular nature makes something else of a particular nature, through its own presence and absence, that one has efficacy with reference to that effect.

And we find it proper that the particulars of that one, such as in the case of being a rice seed and so on, are productive of particular effects.
Udayana's attack on kurvadrūpa continued

kasya punah pramāṇasyāyaṃ vyāpārakaḷāpa iti cet.

tadutpattiniścayahetoh pratyakṣānupalambhātmakasyeti brūmah.

athanāyārena vinā na te parītōṣaḥ, śṛṇu tamapi
tadāyadaṅkuraṁ pratyaprayojakaṁ na tadbijātīyaṁ
yathā śilāśakalam, aṅkuraṁ pratyaprayojakaṁ ca
kuśūlanihitam bijamabhupetaṁ paraśirīti
vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ prasaṅgahetuh.

viparyaye' pi kiṁ bādhakamiti cet?

aṅkurasya jātipratiniyamākasmiṃkatvapraśaṅga ityuktam.

bījatvam tasya pratyakṣasiddhamāsākyāpahṛṇavamiti ced
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Udayana's attack on kurvadrūpa continued

"To which instrument of knowledge do the various statements which you have made belong?"

It is based on the reason which determines the cause and effect relationship which is of the nature of perception and non-perception.²²

If you are not satisfied unless you have an inference, then hear this – with reference to the sprout, whatever is not a cause does not belong to the universal "seedness", like a piece of stone. The seed which is kept in the granary is not the cause in relation to the sprout —this non-perception of the pervader (sprout) is accepted by the opponent, and this is the hetu in the form of a prasaṅga.²³

"In the reverse what is the restriction?"

There will be no causality with regard to the sprout—universal (aṅkurajāti).²⁴

"The granary seed's belonging to the seed class is perceptible and cannot be concealed by a prasaṅga."²⁵
The nature of the seed considered

The nature of the seed considered

The nature of the seed considered

The nature of the seed considered

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Let there be the contrary — whatever is a seed is a cause for the sprout, as in the case of the field seed which is present along with the totality of accessorical causes, and this one under dispute is a seed — thus we have the svabhāvahetu. The sprout's connection with the causal property (jāti) cannot be arbitrary. Otherwise it would arise everywhere. Nor can it be based on something other than it, because there is nothing as such like that.26 Possessing some real basis, not existing in its contrary, results in the sprout having the seed as its specific causal factor. In this way the concomitance is established.27

The nature of the seed considered

Or, let us stop considering the sprout. Is the nature of the seed to be a cause of something or not? If not, then the seed is no more of a seed nature, and in that form it is not useful in any context. Hence it shows the excellent clarity of your mind that 'the seed which you see has no essential nature (bijasvabhāvatvam), but there is an excellence (kurvadrūpatvam) which is outside the scope of all instruments of knowledge.'28
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

kvacidupogopekasya tena rūpeṇa sarveṣāmaviśeṣas-
tāḍṛṣṭaḥ, tathaḥ ca kathāṁ kiṃcideva bījaṁ svakāryaṁ
kuryāt nāparāṇī?

na ca vastumātraṁ tatāryaṁ, abhijāt tadanutpattipradaṇṇāṁ.

nāpi bījamātraṁ, aṅkurakāriṇo'pi tadanupattipradaṇṇāṁ.

nāpyaṅkurāḍyanyatamamātraṁ, prāgapi tadanupattipradaṇṇāṁ.

yadā tadanupannaṁ sat yatāryaṅukulasaḥ kārīmadhyamadhiśete
tadā tad eva kāryaṁ prati tasya prayojakatvam iti cet.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

If it is productive [as cause] in some effect, then because of its being the cause in the case of one [seed], all others being of the same class will be productive because of their common nature. And thus, how is it that only a certain seed is effective and others not?29

And nor can its effect be a thing in a general sense, because there will be the possibility of the non-production [of a thing in a general sense] from what is not a seed.30

Nor can you say that only a seed is produced from the seed. Then you have to accept the production of such [a seed] from [the seed] which produces a sprout.31

Nor can you say that any one amongst the sprout et cetera, can be the effect, because otherwise there will be the possibility of [the sprout's] being produced earlier.32

"When something comes into being along with the accessorial causes favourable to the production of a particular effect, then at that particular moment there is efficacy with regard to that effect."
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda I

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

tat kimavāntara jātibhedamupādāya bijasvabhāvenaiva vā?

ādye sa eva jātibhedastatra prayojakaḥ, kimāya taṁ bijatvasya?
dvitiye tu samānaśilānāmapi sahaṅgirivaikalyādakaraṇam ityāyātaṁ, tattatsahakārisāhitye sati tattatkāryam prati prayojakasya bijasvabhāvasya sarvasādharāṇaṁvatvād-iti.

atrāpi prayogah - yadyena rūpeṇārthakriyaśu nopayujyate na tat tadrūpam, yathā bijam kuñjaraṁvena kiñcidapyakurvanna kuñjarasvarūpam, yathā ca sālyādavaḥ sāmagrīpraviṣṭā bijatvenārthakriyaśu nopayujyanta iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ prasaṅgahetuḥ, tadrūpatāvā arthakriyaḥ prati yogyatayā vyāptatvāt, anyathātiprasaṅgāt.

tadrūpatvametasya prayakṣasiddhatvaṁādāsakṛṣaṁpahnavamiti cet.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Then is it by means of the efficacious nature (kurvadrūpatvam) or the essential seed-nature (bījasvabhāva) only?

In the first alternative where the efficacious nature alone is the cause [of the seed], what then happens to seedness?

In the second case it results in the fact that all things (that is, seeds) being of the same nature, are ineffective because of the absence of accessoriable causes. Hence the nature of the seed, being common to all seeds, when it is associated with the respective accessoriable causes, is effective with respect to the respective effects.33

And so the reasoning in this matter is—if a thing with a particular nature in the matter of producing an effect is not used, then that thing is not of that nature, just as a seed does not bring about any effect in terms of having an elephant nature and so is not of an elephant nature. Similarly, rice seeds et cetera, being present along with the accessoriable causes, are not used as seeds in the production of the effect—this is the prasaṅga, that there is no perception of the pervader (vyāpaka), because fitness to produce an effect pervades the having a particular nature.34

"The nature of the granary seed, because of being established by perception, cannot be contradicted."35
astu tarhi viparyayah.
yadyadrupaṁ tat tena rupenaṁ rupakritvāsūpayuyaste,
yathāsvabhāvena sāmagriṇiveśino bhāvāḥ bijajātyāścaite
kusūlasthādaya iti svabhāvaḥ hetuḥ, tadrūpatvamātraṁ
nubandhitvādyogyatāyāḥ.

tatascāsti kiṁcit kāryaṁ yatra bijatvena bijamupayuyysta
iti.
bijānubhava evasādhāraṇaṁ kāryaṁ yatra bijatvam
prayojakaṁ tacca sarvasmādeva bijabhavatīti
kimanupapannam? iti cet.
Then let the opposite be true. Whatever is of a particular nature, that one is used with that nature in the production of a particular effect, like entities with that nature combining with the totality of accessorial causes, and these granary seeds et cetera belong to the category of "seed" (bijajāti) — this is the svabhāvahetu, because the possession of that nature alone is connected to efficacy. And therefore some effect is there with reference to which the seed is utilized as having the nature "seedness".

"The experience that it is a seed, that alone is the effect specific to seedness. In this case seedness is the cause and that cause arises everywhere from all seeds. What is untenable with this?"

(There now follows Udayana's rejoinder to this argument of the Buddhist. Udayana first points out that in yogic perception the perception can take place even in the absence of the seed. Even in ordinary perception in the presence of a blind man the seeds will not be perceived or where there are many seeds in the presence of a sighted man some of those seeds will not be perceived.)
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

kāryāntaram evaṁ indriyam sarvabijāvyabhicāri bhaviṣyatīti
cet.
tanna tāvadupadeyam, amūrtasya mūrtanupadeyatvāt,
paridṛṣṭvamānāmūrttaghaṭitatayā mūrtāntarasya
taddeśāsasyānupapatteh.

api caivaṁ sati prayojakasvabhāvo nānvavavyatirekagocarāh,
tadgocarastu na prayojakābh, dṛśyaṁ ca kāryajātamaṇḍrasyen-
āvai svabhāvena kriyate, dṛśyena tvadrīṣyameveti,
so'yaṁ yo dhruvāṇītyasva viśayaḥ.

athavā vyatirekeṇa prayogāḥ vivādādhyāśitaṁ bījaṁ
sahakāriyākalyapravṛttāṅkurdikāryavaikalyaṁ
taduttarīṇaścāyavivasayībhūtabījajātīyatvāt, yat
punah sahakāriyākalyapravṛttāṅkurdikāryavaikalyaṁ
na bhavati na tadevaṁbhūtabījajātīyaṁ, yathā
śilāśakalamiti.
"Another effect in a form which is beyond the senses exists which does not violate any of the seeds."

No, taking that as the effect is not possible, because a thing of no size cannot be the effect of a thing of visible size, or in the case of an effect of limited size there is an untenability in that place being also connected with another effect of visible size.37

And so, in this way, the causal essential nature is not within the scope of observation (anvayavyatireka) and whatever is within its scope is not the cause, and the whole effect which is perceptible is brought about by a nature which is not perceptible, and by the nature which is perceptible a non-perceptible effect is brought about. Here we have a case of 'vo dhruvāpi'.38

And another proof in the form of absence is: The seed which is the object of dispute (the granary seed) is one which has the absence of the effect, sprout et cetera, brought about by the absence of the accessorial causes, because it belongs to the species of seed which is within the scope of the cause and effect relationship. That one which is not an instance where the absence of the effect, sprout et cetera, is brought about by the absence of the accessorial causes is not a member of the seed species of this nature, like the piece of stone.
[This brings to an end this particular argument. The discussion moves on to consider another related topic, the nature of contradiction with respect to efficacy (sāmarthya) and non-efficacy (asāmarthya).]
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda I

FOOTNOTES TO TEXT C

1. ATV pp. 18-36 (1940 edition)
   ATV pp. 64-114 (1939 edition)

2. I have followed the 1940 text here since the punctuation in the 1939 text seems inappropriate here (tathā sahakārisamavadhānarahitasyākaraṇamityapi // atra ca ....)

3. In this passage Udayana is asking the question as to what the Buddhist means exactly when he talks about causality (kāraṇam) as a phenomenon which must take place without delay. In examining the four alternatives put forward here, Udayana is attempting to reveal the absurdity of the Buddhist position. If the Buddhist means that as soon as all the co-causes are present then there will be a production, or, that whilst the co-causes are not present there will be no production, then this is the position of the Naiyāyikas and Udayana would not argue against this viewpoint, which indeed he maintains is established by perception. Hence whilst in agreement with the second and third alternatives, Udayana disagrees with the first and fourth alternatives, which are the ones offered as a representation of the Buddhist position. If, as the Buddhist supposedly maintains, something is non-productive at a particular time, then, according to him, it will remain non-productive even when the co-causes are present. Udayana is here attempting to force the Buddhist into a position where he will have to admit the possibility that the field seed could be non-productive. ("viparyaye bādhakaṁ sphaṭayati / tathāḥti / yajjātiyaṁ sahakāri-
   samavadhānāsamavadhānayorakāraṇam ta[jjātiyaṁakāraṇameva
   śilāśakalavaditi vyāptvupāstambhenāha //") Nārāyapi Commentary on the ATV (1940) p. 19 footnote 2.) That is, if something does not produce in the absence of the co-causes and still does not produce when they are present, then this is like a piece of stone and is an admission that the presence of the co-causes does not bring productivity. And conversely, according to the Buddhist, if something is productive, then it will be productive even in the absence of the co-causes. Here Udayana is trying to put the Buddhist in a position where he will have to allow that the field seed could sprout even without the presence of the co-causes. Udayana's strategy here is to link production or not with the presence or absence of the co-causes. If production or not, according to Udayana, is made to depend on the presence or absence of the kuryadrūpa, then the connection between the production of the effect and the co-causes is broken. Apart from there being no instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) for the kuryadrūpa, it will also mean that the timeliness (kādācīkatva) of the effect will be broken and it will become a random event.
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT C CONTD.

4. The Buddhist's intention in this whole argument has been to demonstrate that only two natures are admissible — apart from delay and non-delay no other nature is possible (delay here means the non-efficacious seed (asamarthabīja) and non-delay means the efficacious seed (samarthabīja), that is, the granary seed and the field seed are different). By examining more closely the two different interpretations of "production without delay" and the two different interpretations of "production with delay", Udayana attempted to show the absurdity of the first and fourth options between which there is a contradiction (virodha), and which therefore support the Buddhist case. In demonstrating that only the second and third options are acceptable, Udayana hoped to fortify his position since there is no virodha between these two options (and hence one and the same seed can have both natures, that is, there is no virodha between the efficacious seed and the non-efficacious seed, and so no difference between the field seed and the granary seed). [See next page for the plan of the argument.]
Plan of first stage of argument

**THE BUDDHIST**
Apart from delay and non-delay, no other nature is possible. (Delay means non-efficacious seed, non-delay means efficacious seed. Hence field seed and granary seed are different.)

**UDAYANA**
What do you mean by delay and non-delay?

1. Coming immediately into being after previous cause
2. Production in presence of co-causes
3. Non-production in absence of co-causes
4. Production never at all

(1) & (4) No pramāṇa [instrument of knowledge]
(1) If something is productive then it will produce even in the absence of co-causes.
(4) If something is non-productive then it will remain non-productive.

Causality becomes random.

(2) & (3) pratyakṣa pramāṇa [knowledge from perception]

The opposition (virodha) is due to the presence or absence of the co-causes. Hence there is a third alternative to delay and non-delay.

The seed can therefore possess both natures.
5. The Sanskrit device "kim...uta...atha..." used here means that three alternatives are being offered for consideration. Hence the punctuation in the ATV (1939) pp. 68-71 seems inappropriate here.

6. In this part of the argument the Buddhist is attempting to reintroduce the idea of momentariness in relation to the co-causes. They are suggesting that the co-causes may be associated with the seed when it is efficacious and are absent when it is non-efficacious. In this way the presence and absence of the co-causes does not destroy the Buddhist position with regard to momentariness (kṣanikatvam). Udayana counters with the undeniable fact that in some way granary seeds have to be considered productive in relation to the sprout. Otherwise, why store them and not pieces of stone in the granary? The Buddhist reply here is obvious—that the granary seed is an essential stage in the sequence of seed moments leading to the production of the sprout. Hence we are back to the original question: what is the nature of the seed?

7. The first two alternatives discussed here are fairly clear. The idea in the third alternative is rather obscure but seems to be as follows: When a seed moment becomes efficacious (samartha) the rule is that the co-causes will be present. Udayana is pointing out here that, according to the Buddhist's own position, there should not be any doubt concerning whether the co-causes will be present or not. This is because all the seed moments should be of a uniform nature, that is, they will all be the same and hence at each and every moment the co-causes will be present.

8. The Buddhist counters this by saying that it is only when the seed moment is capable (samartha) is there the presence of the co-causes. The main point of the argument seems to be:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{series of seed moments, all the same} \\
\text{co-causes} \\
\text{samarthabāja kṣaṇa} \\
\text{(efficacious seed-moment)}
\end{align*}
\]

Because they are all the same, the presence of co-causes with one should mean the presence of co-causes everywhere.
Udayana continues to press his argument by asking exactly what the Buddhist means when he says the co-causes are present only alongside the capable seed moment (samarthabija kṣaṇa). The first option he considers is that the co-causes can never be found alongside an inefficient moment because they are indeed found alongside a piece of stone which in this context is a non-capable moment (asamatha kṣaṇa). The second alternative seems to be that the co-causes accompany an efficient seed moment, and even if the co-causes are present alongside a non-capable seed moment (asamarthabija kṣaṇa) there will still be no production of the sprout (as in a case of a piece of stone).

Udayana rejects this alternative because it means that a seed could possibly not produce a sprout even in the presence of the co-causes. The point the Buddhist wants to make here is that the efficient seed moment itself is responsible for the production of the sprout, not the co-causes.

9. The Buddhist seems to accept the doubt that will arise concerning the production of the sprout when its production is separated from the presence of the co-causes. Udayana points out that if there is doubt about the production of the sprout even in the presence of the co-causes one may as well doubt whether a sprout could be produced even without a seed!

10. The Buddhist summarizes his doubt as follows: first he denies the doubts which Udayana has tried to thrust upon him so that (yena) he will have to accept the consequences Udayana outlines. The Buddhist is saying that the kurvadrūpa comes into the seed series along with the co-causes. He does not admit that the kurvadrūpa can come at random although there is room for doubt concerning its appearance. When the bija is with the co-causes then the kurvadrūpa comes into being and it is this latter which is effective. It is the kurvadrūpa which has the power (śakti). The capable seed is a kurvadrūpa and it is this which distinguishes it from the non-capable seed. See Nārāyaṇī Commentary on the ATV (1940) p. 23. The Buddhist's main contention here is that unless Udayana demolishes the idea of the kurvadrūpa he cannot establish permanence (sthiratva).
Kṣapabhaṅgavāda I

Plan of second stage of argument

**THE BUDDHIST**
Admits a doubt as to when a productive seed moment will be produced in the series.

**UDAYANA**
What is the nature of this doubt?

1. In the presence of the co-causes will it produce or not?
2. In the absence of the co-causes will it produce or not?
3. Will the co-causes be present or not?

**UDAYANA**
(1) Does this mean there can be no co-causes present with a non-capable moment? No, because they can be present with a piece of stone.

(2) Does it mean that even with the co-causes present there will be no production from a seed which is non-capable? No, because of the contingency of the effect not arising from the seed.

**THE BUDDHIST**
According to the Buddhist's own position, they should be present everywhere.

not if you know the nature of the seed
not if you have any understanding regarding the nature of the co-causes
only when the seed moment is capable will there be presence of co-causes
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT C CONTD.

11. Here Udayana begins his refutation of kurvadrūpa and lists five arguments which he intends to use. Each of these will be discussed more fully in turn.

12. This passage is a little obscure and it is hard to make sense of this passage without the insertion of "iti cet" after "svākriyante", a suggestion made by Saṅkara Miśra in his Commentary on the ATW (1939) p. 73.

13. Here we have a clear statement of Udayana's position regarding the nature of causality. An entity, such as a pot, is capable of producing a range of effects depending on its association with a range of co-causes (sahakārins). This is all that is required for a full description of the causal nature of any entity. There is no need to conjure up some additional entity, such as the kurvadrūpa, for which there is no instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa). As Nārāyaṇa points out in his Commentary on the ATW (1940) p. 24, because for each object there is a range of possible effects, the Buddhist will have to postulate a different kurvadrūpa for each particular effect.

14. For example, if Devadatta, who is fat, is seen eating sweets by day then there is no need to postulate that he is fat because he eats at night. Similarly, the seed plus the co-causes together are perfectly adequate for explaining the production of the sprout and hence the additional postulation of the kurvadrūpa is unnecessary.

15. The best explanation for this passage is probably to be found in Nārāyaṇa's Commentary on the ATW (1940) p. 24 note 1, where he points out that, given the Buddhist's explanation of causality, he will have to give up the idea of indriyapratyakṣa, perception by means of the sense organ. The parallel to be drawn is that just as the bija is dispensed with in the matter of the production of the sprout so too can the sense organ be dispensed with in the production of a perception. The kurvadrūpa along with the sahakārins are responsible for the production of the sprout, and the knower in conjunction with light (ālōca) are responsible for the arisal of a perception.
16. Here Udayana is discussing the relationship between kurvadrüpattvaṁ, the sprout-producing effectiveness, and bījatvāṁ, seedness. He takes the example of the rice seed in which sālītvāṁ or "rice-seedness" inheres. Firstly, Udayana considers the consequences of the kurvadrüpattvaṁ (jātivīṣeṣa) as pervading (sathgrāhako) or excluding sālītvāṁ. These two can be expressed respectively by:

(i) Wherever there is rice-seedness (sālītvāṁ) there is productiveness (kurvadrüpattvaṁ).
(ii) Wherever there is productiveness (kurvadrüpattvaṁ) there is not rice-seedness (sālītvāṁ).

Both of these alternatives are untenable. In (i) it will result in the presence of kurvadrüpattvaṁ in the rice seed in the granary which would mean that the seed in the granary should produce a sprout, a position obviously not acceptable to the Buddhists. In (ii) the result will be that there will be no kurvadrüpattvaṁ present in the rice seed in the field which will therefore be impotent with respect to producing a sprout. Secondly, Udayanācārya considers the consequences of sālītvāṁ as pervading or excluding kurvadrüpattvaṁ. This will generate the following alternatives:

(i) Wherever there is productiveness (kurvadrüpattvaṁ) there is rice-seedness (sālītvāṁ).
(ii) Wherever there is rice-seedness (sālītvāṁ) there is not productiveness (kurvadrüpattvaṁ).

Again both of these alternatives are untenable. In (i) it will result in the non-productivity of whatever is not a sālī seed. Hence a barley seed will be unable to produce a sprout. In (ii) it will result in the non-productivity of sālī seeds. This, according to Udayana, exhausts all the alternatives, for apart from virodha (exclusion, pratikṣepaka) and avirodha (inclusion, saṃgrāhaka) there is no other option.

17. Udayana here has the Buddhist trying to evade the consequences for the above argument by saying that the granary seed and the field seed are two different instances of seed. Therefore it is possible for the kurvadrüpattvaṁ to be present along with sālītvāṁ in one instance (in the field) and absent from sālītvāṁ in another instance (in the granary). Udayana disallows this on the grounds that it will have unacceptable consequences since it destroys the very notion of what it means for an individual to belong to a particular species (jātī). If on one occasion an object belongs to the jātī of horseness then it cannot in another instance belong to the jātī of birdness. If individuals are allowed to wander from jātīs in this way then why not allow śimśapattvaṁ to wander from vrkṣatvāṁ (tree-ness). If a "lower" universal is allowed to wander from the "higher"
universal in this way then the svabhāvahetu will no longer be possible (Chap. 3, footnote 10). A similar argument is found also in Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali (1845) pp. 56-58.

18. The Buddhist tries to evade this argument by saying that the case in question is different, a difference which can be brought out by considering the opposite circumstance (viparyaya). Without tree-ness there could be no śimśapā-ness [śimśapā is a type of tree], that is, śimśapā-ness could not exist apart from tree-ness. Hence there is no possibility of it wandering from tree-ness. The contention here is that kurvadrūpatvam is able to exist apart from śālitvam. This argument of Udayana's, or rather this representation of the Buddhist position by Udayana, is rather confusing in that it discusses the relationship between a particular type of seed, the rice seed, and a general capacity for producing the sprout, kurvadrūpatvam. Rather, it would seem that the relationship to be considered should be between śālitvam and the specific capacity for producing the rice sprout, śālikurvadrūpatvam. Indeed, in the next section Udayana does just this.

19. The basic premiss of this argument is that a particular effect can only be brought about by the same degree of particularity in the cause. Therefore the relationship of kurvadrūpatvam should be to the sprout-in-general. a rice sprout is the effect of the śāli-kurvadrūpatvam, a barley (yava) sprout is the effect of the yava-kurvadrūpatvam. By relating the production of the sprout to kurvadrūpatvam, however, the concomitance between seedness and sproutness is replaced by a concomitance between kurvadrūpatvam and añkuratvam (sproutness). In this way seedness is no longer responsible for the production of the añkura and hence Udayana contends it will be possible for a sprout to arise even in the absence of a seed.

20. The Buddhist here is portrayed as trying to evade Udayana's criticism by an attempt to re-introduce the importance of the seed in relation to the production of the sprout [without of course actually making seedness (bijatvam) responsible for sproutness (añkuratvam)]. First of all, the Buddhist contends here that since kurvadrūpatvam is a special distinction of bijatvam then it cannot wander from bijatvam. Udayana's reply to this tactic is somewhat ironic in that he repeats this argument in case of the rice seed. Since the kurvadrūpatvam is also a special distinction of the rice seed, how can it wander from rice seeds? In that case, as he points out, anything other than a rice seed will be unable to produce a sprout. The second tactic of the Buddhist is to allow therefore that kurvadrūpatvam can exist apart from bijatvam. This does not mean though that non-
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT C CONT'D.

Seeds will be able to produce sprouts since it is only when kurvadṛṣṭapattam exists inherently in the same thing in which seedness exists (bījatvaikārthasamaveta) that a sprout will be produced. This is the closest the Buddhist can come to reintroducing the importance of the seed as having the function of restricting the scope of the activity of kurvadṛṣṭapattam, without making it the cause of the sprout. Ĉdayana disallows this on the grounds that just as kurvadṛṣṭapattam cannot be restricted by its co-presence with rice-seedness, so too the Buddhist cannot restrict it by its co-presence with seedness and hence we return to the original possibility of a sprout being produced by a non-seed. In all these arguments Ĉdayana is trying to get the Buddhist to admit that seedness is the general cause of sproutness and of course the Buddhist does his best to avoid such an admission.

21. Here we have a clear statement of Ĉdayana's views concerning the nature of causality. The capacity of a seed to produce a sprout ultimately depends on the presence of the universal "seedness", which must be present in all those objects called seeds. The law-like relationship between seeds and sprouts is, according to Ėyāya thought, discerned through a process of observing their regular connection (anvayavvatireka). It is the presence of the seed-universal (bīja jāti) which is responsible for the range of effects possible for each individual in which the jāti inheres. Hence the universal defines the nature of the causal behaviour in general (prayojakahetu), whilst it is the individual seed itself which is responsible for the actual production of the individual sprout (kāraṇahetu).

22. The Buddhist now challenges Ĉdayana to produce an instrument of knowledge for making the above statements. Ĉdayana replies that observation (pratyakṣānupalambha) establishes a cause and effect relationship (tadutpatti/kāryakaraṇabhāva) in which one universal is consistently linked with another at an earlier time (pūrvakālanyatājātiyatvā).

23. Here Ĉdayana gives the full inference for the Buddhist: whatever is not a cause with respect to the sprout (aṅkurāprajvakatvam) does not belong to the bīja jāti. Ĉdayana presents the Buddhist with the following prasaṅga: If the 'seed' in the granary were a seed it would have efficacy with respect to the production of the sprout; it does not and so is not a seed.

This non-perception of efficacy with regard to the sprout is admitted by the Buddhist. The concomitance on which this argument is based is: Wherever there is seedness (bīja tva) [vyāpya - pervaded], there is productivity with
respects to the sprout (aṅkuraprayojakatvam) [vyāpaka - pervader]. The non-perception of the vyāpaka (vyāpakunupalabdhi) is reason for inferring the non-existence of the vyāpya.

24. The Buddhist now challenges Udayana to find a restriction (bādhaka) to the reverse argument of the prasaṅga (prasāṅgavāparyayā). Unless he can do this, the original prasāṅga will not be considered valid according to the rules governing the use of prasāṅga-type arguments. Udayana has to produce a counter-argument to a concomitance between seedness (bījatvam) and no productivity with respect to the sprout (aṅkurāprajoiṣakatvam) expressed in the prasāṅgavāparyaya: a seed would be non-productive with respect to the sprout (aṅkurāprajoiṣakatvam bījam syād). Udayana’s argument or bādhaka here is that, if this were admitted, it would lead to the possibility of a sprout coming out of anything that does not belong to the bījajāti. This would mean that one could never specify the exact cause of the sprout as belonging to any particular class at all.

25. The Buddhist now counters by saying that granary ‘seeds’ are seeds, a fact plainly revealed by perception. As the Buddhist rightly points out here, knowledge from perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) takes precedence over the prasāṅga.

26. In this inference (anumāna), Udayana accepts the presence of seedness in the granary seed (whereas with the first anumāna Udayana was concerned to get the Buddhist to admit that the ‘seed’ in the granary could not be a seed). In this anumāna, seedness is made the confirming property or pervader (vyāpaka) of efficaciousness with regard to the sprout. If the granary seed is admitted to be a seed then it must also be efficacious with regard to the sprout (bījatvam is the svabhāvahetu for aṅkuraprayojakatvam). Aṅkuraprayojakatvam cannot have an arbitrary basis because otherwise the sprout could arise at random, nor can it be due to anything like kurvadrūpapatvam because Udayana professes to have already destroyed such a notion.

27. Productivity with respect to the sprout (aṅkuraprayojakatvam) is thus based on something — it has a basis (nīmittavattā). No basis (nirnīmitta) and another basis (anyanīmitta) such as kurvadrūpapatvam have already been ruled out and hence the basis is not to be found in the vipakṣa. This leaves only seedness (bījatvam) as the basis for aṅkuraprayojakatvam.

(Please see the next page for the plan of the argument.)
Plan of third stage of argument

**UDAYANA**
Whatever is not a cause with respect to the sprout is not a seed.

By means of *prasaṅga* the Buddhist will have to accept that the 'seed' in the granary is not a seed at all because of their non-acceptance of production of the sprout (*añkuraprayojakatvam*) there.

**UDAYANA**
Whatever is not a cause with respect to the sprout is not a seed.

**THE BUDDHIST**
By means of *prasaṅga* the Buddhist will have to accept that the 'seed' in the granary is not a seed at all because of their non-acceptance of production of the sprout (*añkuraprayojakatvam*) there.

**THE BUDDHIST**
Whatever is not a cause with respect to the sprout is yet a seed.

**UDAYANA**
Whatever is not a cause with respect to the sprout is not a seed.

**THE BUDDHIST**
By means of *prasaṅga* the Buddhist will have to accept that the 'seed' in the granary is not a seed at all because of their non-acceptance of production of the sprout (*añkuraprayojakatvam*) there.

**THE BUDDHIST**
knowledge from perception overcomes *prasaṅga* and establishes that the seed in the granary is indeed a seed.

**UDAYANA**
Whatever is a seed is productive of the sprout, like a field seed. The granary seed under dispute is a seed.

**THE BUDDHIST**
knowledge from perception overcomes *prasaṅga* and establishes that the seed in the granary is indeed a seed.

**UDAYANA**
Whatever is a seed is productive of the sprout, like a field seed. The granary seed under dispute is a seed.

Hence the basis for the sprout-production is seedness.
28. Here Udayana is beginning a new type of argument, turning his attention away from the production of the sprout to the nature of the seed itself. By disassociating the seed from the production of the sprout, Udayana contends that the Buddhist is depriving the seed of its essential nature. Udayana is being ironic here in declaring that the Buddhist has deprived the seed of its essential nature whilst at the same time he introduces the notion of an unknowable kurvdrūpa. [It should be noted here that Udayana had supposedly got the Buddhist to admit that seedness is within the scope of perception on pp. 49 and 96 of the ATV (1939) and had also proved that kurvdrūpatvam is not within the scope of any instrument of knowledge.] Udayana's argument here is that the seed, in order to be a seed, must have some essential nature. If it does not then it is no longer a seed. [For example, a watch which is broken into pieces is no longer a watch and is called a "watch" only in a figurative (upacāra) sense. In this theory of meaning an object is entitled to be referred to by its designator only if it is in possession of the requisite essential nature (svabhāva).] A seed must be productive of something (arthakriyakārin), otherwise it will be a non-existent (asat). [See Śaṅkara Miśra's Commentary (1939) p. 100: brjatvena kvacit kārye bījam yadi prayojakaṁ na bhavet tadā tena rūpeṇa tad asat syād iti.]

29. Here the argument is that, as seeds, the field and granary seeds are the same, that is, they should have the same essential nature. From the point of view of the Buddhist therefore there is a difficulty in explaining why the granary seed should not be considered productive in relation to the sprout. This would be to deprive the granary seed of its essential nature.

30. The Buddhist rejoinder here is that the seed is effective in some way, that is, the seed has an essential nature so it should produce something if not the sprout. Something else is the direct cause of the sprout (kurvdrūpa). The seed is not responsible for the sprout as its effect but rather some other effect. The specific argument here seems rather obscure and superfluous. The use of mātram after vastu removes the association of añkura as the specific effect of bīja and replaces it with an object in general. [See Nārāyaṇa's Commentary on the ATV (1940) p. 31: mātraśabdena bījamātrānvyayavystirekānuvidhāy añkurāvāntarakāryam vyaviccchinatti.] Udayana seems to be saying in this passage that perhaps the Buddhist might want to say that the effect of the seed is some object in general, a jar for example. Then the Buddhist will have to accept that without the seed this
object will not be produced, and, extending this argument to other objects, it will mean no object at all will be produced!

31. Here Udayana is concerned to rule out that the svabhāva of a seed could be another seed. This would seem to be the most plausible reply that the Buddhist could offer here, since for the Buddhist a seed consists of a continuum of seed moments. Hence it would seem that the Buddhist could say that any particular seed moment has for its effect the production of the next seed moment in the series. Udayana rules this out on the basis that at the time that the sprout is produced, the particular seed moment involved will also produce another seed moment as well as the sprout, that is:

\[
\text{āṅkura (sprout)} \rightarrow \text{bijāksana (seed moment)} \rightarrow \text{bijāksana (seed moment)}
\]

32. Here the Buddhist is saying that the seed moment can produce any one of three effects:

\[
\text{āṅkura (sprout)} \quad \text{bijāksana (seed moment)} \quad \text{bijānjñāna (experience of the seed)}
\]

From any seed moment a sprout, another seed moment or knowledge of the seed in a perceiver can be produced. Udayana counters this by saying that in this case the Buddhist must then explain why the sprout comes at the time that it does. There must be some factor which causes the sprout to be produced and not another seed moment. Of course Udayana here wants to tie the Buddhist down to the accessorial causes.

33. If it is the kurvadrūpa alone coming into being at that moment which is responsible for the production of the sprout then the Buddhist still has the problem of explaining what happens to seedness. The seed having a svabhāva of its own cannot remain ineffective and has to give rise to an effect. The position of the Buddhist here deprives the seed at that moment of its svabhāva since he postulates an effect, the sprout, which arises from another cause, the kurvadrūpa. On the other hand, if the seed essence (bijāsvabhāva) alone is made responsible for the production of the sprout then this would contradict the non-productivity of the granary seeds which do not produce yet possess bijāsvabhāva. Either all the seeds should be non-productive or they should all be productive. Udayana concludes it has to be the bijāsvabhāva in conjunction with the accessorial causes which is responsible for the production of the sprout.
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT C CONT'D.

34. The concomitance here is:

where there is
possession of a particular nature

there is
fitness to produce

pervaded

pervader

Hence if the rice 'seeds' stored in the granary are not taken into the field as seeds in order to sow a crop of sprouts then they are not really seeds. It is only their fitness to produce sprouts that makes them seeds.

35. The Buddhist again counters by referring to perception (pratyakṣapramaṇa), that seeds in the granary just do not sprout and this is plain for all to see.

36. The Buddhist has attempted to find another effect (kārya) common to all seeds in virtue of which they are all seeds. Udayana disallows his proposition, that it is the experience that seeds are seeds which is their common effect, on the basis that indeed not all seeds actually share this. The svabhāva of the seeds to qualify as such must always be fit to produce the effect; non-production may only be the result of the absence of the accessorial causes. When we glance at a mass of seeds it just so happens that some of them will not be perceived whereas when the seeds in the granary do not produce sprouts it is because of the absence of water, soil and so on.

37. The Buddhist is portrayed here in one final attempt to find a suitable effect. Having failed to find an effect which is within the scope of the senses, he now proposes that it might be some effect which is beyond the senses. This means it must be of no size at all or of very small size. Either alternative is impossible. Something of no size (amūrtā) cannot be the effect of something of size (mūrtā). If the effect is then said to be of very small size, which would qualify it still as mūrtā, then this would be untenable because it cannot occupy the same place as another effect which is also mūrtā, that is in this case the sprout already produced by the kuvadrūpa.
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT C CONTD.

38. Here Udayana is being ironic. If the sprout is the effect of the kurvadrūpa, then we have a situation where a visible effect is said to come from an imperceptible cause. And the visible cause, that is, the sprout, is said to give rise to an effect which is not visible. The verse referred to by 'yo dhruvāni' is as follows:

\[
\text{yo dhruvāni parityajya adhruvāni nişevate/}
\text{adhruvāni tasya naşyanti adhruvāṁ naştameva hi/}
\]

Nārāyaṇī Commentary on the ATV (1940 edition) p. 36

he who abandons whatever is certain resorts to get what is uncertain,
he loses even those things which are certain to hi and the uncertain things are lost already.

The Buddhist loses his momentariness (kṣanatva), having already lost the certainty of permanence (sthiratva).
Moreover, observing that all this nature is in motion, and thinking that nothing is true of that which changes, they came to the belief that nothing indeed may be truly said of that which changes altogether and in every way. Now it was from this belief that blossomed the most extreme of the doctrines we have mentioned, namely, that of the followers of Heraclitus, and also such doctrine as was held by Cratylus, who finally thought that nothing should be spoken but only moved his finger, and who criticized even Heraclitus for saying that one cannot step into the same river twice, for he himself thought that one could not even do so once.

Aristotle Metaphysics 1010a

The Philosophical Background

Udayana and his Buddhist adversary differ in their accounts of the nature of language in ways directly reflective of their disagreements concerning the nature of the external world. Differing philosophical problems arose for the philosophers of each tradition when they attempted to demonstrate the way in which language could describe the world.

The Sautrāntika/Yogācāra belief that the world is momentary in nature raises the question of whether language could be possible in such a world at all. If reality is made up of absolutely unique point instants (śvalakṣaṇas), then their very nature would seem to make it impossible for them to be expressed in language. Dignāga accepted this as a consequence of his world view—that ultimate reality is not amenable to direct linguistic expression—yet at the same time he recognized the apparent
effectiveness of linguistic activity. In the fifth chapter of the Pramāṇa Samuccaya he developed a theory of meaning, apoha, in which he attempted to explain this apparent effectiveness of linguistic activity without compromising his commitment to the idea that the real world is transitory in nature. Whether or not apoha satisfactorily accomplishes this depends on whether it can answer the question of how language can "hook on to" a world which of its very nature evades direct linguistic expression.

In contrast to this, the Naiyāyikas believed in a world which was made up of relatively stable objects, a world in which some universals at least were postulated as reals, and finally a world which was directly amenable to and reflected in linguistic expression. Dignāga obviously rejected the notions that there are stable objects in the world and that real resemblances among particulars could be the basis for the application of general terms. Hence he sought to explain how names of objects and universals function in language without making any ontological commitment to those objects' actual existence. Thus apoha strikes directly at Nyāya realism, making apoha central to the Nyāya/Buddhist controversy concerning the nature of reality and its relationship to language.¹

In Dignāga's system only the particulars (svalaksanas) are real in the absolute sense, each particular being self-sustained, self-destructive and unique to each moment. The only way in which these particulars can be cognized is by means of perception (pratyakṣa), perception being here a direct grasping of the
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svalaksana which is entirely free from conceptual construction (kalpanā). Hence what Dignāga means by perception is more akin to pure sensation and it is a pre-linguistic activity. Perception has an absolute truth claim in Dignāga's system because of this very fact, that it is entirely free of any kind of conceptual construction. Errors are expressed in the form of a judgement, and since sense-perception is non-judgemental this precludes the possibility of errors.

In early Nyāya thought sense-perception is also defined as a means of cognition which is independent of any kind of verbalization. In his definition of perception Gautama characterizes perception as a-vyapadesyam - what is not or cannot be verbalized. It is left to Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the Nyāya Sūtras, the Nyāyabhāṣya, to discuss further the meaning of this term. He explains that the meaning of Gautama's inclusion of this term in his definition is to make clear that perception is to be distinguished from its verbal expression, and that such a distinction is possible. He seems to be arguing against the view that perception is always inextricably intertwined with its verbal expression because he points out that perception is possible even when the name of the object is not known. Even where the name is known, it is an additional factor added on to the apprehension, the apprehension itself remaining as before, entirely independent of the name. The name functions to communicate the perception to others.

Hence it would seem that the early Naiyāyikas agreed with Dignāga in holding that perception itself must be distinguished
from its verbal expression. Gautama's definition, however, already indicates the possibility of a major disagreement between them. Unlike Dignāga, Gautama includes the term ayabhicāra in his definition, which is intended to exclude erroneous perceptions. Thus, from the beginning, the Nyāya definition of perception presupposes an objective external world, stable in nature, which may or may not be successfully cognized by means of perception. This is a world in which it is possible to re-examine, and hence verify or not, one's perceptions of it. So, for Gautama, such phenomena as mirages would not be counted as perception because they do not give us true knowledge about the object of perception.

This Naiyāyika belief in an external world of stable objects, already reflected in Gautama's definition, became the basis for increasing disagreements between later Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers concerning the nature of perception. We can see how such a difference between the Sautrāntika/Yogācāra Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas on the nature of reality would lead to very different descriptions of perception. In Dignāga's system, where reality is made up of unique point instants which have no temporal endurance, there is no possibility for coming back to take a second look. The svalakṣaṇa, once grasped by perception, is gone forever from any perceptual analysis. In the Nyāya system, particular objects like pots and cows, not the unique point instants, are the reals. Such objects are thought to be relatively stable and may be examined at different times from various perspectives; we can come back to the same pot time
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and time again and make new discoveries about it. This Naiyāyika belief in an objective, accessible external world became the basis for a more complex understanding of the nature of perception. From the time of Praśastapāda onwards, the Naiyāyikas recognized not only a non-conceptual type of perception, but also admitted as perception the judgemental phase following immediately in its wake in which the bare object would be associated with its various qualifiers.⁷ We shall see that this distinction between a conceptual and non-conceptual type of perception became a central part of the attempt by Nyāya philosophers to destroy Dignāga's world view and there is therefore in post-Dignāga times a greater emphasis placed on the acknowledgement of these two types of perception. Vācaspati Miśrā took up this idea, introduced by Praśastapāda, that there are two types of perception, using for the first time in extant Nyāya texts the terms nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa (perception without construction) and savikalpa-pratyakṣa (perception with construction), which henceforth became the accepted method of classification.⁸

In Nyāya thought, the non-conceptual type of perception, which takes place in the first moment that the senses come into contact with an object, is known as nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa. In this type of perception there is no classification of the object involved; it is rather perceived as an undifferentiated whole. This does not mean that the qualifier and qualificand⁹ are not present in this type of perception. Indeed they must be, for, according to the Nyāya system, the nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa provides
the raw material for the following second type of perception, the savikalpa-pratyakṣa. They are, however, only perceived as mere existents, not in terms of their qualifier-qualificand relationship. This relationship is not perceived until savikalpa-pratyakṣa, in which the object is perceived as being of a particular type. The important point here is that the savikalpa-pratyakṣa constitutes an arrangement of elements already present in the nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa. Hence for the Naiyāyikas, this type of perception is as valid as the non-conceptual type of perception. Obviously the formation of the savikalpa-pratyakṣa is a complex process in which language and memory are also operative, but as long as the senses continue to be in contact with the object involved it is thought to have a perceptual basis and, as such, is to be counted as perception. Unlike the nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa, the savikalpa-pratyakṣa is amenable to linguistic expression. Indeed, its very possibility is intimately bound up with its linguistic structure, usually expressed in the form of a propositional judgement, "this is an x".\textsuperscript{10}

As would be expected, there is no place in Dignāga's thought for this conceptual type of perception. In his system there is an exhaustive classification of objects to be cognized into two mutually exclusive categories, the unique particular (svalaṅga) and the universal (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa). Corresponding to this there are just two means of cognition, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna).\textsuperscript{11} Hence svalaṅgas can be grasped only by means of direct perception, a view we have already noted, and
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sāmānyā-lakṣaṇas only by means of inference. This second fact is clearly the outcome of the first for, since every svalakṣaṇa is absolutely unique and distinct, there can be no place in Dignāga's system for universals in a real sense, that is, universals which can actually be perceived. Hence Dignāga postulates that universals can be known only by means of inference and by doing so rejects the possibility of any conceptual type of perception. (Savikalpa-pratyakṣa presupposes the actual reality of universals in its claim to be counted as true perception, the very presupposition strongly contested by Dignāga.)

