THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE IN PORTUGAL

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THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE IN PORTUGAL

A thesis submitted to THE OPEN UNIVERSITY by MANUELA D'OLIVEIRA, BSc (London) in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PhD) in the subject of SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY on 30 April, 1989
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I wish to single out a few.

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Also, Prof. Armando Rocha Trindade, Rector of the Universidade Aberta, Portugal, for the facilities put at my disposal during the field work. Mr. John Mallon, Representative of The British Council, Portugal, again for all the facilities put at my disposal in the final stages of the write-up.

My colleagues Ana Sofia Peralta Leitão and Maria Amélia Mendonça for typing and retyping the manuscript with infinite patience and efficiency.

Finally, my daughter Maria João and my son Pedro who so gallantly shared me with this eight year old rival. And, most especially, Eduardo, without whom the work would have never been accomplished.

TO ALL MY SINCERE THANKS.
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LIBRARY AUTHORISATION FORM

STUDENT: MANUELA D'OLIVEIRA
DEGREE: PhD

TITLE OF THESIS: THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE IN PORTUGAL

I confirm that I am willing that my thesis be made available to readers and maybe photocopied, subject to the discretion of the Librarian.

SIGNED: [Signature]
DATE: 30.4.89
The Reasoned Action model was applied in Portugal to study the factors which determine vote choice among Portuguese voters. Covering three elections (the 1980 Presidential election, the 1982 Local elections and the 1983 General election) the study was started six years after the Revolution of 25 April 1974 which restored Democracy after 48 years of the Salazar-Caetano Dictatorship.

The Reasoned Action model, successfully tested in one American Presidential election and in one British General election, assumes that voting intentions are directly related to a) attitudes towards voting for each candidate or party based on knowledge voters possess about important issues and about the candidates or parties stands on them, and b) social influence factors based on voters' beliefs on the opinions of trusted referents as to whom they should be voting for.

The results obtained in the three Portuguese electoral studies give strong support to the thesis that in spite of their undemocratic background Portuguese voters like their American and British counterparts make reasoned choices based on their knowledge of important issues and of the differences between the candidates' or parties' stands on such issues. As in the American and British studies the weight of the attitudinal component of the Reasoned Action model was found to be a much more significant determinant of voting intentions than its social influence component.
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THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE IN PORTUGAL

Introduction

Voting behaviour has been the subject of continuous study in the United States and Great Britain for many decades. Social psychologists in these countries have developed models of voting behaviour of increasing complexity in an attempt to explain how voters arrive at electoral decision.

Making use of one such model, the Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein & Coombs, 1974), the object of this research was to enquire into the determinant factors which affect voting decision making among Portuguese voters, and in so doing, ascertain whether Portuguese voters, in view of their non-democratic tradition, appear to be influenced by factors different from those which affect their American and British counterparts.

American and British voters have enjoyed stable democratic life for many decades. In the 50 years prior to the 1974 Revolution, Portugal was ruled by a Dictatorship. In 1974, the country jumped from a one-party to a multi-party system, from oppressive silence enforced by brutal force, to freedom, irrepressive freedom of expression, of assembly and of choice.

The research covers three elections: the presidential election of 1980, the local elections of 1982 and the
general election of 1983. Between 1974 and the presidential election of 1980 there had already been seven elections: four general elections, one presidential election and two local elections. Prior to the 1980 presidential election, the political instability and uncertainty, and the divisions within the left had created conditions for a strong recovery on the part of the right wing political forces.

The American conservative Firsher Ames once wrote:

"Authoritarian government is like a splendid ship with all sails set; it moves majestically on, then it hits a rock and sinks forever. Democracy is like a raft. It never sinks, but, damn it, your feet are always in the water".

The Portuguese voters were learning to live with their feet wet.

The study is organised in ten Chapters and five Appendices as follows:

Chapter I - Electoral issues in the context of political developments

Chapter II - A survey of the main social psychology models of voting behaviour

Chapter III - Using the model of Reasoned Action to study the determinants of vote choice among Portuguese voters
Chapter IV - Applications of the Reasoned Action model in American and British elections: implications for the Portuguese studies

Chapter V - Method and procedure

Chapter VI - Description of the samples used in the three Portuguese elections

Chapter VII - Results of the tests of the Reasoned Action model in the three Portuguese elections

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CHAPTER I

ELECTORAL ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

The main argument of this thesis is that in their voting behaviour Portuguese voters make reasoned choices based on knowledge of current electoral issues and of the stands candidates and parties have on them.

Electoral issues are thus key features of the three surveys carried out to test the argument of the thesis in each of the three types of elections which are held in Portugal: Presidential elections, General elections and Local Government elections.

The surveys were started in 1980, six years after the Revolution. By and large, the quick succession of confused and confusing political developments had been based on concurrent fights for power between the Right and the Left and within the Left itself, amidst a great deal of additional unrest created by the many fringe parties on both extremes of the political spectrum.

After their initial political proclamations, the four main political parties were themselves going through a period of readjustment and realignment. This realignment was being achieved through the clarification and redefinition of important issues concerning the socio-economic framework and the institutional inter-relationships of the incipient Portuguese democracy.
By 1980, such issues had come to the fore and their settlement became dependent upon the direction of the vote in the 1980 Presidential election, the first covered by this study.

The centrality of electoral issues to the argument of the thesis requires their immediate presentation and discussion. This, however, can only be achieved with reference to the main political and electoral developments which occurred in Portugal since the Revolution.

The aim of Chapter 1 is thus twofold. First it aims at directing attention to electoral issues, the key elements of the study; second, it aims at situating the issues within their terms of reference, i.e. the Portuguese political scene.

To achieve its aim the chapter covers 57 years of political life in Portugal from the beginning of the Dictatorship in 1926 to the General election of 1983, nine years after the Revolution of 1974, and is divided in five sections.

Section 1.1 gives a brief account of the two post-revolutionary years from the date of the Revolution, 25 April 1974, to the date of the first General legislative elections, 25 April 1976. There are two Appendices associated with this Section. Appendix 1, traces a brief history of the 48 years of dictatorship, from 1926 to 1974. Appendix 2, presents a calendar of the main events which took place during the first two post-revolutionary years.
Section 1.2 describes the main political developments from the General election of 1976 to the General election of 1980.

Section 1.3 describes the main political developments from the General election of 1980 to the General election of 1983 setting the scene of the three electoral surveys carried out for this study: the 1980 Presidential election survey the 1982 Local elections survey and the 1983 General election survey.

Section 1.4 presents and discusses the electoral issues selected for use in the three surveys and is followed by a brief summary in Section 5.

Section 1.1 — The post-revolutionary years — from April 1974 to April 1976

The Revolution of 25 April 1974 put an end to nearly 50 years of the authoritarian rule of Professors Salazar and Caetano in Portugal (1). As far as the immediate antecedents of the Revolution are concerned it will suffice to say that the military — The Movimento das Forcas Armadas — acted primarily to put an end to their 13 year old involvement with the wars against the freedom movements in the African colonies of Guine-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. The end of the wars was the uniting factor

(1) For a brief description of the years of Dictatorship, refer to Appendix 1.
among the military. The fall of the regime was the necessary prerequisite for the fulfillment of their aspiration.

The officers who overthrew the regime, however, conscious of the social injustices and economic underdevelopment fostered by the Dictatorship, wanted, also, to ensure the establishment of a new political order in the country. The new political path which the officers wanted for Portugal was clear about its aims: the establishment of democratic rule, taking "the road to Socialism" as the only means to achieve social justice and economic development. The country had an illiteracy rate in the order of 35%, a GNP per capita superior only to Turkey in the European table and had been subjected to 48 years of psychological and physical repression.

The immediate aftermath of the Revolution was characterised by a mass euphoria in most of the bigger popualtional centres of the country. The Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA) had instantaneous popular support and left the most sceptical observers in no doubt as to the strength of popular feeling against the dictatorship, especially in the cities.

The military Junta which took over on April 25 was determined that power should be handed over to civilians as soon as possible. Universal free elections were fixed for April 1975 to elect a Constituent Assembly who would sit for one year with the sole responsibility of drafting a new
Constitution. Three elections were to take place following the approval of the Constitution in 1976: a general election to elect the first legislative Parliament, a presidential election and local elections.

Meanwhile the country was to be governed by a provisional government formed by representatives of the main political forces, the military and prestigious independents. As it happened there was a succession of provisional governments amidst understandable political unrest (2). However, the first free universal elections did take place on April 25, 1975 and the Constituent Assembly was elected reflecting the wishes of the electorate. The distribution of the vote among the political parties which contested the election is shown in table 1.1. The figures in brackets show the number of representatives each party elected.

(2) For a chronological listing of the main events which occurred in the post revolutionary period, refer to Appendix 2, the Post-revolutionary years - Calendar of main events.
TABLE 1.1

Distribution of the vote in the 1975 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No of seats in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRO DEMOCRATICO SOCIAL CDS - (Christian-Democrats)</td>
<td>8.4% 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTIDO POPULAR DEMOCRATICO PPD - (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>26.2% 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTIDO SOCIALISTA PS - (Socialists)</td>
<td>37.9% 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVIMENTO DEMOCRATICO PORTUGUES MDP - (Left-wing Socialists)</td>
<td>4.1% 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTIDO COMUNISTA PORTUGUES PCP (Communists)</td>
<td>12.5% 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIAO DEMOCRATICA PORTUGUESA UDP - (Maoists)</td>
<td>.8% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVIMENTO DA ESQUERDA SOCIALISTA MES - (Intellectual Socialists)</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various leftist parties</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In "As Eleicoes no Portugal de Abril", 1980)

The electorate gave a clear mandate to the left wing parties in an election where voting, which is not compulsory, reached a record level of 91.7%, of which only 5.6% were spoiled or blank votes.

The PS (socialists), the MDP (leftwing socialists), the PCP (communists) and the UDP (maoists) combined won 152 of the 249 seats in the Assembly. The centre-right (PPD) and the right (CDS) obtained 97 seats altogether.

---

(1) Member of the Union of the Christian Democratic Parties
(2) Member of the International Liberal Movement
(3) Member of the Socialist International
(4) Part of the International Communist Movement
The socialists (PS), although more popular in the urban and coastal districts found countrywide support. The communists (PCP) drew their support from the rural regions South of Lisbon and from the industrial belts of Lisbon, Setubal and Oporto. The MDP (leftwing socialists) and UDP (Maoists) drew their support from the urban areas, especially Lisbon. The PPD (Social Democrats)'s strength was found mainly in the North and Centre, whereas the stronghold of the CDS (Christian Democrats)'s vote was mainly concentrated in the Northeast (3). The following schematic map of Portugal shows the main concentrations of the Parties' vote.

![Schematic map of Portugal showing concentration of parties' vote](image)

(3) The population is unevenly distributed. Discounting the big cities of Lisbon, Oporto and Setúbal, which account for over one third of the 10 million inhabitants, the largest population indices are found in the Northwest and in the Central coastal regions. The South of Lisbon regions, with the exception of the city of Setúbal, and the Northeast are thinly populated.
In spite of the continuing political unrest (see Post-Revolutionary years - Calendar of Main Events, Appendix 2) and the considerable difficulties faced by each one of the succeeding provisional governments, the new Constitution was drafted and approved, on April 2, 1976.