For Dignāga, this moment of non-conceptual perception is followed by a process of imaginative construction in which the percept is associated with a particular qualifier. This will result, as in the savikalpa-pratyakṣa, in a propositional judgement of the form "this is x". Dignāga lists five types of qualifiers, all of which belong to the category of sāmānyā-lakṣaṇa, and as such must be seen as purely imaginative constructs.¹²

All these qualifiers distinguish their objects by virtue of being MERE names of them without in any sense implying real entities.

Matilal (1979) p. 35

Hence there is a difference in the way a post-Dignāga Naiyāyika and a follower of Dignāga would understand a propositional judgement such as "this is a cow". For the Naiyāyika, when pronounced in the presence of a cow, this judgement is based on a perceptual knowledge and has as much, if

¹²
not more, validity than the simple perception that went prior to it. It can be said to have more validity because in the savikalpa-pratyakṣa our knowledge of the object becomes deeper as we come to see its characteristics and classify it as being of a particular type.\textsuperscript{13} It is as if our vision, initially vague and unclear, becomes clear and detailed, like a person's eyesight gradually becoming clearer upon entering a dimly lit room after travelling in the hot sun. The dependence of this type of perception on language and memory should not reduce its reality, for, as Jayanta says:

Why should all these so-called extraneous factors necessarily effect our judgemental perception in such a way that it will lose contact with reality and slip into the world of fiction? With some special illumination we can perceive dust particles which we would not have seen under ordinary light. But dependence upon this accessory cannot turn perception of dust particles into dust fictions or constructions. Similarly, dependence upon other accessories cannot, of necessity, turn a veridical perception into a mere fiction.\textsuperscript{14}

For Dignāga, this type of judgement takes us away from reality. Our simple perception of the svalakṣaṇa is grounded in reality, the momentary svalakṣaṇa is grasped in the first moment of sensation, and once we begin to impose a linguistic superstructure upon this we lose contact with that reality. What is cognized by the intellect following the first moment of sensation cannot be the original svalakṣaṇa but rather is the result of inference (anumāna) or conceptualization. It is this conceptualized world which is referred to by words.

It is by further examining the respective ways in which the Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers analyze a phrase such as "this is
a cow" that we come closest to piecing together their respective theories about language. Far from being too narrow an approach, it will involve us in some of the most fundamental questions concerning the nature of language, for these philosophers were asking such questions as: "How is language connected to our perception of the world?" "What is the structure of the external world and is that structure mirrored by language?" "Are there real universals?" and "How do words have meaning?" It is true that much of our language does not function in the simple referential manner typified in the phrase "this is a cow". Language is an enormously complex and rich phenomenon and in recent times western philosophers have been concerned to broaden their study to include the wide range of tasks accomplished by the use of language. Yet both western and Indian philosophers have always considered the referential aspects of language to be central in their task of understanding the relationship between language and the world — that if they could understand the way in which such simple phrases as "this is a cow" secured their reference then they would also be addressing the more general problem.

TEXT D: Udayana's arguments against apohavāda

[See translation at the end of this chapter, pp. 232-248.]

First of all, let us examine what is meant by the second part of the phrase "this is a cow". What could Dignāga mean by the word "cow" here? It cannot refer to a particular svalaksana as qualified by cowness since Dignāga denies the existence of any
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real resemblances between particulars. The problem for Dignāga here is to explain why the particular svalakṣaṇa should in this instance be associated with the word "cow" rather than "horse", without at the same time committing himself to the ontological reality of such entities as real resemblances, universals and stable objects.

Dignāga's theory of meaning, known as apohavāda, is thus his attempt to deal with this problem. Apohavāda had derived from Dignāga's understanding of the nature of inference. For example, in the inference from smoke to fire, what is actually inferred is not a particular fire, but rather the general idea of fire. Dignāga, however, makes the point that "fire in general" is not a real object and what is actually inferred from smoke is that which is not a non-fire. In the fifth chapter of the Pramāṇa Sāmcaya, Dignāga explains that cognition based on a word (śabdam) should not be considered any different from a cognition based on inference (anumānāt) as a means of knowledge. Thus, he says, a word refers to its object by means of the exclusion of things other than it (arthāntaranivṛtti anyāpoha).

Hence in the expression "this is a cow", "cow" should be understood as a sign which acts to exclude everything which is not a cow. So, in the expression "this is a cow", just as in the example of the inference of fire from smoke, there can be no cow-in-general. Rather, it is a mental construction that comes about from the exclusion of all that is non-cow (apaJayh - to push away, to deny). This is a mental activity which has no corresponding element in reality. In this way Dignāga hopes to avoid an
ontological commitment to any real entity such as cowness.

Udayana, in the latter part of the kṣaṇabhaṅgapariccheda of the ATV, finds several difficulties with this theory of meaning and in doing so was actually repeating concerns which had been voiced previously by both Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers alike. It was the seemingly negative character of apohavāda that many found problematic. As Udayana says, activity arises with reference to positive and not negative things. On hearing that there is smoke on the hill one automatically concludes that there is fire there, and not that there is not non-fire there. Hence Udayana is here attacking the very basis of apohavāda which had had its origins in Dignāga's theory of inference (see p. 235). Udayana also declared that in order to differentiate between non-cows and not non-cows one would have to proceed on the basis of some positive criteria; otherwise the procedure could never get started. Kumārila, a Mīmāṃsā philosopher, had been the champion of this argument previous to Udayana. His argument in the Śloka-vārttika goes as follows: we could only say of a particular object, x, that it was a non-cow if we already know what it meant to be a cow. If we are told that to be a cow is to be not a non-cow, then we are caught in a circular argument.¹⁸

Some of Dignāga's Buddhist successors also found what they took to be the entirely negative nature of Dignāga's apohavāda unsatisfactory and sought to introduce a positive element into the theory. Foremost amongst the Buddhist philosophers who sought to amend Dignāga's apoha theory was Śāntarakṣita, under the influence of Kumārila's criticisms. He did so by appealing
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to Dignāga's theory of sentence meaning (in which Dignāga himself had been most likely influenced by Bhartṛhari). According to this theory, the meaning of a sentence (which in this context should be understood as the object denoted by the sentence) is an immediate intuition which is produced in the mind of the listener, known as pratibhā. This matter is discussed in considerable detail by Hattori, from whom the following extract is taken:

Pratibhā is, according to him [Dignāga], the internal awareness of the idea, which is produced by a sentence. The ideas that arise in the minds of different persons on their hearing the same sentence are not the same as each other, so that each person has his own pratibhā which is not communicable to any other person. However, they are generalized and regarded as the object denoted by the sentence, because they have a common feature in that they are distinguished from those produced by another sentence. It is thus to be affirmed that a sentence denotes its object through the "differentiation from others" (anyāpoha). Dignāga admitted as a psychological fact that pratibhā flashed upon a man immediately after his hearing a sentence, and at the same time maintained on a logical analysis that a sentence expressed its meaning through the exclusion (apoha) of other meanings. Hattori (1979) p. 66

Kumārila felt that this revealed an element of inconsistency in Dignāga's theory. He attacked Dignāga for allowing a sentence to generate a positive form, pratibhā, but to deny this in the case of a single word. Śāntarakṣita sought to dissolve this apparent contradiction pointed out by Kumārila and introduced the idea that in the conceptual construction "cow" there appears an accompanying image. Apoha thus properly refers to this image which functions to exclude non-cows.

Śāntarakṣita was criticized by later Buddhists, such as
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Ratnakīrti, and rightly so I believe, for misunderstanding the nature of Dignāga's original theory. It is not clear what the introduction of an image would accomplish here. In order to illustrate this point I would like to consider apohavāda purely as a theory of meaning separately from Dignāga's related thesis concerning the momentariness of the world.

Contemporary philosophers have moved away from theories of meaning which essentially conceive language, especially in its referential aspect, to be the simple procedure of attaching labels to things. For example, the belief was that one could approach the animal, point and utter "this is a cow" and expect by that procedure to secure a reference for and explain the meaning of the word "cow". We are indebted to such twentieth century philosophers as Wittgenstein for showing the problems of such a simple view of language. In numerous cases, Wittgenstein showed the kinds of misunderstanding that could occur in the simplest of labelling procedures. Hence when we point to an animal and declare "this is a cow", how can we understand what is meant by the pointing? We could only understand that as we came to understand the meaning of the word "cow"! "This" could have meant any four-legged animal, or the colour of the cow or the tail, if we happened to be pointing in that direction. Of course once the individual has acquired enough of a conceptual apparatus, a kind of labelling can occur. We could say "this animal is a cow", for example, increasing the chances of our being understood. Otherwise no amount of finger pointing, repetition or remonstration can demarcate the intended reference.
What fixes the reference is the acquisition of an ability to use the word. The Nyāya philosophers tend to see the process as a chronological sequence, that one labels and then proceeds to make use of that label. So, for example, according to Udayana, the meaning of the word "cow" does not in itself exclude "horse". When we are ordered to "tie the cow", no thought of excluding horses is part of our response. Yet, if we encounter a horse in following the instruction, we are well able to turn back in the recognition that a cow is not there.

The use of images as an aid in grasping the meaning of a word is subject to the same criticism. When understanding the word "cow", a certain image may appear before the mind, but surely this is of psychological rather than philosophical interest. Whether we are talking about the real cow or an image of a cow, the same problems occur. Just as we could not know what was meant by "this" when pointing to the cow, so too we could not know which aspect of the image "this" was meant to pick out until we arrived at an understanding of the word "cow".

This becomes even more obvious if we consider the use of the word "cow" in which it is clear that the context concerns cows in general. How could any image represent a cow in general? As David Hume says:

> the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degrees of each.

Hume (1969 edition) p. 65

As Hume goes on to say, a particular idea becomes general in its representation only by being annexed to a general term. And
moreover, the role of the image becomes superfluous here. Some people may experience numerous images accompanying their use of language; others may not. The image is not where the understanding lies, although for some people it may function as an aid to understanding.

Thus, Śāntarakṣita's thesis that a positive image is the primary meaning of the word overlooks the central thesis of Dignāga's *apohavāda*, that the meaning of a word is dependent on a process of differentiation. It was this insight which Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrī were concerned to reiterate. By introducing a temporal element into the process, namely the formation of a positive image followed by a process of differentiation, Śāntarakṣita transformed *apohavāda* into a theory of meaning which came much closer to that of the Naiyāyikas. Meaning becomes a procedure of labelling followed by differentiation. Ratnakīrti stresses that the affirmation and negation are simultaneous processes and their relationship should be understood as a logical rather than a temporal connection.

Udayana, at the beginning of his critique of *apohavāda*, had concentrated his attack on the version of the theory which was purely negative in nature. Whatever the importance of the differential nature of language, one must agree here with Udayana that a language in which words have meaning solely through a process of exclusion is a language which remains forever turned in on itself and disconnected from an independent reality. For example, part of the meaning of the word "blue" might function to exclude all non-blue things, but that does not exhaust the
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meaning of the word. Intuitively we agree that the full meaning of such a word must contain a positive sensory content. We have already seen why Śāntarakṣita was criticized by Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrī for making such a positive image the primary meaning of the word with the differential aspect being subordinate and sequentially later. Yet both Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrī admitted some positive form (vidhi) as an important aspect of the meaning of the word and it is this more plausible version of the apoha theory which Udayana must refute.

The questions which Udayana must deal with now concern the relationship between language and our sensory experience of the world. Since he now has a Buddhist opponent who accepts that a positive form plays an important role in the meaning of the word, he must now question the Buddhist closely as to the exact nature of this positive element, its status regarding the momentary world of svalakṣagas and hence the relationship between language and independent reality. A word like "cow" for this Buddhist opponent does not describe a world in which cowness is admitted as real, so presumably any positive idea of cowness does not correspond to an independent reality.

TEXT E: On the nature of vidhi and the relationship between language and reality.
[See translation at the end of this chapter, pp. 250-259.]

A statement such as "this is a cow" is normally understood to mean that the individual being referred to is of a particular type, in this case a cow, and is called a cow on the basis of
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some commonly shared characteristic with other cow particulars. In Dignāga's system every svalakṣaṇa is unique so there can be no basis for commonality between them. For Dignāga, a proposition of the form "this is a cow" is not an analysis of external reality but rather the imposition of a mentally constructed order on that reality. The first immediate way in which one might analyze this judgement in accordance with this Buddhist position is to say (1) by "this" the unique particular is being referred to, and (2) by "cow" the mental construct is being referred to, and that (3) these two are wrongly identified with each other. This cognition "this is a cow" cannot be a real perception since mental constructs are conceived as if they belonged to the external world. In order to explain this confusion, the Buddhist here uses a theory of error similar to that of the Prabhākara Mīmāṁsaka. The unique particular and the mental construct, though dissimilar, are perceived as similar since the difference between them is not grasped. The relation between external reality and the mental construct is a case of bhedāgraha (non-comprehension of difference). An analysis of the phrase "this is a cow" would look like this:

```
    this is a cow
     △
    svalakṣaṇa  mental construct
     △ anyāpoha
```

bhedāgraha

overlooking the difference between the two

Such a simple analysis, however, does not fully take into account
the implications of Dignāga's original philosophical position. Udayana, in his critique of the above analysis exposed many of its difficulties.

After rejecting the notion that the positive aspect of apoha is unreal, Udayana then examines the idea that the positive aspect of apoha comes about as a result of superimposition. Just as we can mistakenly perceive a shell as a piece of silver, so too we can mistakenly perceive a svalaksana as the mental construct "cow".

Udayana rejects this parallel for three reasons. Firstly, unlike the shell, the svalaksana supposedly cannot appear in a qualified cognition. Secondly, unlike silver, cowness does not, according to the Buddhist, have a reality elsewhere. Although silver does not exist at the site of the shell, superimposition presupposes that silver has an existence elsewhere (since it should have been perceived elsewhere), an existence which just happens to be misplaced in this instance. (It could be argued from the Buddhist point of view that the difference between these two models is not as great as Udayana supposed.) Thirdly, unlike the shell and silver, the svalaksana and the mental construct "cow" do not have any similarity in their appearance.

Udayana then examines another attempt by his Buddhist opponent to incorporate the svalaksana and the sāmānyalaksana.
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into one judgement. In this case the Buddhist states that there is only a statement of superimposition rather than an actual superimposition. The difference between the svalakṣaṇa and the mental construct of "cow" is not grasped and hence the latter is stated to be the former.

superimposition

this is a cow

bhedāgraha
(non-comprehension of difference)

Udayana rejects this too for the following four reasons. Firstly, in order for non-comprehension of difference to occur they must both be capable of appearing in the cognition. This does not seem possible since the svalakṣaṇa is supposedly not amenable to appearing in a qualified cognition. Since the nature of the mental construct (the exclusion aspect of apoha) is wholly one of exclusion, Udayana questions how an entity lacking any positive form can appear in a cognition. Secondly, Udayana questions how two entities so obviously different in form can be confused. There is no possibility of either of them appearing in the cognition in another guise and since one is essentially positive and the other essentially negative, it is hard to see how non-comprehension of difference could occur. Thirdly, Udayana points out that since his Buddhist opponent is upholding a view of apoha which includes both positive and negative aspects, both the positive element and the negative element must appear in the qualified cognition. Fourthly, this would mean
that the statement of superimposition must work on the basis of imagined properties and must itself be imagined (since the constituents of the qualified cognition have to be imagined as other than they actually are and they are both present in the cognition unlike the case of the shell and silver).  

The reason why the type of analysis given above would have been proposed is that it seems to be able to relate the momentary world of svalakṣaṇas to the attempts of language to capture that world. By showing a mechanism whereby both svalakṣaṇa and mental construct are incorporated into one cognition, it could provide the juncture at which language "hooks on to" the world. In western philosophy, there are many examples of philosophers who, like Udayana's Buddhist opponent, hold the view that language is a complex superstructure that does not reflect the structure of the external world. For example, Russell in his theory of Logical Atomism expressed a view similar to Dignāga's inasmuch as he believed that such everyday objects as "tables and chairs, loaves and fishes, persons and principalities and powers" were all convenient fictions [Pears (1972) p. 44]. Russell believed that in a fully analyzed language these entities would disappear. Russell, however, did attempt to formulate a way in which language and reality could intersect, with his theory of logically proper names. This would seem to be a necessary requirement of languages since, as David Pears says in his introduction to Russell's Logical Atomism:

Russell assumed that, if any of these non-logical words have meanings, some of them must signify existent things. This is a reasonable assumption since, if none
of them signified existent things, the whole vocabulary, whatever the connections between its elements, would lack any connection with anything outside of itself...Russell brings in the syntactical distinction between analysable and unanalyisable expressions. An analysable expression may or may not signify an existent thing, and if it does, the existence of the thing will amount to no more than the existence and appropriate combinations of its elements, and such things are logical fictions. But an unanalysable, or simple expression (that is, a logically proper name) must signify an existent thing, and in such a case Russell equates the meaning of the expression with the thing itself, and the thing is a genuine constituent of the world. [Pears (1972) p. 8]

In Dignāga's philosophy there is no equivalent to Russell's theory of logically proper names, that is to say, a sub-set of words which must signify existent things. Although Udayana criticized the analysis of "this is a cow" in which both svalakṣaṇa and mental construct are incorporated on the basis that the svalakṣaṇa cannot be part of a qualified cognition, we might ask whether or not Dignāga's theory would have been stronger had he allowed the svalakṣaṇa to be referred to by language. Sanskrit has only one word, artha, which can ambiguously stand for "meaning", "signification", "denotation", or "connotation" [Matilal (1971) p. 43]. Dignāga rejects the possibility that svalakṣaṇas can be named because:

Dignāga thinks that words or names cannot directly express the particular or datum. In order to refer to a unique particular, one has to use a word or a name, and to use a word or a name one has to use a concept as the 'ground for its application' which is, according to Dignāga, a conceptual construction. Matilal (1971) p. 41

In order to avoid an endless regress, Russell denied this very proposition, that every name can secure its reference only by means of a "ground for its application". The point of Russell's
logically proper names is that they are supposed to secure their reference directly without the mediation of any descriptions. The meaning of a logically proper name just is the thing which it signifies. In Russell's system, logically proper names name un analysable simple particulars which he identifies with sense-data. Like Dignāga's svalaksesas, sense-data cannot be known by description. They can only be known by direct acquaintance, what Russell calls "knowledge by acquaintance". Sense-data, again like Dignāga's svalaksesas, are momentary, although Russell does admit of a "specious present". A sense-datum is thus seen as being situated within time and is seen as having some duration. Russell's programme was an attempt to demonstrate how language could ultimately be analysed in terms of logically proper names and logical functions, and hence how knowledge too is ultimately of a logical or empirical nature. The possibility of naming these simple particulars represents the contact between language and the world and meets the requirement that analysis had to come to an end at some point.

To return to the phrase "this is a cow", the thesis being presupposed in an analysis such as Udayana's is that the demonstrative pronoun "this" does refer to the svalaksesa. In Russell's terminology, the idea is that "this" can function as a logically proper name in just denoting a svalaksesa. Russell himself, considered the possibility that a demonstrative such as "this" could operate as a logically proper name but ultimately rejected it on the grounds that, as a demonstrative pronoun, it was not devoid of descriptive content, whereas logically proper
names should have no descriptive content — their meanings just are the things which they signify. Ultimately Russell was unable to come up with an example of a logically proper name. Western philosophers have found strange the idea that, if the meaning of a name just is the object to which it refers, then this somehow implies that the object's existence is necessary and a phrase such as "a exists" becomes tautologous. In the case of a sense datum, we can see how it might not make sense to name it and then go on to deny its existence. Words can never become their references, hence the division between language and svalakaṇas in Dignāga's system.

Russell's Logical Atomism was bedevilled by so many problems and his understanding of language has been superseded in the western tradition. One would not therefore want to use the idea of a logically proper name to enable svalakaṇas to be referred to by language. Russell's Logical Atomism is now mostly of historical interest, but recently the idea of words which function only in a referring capacity has been resurrected in an ironic twist to Russell's theory. Russell had rejected ordinary proper names as being logically proper names, since he proposed that they really functioned as disguised descriptions. This orthodoxy has been questioned recently by several philosophers who have proposed that ordinary proper names function in a way that is akin to Russell's logically proper names:
In opposition to the traditional theory, Kripke and Donnellan argue that proper names refer independently of identifying descriptions. One of Donnellan's major contributions has been to show that reference can take place not only in the absence of identifying descriptions but even when the identifying descriptions associated with a name do not correctly apply to the individual to whom the name refers. Schwartz (1977) p. 21

In Kripke's terminology, names are "rigid designators" which means that they refer to the same individual in all possible worlds whether or not that individual satisfies a particular list of associated descriptions. Obviously those philosophers who disclaim that the reference of names is not determined by descriptions need to demonstrate an alternative means for securing reference. Donnellan and others propose that reference is determined in many cases by causal chains, but this is a theory which still needs to be fully worked out.20 The question to be asked in connection with the phrase "this is a cow" is whether the link between svalakṣaṇas and language could be made through the acknowledgement of signs in the language which function in a purely referential manner. If Dignāga's idea that language and absolute reality are totally divorced from each other rests on the claim that all words depend on a "ground for their application", then this is a claim which may be open to dispute.21

Udayana's criticisms of the analysis of "this is a cow", in which the two elements of the judgement are confused because of non-comprehension of differences (bheda-graha), treats the confusion as if it were a perceptual error. Apart from the criticism which we have just considered, that svalakṣaṇas are not
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amenable to being included in a qualified cognition, Udayana also wonders how two very different entities could be so confused. When we talk about confusion between words and things, surely we are not thinking of a perceptual confusion. Similarly, it would seem that the confusion here is of a cognitive nature arising from a misunderstanding of the relationship between conceptual constructs and svalaṅgas. In a perceptual error, such as seeing a shell as a piece of silver, the way in which we correct such an error is by taking a closer look at the object in question. The very fact that we can clear up such errors presupposes the possibility of non-erroneous perception, the possibility, in this example, of arriving at the correct judgement "this is a shell". This is not the way in which we would clear up the confusion concerning the nature of the judgement of "this is a cow". Rather, we would clear up such a confusion by stressing facts of a logical nature. We might point out the fact that you can't attach labels to things as easily as people might suppose, that labelling presupposes a whole background of conceptual thought which allows a particular differentiation to take place. We would stress the differences between words and things, that you can, for example, milk cows but not the meaning of "cows". We would attempt to demonstrate how it is through the use of language that we are able to demarcate a portion of reality. We need to understand the role which our perceptual experiences of 'cow' or 'blue', for example, play in the meanings of the words "cow" and "blue" respectively. The problem here is philosophical and not perceptual.
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Dignāga's emphasis on the differential nature of language and the radical difference between conceptual constructs and svalakṣaṇas were important insights in developing a theory of meaning. Yet he does not answer the question of how apohavāda can lead to successful activity in a world which is made up of unique momentary instants.\(^{22}\) Apohavāda becomes most problematic in relation to such a world. This would be a world devoid of real resemblances between the svalakṣaṇas, a world devoid of any enduring objects and hence devoid of any synthesising intelligence, a world in which every occurrence of a word would itself be unique, indeed, a world in which it is not clear what could be meant by successful linguistic activity. Buddhist philosophers who came after Dignāga focussed more on this problem, namely —if apohavāda is accepted as a theory of meaning, how then does it succeed in a momentary world? Śāntarakṣita's introduction of mental images was, as we have seen, problematic in describing apohavāda purely as a theory of meaning. Where Śāntarakṣita's ideas become important though, is in describing how, as a matter of fact, language relates to a world of momentary svalakṣaṇas. Images come to play a causal role in relating the individual to the world through the medium of language.\(^{23}\)

Udayana's Theory of Universals

In the Nyāya system, the world is made up of relatively stable objects which endure through time and which may be classified into different types on the basis of real
resemblances. Generality is an essential feature of the objects of experience and recognition of that generality is an essential feature of the experience itself, a fact reflected in the preponderance of general words in the language. This is a view of the world which makes more immediate sense than that of Dignāga. It would seem that the very possibility of language depends on there being real resemblances in the world and on our physiological constitution as human beings to be sensitive to those resemblances in similar ways. A contemporary western philosopher, Quine, sees it in the following way:

For surely there is nothing more basic to thought and language than our sense of similarity, our sorting of things into kinds. The usual general term, whether a common noun or verb or an adjective, owes its generality to some resemblance among the things referred to. Quine in Schwartz (1977) p. 157

So, Nyāya philosophers would also wish to say that many of the resemblances which we see between different objects or between the same objects at different times are real in the sense that their origin is not just a product of mental construction but that, in many cases at least, the generality in the structure of language does actually reflect an external reality. This is in direct contrast to Dignāga's view that the world and our experience of it is characterized by particularity only, meaning that universals belong entirely to the world of imaginative construction.

Hence controversy over the nature of universals in Indian philosophy in post-Dignāga times becomes central to the debate between the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhist successors of Dignāga.
over the nature of reality, whether or not it is particular and momentary. Nyāya philosophers are often called realists in the sense that they posited the existence of universals as real ontological entities. They came to hold a theory of universals, however, which is more complex than this label would suggest. As we shall see, when the Nyāya philosophers are attempting to account for the basis of generality in language, they are not just simply realist and we should understand that two separate concerns are at stake here:

(1) The role of universals in the refutation of Dignāga’s theory of momentariness. It is in this respect that some form of realism became important for the Nyāya philosophers, and they actually developed a realistic theory of universals in relation to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Hence a realistic theory of universals, not clearly stated in early Nyāya thought, is gradually developed in relation to its importance as a tool in the attack on the thesis of momentariness, and culminates with the thought of Üdayana in such works as the Kiranāvalī and, as we have seen, the kṣapabhaṅgavāda chapter of the ATV.

(2) The role of the universal in the Nyāya account of how general words get their meaning. In this case a realistic theory of universals is not so crucial and we shall certainly see that they understood that ontologically real universals were not at the basis of every idea of generality.

In summary, where universals are ontologically necessary is in
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their attack on Dignāga's theory of momentariness. The Nyāya analysis of "this here is that", or more specifically a phrase such as "this is a cow", usually occurs in the context of attacking the Buddhist theory of momentariness and hence the emphasis is on the ontological existence of universals. The ontological existence of universals in Nyāya thought becomes bound up with their defence of a stable external world, as the following passage from Udayana's Pariśuddhi shows:

The Realist, the advocate of enduring objects possessing stability, should at any price vindicate the reliability of our knowledge concerning the element "that". Otherwise the whole universe will be cut to pieces and torn apart. And the opponent should likewise assail that reliability with all his might. Indeed, only by repudiating it, will he disprove the reality of universals, and thus it will become an easy task for him to repudiate the reliability of that thought construction which establishes a link between the elements "this" and "that".

Savikalpa-Pratyākṣa

Since Dignāga's thesis involved the absolute uniqueness of each svalakṣaṇa, obviously the judgement "this is a cow" is not one which can be based on perception. The Nyāya philosophers sought to refute this claim by demonstrating the real existence of the universal. Their defence of a stable external world is thus based on demonstrating a perceptual basis to the judgement "this is a cow". As Jayanta says, "the very life of the followers of the Nyāya consists in the theory of savikalpa-pratyākṣa". Hence the realism of the Nyāya system involves both that some universals are ontologically real entities and that they are perceptible. The establishment of the real
perceptible universal became the cornerstone of the Nyaya attack against the Sautrāntika/Yogācāra theory of momentariness.\(^{27}\)

In the early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika literature it is not clear whether or not sāmānyya was held to be objectively real.\(^{28}\) In post-Dignāga times, however, there is an increasing emphasis on the objective reality of the universal, beginning with the clear assertion of Praśastapāda that universals were eternal and objectively real, and culminating in the Kirāṇāvalī of Udayana (see p. 224). The tactic of establishing the universal as a perceptible entity does not, however, achieve what the Nyāya philosophers claimed —a proof of a stable external world — and it also involves them in difficulties common to many theories of realism. There are three main weaknesses in this theory of universals:

1. It is not clear that making universals perceptible entities achieves what the Naiyāyikas hoped. This would depend on the nature of perception.\(^{29}\)
2. As a theory of universals it involves all the problems common to theories of realism which tend to treat universals as if they were substances.
3. As an all-round explanation of what is involved in generality and our experience of it, it is inadequate.

I shall deal with each of these weaknesses in turn.

On the Nature of Perception

According to Gautama, perception is a cognition produced by sense-object contact.\(^{30}\) Hence the existence of external objects
Kṣanabhaṅgavāda II is something presupposed rather than revealed by perception. This presupposition remains in the chain of reasoning which seems to lie behind the Nyāya attempt to anchor a proof of a stable external world to a demonstration of the perceptibility of universals. The argument is that:

1. Their proof of universals rests on their perceptibility.
2. Their proof of a stable external world of objects which can be classified into different types rests on the existence of universals as ontological entities.

For this proof to succeed it is necessary that the nature of perception is such that it is able to present to the senses objects of continuity. Since many philosophers have disputed this, the inquiry has to be taken a step further. The fundamental question concerns the nature of perception—this is the question which needs to be considered in addition to whether or not universals are perceptible. If the nature of perception is itself momentary, the Naiyāyika demonstration that universals are perceptible would not achieve their goal. All they could ever establish would be a series of similar perceptions of, for examples, the cow universal.

If the Sautrāntika/Yogācāra theory of momentariness is tied to an understanding of perception as momentary in nature, for the Naiyāyikas to counter their arguments by demonstrating the perceptibility of universals would be somewhat redundant.31

Problems in Theories of Realism
Kṣapabhaṅgavāda II

The Naiyāyikas were realists inasmuch as they believed that some notions of commonness could be explained with reference to the existence of universals. As we have already seen, these universals were not Platonic forms existing in another order of reality, but were amenable to direct perception in this world, this being an important element in their attack on the Buddhist theory of momentariness. There is, however, an element in the Nyāya theory similar to Plato's Theory of Forms since the Naiyāyikas postulate the existence of universals separate from the individuals with which they become associated.

In making the universal directly perceptible, the Naiyāyikas would seem to be overlooking the element of intellectual abstraction involved in our understanding of universals. Both Platonic and Aristotelean realism grapple with the problem of empirical diversity whereas the Nyāya theory does not give this problem much thought. For example, consider the formation of our understanding of the universal "red". There are in the world a large number of individual objects which we would agree to call "red", despite a considerable variation in their actual colour. In Aristotelean realism, the knowledge of the universal "red" is said to be rooted in sense perception, but the intellect is important in forming a clear understanding of the universal involved, through a process of intellectual abstraction. Hence apprehension of the universal is not a sudden once-and-for-all business, given in a single process, but a gradual process. In the Nyāya theory, by making the universal an object of direct perception, there is no reason why it could not be fully grasped
Kṣapabhaṅgavāda II

in just one single perception. Also, it would seem unable to account for the variety in the different shades of red in the particular example under consideration. It would seem that there would have to be as many universals as there are shades of red.

Udayana seems to have been aware of this problem. In the Kiranvali he states that a universal's existence cannot be proved in the same way as an individual substance such as a cow. Perception of a universal comes from seeing that many things have something in common. Udayana seems to be introducing the idea that the intellect plays an important part in the cognition of the universal, that universals cannot be perceived in the same way that individual objects can.

In general, however, Nyāya realism offers an account of universals that falls somewhere in between Platonic and Aristotelean versions of realism. On the one hand it embraces a "separation thesis" in that universals are separate entities from individual objects, whilst on the other hand, universals belong to the world of sense experience and not some transcendental order of a more perfect reality. The Nyāya philosophers devoted much thought to explaining the relationship between a universal and the individuals to which it is related.

The Nyāya Account of Generality

We have already seen that the existence of universals plays an important part in the Nyāya attack on the Buddhist thesis of momentariness. Universals also have an important function inasmuch as they can be invoked to explain the notion of
commonness:

The main problem in the doctrine of universals seems to be the following question: how or why are we able to apply, as we generally do, the same name to different and distinct individuals unless they are believed to belong to the same category such that we can apply the same name to them? Nyāya Realism claims that the applicability of a general term to many individuals is to be explained with reference to the existence of a generic entity, a universal. Matilal (1971) p. 62

Hence the Naiyāyikas sought to explain the notion of commonness by postulating the real existence of one entity shared by all the individuals of a similar kind. This, of course, raises the problem common to all theories of Realism, of how one universal can subsist in many individuals.

What is most interesting in the development of the Nyāya theory of universals is the recognition that there is no uniform explanation for the notion of commonness, and from the time of Uddyotakara onwards the Naiyāyikas quite clearly stated that not all notions of commonness should be construed as separate from the individuals in which they are instantiated. Hence for the Naiyāyika, there is a fundamental difference in the way in which he would explain the notion of cowness and the notion of being a cook, and it is only with reference to cowness that he would invoke the existence of a real universal. This division is developed from the time of Uddyotakara onwards, culminating in the conditions which Udayana lists in the Kirāgāvalī which must be met by a universal if it is to count as real (see p. 224). The distinction between "cookness" and "cowness" corresponds in Nyāya terminology to the upādhi/jāti distinction. Those class
properties which are not considered real are called upādhis or imposed properties. Those class properties which are considered real are called jātis.\textsuperscript{35}

Once this idea was accepted, it might be thought that the way was left wide open for the complete rejection of real universals. Since commonness could be explained without reference to real universals, then it could no longer be invoked to justify their existence. One reason why this did not happen is that, as we have already seen, real universals played an important role in attacking the Buddhist thesis of momentariness. In wishing to maintain the upādhi/jāti distinction though, I believe the Naiyāyikas had an important insight into the way common nouns function. For them, the importance of maintaining and including jāti in their terminology had to do with their belief that our language was sometimes shaped by real divisions in the world, rather than vice versa.

One of the main concerns in any theory of universals is to explain the way in which general terms function in our language. How are we able to apply the same word to different individuals? More specifically, to return to our examples, on what basis do we single out a person to be a cook, or an animal to be a cow? Philosophers in both east and west have studied this problem. What is clear though, is that this group of words makes up a considerable proportion of words in the language, and that any theory which does not take into account the complexity of this group is liable to error.

Recently in the western tradition there has been a
recognition of this fact, and traditional theories of meaning concerning general terms have been criticized on the basis that they are too simplistic and have treated all general terms as if they functioned in a similar manner. In the case of the debate between the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists, the stock examples used are the terms "cow" and "cook", both general words, but other than that, words which may well function in different ways. This means that often in the debate between the Buddhists and Naiyāyikas they are arguing at cross purposes, since the Buddhists refer their arguments to the term "cook" and the Naiyāyikas to the term "cow".

In western philosophy, traditional theories have been rejected by such philosophers as Kripke and Putnam in favour of semantic theories which seek to further analyse this group of terms, and provide more complex theories of meaning which take into account the various ways in which such terms function. If we look at general terms we can distinguish several different types. For example:

(1) Some, like "bachelor", admit of an explicit definition.
(2) Some, like "table" are much harder to define, although some general vaguer definition can be given.
(3) Some are derived by transformations from verbal forms. For example, a cook is one who cooks.
(4) Some general nouns are associated with natural kinds, for example, a cow.

Nyāya philosophers came to believe that general terms in a suitable context are usually used to denote an individual
Characterized by the relevant class property. For example, the phrase "this is a cow", denotes an individual cow characterized by the class-property "cowness". It will be the same for cooks and bachelors too. The difference lies in the nature of the class-property, as we have already seen, namely, that some class-properties are considered real (jāti) and some are not (upādhi).

This jāti/upādhi distinction, which the Nyāya philosophers make, seems to be a recognition of the fact that there is no one uniform explanation for the way in which general terms function. The point of the distinction seems to be in some cases that we are responsible for the classification in question (upādhi). There is no separate observable universal in this case, but rather we have found it convenient to group together a selection of properties. In other cases the reverse is true; language is reflecting divisions that belong to nature rather than culture (jāti). In this case general terms are applied on the basis of an independently existing universal. This jāti/upādhi distinction is interesting in the light of recent developments in western philosophy which I now wish to examine.

In the traditional theories of western philosophy general terms can be used to denote an individual in a suitable context, and whether or not a particular individual belongs to a certain class is dependent upon it possessing certain requisite properties. Hence whether or not we can truly say of an object "this is a cow" will be dependent upon that object satisfying some list of appropriate descriptions:
To understand a term is to know how to apply it correctly, but for this it is not necessary to know all of the objects to which it may be correctly applied. It is required only that we have a criterion for deciding of any given object whether it falls within the extension of term or not. All objects in the extension of a given term have some common properties or characteristics which lead us to use the same term to denote them....The collection of a term's extension is called the intension or connotation of that term.

Copi (1972) p. 125

According to this theory, whether or not something is of a certain kind depends upon whether or not it has the required characteristics. Formally speaking, intension determines extension. The new theory of meaning concerning the nature of general terms picks out a particular group as functioning in a different manner than that described by the more traditional theory:

The new theory of reference holds that descriptions, if any, associated with natural kind terms do not have a decisive role in deciding whether the term applies in a given case. At best the descriptions associated with such a term are a handy guide in picking out things of a kind named, but the descriptions do not determine what it is to be of the kind.... Biological kinds are determined by genetic structure, and other natural kinds are similarly determined.

Schwartz (1977) p. 27

What this new theory does is to create a very clear division in the way in which general terms function. Firstly, there are those general terms for which the traditional theory holds. Whether or not a particular individual can be characterized by a term depends upon it satisfying a set of relevant descriptions. Within this first group there are two subgroups. A very small group functions like terms such as "bachelor", and whether or not an individual is to be counted as such depends upon it satisfying
a very precise set of descriptions. Putnam has recently pointed out that:

What has happened is this: the traditional theory has taken an account which is correct for the "one-criterion" concepts, and made it a general account of the meaning of general names. A theory which perhaps correctly described the behaviour of three hundred words has been asserted to correctly describe the behavior of the tens of thousands of general names.


With the introduction of ideas such as Wittgenstein's "family-resemblances" and the notion of "cluster descriptions", the traditional theory was given a greater subtlety and could then be used to explain the way in which a much larger group of general terms, such as "table", function. Whether or not an individual is to be counted as such in this case depends upon it satisfying a set of more or less loosely defined cluster of descriptions. The way in which this group of terms function is, however, essentially similar to the way in which a term like "bachelor" functions. They are all cases in which the intension of the term determines the extension of that term.

And secondly, there is a group of general terms which function in an essentially dissimilar way to the above categories. The so-called "natural-kind" terms name substances without the mediation of a list of descriptions. In this case, the descriptions do not determine which individuals belong to the kind, although they may certainly be a handy guide to identification, especially for the lay person. What counts here is whether or not the individual is of the right "stuff". Thus, for example, however much a creature looks like a cow, unless it
Karabhaṅgavāda II

is of the right genetic structure, it will not be a cow. Nor is this new theory a mere refinement of traditional theories, just a matter of replacing ordinary definitions with scientific ones. To take the example of water — on the traditional theory, "water is H₂O" would be analytic since it would be true by definition. According to the new theory, it could be that we are mistaken as to the molecular structure of water. What the new theory says rather, is that once the discovery is made that water is H₂O, then the statement "water is H₂O" will be necessarily true. Anything that is not H₂O, however much it may resemble water in other aspects, will not be water. Our certainty that water is H₂O, however, is the certainty of a well established scientific theory, and not the certainty that comes from knowledge of a definition. Thus this new theory separates the notion of analyticity and necessity, and the statement "water is H₂O" is given as an example, if true, of a necessary a posteriori synthetic proposition. The new theory more properly states that:

"water" has no definition at all, at least not in the traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific substance. Schwartz (1977) p. 30

This new theory of meaning supports a scientific naturalism, and grew out of studies in the philosophy of science. Although languages were developed before the establishment of sciences, underlying the basis of language is a substance metaphysic, the idea that certain observable properties are consistently grouped together on the basis of some underlying substance. With the advancement of science comes the belief that we can know real
essences of things. It is the belief that science enables us to get at the hidden structure of the world which is only hinted at in language (which is based on human interests and observable properties). It is this that is taken into account by the new theory of meaning in its thesis that natural kind words are really proper names of substances. The observable properties are the lay person's guide for identifying kinds but it is the underlying "stuff" that is all-important. Where in two instances all properties are the same, for there to be real identity of kind there has to be identity of underlying stuff. In the case of other general words this is not the case — bachelors, cooks, tables and so on. Here there is no underlying stuff; what is essential for something to be a bachelor or a table is a conformity to a set of descriptions. In this case the difference between essence and accident is a question of definition and terminology. In the case of natural kind words, the differences between essence and accident is fixed by the surrounding theoretical structure of scientific thought. Ultimately too, what counts as a natural kind is relative to the appropriate scientific discipline.

The question to be considered now is how far does the Naiyāyika distinction between upādhi and jāti conform to this difference in the explanation of general terms in western philosophy, and also to understand the wider significance of this distinction in Nyāya philosophy. Obviously there are major differences between the thought of Udayana and the work of
contemporary philosophers of science. Udayana did not share the scientific achievements of our contemporary world, and also we have to take into account the Nyāya insistence on the perceptibility of universals. Udayana, however, does share with modern scientific naturalism a substance metaphysic and a realist epistemology, an intuition that underlying the consistent grouping together of certain properties, there is some deeper explanatory mechanism.

Udayana lists in the Kīranāvalī the conditions which have to be met for something to qualify as a jāti rather than an upādhi. They are as follows:

A jāti must be simple.
A jāti must be realized in more than one individual.
Two jātis will be counted as identical only if they are instantiated in the same individuals.
A jāti cannot be instantiated in another jāti. There must be a category difference.
A jāti occurs in individuals by means of a relation known as inherence (samavāya).
There is a hierarchy of jātis. A particular jāti may be completely "nested" or contained in a higher jāti.
If the extension of one proposed jāti partially overlaps the extension of another, then neither of these should be considered as true jātis. This is known as the defect of cross division (sañkara).

The ultimate particulars of the system cannot be
Rather than belong to a class, any jati should be an instantiation of any jati.

The Relevance of Udayana's Conditions

Consider the following passage from Matilal:

Similarly the notion of belonging to a class expressed by the predicate 'is a generic property' should not be explained with recourse to another generic property. It is true that we say "Cowness is a general property" and "Horseness is a general property" and so on. But 'is a generic property' unpacks as 'is a real property which exists (i.e. inheres) in many individuals', and hence we need not construe its meaning as a separately existing entity. One may point out that we can do the exact same sort of 'unpacking' with respect to such case as 'is a cow' and 'is a horse' and thus get rid of the whole concept of generic property or real universal....Thus if we find some empirically determinable CONDITION by virtue of which the applicability of a general term to different individuals can be satisfactorily explained we need not derive a generic property from the meaning of such a general term. But Nyāya claims that short of some artificial definitions predicates like 'is a cow' or 'is a horse' cannot be explained away. Thus cowness and horseness should be regarded as generic properties. But this argument is not at all convincing.43

It may not seem convincing at first sight, but becomes more so in light of the recent developments in contemporary philosophy concerning general terms. The thesis is put forward, as we have already seen, that the meaning of natural kind terms is not to be given by unpacking them, that is, by replacing them with a list of properties or descriptions. The meaning of cow is not given by "is a four-legged animal ...". It has already been stated that the meaning of such terms is more properly understood by considering them as proper names for substances. Matilal goes on to comment:
What Nyāya is trying to say here might be understood in the following way. A class-property must be simple, non-complex or non-compound, in order to be construed as a generic property. [Matilal (1971) p. 72]

This would seem to accord with treating such terms as proper names rather than as abbreviated descriptions. In separating a group of general names from the totality of general names and calling them jātis, a case can be made for saying that Udayana had something in mind akin to the contemporary notion of natural kind. This can be seen by examining in more detail some of the conditions which he lists in relation to jātis:

(1) A jāti is a natural, not "accidental" or "external" property (aupādhika) of things.
(2) If a jāti is found in all and only those individuals where another jāti is found, then they must not be construed as two distinct jātis. This would be a natural result of seeing that a word such as "cowness" functions as a proper name of a particular substance, to which it refers directly without the mediation of a set of descriptions. Udayana's stricture would be true of contemporary natural kind terms, were it not for the development of "possible worlds" logic. Consider the following example:

These two properties are different, yet in the actual world
have the same extension. They are not true natural kinds (or jātis in Udayana's terminology) since their meaning is intensional. "Creature with a heart" and "creature with a kidney" could point to different individuals since they have different intensions and it is their intensions which determine their extensions. A natural kind term's extension is not so determined since they function as proper names. As previously mentioned, if it were not for multi-world logic, two natural kind terms with the same meaning would, like jātis, necessarily point to the same individuals.

(3) The same individual or individuals cannot be the locus of two jātis unless one of them is totally included in the other; otherwise there is the defect of overlapping (saṃkara). The idea here is that natural kinds of words have a biological, chemical or atomic essence. As Matilal has observed:

The Nyāya doctrine of generic properties can be said to be due to the instinctive inclination toward the NATURAL classification of objects of our experience. 'Overlapping' destroys in some sense the natural order of classification. [Matilal (1971) p. 76]

We can also see in this stricture some sort of impenetrability principle operating, due to the objective reality of the universal.

Concluding Remarks

Matilal, along with others, has linked the Nyāya theories concerning the universal with the organization of their society
into castes:

....one might discover in the Nyāya doctrine of generic property a remote influence of the socio-religious ideas of the brahmins. Translated into biological terms, the above principle of "non-overlapping" becomes a principle which opposes cross-breeding. There is thus some evidence that the Nyāya bias for real generic properties was partially influenced by the Brahmanical concept of an ideal social structure where intermixture of classes is not to be permitted. [Matilal (1971) p. 76]

The importance of the jāti/upādhi distinction in relation to the organization of society into castes goes beyond, I believe, the stricture against marriage between different castes. Nyāya philosophers were concerned to uphold the basis of the caste system as founded in real divisions in the world. Buddhist philosophy in general, and apohavāda in particular, denies the basis in reality of the terms in the language used to signify the caste divisions in society. There is no underlying reality corresponding to the universal of being a brahmin (brāhmaṇatva). According to Nyāya thought, brāhmaṇatva is to be counted as a jāti, implying that this is a simple property whose reality is indicated by the way in which the term brāhmaṇatva functions in the language. In contemporary terminology, brāhmaṇatva is a natural kind term. To be a brahmin is not to satisfy some set of descriptions (as the Buddhists had proposed) but rather, it is to be of the right substance. Hence however much one was to outwardly emulate the behaviour of a brahmin, unless one was made out of the right "stuff" one could never be counted as such. In counting "brāhmaṇatva" as a jāti, the Naiyāyikas were upholding as real the basis of the orthodox caste oriented society. From
an examination of which universals are counted as jātis and which are not, we can come to an understanding of the world-view of the Naiyāyikas. In some sense their "science" is embodied in this distinction. Their intention to classify and use "brāhmaṇatvā" as a jāti term is an intention to settle a dispute concerning the nature of caste in a particular way. Contemporary philosophers of science recognize that finally, natural kind terms are relative to a particular scientific theory and hence ultimately reflect human interest as do our other methods of classification. For the Nyāya philosopher, the normative aspect of natural kind terms or jātis was not understood in the same way in which they understood the normative aspect of upādhis. To be classified as a jāti was to be given some absolute independent reality.

This is interesting in light of recent studies of the caste system by contemporary thinkers. Louis Dumont, a French structuralist thinker, is noted for his studies of the caste system and especially for his emphasis on its hierarchical nature, such that a caste has no reality except in relation to the whole. More recently, some scholars have indicated that Dumont's analysis overlooks the importance of some kind of biological substantialism as a factor in understanding the caste system. E. Valentine Daniel has suggested in his recent work Fluid Signs:

...several principles have been identified as underlying or generating the caste system, the most popular being that of purity versus pollution. Unfortunately, these present but half the truth....The inability to go beyond or beneath caste arose from the failure to see that jāti meaning "genus" (the source
concept of the ill-translated "caste") is not applied to human beings only, but to animals, plants, and even inorganic material, such as metals and minerals as well....There is no better term than substance to describe the general nature of these variously ranked cultural units. In other words, differentially valued and ranked substances underlie the system known as the caste system, which is but one of many surface manifestations of this system of ranked substances. [E. Valentine Daniel (1984) pp. 1-2]

This understanding of the caste system can be clearly seen in the Nyāya theory of the jātis, that in considering such distinctions as brāhmaṇatva to be jātis, they are in essence saying something very similar to E. Valentine Daniel, that underlying the different social groupings there is a corresponding difference of substance.
Udayana's arguments against apohavāda

ksanikatvānupapattiścāṅugatavyavahārānanyathāsiddheḥ.

śabdaliṅgavikalpā hi sādhāraṇām rūpamanupasthāpayanto
na trpakubjūkaraṇe'pi samartha ityavivādaṁ, bāhyārthā-
sthitau sthirāsthiravicārāt.

tāccālīkaṁ vā, ākāro vā, bāhyāṁ vastu vети t rayah pakśāḥ.

tatra na prathamaḥ pakṣaḥ, taddhi na tāvadānubhavādeva
tathā vyavasthāpyaṁ, tasyālīkatvānullekhāt. tathātve
vā pravṛttivirodhāt, na hyalīkameva tat ityanubhūyāpy-
arthakriyārthī pravartate.

anyanivṛttisphuraṅgānaiṣa doṣa iti cet.
Udayana's arguments against apohavāda

Momentariness is not feasible because of the need for a suitable explanation of the question of resemblance. For, when conceptual cognitions arising out of words and inference are not capable of demarcating what is the common feature, then they are not capable of even bending a blade of grass. This is indisputable from our considerations of permanence and momentariness in our investigation of external objects.3

Whether this common feature is an unreal entity, or is an image [in the cognition] or is a real external entity — these are the three views to be decided.4

It is not the first of these views, because it cannot be established as such by experience itself, for there is no indication of it being a non-existent entity.5 Or, if it were so, it is contrary to purposive activity, for, a person desiring some effect, having experienced it as non-existent, will not have a tendency to act.6

"There is no fault here because of the manifestation of the negation of other than that."7
etad evāsat, vidhirupasyaiva sphuraṇāt. na hi śabdaliṅgābhīyāmiha mahādhāroddēse anagnirna bhavatīti sphuraṇaṃ api tvaginirastīti.

yadvapi nivṛttimahām pratyemīti na vikalpaḥ, tathāpi nivṛttapadārthaḥ lekhaḥ eva nivṛttyulekhaḥ, na hyanantarbhāvitaśeṣanā viśiṣṭapratītirṇāma, tato yathā sāmānyamahām pratyemītyanuvyavasāyābhāve'pi. sādhārāpākārasphuraṇāt vikalpadhiḥ sāmānyabuddhiḥ paresām, tathā nivṛttapratvayāksiptā nivṛttibuddhirasmākam iti cet.

hanta, sādhārāpākārāparispurāṇe vidhīrupatayā yadi sāmānyabodhavyavasthā, kimāyātamasphuradvahāvākaṁ cetasi nivṛttiṣṭipratītīvyavasthāyāḥ.
This is what is unreal, because the manifestation is positive in aspect. For the situation is not that through seeing and hearing that there is smoke on this part of the mountain one concludes that "there is not non-fire there", but rather, "there is fire".9

"Even though the determinate cognition in his mind is not of the form "I perceive the negation", even so, the negation is an impression of the thing which is negated, just as a cognition of a qualified thing includes the qualifier even though you don't have a determinate cognition in the form of "I perceive the universal". In the case of our opponent there is knowledge of the universal because of the appearance of the common feature in the determinate cognition. Likewise for us there is knowledge of the negation given in the cognition of what is excluded."

Alas, if there is a justification of the cognition of the universal (sāmānya) as positive in nature in the appearance of the image of the common feature, then what happens in the establishment of the negation (nīṛtti) in the cognition (cetasi), which has the form of non-existence which does not shine?10
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

na hyagopoḍho'ram iti vikalpaḥ kim tu gauriti, tato
'nyanivṛttimahāḥ pratyemītyevamākārāḥbhāve'pi nivṛttyākāra-
spūraṇāḥ yadi syāt, ko nivṛttriṇātimapahnuvīta?
anyathā tvatatpratibhāse tatpratīti vyavahṛtiriti
gavākāre cetasi turagabodha ityāstu.

da ca nivṛttimātrapratibhāse'pi pravṛttisambhavaḥ, na
hyaḥgato nāstītyeva ghaṭārthī pravartate, api tu
ghato'stiiti.

aghaṭasya nivṛttiriti pratītau nāyaṁ dośa iti cet.

na, ghaṭanivṛttyapratikṣepe niyamanasyaivaśāsidheḥ.
tatpratikṣepe tu kastato'nto yādhiḥ, niśedhapratikṣeṇaśy-
aiva vidhitvāt?
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The determinate cognition is not in the form of "this is excluded from non-cow" but rather, "this is a cow", but if there were the appearance of the form of exclusion [in the cognition], even though there is no judgement of this nature, namely, "I cognize the exclusion of the non-thing", who would then disallow a cognition (pratīti) of exclusion. But if, on the other hand, you [the Buddhist] maintain that even when there is no mental impression of that, we can talk about the perception of that, then, when the form of a cow is present in the mind, let there be a cognition of a horse also.¹¹

Nor can there be the possibility of a tendency to activity when there is the cognition of the nivṛtti (negation of non-that) alone. A person desiring a pot does not at all proceed to act with the cognition "negation of pot is not there" but only with the cognition "there is a pot".

"The negation is only of 'non-pot' in the cognition. If this is the case then there is no such defect."

No. This restriction [in the form of 'only'] is not established unless the 'absence of pot' is also negated. If this is also negated, what does it mean other than the positive nature (vidhi) in the cognition since negation of a negation is mere assertion?¹²
**Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda II**

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**PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT**

*nivṛttteraparisphuraṇe gāṁ badhāṇeti desītośvamapi*

*badhniyād iti cet.*

*na, bhavedaṃ prevaṃ, yadvaśvo'pi gauḥ syāt, kintu gaur*

*gaurasvośva iti. anyathā nivṛttāvapi kutaste samāśvāsa*

*iti, nivṛttyantarāccedanavasthā, nivartyanivṛtti-

tadadhikaraṇānām svarūpasaṅkarye pravṛttisaṅkarabh syāt,*

*svarūpabhedenaiva niyame vidhimātrapribhāse'pi tathā*

*kiṁ na syāt.*

*svarūpabheda evānyāpohā anyāpoḍhaṃsvarūpatvāḍvidheriti*

*cet.*

*na, alīkapakṣe tadabhāvāt, tasya svarūpavidhāvanalīkatva-

*prasaṅgāt, svalakṣaṇasya ca vikalpānāroḥat.*
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

"If the exclusion of all other things is not in your cognition, one who is ordered by the statement 'tie the cow', he will tie even the horse."

No, this could be possible only if a horse were also a cow, but on the other hand we see "a cow is a cow and a horse is a horse". If this were not so, where is the question of your belief in exclusion? If it is because of another exclusion then there will be an infinite regression. If there is a confusion of what is excluded, the exclusion, and the substratum of the exclusion, then again there will be a confusion in purposeful action. If it is because of its essential nature that it is restricted then why not accept the positive form in the cognition?13

"The distinctive form is anyāpoha, and the positive nature is because of the nature of anyāpoha."

No, because of the non-existence of a distinct form (tadabhāvāt) in the statement of its being unreal, because if the possession of a positive form (svarūpa) is attributed to the exclusion of others (anyāpoha) then it [anyāpoha] cannot be an unreal entity, and because the particular (svalakṣaṇa) cannot appear in the conceptual construction.14
api ca gām badhāneti deśito gavi pravṛtto nāśve,
tadapratīteh yadā tvāśvamupalapsyate tadā tatra
pravṛttyunmukho'pi gorabhāvaṁ pratītyaiva nivartasyatīti
kimanupapannam?

svādetat, na hyanubhavamavadhūya bhavitum kṣamam iti.
ko vidhispuruṇamapahnutām, tadupasaranībhūtas-
tannīśedho'pi sphuratyeva?

anyathā vidheravacchedakatvānupapatteḥ, na hyanyato
viśeṣyamavyāvartavato viśeṣaṇatvaṁ nāma, na ca anyato
vyāvartanaṁ vyavacchittipratyāyaṇādanyat.

tato yathendīvarapuṇḍarīkādiśabdebyo guṇībhūta-
nIładhavalādividhiśekharā pratītistadanyayavacchedastu
tad garbhārbhakāyaṁāṇaṅtathā sarvatreti cet.
And further, a person ordered to tie up the cow with the statement, "tie the cow", acts only towards the cow and not the horse because the horse does not appear in his cognition (tadapratīteh), but when he sees a horse then, even though he is ready to act in this matter, seeing that the cow is not there, he turns back. What is wrong with this?  

"Let this be so, for discarding normal experience doctrine cannot be possible. Who will be able to contradict the appearance in the cognition of a positive form (vidhi) in which cognition the negation of that positive form (tannīsēdhopi) also appears, being subordinate to that positive form (tadupasaranībhūtas)? Otherwise, if this were not so, it would be impossible to give an idea of the positive form as a delimiter, for a thing which does not differentiate the thing to be differentiated from other things is no more a qualification attribute (viṣeṣānātavam), for the act of differentiating is not different from what conveys to you the idea of the differentiation.

So, as in the case where from the words "indīvara, puṇḍarīka" there is a cognition in which the positive qualities blue, white et cetera predominate with the exclusion of all qualities other than these carried like a child in the womb of the positive form, in all cases this is our point of view."
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

asti tāvadevām -vidhistu sphuratītvatra samprati no
nirbandhah, anyathāvacchedyāvaccedakayorapratīter-
avacchittirapi na syāt, yathotpalādāveva nīlatvādy-
apratītāu.
Then let it be like this - it is forced on us now that there is a positive cognition, otherwise, because of the non-cognition of that which is to be distinguished and that which distinguishes, [the cognition of] distinction cannot be made, as in the case where there is non-cognition of blueness and so on in the example of the lotus.¹⁷
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda II

FOOTNOTES TO TEXT D

1. ATV pp. 111-118 (1940 edition) 
   ATV pp. 275-289 (1939 edition)

2. *tad* refers here to *sādharāṇam rūpam* - the common feature.

3. Udayana's account of causality and hence his proof of permanent objects rests very much on the presence of the universal inhering in each individual object. Conversely, the Buddhist needs to demonstrate how in a momentary world we are able to form an idea of resemblance between individual events.

4. Many of the arguments which supply the pūrvapakṣa in this section can be found almost word for word in Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti. In his turn, Jñānaśrī had been concerned to defend Dharmottara from Vācaspati Miśra who had argued against Dharmottara's views in his NVTT. (I am indebted to Mr. Venugopalan of Deccan College for demonstrating this to me in several cases.) In the opening of his section on apohavāda Udayana seems to be referring to the three possibilities put forward by Dharmottara and presented by Vācaspati Miśra in his NVTT.

   (tasmāt eka vikalpa viṣayatḥ na jñānam, jñānakāra vā, 
   nāpi bāhyāḥ iti āsthyaḥ ālikāḥ ēva. tathāha 
   bhadantah dharmottarāḥ, yat rūpam ullikhyate 
   vikalpikāyā buddhyā āviktaḥ aparaiḥ na buddhiḥ 
   na bahiḥ. 
   Vācaspati Miśra p. 682 lines 22-26)

5. Udayana's argument here is that we don't experience common features between individual entities as unreal. Again, this can be traced back to Dharmottara whom Vācaspati quotes as saying, "āpi ca vikalpa viṣayah anubhūyate eva vyavṛtti 
   rūpah". Vācaspati Miśra, NVTT p. 683 line 20. Vācaspati does not attempt to refute Dharmottara's claim that our experience of commonness is one which is in the form of exclusion. Hence Jñānaśrī takes up this point again at the beginning of his AP with this pūrvapakṣa: 
   nanvapohāḥ śabdāṅgābhyaṁ prakāśyata ityanubhava- 
   badhitametat. Jñānaśrīmitra, AP p. 201 line 8

6. This argument of Udayana possibly refers to the Buddhist's argument concerning purposeful activity (pravṛtti) contained in Vācaspati Miśra's NVTT p. 684 line 19 and p. 685 line 4. Vācaspati's reply can be found on p. 685 lines 5-8.

7. The Buddhist accepts that if there is to be purposeful activity then it must be towards something, yet the Buddhist won't accept the anuṅgatarūpavāma (common form) of the Naiyāyikas. The Buddhist tries to show that apohavāda can
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT D CONTD.

be explanatory in this matter. Jñānaśrī's arguments in this matter reveal that he is concerned to oppose a purely negative view of apoha.

8. nivṛttapadārthollekha as in the 1940 edition p. 112 line 13 seems correct here rather than nivṛtti-padārthollekha found in the 1939 edition p. 279 line 19.

9. This is found in Jñānaśrī as forming the pūrvapakṣa: tathāḥiṁaṁ mahīṃharoddise vahniṁastī śabdallīṅgād vā pratītīvīḍhrūpamevollīkhantī lakṣyate. nānagnirnā bhavatiṁ nivṛttimātraṁ mukhayanto yaccānubhava-bādhitaṁ na tatra sādhanāntaracintā. Jñānaśrīmitra, AP p. 201 lines 8-11.

10. Again this argument follows closely both Jñānaśrī and Ratnakṛti in the AP and AS respectively. atha yadyapi nivṛttimāhāṁ pratyemīti na vikalpaḥ. tathāpi nivṛttapadārthollekha eva nivṛttyollekhaṁ, na hyanantarbhāṽavitaviśeṣanapratītirviśiṣṭapratītiḥ. tato yathā sāmānyamahāṁ pratyemīti vikalpabhāve'pi sādhāraṇākāraśariprāṣṭāṅ vikalpabuddhiḥ sāmānyabuddhiḥ pāreśāṁ, tathā nivṛttapratyayākṣiptā nivṛttibuddhirapohapratītyavahāramātānottīti cet? Jñānaśrī AP p. 201 lines 16-20.

The point being made here by the Buddhist is that in a qualified cognition with the form "x is y" there is no separate cognition of y-ness. The cognition would be "this is a cow" and not "this is cow-ness". "Cowness" though is implied by the qualified cognition. The Buddhist wants to draw a parallel between this case and his own case. Hence although there is no cognition with the form "I perceive the nivṛtti" this is given in the cognition of that which is excluded (nivṛtta).

"I perceive a cow" implies cognition of cowness

"I perceive the nivṛtta" implies cognition of nivṛtta

Udayana's retort here is that in his case the cognition is positive because of the reality of the universal. The universal can actually make an appearance in the cognition. In the case of the Buddhist though, the nivṛtta is a negative entity which cannot therefore make such an
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT D CONTD.

appearance. This objection was known to Udayana's Buddhist opposition. See Ratnakīrti:

nanu sādārānākārāparisphurāne vidhīrūpatavyā vadi
sāmāny abodhavya vasthā; tat kim āyātam
asphurabadhāvākāre cetasi nivṛtti pratītīvyavasthāyāh.
Ratnakīrti, AS p. 53 lines 13-14.

11. Udayana continues to explore the differences between his case and that of his Buddhist opponent with regard to the appearance of the universal and the nivṛtti respectively in the cognition. Udayana questions how there could be a mental impression of exclusion, nivṛtti, since this is essentially a negative entity, and according to the Buddhist's own position there can be no perception of absence. If it were possible to have a mental impression of the nivṛtti then Udayana would accept its implication in the judgement of what is excluded. Since there can be no mental impression of the nivṛtti, if the Buddhist insists that it is presupposed in the cognition of the excluded things then one might as well say that when the form of a cow is present in the mind, let the cognition of a horse be there also. Ratnakīrti has exactly the same argument:

tato nivṛttiṁ ahāṁ pratyemīty evamākārābhave'pi
nivṛtty ākārasphurānaṁ yadi svāt, ko nāma nivṛtti–
pratītīsthitīm apalapet. anyathā'sati pratibhāse
tatpratītīvyavahṛtīr itī gāvākārepi cetasi turagabodha
ity astu.
Ratnakīrti, AS p. 53 lines 14-16.

12. Udayana's point here is that in the case of someone wanting a pot there will only be a positive response when that person knows that a pot is there. The statement "There is not non—pot" can be read as "There is not other than pots", that is, anything which is not a pot is excluded from the situation, but that doesn't necessarily assert that there is indeed a pot there. The positive assertion of a pot being there is made only if the absence of a pot is negated, that is, "non—pot" must be read as "absence of pot". Udayana asserts that if the statement is read in this way then this is no different from the assertion "There is a pot".

13. The Buddhist then states one of his main arguments for the apoha theory, that unless the meaning of "cow" excludes horse et cetera, then statements such as "tie the cow" will fail. In order for us to respond successfully to language then, words must pick out their intended referent by a process of exclusion. Udayana responds to this by bringing to bear the argument of infinite regress. If, for example, part of the meaning of "cow" is "non—horse" then the meaning of this in its turn will be dependent on the exclusion of "horse" and so on. Or, if "cow" excludes horse, that is,
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT D CONTD.

non-cow, and "horse" excludes cow, that is, non-horse, then between these words there will be mutual dependency. Hence there will be a confusion in our language-dependent activity. These arguments are not original to Udayana, being stock arguments of the Nyāya philosophers, found in Vācaspati Miśra's works for example.

14. The Buddhist continues to argue against the Nyāya view of the universal by accepting a positive form in the cognition for the common feature, but continuing to assert that this is in the nature of anyāpohā. Udayana counters by saying that something of a positive nature cannot be an alīka, that is, an unreal entity, which was the original assertion of the Buddhist. Yet Udayana portrays the Buddhist here as being caught between the horns of a dilemma which is of his own making. Only svalaṅkaṅnas have a positive nature and these, according to Buddhist definition, cannot appear in the constructive cognition (vikalpa).

15. Udayana here is stressing his point that it is with reference to positive entities that we act. When we are ordered to tie up the cow, we don't necessarily think of horses because this is not part of our understanding on hearing these words. Yet when we encounter a horse we are able to see that it is not a cow, so we turn back.

16. Here we have an important admission on the part of the Buddhist who is portrayed by Udayana as conceding an important point, that to understand anyāpohā as wholly negative in nature is not feasible. The Buddhist is here portrayed as shedding and moving beyond the wholly negative account of apoha which is said here to have originated with Dignāga. Our experience is not one of pure exclusion in this matter, so whatever the received Buddhist doctrine says (bhavitum), experience must take precedence. "Bhavitum" refers to the views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and Jñānaśrī is here portrayed as rejecting their views.

(kīrtiṇāṅgādīmate gaurāyamītyādau vidhispuraṇābhāve 'pi jñānaśrīya niṣedhavidvidhirapi tatra sphuratītī yatvābhādguṇatvena gamyat, ityatroktām tadāpi dūṣayitum tanmanetanāṅkate svādaṭaditī / kṣaṇamiti śāstramiti śeṣah / tadupasarjanībhūtah = vidhi-viśeṣaṃbhūtah, anyathā = vyavacchedasphuranābhāve, gotvādervidhervyavacchedakatvām na svādityarthah / tadēvāha nahītyādinā. Nārāyaṇī Commentary on the ATV (1940 edition) p. 117 note 1.)

To what extent this is an accurate portrayal of the Buddhist position is a difficult matter (see main body of the chapter). Certainly, some commentators would not accept that Dignāga held a wholly negative view of apoha [see Sharma (1969) p. 52 footnote 14 for example]. Some
commentators have attributed the origin of this view, that the nature of apoha is simultaneously both negative and positive, to Ratnakīrti. Whilst Ratnakīrti certainly espoused this view, according to the ATV, Jñānaśrī must be credited with its formulation:

\[(\text{na ca nīṣedhyamaspratītirnīṣedhyāṃ sprastum-}
\text{arthati, tasya tannirūpaṇādhiṇanirūpanatvāt} / \text{na ca nīṣedhāntarameva nīṣedhyam, itaretarāśrayaprasaṅgāt} / \text{parānapekganirūpāne tu vidhau nāyām doṣa iti} / \text{tataḥ pratītāvitaratāśrayatvamuktaṃ saṅkete saṅcārya} / \text{yatparihṛtaṃ Jñānaśrīya, tadetat grāmyajanadhandhi-}
\text{karaṃ golaṅgivat sthānāntarasāṅcārāt.} \]

ATV (1940 edition) p. 118. See Jñānaśrī AP p. 203.)

Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrī were both concerned to stress that neither the positive nor the negative element of apoha should predominate and that they should not be understood to be in a relationship of temporal succession but rather, their relationship was one of logical interdependence. This simultaneous cognition of both the positive and negative elements of meaning is said by them to be matter of experience. (Just as when we understand the term "īndīvara" [blue lotus] the elements "blue" and "lotus" are cognized simultaneously, so too in every word the positive and negative elements are understood simultaneously.) Ratnakīrti explicitly criticizes those views which emphasize one aspect at the expense of the other:

\[(\text{yattu goh pratīttau na tadātmāparātmeti sāmartyād}
\text{apohah pasčannīsciya iti vidhivādinām matam;} \]
\[(\text{anypohapratīttau vā sāmartyāt anyāpohohavadhāryyate}
\text{iti pratiṣedhavādinām matam, tad asundaram.} \]

Ratnakīrti AS p. 54 lines 4-6.)

17. See Jñānaśrī AP p. 203 lines 20-22.
Parallels to the Text

On the nature of vidhi: Arguments on the basis of pratyakṣa.

sphuratu vidhyalīkamīti cet.²

na, vyāghātāt. kiṁciditi vidhyartho na kiṁciditi
cālikarthāḥ. atadrūpaparāvruttimātrenālīkatve
svalakṣaṇasyāpyalīkatvaprasaṅgāt. svarūpamātraparāvruttau
tu katham vidhirnāma?
At the end of TEXT D the Buddhist admitted that the nature of anyāpoha needed to have some positive form (vidhi) if the function of differentiating A from non-A was to be possible. The question now arises as to the exact nature of this vidhi since obviously the Buddhist will not accept the reality of the universal. Hence in the judgement "this is a cow" the Buddhist will now accept some positive form associated with the word "cow" but will not accept the reality of an independent universal, nor will he accept the possibility that the svalaksana could be referred to by this judgement. For Udayana, in the judgement "this is a cow", an individual cow is being referred to as such because of cowness residing as a positive entity in the individual cow. For the Buddhist, who admits no such entity, his analysis of "this is a cow" must demonstrate how language can successfully point us to the empirical world, given his beliefs in the unreality of the universal (or real resemblances) and in the separation of svalaksana and language. Udayana now examines the Buddhist position closely in order to understand what the nature of his vidhi could be and how it could provide a link between language and the world.

"Let it be asserted that the vidhi is an unreal entity."

No, because of self-contradiction. "Something" is the meaning of vidhi and "not something" is the meaning of alīka (an unreal entity). If it is called an unreal entity merely because it negates things other than itself then the momentary particular (svalaksana) will also have to be counted as unreal. And if the exclusion of others is its essential nature then why do you call it a positive entity?
Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda II

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

vidhyāṁśasyāropitavādayameva adoṣa iti cet.

na, svalakṣaṇavidhervikalpāsaṁsparsāt, sāmānyavidher-anupagamāt, pariṣėgādālikavidhau virodhasyaiva sthiteḥ.

bhedāgrahādvidhivyavahāramātrametaditi cet.

sambhavedapyetat, yadi svalakṣaṇamapi vidhitvamapahāya sphuret, yadi cālīkamapi niśedharūpatām pariḥṛtya prakāśeta. na caivam. ubhavorapi nīrāmātayaḥ prakāṛāntaramupādāyāprathanāt, aprathamānārūpasambhavāccha.

kālpanikasyāpyamāṁśibhavasyāta eva mūla eva niḥitaḥ kuṭhāraḥ.
"There is no mistake because of superimposition in the matter of the aspect of the positive image."

No, because the positive image in the form of a svalakṣaṇa cannot appear in the conceptual cognition, and also because you do not accept the universal. Finally, there is a contradiction in calling one and the same thing positive and unreal in nature.3

"I merely say "vidhi" because I don't comprehend the difference."

This could be possible only if the svalakṣaṇa itself, abandoning its positive aspect, could appear in the cognition, and only if the unreal entity, also abandoning its nature of exclusion, could appear in the cognition. But it is not so. Furthermore, with respect to both vidhi and alīka, because both of them have no other natures in them apart from their own specific features, they cannot take the help of another feature. Added to which, they (vidhi and alīka) do not have the option of not appearing in the cognition.

Because the superimposition is postulated on the basis of imagined properties, for this very reason the axe has been put to the root itself.4
Karjabhaṅgavāda II

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

sādhāraṇaḥ ca rūpam vikalpagocaraḥ, na cālīkam tathā
bhavitumarhati, tasya hi deśakālāṅugamo na svābhāvikaḥ,
tucchatvāt. na kālpanikaḥ, tasyāḥ kṣanikatvāt.
nāropitāḥ, anyātrāpyaprasiddheḥ.

bhedāgraḥādekatvamātramanusandhīyata iti cet.

na, bhāvikasya bhedasyābhāvāt, bhāve vā kālpanikatvasya
vyāghātāt.

paramārthāsataḥ paramārthābhedaparyavasāyitvāt.

āropitasyāgraḥānupatteḥ, abheđāropānavaṅkāśācca.

āropitāsattvasya paramārthasattvapraśaṅgāt.

catuḥkoṭinirmuktasya cātiprasaṅjakatvāt, tadagrahasya
trailokyepi sulabhatvāt.
And, as the common feature is an object in a verbal cognition, it cannot be an unreal entity, because it would not have a common form running through space and time since it is non-existent. Nor can the positive form be something which is postulated because of momentariness. Nor can you say that it is something which is superimposed because you have not established its existence elsewhere.5

"Because of the non-perception of difference [in all these cognitions] there arises the idea of uniformity."

No, because there is no real difference between them, or, if the difference is real, then this contradicts your idea that each one is conceptual.6

If the distinction is not really existent (that is, unreal) then the result is that there is no real difference.
Also, it is logically impossible to non-cognize [a difference] which is superimposed as well as the fact that there is no reason to superimpose the identity.
And if the argument is that non-reality is superimposed on the difference, then this implies that the distinction is really real.

If you say that [the non-perception of difference] is not any of the above four types, then the result will be a wider application in that it will be possible to perceive all things in the three worlds as being non-different.
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT E

1. ATV (1940 edition) pp. 119-123
   ATV (1939 edition) pp. 302-304

2. *vidhyalīkām* is a *karmadhārāya* compound; here the idea is that the positive form has no reality.

3. The arguments which follow, that the positive aspect of *āpoha* is unreal are all on the basis of *pratyakṣa* (perception). (Udayana deals with the arguments based on *anumāna* (inference) in the next section.) The arguments based on *pratyakṣa* are in two sections, those which examine the nature of an individual judgement "this is a cow" and those which examine the nature of a sequence of such judgements. It must be remembered that the reason why the Buddhist introduced *vidhi* as an aspect of *āpoha* was to explain the relationship between language and the world, that is, how language can enable us to interact successfully with an independent reality consisting of momentary *svalakṣaṇas*. Udayana first of all rejects the view that the positive form is unreal and his reasons for doing so are stated quite clearly. Apart from Udayana's criticisms, if the positive aspect of *āpoha* is just simply said to be unreal then this does not explain satisfactorily the relationship between language and the world of *svalakṣaṇas*. The Buddhist then puts forward the view that the positive *vidhi* is superimposed on the world of *svalakṣaṇas*. This is said to be the view of Dharmotarā and was severely criticized by both Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti, who state that this view of illusory externality (*āropita bāhyatvā*) was unrealistic (*alaukikam*), against the tradition of Buddhist thought (*anāgamanam*) and illogical (*ātkākīyaṃ*).

(etAddress yadd Dharmottara: āropitasya bāhyatvasya
vidhiṇiśedhāv ity alaukikam anāgamanam ātkākīyaṃ
cathayati tad apahasitam.)

[Ratnakīrti AS p. 60 lines 13-14]

Dravid (1972) puts it succinctly thus:
"The object of Dharmotara's conception having an illusory externality is, according to Jñānaśrī, neither empirical (samvṛtī) nor ultimate (paramārtha). Empirical truth is nothing but what is commonly accepted to be true (lokābhīmāna). Our judgments are commonly believed to refer to external things. This belief is based on repeated experience. The externality of empirical objects is never believed to be illusory, as its cognition leads to the fulfilment of volitional activity. So the externality of the objects of our judgments is not a case of illusion. Nor is the so called illusory externality a character of the real, because the latter, by accredited tradition, is beyond affirmation and negation."

[Dravid (1972) pp. 314-315]. See Jñānaśrī AP p. 229 for his
views on this matter.]
Udayana demonstrates that the superimposition of the positive aspects of apoha on an external svalaksana is just not feasible. The model for this idea is to be found in the Prabhakara theory of error and is paralleled in the mistaken judgement "this is silver" pronounced in the presence of a shell. The error here is explained by the fact that the idea of silver is superimposed on the shell appearing in the cognition. Udayana points out that this model will not work for several reasons. First of all, unlike the shell, the svalaksana cannot appear in the cognition expressed by the words "this is a cow", for example. Secondly, the Buddhists do not admit the reality of cowness which is supposed to be superimposed on the svalaksana (whereas silver, although not existing in the shell, is supposed to have a real existence elsewhere). Finally, unlike the shell and silver, Udayana points out that there is no similarity at all between positivity and unreality.

Here the Buddhist is changing his position from saying that there is an actual superimposition of the positive aspect of apoha on the svalaksana to saying that there is only a statement of superimposition. This would be an attempt to avoid some of the problems pointed out by Udayana which result from saying that there is an actual superimposition. For example, there is now no need for the vidhi (which it should be remembered is said to be unreal or alīka throughout this whole argument) to be real like the silver. In this case there is a non-comprehension of difference between the positive aspect of the cognition and the negative aspect. Their natures which are different are not comprehended as such. In order for non-comprehension of difference (bheda-graha) to occur, however, there should be some common form shared by the two entities (sāmānyākāra). Udayana finds fault with this idea on four counts. Firstly, the non-comprehension of difference could only happen if the svalaksana could appear in the cognition without its positive aspect and if the unreal aspect (alīka) could appear abandoning its nature of exclusion. [The alīka in order to appear in the cognition must have some positive form (vidhi).] Secondly, it would seem that this is impossible since they are both essentially of positive and negative natures respectively. The idea behind these two points is that first, the two entities involved are supposedly so different it is hard to see how non-comprehension of difference could occur at all. Secondly, the essential nature of a svalaksana is such that it is not amenable to expression in a conceptual cognition and the essential nature of exclusion is such that it does not have any positive form which could appear in a conceptual cognition. Udayana's third point is that both entities must appear in the cognition because of
Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda II

calling it vidhyalīka. The vidhi aspect is supplied by the svalaṅka and the alīka aspect by anyāpoha. Hence if the conceptual cognition is to be labelled vidhyalīka then both contributors must be present. This makes the possibility of superimposition hard to understand if both elements are present. Usually for superimposition to occur one element must by absent (as in the case of shell and silver). This leads to Udayana's fourth point that in this case the imagination would have to work against what is actually present in the cognition. There has to be a non-comprehension of difference on the basis of imagined properties.

5. Udayana is here making the point that the common feature cannot be an unreal entity since an unreal entity would not satisfy what is required of a common feature, namely, that it have a common form running through space and time (deśakālānugamo). The common feature cannot either be the result of postulation since the very nature of a cognition itself is momentary. It might seem here that Udayana's arguments themselves presuppose the real existence of universals or common features rather than demonstrate their existence. The Buddhist could say in opposition to Udayana here that it is just because of the fact that cognitions are momentary that common features running through space and time are not possible, hence proving their point of view. The question posed by Udayana here though is that we do have an idea of common features running through space and time, and hence it is incumbent on the Buddhist to show how we could form such a notion in a world of momentariness.

6. The Buddhist reply to this point is that it is because of the similarity between a sequence of momentary cognitions that we form an idea of a common feature running through space and time (which may remind some readers of a similar idea put forward by David Hume). This idea was put forward by Dharmakīrti and quoted by Vācaspati Miśra. (ekapratyavamarāṣāya hetutvāddhirabhedinā ekadhīthubhāvena vyaktīnāmaprabhinnatā.) This idea is put forward by Raja thus: "The so-called objective world is made up of a succession of such momentary particulars, like the still pictures of a cinema. Strictly speaking, these momentary particulars produce mutually different results, but since they produce the same sensation they all appear as identical. Dharmakīrti says that the sensation of sameness is produced by a repeated series of similar perceptions, and the sameness of the particulars is the consequence of the fact that they produce the same sensation. The relative difference of these particulars is not grasped, hence man imputes sameness to them, by the common exclusion of all the others."

[Raja (1963) p. 181]

Udayana criticizes this account in four ways. Firstly, he
says that if there is to be a real difference between things, then the things themselves should be real. For the Buddhist, however, the cognitions involved are only conceptual, that is, there can be no real difference non-cognition of which can lead to the idea of uniformity. Udayana's second criticism is that if the Buddhist tries to evade this criticism by saying that the difference between the cognitions (vikalpa vişayas) is not real, then this results in their being one. The Buddhist is not portrayed as saying that they are all the same, but there is a difference between them which is superimposed, which in its turn is not perceived, hence giving the idea of a common feature running through space and time. Udayana's third criticism is therefore to show the absurdity of this idea, since anything which is superimposed is always grasped. You cannot superimpose something and not perceive it!
Chapter Five

BĀHYĀRTHABHĀṅGAVĀDA AND GUNAGUNIbhEDABHĀṅGAVĀDA: ON THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

But under the requirement of philosophic consistency, and the impact of the perfectly valid reflection that experience is always my experience, and never part of some object independent of me, the world shrinks to the extension of my experience only, and I am left with bundles of my sensations. What are the natural consequences of such an epistemological sophistication?

One plausible and natural reaction is what one might call the 'Indian' one. It runs roughly as follows: my experience of the world is, alas, only my experience. It is not 'the real'. Moreover, the world disclosed in my experience is one of misery, precariousness, insecurity, which ends in old age and death and within which no secure, reliable, undeceptive goods can be found. The flux and precariousness which make it so unhappy a place, also make it most ill-suited to be an object of knowledge.


The Philosophical Background

Contrary to Gellner's caricature of Indian philosophy as idealist in nature (a common misconception), as we have seen there were several schools of Indian thought, such as Nyāya, which strongly defended the existence of an independent, external world. Indeed, Gellner's paragraph introduces four separate theses which need to be kept distinct if one wishes to understand the differences between the various schools of Indian philosophy.