By and large, the principles of the new Constitution are akin to those of other Western Parliamentary democracies. The republican form of government, the separation of Church and State, and the rights, freedoms and safeguards of citizens cannot be amended. But the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 also committed the country to Socialism. In so doing it enshrined a number of principles which caused great and grave friction between the Right and Left wing parties, namely, the principle of collective ownership of the main means of production, and of natural resources, the abolition of monopolies and large estates, collectivization of land and national economic planning.

The Constitution contained a paradox. On the one hand it upheld the principle of a multi-party type of Western democracy; on the other, it prescribed an economic model which the Right could hardly be expected to subscribe to. The christian democrats (CDS) voted against the Constitution. Surprisingly, however, the social democrats (PPD) voted in favour. As later events were to confirm, the endorsement of the Constitution by the social democrats was an act of political strategy rather than of belief. Their vote of approval acknowledged the more generalised
left wing leanings of the electorate and avoided the risk of immediate, open confrontation with the left. It was a bid for time, since the Constitution included provisions for changes and amendments to be introduced every five years. Such changes, however, can only be introduced if approved by a two-third parliamentary majority.

The Constitution also includes a detailed account of electoral procedures.

Presidential electoral procedures: The President is elected by absolute majority in direct, universal, elections. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority (over 50% of the votes) at the first ballot, a second ballot takes place between the two most voted candidates in the first ballot.

General Elections: the franchise is universal, registration is automatic and compulsory. The 250 parliamentary seats are allotted amongst 22 constituencies called Districts. Each District is allotted a number of seats according to the number of voters registered. Voting is by party list in each District and the distribution of seats within each District follows the d'Hondt method of proportional representation. Under this method, on the first count, the party with the largest vote in the District takes a seat. Its total is divided by two and parties' votes are compared again. The list with the largest number of votes takes the next seat. Each time a party takes a seat, its original total is divided by the number of seats it has already won.
plus one. Distribution continues in this manner until all the District seats have been allocated.

Local elections: in the local elections the d'Hont method is applied within each Municipality, an administrative subdivision within Districts. The number of Municipalities varies between Districts since, by and large, it depends on the geographical distribution of the population.

Section 1.2 - Political developments from April 1976 to October 1980

1.2.1 The General Election of 1976

According to the Portuguese Constitution, the normal life of a Parliament is four years, unless the Government loses a vote of confidence and Parliament is unable to provide an alternative Government.

The election of the first legislature took place on April 25, 1976. Three of the four main parties, i.e. the CDS (Christian Democrats), the PPD/PSD (Social Democrats, who had now added a second name - Partido Social Democrata - to their original name - Partido Popular Democratico - and the PS (socialists) ran on their own. The PCP (communists) formed an alliance with the MDP (left wing socialists) called Alianca Povo Unido, APU.

In comparison with 1975, the 1976 election results show little vote switching between the parties. Only the CDS
(Christian Democrats), relatively to 1975 showed a considerable increase of approximately 68% in votes.

Table 1.2 compares the percentages of the vote obtained by the four main political groups in the 1975 and 1976 elections. The numbers in brackets show the number of seats obtained by each group.

**TABLE 1.2**

Percentage distribution of the vote among the four main political groups in the general elections of 1975 and 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>1975 RESULTS</th>
<th>1976 RESULTS*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS (christian democrats)</td>
<td>8.4% (16)</td>
<td>14.1% (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD/PSD (social democrats)</td>
<td>28.2% (81)</td>
<td>26.3% (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>37.9% (116)</td>
<td>35.0% (107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communists + MDP)</td>
<td>16.6% (35)**</td>
<td>14.6% (40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (In "As Eleicoes no Portugal de Abril", 1980)

** the results shown with respect to the 1975 election represent the sum of the percentages and number of seats obtained by these two political groups in that election.

It is interesting to note the influence of the d'Hondt method of proportional representation on the number of seats obtained in relation to the national percentage of the vote obtained by each party. The method favours larger
parties, particularly in smaller districts but it also favours parties whose support is geographically concentrated (Goldey, 1983).

After the election, the Socialist Party was asked by the President to form a minority government. This minority government ran into difficulties. Distancing themselves from the communists, the socialists sought the support of the christian democrats with whom, for a few months, entered into a governmental platform. This platform was dissolved and after losing a vote of confidence in Parliament the Government was dismissed by the President. Parliament was unable to provide a stable alternative. The President, using powers bestowed to him by the Constitution, tried to restore stability by appointing a government of his own initiative. This "national-government of experts ploy behind independent premiers" (Goldey, 1983) failed twice. A third government was formed to prepare the country for interim elections. These took place nine months before the normal full term of Parliament, in December 1979, and were followed in October 1980 by another general election, in accordance with constitutional regulations.

By December 1979, the christian democrats, the social democrats, and the very small Monarchist Party had formed an Alliance, the Aliança Democrática, AD. The Socialist Party together with small socialist groups, had also formed and electoral Front called Frente Republicana Socialista
(FRS). The above two alliances, together with the APU alliance already formed between the communists and the MDP, (the APU alliance) were the main political groups contesting the elections of 1979 and of 1980.

Table 1.3 shows the results of the 1979 and 1980 elections together with the 1975 and 1976 elections for easier reference and Table 1.4 shows the distribution of seats in Parliament resulting from each election.

**TABLE 1.3**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1979*</th>
<th>1980**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD/PSD</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD (CDS+PSD)</td>
<td>(34.6)</td>
<td>(40.4)AD</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRS (PS+small parties)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (PCP+MDP+Independents)</td>
<td>(16.6)</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP (maoists)</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (In "Diário da República, I Série, N. 295, Monday 24 December 1979)

** (In "Diário da República", I Série, N. 295, Monday 3 November 1980)
Table 1.4 shows the distribution of seats in Parliament after the above elections:

**TABLE 1.4**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD/PSD</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD(CDS+PSD) (97)</td>
<td>(115)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRS(PS+small parties)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU(PCP+MDP+Independents)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP(maoists)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>249</strong></td>
<td><strong>263</strong></td>
<td><strong>250</strong></td>
<td><strong>250</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Between the 1976 and 1979 elections Parliament decided to fix the total number of seats in 250. Number of seats were proportionally distributed among the electoral districts as a function of the number of registered voters in each District.

(Adapted from "O Jornal", 29 April 1983, and "Expresso", 23 April 1983. The 1975 result excludes an independent from Macau who did not sit).
The AD alliance between the CDS and the PPD/PSD (and the small Monarchist Party) obtained a clear victory in the interim elections of 1979 and increased its majority in the Elections of October 1980. The losers were, undoubtedly, the socialists who lost a great deal of their initial popularity after their two and half years in Government.

Such was the parliamentary representation of the political groups and the strong position of the AD government when the country prepared for the second Presidential election, in 1980, the first of the elections covered by this study. Before the political context in which the 1980 Presidential election took place is discussed the following subsection gives a summary of the main events related to the first Presidential election held in 1976.

1.2.2 - The first Presidential Election of 1976

The President's term of office runs for five years. With the new Constitution approved in April 1976, the President who during the dictatorship, was a mere puppet figure subordinated to the Dictator, assumed greater importance. The President became the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and held the right to veto any Bills approved by Parliament which were deemed to be unconstitutional. (Until the first Constitutional revision in 1982, the President was advised on constitutional matters by the Conselho da Revolução (Revolutionary Council) composed of representatives of the MFA (the Armed Forces Movement).
The 1982 constitutional revision dissolved the Conselho da Revolução, and created in its place the Constitutional Tribunal, a body composed of representatives of the main political parties and independents headed by the President. The use of the veto by the President to block the approval of unconstitutional Bills is on the one hand a safeguard to ensure that the Constitution is respected. On the other hand, it can become a source of institutional conflict between the Presidency and the Government and/or Parliament.

The first Presidential election took place in June 1976. General Ramalho Eanes, the officer who took decisive action during the events of November 1975 (see Calendar of Events) ran for office with the backing of the CDS (Christian democrats), the PPD/PSD (social democrats) and the PS (socialists) although some socialists supported Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, the Prime Minister in the last Provisional Government. The Communist Party presented its own candidate, Octavio Pato, and the parties of the extreme left supported Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the hero of the April Revolution, former head of COPCON (see Calendar of Events). Otelo enjoyed still a great deal of popular support among the left as the percentage of votes obtained by him indicates. Table 1.5 shows the distribution of the popular vote among the candidates:
Table 1.5

Distribution of the vote among the 1976* Presidential candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY SUPPORT</th>
<th>CANDIDATE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF VOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS, PSD, PS</td>
<td>Eanes</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Pato</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP, extreme left</td>
<td>Otelo</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Azevedo</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (Adapted from "O Jornal")

General Ramalho Eanes was thus elected at the first ballot with a clear, absolute majority of 61.5% of the popular vote. If, at first, he might have been considered as politically naive and open to manipulation by his main political supporters, Ramalho Eanes soon established himself as an independent President set to respect and force both Parliament and Government to respect the Constitution.

Section 1.3 - Political developments from December 1980 to April 1983

1.3.1. The electoral campaign for the presidential election of December 1980

When the Presidential campaign opened officially three weeks before the election on December 7, the AD government
had just seen its majority in Parliament highly reinforced by the results of the general election of October 1980.

During the AD first nine months in office, a series of serious conflicts occurred between the Government and the President. Highly critical of the Constitution, especially with respect to the provisions limiting private enterprise and the size of the public sector, the AD government sought to implement Bills which were considered to be unconstitutional by the President and his advisory body on Constitutional matters, the Conselho da Revolução. The President, Ramalho Eanes, used the veto to block such proposals to much annoyance and vociferation on the part of the AD leadership.

Withdrawing their former support to the President, the AD parties proposed and backed a more acceptable and pliable candidate. They chose an obscure Army General, Soares Carneiro, a figure of little impact and campaigned vigorously on his behalf.

The President, who ran for a second term of office received the support of the Socialist Party, although the Secretary General of the Party (the Prime Minister of the Socialist Government dismissed by Eanes) withdrew his personal support.

The communists presented their own candidate only to gain access to the media to explain to their electorate the reasons for recommending the vote in the President when
their candidate withdrew. Contrary to the AD assertions regarding the President's communist bias, Eanes did not enjoy support among communist voters. These had never forgotten his role in the November 1975 coup (see Calendar of Events) which they considered anti-revolutionary and a setback to the socialist cause.

Otelo, the popular revolutionary hero, ran again counting on the support of the extreme left and hoping for a percentage of the communist vote as he had obtained in the 1976 election.

There were two more candidates but neither received support from the main parties.

The campaign was vigorous. The AD leadership heavily involved and committed to the election of its candidate, without which the AD plans for reforms could not succeed, sought to discredit the President accusing him of favouring the communists and creating the conditions for a communist take over. The AD was quite open about their reasons for choosing Soares Carneiro. They argued that in order to achieve economic development and prosperity the country needed political stability, and that the latter could only be established if the Institutions, i.e. Presidency, Parliament and Government, shared the same ideals and worked in harmony. Their attacks against the Constitution were virulently linked to what they considered to have been a communist manoeuvre to control the country.
The Socialist Party formed a national movement to give the President's campaign the logistic and political support it needed. The President campaigned actively throughout the country and abstained from personal attacks against the AD and its candidate. His main message was that, in spite of the political instability and institutional conflict, the democratic institutions were functioning. This, he considered, was due to the fact that the Constitution was being respected. His campaign was almost didactic in that, it sought to explain how the democratic institutions worked and the importance the Constitution had to hold them together. His position was that irrespective of the justice of the arguments voiced by any political party at any one time against the Constitution, its text and spirit had to be respected until changes were introduced by democratic means, i.e. by a two-third majority in Parliament, every five years.