These are namely:

(1) The world as a place of suffering
(2) The world as transitory in nature
(3) The world, that is the external world, as unreal
The external world as unknowable

The idea that the world is a precarious place full of suffering became increasingly important in Upaniṣadic thought and, of course, was from the beginning central to Buddhism. This worldly pessimism is fully expressed in the opening of the Maitri Upaniṣad:

O Revered One, in this foul-smelling, unsubstantial body, a conglomerate of bone, skin, muscle, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus, tears, rheum, faeces, urine, wind, bile and phlegm, what is the good of the enjoyment of desires? In this body which is afflicted with desire, anger, covetousness, delusion, fear, despondency, envy, separation from what is desired, union with the undesired, hunger, thirst, old age, death, disease, sorrow and the like, what is the good of enjoyment of desires? And we see that all this is perishing, as these gnats, mosquitoes and the like, the grass and the trees that grow and decay.... Among other things there is the drying up of great oceans, the falling away of mountain peaks, the deviation of the fixed pole-star, the cutting of the wind ropes (that hold the stars in their places), the submergence of the earth, the departure of the gods from their station. In such a world as this what is the good of enjoyment of desires? [Maitri Upaniṣad verses 3-4]

The suffering of the world arises from the fact that ultimately everything in the world is subject to decay and is of no absolute value. There is no doubt that this view of the world lies at the heart of Indian soteriological thought, and whilst the responses of such schools as Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, Vaibhāṣīka and Mādhyamika in the Buddhist tradition and Advaita Vedānta in the Hindu tradition might seem to be more immediately in sympathy with such a world view, it must also be stated that there is no inconsistency between the realism of the Nyāya school and the idea that the world is a place of suffering and decay. The
A scholar needs to be curious though about what role Nyāya realism could play in a soteriological framework which places small value on the temporal world.\(^2\)

Gellner conflates the next two theses, the view that there is no external world and that the world is momentary in nature. These two theses are quite clearly separated in the ATV where Udayana examines the question of momentariness in the kṣanabhaṅgavāda section and only moves on to consider the notion of an independent, external world in the next section, bāhyārthabhaṅgavāda. This is no accident, for in western philosophy the thesis that the world is momentary in nature is directly related to the idea that "nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions" [David Hume (1969) p. 116]. This one premiss is the basis for both the argument that the world is momentary in nature and the argument that there is no independent, external world. Gellner has expressed it succinctly thus:

The key premiss is a tautology: we only experience what we experience. What we do not experience, we do not experience. But tautological though this premiss may seem, it also appears to be pregnant with the most important consequences .... By considering carefully, as Hume did, what we do and do not experience we note that we do not — and could not — experience either the permanent, persistent substantiability credited to material objects by common sense, or the causal links which bind events, and which make the world predictable and manipulable, to a degree at least sufficient for a tolerable human habitat. The 'naive realist' attitude towards both objects and towards the connections between events, an attitude which had full confidence in their inherent reality, is possible thanks to a kind of confused double think, which conceives the gaps in the series of data as, all at once, not being gaps after all, but being permanently filled. But what is the point of saying that objects are 'really there'even
when no one is looking at them? How could you establish this? You cannot look without looking. The very terms of reference preclude an answer. [Gellner (1974) p. 73-74]

We have already dealt with the Buddhist arguments for the momentary nature of the world, and the philosopher trained solely in the western tradition will surely have been impressed there by the absence of arguments relating the doctrine of momentariness to the nature of our perceptual experience. Udayana was concerned to refute a thesis of momentariness which his Buddhist opposition had argued for on the basis of the nature of existence and causality, rather than on the basis of the nature and limitations of our perceptual experience. Hence in the kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda chapter, Udayana's main opposition had been the Sautrāntika Buddhists who upheld a thesis of momentariness in combination with a thesis of the reality of the external world. In that chapter, the nature but not the existence of the external world was under dispute.³

In the bāhyārthabhaṅga and guṇagunibhedabhaṅga chapters of the ATV, Udayana moves on to defend the existence of an external world, independent of and external to an individual's private experience.⁴ The opposition shifts from being simply one of Buddhist phenomenalism to one of Buddhist phenomenalism-cum-idealism.⁵ In these chapters, Udayana is concerned especially to defeat the Yogācāra school of Buddhism which put forward an idealist interpretation of Dignāga's philosophy.⁶

The relationship of the third and fourth theses, that is, the existence and knowability of an external world, to the first
two theses is also a complicated issue in Indian philosophy. It is not so much the transitoriness of the world which makes it an unsuitable object of knowledge. Indeed, according to the Sautrāntika Buddhist, such a world is grasped directly in perception and hence "known". Rather, the Yogācāra school disputes the idea that we can know of an external world on the basis that we can never perceive anything as separate from our judgements. Indeed, for the Yogācāra school, the very division of internal/external makes little sense. Thus the argument that "nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions", whilst not a central issue in the debate over kṣaṇātva, is central to the Yogācāra dismissal of a knowable, external world.

Nyāya realism argues for a position whereby we have direct access to the external world, and where perception, rather than throwing a veil of "sense-data" between us and the world, gives us this direct access. Nyāya philosophers propose a theory of perception that tries to overcome any divide between us and the world. They would deny the existence of any mediating entities such as "sense-data", for once entities such as these are inserted between the observer and the "observed", then both the idea of an external world and an object independent of its qualities become undermined. By proposing that in perception we are brought into immediate contact with the world around us, the Nyāya school is arguing against a fundamental premiss common to all forms of idealism that perception does not give us any direct access to a world outside of itself. As J.N. Mohanty states:

It is well known that the Nyāya advocates an extreme
form of direct realism and maintains that what we
directly perceive are physical objects and not some
intermediate entities called variably by philosophers
'ideas', 'contents' or even 'sense data'.

In order to defend the Nyāya form of realism, in the
bāhyārthabhaṅga and guṇaṅgupibhedabhāṅga chapters of the ATV
Udayana considers all the major disputes between the realists of
the Nyāya school and the phenomenalistic idealism of the Yogācāra
school. I have grouped these overlapping arguments under three
main headings:

(1) The nature of perception

Here the arguments concern the nature of our judgements
about the world, whether or not perception can bring us into
direct contact with the world. The debate concerns the nature of
our awareness and how it could possibly grasp objects external
to it.8

(2) The nature of everyday objects

Here Udayana is concerned to defend the existence of
objects such as tables and chairs. Udayana argues against a
regressive representationalism, in which it is claimed that such
everyday objects have to be inferred from our perceptual
experience which cannot present such objects directly but at best
give us a representative similarity. His main concern, however,
is to argue against a progressive phenomenalism in which objects
such as tables and chairs are said to be built up from the
elements given in perception. In arguing for his position,
Udayana utilizes arguments in which he attempts to show that an
object is more than the sum of its parts and that there is a
real difference between an object and its qualities. In order to defend this distinction (guñaguñibheda), Udayana argues that:

(i) there is a correlation between our senses of sight and touch, that the object which we see is the same object which we can touch.

(ii) it is possible to perceive a whole (avayavin) through perceiving a part of that object.

(iii) it is possible for us to perceive an object separate from its qualities. He gives as examples the perception of a conch shell as yellow by a jaundiced individual, and the differing presentations of an object given to an individual who changes her position with respect to that object.

(3) Knowledge of an external world

Udayana argues against a scepticism which claims that we can never have a certain knowledge of a world external to us. He defends the role of the pramānas, the instruments of knowledge, in their capacity to give us such knowledge. The argument that our perceptions can give us a direct access to an external world is also important in this respect. In order to defend the possibility of knowledge about an external world, Nyāya needs to have an adequate explanation for such phenomena as perceptual illusions and errors, phenomena which Udayana also examines.

I will now examine some of these arguments in greater detail by means of the following two translations taken from the guṇaguṇibhedabhaṅga chapter of the ATV.9
On what we see and touch

Udayana's basic argument in this portion of the text rests on the notion that when we perceive an object, such as a table, we have an intuitive understanding of it as being one object (ekārtha). This is not a position which he argues for. Rather, it is this very premiss which is assumed, and his defence of guṇagunibheda, that an object is different from its qualities, rests on the thesis that guṇagunibheda is the only viable explanation for the basic awareness which we all have of one object which we can both see and touch. Hence Udayana's strategy is to offer our awareness of one object (ekārthānusandhānam) as self-obvious and then demonstrate that of five possible explanations only guṇagunibheda can adequately explain this phenomenon. The five possible explanations which he considers are, in the following order:

1. that the object of vision is the same as the object of touch.
2. that the object of vision and the object of touch form an aggregate object (samudāya), which functions for all purposes as one object.
3. that the object is separate from its qualities which are the objects of our organs of sight and touch.
4. that the object does not correspond to reality.
5. that the object is unreal.

According to Udayana's Buddhist opposition, each sense faculty reigns over a separate and exclusive domain of objects, a
theory known as vyavastha. Just as we cannot taste sounds, so too according to a strict vyavastha theory, we cannot see those objects which belong to the domain of touch. Nyāya philosophers, on the other hand, do not apparently accept this strict interpretation of the vyavastha theory. They accept that the sense of taste and hearing are mutually exclusive, but maintain that this is not the case with the senses of sight and touch. For example, what we see and touch is one and the same rose, whereas what we smell is the fragrance of that rose rather than the rose itself. This theory in which an object may be known through different means is known as the samplava theory.\textsuperscript{11}

In this section of the ATV, however, Udayana makes clear that it is only by assuming a separation between an object and its qualities that we can formulate the understanding which we have of one object, such as a table, for example. I would like to consider this thesis of gunaguṇibheda in relation to the samplava theory, and also to understand the role which the guṇa/guṇin distinction plays in Udayana's realism. Consider the following passages from Professor Matilal's recent work, Perception:

A follower of Nyāya is a direct realist and therefore holds that we can grasp the same material body by both the sense of touch and that of vision. Not only do we see the material body, the chair, but also touch the same body.

and:

Nyāya therefore allows 'mixture' (or samplava) in the case of vision and touch, in the case of [perceptual] judgement and inference. Nyāya would say that the same property, shape of the thing, can be both touched and seen (a point on which the Sautrāntika apparently, and
rightly from the Buddhist point of view, disagreed). Furthermore, Nyāya contends that the same thing, the propertied object or the 'shaped' body is also seen and touched by us.12 [Matilal (1986 p. 253]

Now in Udayana's first alternative, he considers the thesis that our notion of one object results from the possibility of the visual and tactile objects being one and the same. In discussing this first alternative, Udayana demonstrates one way in which the visual organ operates in a domain different from that of the tactile organ. As he points out, we cannot touch colour; otherwise a blind man would be able to see blue with his fingers (see translation of TEXT F, pp. 286–287). Several questions arise here in the context of the passages from Matilal cited above:

(i) Since there is no mixing in respect of colour, would that mean that we are seeing the colour of the table, and not the table itself?

(ii) When it comes to talking of the shape of the table, is this a case where there is 'mixing', in the sense that the same quality can be both seen and touched? Professor Matilal, it seems, asserts that this is indeed so according to the samplava theory, and it is this fact which is the basis for our understanding of the table as one object—that is, that our idea of 'one table' is incumbent on our being able to both seen and touch this shape.

Empirical evidence throws doubt upon whether this is indeed the case. Professor Matilal himself, raises the Molyneux question in the course of his discussion:
Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see: quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube? [Locke (1964) p. 121]

Locke and Molyneux agreed that the answer was no, and apparently in this they are supported by experimental evidence. Matilal gives the following hypothetical answer that Nyāya might offer in explanation:

It would say that one sees, of course, the same cube one touched before (when one was blind, for example), but one's inability to use the same name N to name what one sees now (assuming this to be a proven fact) can be accounted for in a different way. It is certainly true that for Nyāya that the person concerned sees N under the circumstances. But seeing N is not the same thing as seeing it as N. Moreover to use N to name it we need to see it as N. For simply seeing N is not a sufficient condition for our being able to judge it to be N. The blind man suddenly gaining eyesight miraculously may initially have difficulties in identifying as N the cube he sees now, but after another try (after, for example, touching it again blindfolded and then seeing it again) he would be able to bridge 'the gap' and claim that he grasps the same object (thing) by both vision and touch. [Matilal (1986) p. 254]

It is my contention that one cannot read this section of the guṇaṇibhedabhāṅga chapter and maintain that Udayana's thesis for our comprehension of there being one table, for example, rests on an understanding of the samplava theory in which visual and tactile objects coincide. He does not specifically discuss the quality of shape but rather colour — that a blind man cannot see blue, but, if he were to assent to the idea that in the perception of shape the organs of touch and vision have a common
object then this renders the argument in the remaining portion of
this chapter superfluous. His contention is that it is only by
accepting the guṇa/guṇin distinction that we can have a notion of
one object. By accepting the joint visual/tactile perception of
shape, alternative (1) would be an acceptable explanation and
there would be no need for alternative (3) and hence no
successful refutation of the badhaka — guṇaguninorābheda (non-
difference between an object and its qualities). On a reading
which gives this section coherency, one would have to say that
Udayana would side with Molyneux and Locke in the sense that a
blind person does not see the shape that a sighted person sees,
and that the shape which he feels is not the same sensory object
as the shape which the sighted person sees. The reverse of this
would also be true — someone who had no sense of touch could not
touch the hard edges of the cube with his eyes; otherwise it
would be possible to hurt someone by visually showing him the
point of a dagger. The visual perception of the cube involves
the visual sensation of a shaped mass of colour, whereas the
tactile perception involves tactile sensations of hardness and so
on. In the case of Udayana, I suggest, an agreement with
Molyneux on this question is not damaging to his realism because
his theory of realism does not depend on a theory of samplava in
which visual qualities can be grasped by the tactile organ. It
seems that Udayana quite categorically rules out alternative (1),
that our idea of one object arises from the visual and tactile
organs operating on common objects. Rather, he would want to say
that what we see is the same table that we can touch because the
colour, shape, hardness, et cetera are qualities which inhere in one and the same object. Samplava here would mean that we can see and touch one and the same material object, not that the visual organ can grasp objects in the domain of the tactile organ and vice versa. (Presumably the reason why we smell the fragrance of the rose rather than the rose itself is because smell is not a quality which inheres in the object itself.)

It could be claimed now that Udayana's position will lead directly to phenomenalism, since an object in this situation is merely an aggregate of qualities grouped together — a table will be a composite object made up of visual and tactile forms. It would seem that Udayana was aware of this danger, for in alternative (2) he moves on to discuss and dismiss this as a possibility, that an object such as a table could be a mere aggregate (samudāya). The Phenomenalist needs to explain how "if there are only parts, how can a mere plurality be referred to as one object" [Mohanty (1970) p. 186]. The problem for the phenomenalist here is to explain the basis for the unity which we ascribe to physical objects, to distinguish between a unified object such as a table and something which we would consider a mere aggregate, such as a pile of apples.

The sense of unity ('This is one') and the sense of plurality ('These are many') cannot refer to the same object. The former refers to one object, not to a mere aggregate. The latter to an aggregate, but not to a unity. "But" it may be asked, "do we not refer to a wood or to an army as one object, although the wood or the army really is a mere aggregate of many different things? Why then would it not be possible in a similar manner to refer to a tree as one object though in reality it is a mere aggregate?" To this, the Nyāya replies in the following manner. It is true that we
mistake from a distance, or on account of other doṣas, a mere aggregate or a plurality for a unity, so that instead of saying 'These are many', we say 'This is one'. Such a sense of unity is no doubt erroneous. But such an erroneous sense of unity is possible, only if there are other cases, where our sense of unity is right. [Mohanty (1970) pp. 186-187]

In dismissing alternative (2), the object as an aggregate, Udayana's strategy is to systematically undermine any principle upon which the visual and tactile objects could be grouped together. Udayana would contend that it is only because we already have a sense of a unified object that we group together our various perceptions of it. He examines in turn each of the four possible principles which could be the basis for grouping together a collection of perceptions, namely, their having a common locus, a common effect, a common cause and even existing at a common time. In each case Udayana carefully demonstrates their inadequacy in the task of acting as a unifying principle. (See translation of TEXT F pp. 286-295.)

Udayana's sense of realism is offended by the claim that objects such as tables are unreal or have no true correspondence with reality. For him, our successful interaction with the objects of the world is a strong argument against such a claim. In the course of arguing for this position he also has cause to refer to his previous arguments defending the idea of the whole (avayavin). The Buddhist assertion is that such a whole is never perceived. For example, in our perception of a tree, all we ever see are various parts of the tree. The notion of the avayavin played an important role in Nyāya realism, and it had been vigorously defended since the time of Gautama. The whole
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resides in its parts and hence Nyāya would dismiss the claim that in order to see the whole we would have to see all of its parts. Thus if I have a clear unobstructed view of the table, then I see the whole table, even though there are parts of the table which I may not be able to see. It is only in the case where my view of the table is obstructed, when I can just see one leg, for example, that it can be said that I only see part of the table. Having a partial view of an object only makes sense in terms of knowing what it means to have a view of the whole. The Nyāya concept of avayavin is an important defence against the argument which claims that we cannot really perceive physical objects, but only infer or construct them on the basis of our perceptual data.

Thus in this section of the guṇagunibhedabhaṅga, Udayana focusses on the importance of the guṇa/guṇin distinction for his realism. His claim is that only the guṇin, the possessor of qualities, can explain the correlation we experience between our visual and tactile senses which work together to give us a sense of unity. In this section, Udayana also gives a sense of the relationship between the guṇa/guṇin distinction and the notion of avayavin. Avayavipratyakṣa (perception of the whole) is an important defence against the Buddhist who claims that however much Udayana argues against the idea of an aggregate object, all he can do is replace it with an object which we can never perceive. The guṇa/guṇin distinction emphasizes the distinctness of the table from its qualities, the notion of avayavin emphasizes the intimate connection between a whole and its parts. Both are necessary for the defence of Nyāya realism.
In this section of the *guṇa-guṇibhedabhaṇaṅga*, Udayana discusses the central argument of the idealist Yogācāra school. For the Yogācāra school, the distinction which we make between an external reality and our perception of that reality is a mere mental perception arising out of ignorance. Dharmakīrti presented the case for his phenomenalistic idealism thus:

\[ \text{sahopalambhaniyaṇād abhedonīlaṭaddhiyoh}^{16} \]

The claim here is that "because they are always apprehended together, there can be no distinction between blue and our perception of it". Dharmakīrti is making the point that there is no reason to distinguish between blue and our awareness of blue — if these two were different then it should not be the case that they are invariably apprehended together. It is not so much an argument against the external world but, rather, that the very bifurcation itself of internal/external is mistaken. Dharmakīrti's argument is effective both against a phenomenalistic realism as well as Udayana's realism, for not only is it an argument about the existence of qualities separate from our apprehension of them, but also against the existence of an object as separate from its qualities, since the object is never perceived as separate from its qualities.

Before confronting this argument in the *guṇa-guṇibhedabhaṇaṅga* section, Udayana had already considered it in the *bāhyārtha-bhaṅaṅga* section:

\[ \text{na grāhyabhedam avadhūya dhiyo'sti vr̥ttih}^{17} \]
His reply to Dharmakīrti's argument is that "there is no awareness (which we have) that negates the difference between the apprehended (object and the apprehension itself)". Hence in the bāhyārthabhaṅga section, Udayana appeals to a basic element of our experience, that we experience objects as separate from our perceptions of them. Just as in TEXT F, where Udayana began his arguments with an appeal to an intuitive element of our experience, that we experience such objects as tables as unified objects, here too Udayana is appealing to what he considers to be an intuitive aspect of our experience. Dharmakīrti may claim that there is no basis for making a distinction between an object and our apprehension of it, but Udayana stresses that this is not how things are. Whenever we perceive an object, then that perception clearly marks the object as distinct from the perception itself.18 In the guṇagunibhedabhāṅga section, Udayana returns to this same argument but this time with the intention of refuting Dharmakīrti's claim on the basis of arguments. Udayana's intention here is to demonstrate cases in which an object is indeed perceived as separate from its qualities.

Udayana uses as his example the case in which a white conch shell is perceived as yellow by a jaundiced individual. From the point of view of a mutual joint perception (samāsahopalambha), which Udayana considers first, the conch shell and the whiteness of the conch shell should always appear in the cognition together. By introducing the example of the cognition of the conch shell as yellow, Udayana intends to drive a wedge between the conch shell and its quality of being white. It might be
thought that Udayana has misunderstood the full import of the Buddhist argument here, which his counter-argument trivializes, and does little to undermine the idealist thesis that an object consistently appears in the cognition with its qualities. It does not matter much, it might be said, whether the conch shell is seen as yellow or white. The important point is that it must be seen as some colour, that we can never perceive an object as other than an aggregate of qualities.

The point of Udayana's example, however, goes deeper than the observation that objects can appear in different guises. Both the Buddhist idealist and the Nyāya realist must be able to accommodate within their world views an adequate explanation to distinguish erroneous perceptions from non-erroneous ones. The realist is challenged by the sceptic to say how we can distinguish between erroneous and non-erroneous perceptions, a distinction which he must be able to make if he is to uphold the claim that perception can give us access to and knowledge of an external world. Conversely though, it is also incumbent on the idealist, given his lack of reference to any external world, to explain the basis on which we classify some perceptions as erroneous and some as not, for what is indubitable is that we do make this distinction. Hence the strength of Udayana's example is not just the point it makes that the conch shell can appear in a perception without its qualifying whiteness, but also that the Buddhist idealist must now provide a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon given (i) his wish to maintain a distinction between erroneous and non-erroneous perceptions, and (ii) his
non-acceptance of any distinction between an object and its qualities.

Traditionally the Nyāya school held a theory of error known as the anyathākhyāti theory, sometimes translated as the "misplacement" theory. This is usually explained with reference to the illusion in which I see a piece of coiled rope as a snake. Nyāya insists that in this illusion there is a real perceptual element, namely the perception of the rope. It is the role of past experience, memory, associations and so on which is responsible for turning this into an illusory experience. The object of past experience, the snake, is triggered-off by our perception of the rope, because of a similarity in their appearance. By means of a non-physical connection (alaukika-sannikarṣa) between the memory of the snake and the eyes, the rope is misperceived as a snake.

The gupa/gupin distinction plays an important role in the Nyāya theory of error. An erroneous cognition is a complex judgement in which two elements are falsely united, in this case a rope and "snakeness". In a judgement such as "a is b", a relationship of qualificand and qualifier exists between the two elements. The rope, the qualificand (gupin) is qualified by "snakeness", the qualifier (gupa). This Nyāya theory of error must not be confused with contemporary western theories which postulate a sensory core common to the rope and the snake, the so-called "sense-datum". In this type of theory what characterizes the difference between a false and a veridical perception depends on the particular theory of perception adhered
to. For the representationalist the difference will lie in whether or not the sense-datum correctly represents the object. For the idealist a veridical perception will consist in coherency with a whole web of such sense-data. Sense-data are not part of the Nyåya theory, however, for as we have already seen in our discussion of TEXT F, there is no admission of any such entities as sense-data. Rather, the object is perceived directly.

Professor Matilal sums up the Nyåya position as follows:

Some sense-data philosophers believe that sense-data are physical, or part of the material world, and hence it may be claimed that what they are saying does not differ from the position I am defending here. G.E. Moore, for example, would consider that sense-data are 'properties' of the material object, sometimes of the visible (front) part of the opaque physical object. It is important to realize the difference here. The features, properties, parts and so on which I am invoking as the basis of similarity are attributable (in fact, they may be said to belong) to the material object in the same way as some philosophers would attribute sense-data to the material object, or to the physical occupant. But what the sense-data philosophers say, and Nyåya does not say, is that they are also the objects of our immediate perception, on the basis of which perception we see the material object. [Matilal (1986) p. 203]

Hence it is the object (guṇin) which is directly perceived, a perception made possible by the features which that object possesses. On the basis of a similarity of such features with another object there results a false characterization of that object. Because of the fact that the object (guṇin) is always perceived directly in Nyåya, there can be no mistaken perception of that object. The mistake arises in ascribing something falsely to the object of our direct perception. In terms of the qualificand/qualifier (guṇin/guṇa) relationship the mistake occurs in wrongly ascribing a particular qualifier to a
particular qualificand. It is a mistake of predication in which the subject/predicate relationship is paralleled by the gupin/gupa relationship.

Although the example of the yellow conch shell may be particularly well-suited for Udayana's refutation of the Buddhist thesis that an object always appears with its qualities, it is problematic in terms of the anyathākhyāti theory of error. It would seem that the conch shell just is seen as yellow, rather than yellow being falsely ascribed to the shell on the basis of some past association or resemblance. We neither superimpose yellowness on the white shell nor do we mistakenly ascribe a yellow colour to a white colour. Later Nyāya thinkers dispensed with the anyathākhyāti theory of error for cases such as the perception of the conch shell as yellow, in which there seems to be instead a direct perception of the conch shell as yellow on the basis of some physiological malfunction.21

Udayana considers in TEXT G several other possible explanations for the phenomenon of the yellow conch shell, positions which a Buddhist opponent might hold. He first considers the rejoinder that the yellow conch shell is not real (see TEXT G pp. 302-303), in which case there is no question of the conch shell appearing without its qualifying whiteness. Udayana queries such a position, asking how can it be so since we can pick up the conch shell in our hand. It fulfills all the conditions of a real object and should be thus distinguished from a truly hallucinatory object which cannot be so handled.

The next Buddhist rejoinder is that a yellow conch shell has
come into being. Just as a white shell will always appear as qualified by whiteness, so too a yellow shell will always appear as qualified by yellowness. Once again this tactic aims to undermine the distinction between an object and its qualities, since in this explanation there is no perception of a conch shell as separate from its colour. There are just white conch shells and yellow conch shells. On this basis it would appear that the perception of the conch shell as yellow could no longer be counted as a misperception. Udayana refutes this suggestion by recourse to the idea that the conch shell is a public object. When the jaundiced individual sees the conch shell as yellow, a non-jaundiced individual will still see it as white (see TEXT G pp. 304-305).

Since Nyāya proposes a separation between the conch shell and its colour, the case of the yellow conch shell can be explained with recourse to the guṇa/guṇin distinction, even though the anyathākhyāti theory was eventually felt by later Nyāya thinkers to be an unsuitable model for this case. The question which must be asked here is — What is the status of this yellow appearance of the conch shell? Does it belong to the shell or not? The type of explanation which this example demands is actually part of a wider problem — how to explain the variety of ways an object can present itself according to the condition and situation of the percipient. A penny will appear elliptical from a particular perspective, a tree will appear as large or small depending on the proximity of the observer and the conch shell will appear as yellow or white depending on the
physiological condition of the percipient. We are already familiar with the Nyāya thesis that we perceive the object directly. Thus, in the case of the elliptical penny, we perceive the penny directly, a perception made possible in this case by the elliptical appearance of the penny. Similarly, we perceive the conch shell directly, a perception made possible by its yellow appearance. For the Nyāya thinker, however, a material object is not to be understood as consisting of a set of such potential appearances. The penny is round and the conch shell is white, appearances which may be temporarily changed due to the condition of the percipient. Professor Matilal discusses the nature of these temporary appearances which he sees to be temporarily produced through an interaction between the material object and the percipient:

How do these particulars differ from the sense-data? First, they are not mental, but external objects, although they have been anomalously created by a mental episode as one of its causal factors. Most sense-data philosophers take sense-data to be mental, but the Naiyāyika's particulars are not in the 'head' of any person. Second, they are according to Nyāya not direct and immediate objects of perception. He who sees an elliptical penny does not see the elliptical shape first, by virtue of which he sees the penny. He sees simply the penny as elliptical. Third, these particulars are not in any case part of the surface of the object of perception. They do not belong to the object but are only attributed to it.


Professor Matilal's explanation offers a more detailed explanation of how Nyāya realism might function. In TEXT G, Udayana was concerned to break the link between an object and its qualities, to demonstrate that only the guna/gupin distinction can account for our fundamental awareness that it is one and the
same object which we grasp throughout its various appearances.  

Concluding Remarks

The distinction between an object and its qualities is one which had a wide-ranging importance in the realism of the Nyaya system:

The conflict between nominalistic movements and realistic movements in Indian philosophy may be expressed in terms of a function of the distinction (or distance) between dharma and dharmin. Generally speaking, the clearer the distinction between the two, the more realistic the theory becomes; if the boundary between dharma and dharmin becomes vague, the theory tends to become nominalistic. [Tachikawa (1981) p. 10]

The role of the dharma/dharmin relationship, that is the relationship between a property (dharma/guna) and property possessor (dharmin/gunin) has been carefully studied by Tachikawa in his book The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism. In that work, he demonstrates how Udayana in his Lakṣaṇāvalī (written before the ATV) was able to classify all the categories of the Vaiṣeṣika system in terms of two concepts, namely, samaveta (that which inheres in things) and samavetavat (that which has things inhering in itself). In a later work, the Kirāṇāvalī (written after the ATV), Udayana came to define inherence in terms of the dharma/dharmin relationship which replaces the samaveta/samavetavat relationship. For Udayana, his realism is dependent on this relationship which binds together all the elements of his universe. Hence the distinction between an object and its qualities was not only important for maintain the separation between the ātman and its qualities (that is, the momentary cognitions) but was also important for his particular
brand of realism. The gupagujibhedabhaṅga chapter of the ATV may be seen as an important step between the Laksanāvalī and the Kirapāvalī.

The factors comprising the world are connected by inherence, which Udayana has defined in terms of the dharma-dharmin relation. In his system dharma must be distinguished from dharmin so that the category of inherence is established. The clear distinction between dharma and dharmin has become the basis of the hierarchical structure of the world. Differentiating substance, quality, action, etc, from each other, may be called 'horizontal differentiation'. What is important is that differentiation of this type is made in terms of the differentiation between dharma and dharmin, which may be called 'vertical differentiation'.

[Tachikawa (1981) p. 41]

Thus, the defence of ātman in the Nyāya system has been clearly bound up with its defence of realism. It will be the task of my next chapter to understand the place of both its realism and its understanding of ātman in the wider context of Indian soteriological thought.
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

On what we see and touch

**guṇagupibhedaḥbhāṅgavādaprārāmbhaḥ.**

_astu tarhi guṇaguṇinorabhedānairātmyam,
  kṣanikajñānamātraparīśeṣāditi cet._

_ucyate-asti tāvadiha darsānasparśānābhyaṃ-
  ekārthānusandhānam._

_tadidam (1) ekaikaviyām vā syāt; (2) samudāyaviyām
  vā; (3) tadatiriktaviyām vā; (4) vastvanuvrodhy-
  ākāraviyām vā; (5) alīkaviyām vā._

First Alternative considered: the object as a single entity

_na tāvadadyaḥ, na hi yadeva rūpam sa eva sparśa iti.
  na ca rūpam tvagindriyagrāhyam, andhasyāpi
  nīlādipratyayaprastaṅgāt._
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

On what we see and touch
Let us now begin the examination of the theory which says that there is no difference between a quality and the thing which possesses that quality.

"Let then 'the absence of an ātman' be due to the qualifier and the qualifier-possessor being identical. Because [in such a case] it results in the momentary cognition alone."³

Well now, there is in this world an idea of one object (ekārthānusandhānam) through a correlation between seeing and touching.⁴

That (which the acts of seeing and touching relate to) could be (1) a single object; (2) an object which is an aggregate; (3) an object which is something different from the two acts; (4) an object which is a conceptual construct and not in reality the object which [the acts of seeing and touching] relate to; (5) or an object which is unreal.

First Alternative considered: the object as a single entity
It is not the first alternative. For it is not the case that that which has visual form has also tactile form. For colour is not perceived by the tactile senses, because in that case there will be the contingency of even a blind man having a cognition of the colour blue and so on.
Second Alternative considered: the object as an aggregate
nāpi dvitiyaḥ, sahi ekadesatayā vā ekakālatayā vā
ekakāryatayā vā ekakāraṇatayā vēti.

(1) (i) na tāvadupādānārūpaikadesāsambhavaḥ, tayoḥ
pratiniyatopādānantvāt, sambhave vā tadeva dravyamiti
paryavasitāṃ vivādena.

(1) (ii) nāpyadhikaraṇībhūtabhūtalādyādhāratayā
tatsambhavaḥ.

(a) cakṣuṣā hyupalabhyamāne bhūtale rūpaviśeṣe
ghaṭopī cakṣuṣāivopalabhyamāno rūpaviśeṣastadādhāra
iti śakyate niścetum, tayoradharmacarabhāvenaikajñāna-
saṃsargitvāt.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

And it is not proper to say that one and the same object appears in the cognition differently because of a difference in the sense-organ, because then [the object of cognition] would have no nature of its own, and also because it would not be possible to establish difference and identity.  

Second Alternative considered: the object as an aggregate

Nor is it the second alternative. This alternative [in which the object is a group] could be interpreted as (1) [the two objects of sight and touch] having one and the same place; (2) having one and the same moment of time; (3) having one and the same effect; (4) or having one and the same cause.  

(1) (i) There is no possibility of having the same place being due to sharing one and the same cause, because the causes of sight and touch are distinct, or in the instance where this is possible, by logical reasoning, it results in that it is what we call substance.  

(1) (ii) Nor can the possibility of having the same place be sharing as their substratum the ground et cetera on which they subsist.  

(a) For, when the ground being of a particular visual form is being perceived by the visual faculty, it is also possible to discern that the pot too, which is perceived as having a particular visual form, has that [ground] for its support because being above and below each other they appear together in the same cognition.
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

tadadhikaraṇāḥ sparśādayopīti tu kasya pramāṇasya 
vigavyah? nahi sparśādayaścākṣuṣe cetasi cakāsatī.
tvaco'yaṁ vyāpāra ityapi nāsti, tathāpi 
bhūtalaghaṭasparśayorādhārādheya bhāvapatīteḥ.

na ca samudāyavostatsambhavah, parasparāśrayatvaprasaṅgāt 
—ekādhāratāyām hi samudāyānusandhānaṁ samudāyānusandhāne 
caikādhāratānusandhānasambhavah— iti.

anavasthāprasāṅgācca—bhūtalasyāpi samudāyatvam kiṁkṛtam— 
ityanuyogānivṛtteḥ.

ata eva naikakālalatayāpi, tayorekakālalatayām 
pramāṇabhāvāt, bhāve vā rāsabhakarabhayarupye kālalatayā 
samudāyatvaprasaṅgaḥ, bhedāgrahasya prakṛtepyasambhavāt.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

But which instrument of knowledge tells you that the object which is given in its tactile form has that same ground as its support? For the tactile form et cetera cannot be objects in a visual perception.

(b) Nor is there the possibility [of the cognition] of the supporter/supported relationship with regard to [colour and touch] being grouped together because of the contingency of mutual dependence. For, where there is [the cognition of] having the same substratum there is also the cognition of both being grouped together, and where there is the cognition of both being grouped together there is the possibility of the cognition of having one and the same support.

(c) [Nor is it possible] because of the contingency of infinite regress. This is due to the unending questioning as to the placement of the group, even in the case of the ground.8

(2) And so [the togetherness of colour and touch] cannot be due to simultaneity because of the absence of any proof for this simultaneity. Or, if it is asserted that there is a simultaneity, then even donkeys and camels can be considered as a group because of belonging to one and the same moment. And in this case such a non-comprehension of difference is not possible.9
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

ata eva naikakāryatayāpi, upādeyarūpasyaikasya kāryasyābhāvāt.

ekodakāharaṇalakṣaṇā arthakriyā ityapi na yuktam, rūpādyatiriktasyodakasyānabhyupagamāt ekaikasyānekāhāryatve pramānābhāvāt, samudāyasya cāsiiddheḥ.

ata eva naikakāraṇatayāpīti, nimittamantarepa tu samudāyavyavahāre'tiprāsaṅgaḥ.

Third Alternative considered: the object as an entity distinct from its visual and tactile forms.

trīṣye tu na vivāдаḥ.

Fourth Alternative considered: the object as a conceptual construct.

nāpi caturthāḥ.
(3) And hence the object cannot be considered as an aggregate due to having a common effect because of the absence of a common effect in the case of the material causes such as colour and so on.

It is also not proper to say that the common effect could be a common purpose, such as holding water, because you could not allow water to be any different from visual form et cetera; also because there is no proof that each one of the effects has a manifold cause; and also because it is not established still that the object is an aggregate.10

(4) Hence too it is not possible to say that the object is an aggregate because of having a common cause.11 If we call something an aggregate without a good reason then this would result in the unwanted conclusion that we could call any object whatsoever an aggregate.

Third Alternative considered: the object as an entity distinct from its visual and tactile forms.

There is no argument with the third alternative.

Fourth Alternative considered: the object as a conceptual construct

It is not the fourth alternative [that the object is without any correspondence to an external reality].
Fifth Alternative considered: the object as unreal
etenālikaviṣayatāpi nirastā.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

This [fourth alternative] could be either based on the doctrine that there is no object apart from our cognition of it, or because of the non-correspondence [of the object and the cognition], like the perception of two moons, et cetera.\(^{12}\)

(i) In respect of the first option, why do you have a predilection for terms like colour, and so on?\(^{13}\)

(ii) It is also not the second option because there is the attainment and fulfillment of our desired aims. If you say that these two [that is, the attainment and fulfillment of our desired aims] apply only to colour and so on, then I would refute this. Rather, should it not be that [attainment of the desired aims] belong to that which has those qualities?

(Udayana then considers two bādhakas which his Buddhist opponent attempts to bring against Udayana's understanding of objects such as tables and chairs, namely, that the world is momentary in nature and that we can never perceive these objects as such, but only parts of them. Udayana refers his opponent to the fact that in previous sections of the ATV the whole (avayavin) and permanence (sthiratvā) have been successfully defended from the attacks of the Buddhist.)

Fifth Alternative considered: the object as unreal

The fifth alternative, that the object of cognition is an unreal object, is ruled out by the previous argument.\(^{14}\)
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT F

1. ATV (1939 edition) pp. 712-720
ATV (1940 edition) pp. 320-325

2. ATV (1939 edition) has ekãrthānusandhānam here, the ATV (1940 edition) reads ekrthapratisandhanam. The idea being put forward here is that through our senses of sight and touch we have an idea of one object, that we put together the input from these senses (see pp. 268-269) for further discussion on this topic).

3. The Buddhist argument here is that the absence of an ātman is to be understood as the absence of an ātman as separate from the momentary cognitions. The body, sense organs and internal organ, have all been rejected as candidates for being the ātman so the remaining possibility for the Naiyāyikas is that the ātman could be understood as the locus in which the momentary cognitions inhere. This too is to be rejected by the Buddhist opposition, so that all that remain are the momentary cognitions. This type of argument which the Buddhist employs here is known as pariśega, which Matilal defines in the following way: "pariśega —of several possibilities a,b,c...if all but one, say c, are rejected by evidence to the contrary, c is automatically established." [Matilal (1986) p. 185] The Buddhist thus attempts to refute all possible candidates for the ātman except the stream of momentary cognitions; this will be the only remaining possibility after all the others have been rejected.

4. The idea put forward here is that we have a notion of one object — our different senses of sight and touch operate in such a way as to give us this basic understanding of material objects. If the Buddhist rejects the thesis that there is no difference between an object and its qualities, then he needs to explain how else we could arrive at such an understanding, built up from the separate faculties of sight and touch. The argument in this chapter is concerned in general with refuting the thesis of non-difference between an object and its qualities (guṇagūpinorabheda). If the thesis that there is no ātman (nairātmyam) is based upon guṇagūpinorabheda, then the refutation of that thesis will undermine such an argument. Hence although this section begins with a statement concerning the ātman specifically, as in the other sections, the argument is a general one in its treatment of guṇagūpinorabheda. There is another aspect to this argument which Udayana does not deal with in this section, and that is the role which the ātman might possibly play in correlating the input from our different sensory organs, for example, the role the ātman might play in correlating the object which I see with the object which I am touching. It is in the final section (anupalambhavāda)
that Udayana examines specifically the role played by the \textit{atman} as the synthesizer of all our experiences.

5. Udayana lists five possibilities as to how we could formulate this notion of one object from the different senses of seeing and touching, and proceeds to consider each one of these in turn. In the first alternative Udayana considers that the objects of touch and sight are identical.

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TOUCH ----> SIGHT
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This first alternative must be kept distinct from the third alternative in which the visual and tactile objects are considered to be qualities of the same object. In this first option there is no qualified/qualifier distinction—what we touch is what we see in the sense that a blind man could 'see' blue with his fingers as if he were seeing it with his eyes. Udayana argues that under these circumstances we could never discriminate between the visual and tactile nature of an object. (See the discussion of TEXT F in this chapter for a more detailed discussion of this alternative.)

6. In the second alternative, the objects, of our visual and tactile senses, are considered as forming a group, on the basis of which we form an idea of one single object.

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TOUCH ----> SIGHT
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Udayana considers this second alternative as yielding four possibilities—that they can be considered as forming an aggregate object on the basis of (i) being in one place (ekadeśatayā); (ii) being in the same moment of time (ekakālatayā); (iii) having one and the same effect (ekakāryatayā); and (iv) having the same cause (ekakāraṇatayā). He proceeds in his usual systematic matter to examine each one of these in turn.

7. "One-placeness" (ekadeśatayā) can be interpreted in two ways—according to the learned tradition (śāstra) it would mean having a common cause. Udayana rejects this option [listed as (1) (i) in the translation] since the arguments against the first alternative will be also relevant here. He has already successfully argued in that first alternative that one cause cannot be responsible for both sight and
touch unless of course the Buddhist were to admit the possibility of the Nyāya idea of substance.

8. The second interpretation of ekadeśatayā is according to common understanding, that it means sharing a common locality, on the basis of which the objects of sight and touch may be said to form an aggregate [listed as (1) (ii) in the translation]. Udayana gives three main arguments against this interpretation [listed as (a), (b) and (c) in the translation].

(a) When we see a pot we can see that it is also in a particular relationship to the ground, and this is information which can be given to us in one visual cognition:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{POT} \quad \text{(ādheya)} \\
\text{GROUND} \quad \text{(ādhāra)}
\end{array}
\]

If, however, we were to close our eyes and just touch the pot then we could not be aware of this relationship between the supported pot and the ground (ādhāra/ādheya) unless we were touching the ground at the same time. According to the thesis that the object can be considered an aggregate on the basis of a common locality, then when you touch just the pot you should also be aware of its relationship to the ground. Udayana points out here that there is no pramāṇa, no instrument of knowledge, by means of which we could gain such information from just touching the pot. The visual knowledge of the ground which we gain from looking at the pot cannot be part of the cognition that arises from just touching that pot in the same place. If the visual and tactile forms did share a common locality, then, since the visual cognition of the pot yields information of its relationship to the ground, then the tactile cognition of the pot alone should also yield such information. Udayana's main point here seems to be that visual knowledge cannot be gained through the pramāṇa by means of which we gain tactile knowledge.