The communists' campaign was based on two central lines. On the one hand, the PCP seeking to discredit the AD candidate, made public accusations of the General's handling of a prison camp in Angola, during the colonial wars, where, allegedly, torture had taken place. On the other hand they warned against the possible return to "fascism" if the AD succeeded in electing a President incapable of assuming an independent role.

The electorate wanted political stability. It had just returned the AD to power with an increased majority
obviously tired of the continuing strife within the left. It now faced the choice between the AD candidate who offered immediate institutional stability, and the President, supported by the left, a stern figure, given to few smiles, who during his first mandate had dismissed a minority government, had appointed unpopular governments of his own initiative and had entered into conflict with a majority government by exercising the Presidential veto on some of the government's more fundamental proposals in his plan for reform.

In short, to win, the AD candidate needed just under 3% of the vote provided the AD electorate remained solidly behind the AD leadership. The President, on the other hand needed just over 5% of the vote provided all who had voted for the socialists and the APU in October voted for him.

Would AD voters remain loyal to the leadership and vote for the AD candidate? Would socialist voters follow the Socialist party line and vote for the President or would they follow the party's Secretary General position, undefined as to how to vote but nevertheless unsupportive of the President? Would communist voters and sympathisers follow the advice of the PCP leadership and vote for the President, would they abstain or vote for Otelo as many did in the 1976 Presidential election?

Four days before the election, the AD Prime Minister, Sá Carneiro, leader and main founder of the PSD party, died in a plane crash just after taking off from Lisbon airport to
go to a campaign rally in Oporto. With him travelled the Defense Minister, Adelino Amaro da Costa, the number two of the christian democrats, who also died.

Some political observers attributed the victory of the President in the first round of the elections to these tragic deaths. However, the data collected for this research prior to the accident suggests otherwise as it is discussed in Chapter IX.

Table 1.6 shows the percentage of the vote in the two Presidential Elections of 1976 and 1980.

### TABLE 1.6
1976 and 1980 Presidential Elections
(percentage of vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY SUPPORT</th>
<th>CANDIDATE</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme left</td>
<td>Otelo</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Pato</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS+PSD+CDS</td>
<td>Eanes</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (+APU)</td>
<td>Eanes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD +CDS</td>
<td>Soares Carneiro</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Turnout)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(75.4)</td>
<td>(84.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The candidate supported by the extreme left wing, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho had the 16.5% of the vote obtained in the 1976 Presidential election severely reduced to 1.5% in the 1980 Presidential election.

Ramalho Eanes, who in the 1976 election with the support of the socialists (PS), the social democrats (PSD) (PSD) and the christian democrats (CDS) had obtained 61.5% of the vote, had this percentage reduced to 56.4% in the 1980 Presidential election with the support of the socialists (PS), the communists (PCP) and their allies in the APU alliance.

Soares Carneiro, the candidate supported by the right wing alliance, AD, formed between the social democrats (PSD) and the christian democrats (CDS) in the 1980 Presidential election obtained 40.3% of the vote, approximately 7% less than the percentage obtained by the AD in the 1980 General election which took place two months prior to the Presidential election.

1.3.2 - The AD Government from December 1980 to January 1983

With the death of the Prime Minister and of the Defence Minister, two key figures of the AD Alliance, the AD government suffered a severe blow. The Prime Minister was succeeded by Pinto Balsemão, a lawyer and prominent journalist, co-founder of the Social Democratic Party.
Pinto Balsemão was a more compromising and less abrasive politician than his predecessor and relations with the President improved. However, unlike his predecessor he was unable to control the factions within his own Party, the PSD. Internal conflict, the ambitions of the Christian democrats who aspired at enlarging their influence in the Government and the continuing deterioration of the economy contributed to the rapid loss of much of the impetus the Alliance had known during Sá Carneiro’s leadership.

As foreseen by the 1975 Constitution, which allowed for amendments to be made to its text every five years, some of its articles were amended in 1982. Although enjoying an absolute majority in Parliament, the AD did not have the two-third majority needed to introduce their own amendments. In the circumstances they had to compromise with the other parties represented in Parliament, especially with the socialists, and were unable to introduce the drastic changes they wanted in economic and labour regulations.

The AD government, weakened by the continuing in-fighting, was unable to take countercactive measures to prevent a grave economic crisis. This they blamed on the fact that the changes introduced in the Constitution in those aspects related to the relative weight of the public and private
sectors and the liberalisation of private enterprise had been so limited. Corruption, political intrigue and favouritism were widespread.

The AD alliance was dissolved in December 1982. In January, the PSD Prime Minister was replaced by Mota Pinto, who in 1978 had led one of the governments formed by the President.

The President dissolved Parliament and elections were called for April 1983.

1.3.3. The electoral campaign for the General Election of 1983

The right wing coalition had not brought the desired political stability and failed to achieve much needed economic development. All parties, including the Social-Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party, agreed that, due to the economic crisis, the gulf between the better-off classes and the less privileged was widening. There were increasing signs of severe hardship and widespread social injustice.

All parties underlined their campaigns with the same theme, i.e. the need to solve the economic crisis and the promotion of social welfare.
The former AD partners (Christian democrats, CDS, and the social democrats, PSD) wanted to distance themselves from the political instability and weakness of their joint former government. In their wall posters, speeches and party political broadcasts, they insisted on the need to restore old values such as morality, firmness of purpose, order and authority. In other respects the electoral platforms of the CDS and the PSD were also very similar.

Both parties strongly supported the introduction of changes in labour laws to allow for greater flexibility in the hiring and firing of labour, and continued to base their economic strategy on radical constitutional changes to allow the reduction of the public sector and the liberalisation of private enterprise.

The reduction of the public sector and the introduction of changes in labour laws clearly divided the right wing from the left wing parties. Within the left, however, the two issues also produced a division. The socialists favoured a more open and conciliatory attitude towards changes than the communists who continued to argue that a reduction of the public sector and interference with labour legislation were against the spirit and text of the Constitution.
In agreeing that some changes needed to be introduced in these two sectors, the socialists advocated that in so far as the labour sector was concerned, such changes should be negotiated by a forum of representatives from the government, parties, unions and employers — the Social Contract. This suggestion was well received by both the christian and social democrats and the smaller Trades Union Congress, the UGT. However, the communists and the larger Trades Unions Congress, the CGTP-Intersindical put up great opposition denouncing the suggestion as a means to weaken the position of workers.

During the campaign, the socialists announced their intention to carry out, if elected, 100 measures in their first 100 days in office. These measures covered all sectors of the economic and social life of the country. It would be impossible to describe all of them. In general terms, the 100 measures reflected the Socialists' preoccupations with social welfare, harmonious labour relations and economic recovery. On the latter, though, the socialists were quite clear that to achieve it, in the first two years of government they would be forced to introduce strict austerity measures to straighten the economy and bring inflation down from around 33% per annum to more acceptable levels, more in line with the inflation levels in other European countries.

The communists' campaign also reflected their great concern with the economy and with the general deterioration of
living conditions. But unlike the socialists who were advocating austerity measures to tackle the economic crisis, the communists called for the immediate restoration of the purchasing power.

According to the communists, the solution to the economic problems was not to be found in the reduction of the public sector and the liberalisation of labour laws. They saw the solution as lying in massive state investment in the country's natural resources, i.e. hydroelectric power, mining, agriculture, etc. Such investment, needed to diversify production, would create jobs and reduce the country's increasing reliance on imports, especially food imports.

Like all previous campaigns, the 1983 General election campaign was noisy, full of public meetings and carrying massive displays of party propaganda in every available space. Most issues became every party's issues, i.e. labour harmony, protection of workers' rights, increased welfare, development of national resources, creation of jobs and drop in inflation rates, etc. The controversy about the public sector and the liberalisation of labour laws remained, by and large, the two issues on which division between the Right and the Left was most apparent.
The general feeling was that no party would receive a majority of votes and that, therefore, after the election a coalition would have to be formed. The social democrats, unlike their former AD partners the christian democrats, made it clear that under no circumstances would they form a coalition with the christian democrats again. However, the social democrats, without committing themselves, were not unsympathetic to the formation of a joint post electoral platform with the socialists, who, for their part, remained aloof and uncommitted.

Table 1.7 shows the distribution of the vote in the 1983 General election among the main parties and the number of seats each party won in the Parliament. For comparison purposes and easier reference, the table also shows these results in the 1980 General election and in the 1976 General election the last election in which the CDS and PSD parties ran on their own prior to the formation of the AD alliance.
TABLE 1.7

Percentage distribution of the vote and number of seats won by each party in the 1983 General election (the % distribution of the vote and number of party seats in the 1976 and 1980 General election is also shown for easier reference)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD (CDS+PSD)</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (In "Diário da República",I Série, N. 121, Thursday 26 May 1983)

By and large, the 1983 General election results returned the parties to their 1976 positions. The CDS lost 1.5% of its share of the vote but the PSD increased its share by almost 1%. The Socialist party in 1983, in comparison with 1976, increased its share of the vote by just over 1% and the APU, in 1983, obtained 3.5% more of the votes it had obtained in 1976, due, perhaps, to the losses suffered by the small parties on its left.
Although the impetus of the AD alliance was broken, it is clear that CDS and PSD voters remained loyal to their respective parties in spite of the alliance's failure. It is probable, therefore, that the disenchantment with the AD was more acutely felt by the socialist voters who had switched their vote in 1979 and 1980.

1.3.4. The Local Elections of 1982

Independent local government was undoubtedly one of the most fundamental changes introduced by the Revolution of April 1974.

Until the Revolution, local government was one of the instruments used by the regime to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. The advent of elected local government from 1976, independent from national government, brought development and a substantial amelioration to the quality of life of local populations up and down the country. Electricity and water supply, housing, local transport, provision of creches, old age homes, playground facilities, health centres etc etc., increased dramatically.

In broad terms party distribution in local elections follows closely the national distribution (see table 1.8). However, given the more localized nature of the elections, i.e. candidates for a start are known to the voters, and the work achieved by the various local authority bodies is more easily assessed, voters, on the whole appear to be less passionately divided according to party lines than
during general election campaigns. Also, turnout percentages indicate less interest on the part of the electorate in Local elections. For example, the turnout in the Local elections of 1979 was 73.9%; by comparison, in the General election held in the same year turnout was 87.4%.

In the local elections of 1982, the survey was carried out in the Municipalities of Coimbra, Lisbon and Barreiro. The Presidency of the Municipal Chambers (Town Halls) of Lisbon and Barreiro were at the time in control of the AD and APU respectively. The Presidency of the Municipal Chamber of Coimbra had been in control of the Socialist party until the 1979 Local elections, when the Socialist party lost it to the AD alliance. The socialists, however, retained a great deal of influence in the Chamber.

Table 1.8 compares the party vote between the General election of 1979 and the Local elections of 1979 in the cities of Coimbra (200 km north of Lisbon), Lisbon and Barreiro (25 km south of Lisbon in the district of Setubal).
### TABLE 1.8

Comparison between the percentages of the vote obtained by the AD, the PS and the APU in the General election and Local election of 1979 in the Municipalities of the cities of Coimbra, Lisbon and Barreiro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipalities (Town Halls)</th>
<th>1979 General election (Parliament)</th>
<th>1979 Local* election (Town Halls)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Lisbon (District of Lisbon)</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Coimbra (District of Coimbra)</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Barreiro (District of Setubal)</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (In "As Eleições no Portugal de Abril", 1980)

**Section 1.4 - Electoral issues used in the three electoral surveys**

**1.4.1. Issues selected for the 1980 Presidential election**

The selection of the ten issues used for the 1980 Presidential election survey was based on the issues raised by the ongoing conflict between the AD government and the incumbent President Ramalho Eanes, and the arguments put forward by the AD leadership in support of institutional harmony as a safeguard of political stability.
The ten issues were:

1. A President should be impartial
2. A President should respect the Constitution
3. A President should use his right to veto bills judged to be unconstitutional
4. A President should risk political instability rather than give in to a government who act against the Constitution
5. A President should give unconditional support to the government
6. A President should support a dictatorial form of government
7. A President should support political stability
8. A President should support political instability
9. A President should support Revolution
10. A President should support a military coup

1.4.2. Issues selected for the 1982 Local elections

The ten issues selected for the 1982 Local elections tended to be of a social welfare nature reflecting the general needs of the population both in urban and rural areas. Seven out of the ten issues used concern such questions. Two of the remaining three address themselves to problems which were being reported by the newspapers concerning corruption charges made against a few town councillors. The tenth issue raised the point of the general lack of contact between councillors and local populations during mandates.
The ten issues were:

"In the municipality where I live ..."

1. ... housing should all be provided with piped water, electricity and sewage.

2. ... priority should be given to solving housing shortages

3. ... more sport and socio-cultural facilities should be provided

4. ... more playgrounds and creches should be built

5. ... more schools should be built

6. ... the important thing is to elect honest and hard working councillors who are interested in improving living conditions

7. ... local authorities should be accountable as to the manner public funds are administered

8. ... transport problems should be solved

9. ... priority should be given to pollution control

10. ... Councillors should maintain frequent contacts with local populations so that the most pressing problems are identified and solved

1.4.3 Issues selected for the 1983 General election

The selection of issues presented difficulties. The main one was due to the lack of differentiation between the main parties' positions on most of the issues raised, as explained in Section 1.3.3.
In view of the generally accepted principle that urgent measures were needed to solve the economic crisis and promote social welfare and justice, the eight issues selected were presented as corollaries to that principle.

The eight issues selected were:

"to solve the crisis and promote social welfare and justice ..."

1. ... the social contract between government employers and Unions should be celebrated. (issue proposed by the Socialist party, supported by the christian and social democrats and opposed by the communists)

2. ... patriotism and order should be strengthen (values which underlined the christian democrats' campaign)

3. ... social welfare policies based on the right of all to health, education and housing should be promoted (issue presented in great detail by the socialists within their 100 measures manifesto, supported by all the other parties)

4. ... the public sector should be reduced (issue supported by the social democrats and christian democrats; half supported by the socialists who criticised the extent and radical nature of the two right wing parties' stands and bitterly opposed by the communists)

5. ... government should rule with purpose, authority and
morality (values which underlined the social-democrats' campaign)

6. ... a new government should embark on a programme of development of the country's natural resources, in order to diversify production and create new jobs (issue proposed by the communists but widely supported by all the other parties)

7. ... changes in Labour Laws including the strike law should be introduced (issue supported by the social democrats and christian democrats; half supported by the socialists who criticised the extent and radical nature of the two right wing parties' stands and bitterly opposed by the communists)

8. ... a new government should increase the purchasing power of the people (issue proposed by the communists and supported by the right wing parties; the socialists did not on account that austerity measures needed to be introduced to curb inflation, before the country could embark on an economic recovery).

Section 1.5 - Summary of Chapter I

This chapter reviewed the main political and electoral developments that took place in Portugal between the 1974 Revolution and the General election held in 1983 to provide the necessary framework for the issues used to probe into the political awareness of Portuguese voters.
Extensive reference will be made to the selected issues and to their background in the Chapters devoted to the presentation and discussion of the results of each of the three surveys. The theoretical basis of the research will now be presented and discussed.

The following three chapters are devoted, therefore, to a description of the main social Psychology models of voting behaviour (Chapter II); a detailed account of the Reasoned Action Model (Chapter III) and examples of the applications of the model in Britain and the United States (Chapter IV).
CHAPTER II

A SURVEY OF THE MAIN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MODELS
OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

When individuals cast their votes in an election what are the main influences which have impinged upon them to make them pick one particular party or candidate out of a number of choices?

From the first day of our lives, we live in a social environment. We receive from it socially structured knowledge (Bruner and Sherwood, 1981) which in adulthood is coloured by its particular values, motivations and norms (Kraus, 1980; Zajonc, 1980; Taffel and Forgas, 1981). However, we are more than passive receivers of knowledge. We are recreators and creators of knowledge, ideas and representations at the individual and social level (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Moscovici, 1981). Furthermore, we develop particularised preferences, dictated not only by our emotions but also by our reason. Therefore, the factors which influence vote choice, like any other choice, are to be found in our social environment and in our own cognitions.

The important question is, to decide which factors play a more determinant role in vote choice, whether those related to the socialization processes, social norms and expectations of the social environment or those related to
the individuals' own rational processes and attitudes, i.e. the creation and recreation of knowledge and representations by themselves.

The bulk of research on voting behaviour has been carried out in the United States where, in the last fifty years or so, systematic attempts have been made to understand and predict electoral choice. More recently, researchers in Great Britain have taken up the challenge posed by what should be the most important process of decision making at a social level in a democracy.

In the United States, two models of voting behaviour dominated research from 1944 until the late seventies: the Columbia Model (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944, and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954); and the Michigan Model (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960). Research findings supported the view of social influence rather than individual cognitions as the determinant factor in vote choice. The findings differed, though, as regards to the type of social influence directly linked to vote choice.

Later models, such as the Reasoned Action Model, developed by Fishbein et al (1976) in the United States, and the Cognitive Model developed by Himmelweit et al (1982) in Britain, support the relevance of social normative influence on vote choice but consider that individuals' cognitions, i.e. political knowledge, play a more determinant role. The authors of these two later
models acknowledge the influence of a model of voting behaviour developed by a political scientist (Downs, 1957), the Rational Voter Model. In the following sections, this model is presented as a brief bridging reference between the two distinct periods in psychological research on voting behaviour.

All the models of voting behaviour described in this chapter make use of one concept, central to the understanding and explanation of human social behaviour, i.e the concept of attitude. Social psychology has provided two definitions of attitude which will be referred to and discussed later on in this chapter and in chapter III. For the moment it is important to refer the common element of the two definitions, namely that an attitude is an expression of what a person feels towards her world, be it an object, an event, an idea or a behaviour. It is also important to stress that a person's attitudes do not develop independently of the particular social environment in which she lives. Her attitudes are, therefore formed by the combination of social influence factors and of her own cognitions and representations.

General references made to "attitude" in the description of the voting behaviour models that follows should not depart from these consideranda.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.1 describes the earlier models of voting behaviour, i.e the
Columbia and Michigan models. Section 2.2 presents a brief account of the Rational Voter Model developed by Downs.

Section 2.3 is devoted to the later models of voting behaviour: the Reasoned Action Model which will be presented and discussed in chapter III will only be briefly introduced here, and the Cognitive Model. Section 2.4 gives a brief summary of the chapter.

Section 2.1. The earlier Models - Columbia and Michigan

2.1.1. The Columbia Model

Using the panel method of interviewing, the Columbia researchers interviewed the same group of 600 respondents, once a month, over a period of seven months, prior to the American presidential elections of November 1940 and 1944.

The questions put to respondents were wide ranging and allowed for the study of the decision making process while respondents were actually making up their minds. It was, thus, possible to discover if specific events during the campaign had had an effect on decision and whether people's decisions were affected by the information they were exposed to, i.e., the media, other people's opinions, etc. It was also possible, after the election, to ascertain whether respondents had voted according to their expressed decision prior to the elections, i.e. whether intentions were upheld by behaviour.
In spite of their initial intention to concentrate on the study of attitudes in the specific context of voting behaviour, i.e. attitudes to parties, candidates, issues, Lazarsfeld et al switched their focus of attention to other variables which, as the interviews progressed, appeared to be central to vote choice.

This change in their initial focus of attention was due to an important preliminary finding which suggested that attitudes towards parties, candidates and issues changed not through knowledge acquired through reading or hearing about them but through personal face to face contacts with other people. In other words people's attitudes appeared to be influenced by the opinions of others and were therefore, maintained or changed due to the effect of some social processes which the Columbia researchers set out to define.

Attitude formation and maintenance towards political parties was found to be the result of "social application", i.e. group membership on the basis of social class, ethnic group, religious groups and other informed associations in which a person participates. In view of the fact that by and large, voters continued to vote as they always had and as the families had, party identification was seen as a consequence of group membership, since an individual's positive or negative attitudes towards the parties resulted from whether the group or groups to which he belonged supported the parties or not.
According to the findings, within groups the same attitudes were developed and maintained by the influence some people were able to exercise on the other group members. These opinion leaders were found to be the only group members who possessed an ideology, in any conscious way, and were able to translate their ideas into decisions about their actions. Ordinary people appeared to accept and follow passively the ideas of the opinion leaders in their group.

However, some people did change their attitudes during electoral campaigns. This change in their attitudes was found to be due to the effect of cross pressures, that is the conflicting opinions between the various groups a person is affiliated to. As Lazarsfeld et al put it:

"... an upper class Catholic may find that his religious affiliation pulls him in one direction, while his class position pulls him in the opposite direction. And when concrete situations, such as an election campaign, require him to make a definite decision, he must also decide which of his group loyalties should take priority." (Ibid, 1948, p.xxiv).

Summing up and as it can be seen in Figure 2 next page the Columbia researchers considered that social group influence was the most important determinant of party identification, either through the influence of past voting habits determined by parental vote and reinforced by the opinions of the groups to which a person belonged, or through the result of inter group cross pressures.
Figure 2 Patterns of influence determining how the "ordinary voter" will vote: The Columbia model (arrows indicate directions of influence)

In turn, party identification was found to be the only determinant of vote choice. Although political attitudes i.e. attitudes toward the parties, candidates and issues, were found to correlate with vote choice, the Columbia researchers considered that they only did so because they were determined by party identification. Party identification therefore, was found to influence vote choice and political attitudes in a similar way.

The Columbia findings, attributing to attitudes a secondary - indirect role, influenced many years of voting behaviour research. And yet, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1948) made specific references to a factor which can assume great importance in vote decision processes.
They noted that the two Presidential elections covered by their research had taken place in a calm political climate in which few issues had split the main parties, and wondered what their model would have looked like if the political climate had not been so calm. Would political attitudes have been assigned a different role?

2.1.2. The Michigan Model

In 1960, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Centre, published "The American voter", a book devoted to a 'new way of looking into vote choice'.