(b) The second argument concerning common locality postulates that it involves the fallacy of mutual dependency (parasparāśrayaprastāṅgāt). In order to say that the visual object (rūpa) is in the same place as the tactile object (sparśa) you need to be able to specify the place, that is, they should have the same support (adhiparāśri). But the ground (adhiparāśri) on which the pot rests is itself established in relation to the pot. They cannot be therefore established independently.
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT F CONTD.

(c) The argument concerning common locality would also involve the fallacy of an infinite regress (anavasthā-prasaṅgāt). For example, the place of the pot is established with respect to the table on which it rests, the table in its turn has its locality established in relation to the ground on which it rests and so on. Since each object involved is in itself an aggregate (samudāya), Udayana states that the regress would be endless.

9. Udayana here rejects simultaneity (ekakālatayā) as the basis on which the objects of touch and sight could be united. According the Buddhist's own understanding of the momentary cognition, then surely this would rule out the simultaneous occurrence of visual and tactile cognitions. Udayana also rejects this option on logical grounds, that "one-timeness" (ekakālatvā) cannot be a means (upādhi) by which things can be grouped together when there is clearly a cognition of difference. The simultaneous cognition of donkeys and camels would not be sufficient to group them together as a unified aggregate object. Donkeys and camels may be grouped together only by means of a category in which they are non-different, such as both being animals. Udayana contends that in this case no such possibility exists.

10. In the third option, it is suggested that the visual and tactile objects may be grouped together on the basis of having a common effect (ekakāryatayā). The notion of common effect is subject to two interpretations, either as the effect of the aggregate or as the purpose for which the aggregate may be used. The first interpretation has already been ruled out by previous arguments (see preceding footnotes 5 and 8(a) in this section). It has already been ruled out, for example, that the visual object could enter into a tactile cognition with the tactile object. It is therefore the second interpretation which is given more attention. The contention is that, for example, the visual and tactile objects are united in a pot by the act of pouring water. Udayana argues against this by pointing out that water itself must be understood as an aggregate of the visual and tactile objects. Given that this is the case, it is by no means clear that each part of this aggregate should have a manifold cause, that is, that the visual aspect of water should be caused by both the visual and tactile aspects of the pot. Rather, it is like four men lifting a table; each individual supports one leg of the table. Similarly, the visual aspect of the pot is responsible for the visual aspect of the water and so on. [I am indebted to Mr. Venugopalan for this analogy.] It could be argued against Udayana here that he has not made a clear enough distinction between the water itself and the act of pouring.
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT F CONT.

the water. It is not that the pot is in any sense a material cause of the water but rather that the act of pouring the water unites the visual and tactile aspects of the pot. Similarly, although it may be said that each man lifts just one leg of the table, they are still united by their common task of lifting the table.

11. The arguments against this option have already been considered by Udayana in section (1) (i).

12. Two interpretations of the fourth alternative are offered by Udayana. The first is the idealist interpretation, that there is no external object apart from its appearance in the cognition. The second is that there is no correspondence between the object constructed on the basis of our perceptions and external reality, as in the case of double vision where two moons are perceived, neither of which corresponds to the real moon.

13. The point here is not too clear. It may be that Udayana is saying that to talk of external qualities such as colour, hardness et cetera makes little sense on an idealist view of the world in which there is nothing but our perceptions. This does not, however, seem to be an appropriate criticism of idealism. Gellner makes a similar observation of such a critical attitude towards idealism: "The 'phenomenalist' doctrine of the empiricists, which restricts reality to experience, and reduces all other entities to fictions which refer to experiences indirectly, sounds paradoxical largely because it seems to be saying that the world of sight is real in some ultimate sense, whereas the world of touch, of pressure-resisting three-dimensional objects occupying space, is but a logical fiction." But he then goes on to point out that: "The bundles should, rather, be seen as including those experiences which we would normally describe as, for instance, the clasping a small hard ball in the palm of the hand — a very tactile, 'hard' and three-dimensional 'experience'. There is nothing in phenomenalism as such to exclude such an experience, and to force us to make it derivative from a two-dimensional, visual perception of a squash-ball." [Gellner (1974) pp. 75-76]

14. It would appear that the argument referred to here is specifically that of 4(i).
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

Cognition of an Object as Separate from its Qualities

abhedasādhanāṃ bādhakamiti cēt.

kim tat?

sahopalambhaniyama iti cēt.

na. samasahopalambhaniyamasyāsiddheḥ, pītaśaṅkhopalambhādau
śvaityānupalambhe'pi śaṅkhopalambhāt.

nasau śaṅkhaḥ kintu śaṅkha iva taimirikakeśavaditi cēt.

aho guṇavadvidveṣāḥ yattaimirikakeśāḥ
karatalaparāmarśapratinivyatārthakriyayorapāyānna santi iti
vyavasthāpayati, iha tu tatsambhave'pi
śubhratāmātrānupalambhāditi.
Cognition of an Object as Separate from its Qualities

"There is a further counter-inference which will establish that there is no difference between an object and its properties."

What is that?

"It is because both of them consistently appear together in the cognition."

No, because there is no proof of such a consistent joint cognition that operates both ways (samasahopalambha). For example, in the case of a yellow conch shell [by a person suffering from jaundice], there is perception of the conch shell, even though there is no perception of whiteness.

"In that case, it is not really the conch shell, but only something like a conch shell [that is being perceived], just like the hairs which appear to a person with diseased eyes."

Oh, so much are you prejudiced against the possessor of qualities! All that is established by your example is that the hairs which appear due to the eye disease do not at all exist, because you cannot touch them with your hand, nor do they have the effectiveness [of real hairs]. In the present case you deny [the existence of the shell] merely because there is no perception of whiteness.
vyāpakatvādīti cet.

tasmānna vyāpakānupalabdhā vyāpyatadupalabdhī nyāvartete, dahanānupalabdhau dhūmatadupalabdhvorapi nyūtttiprasaṅgāt. tannāpi vā kim na parikalpayasi dhūma ivāsau na dhūma iti pāvakavattānupalabdhāraddi.

tasmānna vyāpakānupalabdhā vyāpyatadupalabdhvornīṛtthiḥ, kintu vyāpakaniyārtteḥ, sa cātrāsiddhēti vācyam, tadetattulyām prakṛteḥ, upalabdhēstu vyāptīrīhaiva bhagñā śvaityānupalambheḥpi śaṅkhopalambhādityuktam.

svādetat. pīta eva śaṅkha utpanna iti cet.

na, puruṣāntareṇa śvētaśaivoplabdhēḥ.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

"[The non-perception of one thing in the joint-cognition] is because of its being the pervader."

Is this concomitance between two existing things or between two cognitions?  
In the first alternative there is no dispute.  
Nor [can you say that] by the mere non-cognition of the pervader, the pervaded and the cognition of the pervaded become absent, because that would result in admitting the absence of smoke, and the cognition of smoke as well, just on the basis of the non-cognition of the fire. In that case, why don't you assume, "this is only like smoke, but not really smoke!", because of the non-perception of the mountain [on which the fire burns].  
In truth, you should say only that the absence of the pervader, and not the absence of the cognition of the pervader, gives rise to the absence of the pervaded. This has not been established, and it is the same in the case [of the conch shell]. The concomitance between the cognitions is broken here because there is perception of the conch shell even though there is no perception of whiteness — a matter we have already discussed.

"Let this be so. It is just that a yellow conch shell has come into being."

It is not so, because the white color is seen by other persons [not suffering from jaundice].
nāpyasama eva sahopalambhaniyamo hetuḥ, anaikāntāḥ - abhāsvaram
hi rūpam bhāsvareṇa saha niyamena palabhya te tato
bhinnaśceti.

deśaviccheda iti cet.

na, asiddheḥ, dehadehiḥ bhāsmaikāntāccha.

na tayoravicchedadastadanupalambhe'pyupalambhāditi cet.

tulyam - rūpādyanupalambhe'pi tadvatāmupalabdheḥ.

tathāpi na viparyayah kadāpi tītī cet.

tulyam - nahi dehānupalambhe dehūupalambhavaddheyanupalambhe'pi
dehasyopalambhasambhavah.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Nor can you take as your reason the rule of unequal joint cognition (asamasahopalambha), because the result is inconclusive—non-luminescent forms are regularly perceived along with luminescent forms and in this case the two are different.8

"The example must be from an instance where there is no difference in location."

No, because it is not established and also it is inconclusive as in the case of the body and the embodied.

"There is not a 'non-difference in location' [in the case of the body and the embodied] because even when the embodied is seen the body need not be seen."9

The argument is the same for me, because of the cognition of the things that possess [colour] even though there is no perception of the colour and so on.

"Even so, the reverse is not at any time possible."

The same applies to my argument. In your doctrine, it cannot be said that, even though there is no perception of the embodied, there is perception of the body, as you can in the case where there is perception of the embodied, even though there is no perception of the body.10
1. ATV (1939 edition) pp. 722-726
ATV (1940 edition) pp. 326-329

2. Here Udayana introduces a classic argument of the Buddhists in favour of a phenomenalistic idealism. The argument derives from Dharmakirti — "sahopalambhariyanād abheda nilataddhiyoh". This is discussed in the main body of the chapter.

3. Udayana's response is to refute the claim of consistent joint cognition by giving examples in which an object does not always appear with its qualities. He discusses two possible interpretations of sahopalambha; the first he deals with is the stricter version, samasahopalambha, which operates both ways, that is — Wherever there is A there is B and wherever there is B there is A. In order to refute this version of the thesis, Udayana gives the example of the white conch shell which can appear separate from its quality of being white in the instance of appearing to a person suffering from a case of jaundice, in which case it would appear as yellow. Udayana scoffs at the suggestion made by the Buddhist that in this case it is not really the conch shell that is being seen, because it is clearly real in that we can touch it, pour water from it and so on. The argument here centres on questions of illusory and mistaken perceptions which are discussed in the main body of the chapter.

4. The Buddhist opponent now moves on to consider cases which would explain the non-appearance of one of the pair in the cognition. We are now considering therefore the case of non-equal joint perception known as asamasahopalambha. One example of asamasahopalambha would be the relationship which exists between a thing which pervades and the thing which is pervaded, the vyāpaka/vyāpya relationship, illustrated by the relationship which exists between fire and smoke. If this is the suggestion, Udayana first asks if we are meant to consider this to be a relationship between things or perceptions of things.

5. Udayana does not disagree with the first option because this of course would compel the Buddhist to admit the existence of independently existing objects. It is true that when there is no fire then there is no smoke, but this inference assumes the independent existence of fire and smoke separate from our awareness of them.

6. If the suggestion is that the vyāpaka/vyāpya relationship is to be understood as existing between perceptions, then Udayana demonstrates how this would be fatal to inferential
reasoning, a consequence as unacceptable to the Buddhist as to the Naiyāyika. In the inference of fire from smoke there is no perception of fire (the pervader) because of course there would not otherwise be any need of the inference. But that doesn't mean that one then says, "this is not really smoke", which the Buddhist has claimed in the case of the conch shell, saying that "this is not really a conch shell" just because there is no perception of whiteness, the pervader in this case. The parallels between the two are as follows:

Wherever there is smoke there is fire
Wherever there is conch there is whiteness
Wherever there is the pervaded there is the pervader

It is the absence of the pervader and not the absence of the perception of the pervader which leads to the absence of the pervaded. In the case of the conch shell it has not been established that whiteness is absent but only that the perception of whiteness is absent. And in the absence of that perception of whiteness, there is still perception of the conch shell. Hence a vyāpaka/vyāpya relationship does not exist between the perception of whiteness and the perception of the conch shell.

7. The Buddhist tactic is now to admit that the conch shell perceived by the jaundiced individual is real, but in this case it is a yellow conch shell. This may seem to confirm the Buddhist thesis that an object does not appear without qualities. Udayana counters this by asking the Buddhist to explain the fact that the same conch shell will be seen by a non-jaundiced individual as white. It is not the case that a yellow conch shell has come into being but rather that the white conch shell is mistakenly perceived as yellow.

8. Here Udayana considers the rule of unequal joint cognition (asamasahopalambha), expressed as:

Wherever there is A there is B (but not wherever there is B there is A).

This would be the version preferred by Udayana's Buddhist opponent since it allows him to express his thesis without falling into the trap of having to admit the separate existence of the gupin. The idea is that the gupin cannot appear in the cognition without the gupa:

Wherever there is perception of gupin there is perception of
Udayana points out that this leads to an inconclusive result and gives an example to demonstrate. We consistently perceive non-luminescent objects along with their light source. For example:

Wherever there is perception of the pot, there is perception of the light source.

The pot cannot appear without the light source, whereas the light source can appear without the pot. In this case then, as Udayana points out, the separate existence of the pot and the light source is accepted, so why not in the case of the shell and whiteness?

9. The Buddhist now claims that this is not a fair example. An appropriate example must be one in which the two entities involved have a common location. Udayana replies that this would still give an inconclusive result as in the case of the body (deha) and the embodied (dehin) or body possessor. Whenever we perceive our body we perceive the embodied (which would be the alayavijñāna or storehouse-consciousness in the case of the Buddhist opponent here), and the Buddhist accepts a difference between these two. The Buddhist replies that these two cannot have the same location because we can perceived the embodied and yet not perceive the body.

10. Udayana retorts that this is exactly the point — because you can see the shell and yet not perceive its whiteness, then this shows that the two must be different. The Buddhist tries to drive a wedge between the shell/whiteness example and the body/embodied example by stating that in the shell/whiteness case the reverse is not possible. You cannot perceive the whiteness of the shell and not the shell itself. Udayana points out that in this respect the two cases are not dissimilar, for, according to the Buddhist's own doctrine you cannot perceive the body and not the embodied. (Udayana is referring here to the Buddhist theory of svasaṃvedanam, in which all cognitions contain within them their own self-awareness.)

\[ \text{body} \quad \text{embodied} \]
\[ \text{whiteness} \quad \text{shell} \]

In both cases the non-perception of A alongside the perception of B is possible, whereas the perception A alongside the non-perception of B is not possible.
SECTION ONE: One object given through a correlation between seeing and touching

Five possible explanations for this

1) Each of the two acts relates to one object — No

2) Each of the two acts relate to separate objects which form an aggregate (samudāya)
   - Four possibilities:
     1(i) have a common locus — No
     1(ii) have a common time — No
     1(iii) have a common effect — No
     1(iv) have a common cause — No

3) The object is something different from the two acts of seeing and touching - Udayana's position

4) The object has no correspondence to reality
   - Two possibilities:
     4(i) the object as unreal - No
     4(ii) the object as having a form not relevant to its real form — No

5) The object as unreal - ruled out by (4)(i)
   [Udayana's defence of sthiratva and avayavin used here]

SECTION TWO: The consistent joint perception of an object with its qualities

Two interpretations of this

1) Samasahapalambha: joint mutual perception — No, because of yellow conch real (arthakriyākārin) perception of yellow conch non-appearance of whiteness because of its being the pervader ruled out

2) Asamasahapalambha: wherever there is guṇa there is guṇin — No

SECTION THREE: One and the same object grasped from a distance and close at hand by one observer
ATMAN IN NYĀYA THOUGHT

But unless we believe that there is an ātman we can neither desire to discard suffering nor can we obtain happiness. As long as we perform actions we must do so with some goal in mind. For example, we say, "I, desiring the rewards of a life in heaven, should pursue happiness and avoid suffering". If this is not so, the desired result will not occur. The anātman doctrine thus leads to unorthodox ideas. It is true that a person who believes in the existence of ātman will be attached to those things that are beneficial for its attainment and will avoid things which are harmful to it, just as a person wanting liberation will be attached to its causes—like a person seeking happiness who will be attached to its causes. If this were not so, mokṣa would not be possible.¹

[Udayana ATV (1939) pp. 814-815]

In this chapter I intend to return to the categories which I used in Chapter One to examine the nature of Upaniṣadic thought. In that chapter I stated the importance of the Upaniṣads for subsequent developments in Indian thought, even for such schools as Nyāya which are considered to be less closely related to Upaniṣadic ideas than, for example, the Advaita Vedānta and Sāṅkhya schools. I also attempted to demonstrate in that chapter the ways in which the various aspects of Upaniṣadic thought fitted together to form a reasonably consistent understanding of the cosmos. I now wish to do the same for Nyāya thought, or more specifically for Udayana's thought, to broaden the discussion from the more technical arguments examined in the previous three chapters to a more general examination of the way in which the arguments presented in the ATV fit together to form a characteristically Nyāya world view. I also intend to examine the posi-
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tive arguments which Udayana used for his defence of Atman and to examine the role of Atman in Nyāya thought. By using the same categories as those which I used in my discussion of Upaniṣadic thought (though not in the same order) I also hope to demonstrate some aspects of the relationship between Upaniṣadic and Nyāya thought, and hence the place of Nyāya in the wider context of Indian thought.

(1) Psychology of the Nyāya system

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought the Atman is said to be all-pervasive and eternal - it is never born and never dies. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, however, does postulate a plurality of Ātmanas, each of which is the seat of cognitive and volitional activity. Gautama lists the Atman as first among the objects of cognition but, though an object of cognition (prameya), early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought did not believe that Atman could be known directly through ordinary perception. Kāṇāda, reputed author of the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras, held that the Atman cannot be perceived by ordinary folk but only by yogis. Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya held this view too. Ordinarily our knowledge of Atman would derive from two pramāṇas, verbal testimony (śabda) and inference (anumāna). For a yogi, however, there is a direct perception of Ātman through a special mind-Self contact, a yogic samādhi which is the last stage in the procedure of Self-cognition. This idea that, for ordinary folk at least, the Atman is only inferable and not perceptible is a characteristic of early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought and is abandoned later on. By the time we come to Udayana's ATV, the idea that the Atman is perceived by the
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internal organs (manas) of normal people is well-established,\textsuperscript{7} and indeed seems an integral part of Udayana's proof for the existence of the \( \text{atman} \).

Anupalabdhi: Udayana's arguments against the Buddhist thesis that the \( \text{atman} \) is not perceivable.

Udayana's Buddhist opponent bases his final argument for the no-Self (\( \text{anatman} \)) doctrine on the thesis that it is never perceived:

\begin{quote}
Let then the [doctrine of] no-Self [be upheld], because there is no perception [of such an entity].
\end{quote}

\text{astu tarhi nair\textsc{at}myam, anupalabdher} \\
\text{[ATV (1939) p. 739; ATV (1940) p. 334]}

We need to distinguish between two aspects of this argument from non-perception (\( \text{anupalabdhi} \)). Firstly, the Buddhist could argue for the non-perception of \( \text{atman} \) on logical grounds — that the existence of such an entity is logically impossible and hence could never be perceived. For example, if the Buddhist were to successfully establish his thesis of universal momentariness, then it would logically follow that an enduring \( \text{atman} \) could never be perceived, since such an entity would be an impossibility. Or, secondly, the Buddhist could argue from an experiential basis that, as a matter of fact, no-one has ever perceived the \( \text{atman} \). As Udayana points out, this would not be a conclusive argument but, at best, a basis for doubt.\textsuperscript{8} There are other things which people do not apprehend which nevertheless exist. Their existence, like that of the \( \text{atman} \), would then have to be established by arguments. Udayana uses both means in his refutation of the Buddhist thesis that the \( \text{atman} \) is never perceived. Firstly, he
claims that we do indeed perceive an \textit{ātman} in ourselves and secondly, he establishes its existence by means of arguments in which he attempts to demonstrate that the \textit{ātman} must exist if we are to explain certain facts about the nature of our experience.

\textbf{TEXT H: On our perception of \textit{ātman}}
(Translated pp. 362-369)

Udayana begins his refutation of the Buddhist thesis of non-perception (\textit{anupalabdhi}) by claiming that we do actually experience the \textit{ātman}. Because of his response to the Buddhist argument it might be thought that Udayana failed to appreciate that the argument of \textit{anupalabdhi} could have a logical force. It should be remembered, however, that Udayana had, to his satisfaction, already refuted the three restrictions (\textit{kṣagabhaṅgavāda}, \textit{bāhyārthabhaṅgavāda} and \textit{gunagunibhedabhaṅgavāda}) which could have provided the \textit{anupalabdhi} argument with a logical basis.

Udayana's claim that we can experience the \textit{ātman} is made not by demonstrating the existence of some extraordinary kind of yogic perception, but rather, by demonstrating that the perception of \textit{ātman} is an integral part of our everyday experience, common to all people. (I will examine this shift later in order to understand what significance this had for the traditional soteriological importance of \textit{ātman}. See pp. 334-335). Udayana claims that we have a direct experience of \textit{ātman} in the non-verbal, unmediated judgement of our own subjectivity. The \textit{ātman} is the object of a judgement which Udayana expresses as "I am" (\textit{ahamiti vikalpa}). Udayana's claim here is that the nature of the judgement in question is such as
Atman in Nyāya thought to make the existence of the Ātman indubitable. The Buddhist opponent is committed to accepting that the objects of non-propositional judgements are real and, according to Udayana, it is this type of judgement which we have here. Udayana compares our perception of Ātman to our perception of colours, blue and so on. Supposedly our perception of blueness carries with it the certainty of its existence. Whatever we may go on to say about blue, even if mistaken, presupposes the existence of the unmediated experience of blueness.

It might be thought here that Udayana’s argument is reminiscent of Descartes' well-known argument, "Cogito ergo sum", but there is an important difference between the two. Udayana is arguing that it is the very content of the experience itself which gives us indubitable proof of the Ātman's existence. Descartes' argument is of an inferential nature, that is, the inference of "sum" from "cogito", and he has often been criticized for the unwarranted nature of this inference. Lichtenberg, for example, criticized Descartes for going too far in his proof. The inference from "I think" should have been merely "therefore there is a thought". Udayana was criticized by his Buddhist opponent in a way which parallels Lichtenberg's criticism of Descartes. The Buddhist proposed to Udayana that his so-called Ātman is only revealed insofar as we engage in acts of thinking. Just as blue appears in the cognition solely because of blueness, so too the Ātman appears in the cognition solely because of the mental activity of thinking, that is, that there is a thought. Udayana's retort, however, is that we do not infer the Ātman
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from an act of cognition but rather, that in a cognition such as "I know' (or "I think") we clearly experience two separate elements, the subject, the Ātman, and the act of knowing. This is not an inference but rather, according to Udayana, a direct experience in which the two elements are clearly experienced as separate, in the same way in which we would experience red and blue as two separate colours. Udayana would say that to paraphrase "I think" as "There is a thought going on" leaves out half of the content of the original experience. It is in this respect that we can see a major difference between Descartes' proof and what Udayana is saying here. Udayana's proof, if it can be called a proof, consists solely in our direct experience of the Ātman. His argument would actually only consist of the latter part of Descartes' proof, that is, "I am" (ahamiti) furnishes all the evidence we need. The Ātman exists because in each of our mental acts we experience it directly. It can be seen here how the previous chapters of the ATV have lead to Udayana's final claim for the existence of the Ātman. He has already sought to establish that perception can give us direct knowledge of objects as separate from our perceptions of them, hence establishing the foundation for the possibility that we can directly perceive our own Ātman in the judgement "I am".

The problem with Udayana's claim is that it is very difficult to argue about what people do or do not claim to perceive. In the west, it is not uncommon to find people making claims similar to that of Udayana:

my personal identity...implies the continued existence
Atman in Nyāya thought

of that indivisible thing that I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling. I am something that thinks, and acts, and suffers.”
[Reid in Perry (1975) p. 109]

On the other hand, this is contradicted by those who claim to have no such experience, for example, Derek Parfit:

Is it true that, in memory, we are directly aware of what the Reductionist denies? Are we aware that each of us is a persistent subject of experiences, a separately existing entity that is not our brain and body? Are we aware, for example, that each of us is a Cartesian Ego? This is not a point that can be argued. I do not believe that I am directly aware that I am such an entity. And I assume that I am not unusual. I believe that no-one is directly aware of such a fact. [Parfit (1986) p. 223]

Here it can be seen that one person is blind to what another is so convinced about. Like Reid, Udayana argues that the Atman is something different from our bodies, our senses and our stream of consciousness, and our personal identity consists in this further fact. Over and above any experience of knowing, remembering, and so on, Udayana maintains that there is the agent, separate from the action. "I know" is like the expression "I cut" since, according to Udayana, both the agent and the action are subject to a direct, unmediated perception and are both experienced as indubitably as we experience blue.

Even if it were accepted, for argument's sake, that we are aware of ourselves as separately existing subjects of experiences, there are still objections to assuming that such an entity enjoys a continuous existence. It has been argued that there is no way that I could know whether or not such an entity continued to exist. Both Locke and Kant have argued that there
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might be a series of such separately existing subjects:

But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent.

[Locke (1964) p. 214]¹¹

Derek Parfit has argued that as long as psychological continuity was preserved we would not be aware of one of these entities being replaced by another:

...when we have had a series of thoughts, the most that we are aware of is the psychological continuity of our stream of consciousness. Some claim that we are aware of the continued existence of separately existing subjects of experiences. As Locke and Kant argued, and as our example seems to show,¹² such awareness cannot in fact be distinguished from our awareness of mere psychological continuity. Our experiences give us no reason to believe in the existence of these entities.

[Parfit (1986) p. 224]

It is being argued here that one entity such as the Ātman could replace another such entity and no-one would notice any difference. I will examine this argument further in relation to the role which the Ātman plays in the operation of rebirth and karma.

(See pp. 329-335)

TEXT I: Arguments for Ātman on the basis of experience
(Translated pp. 370-376)

Udayana does not discuss at great length our direct experience of Ātman. Rather, in this final section, most of his arguments are about the relationship between the Ātman and our experiences in general. More specifically, he is concerned to demonstrate the essential role of the Ātman in uniting together any individual's experiences. Udayana argues that without the
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Atman there can be no basis for the demarcation of A's experiences from B's and C's experiences — and so on. The theme of Udayana's arguments here is that without the atman, since there is no basis for demarcating one individual's experiences from another's, the basis for a person's identity is undermined.

Consider the following as a pattern of momentary mental events:

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

The question Udayana asks is why they should be linked as follows:

— 0 0 0 0 0 —
— 0 0 0 0 0 —
— 0 0 0 0 0 —

A
B
C

rather than say:

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

C
A
B

The same kind of question has been asked by western philosophers:

If it (the mind) is regarded as a collection of experiences, there is the problem, to which Hume himself confessed that he could see no answer, of showing how the collection is united. What is it that makes a given experience a member of one such collection rather than another? With any view of this type, there is also the problem of identifying the experiences themselves. In the ordinary way, we identify experiences in terms of the persons whose experiences they are, but clearly this will lead to a vicious circle if persons themselves are to be analysed in terms of their experiences. [Ayer (1963) p. 84]

Udayana, in dealing with this question, considers the following
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arguments.

1 (The possession of different bodies is not perceived to apply to a given continuum. (See translation pp. 372-375)

Udayana rejects the body as the criterion for demarcating one mental continuum from another because of his belief in reincarnation, that one person can have many lives and hence many bodies. For Udayana, reincarnation demands that the continuity of a mental series can survive a bodily change. (Naiyāyikas also believed that a yogi could inhabit several bodies at once.) Similarly, western philosophers who have upheld some version of bodily identity as the criterion for personal identity have been challenged with examples in which an individual seems to survive a change in his or her body.¹³

In addition to this there are problems relating to the identity of the body itself. What is to count as the same body? Does someone who undergoes a heart-lung transplant, leg amputation or plastic surgery thereby change their personal identity? Clearly not — plastic surgery and a changed appearance are no defence for a criminal brought to trial in a court-of-law. Contemporary philosophers who uphold some version of a physical criterion for personal identity have tended to focus their attention on the brain:¹⁴

What is necessary is not the continued existence of the whole body but the continued existence of enough of the brain to be the brain of a living person. [Parfit (1986) p. 204]

In the case of the human body we obviously need to decide what is to count as the same body. We have already discussed the problem
of change versus continuity in relation to the Buddhist theory of causality (see Chapter Three) and, as Udayana points out here, the physical criterion is not open to his Buddhist opponent anyway, given his doctrine of momentariness. A human body undergoes many changes and is capable of different things at different stages in its existence, like a seed in the granary and a seed in the field, and hence the Buddhist cannot talk of the same body.

Udayana has already questioned the idea that the body can be the object of the judgement "I am" (see TEXT H pp. 364-365). As he points out, we already have a sense of our own identity which is the basis for calling a body one's own, that is, our sense of our own identity is prior to calling a body "mine". And of course, for Udayana, that sense of identity resides in an enduring ātman.

(ii) The idea of a single agent is based on relations between successive mental events. (See translation pp. 370-375)

Udayana also attacks the Buddhist view which tries to bind the mental events together into one continuum on the basis of internal relations between them (like a Humean theory in which a person's identity is made to depend upon relations irrespective of the body). Our internal life is relatively chaotic, with so many changes in our sequence of thought that it is difficult to see how the relationship between all our mental events could be reduced to some basic principle. As Barry Stroud says in relation to Hume:

The novelty and lack of uniformity that we find in our inner life make it difficult to see how Hume's appeal to resemblance and causality could possibly be enough
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to explain why we come to have an idea of an individual mind or self that endures through time. The true story must be at least more complicated than he allows. [Stroud (1977) p. 127]

Udayana examines closely the idea that the relationship of a cause to its effect could explain the connection between the individual momentary events of one continuum. The relationship between a cause and its effect is typified in the relationship between an object and the act which apprehends it. This, however, will not do for explaining the connections between a sequential series of momentary events. Stroud made the following point about Hume which is relevant here:

But the causality holding between impressions and their corresponding ideas is not of the right sort to help Hume solve the problem of how we come to ascribe identity to ourselves. Those causal connections run 'vertically', so to speak, from the impression to the idea, and then perhaps to other ideas and impressions. What Hume needs is a causal chain that runs 'horizontally', as it were, along the whole series of incoming impressions that we get from moment to moment.

Stroud goes on to argue that:

When I am having an impression of a tree I might turn my head and get an impression of a building, but the first impression is not a cause of the second. [Stroud (1977) p. 126]

Thus, although a coherency is at times given to our sequence of thoughts on account of our interaction with the objects of apprehension, this is not the type of relationship that we are looking for. Much of our thinking takes place in the absence of objects of apprehension, and it would also create an unwanted overlapping between different continua. We would not, for example, want to group together into one continuum all those mental events caused by one and the same sounding tuning-fork.16
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The Buddhist, like Hume, needs some kind of relationship that runs 'horizontally' to link the events together into one continuum. In this context Udayana cites a passage from Jñānaśrī's Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya and examines Jñānaśrī's thesis that there are two types of causal relationship operative within mental continua:

There are two types of continuum. One has a single basis because of a similarity [between the mental events] and another which consists of change. The first kind consists of the relation of a material cause to its effect [in which there is a similarity between the cause and its effect] and the second kind which is a relation of cause and effect [in which there is no such similarity].

Udayana illustrates his case with the example of the transformation of wood into ash through its contact with fire. This supposedly, is a causal relationship of the second kind in which there is no similarity between the cause and its effect. Hence the Buddhist cannot link the wood with the ash on the basis of some similarity in nature. How therefore, Udayana asks, does the Buddhist link the wood with the ash and not the fire? He cannot do it on the basis of their belonging to the same continuum because this is the very thing which needs to be demonstrated. Udayana asserts that the relationship between the wood and the ash can only be explained by defining the relationship between them as one of material cause to effect, even though they are dissimilar. In the same way, it is only by postulating the existence of an Atman that we can bring together dissimilar events into one continuum.

The problem which Udayana addresses here is the very speci-
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Specific question of what binds together a series of mental events into one continuum. Take any mental event, 'c', what is it that places it in continuum 'A' rather than continuum 'B'? It is important to distinguish this problem from related issues in the matter of personal identity and to pose three separate questions: (i) What is it that groups together a series of mental events into one continuum? (ii) What is it that makes a person at two different times one and the same person? (iii) How do we get a sense of our own identity?

In answer to the first question the Buddhist has postulated that it is possible to group together a series of mental events into one continuum on the basis of internal relations between them. Udayana has been concerned to show that such relations as cause and effect are inadequate for this task, and that it is only by postulating an enduring atman that we can demarcate one continuum from another. For the Buddhist opponent, the answer to the second question would be that the identity of an individual is equivalent to the identity of a particular continuum, whereas for Udayana the identity of an individual would be equivalent to a particular atman. The answer to these two questions does not necessarily, however, provide an answer to question (iii). A comment of Barry Stroud in relation to Hume is once again relevant here:

Even if all the perceptions belonging to a single mind were to inhere in a simple substance, that in itself would not explain how we ever get the idea of a mind or self in the first place. We would still need an account of how various features of our experience
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combine with fundamental principles of the mind to provide us with that idea. [Stroud (1977) p. 134]

As we have already seen, for Udayana the Atman once again would provide the answer to this question (see TEXT H). Our sense of self is based on a direct unmediated experience of our Atman which is the object of the judgement "I am". The main focus of Udayana's arguments, however, is not with this question of how we arrive at a sense of our own self. For him the most important question is to find a basis upon which the division between individuals can be clearly demarcated and any particular mental event assigned to one individual. This shows clearly in his discussion of memory. In western philosophy memory has played an important role as a criterion for personal identity inasmuch as it makes us aware of our continued existence over time. Memory may not be sufficient in itself to relate together all the events of one continuum, but it certainly makes a considerable contribution towards a sense of psychological connectedness which in its turn is responsible for engendering a sense of self. Other western philosophers have made use of memory in a different way, arguing that in memory we experience our self directly. For Udayana, however, the importance of memory is that he sees it to be an important argument against the Buddhist anAtman doctrine inasmuch as he challenges the Buddhist to demonstrate how, given his denial of an enduring Atman, he could limit the range of memory to one continuum. Without the firm basis of an enduring Atman, he declares, there is no way in which a memory of 'c' at a later time could be restricted to one and the same continuum. Hence one
person could remember another's experiences, and once again the boundaries between continua would dissolve. In his discussion of memory, Udayana does not consider the possibility that memory could be responsible for engendering a sense of self-identity.

The atman and personal identity

The aim of Udayana's ATV, through his attack on the four bädhakas raised by the Buddhists, has been to establish the atman as an entity existing separately from our bodies, thoughts and so on, and I believe that the importance of the atman for the Nyāya system is clearly associated with the requirement that personal identity be determinate in all cases. In the final arguments of the ATV, Udayana stresses the ontological rather than the epistemological role played by the atman, and clearly, for Udayana, the importance of the atman is its essential place in maintaining a clear distinction between one individual and another. He has argued that without the atman it is impossible to bind all the mental events of any one continuum together, and to limit the range of causal and memory relations between mental events in a continuum to that particular continuum. In a recent work, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit has argued convincingly and in great detail that the notion of a determinate personal identity is defensible only on the grounds that our identity does indeed reside in some entity that exists separately from our bodies and thoughts. If we believe that our identity consists in our bodies, or in the connections between our thoughts, or in some combination between these two, then there are going to be
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cases in which questions of personal identity are not decidable: 22

If we believe that our identity must be determinate, must we believe that we are separately existing entities? Having the first belief does not imply having the second. We might believe both that we are not separately existing entities, and that to any question about personal identity, there must always be an answer, which must be either Yes or No. There are some writers who accept this view. But I shall argue that this view is indefensible. Only if we are separately existing entities can it be true that our identity must be determinate.
[Parfit (1986) p. 216]

For the orthodox Nyāya thinker, it was important that the boundaries between individuals (used here in an empirical rather than a normative sense) remain clear since they considered this to be essential for the maintenance of the whole complex of ideas relating to saṃsāra, karma and mokṣa (and hence the hierarchical nature of Indian society). I shall now examine the role played by Ātman in the mechanism governing rebirth and the operation of karma.

First of all, it should be reiterated that the belief in karma and reincarnation was a belief shared by both the Buddhists and Naiyāyikas alike. Therefore reincarnation should not be seen as a decisive proof for the existence of the Ātman, but rather as something which the philosophers of the respective traditions need to explain in accordance with their position on the existence of the Ātman. Hence for Udayana, the importance of reincarnation is that it really only makes sense in terms of an enduring Ātman. His Buddhist opponent, on the other hand, seeks to demonstrate the viability of reincarnation in the absence of
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an enduring Ātman.23

In Chapter One we encountered Yājñavalkya who instructed Ārtabhāga on the nature of karma — that by good works a man becomes good and by bad works he becomes bad (B.U. III ii verse 13). The essential point about karma is that an event in an individual's life be able to harbour consequences for that same individual at a later time. Vātsyāyana had argued in the Nyāyabhāṣya (Book Three; Portion Two; sūtras 4-6) that, even within a single life, an enduring Ātman is necessary for moral culpability to make sense. If an individual is being destroyed and recreated every instant, then there is no one to be held accountable for a past crime. In the course of our discussion on Udayana's defence of Ātman, we have already seen what would be his main arguments in this matter. Unless one mental continuum is kept absolutely distinct from another, the boundaries between individuals will become unclear and hence there will be a confusion of karma. Udayana has also argued against the possibility of one mental event being able to engender consequences later on in the continuum through the operation of karmic forces (see Chap. 6 footnote 21).

Paul Griffiths, in his article "Notes Towards A Critique Of Buddhist Theory", has criticized the Buddhists for incoherency in the matter of karma and reincarnation. He sees one of the main functions of Buddhist karmic theory to be an explanatory hypothesis for the various conditions of sentient beings, and that one of the truth claims inherent in this function is that "Each individual undergoes more than one life", a statement which he
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labels as P3. He then rephrases P3 as, "Any given caused continuum of momentary states exhibiting sentience (i.e. an 'individual') does not cease with death", in order to reflect more accurately the Buddhist position, as statement which he labels as P3'. He then criticizes the Buddhists for sliding between these two statements:

This is especially often the case when Buddhist karmic theory is being used as a means of social control, to explain to people why they should follow the Buddhist path and why they should observe the five basic precepts of Buddhist ethics. It is easy to see why: if you want to persuade someone that killing is not a good idea because of the suffering undergone by the killer as inevitable retribution, then P3 is a much more powerfully persuasive tool than P3'. A strong sense of identity across lives — much stronger than causal continuity — is required when Buddhist karmic theory is used as a means of social control. But when philosophically pressed or when thinking about the fundamental anātman doctrine, Buddhist philosophers tend to retreat to P3'.


He then goes on to say:

We may note that this is a problem of which Buddhists themselves have been, and are, acutely aware. Without memory, continuity of physical identity and continuing character traits and so on, does it really make sense to talk of 'the same individual' undergoing a multiplicity of lives.


and in a footnote to this section:

It should be noted that it may be possible to make P3 coherent by asserting a rather stronger concept of personal identity than Buddhists — at least in their orthodox moods — are willing to do. Thus if, for example, the theory states that the reborn individual has the possibility of memory of previous lives, then we do have at least one criterion of personal identity and P3 begins to make sense. It would probably still have to be rejected on the ground of implausibility, but no longer on the ground of incoherence. This move — of asserting a strong sense of personal continuity and identity through many lives — is available to Hindu
Griffiths' complaints raise several important points. His assertion is that Hindu theoreticians, of whom Udayana is one, were able to utilize a stronger sense of identity and continuity through several incarnations on the basis of their belief in an enduring ātman. Supposedly with the introduction of the ātman the doctrine of reincarnation becomes more meaningful and more likely to exert a measure of social control over the population. Indeed, Udayana himself does use an argument similar to this and claims that the ātman is an important incentive for people to practice orthodoxy in their lives. (See ATV (1939 edition) pp. 714-715; translated p. 312) It is not clear, however, that the ātman does make the doctrine of reincarnation more meaningful in the way that Griffiths suggests, and I would like to raise two points in relation to this.

Firstly, Udayana's major complaint against the Buddhist is that he is guilty of an ontological failure. It is not so much that the Buddhist's notion of a causal continuum results in a weak sense of our own personal identity, but rather that he cannot link mental events at all into one continuum on the basis of internal relations between them. Hence Udayana is attacking his Buddhist opponent not on the basis of the epistemological consequences of the notion of a causal continuum (that is, no real sense of our continued identity across time), but rather on the basis of not being able to establish a causal continuum at
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all. Were Udayana to admit that mental events could be so linked, then much of his disagreement with the Buddhist would disappear. For Udayana, however, the chain of mental events, stretching out across many lives, can only be strung together on the thread of an enduring atman.

Secondly, it is not clear that the atman achieves what Griffiths states, a stronger sense of personal identity. That would only be achieved if the atman were to be identified with my own sense of self-identity. As we have seen, the role of the atman is more ontological than epistemological — the atman does not necessarily give us memories of our former lives, nor does it necessarily give us continuity of character traits. It does not give the ordinary person a sense of 'myself' in another incarnation. Because of this fact, it is not clear that the postulation of an enduring atman gives us any more experiential contact with our former lives than the Buddhist thesis of a causal continuum.