Instead of the panel method of interviewing used by the Columbia group, the Michigan researchers collected their data by means of nationwide surveys of representative samples of voters during the campaigns for the 1956 presidential election, the 1958 congressional election, and also, but to a limited extent, the 1952 presidential election.

Party identification, revealed by the consistency with which voters vote for the same party across elections, was found to be the major determinant of vote choice. Identification, however, was not found to be the result of a decision process based on ideological and political awareness. The attachment to a particular party appeared to be due to the influence of past voting habits and early political socialization experiences. The latter, in turn,
were determined by the background of voters, i.e. social status, social mobility, parental vote, etc. Political socialization and voting habits shaped the individual's system of values and personal goals although these did not contribute directly to vote choice.

Political attitudes were only considered to develop as a result of party identification. In other words, individuals appeared to hold political attitudes only in so far as they reflected those adopted by the party they identified with.

In their original model, the Michigan group assumed that information sources such as the media, the stands of politicians, the opinions of friends, etc., had no direct or immediate effect on vote choice. Subsequently this assumption was considered to be too strong (Butler and Stokes, 1974; Key, 1966). The influence of information sources was later included in the model, as having a weak and indirect effect on the shaping of party identification.

In the weaker version of the model, political attitudes, which in the earlier version were considered to be a consequence of party identification, are viewed as primarily determined by past voting habits although able to receive some influence from information sources, i.e. the media, politicians' stands, opinions of friends etc.
The two following figures depict the pattern of influences in vote choice suggested by the strong and weak versions of the Michigan model.

**Figure 3** The Michigan model of vote choice (original "strong form").

**Figure 4** The Michigan model of vote choice: general version of the modified "weak" forms of the model

(Humphreys, P. (1985), Unit 17/18, D307 Social Psychology Course, The Open University, pp.30 and 35).
2.1.3 A comparison of the Columbia and Michigan models

The two models suggest, through different types of social influence (group dynamics in one and early socialization in the other), that party identification is the major factor affecting voting decision. In both studies, political attitudes are considered to be dependent upon party identification. Attitudes towards parties, party leaders and the parties' stands concerning electoral issues were considered to be consequences rather than determinants of party identification.

The Columbia researchers had, however, considered the possibility that attitudes could have a role to play if election campaigns were centred around important issues. They also hinted at the importance that clear arguments on the part of politicians could have on the decisions made by voters, as later research findings suggested (Key, 1966). In their opinion the policies discussed by the parties during the election campaigns of 1940 and 1944, were poorly expressed and articulated by the parties. By and large, people appeared uninterested in political issues and their electoral decision had not been affected by them.

In "The American voter", the Michigan group were much more critical of the voters' lack of interest. They viewed the American voter as an apathetic, uninformed individual with only a modest understanding of specific issues and quite
ignorant of matters of public policy. In their conclusions, they wrote:

"Our failure to locate more than a trace of 'ideological' thinking in the protocols of our surveys emphasises the general impoverishment of political thought in a large proportion of the electorate". (pp.542-543).

Some researchers suggest that the disinterest shown by American voters might have been due to the political context in which the elections were fought, a factor which was not taken into account by the Michigan group (Lindzey and Aronson, 1969, pp 324).

Referring to the 1956 American presidential election, covered by the Michigan study, Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976, p.a.), call it "an unfortunate baseline" and wonder whether 1956 was an "atypical year with few crucial divisive issues". Later, Himmelweit et al (1985) pointed out that the Michigan surveys "fitted the calm period of the 1950's when few issues divided the electorate."

In spite of the atypical context in which the elections covered by the Michigan surveys may have been fought, which by itself may explain the researchers conclusions regarding the lack of political thought on the part of the majority of the electorate, the basis on which voters were found to be lacking in ideological ability should be questioned.

The Michigan group viewed the ideological ability of voters from a perspective of the type of ideological knowledge
which is assumed to underlie the political thinking of party leaders, politicians and political scientists. They expected ideology to encompass political content as well as "content outside the political order as narrowly defined - social and economic relationships, and even matters of religion, education, and the like", and to be a "highly differentiated attitude structure" where "the parts are organized in coherent fashion". (pp.192, "The American Voter).

The generalised lack of ideological thinking found by Campbell et al (1960) was supported by later research results from tests of political socialization theories based on cognitive development (Adelson and O'Neill, 1966; Merelman, 1969). Such results indicated that only a minority of the population possess a coherent attitude structure on which they base their political actions. In other words, only a minority reached the highest stage of being 'ideologues' (Converse, 1964).

More recently, a study carried out to assess the patterns of support for democratic and capitalist values in the United States (Chong, McClosky and Zeller, 1985), supported Converse's view. Chong et al found that only an elite displays an effective knowledge of and coherent attitude structures to these values. The attitudes of the general public, on the other hand, "reflect only a faint recognition of the general principles underlying the two traditions". (p.431)
One problem with such approaches to the development of political thinking is the assumption that individuals can only make political choices when they are in full possession of comprehensive and highly organized political, social and economic knowledge. The general impoverishment of political thought found by such studies may be more apparent than real since it may have more to do with the strict, albeit correct, definition of ideology against which people's ideological thinking is measured, than with the capacity which people may have to judge among political alternatives.

By and large, individuals can and do make rational decisions with respect to goals they want to achieve possessing incomplete, diffuse or fragmented information. They rely upon the internal representations they have built about the world as they know it, i.e. their cognitive scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977) which represent coherent and stable interpretations of sequences of events. When faced with a choice between competing alternatives, the crucial factor is that they are able to assess the differences which distinguish the options available to them in relation to what they, themselves, want.

Section 2.2 Downs Model of the Rational Voter

The notion of the rational voter was introduced by Downs (1957) in his book "An economic theory of democracy". The model developed by Downs is based on economic rationality and draws parallels between economic concepts such as
'utilities' opportunity costs and pay-offs and the variables which underlie vote decision processes. Although the model refers to psychological variables, i.e. attitudes, evaluations, which underlie decision processes, such variables are not introduced and discussed within a psychological framework. They retain the subjective value which in economic theory is related to 'cash value' (Humphreys, 1985) rather than assuming the subjective value of psychological attributes, i.e. the affective, cognitive and conative elements which influence human behaviour or action.

Downs considered both why people should vote and the reasons which led them to pick one party rather than another. According to Downs, people vote on account of two main reasons. First because they perceive it as their duty as citizens to participate in the democratic life of their country; and second because they are given a choice between alternatives, a choice which can 'maximize utilities and minimize regret'. In other words, people understand that electoral outcomes are important in that they can affect their lives.

Parties on the other hand, run for elections because they formulate policies which they want to implement. In order to achieve their goals, parties need to win votes, more votes than their opponents. According to the model, the choice voters face, therefore, is not a choice between parties, but rather a choice between parties' platforms.
Party identification, the most important determinant of vote choice according to the Columbia and Michigan findings, has only a marginal role to play in Downs' vote decision model. The rational voter model ascribes to party identification a labile role directly dependent upon the individual voter. According to the model, the voter will identify with a particular party as long as the party's policies conform with the voter's expectations. The result of an election is seen as an equilibrium between voter's decisions and parties' policies, in an analogous way to the consumer who wants to maximize his utilities and the firms, who in providing the goods for the consumer to buy, want to maximize their profits. "Parties' purpose is to win votes, they will spell out the aims and costs of proposals only in so far as this is necessary for this purpose given the actions of the opposition parties" (Downs, 1957). In other words, parties 'advertise their goods' bearing in mind their opponents 'advertising' campaigns.

According to Downs theory, evaluation of parties' platforms together with some image of the parties are the only determinants of vote choice. When parties' stands on issues do not conform with the expectations of people who have previously voted for them, the parties are likely to lose their support. Vote switching should, therefore, be a consequence of a mismatch between voters' expectations and parties' platforms.
The Downs' model, however, has only received occasional empirical support (Fishbein and Coombs, 1974). In one of such studies, Key (1966), using Downs model, compared attitudes of vote switchers to those who remained with the same party across seven different elections. Consistent with the model's expectations, findings showed that vote switchers' attitudes no longer fitted those of the voters who continued to vote for the same party. Furthermore, the factor which appeared to affect rational and responsible choice on the part of voters was the clarity of the parties' positions and the amount of information available concerning the alternatives.

Downs' model is important on two counts. First, it highlighted the importance of issues in electoral campaigns and the impact of information concerning electoral alternatives. In asserting the importance of parties' stands vis-a-vis voters' choices, the model conferred to voters the ability to make a choice which is not confined to the restricted sphere of social influence but open to the influence of voters' own likes, beliefs and expectations.

Secondly, the model has had great influence, in the change of perspective adopted in later social psychology models of voting, especially the two models discussed in the next sections, one of which, The Reasoned Action model, underlies the thesis.
Section 2.3 The later models - The Reasoned Action Model and the Cognitive Model of Vote Choice

While research on voting behaviour continued, based on versions of the Michigan model, two new models were being developed and tested. One, the Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein et al, 1974, 1978 and 1980) was developed by American researchers and tested both in the United States and in Britain. The second model, the Cognitive Model of Vote Choice (Himmelweit et al, 1982) was derived by British researchers across a longitudinal study covering a period of 23 years.

In the next section, the Reasoned Action Model, which will be fully presented and discussed in Chapter III, will only be briefly introduced. The final section of this Chapter presents the main features and findings of the Cognitive Model.

2.3.1 The Reasoned Action Model of Voting Behaviour

The Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein et al, 1978) is composed of two interconnected sub-models: the attitudinal model and a decision making model based on intentionality, called the intention model.

The attitudinal model is based on a psychological theory of attitude developed by Fishbein in 1967 and tested in the American presidential election of 1964 (Fishbein and Coombs, 1974). The intention model (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) describes the psychological mechanism through which
attitudes are translated into action, i.e. the prediction of behaviour.

The overall theory of reasoned action which underlies the model makes one basic assumption, that human beings are usually quite rational and make systematic use of the information available to them, and it argues that people consider the implications of their actions before they decide to engage or not to engage in a given behaviour (Fishbein et al, 1980, p.5). According to the theory, people, in their actions, are guided by their attitudes but the immediate precursor is their intention to perform or not to perform them.

This theory of attitude makes an important distinction between beliefs and attitudes.

Considering attitude as an unidimensional concept (Fishbein, 1967: Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957: Thurstone, 1931), Fishbein and Coombs (1974) describe it as the 'amount of affect for or against' an object, i.e. the amount of liking or disliking, or the indifference an individual feels towards an object and not as a combination of feelings, beliefs and actions. The amount of affect can be evaluated positively or negatively or be neutral (Osgood et al 1957).

A belief, on the other hand, assumes a connection between a concept and another concept to which it may be temporarily or permanently associated (Fishbein, 1967: Fishbein and
Coombs, 1974). Paraphrasing Fishbein and Coombs' example, a person may be asked to consider the following statement: 'Mrs Thatcher opposes nationalizations'. The person may believe the statement to be true, i.e. that 'Mrs Thatcher' and 'nationalizations' are related as the statement implies or untrue, i.e. that such relation between the two objects does not exist. Or, still, the person may know nothing about such relationship. The verification of the statement as true or untrue depends, however, on the amount of information the person has about the suggested relationship. If the information the person possesses about the relationship does not permit her to verify the statement, categorically, in either direction, it may still allow her to consider it as probably true or probably untrue. The operational definition of a belief is, thus, the probability or improbability that a particular relationship exists between the object of belief (Mrs Thatcher) and some other object (nationalizations).

The beliefs held towards the attitude object (i.e. Mrs Thatcher) are compared against the person's own evaluations of the other objects (i.e. nationalization, etc) with which the attitude object is being associated. Thus, in the attitudinal model, attitudes towards objects are considered to be the product of a combination between beliefs and the independent evaluations of the objects themselves, i.e. the belief that Mrs Thatcher holds a particular view regarding nationalization, and the person's evaluation of the concept 'nationalization' itself.
Apart from the distinction between attitudes and beliefs and the weight of beliefs in the formation of general attitudes, the theory of reasoned action makes a further distinction, namely that between attitudes towards objects (i.e. attitude toward Mrs Thatcher) and attitudes towards behaviours or actions (i.e. attitude towards voting for Mrs Thatcher).

According to the theory of reasoned action attitudes towards objects do not usually directly determine action with respect to that object. The direct determinant of behaviour is the person's intention to perform it or not to perform it. In the case of electoral decision, intention to vote is dependent upon the person's attitude towards voting and also upon a normative, social influence element reflecting the opinion of trusted others as to whether and how the action should be performed. (The actual behaviour is, of course, ultimately dependent upon transient variables such as the weather, health, time, etc.).

The Reasoned Action Model by focusing on the determinants of attitude to acts and social influence, takes account of the factors which are likely to have greater effect on voters' decisions in the period prior to elections: on the one hand, the voters' own evaluations of electoral issues and their beliefs regarding the parties' stands on them; on the other, the value voters attribute to the opinion of trusted others. The relative weight of the two components on the electoral decision, i.e. the rational component
reflected in the attitudes towards voting for the various parties and/or candidates, and the normative component, is an empirical question.

However, the model does not exclude the importance of other factors found to be determinants of vote choice by both the Columbia and the Michigan studies. Social influence through group membership and demographic variables (Columbia model) is represented, although indirectly, in the normative constraints which might have a greater effect on voters' decisions than attitudinal factors (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980, pp.177). The effect of party identification (Michigan model) is also assumed to be indirect, mediated by the attitudinal and normative components of choice (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980, p.178).

2.3.2 The Cognitive Model of Vote Choice

The Cognitive model was derived from a major longitudinal study carried out in Britain from 1951 to 1974, using a cross sectional sample group of boys who, in 1951, were 13-14 years of age. Their progress was followed across a 23 year period, from adolescence to 1959, the first election in which they voted, and from 1959 to 1974, during which period the group provided data related to five of the six general elections which took place in Britain.

The study was carried out by a group of researchers, Himmelweit et al, at the London School of Economics, and the model is often referred to as the L.S.E. Model. In
their book "How voters decide" (1985) Himmelweit et al describe the study and present and discuss the results on which the Cognitive Model is based. They also use three additional data sources from Sarlvik and Crewe's surveys of the general elections of 1974, 1979 and 1983.

Acknowledging the contribution of both the Michigan and the Downs Rational models to the Cognitive Model, Himmelweit et al (1985) write:

"Although models centred on the 'economic rationality' of the voter take into account party and candidate performance, they tend to concentrate on the final decision process only, and ignore the influences that lead to particular evaluations of issues. In the Michigan model the past does enter: party identification is thought to have its roots in early socialization and in attachment to subsequent reference groups, with time and habit of voting increasing that attachment. But in both models too little account is taken of the social context in which the elections are fought, the cultural values of the society of the day and the life history of issues, i.e. the way political ideas develop, crystallize and are put into practice and, in the process, transformed. Nor is the role of the individual's value system considered, how assessment of specific proposals is coloured by their broader perspective on society".
The Cognitive model, therefore, combines elements related to early socialization processes and past voting habit effects with the rational processes which take place when the voter has to make a choice between electoral alternatives, and extends the network of influences to include the voters' own value systems and the social context in which elections take place.

Figure 5 illustrates the complex network of influences and their suggested strengths in vote choice.

Within this global cognitive mode, the L.S.E. group include a sub-model 'the consumer model' to explain the processes which take place at the time voters make up their minds.

Figure 6 shows the components of the consumer model.
Figure 6 The Consumer model - the decision mechanism of the Cognitive model.

The consumer model is concerned with the factors which in the general cognitive model immediately precede and are considered as the most direct determinants of vote choice, i.e. political attitudes, beliefs and evaluations of parties and party leaders, party preference and party identification.

The term 'utility' borrowed from economic theory is not used in the same sense as in economics. In economic theory 'utility' i.e. the subjective value of a commodity, is defined in relation to its 'objective' cash value. In the consumer model, the term 'utility' is defined in relation to the attributes which characterize, psychologically, each of the electoral alternatives (Humphreys, 1980).
In the consumer model the choice of a party among the electoral alternatives is a function of the relative preferences a voter has for each party and the likelihood of desired policies being implemented. Such preferences depend in turn on the voters' attitudes to issues, and on the probability that parties implement desirable policies and will not implement undesirable ones.

The data collected by the L.S.E. group across the 23 years provides a wealth of information regarding the influence of each component of the cognitive model as a whole in the processes directly and indirectly related to vote choice. The detailed and interconnected analyses of components, i.e. sociological, social influence, value systems, attitudinal and cognitive are highly informative in a way, that, perhaps, only a longitudinal study of such dimension and characteristics can provide.

Himmelweit et al argue the validity of the model on the basis of four major findings which indicate that attitudes rather than social influence and early socialization effects are the main determinant factors of vote choice.

First, the sample showed a high degree of volatility from election to election indicated by the low correlations obtained between past vote and vote choice. Only 30% of the sample, across all elections, voted consistently for the same party: 16% for the Conservative party, 10% for the Labour party, 2% for the Liberal party and 2% never voted (pp.35). Such high volatility in vote choice would not be
expected to occur if early socialization were to have a determinant effect on vote choice.

Secondly, voters were able to perceive correctly the differences between the parties' stands on non-consensus issues (pp.113). This finding assumes extreme importance in the validation of any model of vote choice when voters decide which way to vote they not only need to have an opinion concerning the electoral issues but also know the parties stands on the same issues. To be rational, electoral decision must rest on knowledge of the differences between the stands of each party.

Thirdly, an evaluation of the separate and combined effects of past voting history and attitudes on vote choice revealed that full knowledge of an individual's past voting history, gathered at the time of each election and not on recall, "comes close to being as good an indicator of that person's future vote as his attitudes" (pp.84). However, attitudes when added to the full voting history of the individual enhance prediction. The percentage of correct classification yielded by two discriminant analyses on the 1984 vote of the longitudinal study rose from 71% to 80% across all voters when 1974 attitudes were added to past voting history.

Since attitudes appear to make a contribution to vote choice over and above voting history it is pertinent to suggest that past voting and therefore vote choice is shaped by attitudes.
Finally, in order to establish unequivocally a causal link between attitudes and behaviour, the L.S.E. group set out to show that when an individual voter expressed attitudes which were at variance with those expressed by the majority of those voting for the same party, the likelihood of him defecting to another party in a subsequent election increased. This test was carried out comparing data obtained by the British Election Survey (Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983) with the longitudinal study data (Himmelweit et al). Out of 82% of voters who in the 1974 election had shown a good fit on attitudes to issues only 18% voted for a different party in 1979. Of the 69% who in 1974 had shown a poor fit, 31% voted for a different party in 1979 (pp.103).

The attitudinal component, i.e. the combined effect of the voters attitudes towards electoral issues and their beliefs concerning the parties' stands on these issues, was found to be the major determinant of vote choice. Social influence and sociological variables were found to have little effect on the prediction of vote choice. The results do not support, therefore, the Michigan findings but are comparable with those obtained with the tests of the Fishbein's model of reasoned action. The latter will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

2.3.3 A comparison of the Cognitive and Reasoned Action Models

The Cognitive model and the Reasoned Action model have
important similarities and differences. They both take account of the importance of the social environment and background of voters, of electoral issues and electoral contexts, although these are subjugated to attitudes as determinants. They both postulate a decision mechanism which deals directly with the choice voters have to make, i.e. the Consumer Model in the Cognitive Model, and the Intention Model in the Reasoned Action Model. The main differences lie precisely in the way these decision mechanisms are considered to operate.

The decision mechanism of the Cognitive Model, i.e. the consumer model postulates that attitudes to issues together with beliefs about the likelihood of parties implementing them yield a measure of preference for party. It is this reasoning, which just before elections, can predict actual voting.

The decision mechanism of the Reasoned Action Model, i.e. the intention model considers attitudes to issues and beliefs regarding the parties stands on them as only an influence on one of the two components of choice, i.e. voters' attitudes towards voting for each party. The other component of the decision to vote is under normative control. In the intention model decision is not exclusively under the control of attitudes. The predictive measure of actual voting, i.e. intention, is a weighted measure which indicates which of the components has more weight in the decision to vote for a particular party. The
way the components are weighted can change for different voters, for different elections, for different historical periods, for different cultures, etc.

The consumer model and the intention model are both expectancy-value attitude models. "Expectancy", another name for a belief, is a probabilistic expectation about any future happening. "Value", in this sense, means feeling or evaluation. There are various types of expectancy-value attitude models.

The consumer model, the sub-model within the Cognitive Model which predicts vote choice, is based on behavioural decision theory (Edwards, 1954) and is usually described as a decision theoretic model. According to behavioural decision theory when a person has to choose between alternatives, she chooses the alternative with higher probabilities of producing the most favourable outcome. The consumer model takes into account the person's own cognitions of the election context and the likelihood of the person, through her choice, improve, deteriorate or maintain the existing status quo. The Model can predict which choice a rational personal should make.

The intention model, the sub-model within the Reasoned Action Model, is an earlier example of expectancy-value attitude models. Although closely related to decision theoretic models, is mathematically less consistent and robust. It predicts vote intention by taking into account the overall feeling of favourability or unfavourability a
person holds with respect to each alternative. However, it is simpler to administer. In the particular case of Portugal, the intention model was considered to have a distinctive advantage over the more robust consumer model. For, unlike the consumer model, it provided a simple and direct way of assessing the contribution of social influence factors vis-a-vis the weight of attitudinal factors in the decision making processes of an electorate little accustomed to facing alternative electoral choices. And this was crucial.

Section 2.4 - Summary of Chapter II

This chapter started by making an important point, namely that vote choice had to be dependent upon the influence of the social environment on voters' and voters' own cognitions and representations, i.e. their own knowledge of electoral issues and their attitudes towards the political elements directly related to their vote choices.

Probably due to the calmer political climate of the time, the earlier models concluded that voting behaviour was dependent upon social influence factors which shaped the only direct determinant of vote choice, i.e. party identification.