Griffiths states that the doctrine of reincarnation is postulated as an explanatory hypothesis for the diverse fortunes of different individuals and consequently is supposed to involve the truth claim that "There is no undeserved suffering", a statement which he labels as P5. This is what Griffiths says of P5:

We may also note in passing, putting aside our philosophical guise for a moment, that to most Western eyes, and certainly to Christians, P5 is morally reprehensible, even inhuman. But this is a different argument. [Griffiths (1982) p. 287]

Griffith's point here seems to be that most Westerners would find it morally repugnant to be held accountable for crimes of which
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they had no memory, for lives which they have no sense of ever having lived, and in this respect I propose that the existence of an entity such as ātman would not make karmic theory any more acceptable to him. This would only be the case if ātman were equated with a sense of "I", and the existence of ātman meant that we did actually remember our past lives (which clearly most of us do not). Previously we noted that ātmans might be interchangeable and nobody would notice any difference (see pp. 318-319). Parfit has noted that:

the Cartesian Ego that I am might suddenly cease to exist and be replaced by another ego. This new Ego might 'inherit' all of my psychological characteristics, as in a relay race. On this Featureless Cartesian View, while you are reading this page of text, you might suddenly cease to exist, and your body be taken over by some new person who is merely exactly like you. If this happened, no one would notice any difference. There would never by any evidence, public or private, showing whether or not this happens, and, if so, how often. We therefore cannot even claim that it is unlikely to happen. And there are other possibilities. On this view, history might have gone just as it did, except that I was Napoleon and he was me. This is not the claim that Derek Parfit might have been Napoleon. The claim is rather that I am one Cartesian Ego, and that Napoleon was another, and that these two Egos might have 'occupied' each other's places. [Parfit (1986) p. 228]

On traditional theories of ātman there does not seem to be any qualitative difference between one ātman and another. Hence what Parfit says about the Cartesian Ego would also hold true for the ātman. One ātman could 'occupy' another's place in any sequence of incarnations. The ātman traditionally available to Hindu theoreticians certainly does not provide the kind of continuity of personal identity that Griffiths is looking for. The argument
between Udayana and his Buddhist opponent, however, is clearly about something different, and reveals their concern to be quite different from that of Griffiths, namely, a concern with overall order, rather than with the individual. What concerns Udayana and his Buddhist opponent is that there be some ontological basis for a clear demarcation between continua. It would appear that both Udayana and his Buddhist opponent would be morally satisfied with the workings of *karma* so long as this is the case. Where they disagree is on how this is to be achieved, whether by means of the *ātman* or internal relations between mental events. The way in which Griffiths judges the issue is similar to ways in which the caste system has been judged. Dumont criticized in his *Homo Hierarchicus* previous studies of the caste system for being biased by an ethnocentricity that saw the world to be made up of individuals imbued with all the values of western civilization. In the same way, Griffiths is judging the morality of *karma* from a viewpoint in which paramount importance is given to the individual. Our sense of fair play may demand full memory of lives which we may be held accountable for, but from the soteriological point of view of traditional Indian thought, the overall moral order of the cosmos is of supreme importance.

What is interesting in the case of Udayana though, is that he does seem to waver between two senses of *ātman*. In TEXT H, we saw that he put forward an argument for the existence of *ātman* based upon our direct, unmediated experience of it. The *ātman* becomes the object of the judgement "I am", and thus it would seem that Udayana closely associates the *ātman* with our sense of
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self-identity. In doing this, he is giving the individual Atman the kind of epistemological significance that Griffiths thought necessary for the doctrine of reincarnation to be morally acceptable and meaningful. At the same time, it would also seem that Udayana is in danger of departing from the soteriologically significant understanding of Atman. Traditionally, since Upaniṣadic times, orthodox thinkers had equated mokṣa with some kind of realization of a transcendental Self, the Atman. As we have already seen (see pp. 32-34), this experience was an extraordinary one, not encountered in ordinary states of consciousness such as waking, dreaming and deep sleep. We also saw (see pp. 41-46) that in the Upaniṣads there is an important distinction between the Atman and the ahamkāra or ego-consciousness. Both of these tenets have been ignored by Udayana in his defence of Atman as experienced in the judgement "I am". In this respect, early Nyāya thought was more in accord with Upaniṣadic thought than later Nyāya thought, since in early Nyāya thought the Atman was to be known only through a special yogic perception. In making his argument for a direct perception of Atman rest on the Atman being the object of the judgement "I am", Udayana is bringing the Atman back to the realm of everyday experience and also conflating the Atman/ahamkāra distinction so important in the Upaniṣads. Thus he is in danger of defending a concept of Atman that would cease to be significant for traditional soteriological thought. Hence I would now like to examine a second major category of Upaniṣadic thought in relation to the Nyāya system, that of mokṣa.
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(2) Mokṣa in the Nyāya system

The traditional roots of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems are especially apparent in those passages which are concerned with mokṣa, known also in these systems as apavarga (completion) and niḥśreyasa (having no better). What the Nyāya philosophers have to say on this topic is closely connected to ideas which had developed from the Upaniṣadic teachings, and there is no doubt that the ātman continues to play a central role in their understanding of mokṣa.

In the ATV, Udayana advocates a threefold path leading towards mokṣa, a tradition common since the time of the Upaniṣads:

[First], hearing from the Veda about the existence of ātman, [a person] should then determine by means of syllogistic reasoning, which is all in accordance with the Veda, that the real nature of the ātman is to be free of all that needs to be discarded [for the attainment of liberation]. Then, a person, having as his sole means firm conviction or faith [in the ātman], should practice control of mind, control of the external senses and detachment, should meditate on the ātman through the rules of yoga which lead towards a one-pointedness of mind and break the bonds of a transmigratory existence.25

Thus first of all, one should gain knowledge of the ātman from the traditional texts, the Vedas. The minimal meaning of mokṣa in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems is in accord with these traditional teachings, that mokṣa consists in liberating the ātman from any connections with the physical body. Both Kaṇāda and Gautama emphasize the relationship between karma and mokṣa—it is because of karma that an ātman becomes embroiled in a physical body and mokṣa comes about when this undesirable union
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is broken once and for all. Hence one needs to know about the atman, what causes it to be caught up in the cycle of birth and death. One needs to know what types of behaviour will aid the process of liberation and what types of behaviour will impede it. Udayana states that the recognition of an atman provides the necessary incentive for persons to order their conduct appropriately, and hence we can see that the atman functions as an important locus for ordering codes of conduct. It becomes the absolute standard against which actions are to be judged. Whereas the Buddhists saw the belief in an enduring atman to be an impediment to achieving freedom from the cycle of existence, orthodox thinkers believed that without such a belief there would be neither an impetus for seeking moksha nor an impetus for moral conduct.

Secondly, one should substantiate traditional teachings by means of a process of ratiocination. The originality of Nyaya thinkers in relation to moksha lies in their emphasis on the importance of correct knowledge in this process. Nyaya philosophers were concerned to defend the propriety of such an emphasis, which was sometimes questioned by other orthodox thinkers, and in this passage Udayana is concerned to stress that syllogistic reasoning is quite in accordance with the Vedas. I believe this emphasis on correct knowledge is crucial for understanding the rationale of the Nyaya system, and I shall consider it fully in the concluding sections of this chapter (see pp. 339-360).

Thirdly, the aspirant should utilize the techniques of yoga
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to achieve one-pointedness of mind which comes about as a result of meditating on the ātman. Nyāya adds little to the tradition of yogic practice. Just as Nyāya was considered by the orthodox schools to be the authority on logical reasoning, so too Nyāya recognized the expertise of the Yoga system on matters of spiritual practice and accepted the practical disciplines outlined in the *Yoga Sūtras*. In both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, however, there is less emphasis on the experiential aspect of mokṣa, and a marked reluctance to fully equate mokṣa with some blissful state of consciousness. Nyāya philosophers do discuss the experiential aspects of mokṣa. Gautama equates mokṣa with deep sleep and freedom from pain.28 Similarly, Vātsyāyana states that mokṣa consists in freedom from fear, a condition which he equates with brahman, thus referring his teachings back to the Upaniṣads. Vātsyāyana, however, is concerned to refute the view that in mokṣa the ātman enjoys an experience of eternal pleasure.29 This is a teaching echoed throughout the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika texts. Vācaspati Miśra states that in the state of final liberation there is cessation of both pleasure and pain. Hence only the wise will be able to fully appreciate such teachings. Vṛmaśiva states that "bliss" in relation to mokṣa should be understood to just mean an absence of pain,30 and Udayana too defines mokṣa as the final cessation of sorrow.31 What is important in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika systems, however, is that mokṣa is not fully defined by describing a particular state of consciousness. Certainly, it is characterized by certain experiential qualities, such as freedom...
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from pain, but an essential element of moksha consists in attaining correct knowledge. Again and again we read in the texts of the Nyaya Vaiseshika systems that it is through correct knowledge of the categories of their systems that liberation will be attained. Such views culminate with Sivaditya's negative definition of moksha as, "the absence of sorrow together with the posterior absence of false knowledge which is the cause of sorrow, which posterior absence is produced by true knowledge".32

Moksha in the Nyaya Vaiseshika systems equals a particular state of consciousness plus a particular understanding of the world. Indeed, moksha in these systems cannot be fully understood apart from understanding the role which knowledge plays in these systems. I shall now turn in the final section of my thesis to discuss the role which knowledge plays in the Nyaya system since, as I have already mentioned, I believe it is through this category that we can come to an overall perspective of the system.

(3) Knowledge in the Nyaya system

We saw in the introduction that some critics, by showing the largely logical nature of the Nyaya system, assumed that it was thereby disassociated from any soteriological context and somehow qualified as "pure" philosophy. There is no doubt though that the Nyaya system did concern itself with soteriological matters. Paul Williams has noted:

One can see at a glance the amount of space devoted to moral and soteriological concerns. The Nyaya-Vaiseshika was fully committed to liberation, but its conception of liberation involved emphasising perhaps to an ex-
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treme degree the role of knowledge in this project. As Potter says, "while the Naiyāyikas did not equate the good life with the reflective life, they did feel that one would not find his appropriate path eventually in liberation without understanding the truths about reality enshrined in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine, and without mastering the methods of investigation taught in the system [Potter (1976) p. 19]."
[Williams (1978) pp. 279-280]

The final task of my thesis will be to understand the significance of this marriage between traditional soteriological thought and their original contribution that knowledge of the Nyāya categories must also be a necessary component of final liberation. The relationship between the quest for mokṣa (sometimes known as atmavidyā – the study of atman) and logical reasoning is long and complicated, beyond the scope of this thesis. We do need to ask, however, if theories of liberation and disputation were related prior to their incorporation into the Nyāyasūtras, and hence whether the Naiyāyikas were innovators in making such knowledge an essential part of liberation.

Early history of logical thought in India

Paul Williams mentions that the emphasis on knowledge in the Nyāya system:

reflects an old Indian tendency which can be traced back at least as far as the earlier Upaniṣads where freedom from rebirth results from knowing something.
[Williams (1978) p. 280]

The atmavidyā tradition of the Upaniṣads, however, although a gnostic tradition, had little place for logical thought in its scheme of things. An analysis of early ideas about liberation as conceived in the Upaniṣadic atmavidyā tradition (see Chapter One), shows that mokṣa, although achieved through knowledge, was
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the prize of ritual and experiential adeptness, rather than any logical skill. It is true that there was a great deal of debate in the early classical Upaniṣads, but the "rationale" of these discussions, whilst not illogical, would be intelligible only to those well versed in the mechanics of Vedic sacrificial thought. It would seem, however, that logical thought in India evolved out of this situation in which there was a great deal of religious debate, a situation clearly portrayed in the Upaniṣads.

First, the Upaniṣads continued to be preoccupied with questions concerning the correct performance of the sacrifice, despite their growing interest in questions concerning mokṣa. The correct performance of the sacrifice had originally been the responsibility of the brāhmaṇ priest officiating at the sacrifice and such matters were dealt with in the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Vedas. This interest was later taken up as the specific concern of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school. Jaimini's Mīmāṃsāsūtras, which is the earliest extant text of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school, aim to clarify the notion of one's dharma (duty) in the light of Vedic injunctions. In posing Vedic instructions as an infallible means for knowing dharma the author had to deal with such questions as, "What are the valid means of knowledge?", and "What is the relationship between a word and the thing which it signifies?". It is from such questions that a basis for inferential reasoning begins to emerge. Thus inferential reasoning, like many other sciences in India — astronomy, grammar, phonetics and astrology, for example — grew out of the need for greater knowledge and accuracy in relation to the sacrifice. It is interesting to note...
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that it is in this context that the word "nyāya" makes its first appearance, a word which has since become more associated with the Nyāya school itself. The rules propounded in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school were known as Nyāyas.\textsuperscript{33}

Secondly, as the teachings of the Upaniṣads became integrated into the orthodox brahmanical schools, it became necessary to defend such teachings from the attacks of the heterodox schools such as the Buddhists. The doctrinal differences and social implications of Buddhism especially, led to this type of confrontation with the brahmanical orthodoxy, necessitating each side to sharpen its ideas in the face of the attacks from the opposition.

Thirdly, alongside this rivalry there was also a rivalry within each of the orthodox and heterodox traditions. For example, after the death of the Buddha, Buddhism became subject to internal dissension, and we find the Buddhists settling matters of doctrine by the traditional means of calling together an assembly for debate. The accounts that we have of the so-called Buddhist Councils are somewhat mythical, but we do know that they led to the formulation of rules to govern the course of debate and also generated a technical vocabulary in association with this. The earliest record of such a schemata is to be found in an Abhidharma text, the Kathāvatthu, which is part of the Buddhist Pāli Canon. This text is traditionally associated with the Third Buddhist Council reputedly called by Aśoka in the seventeenth year of his reign (252 B.C.) when the Saṁgha was threatened by the entry of "heretics" into the order. The
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Kāṭhāvatthu lays down specific schemas for making inferences and contains certain technical terms (for example, upanaya, nigraha) which can be also found in the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama but with a more specialized meaning. Characteristic of the Kāṭhāvatthu is the lack of any metalanguage concerning logic and also a dialectic which is somewhat cumbersome and repetitive. Randle has concluded from this:

that logic was preceded by attempts to schematise discussion, attempts which were inevitable in view of the habit of organised public discussion which prevailed in early India, but which could not succeed until the nerve of argument had been separated from the irrelevances in which the early methodology obscured it, and plainly exposed in a formulation of the syllogism .... Assuming that the Buddhist culture of the period was not inferior to contemporary Brahmanical culture, we can assert that logic did not exist in India at the period of which the Kāṭhāvatthu is representative; though some of the terms which afterwards became vehicles of genuinely logical conceptions were already being used systematically in connection with a methodology which was not yet logical, and which may not unreasonably be thought to have been separated by several generations from the beginnings of logic proper.

[Randle (1930) pp. 14-15]

The Kāṭhāvatthu, however, certainly represents a genuine proto-logical phase in that it recognizes the validity of any particular conclusion to be dependent on its relationship to a specific pattern of preceding premises. The nature of the technical vocabulary used in association with the debate also shows some recognition of the separation of form from content.

In all these example the relationship between logical thought and the quest for mokṣa (or nirvāṇa in the case of the Buddhists) was an external one in that it grew out of a defence of such beliefs rather than being an integral part of the path.
Atman in Nyāya thought towards liberation. Indeed, in the Upaniṣads, what references there are to logical thought manifest some degree of antagonism towards its being a proper means for attaining mokṣa. In the beginning, however, the discipline of logical thought was intimately bound up with the subject matter dealing with the pursuit of liberation. But once the separation between form and content is recognized, it allows for the extension of logical reasoning into other areas, since it frees it from a religious context. It implies an understanding of logical reasoning to be an underlying structure common to many modes of thought, with a universal application.

There is some evidence that this had actually happened before the Kathāvatthu, and that logical reasoning was indeed known as a separate discipline where it went by the name of ānvīkṣikī. This conjecture is based upon passages from the Arthasaśāstra, a text concerned to instruct kings in politics and diplomacy. In that text, Kautilya lists ānvīkṣikī, alongside the triple Veda, commerce and statecraft, as one of the four sciences which a king should know. This text was supposedly composed by Kautilya, who was a minister at the court of Candragupta Maurya, grandfather to Ashoka. This would place it between 321-292 B.C., making it a text considerably earlier than the Kathāvatthu. If we accept this early date, it would mean that logical reasoning began to emerge as a separate discipline at the end of the fourth century B.C.

Even if the authenticity of Kautilya's text is accepted, the Arthasaśāstra should not be read in isolation from the general
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intellectual developments of the time. Many scholars have debated whether or not Kauṭilya's use of ānvīkṣikī should be understood to include atmavidyā. I do not believe that we can settle this question by a philological analysis of the text alone, and we need to read Kauṭilya in the light of what we already know about atmavidyā and ratiocination up to this point. What is significant about the Arthaśāstra is not so much any self-declared statement about ānvīkṣikī on the part of Kauṭilya, but rather the very fact that here we have the inclusion of subject matter hitherto only associated with religious debate, in the more secular context of a treatise about statecraft. The very fact that Kauṭilya took such a step is in itself historic since it initiates the secularization of logical thought and would inevitably lead to an awareness of its independence from religious thought.

Finally, we should also remember that when we talk of logical thought in the context of Kauṭilya, we are not talking of a fully developed logical system. We know from other sources, such as the Kathāvatthu, that logical thought at that time constituted no more than a collection of rather ad hoc rules for debate. Indeed, Kauṭilya himself included such rules at the end of his treatise, comprised of thirty-two technical terms known as tantrayukti. It is doubtful whether in the time of Kauṭilya logical thought had developed to a point where it had enough self-understanding to see itself as a separate discipline. This would have to wait until the development of a distinctive methodology which only came about later with the formulation of
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Syllogistic reasoning. It should also be remembered that ānvīkaśīkī never became a widely used term in Indian thought, where the term darsāna became more commonly used.37

Origins of the Nyāya system

It has been suggested that the Nyāya system grew out of the concern for formulating rules of debate. As the volume of debate between the different schools increased, so too did the numbers of manuals outlining its proper conduct. We have already mentioned the Kathāvatthu and the list of tantrayuktī in the Arthaśāstra. Nyāya most probably began as one such vādaśāstra (scientific treatise concerned with debate). Several such vāda traditions have been traced,38 and all vāda presentations have an essentially similar structure. In the first part, ideas which deal with the analysis of disputation were discussed, and in the second part, false arguments and reasons for defeat were examined. The vāda expositions did not have their own metaphysics or physics, nor were cosmological doctrines of liberation usually expounded by such treatises. Rather, they were tools of debate for systems which did hold views on such matters.

The Nyāyasūtras began as one such vādaśāstra. Although finally redacted sometime around the second century of the Christian era, they were certainly not the work of one author, and scholars have identified certain sections as being older than others. Professor Oberhammer has identified ādhyāyas (chapters) I and V as forming the oldest core of the Nyāyasūtras since together they bear a marked resemblance to the form of a
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Yet even in these sections there are certain differences from the more usual vāda expositions, and Oberhammer proposes that ādhyāyas I and V must have already undergone some elaboration because of their unusual arrangement of topics. In the Nyāyasūtras a discussion of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is given prime importance. In the first sūtra, sixteen categories are listed, the first two being pramāṇa (instrument of knowledge) and prameya (object of knowledge). This has been noted by several scholars and Matilal states that this:

brought the epistemological theory in the forefront of the philosophical discussion or debate. In this regard, the final version of the sūtra-text differs from other available Vāda-sāstras.

[Matilal (1977) p. 78]

Oberhammer also notes that the relatively detailed explanation of a cosmological doctrine of liberation in the first ādhyāya is also unusual for a vāda treatise. In the Nyāyasūtras, the rules governing debate are once more given in the context of the pursuit of mokṣa, rather than in the more secular context of treatises on medicine and statecraft. What is more, the relationship between the two is now an intimate one. It is not just that the rules of debate can be used to defend a particular doctrine of liberation but rather, it is stated at the beginning of the work that nibhreyasa comes about as a result of correct judgement of the sixteen categories listed in the same sūtra.

Another important aspect of the Nyāyasūtras is that it is obviously only concerned about knowledge of things which are relevant for the attainment of liberation. In this respect, Pradeep Gokhale has noted an important difference between the
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Nyāyasūtras and the Vaiśeṣikasūtras. In sūtra one of the Nyāyasūtras the sixteen following categories are listed: means of knowledge, object of knowledge, doubt, purpose, example, tenets, members of an inference, tarka, ascertainment, discussion, sophistry, cavil, fallacies of reason, quibble, futile rejoinder and ways of losing an argument. In sūtra nine the objects of knowledge (prameyas) are listed as self, body, sense organs, object, judgement, internal organ, activity, defect, rebirth, fruit, pain and release. Gokhale states that the prameyas of the Nyāyasūtras are not meant to be an exhaustive classification of all that there is to know, but rather, a classification of all that needs to be known for the pursuit of liberation. In the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, however, the categories listed in sūtra one are meant to be such an exhaustive classification:

It is clear from the list that these prameyas are the important factors of human life, rather than being the important factors of the objective world. The Vaiśeṣikas were interested in finding out and analyzing the factors of the objective world, and they were looking at the subjective world, so to speak, as a small part of that objective world, not always as its center. But Gautama seems to support that the basic facts of human life, (for example, we have a body, we sense certain objects, we act, we experience pains, we are capable of emancipation, and more) form the real problems of philosophy. In this way Gautama's conception of philosophy is anthropocentric. On the contrary, the Vaiśeṣikas' concept of philosophy, at its outset, is cosmocentric.


Thus in the Nyāyasūtras a vāda exposition is transformed from being a mere organon of debate into a work wanting to put forward a clear philosophical position. From its early beginnings, Nyāya was concerned to bring together the art of logical reasoning with
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the pursuit of liberation and make the former an integral part of the pursuit of the latter.

As the Nyāya system continued to develop, both these concerns with liberation and formulating a rational epistemological system were maintained. The ādhyāyas II, III and IV added later maintain an interest in cosmological matters whilst also discussing in greater detail the instruments of knowledge. In his Nyāyabhāṣya, Vātsyāyana must be credited for establishing once and for all that these two aspects of the system must be maintained. In his commentary on sūtra one of the Nyāyasūtras, he answers an objection that only the first two of the sixteen categories need to be listed since between them they contain the other fourteen, in the following way:

This may be so. But four sciences are taught for the welfare of man, of which logical reasoning (ānvikṣikī), also known as nyāya, is one. Each one has a different subject matter. Its [that is, nyāya's] subject matter are the categories of doubt, etc. Without the separate instruction of them, [nyāya] would be merely atmavidyā as in the Upaniṣads.41

Alongside this must be read his commentary on sūtra nine in which the prameyas were listed:

Though apart from these there are many other prameyas (objects of knowledge), such as substance, quality, action, commonness, individuality and inherence, yet it would be impossible to enumerate all such objects severally. What this sūtra intends is to mention specifically only those objects whose right knowledge will bring release, and whose wrong knowledge will lead to rebirth.42

Hence Vātsyāyana is stating quite clearly that the proper subject matter of Nyāya is to be the pursuit of mokṣa, but that mokṣa will be attained as a result of subjecting the relevant
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categories to a rational enquiry. In this respect Nyāya will be
different from the pursuit of mokṣa typified by the ātma vidyā
tradition of the Upaniṣads.

I would now like to conclude my thesis by quoting at length
Udayana's ATV in order to examine more fully this relationship
between the pursuit of mokṣa and the practice of logical enquiry:

Concluding Remarks

When [the ātman] is being contemplated upon through
yoga, first of all only external material objects
appear [to the aspirant]. On the basis of this, the
doctrine of Karma Mīmāṃsā is arrived at, against which is
pitted the materialist philosophy of Cārvāka. In
support of this materialist philosophy there are
statements such as, "The Self-creator created the sense
organs looking outwards", and in order to avoid
such false views [there are statements] such as,
"Beyond karma". Then the ātman in the form of external
objects [appears to the aspirant], based on which the
doctrine of the Tridaṇḍins comes as a final conclusion,
against which is pitted the Yogacāra doctrine. In
support of this [Yogacāra doctrine] there are
statements such as, "All this is only the Self",
against which [there are statements] such as, "Without
smell, without taste, etc.". Then [appears to the
aspirant] the absence of all [external] things, based
on which there is the conclusive doctrine which is
actually only the initial stage of the Upaniṣadic
doctrine, against which is the opposing doctrine
of the nihilists, the Sūnyavādins and Nairātmyavādins.
In support of this opposing doctrine there are such
statements as, "In the beginning all this was nothing",
and to counteract this [there are statements] such as,
"Those people who kill the ātman enter the blinding
darkness." Then appears [to the aspirant] the
distinction [between the ātman and external objects],
based upon which there is the conclusion of the
Sāmkhyas, against which is pitted the view of the Sākta
doctrine. In order to justify this opposing doctrine
there are statements such as, "Beyond matter", and to
oppose this [there are statements] such as, "There is
nothing else as existent". Then appears
the ātman alone, based upon which there is the final
doctrine of Non-Duality. In support of this [there are
statements] such as, "From which words return along
with the mind without ever reaching it". This state is
not to be discarded. To support it [the statements]
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are, "Some say he does not see and he becomes one". In order to discard even this view [there is the statement], "There is neither non-duality nor duality". Then, because of the complete subjugation of all karmic traces, even though [the ātman] is in isolation, it is never viewed as either "this" or "this". On the basis of this comes the final doctrine of the Upaniṣads since this view is the principle entrance to the city of liberation. Through that [liberation] there arises an automatic extinction [of suffering], on the basis of which comes the final doctrine of Nyāya. To justify this there are statements such as, "Then he who becomes desireless, whose desire is only ātman, who has thus attained all desires, he being brahman itself attains to brahman. His vital breath does not go out. It gets dissolved in itself." Hence, even though a person is keen to practice this contemplation of the ātman, he should enter the path to liberation only through proper means, discarding all wrong means. For it is said regarding proper and improper paths, that [ordinary persons who wish to pursue the path towards the goal], who are apprehensive of delusions should 'fix the arrow to the bow with reference to the target'.

In this remarkable passage Udayana describes a path to mokṣa which encompasses and ranks all the rival systems, both orthodox and non-orthodox, into a hierarchy which culminates in the perfection of the Nyāya teachings. The path which he describes includes both the meditative techniques of yoga, as well as the discursive processes of reasoning. The aspirant is to take the ātman as his object of meditation, and Udayana describes five successive states in this meditative process:

(1) only external objects experienced as real
(2) the ātman experienced in the form of external objects
(3) the absence of all external objects experienced
(4) the distinction between the ātman and external objects experienced and
(5) the ātman alone experienced.

It would seem that Udayana intends that each of these successive
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stages should correspond to a level of meditation in which these different ways of seeing the atman are existentially realized. In addition, for each level of meditative experience, Udayana names two rival philosophical schools which result from a discursive reflection on the experience. Only one of the pair named for each level of experience expresses a world view acceptable to the orthodox tradition, whilst the other expresses a rival world view which is not acceptable. Yet it is important to note that both systems are in accord with the original experience and arise directly out of it, and both systems can look to sayings from the Upanishads for their justification. Indeed, Udayana himself presents the orthodox (upasamhara) and opposing views (uttara) along with Upanishadic statements which support the respective views.

Several important conclusions about the role of reasoning in the meditative process can be drawn from this passage. Firstly, it is clear that for Udayana the quest for moksa includes not only the traditional methods of yogic meditation, but also discursive processes of reasoning in which the aspirant tries to make sense of those experiences. He presents a path which consists of two integrated methods, contemplative and discursive.

Paul Williams has noted that:

One aspect which Potter and other thinkers fail to sufficiently emphasize, however, is the extent to which the investigation of things through reasoning and critical debate was itself considered a form of meditative activity in India. Perhaps it was an early state of discursive meditation, but Gautama clearly states that liberation can be reached through discussion and it is clear that the division between meditation and philosophical investigation cannot have
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been too clearly marked. [Williams (1978) p. 280]

Secondly, it is clear that the method of logical reasoning is important as a corrective device to help the aspirant 'fix the arrow in the bow with reference to the target'. According to Udayana's presentation of the path towards mokṣa, it would be possible to arrive at an unorthodox world view on the basis of a particular meditative experience, but with the aid of logical reasoning the acceptable view can be shown to be superior. It is interesting to note that by giving Upaniṣadic statements in support of both systems in each pair, Udayana is thereby in a subtle manner undermining the usefulness of the scriptural tradition in resolving each dispute.

The path which Udayana describes is similar to many other so-called "mystical" traditions in that it describes a step by step process towards a final goal — a "ladder of perfection", that is, a highly structured discipline consisting of both discursive and contemplative processes. Whether or not Udayana was really recommending or describing an actual path to be followed by the aspirant is highly debatable. More likely, in this passage he is presenting a theoretical arrangement in which he is able to tidily organize all his rival systems. Even if it is rather an idealized account, it does show the way in which Udayana saw the role of reasoning to be a crucial part of the spiritual life. The way in which logical reasoning and traditional yogic techniques fit together in Udayana's outline can be profitably explained with reference to contemporary
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studies of mysticism.

In his schema, Udayana makes a distinction between the experience and its interpretation, where the interpretation of an experience is dependent on factors external to the experience itself — the most important of which here would be the aspirant's religious doctrinal beliefs. Hence a Buddhist would be likely to interpret an experience one way, and a Hindu another. Since the work of Steven Katz on mysticism, however, contemporary scholars have become especially sensitive to the importance of the beliefs held by an individual in shaping the type of religious experiences he or she will have. Interpretation does take place after the experience, but the experience itself has already been shaped by beliefs held prior to it. Katz denied the possibility that any mystical experiences could transcend the boundaries of their particular religious traditions. Hence scholars with views similar to those of Katz would find Udayana's schema unacceptable inasmuch as it portrays a sequence of meditative experiences to be held in common by rival traditions.

Katz's work on mysticism has been questioned in more recent studies on the subject — in particular his basic premise that experience must always be specific to a particular doctrinal tradition. Philip Almond postulates that there is a certain type of experience which may be held in common by different traditions:

the occurrence of contentless experiences provides therefore a counter-balance to the somewhat deterministic view of model five that all mystical
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experience is totally dependent on its context. It suggests rather that there are mystical experiences which, by virtue of their contentlessness, are identical irrespective of the cultural milieu in which they occur. In so far as we are speaking of contentless mystical experiences, there is a unanimity and a universality which transcends the cultural context in which they occur."


Almond does not deny that there are many mystical experiences which are inseparable from their religious context. He also says that, although this type of contentless experience may be found in different traditions, it will have a different role in each tradition:

The contentless experience is compatible with a number of conflicting doctrinal systems, and herein lies its appeal for those who, like Radhakrishnan, argue for the thesis of the unity of all religions by appeal to it. Again, only extra-experiential criteria could resolve the problem of conflicting duty claims in religious systems grounded in a common experience that transcends their respective contexts.


Almond suggests that such an experience occurs in Theravāda Buddhism, Śāmkhya Yoga and Advaita Vedānta, among others.

Whether or not this is absolutely the case is not crucial for my argument. What is important, though, in relation to Almond's argument is that on an experiential level the difference between Udayana and his Buddhist opponents is less clear than in other areas. The antipathy between the Naiyāyikas and their Buddhist opponents was a disagreement between ways of looking at the world, not a disagreement concerning the experiential aspects of mokṣa and nirvāṇa. It is obvious from Udayana's schema that experience plays an important but limited role in the attainment of mokṣa. He portrays Buddhists and Hindus as sharing a common
platform of meditative experiences, revealing that for him at least the disagreement with the Buddhists is over the interpretation of such experiences and their role in attaining liberation. For the Naiyāyikas, mokṣa itself does not consist of having a particular experience. Rather, it is characterized by an absence of suffering, freedom from rebirth and having a correct knowledge of the Nyāya system in conjunction with the experience of the ātman alone. Similarly, the Buddhist nirvāṇa is not reducible to having a particular experience. Hence, whilst it might be the case that the Buddhist and Hindu traditions share experiences which in virtue of their contentlessness are similar, it is wrong in the case of both traditions to reduce liberation to such experiences. Almond's thesis is important in that it indicates that disagreement between traditions which feature such types of experience usually lies in doctrinal matters external to the experience itself. If we talk of the Nyāya concept of mokṣa in terms of freedom from suffering and freedom from rebirth, then it is so similar to the Buddhist concept of nirvāṇa that we might wonder at the antipathy which each tradition felt for the other. Rather, I believe that the antagonism arose from the very fact that for each tradition, Nyāya and Buddhist alike, 'having the right view' was also an essential part of spiritual liberation. What Steven Collins has said of the anātman doctrine is important in this respect:

As a socially institutionalised system of symbols, Buddhist theory functions as a reference point which orients, and provides a criterion for, the general
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religious outlook and practices of the ordinary Buddhist; in this sense, the anattā doctrine's crucial importance is to provide an intransigent symbolic opposition to the belief system of the Brahmin priesthood, and therefore to the social position of the Brahmins themselves. [Collins (1982) p. 12]

This passage indicates the real source of the tension between the Naiyāyikas and their Buddhist opponents, namely the position of the brahmins within the hierarchical society of India. This was not only a source of tension between the Buddhist and the orthodox tradition, but it was also a problem within the orthodox tradition itself in its attempt to place the quest for mokṣa in the context of a carefully ordered society.

At first sight the realism of Nyāya somehow seems out of place and somewhat contrived in the 'ladder of 'perfection' constructed by Udayana at the end of his ATV. It becomes clear only when we consider this tension in the orthodox tradition itself as well as the tension between the orthodox brahmins and the Buddhists. In this respect, it is interesting and somewhat surprising to see that in Udayana's ranking Advaita Vedānta comes second only to Nyāya as being a final expression of the truth. (Indeed Udayana himself is sometimes labelled an Advaita Vedānta philosopher.) Udayana portrays the Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta systems as both arising from the experience of Atman alone. Nyāya is portrayed as the final doctrine of the Upaniṣads, going beyond the non-duality of Advaita Vedānta. The realism of the Nyāya school seems a long way from the teachings of the Advaita Vedānta school which denies, from an absolute point of view, the reality of the empirical world which the Nyāya system argues for
Atman in Nyāya thought so strongly. The apparent inappropriateness of Nyāya realism in this schema which Udayana presents, again reflects the tension between the soteriological teachings concerned with mokṣa and the teachings concerned with the order of society, that is, teachings related to dharma.

In the Manusmrti, we see the quest for mokṣa being tamed by ordinances which laid down when the pursuit of mokṣa was proper. Mokṣa was made subservient to dharma in that only male brahmins who had seen the birth of their first grandson could properly renounce the world and seek liberation. Despite its idealism, Advaita Vedānta was a system of the brahmanical orthodoxy, in which the empirical world was reconciled with the all-embracing unity of brahman through its doctrine of two levels of truth, empirical and absolute. Advaita Vedānta by no means advocates a universal renunciation of the world in the pursuit of mokṣa. I believe that whilst Udayana held that Advaita Vedānta system in great respect, he viewed that system as leading all too easily to a situation in which the proper ordering of society would be neglected. For Udayana, the Advaita Vedānta system did not make a strong enough case against the Buddhists and others who challenged the brahmins' preeminent position in society.

As we have seen, already in the Upaniṣads one finds knowledge associated with mystical power. Originally that power derived from the knowledge of sacrificial equivalents, i.e., the knowledge of brahmin priests, custodians of the ritual. However, once the emphasis shifted to an experiential knowledge, the position of brahmins was threatened. Power now might be
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understood to belong to the spiritual adept. In addition, the Upāniṣads seem to have taught that the quest for mokṣa was more important than anything else, more important than following the rules of society.

The Nyāya system, I contend, represents one more attempt of brahmanical orthodoxy to contain the pursuit of mokṣa within safe boundaries whilst not being antagonistic toward it. Most of the Nyāya philosophers were themselves brahmins and their system works both to re-appropriate the power of knowledge for themselves and to give their superior position in society a basis in reality. In this way they were able to counter the threat posed by both the Buddhists and antinomian trends within their own tradition.

The Nyāya emphasis on knowledge worked jointly with the realism of the system to maintain the position of brahmins. We have already seen in the Upāniṣads that a belief in some mystical connection between language and the world was at the root of sacrificial thought. Although Nyāya philosophers discarded such theories of language, they incorporated into their philosophy some belief in a correspondence between language and the world, a belief that, in many cases at least, the divisions of language reflected real divisions in the world. Labelling a feature as a jāti rather than an upādhi meant endowing that feature with an independent reality. Hence by making brāhmaṇatvā a jāti, the Nyāya philosophers were declaring that their social position was based upon an independent reality, a natural fact. We have also seen in the ATV how the very defence of Atman was
Atman in Nyāya thought tied to the whole realist platform. In turn, the existence of the ātman itself became another plank in the argument for the rightful superiority of brahmins. Because the Nyāya system taught that there are a plurality of ātmans, Naiyāyikas could maintain that personal identity was determinate, and consequently that the difference between a brahmin and a non-brahmin was absolute. It is interesting to see how often Udayana uses examples of hierarchical relationships in his discussions of the existence of ātman, namely, the father/son relationship and the teacher/pupil relationship.

In the Manusmṛti, there is an antagonism towards logical reasoning because it was felt that it could be used to question and undermine orthodox beliefs. The Naiyāyikas, however, turned this situation around by bringing logical reasoning to the service of brahmins. Mokṣa could not be reduced to experience, but could only be attained when the experiential process was accompanied by an intellectual understanding which recognized the validity of the Nyāya world view — and hence the reality of the empirical world. Without endorsing this Nyāya view of the world, an aspirant could not attain mokṣa, whatever experiences he had attained in meditative practice. As we have seen, in the Nyāya system the defence of realism included a defence of the reality of the different orders of society. The Nyāya philosophers thus succeeded in making an acceptance of the orthodox view of society an integral part of the path to mokṣa, just as Manu in his own way had done. In addition, this emphasis on knowledge also meant that the pursuit of mokṣa was available
Atman in Nyāya thought only to those who would have the opportunity of gaining access to this type of knowledge, that is, the brahmins.

There is no doubt that there is a tension in the Nyāya system between its realism and its adherence to traditional soteriological teachings, but this is a tension inherent in the orthodox tradition itself and which was inevitable given the juxtaposition of teachings about mokṣa with those upholding a social hierarchy. Like other religious traditions, Hinduism could not be based on the indeterminateness and anarchy of private religious experience. The Nyāya system represents one attempt to solve this classic dharma/mokṣa conflict of orthodox Hinduism.
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TEXT H: On our perception of atman

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

ātma tad bhāve kim pramāṇam?

pratyakṣameva tāvat, ahamiti vikalpasya prānabharṇmātrasiddhatvāt.

na cāyam avastuḥ saṃdīghavastuko vā, asābdatvādaprakṣepacca.

na ca laṅgikaḥ, ananuṣamhitaliṅgasyāpi svapratyayāt.

na ca smṛtirīyaṃ, ananubbhūte tadanupapateḥ.

anādīvāsanāvāsadānādirayamavastuko vikalpa ityapi na yuktam,

nīlādivikalpasādārayāt.

iha tu vāsanāmupādāyānāśvāse pramāṇāntare'pi kaḥ saṃāśvāso yato

nīlādivikalpeṣu saṃāśvāsaḥ syāt.

tasmādīvāsanāmātravādāṃ vīhāyāgantukamapi kīcīt kāraṇām vācyam,

taccāptāntaśabdau vā liṅgatadvahāsau vā pratyakṣatadadvahāsau

veti.
TEXT H: On our perception of Ātman

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

"By what means then do we come to know of the existence of Ātman?"

Well, it is actually direct perception, because the judgement "I am" establishes the 'bearer of breath' alone [as its object].

And this [judgement] is neither one without an object nor one whose object is doubtful, because of the non-verbal and unmediated nature [of the judgement "I am"].

Nor is it [a judgement] of an inferential nature, because even in an incorrect inference there is a basis in experience.

Nor is this [judgement] a memory, because of its non-arisal in the case of it not being experienced.

It is also not right to say that this judgement is without an object because it is produced by the power of beginningless impressions, because of its similarity to judgements about blue et cetera.

If an unreliable means of gaining knowledge based on karmic impressions, different from the pramāṇas, is postulated [to explain our knowledge from the judgement "I am"], what is the reliable basis by means of which there could be confidence in our judgements about blue and so on?

Thus, having abandoned this doctrine of karmic impressions simply [being the basis for the judgement "I am"], some additional cause [for its arisal] must be stated. That could be (i) verbal authority, either reliable or unreliable, (ii) inference or (iii) direct perception. And just as judgements about blue take place
Atman in Nyaya thought

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

tatra yathā prathamamadhyamapaśrābhāvānñīlavikalpaś-
caramam kalpamālambate tathāhamiti vikalpe'pi.
tatrāyaṁ pratyaksāprṣṭabhāvītve sāksādeva savastukah,
tadābhāse tu mūle'sya pāramparāt savastukateti.

śārtādivastuko'pibhāvyatīti cet.
nā. nirupādhiśarTrendriyabuddhitatsamudāyālambanatve
'tiprasaṅgāt.

svasambhandhinisārTadāvayam syāditi hi vācyam, tatra kah
svārtha iti vacanīyam?

ananyatvaṁ svattvaṁ sarvabhāvānum, tathā ca yadā tenaiva
tadanubhūyate tadā pratyetūḥ pratyetavyādavyatirekaḥhamiti
syāt.
in the absence of the first and second alternatives because they are based on the third [perception], so too in the judgement "I am". In the case when the character of this [judgement] changes after the first direct perception, it still has an object because of its original basis [in perception]. So, when there is a change in the basic form of that [non-propositional perceptual judgement] it still has an object [even when, as a result of such alteration there is an erroneous grasp of that object], because of its original basis in direct perception.6

"[The judgement 'I am'] has the body, et cetera, as its object."7

No. This would result in the excessively broad conclusion that the judgement ["I am"] could be based on any physical body, senses, intellect or combination of these.

If [the Buddhist] were to say that this [judgement] is related only to the body et cetera which is one's own, then what does the expression "one's own" (svārtha) mean here?

For the "ownness" of all beings is that they are not other [than they are], and so when that [Ātman] is experienced by means of that [sense of "ownness"] then one has the notion which would be expressed in the judgement "I am", since there is no reason to logically exclude such a judgement.8
Atman in Nyāya thought

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

ata eva ghaṭādayo na kadācidananyānubhavitṛkā iti na
kadāpyrahāmaśpadamiti cet.

evam tarhi tvanmate'pyaham pratyayaḥ śarīrādāvaroparūpa
eva tataḥ pratyeturanyatvāt.

buddhau mukhya eveti cet.

na, tasyāḥ kriyātvenānubhuyamānāyāḥ bhinnasya karturahāṁ
cchinnadbhītivadahāṁ jānāṁityanubhavāt.

nīlādi-pratyetavyaravat pratipattyakaropī pratipattter-
evayamatma tatha bhasata iti cet.

tarhi pratyetavyaprati-pattyakarayostulyayogaksematvat
siddham na samihitam.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

"Because there is no unchanging experiencer for such things as pots, it is not clear who makes such judgements. Thus there is never any basis for the judgement "I am"."\(^9\)

This is not so because, according to your own position, the notion of "I am" is superimposed on the body et cetera so that you have already assented to the idea that the [object of the judgement "I am"] is something other than the body.\(^10\)

"The judgement "I am" has only the intellect [buddhi] as its object."