In contrast, the later models, tested perhaps in less calm electoral periods, concluded that attitudes played a more important role in voting behaviour but did not exclude the importance of social influence factors. Indeed, the
Reasoned Action Model which was applied in this research, suggests that the relative weights of the social influence component and of the attitudinal component of vote choice vary according to voters, elections, cultures and historical periods. It is to a fuller discussion of the components of the Reasoned Action Model that we now turn.
CHAPTER III

USING THE MODEL OF REASONED ACTION TO STUDY THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE AMONG PORTUGUESE VOTERS

Introduction

In both the United States and Britain, the life history of issues mirrors the passage of time, the success and failures of past governments and provide the electorate not only with a basis for deciding which are the most pressing problems which need to be tackled but also who, among the parties, appears to be the best equipped to solve them in a particular social, political and economic context, at a particular time. The explanation for significant vote switching from election to election is found, therefore, in the ability of the electorate to determine the important, salient issues, and which party is most likely to implement their solution.

In spite of the obvious shortcomings of the Portuguese political scene in this respect, from the first election in 1975 to the third general election in October 1980, the electorate showed increasingly stronger signs of vote switching. If a comparison between the composition of the first legislative Parliament in 1976 and that of the Parliament elected in 1980 is made, in global left/right terms, the result is a complete reversal, with a leftwing majority being replaced by a rightwing majority.
What was the basis for such rapid and massive electoral change? "Irrational" behaviour based on the influence of normative factors, i.e. opinion of group leaders within the family, the circle of friends or the church, or was there evidence that voters were making reasoned choices even if based on the confused, information available to them?

These signs of vote switching among the Portuguese electorate provided the basis for assessing voting behaviour in terms of reasoned choice and investigate the relationship between this reasoning component of vote choice and that related to social influence.

As stated in Chapter II, the Reasoned Action model provided a simple framework for the research. In this chapter the Model and its elements are presented in detail, together with descriptions of its applications in voting behaviour.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 3.1 presents the assumptions on which the model is based. Section 3.2 describes the relationship between attitudes and behaviour and through a practical example the connection between beliefs, as determinants of attitudes, and behaviour. Section 3.3 using the practical example introduced in section 3.2 describes the role of social influences on intention and behaviour. Section 3.4 provides a brief summary of the chapter.
Section 3.1. - The assumptions of the Reasoned Action Model

The following diagram shows how the two components of the model, i.e. the attitudinal model and the intention model and how their elements are interconnected, as well as the role of other variables which are assumed to indirectly related to the decision process and behaviour, i.e. the external variables.

The model makes three fundamental assumptions. First, that behaviour is directly dependent upon intention to perform or not to perform the behaviour. Second, that intention is directly dependent upon the attitude towards performing the behaviour and also upon a subjective norm related to whether or not the behaviour should be performed. Third, that the determinants of attitude to act and thence intention are, in turn, determined by the individuals' knowledge of the world, i.e. electoral issues, party
platforms and voters' own beliefs and the extent to which the opinion of trusted others are important to them.

All other variables are considered to be external, in the sense that they do not play a direct role in the shaping of intention to perform a given behaviour. Demographic variables, general attitudes toward objects in the world, the personality traits of individuals, in other words, 'what the individuals already are' are held as background constants. They influence the way knowledge is acquired and integrated, the evaluations made about issues in general, the beliefs about the world, the relationships established with social referents and the value of such relationships as guides for action.

Section 3.2 Attitudes and behaviour

Contrary to many conceptions of attitude in which feelings, beliefs and predispositions to act are somewhat vaguely combined to form attitudes (Allport, 1953; Krech and Crutchfield, 1948; Katz and Holland, 1959; Rosenberg et al, 1960), in the Reasoned Action model attitude is defined as "a person's evaluation of any psychological object" i.e. the measure of affect a person's holds toward an object (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, pp.27) or a behaviour.

This unidimensional view of attitude has distinctive advantages over the more traditional multidimensional approach. The advantages are related both to problems with
attitude measurement on the one hand and to problems concerning the relationship between attitudes and behaviour.

Most of the research carried out to explore the link between attitudes and behaviour, following a multidimensional attitude approach failed to measure the three components of attitude, i.e. affective (feelings), cognitive (beliefs) and conative (overt actions). Most studies only tapped the affective component and the low relation found between attitudes and behaviour was circularly explained by the non-inclusion of the other two components in the study.

From a multidimensional perspective, the relationship between attitudes and behaviour was found to be weak. Research under this perspective led to the development of various theories of attitude organization and change known as consistency theories (Heider, 1944, 1958) out of which was developed the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). According to this theory the three components of attitude, i.e. feelings, beliefs and behaviour should be consistent with each other.

When they are not i.e. when the individual experiences cognitive dissonance, the individual will try to eliminate the unpleasantness caused by dissonance and change occurs. For example, if a person's behaviour is inconsistent with her beliefs, the person will either change her beliefs or
her behaviour in such way as to achieve consistency between her beliefs and her actions.

However, research to test cognitive dissonance theory has involved, by and large, paradigms which have forced people to behave in a way inconsistent with their beliefs. Results showed that people tend to change their beliefs and make them consistent with their actions but they have failed to show the extent to which feelings and/or beliefs influence behaviour. Ajzen & Fishbein (1980) reviewing the literature only refer to three studies dealing with the effect of attitude change on behaviour. The three studies reported no change in behaviour caused by a change in attitudes.

The problem concerning the hypothetical causal relationship between attitudes and behaviour in the sense that behaviour is determined by attitudes has permeated most of social psychology research on attitudes and attitude change. In spite of the fact that results of experiments reveal that this relationship is weak, the notion is appealing perhaps in view of its very strong intuitive basis. The reduction of behaviour to a single overt action, as it is the case in experiments, together with the compounded definition of attitude, which itself includes a behavioural component understood as either the behaviour itself or verbal expressions as to what the behaviour would be, fail to take account of the influence of context, knowledge,
normative constraints and other variables, which can influence both behaviour and attitudes at any given time.

As Freedman, Carlsmith and Sears (1970) concluded "...attitudes always produce pressure to behave consistently with them, but external pressures and extraneous considerations can cause people to behave inconsistently with their attitudes. Any attitude or change in attitude tends to produce behaviour that corresponds with it. However, this correspondence often does not appear because of other factors that are involved in the situation (pp. 385-386)".

If experimentally, the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is found to be weak but nevertheless, on intuitive grounds, this relationship remains strong, the problem may be due, as Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) suggest, to errors in determining the appropriate variables which link particular attitudes to particular behaviours. "To predict a single behaviour we have to assess the person's attitude toward the target at which the behaviour is directed". (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, pp.27 chapter 2).

What Ajzen & Fishbein propose is that any behaviour can be predicted from attitude provided that the measure of attitude corresponds to the measure of behaviour under study. Therefore, any study on the influence of attitudes on behaviour has to take account of which issues in any given context at any given time can be used to predict the behaviour.
Ajzen & Fishbein illustrate the complexity of measuring behaviour by drawing attention to the confusion often made between outcomes of behaviour and behaviour itself, between inferences made about behaviour and actual behaviour, and between single behavioural acts and behavioural categories, i.e. the different single acts which, together, are indicative that a particular behaviour can occur.

By drawing attention to such differentiations Ajzen & Fishbein highlight the importance of defining a behavioural criterion or set of criteria in order to establish whether one wants to deal with outcomes of behaviour or actual behaviours, how to accept inferences about behaviours as instances of the behaviours themselves and how many inferences are necessary to characterize each behaviour.

In measuring voting behaviour, for example, consideration should be given to the difference between the simple act of voting in general, and the simple act of voting in a particular election. An individual may think that democratic participation is, generally speaking, a good principle but choose not to vote in a particular election in view of the specific electoral context, for example not having a suitable candidate to vote for or being ill or away or not bothered to face adverse weather conditions, etc., etc. From the decreasing turnout in recent American elections which in some elections is less than 50%, it
should not be inferred that over fifty percent of Americans do not believe in the validity of democratic universal suffrage. In order to ascertain the cause of such non-participatory behaviour it would not suffice to ask the electorate whether they intended to vote in a particular election. The electorate would have to be asked a more general question, i.e. if they accepted the principle or not.

Once the behaviour of interest is defined, i.e. voting in general and/or voting in a particular election it is important to consider and define four behavioural elements: 1) the action, i.e. the act of voting in the election, 2) the targets at which the behaviour is directed, i.e. the candidates running in the election, 3) the contexts, i.e. where one lives, votes, the weather at the time of the election etc and 4) the time, i.e. a single point in time, as for example just before the election and or at various points in time during the electoral campaign.

The important point to make is that in order that an adequate relationship between attitudes and behaviour is established it is not sufficient to enquire about attitudes towards the targets at which the behaviour is directed but, on the contrary, it is imperative that attitudes toward the behaviour itself as defined by its four elements of action, target context and time, are tapped. The attitudes to the
behaviour in question, however, are assessed through beliefs held about important issues which are considered to be directly related to the behaviour.

3.2.1. Beliefs as the determinants of attitude - the attitudinal model (an expectancy-value model)

Fishbein & Ajzen (1980) argue that a person's attitude is a function of his salient beliefs at a given point in time. Each belief associates a given object with some attribute, an attribute which is dependent upon the information he has about the object at any given time.

As explained in chapter II, Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of the relations between beliefs and attitudes is a form of expectancy-value model. An expectancy-value model is "a descriptive model which is applicable to any set of beliefs, whether they are salient or non-salient, new or old" (pp.222). Although the underlying model of the theory of reasoned action is not strict on this point Fishbein and Ajzen consider that a person's attitude toward an object can only be rigourously determined by her salient beliefs.

Another point to note is that although in the theory of Reasoned Action salient beliefs are considered to determine a person's attitude, the use of the model itself does not establish a causal relation between beliefs and attitudes, it only establishes a relation.
The equation which describes the model is

\[ A = \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_i x e_i \]

Where

- \( A \) = attitude toward an object, action or event
- \( b_i \) = beliefs concerning the attributes of the object
- \( e_i \) = evaluations made concerning the attributes of the object or the consequences of the action or event
- \( n \) = number of salient beliefs

Persons holding the same beliefs regarding the parties' stands in an election, i.e., persons who believe that the parties will carry out the same given policies can have different attitudes towards the parties, since their attitudes are also dependent upon their own evaluations of those policies. Likewise, persons holding different beliefs regarding the parties' stands may have the same attitudes. It follows, therefore, that knowing a person's attitude towards an object, action or event provides no information in itself regarding either the beliefs he holds with respect to the object or the consequences of the action or his own evaluations of the attributes associated with the object. In order to ascertain how a person's attitude is formed it is necessary to examine the particular constitution of belief and evaluation in each instance of the set of salient belief statements.
Given the informational basis of an expectancy-value model it is worth considering the limit suggested on the number of belief statements used to characterize an object, action or even. This limit of five to nine maximum belief statements conforms with the limited capacity a person's has in processing information at any given time (Miller, 1956; Mandler, 1967). The way the expectancy-value model is constructed corresponds to this limitation. The model assumes that the number of salient belief statements a person elicits regarding an object are arranged hierarchically in terms of their probabilities. Within this hierarchy, each additional belief statement contributes successively less to the total attitude, tending the evaluation to level off after five to nine statements.

Contrary to what might be expected, therefore, i.e. that increasing the number of belief statements would yield an improved measure of attitude, the hierarchical nature of the model renders an increase beyond the consideration of nine belief statements redundant, as far as an individual is concerned. In surveys, when it is necessary to tap everyone's beliefs the number of belief statements used is usually greater.