No, because the buddhi is experienced only insofar as it acts, and one experiences the agent as separate from the action [which is performed]. In this respect the expression "I know" is like the expression "I cut".

"The way in which actions should be cognized is the same as the way in which blue is cognized, so that the Ātman appears only because of action."

If this is the case, then because of the equally secure possession of both the action and what should be assented to [on the basis of it], what we desire is established.\(^11\)
Atman in Nyaya thought

FOOTNOTES TO TEXT H

1. ATV (1939) pp. 743-749
   ATV (1940) pp. 336-340

2. Here the 'bearer of breath' (pranabhrt) refers to the atman. Hence Udayana's point will be that our consciousness of ourself as revealed in the judgement "I am" is in fact a direct perception of the atman.

3. A judgement without an object would be one about a hare's horn or a round square, for example. A judgement with a doubtful object would be one which appeared in a dream, for example. Udayana is dismissing the possibility that our perception of atman could be linked to either of these two examples. (For example, if the Buddhist were to successfully establish his thesis of momentariness, then an enduring atman would be like the round square, a non-existent and impossible object.) The basis of Udayana's claim is that our awareness of atman is direct and unmediated. In this case the Buddhist must admit that the atman exists because he too is committed to the idea that the objects of direct, unmediated perception (nirvikalpa-pratyaksa) are real.

4. In all these examples, the comparison is made with judgements concerning colour. Thus mistaken judgements about blue, for example, presuppose some real basis in experience. Udayana claims that this judgement cannot be a memory since it cannot occur unless it is actually being experienced. The point here seems to be that memories can take place in the absence of the original object which is being remembered, whereas in the case of blue, for example, when it is remembered it is also experienced. Even if karmically produced forces delude us into an experience of atman, we must be experiencing something, as in the case of blue. (Colour judgements are, according to the Buddhist opponent, products of direct perception — non-verbal, unmediated and thus necessarily veridical.)

5. Udayana is pointing out here that it is incumbent on the Buddhist opponent to point out the difference between judgements about blue and judgements about atman. If he postulates that our direct, unmediated perception of atman is the result of karmically produced forces, then he must also postulate some reliable means which could tell us that this is not the case for judgements about blue. If our faith in direct, unmediated perception in undermined, then this undermines the very basis for all the instruments of knowledge (pramanas).
Atman in Nyāya thought

FOOTNOTES TO TEXT H

6. It might seem superfluous here for Udayana to mention verbal authority and inference, having already made clear that there is a direct awareness of Ātman. He is, however, referring here to the views of early Nyāya thought in which it was believed that the Ātman was known through inference and verbal authority.

7. The Buddhist is here portrayed as accepting that there is a direct perception of something which Udayana maintains is Ātman. His task now is to identify the Ātman with some other object, such as the body.

8. Udayana's point here is that there has to be some basis on which we would say "my body". My body belongs to 'me' because we can already make a decision about its ownership. The sense of "I am" is logically prior to the judgement that this is my body. The Buddhist, according to Udayana, has been unable to give any logical reasons to exclude the notion of the Ātman, which is thus the basis for the judgement "I am", and hence the basis for decisions concerning what is and is not mine.

9. The Buddhist draws Udayana's attention to inanimate objects, such as pots, which retain their identity even though there is no Ātman inhering in them. So the Ātman is unnecessary for decisions concerning personal identity.

10. Udayana now retorts that if this is so, then the Buddhist will be contradicting his own position. If he has as his thesis that in the judgement "I am" there is a superimposition of "I" on the body, then this must mean that "I" has some existence elsewhere (as in the case of shell and silver).

11. The Buddhist now says that the intellect (buddhi) is the object of the judgement of "I am". Udayana's point here is quite clear - that in the judgement "I know" both the agent and the act of knowing are directly perceived as separate. The Buddhist opponent wants to say that just as in the judgement "this is blue", blue appears solely because of blueness, so too in the judgement "I know", the Ātman appears solely because of the act of knowing. Udayana retorts that the example concerning blue operates more in his favour because, just as in the case where we perceive blue because of blueness, so too we perceive the separate existence of the act of knowing and the knower. It is like seeing two separate colours.
Atman in Nyaya thought

TEXT I: Arguments for atman on the basis of experience

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

kah punaratra nyayah? pratisandhanam.

tathyamadamyasiddham, atathyaHca viruddham, avisistam
anaikantikamiti cet.

na. hetvarthana navabodhat. nahi pratyabhijnanamatram — atra
vivaksitam. tat kim karyakaranayorekasantananapratiniyamah.

so'pi viruddha iti cet.

eso'pi na vivaksito nab.

kas tarhi? purvaparadhyaemakarttrayaviniScaya bh.

eso'pi tasamupadapadeyabhavena'pyupapadyata iti cet.

na. sthairyasthitau tadabhavat.
TEXT I: Arguments for ātman on the basis of experience

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What then is our reason [for upholding the existence of ātman]? It is correlation (pratisandhānam).

"The truth of this (1) is not established, (2) is not true, (3) is contradicted, (4) is based on non-distinction, and finally (5) [correlation] is not predicated of a single object."²

No. Because of the absence of understanding the relationship between objects and their causes. We do not wish to say in this matter that only recognition occurs. It should be further asked how the relationship between a cause and its effect can be limited to one continuum.

"It has been contradicted."

For us there is no wish to assert it.

What then? It is based on the idea that there is a single agent operating in successive mental events.

"This [idea of a single agent] relating to successive mental states occurs simply as a result of the existence of acts of apprehension together with their objects."

No. Because of the non-existence of that [act of apprehension] when [the mental continuum] is stable and unchanging.
Atman in Nyāya thought

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

kṣaṇīkatve'pi naikajātiyatve sati tadutpattirevopādāno...bhāvaḥ.

śiṣyācāryadhiyāmapi tathābhāvaprasaṅgāt.

bheda-grahe satīti cet.

na. prakṛte'pi tadābhāvāt.

sarīrabhedāgrahe...vadastīti cet.

na. bhinnajanmajarāṇavyāpteḥ.

anupalabdhapitṛkenāpi bālenātiprasaṅgāt.

ghaṭakapālakṣaṇa-voratathābhāvaprasaṅgācca.

ekādhāratayā tathā niyama iti cet.
Since mental events are momentary, there can be no single locus. Therefore only the relationship of cause and effect can exist between mental events, as in the relationship between acts of apprehension and their objects.

This would result in the possibility that the thoughts of a teacher could also be those of his pupil.\(^3\)

"[The identity of the continuum] exists in the non-apprehension of the difference [between mental events]."

No. Because even in the case of material objects there is no such non-apprehension of difference.\(^4\)

"Well, the possession of different bodies is not perceived to apply [to a given continuum]."

No. Because of the knowledge [which people have] that they have had many lives. Also it would result in the excessively broad conclusion in the case of the son whose father is not perceived [that they would be part of the same continuum].\(^5\)

And it would result in the conclusion of a changed entity in the case where a pot is turned into a cup.

"[Continuity of identity] is assured [in such cases as pots and cups] because of a common substratum."
Atman in Nyāya thought

PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT

na. tasya vāstavasya kṣaṇikatvapakṣe'pi viṣamasamayānāṁ
kṣaṇānāmabhāvāt, kalpanikasya tvatiprasaṅjakatvāt.

śarīrabuddhyorapi samānadesātabhīmānāt.
Atman in Nyāya thought

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

No. Because according to your own view of momentariness, there can be no continued existence of different moments, and further, the same conclusion would also apply to fictional objects.

Finally, [according to your own view of momentariness], the idea that bodies [are substances that] continue to occupy the same place is one that is erroneously ascribed to those mental events that perceive bodies.
Atman in Nyāya thought

FOOTNOTES TO TEXT I

1. ATV (1939 edition) pp. 752-757
   ATV (1940 edition) pp. 342-345

2. The Buddhist gives five reasons for not accepting correlation (pratisandhānam) as a reason for accepting the existence of ātman. Apart from (1) not being established and (2) not true, the Buddhist claims that (3) it is contradicted by the Buddhist belief that what the Naiyāyika perceives as the ātman is actually a series of separate events, and (4) the idea of correlation is not any different from the erroneous idea of the ātman for (5), correlation belongs not to a single ātman but to a series of momentary events.

3. Udayana is concerned to say that correlation here means more than the traditional argument based on recognition (pratyabhijñāna), that we can remember things from our past. (For example, since Gautama, the Naiyāyikas had argued that only the ātman could account for the behaviour of a newborn baby whose behaviour, such as sucking at the mother's breast, they claim, exhibits knowledge that must have been gained in a former life.) Udayana's argument here is more specifically concerned with the relationship which exists between the mental events of one continuum — what is it that binds a particular mental event to one continuum rather than another? Udayana also asks how, if the relationship between the mental events is to be one of cause and effect, it could be limited to one continuum. As the Buddhist himself admits here, the relationship of cause and effect is not able to distinguish the events of one continuum from those of another. Udayana claims that it is only on the basis of an enduring ātman that we can adequately group together the events of one continuum.

4. The Buddhist opponent here claims that it is because of the non-perception of difference between mental events that we group them together. As Udayana observes, this is hardly likely for, even in the case of relatively stable material objects, our experiences are always changing.

5. Here the Buddhist introduces the criteria of bodily identity, that the body differentiates one continuum from another. This is problematic from an Indian point of view, with its belief in reincarnation and the continuity of identity over several bodies.
Footnotes to Introduction

1. There are some materialistic systems, such as Cārvāka, which do not accept the world-view circumscribed by the sāṁśāra/karma/mokṣa complex. Even such systems, however, do present a metaphysical description of the cosmos and man's place within it.

2. In some classifications of the orthodox schools, Buddhism and Jainism are included:

   bauddham naiyāyikaṁ sāṅkhyaṁ jainam vaiśeṣikaṁ tathā/
   jaiminīyam caṣād vidhāṇi darśana//

   Haribhadra Śūri (c. 1168 A.D.) Śaddarśana-samuccaya
   verse 3. From at least the twelfth century A.D.
   Brahmanical circles excluded Buddhism and Jainism from
   the list of orthodox systems:

   gotamasya kāṇadasya kapilasya patañjaleḥ/ vyāsasya
   jaiminēścāpi darśanaṁ caṣād eva hi/

   From the Hayaśīrṣa-pañcarātra (introduced into Bengal
   by Rājā Nallāla Sena c. 1158-1170 A.D.). This verse is
   also quoted in the Gurugūtra of the Viṣṇu-sāra-tantra.
   In this passage the sadārasna are listed according to
   their supposed founders and are namely: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.

3. For example, the term vedāntadarśana includes both Śaṅkara's advaitavedānta as well as the enormously complex traditions of the Śaivite and Vaiṣṇavite schools. But, there are several schools which do not fit into this classification, such as Kashmiri Śaivism. It must also be remembered that the terms Buddhism and Jainism cover many distinct schools of thought.

4. It is a complex issue to determine the criteria by which a school is judged to be orthodox — an āstika system. The reason given is that those schools are orthodox which admit assent to the authority of the Vedas. The Vedas are such a complex body of texts that such an assent does not carry with it any doctrinal implications. Some scholars have attempted to demarcate the orthodox schools on the basis of holding some doctrine in common, for example: "The Buddhist theory of 'no-soul' is therefore fundamentally 'a denial of the theory of substance (adravya-vāda) against which all the orthodox schools, realistic or idealistic, stand arrayed .... the existence of a permanent or abiding substratum (sthīra-dharmaṇ) is an essential tenet of all the orthodox systems. It is diametrically opposed to the Buddhist theory of the flux of point instants (ksaṇa-bhaṅga-vāda)"

   [Shastri (1964) p. 157]

5. Such scholars as Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan postulated that together they directed us toward the truth: "They all help us to see some aspect of truth. This
conception led to the view that the apparently isolated and independent systems were really members of a larger historical plan." [Radhakrishnan (1957) pp. 349-350] It should be understood, however, that each system would see itself as the final expression of a truth only partially grasped by the others. Hence the Nyāya philosophers would not see their system as only a partial expression of the truth, to be viewed in conjunction with the ideas expressed by the other gāddarśana, but rather, they would consider that it perfected the partial visions grasped by the other gāddarśana. For example, Udayana in his ATV postulates stages of realization through which one has to pass, namely: Čārvāka and Karma-Mīmāṁsā, Yogācāra and the Vedānta of Bhāskara, the Śūnyavāda school of Buddhism and Vedānta in general, Sāmkhya and the Śākta cult, Advaita Vedānta and Nyāya, which he calls the "final Vedānta" and considers superior to all the other stages. See ATV (1939 edition) p. 935.

6. In contemporary philosophical studies, the division between a western and eastern philosophical audience is somewhat false. There are many leading philosophers of Indian origin, such as Professors Matilal and Mohanty, who are completely steeped in the western tradition and world-renowned exponents of it. The analytical tradition has spread throughout the world and books such as Alfred Ayer's Language Truth and Logic are standard reading in nearly all philosophy departments world-wide. There are still, however, in India today, traditional pandits who know relatively little about the western tradition and whose training is in traditional Nyāya or Buddhist logic. And of course, many philosophers trained in the western tradition are completely ignorant of Indian philosophy.

7. For example: "....many schools of philosophy have literally nothing to do with mokṣa. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā would predominately come within this group." [Krishna (1965) p. 50] and: "No doubt we shall find metaphysical construction and discussion of the good life among these schools but their first principles, their approach to their enquiries are those of epistemology and logic." [Warder (1970) p. 8]


9. See Quine's "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" [Rosenberg and Travis (1971) p. 63]. He argues in this article against the distinction "between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact", a distinction which he sees to be one of the dogmas of empiricism.
10. See Gellner (1974) p. 84

11. Modern western logic has been strongly influenced by mathematical models in its construction of formal or ideal languages. This raises questions "about the extent to which any ideal-language analysis with its necessary and legitimate restrictions of the multiple semantic values of natural language terms does generate sufficiently and legitimately accurate expressions which describe both what is required for formal argumentation and what is presupposed ontologically, epistemologically (etc.) in the multiple historical uses of such terms in natural languages." [Daye in Katz, N. (1981) p. 61]


15. See Dumont (1970) especially p. 135, where he proposes that "on the whole we have two persons in one: the empirical subject of speech, thought and will, the indivisible sample of mankind, and the independent autonomous moral being, as found first of all in our own ideology of man and society" and "unless we disentangle these two aspects, the empirical as a general but infra-sociological datum and the ideological and normative as characteristic of our own type of society, we remain within our own society: we succumb to sociocentricity." It was this distinction that led to his brilliant analysis of the Indian caste system in Homo Hierarchicus (1980).

16. Paul Griffiths' paper, "Notes Towards a Critique of Buddhist Karmic Theory", is fairly typical of a more critical approach to the subject matter. In that paper he states that while it is important to understand the views expressed in the subject matter, there comes a time when it is proper to subject them to critical judgement. [Griffiths (1982) especially p. 277]
Footnotes to Chapter One

1. "All Hindus accept two basic principles: the saṁsāra belief in the transmigration of souls and the related karmāna doctrine of compensation. These alone are the truly "dogmatic" doctrines of Hinduism, and in their very interrelatedness they represent the unique theodicy of the existing social, that is to say, the caste system." [Weber (1958) p. 118] Thus Weber sees the karmāna/saṁsāra doctrine as providing justification for the caste system, which is the reason for its universal acceptance. Whilst agreeing with the universality of the karmāna/saṁsāra doctrine, I am not postulating that the reason for this is to provide a validation of the caste system. Indeed, the place of the karmāna/saṁsāra dyad as a consciously held idea governing the daily life of the Indian villager is one which has been brought into question by anthropologists working in the field [see Pocock (1973) p. 38]. What I am postulating is that this complex of ideas provided a basic conceptual apparatus within which Indian thinkers operated. To what extent it was a self-conscious part of Nyāya thought is something which obviously has yet to be determined.

2. vrātyas were heterodox priests mentioned in the Vedic hymns [Atharva Veda Book XV]. Possibly, Raikva, the man with the cart, mentioned in the C.U. IV i-iii was such a wandering vrātya.

3. "The overlap of the sacrificial and eschatological aspects of the loka concept is developed in the notion of the 'three births' of a man: he is born first from his parents: for a second time when he performs the sacrifice — this means both the first 'initiation' (upanayana) into one of the three privileged classes of Aryan society which were entitled to use the Brahmanical ritual, and also the initiation (dīksā) into each sacrifice which confirmed and continued this membership: and lastly for the third time when he is placed on the funeral pyre: 'when a man is born [again] from there [into the next life] that is his third birth'. If we remember that the eschatological side of 'being born into another loka' has developed to the point at which we left it at the end of the last section, with a final second death inevitable at the end of any life in a loka after death, it is now perhaps not surprising that, just as after a sojourn in a ritually sacred loka the sacrificer returns to human society, so after a second lifetime in a second loka after death, it is imagined that there is a return to earth, to the world of human society." [Collins (1982) pp. 48-49]
Footnotes to Chapter One

4. There is some suggestion that the doctrine of transmigration had its source in heterodox teachings. In the B.U., when the doctrine of transmigration is first introduced, Gautama, a brahmin priest, is told "This wisdom has never yet reached brahmans before you". The evidence on this point though is far from conclusive.

5. When Yājñavalkya introduces this idea to Ārthabhaṅga, he draws him aside with the comment, "We two alone will speak about this. We should not speak of this in public". Some have interpreted this desire for secrecy as more evidence for a heterodox source for the idea of transmigration.

6. For example, Maitreyī, Yājñavalkya's wife, begs for spiritual instruction rather than material settlement when Yājñavalkya announces to her his intention to renounce his status as a householder (B.U. II iv). Also in the Katha Upaniṣad, Naciketas passes up a boon of wealth, long life and sons for instruction from Yama on an individual's fate after death. (Katha Upaniṣad I verses 20-29)

7. The four legitimate aims of life (purusārtha) are listed in the dharmic literatures as being mokṣa (release), dharma (righteousness), artha (material wealth), and kāma (pleasure). For the world-renouncing samīyāsins, mokṣa tends to dominate the other three, whilst the dharmic literature makes the pursuit of dharma of dominant importance.

8. Translation by Zaehner (1966) p. 10. All translations of the Upaniṣads in this chapter are also from this book.

9. "It is by speaking, sir, that a friend is recognized. By speech, Your Majesty, the Ṛg-Veda, Yajur Veda, Śāma Veda, the Atharva Veda, [the hymns of] the Angirases, the collection of stories, the ancient tales, wisdom, the secret doctrines, the verses, the aphorisms, commentaries and commentaries on commentaries, what is offered up in sacrifice and as an oblation, food and drink, this world and the next and all contingent beings are cognized. Speech it is, sire, that is the highest brahman. And speech does not forsake the man who, knowing thus, reveres it; all beings flow into him. He becomes a god and goes to the gods." (B.U. IV i verse 2) Other passages expressing this idea are: B.U. I iv verse 10; I iv verse 15; I v verses 16-17; I v verse 21; IV i verses 2-7; IV iv verse 11; IV iv verses 23-25; V vii; V vii verses 1-4; V xiv verses 1-3; VI i verses 1-6; C.U. IV v-vii and xi-xv.
Footnotes to Chapter One

10. *atha trayo vāva lokāḥ, manuṣya-lokāḥ, pitr-lokāḥ, deva-loka iti. sō'yaḥ manuṣya-lokāḥ putrenāiva jayyāḥ... karmanā pitr-lokāḥ, vidyā deva-lokāḥ, deva-loko vai lokānām śreṣṭhaḥ: tasmād vidyām prāśaṃsanti.

11. brahma vā idam agra āsīt, tad ātmānam evāvet, aham brahmaṅṃiti: tasmāt tat sarvam abhayat... tad idam api etarhi ya evām veda, aham brahmaṅṃiti sa idam sarvam bhavati.

12. sa ya etam evām vidvās catuṣ-kalaṁ pādaṁ brahmaṇaḥ prakāśāvān ity upāste prakāśavato ha lokāṁ jayati, ya etam evām vidvās catuṣ-kalaṁ pādaṁ brahmaṇaḥ prakāśāvān ity upāste.

13. Yājñavalkya, iti hovāca. yad idam sarvam mṛtyunāptam, sarvam mṛtyunābhīpannam, kena yajamāno mṛtyor āptim atimucyata iti: hotā rūṣiā, agnīā, vācā: vāg vai yajñaśya hotā, tad yeyām vāk. so'yaṃ agniḥ, sa hotā, sā muktiḥ, sātimuktiḥ.

14. ...yat sāksād aparoksād brahma, ya ātmā sarvāntaraḥ, tam me vyācakṣveti.

15. ...athākāmayāmāḥ, yo'kāmo niṣkāma āpta-kāma ātma-kāmā, na tasya prāṇā utkṛṣṭamanti, brahmaiva san brahmaṇyeti.

16. na drṣṭer draṣṭāram paśyeḥ, na śruter śrotāram śṛṇuyāḥ, na māter mantāram manvītāḥ, na vijñātāram vijñātyāḥ, eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ, ato' nyadh ārtam. tato ha uṣastas cākrāyaṇa uparārāma.

17. "If we analyse the principles of thought on which magic is based they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two: first, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and second, that things which have been in contact with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the contact has been severed." [Frazer quoted in Skorupski (1976) p. 136] The first of these two principles gives rise to homeopathic magic, the second to contagious magic. For a discussion of theories of magic, see Skorupski (Ibid.) Chapter 9.

18. nāntah-prajñaḥ, na bahiṣ prajñaḥ, nobhayataḥ-prajñaḥ, na prajña-ghanam, na prajñaḥ, nāprajñaḥ, adrṣṭam, avvavahāryam, agrāhyam, alakṣanam, acintyam, avyāpayeyam, ekātmā-pratyāya-sāram, prapañcāpānām, śāntam, śivam, advaitam, caturtham manyante, sa ātmā; sa vijaneyah.
Footnotes to Chapter One

19. amātraś caturtho'vyavahāryah prapañcopesāmah śivo' dvaita evam aumkāra ātmāiva, saṃviṣaty ātmanā'tmānam ya evam veda.

20. All the priests who took part in the Vedic sacrifice were brahmanical priests, but the one who carried the specific label "brahman" was the one who had this supervisory function.

21. For example, B.U. I ii verse 2. In this verse we have an example of heat being generated from the practice of severe asceticism; tapas literally, warmth, heat.

22. Katha Upaniṣad III. This is the famous metaphor of the chariot in which the senses are likened to the chariot's steeds. The point of the metaphor is to show the necessity of curbing the senses in order to escape the attractions of worldly life.

23. "To start with, much imprecision and difficulty arise from failing to distinguish in the 'individual':
   (1) The empirical agent, present in every society, in virtue of which he is the main raw material for any sociology.
   (2) The rational being and normative subject of institutions; this is peculiar to us, as is shown by the values of equality and liberty: it is an idea that we have, the idea of an ideal.

   For sociological comparison, only the individual in the full sense of the term must be taken as such, and another word should be used to designate the empirical aspect." [Dumont (1980) p. 9]

24. We cannot say that the Upaniṣads "invented" the idea of the individual or ego consciousness. I have already discussed the social changes taking place in Indian society which contributed towards the emergence of the individual in a social sense. Heesterman (1964) links changes in the form of the Vedic sacrifice with the introduction of the individual into Indian thought: "The outcome does not depend any more on others, but everything depends on the crucial execution of the automatically working ritual. This has led to an excessive development of ritual science; but on the other hand it meant a breakthrough in that it set the individual free from the oppressive bonds of reciprocity which tied him to others, the rivals. This was achieved through the symbolical and numerical equivalences. Where there was opposition there was now equivalence." [Heesterman (Ibid.) p. 14] The use of symbolic equivalences in the sacrifice resulted in a
fundamental change in its form, from the older agonistic sacrifice to the classical sacrifice in which this rivalry was eliminated. The rival need no longer be included as an active participant in the ritual because he can be represented and overcome symbolically. The use of symbolic equivalences which allowed for elements in the sacrifice to be interiorized facilitated in some sense the emergence of the individual, since it freed him from relations of reciprocity. Hence we have here at least three contexts in which we have discussed the evolution of the "individual": the speculative, the social and the ritual. To what extent these are related is a further issue.

25. seyam devataikṣata, hantāham imāś tisro devatā anena ĺivenā'tmanā'nupraviśya nāma-rupe vyākaravāṅīti.

26. yathā, saumya, madhu madhukrto nistīṣṭhanti, nānātyayānām vrksāṇām rasāṃ samavahāram ekatām rasāṃ gamayanti.
  te yathā tatra na vivekaṁ labhante, amuṣyāhaṁ vrksasva raso'ṃśi, amuṣyāhaṁ vrksasya rasomīti, evam eva khalu, saumya, imāḥ sarvāḥ prajāh sati sampadya na viduh, sati sampadyāmaha iti.
  sa ya eṣo'ṇīma aitadātyām idaṁ sarvam, tat satyam, sa ātmā, tat tvam asi, śvetaketo, iti; bhūya eva mā, bhagavān, viṇāpayatv iti; saumya, iti hovaca.

27. Vātsyāyana Nyāyabhāṣya; in the examination of sūtra I he states: "An objection is raised: 'The mention of doubt and the rest apart by themselves is superfluous because all these, being included either among 'the Means of Knowledge' or among 'the Objects of Cognition', cannot be regarded as different from these'. This is true; but for the good of living beings have been provided the four sciences ... each of these sciences deals with a distinct set of subjects, and each has its own distinct method of treatment; and as a matter of fact, Doubt and the rest form the subjects dealt with by the science of Logic; consequently if all these were not distinctly enunciated, it would appear that this science dealt with the ātman only, like the Upaniṣads."
Translated by Jha (1915) Vol. I pp. 173-174
Footnotes to Chapter Two

1. A Nyāya philosopher is known as a "Naiyāyika".

2. The sequence of commentaries is as follows:
   - Nyāya Sūtras: Gautama (150–200 A.D.)
   - Nyāyabhāṣya: Vātsyāyana (300–300 A.D.)
   - Nyāya-vārttika: Uddyotakara (500–600 A.D.)
   - Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭikā: Vācaspati Miśra (850–1000 A.D.)
   - Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭikā-pariśuddhi: Udayana (1000–1100 A.D.)

   [The dates given indicate the most likely time period within which a particular philosopher was active. Source of dates: Matilal (1986), pp. xiv–xv]

   Together these works are known as the Quintette.

   Dignaga (400–550 A.D.), the great Buddhist logician, was the focus for Uddyotakara, who was himself countered by Dharmakīrti. Vācaspati Miśra wrote his commentary to answer Dharmakīrti's criticism of Nyāya.


4. For a discussion of Udayana's origins see D.C. Bhattacharyya (1958) p. 5.

5. The first version of this story is based on an Udayanacarita contained in the Bhaviṣyapurāṇapariśiṣṭa Chapter XXX. This is quoted in the introduction to the Nyāyavārttika (Chowkhamba Edition, 1916, by Vindhyaesvariprasada). Bhattacharyya (1958) uses this for his source to recount the tale (pp. 5–6), as does Thakur (1959) pp. 32–33. The self-burning story was recited by Vidhyabhuṣana (1893) pp. 20–21. In this version of the story, Udayana took a Brahmin and a Buddhist to the top of a hill and threw them both off. Whilst they fell, the Brahmin declared that there was a God, the Buddhist that there wasn't. Udayana was denied audience with the Lord Jagannātha because of the death of the Buddhist, so he went to Varanāsī, where he dies by self-immolation. The source of this version of the story is said to be Tibetan.

6. For example, at the court of Janaka, King of Videha: see B.U. III i verse 1.

7. See Bhattacharyya (1958) p. 1 and p. 39, where he discusses the relationship between Udayana and Gaṅgeśa.

Footnotes to Chapter Two


10. The order of composition has been reconstructed by Bhattacharya (1958) pp. 2-5, and is one which most scholars find acceptable.

11. ATV (1939) p. 10

12. ATV (1939) p. 20

13. The term 'judgement' is used here in the sense of a mental event, an episode of cognitive awareness which would include both non-verbal perceptual events as well as verbal thoughts. Hence the occurrence of the thought 'There is a cat on the mat' will be counted as a verbal judgement, whilst a non-verbal perception of the cat on the mat will be a non-verbal judgement. In the Nyāya system, knowledge is understood to be episodic in character. A cognitive awareness, when true, qualifies as knowledge or a knowledge episode (pramā). For a full discussion of this, see Matilal (1986) Chapter Four.

14. ATV (1939) p. 710

15. See Matilal (1971) pp. 127-129

16. For a brief introduction to Indian logic, see Daye, "Buddhist Logic", in ed. Prebish (1975).

17. For a brief but clear introduction to the elements of philosophical argument in India, see Matilal (1986) pp. 69-93.
Footnotes to Chapter Three

1. Knowledge of brahman was salvific, yet at the same time one is already brahman. Obviously there is some tension here—the fact that one is already brahman would seem to render the quest for moksha superfluous.

2. Although meditation is an important element in the Buddhist tradition, the Buddha rejected the yogic systems of meditation as being not wholly adequate for the attainment of liberation, since he regarded such systems as leading to still changeable states of consciousness. He also rejected asceticism as a possible path to liberation and felt that once one abandoned the quest for Self, one would eventually be released from a source of frustration. See Carrithers (1983) pp. 39-52
"The emotional tone of the teaching of non-Self was that of a calm and relieved detachment. It was a liberation which transcended the frustrated strivings of those who revolve around a Self 'like a dog to a post'."
[Carrithers (1983) p. 46]

3. dye vāya brahmaṇo rūpe, mūrtām caiva mūrtam ca, martyam ca, sthitam ca, yac ca, sac ca, tyac ca.
[B.U. III ii verse 1]

4. For a more detailed exposition of these rival theories, see Shastri (1964) pp. 234-245.

5. The basic metaphysics of the Nyāya system were indebted to the Vaiṣeṣika Sūtras and Praśādāpāda's Commentary on that work, the Padārthadharmasamgraha. See Padārthadharmasamgraha (1963) pp. 314-331 for comments on kārydravya and pp. 773-781 for comments on the inherence relation (samavāya). The Nyāya theory of change is closely bound up with maintaining the distinction between a substance (dharmin/guṇin) and its attributes (dharma/guṇas). A substance can persist through change because of this separation between guṇa and guṇin. This relationship was very important in Udayana's metaphysics—for example, in the Laksanavāti, he attempts to describe the structure of the world in terms of two categories, samaveta, or that which inheres in things, and samavetvat, or that which has things inhering in it. As we shall see (Chapter Five), this distinction was another important plank both in Udayana's defence of ātman and in his defence of a realist epistemology. Musashi Tachikawa sees that: "The conflict between nominalistic movements and realistic movements in Indian philosophy may be expressed in terms of a function of the distinction (or distance) between dharma and dharmin. Generally speaking, the clearer the distinction between the two, the more realistic the theory becomes; if the boundary between dharma and dharmin becomes vague, the theory tends to be nominalistic." [Tachikawa (1981) p. 10]
Footnotes to Chapter Three

6. A position argued for by Betty Heimann in her article, "Within the framework of Indian religion: the main dogma of Buddhism", and by Theodore Stcherbatsky in his book The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma.

[Heimann (1961) and Stcherbatsky (1926), reprinted 1970]

7. Richard Robinson (1967) rightly notes that: "Empinness is not a term outside the expressional system, but is simply the key term within it. Those who would hypostatize emptiness are confusing the symbol system with the fact system. No metaphysical fact whatever can be established from the facts of language."

[Robinson (1967) p. 49]

8. For example, according to Abhidharma theory, no dharma can occur in two moments. Nāgārjuna postulates that no dharma could therefore exist at all, because each moment is susceptible to being segmented into several sub-moments. See Robinson (1967) p. 44. Dignāga's svalaksanas are not to be thought of as existents in spatio-temporal framework, for otherwise they too will be subject to this critique of Nāgārjuna. For Dignāga, the world of space and time arises from mental construction. See Shastri (1964) pp. 343-344.

9. Several Nyāya thinkers previous to Udayana had been active critics of the Buddhist thesis of momentariness. Notable among these Nyāya philosophers were Jayanta, in his Nyāyamañjarī, Trilocana, whose works are lost to us, Bhāsarvājña, in his Nyāyabhūṣana, the text of which has recently become available, and Vācaspati Miśra, in his Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyātikā. Śrīdhara, a philosopher of the related Vaśēgika school, also contributed greatly in the Nyāyakandā.

10. Sometimes "svabhāvahetu" is translated as "identity" [see McDermott (1969) p. 28], but this is not an adequate translation. Richare Hayes has traced the development of this term from Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika to his Nyāyabindu and Hetubindu. He demonstrates that the interpretation of svabhāvahetu by Dharmakīrti's commentators changes from one in which the svabhāva is the property to be confirmed, to one in which it is the confirming property: "For in Dharmakīrti's verse the svabhāva is the property to be confirmed and therefore the property that pervades the confirming property. But on the interpretations of Kṛṣṇakagomin and Manorathanandin, the svabhāva is the confirming property and therefore the property that is pervaded by the property to be confirmed." [Hayes (1987) p. 326]

11. In his paper, "Arthakriyā", Nagatomi (1967-1968) discusses the meaning of arthakriyā in Dharmakīrti's philosophy and
concludes that this term has a double meaning in Dharmakirti's works: "useful action" and "causal power". Nagatomi also argues that "useful action" was the primary meaning of this term. [see Nagatomi (1967-1968) p. 63] He admits that in the case of Jñānaśrī and Ratnakirti the emphasis shifts to the second meaning, "causal power", and gives the following reason for this:

"their main objective was to defend Buddhism against the criticisms levelled by their opponents, the Naiyāyikas in particular, on such topics as universal momentariness, non—existence of a permanent God, etc. In so doing they were led by force of context to lay more emphasis on the ontological aspect of arthakriyā, namely 'causal power', which we have located in Dharmakirti's own dialectic." [Nagatomi (1967-1968) p. 71]


13. The Law of Contradiction could be stated in such a way as to make the metaphysical argument for momentariness somewhat redundant. See Matilal's discussion of the Law of Contradiction (1971) pp. 60-62. By introducing the notion of the "delimiter", the Law of Contradiction can be formulated in different ways with respect to different delimiters. The delimiters have the function of defining the scope of the relevant properties. Hence two properties may be contradictory with respect to a particular delimiter and not contradictory with respect to another.

14. Hence one could say that the same object cannot be associated with different times t1 and t2 according to a strict formulation of the Law of Contradiction. Thus although the strict formulation of the Law might be particularly well suited to the Buddhist thesis of momentariness, it should hardly be cited as evidence for it. To say that existence is momentary because of a particular formulation of the Law of Contradiction seems arbitrary in the least and would then seem to be a matter of terminology rather than a point of metaphysical significance. The argument offered by Jñānaśrī, though, does not, as far as I can see, depend on a strict interpretation of the Law of Contradiction, but rather on demonstrating the spontaneous nature of causal efficacy.

15. The Nyāya philosophers implement a threefold classification in order to clarify the different ways in which different types of cause contribute to the production of the effect. From the point of view of a seed these would be:

(1) Substantial or Inherence Cause (samavāyikāraṇa)
In a sense this is considered the cause par excellence. Thus the seed would be the substantial cause of the sprout.

(2) Non—inherence cause (asamavāyikāraṇa)
This is not so clearly defined as the above category.
the qualities which inhere in the *samavāyikārāṇa* and which are considered essential for the production of the effect come under this category. Thus the conjunction of the different parts of the seed would be counted as such.

(3) **Efficient Cause (nimittakārāṇa)**

This includes other relevant conditions, such as the planter of the seed. This classification became subject to further refinement, for example the subdivision of category (3) into *sadhārānanakārāṇa*, or general instrumental factors, and *asadhārānanakārāṇa*, or specific instrumental factors.

16. The suffix `tvam` is a device used in the Sanskrit language to form a neuter abstract noun from a stem, which may be either noun or a compound formation. Hence *āṅkura* (sprout) with the addition of `tvam` becomes *āṅkuratvam* (sprout-ness). See Coulson (1976) p. 154.

17. See Mackie (1962) and Rescher (1961).
1. For example, Vācaspati Miśra states that one and the same entity may be the object of both a perceptual and a qualified cognition. There is no incompatibility between these two — it would be so only if the Buddhist had proved his thesis of momentariness. Hence language is able to refer directly to reality.

(yattāvad uktamārthā sāmārthya-jatvābhīlāpasāmsarṣargāyoga-pratibhāsatvāyorvirodha iti / tatra brūmāḥ / syād virodho yadi svalakṣaṇamevaḥṛthaḥ, na tvetastadi / upapādayisyaṃ ca paramārthasajjātyādi mantramārtha sthemabhajamabhīlāpasāmsargāyogam, tena tajjanitam ārthasaṃmarthya- jāṃ cābhīlāpasāmsargāyogapratabhāsaṃ ceti na virodhaḥ.

Vācaspati Miśra, NVTT p. 117 lines 12-15)

Jayanta states that the very life breaths of the Naiyāyikas depends on their defence of savikalpa-pratyakṣa.

(Naiyāyikānā ca savikalpapratyakṣamayāḥ pṛāgāḥ.
JayantaBhaṭṭa, Nyāyamaṇjarī. (1936) p. 81)

Jayanta goes on to say the Buddhist thesis concerning the constructive nature of savikalpa-pratyakṣa rests on their thesis concerning the momentary nature of the world. If the thesis of momentariness can be disproved, then their arguments concerning the nature of savikalpa-pratyakṣa can also be discounted. Just as sunlight can illuminate dust particles invisible in ordinary light, so too can the use of language and memory illuminate the object in the savikalpa-pratyakṣa. The sunlight does not make the dust particles lose their reality and so too, the use of memory should not make the object under consideration lose its reality.

[Jayanata Bhaṭṭa, Nyāyamaṇjarī, (1936) p. 88]

2. "Perception" (pratyakṣa) is free from conceptual construction (kalpanā)."

[Dignaga, Pramāṇasamuccaya in Hattori (1968) p. 27]

3. Construction (kalpanā) was given a wider interpretation by Dignāga to include mental construction which may take place on a non-verbal level. For example, a pre-linguistic child may possess some constructive faculty. This issue is raised by Matilal. [Matilal (1971) p. 37]

4. "Erroneous cognition (bhrānti-jñāṇa) is not a true perception because it arises from conceptually constructing, for example, water, etc., out of such things as vapor floating over sand."

[Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya in Hattori (1968) p. 28]

Footnotes to Chapter Four

5. Gautama's full definition is as follows: "Sense perception is that cognition which is produced by the contact (sannikarṣa) of the object with the sense organ, which is incapable of verbal expression, which is not erroneous (avyabhicāra), and which is well-defined (vyavasyāṭmaka)."

\[\text{indriyārthasannikarṣotpānapam jñānavyapadeśyam-}\]
\[\text{avyabhicārivyavasāṭmākam pratyakṣam. } \] [Gautama, Nyāyasūtras I. I.4 in NVTT, p. 93]

6. For a translation of Vātsyāyana's commentary on this śūtra see Jha (1915), Vol. II, pp. 111-117.

7. See Praśastapāda, Padārthadharmasaṅgraha (1963) p. 443. Praśastapāda makes a distinction between (1) just perceiving a thing in its own nature and (2) perception which arises in dependence on qualifiers such as universals, individuators, substances, qualities and motions, and which gives rise to such judgements as, "this white earthy substance, which is a cow, is moving".

8. Vācaspati Miśra credits his teacher, Trilocana, with introducing this distinction into Nyāya teachings. Unfortunately there are no extant works of Trilocana.

\[\text{iha dvarā prayākṣajāțitaravikalpikā savikalpikā cetī /}\]
\[\text{tattrohāvāvāvāyābhicāraṃ sannikarṣotpānapam jñānamavyabhicārīti}\]
\[\text{lakṣaṇena sāmṛghītāpi svaśabdenopāttā / tatra \}
\[\text{vipratipattatratrāvikalpakāyāṃ padamavyapadeśyam iti,}\]
\[\text{savikalpikāvāśa vyavasāyāṭmākāti / tatra vyapadeśo}\]
\[\text{viśeṣanamupalakṣaṇe vā / nāmajātyādi tatkarmaṃ}\]
\[\text{vyapadeśyam viśeṣayamīti yāvat / tadvathā dīttōh'yaṃ}\]
\[\text{gaurayam śuklo'yaṃ kagadalamānayam gacchantyayamīti}\]
\[\text{sarvam hi savikalpikām viśeṣanaviśeṣabhāvena vastuṣu}\]
\[\text{pravarttate / avidyamānam vyapadeśyam yasminstadd-}\]
\[\text{avyapadeśyam jātyādi svarūpāvāghā na tu jātyādīnām mitho}\]
\[\text{viśeṣanaviśeṣabhāvāvāghāhīti yāvat. } \] [Vācaspati Miśra, NVTT, p. 108 lines 22-283]

In this passage there is an attempt by Vācaspati Miśra to reconcile his classification with Gautama's original definition by linking nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa with the term avyapadeśyam, and savikalpika-pratyakṣa with vyavasāyāṭmaka, hoping in this way to preserve a continuity in the tradition.

9. I use here the same term as Matilal.

[Matilal (1971) pp. 77-83]

10. nirvikalpena prathamākṣasannipātajānīmanā jātimal-

\[\text{vastuvudedāntat tāropalabdhē ca na saṃbandhasya śabdasya}\]
\[\text{smaraṇām tathā ca tacchadbhādhīhejāvātivātadrayā}-
\[\text{vagāḥ indriyārthasannikarṣa janamavikalpapratyayō}\]
\[\text{gaurayamītyeyamākāro jāyataiti cēd. } \] [NVTT, p. 115 lines 25-27]

Footnotes to Chapter Four

11. "now the means of cognition are (immediate and mediate, namely) perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). There are only two because the object to be cognized has only two aspects. Apart from the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and the inference only the universal." [Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya in Hattori (1968) p. 24]

12. Dignaga's five qualifiers are nāman, jāti, guṇa, kriya and dravya. For a discussion of this, see Matilal (1971) p. 35.

13. Udayana states that a difference in judgement does not affect the identity of a particular object. The difference in judgements rather, arises from a difference in function. The savikalpa-pratyakṣa serves only to identify the object as being of a particular type [ATV (1939 edition) p. 344]. The idea here is that one and the same object may be subject to various means of cognition. See Chapter Five pp. 268-275 for similar discussions regarding the senses of sight and touch.


15. This is an approach typified by such philosophers as Austin, Searle and the later Wittgenstein.


18. See Chapter Four footnote 23.

19. Vācaspati Miśra proposed a solution to this difficulty in his NVTT. He proposed that the "this" referred not directly to the svalakṣaṇa but to some shadowy counterpart caused by the original svalakṣaṇa. Since this would be an unreal particular, confusion between it and an unreal sāmānyalakṣaṇa would seem more likely. The insertion of such a shadowy particular, however, raises further questions. What is the status of the shadow particular? To be consistent with Dignāga, it has either to be a svalakṣaṇa or a mental construction. If it is just a further svalakṣaṇa (even if more "shadowy"), then the original problem remains and the
insertion of mediating svalakṣaṇas could go on ad infinitum. If, on the other hand, this shadowy svalaṅka is a mental construct, then the problem of the relationship between absolute and constructed reality still remains.

20. See Donnellan (1966) and Evans (1973) for definitive outlines of this theory. They propose that objects are named as such on the basis of an association which is established by means of a causal chain with some kind of initial baptism, whether informal or formal. Schwartz associates these theories with Kripke's idea of the "rigid designator":
"Kripke makes the same point about names and in addition claims that they are rigid designators. 'Rigid designator' is a term coined by Kripke to mean a designator, such as a name or description, that refers to the same individual with respect to all possible worlds in which the individual exists. If a name is a rigid designator, then it refers to the same individual when being used to describe counterfactual situations as it does when used to describe the actual world. This means that a name will refer to the same individual whether or not he satisfies some list of commonly associated descriptions." [Schwartz (1977) p. 22]

21. "Dignāga thinks that words or names cannot DIRECTLY express the particular or datum. In order to refer to a unique particular, one has to use a word or a name, and to use a word or a name one has to use a concept as the 'ground for its application'. The MEANING of a word is the 'ground for its application' which is, according to Dignāga, a conceptual construction. The only way a name can identify, or refer to, a particular is through negation and elimination of other concepts." [Matilal (1971) p. 41]

22. "In short, the apohist formula, 'The meaning of "cow" is not non-cow', seems no more informative than saying 'The meaning of "cow" is cow (or cowness). It is far from clear how Dignāga would respond to this objection. This is no doubt because in Dignāga's hands the apoha theory is motivated not so much by the desire to explain our ability to apply words to things, as by the desire to explore what struck him as an important analogy between linguistic apprehension and the inferential cognition. It seems to have been left to Dignāga's successors to formulate a non-circular explanation of our ability to use language in successful practice." [Siderits (1985) p. 141]

23. Thus, as we have seen, Śāntarakṣita's introduction of mental images was in response to criticisms by Kumārila. (siddhayā ced gaurapohyeta goniṣedhātmakaśca saḥ / tatra gaurava vaktavya nañāyah pratiṣidhyate /)
sa ced agoṇiṝtyātmā bhaved anvonyasamārayah /
śiddhaśced gaurapohārtham vṛṭhāpohaparakalpanam /
gavyasiddhe tvacyaurāsti tadabhavētu gauh kutāh /
ḥumārīla, Ślokavārttika (1898) verses 83-85
Sāntarakṣita’s response is found in the śabdārtha
parīkṣā of the Tattvasamgraha. He puts forward what is
essential a causal theory of meaning in which an image
evoked by the word has the causal efficacy to exclude all
those images associated with the exclusion class. His
theory is based on two different types of negation,
paryudāsa, in which the negation contains an affirmation of
the contrary, and prasajya-pratiedha, which is just pure
negation. In relation to the apoha theory, the svalaṅkṣaṇa
itself functions ontologically to exclude all else and is
considered an example of paryudāsa negation known as
paryudāsa arthātmaka. The svalaṅkṣaṇa is the cause of an
image which functions to exclude all those images connected
with the exclusion class. For a good summary of Jñānaśrī’s
and Ratnakīrti’s positions regarding the relationship
between empirical activity and conceptual cognition, see

24. Vācaspati makes the point that there is a conformity between
language and external reality and that universals have an
external reality, even though of course it cannot be said
that names of things actually inhere in the objects.
(dravyādapi hi bhedāḥ sādhavyateteṣām / yathā ca
bhedē’pi teṣām tadvācakānāṃ sāmāṇḍhikaraṇyām
tathopapāditamadhaṣṭāt. Vācaspati Miśra, NVTT, p. 117
lines 15-16)

25. Udayana, Parisuddhi (1924) p. 588
282 footnote 1.

26. See Chapter Four footnote 1

27. See Śrīdhara, Nyāyakandālī (1895) line 4.
(tatra yadi śaṅkṣyāmaḥ pramāṇenaśāmānyam upapādayitum
 tadāṣaty api śadāsamsṛṣṭagṛḥahākatve tad viṣayām
vikalpajñānam indriyārthajātvāt pratyākṣam eva svāt.)

28. For a detailed analysis of early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika
literature on this topic, see Shasṛṣṭi (1964) pp. 310-314.
It would seem that in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, objective reality
was not ascribed to the universal. The highest universal,
sattā (existence), is held to reside only in the first
three of the six Vaiśeṣika categories, namely: substance,
quality and motion.
"sad iti vato dravyagupakarmasu sā sattā." [Kaṇḍa, Vaiśeṣikasūtras 1.2.3, (1961)]
In early Nyāya Vaiśeṣika thought, an object was
characterized by two aspects, the general (sāmānyya) and the particular (viśeṣa). These terms were relative terms inasmuch as one and the same property could sometimes function as a sāmānyya and at other times as a viśeṣa. In the Vaiṣeṣīkasūtras they are stated to be dependent on the intellect:

"sāmānyyaṁ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam." [Kaṇāda, Vaiṣeṣīkasūtras 1.2.3. (1961)]

The way was paved for the universal becoming an objective reality when sāmānyya assumed the function of causing both commonness and differentiation instead of these two being relative aspects of the same object. The idea that these were relative entities persisted in the writings of later Nyāya thinkers such as Uddyotakara and Śrīdhara.

29. This is part of a general Nyāya view concerning the authority of perception.

"The entire argument of the Realist is pivoted on the supposition that class—concepts and identity of nomenclature will be unaccountable if the objective existence of universals is not admitted, and this supposition is a necessary corollary of the more fundamental assumption that all our knowledge is derived from sense—data presented in perception."

[Mookerjee (1935) p. 95]

30. See Chapter Four footnote 5.

31. See TEXT E. It is interesting to see how Udayana turns the momentary nature of perception to his advantage. Usually the momentary nature of all our perceptions is thought to make it difficult to demonstrate the existence of anything which endures. Udayana turns the traditional argument on its head by placing the onus on his Buddhist opponent to show how we could possibly form an idea of a universal, given the momentariness of all our perceptions.


33. Sastrī (1964) pp. 334-342, deals with this problem in considerable detail. The Buddhists put forward various objections to the idea of real universals. Śrīdhara, a Nyāya philosopher, cites the Buddhist objection as follows:

"Some people propound the following view: the common notion with reference to different objects establishes the theory of the universal. But that notion does not cognize two independent entities namely, sāmānyya and viśeṣa, as it does in the case of 'a man with a stick'. Neither does it cognize the relation of sāmānyya and viśeṣa as that of a qualifier and qualificandam, because the cognition does not take the form: 'this cow is qualified by cowness'. As a matter of fact, the cognition in question comprehends only one identical object, because in the expression 'this is a
Footnotes to Chapter Four

cow', only one entity is referred to. The two [the individual and the universal] have no separate forms."

atraike vadanti bhinnevanugatā buddhi. sāmānyāṁ vyasthāpayati sa ca pratipinḍam daṇḍapuruṣaviva na
svātantryena sāmānyavisēṣalakṣaṇe dve vastunī pratibhāsayati
nāpi tayorvisēṣaṃvāriṣeyabhāvam gotvī gotvāvānityeyavam-
anudayāt / kintu tādātmacyagrāhini pratītiriyam
gaurayamityekatmaparāmarṣat ubhayanvonyaprahāneṇa
svarūpāntarābhāvāc. [Śrīdhara, Nyāyakanda (1895) p.
315; translation from Sastri (1964) pp. 331-332]. See TEXT D
pp. 234-235 for Udayana's comments on a related argument.
The Buddhists also objected that a universal cannot move
from one place to another in order to take up residence in a
particular because universals are supposed to be motionless;
the universal could not occupy the same place as the
particular because otherwise it would be manifested in that
place; the universal cannot be understood as coming into
existence at that place at the same time as the particular
because universals are supposed to be eternal; one universal
cannot subsist in many particulars in its parts because
universals are supposed to be partless; a universal cannot
subsist in a particular in its entirety because that would
leave other particulars devoid of that same universal.
Udayana defends the Nyāya position in the ATV (1939 edition)
pp. 401-414.

34. Uddyotakara (1915) pp. 315-317 states that all notions of
commonness need not be explained with reference to real
universals (jāti). For example, there is no real universal
on account of which a group of people who cook can be called
"cooks".

35. Śrīdhara was the first Nyāya philosopher to use the word
"upādhi" in the sense of imposed property. Bhattacharya
(1958) p. 8 dates Śrīdhara at about 991 A.D.

103 suggests that, "(1) traditional theories of meaning
radically falsify the properties of such words; (2)
logicians like Carnap do little more than formalize these
traditional theories, inadequacies and all; (3) such
semantic theories as that produced by Jerrold Katz and his
co-workers likewise share all the defects of the traditional
theory. In Austin's happy phrase, what we have been given
by philosophers, logicians, and "semantic theorists" alike,
is a "myth-eaten" description."

37. For example:
"The heart of the traditional theory of meaning is described
by Putnam in the following way: 'On the traditional view,
the meaning of say, 'lemon', is given by specifying a
conjunction of properties. For each of these properties the
statement 'lemons have the property P' is an analytic truth;
and if $P_1$, $P_2$, ..., $P_n$ are all of the properties in the conjunction, then 'anything with all of the properties $P_1$ ..., is a lemon' is likewise an analytic truth." ["Is Semantics Possible?" p. 103].

The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as "lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon". This intension determines what it is to be a lemon. Thus according to traditional theories, intension determines extension. In the first section of "Meaning and Reference", Putnam also discusses traditional theories of meaning. It was in the ancient and medieval traditions, he says, "that the concept corresponding to a term was just a conjunction of predicates, and hence that the concept corresponding to a term must always provide a necessary and sufficient condition for falling into the extension of the term" [Schwartz (1977) p. 14]

38. Schwartz explains the notion of a cluster theorist in the following way:
"It was natural for many traditional theorists to extend their treatment to cover ordinary proper names. It is on this aspect of traditional theories that Kripke focuses. According to the conjunction theorists and cluster theorists, each meaningful proper name has associated with it a set of descriptions. The unique thing that satisfies the descriptions or, in the case of the cluster theorist, enough of the descriptions is the referent of the name. When one uses a name the intended referent is determined by the descriptions that are associated with the name being used. As examples of the traditional conjunction theory applied to proper names, Kripke cites Russell and Frege, whereas he mentions Wittgenstein and Searle as examples of cluster theorists. The cluster theory of proper names has seemed more plausible to most philosophers than the strict conjunction view of Russell, but Kripke says that the cluster view is just a refinement of the older theory." [Schwartz (1977) p. 18-19]

39. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see "Meaning and Reference", by Putnam in Schwartz (1977) pp. 119-132, especially pp. 120-124, where he discusses the example of a Twin Earth in which a liquid called "water" with all the same properties as water on our earth, actually turns out to have a different chemical formula. Putnam claims that in this case the liquid on Twin Earth would not therefore be water after all. He also discusses the idea of a "division of linguistic labour": "Every linguistic community...possesses at least some terms whose associated criteria are known to only a subset of the speakers who acquire the terms." [Putnam in Schwartz (1977) p. 126]
Footnotes to Chapter Four

40. Copi in "Essence and Accident" says: "There is a certain relativity implied in this account, although it is quite different from those previously discussed. Our notion of what constitutes the real essence of a thing is relative to the science of the day. Centuries hence, wiser men will have radically different and more adequate terms, and their notions will be closer approximations than ours to the real essence of things." [Copi in Schwartz (1977) p. 190]

41. Udayana lists six impediments restricting the jāti (jātibādhaka) in the Kiranāvalī (1911-1912) p. 161. (vyakterabhedastulyatvam saṅkaro' thānavasthitih/ rūpahānirasbandho jātibādhakasāmgraḥḥ/) Earlier in the same text (pp. 118-123), he says that a jāti is a natural and not an accidental property of things.

42. This condition differs from the previous condition in which it was stated that a jāti cannot be instantiated in another jāti, since there must be a category difference. The category difference referred to here would be, for example, the subject/attribute distinction. Hence "cowness" can only be instantiated in an individual, and not in another jāti such as "animal-ness", although it is contained or nested in "animal-ness".

43. Matilal expresses a different view to this in his more recent work, Perception, (1986) pp. 398-403.

44. Having decided that brāhmaṇatvā is a jāti, the Nyāya philosophers then had the problem of explaining why it wasn't perceptible. Jayanata, in the Nyāyamaṭājarī (1936) p. 204 line 15, says that perception in this case needs to be helped by the declaration of someone in authority. Śrīdhara, in the Nyāvakandelī (1895) p. 13, likens it to the example of needing an expert in precious stones to be able to identify a particular gem. (It is interesting to note that here we have the idea of a "division of linguistic labour" that Putnam proposed in his paper "Meaning and Reference". See footnote 39 above.) Śrīdhara concludes his comments with the idea that differences in caste can often be hard to perceive owing to the similarity between human forms which has the effect of masking caste differences. It is interesting to note that in contemporary western philosophy the new theory of reference has had an important influence on issues outside of theories of meaning. Much discussion centres on which terms are natural kind terms and which are not (just as the Naiyāyikas, for example, would want to dispute that brāhmaṇatvā is a natural kind term, that is, a jāti). For example, in the philosophy of mind in contemporary western philosophy, some philosophers have
argued that psychological terms are rigid designators of natural kinds, which influences their understanding of such terms as "dreaming" and so on. [See Schwartz (1977) pp. 34-41]. In the case of brāhmaṇatvā, the whole Naiyāyika understanding of caste hinged on the fact that it was a jāti and not an upādhi. It is for such reasons that the jāti/upādhi distinction was important for Nyāya thought.

J.F. Staal holds that the theory of jātisamkara shows a marked extensional character (that is, the theory that there can be no cross division between jātis). In his article, "The Theory of Definition in Indian Logic", he states that this theory treats the relationship between the extensions in an extensional way rather than in an intensional way. Tachikawa (1981) in response to Staal poses the question: "nobody can deny that the theory of jātisamkara possesses the extensional character insofar as cross-division of extension is dealt with in that theory. But for what purpose does Udayana propose that theory? Why does he have to differentiate between two kinds of universal?" [Tachikawa (1981) p. 50 footnote 43]

In the case of brāhmaṇatvā we gain an idea of what can hinge on this distinction. Brāhmaṇatvā is a rigid designator in that it always refers to the same "stuff" independently of the "stuff's" superficial phenomenal properties. This was an important element in their arguments against the Buddhists; attempt to reinterpret the caste system.


"Hindu and in general Indian, South Asian society has developed transactional thinking perhaps further than has any other. It exhibits an elaborate transactional culture, characterized by explicit, institutionalized concern for givings and receivings of many kinds in kinship, work and worship. Hindu thinking about social transactions viewed from the modern West may seem peculiar for the biological substantialism on which it builds, and for its special orientation to questions of rank."

[Marriott in Kapferer (1976) p. 109]

2. The Upaniṣads do not definitely say that the world is illusory. This was another question left for later systems to argue. Both the momentariness and illusoriness of the world, however, are more in accord with the kind of disdain for the world expressed in the Maitrī Upaniṣad. Hence the place of Nyāya realism in relation to the traditional soteriological teachings needs to be understood. That is, can Nyāya realism be understood as a soteriological device, other than to preserve the reality of the ātman?

3. This can be seen in the nature of the arguments found there, namely, (i) stable versus momentary objects, (ii) the existence or not of the referents of empty subject terms, and (iii) the existence or not of real universals and the related arguments concerning nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa and savikalpa-pratyakṣa (simple and qualified perceptions).

4. There is a distinction to be made between an external world and a world independent of our perception of it: "For realism, the familiar physical object not only exists but also exists independently. This crucial expression 'independently' means that if by chance all the sentient creatures were annihilated our familiar physical objects would still continue to exist in the same way."

[Matilal (1986) p. 15]

Hume made a similar distinction: "We ought to examine apart these two questions, which are commonly confounded together, viz. Why we attribute a CONTINUED existence to objects, and why we suppose them to have an existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception."

[Hume (1969) p. 238]
5. For example: "But the major dispute in classical India was not so much between direct realism and the representative theory, as between direct realism and phenomenalism-cum-idealism." [Matilal (1986) p. 14]

6. We do not know whether Dignāga himself was a Sautrāntika or a Yogācāra. This is still disputed and debated by different schools of Buddhism, especially in the schools of Tibetan Buddhism. As Matilal points out: "In Dignāga's system the place of the absolute reality is taken by the unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas). Each barest particular can be interpreted either as an internal consciousness-moment or an external point instant depending on whether a Yogācārin or a Sautrāntika is the interpreter." [Matilal (1971) p. 39]

7. Mohanty admits that there are some qualifications to this which do not, however, affect the basic realism of the system: "In its theory of savikalpa perception, however, Nyāya is led to grant a peculiarly intermediate status to certain epistemic entities. This does not affect the basic direct realism of the system which is maintained with the help of the theory of nirvikalpa perception in which an object is directly given free from all epistemic adjuncts." [Mohanty (1970) p. 183]

8. The different schools of Hinduism and Buddhism held different views about the nature of awareness and its relation to an external reality. Nyāya philosophers are characterized as nirākāra-jñāna-vādins in that they regarded awareness to be essentially formless. One awareness is distinguished from another on the basis of the object (grāhya) grasped by the awareness (grāhaka). Nyāya philosophers would identify the object grasped in our awareness with an aspect of external reality. For a good summary of the Buddhist schools on this matter in relation to their respective theories of error, see Matilal (1986), pp. 183-190. Udayana deals with this enormously complex topic in the first part of his Bāhyārthabhāṅga chapter, ATV (1939 edition) pp. 429-569, (1940 edition) pp. 189-253.

9. The Bāhyārthabhāṅga and Gunaguṇībhedabhāṅga chapters of the ATV together discuss many issues in relation to realism. There has not been the space here to cover these topics comprehensively. Matilal's recent work, Perception, (1986) is a detailed examination of the realist/idealist controversy in India.

10. Hence for Udayana our grasp of physical objects is a 'given' — it is on this basis that we must build our theories about the world. In this respect Udayana may be compared to
Footnotes to Chapter Five

Strawson:
"This general realist view of the world is reflected, Strawson claims, in 'our ordinary perceptual judgements', and should not be accorded the status of a theory, for its acceptance is the very condition for the sensory experience to be understood as what it is, viz. as what supplies the data or evidence for such a theory." [Matilal (1986) p. 9] This premise was the basis for Strawson's book, *Individuals*.


12. Matilal has just previously discussed the Sautrāntika position which states that there is nothing that is a shape separate from the mass of colour which we see; otherwise, if there were a visually perceived shape, this would go against the Buddhist dictum that each sense faculty has its own domain of objects (for one shape would be both seen and touched). According to the Sautrāntika position, the visual shape is only a nominally existent entity. [Matilal (1986) pp. 250-251]

13. Mohanty is here describing an argument contained in the *Nyāyasūtras* 2.1.31 and taken up by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara in their commentaries on this sūtra.

14. Udayana's arguments for the defence of avayavin are to be found in the ATV (1939 edition) pp. 586-613 and pp. 636-662, (1940 edition) pp. 258-275 and pp. 286-301. Udayana argues for the notion of the avayavin in a way that we have encountered in the Gunaugupihedabhaṅga chapter, namely, that we experience the avayavin directly as a single entity and not as an aggregate of its parts. This is like his argument for our seeing and touching one and the same object — this is just the way we experience the world.

15. *Nyāyasūtras* 2.1.31-37 and 4.2.4-16. See also Vātsyāyana's and Uddyotakara's commentaries on these sūtras.

16. This line of Dharmakīrti is often quoted by his commentators and opponents and can be found in the Pramāṇaviniścaya which survives in Tibetan translation.


18. Early Nyāya philosophers also dealt with the problem of how to overcome the gap between our sense organs and the external object. For example: "From the elements come the olfactory, gustatory, visual and auditory sense organs. These elements are respectively earth, water, fire, air and ākāśa. Their objects are respectively smell, taste, colour, touch and sound." *Nyāyasūtras* 1.1.12-14.
It would seem that by making the sense organs of the same substance as that which is to be perceived, the early Nyāya philosophers are trying to overcome the distance between the external object and the perception of it. They are treating what is essentially a logical gap with a physical remedy.

19. Bhāvivikta first introduced the argument that an object can be perceived without its qualities, for example, when it is in the shade. This view is ascribed to him by Śāntarakṣita, which is our only source since there are no extant works of Bhāvivikta (520–580 A.D. according to Oberhammer). As mentioned though, Udayana's argument is more than the fact that an object can appear separately from its usual qualities. His argument has more to do with giving an adequate explanation of perceptual error, for an object always appears with some qualities.


21. For example, see Vardhamāna's Nibandhaprakāśa (1911) p. 397, where he concludes that the yellowness of the conch shell is just presented perceptually and there is no reason to invoke the device of similarity to explain this error.

22. In the concluding section of the Gunagunibhedabhaṅga chapter of the ATV, Udayana discusses the perception of a tree from near and afar by two different observers. He claims that in such cases only the guṇa/guṇin distinction can explain how it is the same tree that is being seen, even though it has a different appearance for each of the observers. See ATV (1939 edition) pp. 730–735, (1940 edition) pp. 330–333.
Footnotes to Chapter Six

1. **anātmadarśino mumukṣutvavayāghātāt.** na hyātmānamapratīsandhāya kaściddukhakā hātumicchet sukham vāvāptum. mayā svargāpavargaphalabhāgīnā bhavitavyamityprāyasya yāvadabhiyogamanuṛtthe, ananuvṛttāvabhiyoganiuvṛttau phalāsiddheh. iyām ca nairātmyadṛṣṭirnāstikyam drjayet, tacca prabalāvisayātsāpaparitamanarthaṁanantāṁ prasuṣvīta, na cedevam kuto 'yavajjīvam sukham jīved' ityādayo'pi niḥṣākaprālapāh.


2. See **Vaiśeṣikasūtras** III.2.4-5

3. Kaṇāda, reputed author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, states that the ātman can be inferred from such marks as breathing upward, breathing downward, shutting the eye, ... pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort. The **Nyāyasūtras** 1.1.10 state that the marks of the ātman are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and judgement.

4. In the **Nyāyasūtras** 1.1.9, Gautama lists the objects of knowledge as ātman, body, sense organs, objects, judgement, internal organ, activity, defect, rebirth, fruit, pain and release: ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanāhpravṛttidosaḥpretyabhāvaphala-duḥkāpavargastu prameyam.

5. **Vaiśeṣikasūtras** III.1.1-9, 14, and III.2.4-5. In his commentary on the **Nyāyasūtras** 1.1.10, Vātsyāyana states that the ātman is not known by perception but by the marks which Gautama lists in 1.1.10.

6. **Vaiśeṣikasūtra** IX.13-17.

7. As early as Bhāvivikta (520-580 A.D.) we find the view expressed that the ātman can be perceived. Bhāvivikta is mentioned by Śaṅtarakṣita as holding the view that since the ahamkāra is self-cognizable, the ātman is perceptible, and hence its existence is proved. Vyomaśiva in the Vyomavatī, his commentary on the **Padārthadharmasamgraha** (950 A.D.), affirms this view that the ātman is perceptible since it appears in judgements about the ahamkāra.

8. astu tarhi nairātmyam, anupalabdheri cet. na, sarvādṛṣṭeṣaḥ sandehāt tvādṛṣṭeṣvabhihācārataḥ.


9. H.D. Lewis and C.A. Campbell are the two leading contemporary exponents of this view in western philosophy. Campbell puts it this way: "There is, indeed, an apprehended relationship in virtue of which I call experiences 'mine', but it is not a relationship of experiences to one another. It can, I think, only be stated as a relationship of experiences to
me, an identical subject conscious of having or owning them; a relationship of 'belonging to'."


10. This argument was first used by Vatsyayana in the Nyāyabhāṣya 3.1.1 where he states that the ātman is different from the sense organs and that a statement such as "he knows" should be interpreted as being similar to a statement such as "he cuts with an axe".

11. See also Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith (1964), p. 342, especially footnote a.

12. Parfit uses an example from the realm of science fiction to argue his point. He considers a situation in which a replica of a person is created on Mars by pressing a green button. Before the person presses the button he thinks, "snow is falling", and then his replica suddenly becomes conscious in his cubicle on Mars. This replica has all the memories of the original person's life and is conscious of just having had the thought, "snow is falling". He then concludes, "so it must be cold". Parfit contends that the replica is now in the exact state of mind as the person on earth who had had the same two thoughts"

"When my Replica is in this state of mind, he would believe that both these thoughts were had by the same thinker, himself. But this would be false. I had the first thought, and my Replica only had the second. This example is only imaginary. But it seems to show that we could not tell, from the content of experiences, whether we really are aware of the continued existence of a separately existing subject of experiences. The most that we have are states of mind like my Replica."

[Parfit (1986) p. 224]

13. Western philosophers admit that claims about reincarnation, and also numerous fictional examples in which people seem to change physical identity, are not nonsensical. This must mean that the notion of personal identity is at least conceptually separate from physical identity. Many philosophers would then claim, however, that such cases are parasitic on the fact that personal identity must in general involve bodily identity.

14. The reason behind this attention on the brain is the assumption that all of a person's psychological features depend upon the states of the cells in his brain. See Parfit (1986) pp. 234-236, in which he discusses the inadequacies of a physical basis for a determinate personal identity. He uses examples of varying degrees of transplant of brain tissue.
15. Hume, of course, was tackling a different problem than that with which Udayana was concerned. Hume is looking for those features of our experience which cause us to have a sense of our own identity, whereas Udayana is looking for principles by means of which all the events of any particular continuum can be bound together into that continuum. See Stroud (1977) pp. 118-140 for a discussion of the problem which Hume tackled.

16. That is, if several people were to hear a sounding tuning fork, then identical sensations would be the effects of a common cause. Yet we would not want to group them together just because they were all effects, B, of cause A.


18. See Chapter Six footnote 15 for a comparison with Hume's approach. Udayana's argument that we have a direct unmediated experience of the ātman is reminiscent of his arguments relating to the concept of the avayavin (the whole) and his arguments relating to the unity of the object which we see and touch. In all these cases his appeal is to a direct unmediated experience that this is the case.

19. "The most promising suggestion is that the bundles are tied together by means of memory; but this meets with serious difficulties. In the first place, it is exposed to the charge of circularity; for it is plausible to argue that remembering an experience already implies thinking of it as an experience of one's own: and even if this charge can be met, it is clear on other grounds that memory alone will not suffice. For not every experience can be remembered; otherwise each piece of remembering, which is itself an experience, would have to be remembered, and each remembering of a remembering and so on ad infinitum." [Ayer (1963) p. 114]

20. "Memory proper involves the recognition of the past occurrence as one in which I find the consciousness of the person I am now. I relive, as it were, the past event, or recapture it, in the form which involves the peculiar awareness I now have of myself as one unique being wholly incapable of being any other." [Lewis, H.D. (1970) p. 241]
21. Udayana maintains that only an enduring ātman can limit the range of memory to one continuum. The Buddhist poses a karmic force as the carrier of memory. Udayana claims that there is no basis for restricting the range of this force to one continuum — that is, the karmic force could produce a memory in another continuum. Udayana also maintains that there is no room in the continuum for the simultaneous operation of this karmic force alongside the cause and effect relationship governing the sequence of mental events in that continuum. Udayana's arguments here are similar to those he used in relation to the Buddhist notion of kurvadrūpa, where (i) he argued that there was no room for both the kurvadrūpa and the seed moment to operate in the same series and (ii) he argued that there was no way the Buddhist could restrict the activity of the kurvadrūpa to the seed.

22. Parfit in this work systematically undermines both the physical and psychological, or some combination of the two, as providing a basis for a determinate personal identity. His aim is to demonstrate how an acceptable morality can be built up on the basis of the idea that our personal identity is not what matters. Parfit himself, compares his view to those of the Buddhists. The Nyāya belief would therefore be coherent according to a Parfit-type thesis, inasmuch as Nyāya philosophers hold together a belief in an enduring ātman and the belief that our personal identity is determinate.

23. See Parfit (1986) p. 227. Parfit believes that reincarnation could be cited as evidence for the existence of a Cartesian Ego but believes that the right kind of evidence for reincarnation is lacking. As stated in this chapter, both the Buddhists and Naiyāyikas believed in reincarnation and Udayana's argument is that only by positing the existence of the ātman can the belief in reincarnation be defended.

24. In this context I am using "individual" in a normative sense. Griffiths is concerned that our sense of who we are be preserved from one life to the next.


The idea of a threefold path is found in the Upaniṣads, for example, in the B.U. 2.4.5 we read ātma vā are śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsi tavyah. Udayana's words "śrutvā", "viniścirtya" and "upāśita" correspond to the Upaniṣadic "grāvana", "manana" and "nididhyāsana".
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26. Kaṇāda says in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras VI.2.18-19 that the absence of contact of demerit and merit with the body results in liberation.

27. "Since anyone attempting to attain or witness an eternal unchanging Self was, in the Buddha's view, bound to failure, the doctrine of the Self was an invitation to further suffering: 'such (a doctrine of the eternal Self) is merely a sensation, a writhing in discomfort, of the venerable ascetics and Brahmans who neither know nor see, and who have fallen victim to desire (for such a Self)'. So to give up such a doctrine was to give up a potent source of frustration. The emotional tone of the teaching of non-Self was that of a calm and relieved detachment. It was a liberation which transcended the frustrated strivings of those who revolve around a Self 'like a dog tied to a post'."

[Carrithers (1983), p. 46]

It is interesting to see similar views expressed by non-Buddhists who hold some version of a no-Self theory:

"When I believed that my existence was such a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared."


As we have already seen, the ātman was important for Udayana because he believed that without such an entity, there would be no goal to strive for, and nobody would have any reason to pursue mokṣa. (ATV (1939 edition), p. 814; (1940 edition), p. 371. See p. 312 for translation.)

28. Nyāyasūtras 1.1.22; 4.1.59-68.
29. Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.22.
32. Saptapadārthī, ed. and translated by D. Gurumurti, Adyar, Madras, Theosophical Publishing House, 1932, p. 51. There were exceptions among the Nyāya philosophers to this view, most notable Bhāsarvajña, who held that mokṣa was a blissful condition.
33. See Āpastamba, Dharmasūtras, 2.4.8.13; 2.6.14.12. In these two passages Āpastamba settles contested points on the authority of those who know the nyāya, which in this context refers to the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā school.
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34. For example: "Venerable Sir, I know the Rig Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sāma Veda, Atharvāṇa as the fourth (Veda), the epic and the ancient lore as the fifth, the Veda of the Vedas (grammar), propitiation of the fathers, the science of numbers, the science of portents, the science of time, logic, ethics and politics, the science of the Gods, the science of sacred knowledge, the science of elemental spirits, the science of weapons, astronomy, the science of serpents and the fine arts. This, Venerable Sir, I know. But Venerable Sir, I am only like one knowing words, and not a knower of the Self. [C.U. 7.1.2-3. Translated by Radhakrishnan (1953), pp. 468-469] In this passage Radhakrishnan translates vākovākyam as "logic". Dasgupta (1969), p. 276, seems to think that vākovākyam signified some kind of art of disputation: "It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyāya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in the sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in the days of the Upaniṣads, and the art of disputation was regarded even then as a subject of study and probably passed by the name vākovākyā." I would only add here that the mention of vākovākyam in this text really predates the period which saw the crystallization of thought into distinct schools. The disputes as recorded in the Upaniṣads, as already stated, are disputes based strongly on a mastery of Vedic sacrificial lore rather than on purely logical skills. Thus, even if we take the meaning of vākovākyam to be the art of disputation, we should not take the unjustified step of thinking thereby that it involves the study of logical thought. I would rather take the meaning of vākovākyam here to be more akin to the significance which it has in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, a text written before the Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣads, where it refers to certain set portions of the Veda which are in dialogue form [Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 4.6.9.20]. In the Katha Upaniṣad 1.2.9, once again we read that knowledge of the ātman is not to be reached by reasoning, where here the word used is tarka, a term which later came to mean a type of logical argumentation. Once again, however, we should not equate the later meaning of the term with its earlier usage. What is important though is to notice that in both of these passages vākovākyam and tarka are being dismissed in the context of the pursuit of knowledge concerning the ātman.
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35. Kautilya introduces आयिकक्त as one of the four sciences which a king should know about: "The sciences are आयिकक्त, the triple Veda, commerce and statecraft."

आयिकक्त trayā vārtā daśanitiśceti vidyāḥ.
[Arthaśāstra, 1.2.1]

Kautilya then goes on to say that:
"आयिकक्त consists of साम्ख्यa, योगa and लोकयता."
(sāṁkhyaṁ yogo lokāyatam cetyānvikākī.)
[Arthaśāstra, 1.2.10]

Kautilya says of आयिकक्त that it bestows excellence in speech and action and illuminates like a lamp all the other branches of knowledge. These passages from Kautilya have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly debate, beyond the scope of this thesis, although I shall briefly review some of the scholarship on this matter.

Jacobi (1918) postulates that Kautilya meant by आयिकक्त just pure ratiocination separate from अत्माविद्या because he includes लोकयता in his list of schools that counted as आयिकक्त. लोकयता was a name applied specifically to the materialist Cārvāka school which was counted as a heterodox school. Jacobi postulates that Kautilya included this in his list because he wanted to emphasize that आयिकक्त was to do with method rather than content, and by including a heterodox school he was able to accomplish this. According to Jacobi, at the time of Kautilya आयिकक्त was a discipline separate from अत्माविद्या. Later on आयिकक्त came to include अत्माविद्या as a result of an orthodox response to Kautilya.

Kane (1968, Vol. I, p. 225) disagrees with and questions the basic premise of Jacobi's argument, that लोकयता here means the materialist school, since its meaning did change from time to time. Kane, however, does agree with Jacobi's conclusions that आयिकक्त in the context of Kautilya does not include अत्माविद्या.

Dasgupta arrives at a different conclusion, but it would seem that his interpretation is based on a misreading of the text. He reads, "साम्ख्यa योगa लोकयतां चतुरा आयिकक्तI", as enumerating four different systems, rather than as listing the first three to be constituents of the last. On the basis of this, he thinks this passage shows that in Kautilya's time न्याय went by the name of आयिकक्त (whereas Jacobi concluded that this passage shows that at the time of Kautilya the न्याय school was not yet clearly formed). Given his interpretation, Dasgupta needs to explain why आयिकक्त should also be classified as one of the four विद्याः. He does so by concluding that the न्याय system in Kautilya's time already consisted of two branches — अत्माविद्या and the science of logical reasoning. He also thinks that the अत्माविद्या portion was added to make the logical portion more acceptable. Hence Dasgupta agrees with Kane's and Jacobi's chronology but disagrees as to when this took place.
Sastri (1964, p. 88) disagrees with this chronology. He thinks that in the beginning ānヴィkṣ𝑖𝑘ĭ included ātmavidyā, but that as time went on the logical part came to be emphasized at the expense of the ātmavidyā portion.

36. Even if the authenticity of Kauṭilya is accepted, the Arthaśāstra should not be read in isolation from the general intellectual developments of the time. [For a review of the scholarship concerning the dates of the Arthaśāstra, see Kane (1968), Vol. I, p. 247.] It would seem that gradually, as a result of the extent of religious debate at that time, rules regarding disputation were formed. The usefulness of such rules in other areas must have been quickly recognized, as is attested by the fact that such rules were soon included in treatises on statecraft, the Arthaśāstra, and medicine, the Caraka Saṃhitā. It is interesting to see in the latter that the examples used to illustrate points of debate are drawn from both medical and religious disputes, thus revealing the heritage of logical thought in India. When we are looking for precise boundaries of demarcation between the ātmavidyā tradition and ānヴィkṣ𝑖𝑘ĭ, we should also remember that Kauṭilya was concerned with the practical task of instructing princes, not with laying down precise definitions of intellectual disciplines. This point is made by Hacker (1958), p. 82, in his comments on this passage.

37. See Matilal (1986), p. 73, for a discussion of this matter. For an interesting account of the meanings of darśana, ānヴィkṣ𝑖𝑘ĭ and philosophy, see also Halbfass (1981), pp. 296–327. Halbfass agrees with Hacker in that he also criticizes Jacobi's clear identification of ānヴィkṣ𝑖𝑘ĭ with logical thought. He also makes the point that, "the sense of both concepts, ānヴィkṣ𝑖𝑘ĭ and darśana, not only depends on an understanding of Indian philosophy; it has to do with European self-understanding and with the philosophical dialogue between India and Europe as well."

38. Oberhammer (1963) compares some of the early vāda expositions which he sees to be the sole genuine sources of the earliest period of Indian logic. In the course of his article, he establishes three such traditions: "(a) the tradition of the Nyāyasūtras (b) the tradition of the Yogācāra-dialectics and (c) the tradition of the ten-membered proof mentioned by Pakṣilasvāmin in his commentary on the Nyāyasūtras 1.1.32." [Oberhammer (1963), p. 102]

39. "The tradition of the Nyāyasūtras takes its origin from a form of vāda-doctrine which seems to be presupposed by Caraka. The vāda-exposition of Caraka itself is already a younger state of development and corresponds roughly to the "pre-form" of the first and fifth Adhyāyas of the present Nyāyasūtras, though not identical with it. Through a
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re-arrangement of the usual set of dialectical topics this earlier form was then changed into the vāda-manual which has been supposed by W. Ruben and G. Tucci to correspond to the first and fifth Adhyāyas of the Nyāyasūtras. This manual was later enlarged by adding the second Adhyāya or at least parts of it (most probably after Nāgārjuna) and later on the third and fourth Adhyāya of the Nyāyasūtra."

[Oberhammer (1963), pp. 102-103]

40. Oberhammer (1964, p. 303

41. ims tu chatasro vidyāḥ prthak prasthānāḥ prāṇabhṛtām-
   anugrahāyopadīṣyante, yāsām caturṭhiyam ānvikṣīkī
   Nyāyavidyā; tasyāḥ prthakprasthānāḥ samśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ;
   tesām prthagvacanam antarenātmavidvāmaṭram iyaṃ svād,
   yathopanīṣadāḥ.

Here Vātsyāyana is identifying his system of Nyāya with Kauṭilya's ānvikṣīkī.

42. kim punah prameyavisēṣavigayatvāt nāyaṃ prameyavisēṣah
   prameyavisēṣah prameyamātrasya pramāṇalakṣaṇo śena
   bhoditavat prameyavisēsavadharana na sidhyati, tat prameyam
   radanena yathāvartati nyāyamānasapavargaya/
   aparīṭhyamānaścāśvāṃmeti/etadarthaprakāśānīyātmśaūnītarṇam/
   ayameva sūtrārthā yathāvacanām vigrahāḥ
   ubhayāvadhāraṇaprāptāvanyatarāvadhāraṇe.

[ Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.9]

43. upāsyamāne tasminprathamaṁ bahirarthā eva bhāsante
   yāmaśrītya karmamānśopasāhāraḥ cārvākasamutthānaṃca,
   tatpratipādanārtham 'paraṇci khāni, ityādi, taddhānārtham
   'paraḥ karmabhya, ityādi/athārthākāraḥ yamāśrītya
   traidāṇḍikamatopasāhāraḥ yogācārasamutthānaṃca,
   tatpratipādanārtham 'ātmaivedāḥ sarvam' ityādi,
   taddhānārtham 'agandharasam' ityādi/athārthabhāvāḥ,
   yamāśrītya vedāntadvāramātropasāhāraḥ,
   Śunyavānairātmvasamutthānāṃca, tatpratipādanārtham
   'asadevedamagra āśita' ityādi, taddhānāya 'andhantāmah
   praviṃśantī ye ke caṇātmahano janā' ityādi/tato vivekāḥ,
   yamāśrītya sākhyamatopasāhāraḥ, śaktīsatyvasamutthānāṃca,
   tatpratipādanārthāḥ 'prakteṣe parastāḥ' ityādi, taddhānāya
   'nānyat sat' ityādi/tatāsect kevala ātmā prakāṣate
   yamāśrītyadvaitamātropasāhāraḥ, tatpratipādanārthāḥ 'na
   paṣyatītyāharekrābhāvati' ityādi, taddhānārtham 'nādvaitāḥ
   nāpi ca dvaitā' ityādi/tatāḥ samasta samēkārābhāvātmā
   kevalopī vikāpate, yamāśrītya caramavedāntopasāhāraḥ,
   tatpratipādanārthāḥ 'yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasa
   sahyādyā/sā cāvasthā na heva, mokṣanagarapūryāṃpatāt, nirvāṇantu tasya svayameva/ yamāśrītya nyāyamatopasāhāraḥ
   tatpratipādanārthāḥ 'atha yo niṣkām atmakāma āptakāmaḥ sa
   brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti na tasya prāgā utkrāmanti tatraiva
   samavaliyanta' ityādi/tasmādabhīyāsakāmopyapadvārāṇi vihāya
   puradvāram praviṃśeta, yato
Footnotes to Chapter Six

mārgavimārgasamārgasammohamāśaṅkamānairucyate 'lakṣyeva dhanusā yoga' iti.


45. Manusmṛti VI 2

46. Udayana was of course a brahmin and seems to have been associated with a royal court. See Williams (1978) p. 294 for a review of other Nyāya philosophers.

47. Manusmṛti IV 30
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