3.2.2. Beliefs, attitudes and voting behaviour - an example

As we have seen according to the theory of Reasoned Action attitudes guide behaviour. In turn, attitudes toward an
object are determined by beliefs acquired about the object, i.e. the associations which are established between the object and various characteristics, qualities and attributes. According to Ajzen & Fishbein (1980), this association between objects, actions and events and attributes gives rise, automatically, to the formation of attitudes. "More specifically, we learn to like (or have favourable attitudes toward) objects we believe have positive characteristics, and we acquire unfavourable attitudes toward objects we associate with negative characteristics". (pp.63, Chapter 6).

According to the theory of Reasoned Action, at any given time a person attends to a restricted number of characteristics with respect to any given object. These characteristics or attributes of an object, generated by each individual are defined as the individual's salient beliefs in respect to the object, and are these salient beliefs which are the immediate determinants of the individual's attitude toward the object itself, be it an object, an idea, a behaviour etc.

In voting behaviour the relation between salient beliefs and attitudes towards voting for the candidates and of parties can be exemplified as follows. The aim of an election is to choose among alternatives the parties and/or the candidates who, once elected, will be seating in Parliament, form the Government, be the next President etc. according to the specific purpose of the electoral act.
If voting in the election is not compulsory, voters face a choice. They either choose to vote or not to vote in the election, depending upon their attitudes towards voting in that particular election. There may be a number of reasons for people deciding not to vote. Some may know that they will be away on election day and will therefore be unable to cast their vote. This is a decision determined by external factors, i.e. time of the election. Others, however, may make a conscious decision directly related to their feelings about voting in the election, i.e. their attitudes toward voting in the election. Some people may have decided never to vote in any election. Others, however, may vote in some elections and not in others. In such cases, the decision to vote or not to vote in the election is dependent upon factors which are directly related to the particular election, i.e. the issues at stake vis-a-vis the electoral alternatives who, if elected, can pursue policies aimed at bringing the issues to a successful solution. A voter may decide not to vote in a particular election because he or she does not believe that any of the candidates and or parties can solve the problems, i.e. the issues, which the voter believes to be most important.

By implication, when voters decide to vote in an election, they do so because they believe that there are important issues which need to be tackled, and that, among the candidates and or parties, it will be possible to pick
those who will be able to do something about, if not all the issues, at least some of them.

In other words, people are aware of important issues which they believe should be solved in a particular way. An election provides an opportunity for a solution of those issues. Since people cannot directly solve the issues, they will have to consider, in accordance with the declared electoral aims of the candidates and or the parties, which among these, once elected, are more likely to tackle the issues in the desired manner.

How is this connection between voters salient beliefs and voting for the electoral alternatives measured? To illustrate this point the steps that should be taken to measure the connection between voters salient beliefs and their attitudes towards voting for each electoral alternative are described in the following example in a General election.

Prior to the General election, a number of respondents is asked to state the electoral issues which each one of them considers to be the most important for the new government to tackle. The number of salient issues would vary among respondents and there would be differences in the actual issues referred to. Although, in theory, the connection between respondents' salient beliefs and their attitudes toward voting for each electoral alternative should be measured individually, it is possible to standardise the procedure by compiling a single list of the issues most
frequently mentioned by the respondents in general and use this list to measure the connection between beliefs and attitudes among all respondents. Once the set of salient beliefs is formed, respondents are asked to evaluate each belief on a seven point, good-bad scale. Although all beliefs in the set are considered to be important, some will be of more importance than others to each respondent. The differences in the degree of importance are taken into account by the evaluation each respondent accords to each belief.

The evaluation of each belief is thus considered in terms of its consequences. When respondents are asked to evaluate, for example, "nationalizations" on a seven point, good-bad scale, they are being, in fact, asked to assess the value of the outcome of a policy of nationalizations, i.e. whether nationalizations are extremely good, very good, good, nor good nor bad, bad, very bad, or extremely bad. A set of modal salient beliefs assessed in this manner would give an indication of the respondent's attitude towards the main electoral issues, i.e. the problems which the respondent believes must be tackled and an indication of the policies needed to tackle them.

Since the respondent is himself unable to implement the policies necessary to solve the problems he has to assess the probabilities of each party, once elected, adopting the required stands to solve the issues. In other words, respondents believe that parties will or will not adopt the
stands they themselves think should be adopted for all or only part of the issues. The combination of evaluation of the salient issues together with the measure of strength of the respondent's beliefs regarding each party and/or candidate's stand on each issue yield a measure of the respondent's attitude towards voting for each party and/or candidate, i.e. it gives an attitudinal measure directly related to his voting behaviour.

Consider as an example that the respondent was asked to evaluate four salient electoral issues and has two parties to chose from. Consider also that the fours issues were that the government should:

1. abolish direct taxation
2. reduce the working week to 4 days
3. reintroduce capital punishment
4. extend national conscription to women

To evaluate the outcome of the issues the respondent is given the seven point good-bad scale already referred to. To express his beliefs concerning the stands the two parties were likely to adopt on the issues if elected, the respondent is given seven point scales which determine the degree of certainty of the respondent with respect to the position of the two parties on each of the four issues.

Suppose that in the evaluations of the four issues the respondent indicated that he believed that the abolition of direct taxation would be an extremely good (+3) measure,
that the reduction of the working week to four days would be a good measure (+1) that the reintroduction of capital punishment would be neither good nor bad (0) and that the extension of national conscription to women would be an extremely bad measure (-3). Suppose also that when the respondent was asked to state his beliefs concerning the likely stands of the two parties, i.e party X and party Y, he indicated that he believed that if party X were to be elected it would be extremely unlikely (-3) that party X would abolish direct taxation, unlikely (-1) that party X would reduce the working week to four days, very likely (+2) that party X would reintroduce capital punishment and extremely likely (+3) that party X would extend national conscription to women; with respect to party Y suppose that the respondent indicated that he believed that if elected it would be very likely (+2) that party Y would abolish direct taxation, extremely likely (+3) that party Y would reduce the working week to four days, unlikely (-1) that party Y would reintroduce capital punishment and extremely unlikely (-3) that party Y would extend national conscription to women. The following table sets out the strengths of the respondent's evaluations of the issues and his beliefs concerning the parties' stands on the issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Evaluations of outcomes</th>
<th>Beliefs concerning the parties' stands on the issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>+ 3</td>
<td>Party X: - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>+ 1</td>
<td>Party X: - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Party X: + 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>- 3</td>
<td>Party X: + 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Y: + 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Y: - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party Y: - 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the respondent's evaluations of outcomes, i.e. the evaluations of the measures which should be adopted to tackle the issues, it is apparent that the respondent had different feelings for each issue. Whereas he strongly believed that direct taxation should be abolished (+3) his beliefs towards the reduction of the working week to four days although favourable were less strong (+1); he showed indifference towards the reintroduction of capital punishment (0) by stating that the policy would be neither good or bad and showed very strong beliefs (-3) against the extension of national conscription to women.

It is also apparent that the respondent believed party X and party Y had different stands on the issues. Whereas he believed party Y to have stands very similar to his own on the issues, he believed party X's stands to be quite the opposite of those he believed should be adopted.

According to the Reasoned Action Model the respondent's attitude towards voting for Party X and for Party Y is measured by the sum of the products of the respondent's evaluations of the issues themselves and his beliefs concerning the parties' stands, i.e.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Party X</th>
<th>Party Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whereas concerning Party X the respondent's attitude toward voting is very negative (-19), concerning Party Y his attitude towards voting is highly positive (+18). In other words because of the perceived stands of Party Y on the four issues being so similar to the views of the respondent it becomes highly likely that the respondent will vote for Party Y.

Section 3.3 Social influence on intention and behaviour

In the previous section the determinants of attitude, viewed as an unidimensional measure of affect, were discussed in terms of an attitudinal model based on an expectancy-value model.

The model of Reasoned Action, however, does not limit itself to an attitudinal explanation of behaviour. Further, behaviour is considered to be directly related to intentionality, i.e. the person's wish or intention to carry it out, and this also involves social influences. Thus according to the Reasoned Action model the intention to perform a given behaviour is a function of the person's attitude towards performing it (itself a function of the beliefs and evaluations of specific outcomes) and the effect of social influence on the person concerning the performance of the behaviour, i.e. the person's subjective norm.
Subjective norm

The influence of the social environment on intentions and behaviour is understood in terms of the perceptions a person has of what most people who are important to her think she should or should not do. This perception may or may not reflect what those people the person trusts actually think. Whether such perceptions are correct or incorrect is not important. The important question is that for the person they are and in so being that they might actually influence behaviour.

In order to establish the extent of social influence factors on intentions and behaviour respondents are asked to indicate on a prescriptive (should/should not perform the behaviour), seven point scale their degree of certainty/uncertainty or indifference as to the opinion of trusted others (i.e. family, friends, church, etc.)

The combination of subjective norms and attitudes toward performing a given behaviour, i.e. voting for a particular party in an election give the strength of a person's intention to vote for that party. The intention model is expressed as

\[ BI = A + SN \]

\[ \frac{B}{B} \]

\[ w_I \]

\[ w_2 \]

Where BI = behavioural intention

AB = attitude toward performing the behaviour

SN = subjective norm

w1 & w2 = empirically determined weights
In the working example presented Section 3.2.2. we have seen how beliefs held with respect to important issues and with respect to the stands the parties were likely to adopt on them determined the respondent's attitude towards voting for party X and party Y.

Following the example through, suppose, using a seven point scale of +3 to -3, we asked the respondent to state his beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted others on whether he should vote for party X and for party Y; that in order to do this we used four categories of trusted others, i.e. parents, spouse, best friends and workmates and obtained the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of trusted others</th>
<th>Party X</th>
<th>Party Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>parents</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spouse</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workmates</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondent's behavioural intention to vote for party X and party Y would be

\[
\text{BI} = \text{Party X attitude} + \text{Social influence} = -19 + 3 = -16
\]

\[
\text{BI} = \text{Party Y attitude} + \text{Social influence} = +18 - 3 = +15
\]
However, in order to determine the weight of each component on behavioural intention the respondent has to be also asked to state how strong was his intention to vote for party X and for party Y. Suppose that in this particular case the respondent had stated quite definitely (+3) that he intended to vote for party X. It becomes clear, therefore that in spite of the respondent's knowledge of the electoral issues and of the parties' positions on them vis-a-vis his preferred outcomes for the issues, the respondent felt that it was more important to vote according to what he believed his parents and his spouse thought he should do. In other words, the weight of social influence factors on his intention to vote was greater than the weight of his own cognitions and reasoning processes.

Although the model of reasoned action postulates that attitude towards performing a given behaviour and subjective norms determine intention and behaviour it should be made clear the mediating nature of intention on behaviour. Provided correct measures are derived, intention to perform a given behaviour is always predicted from attitudinal and subjective norm measures. However, the relation between the latter two measures and behaviour may not always hold. Intention has only a mediating role on behaviour since the actual performance of the behaviour may be also dependent upon the four elements behavioural elements, i.e. action, target, context and time.
Section 3.4 Summary of chapter III

The model of Reasoned Action is concerned with the prediction and, potentially, with the explanation of behaviour. It is a simple model directly concerned with the immediate determinants of behaviour. It states that when people act their actions are determined both by the knowledge they have acquired about important aspects directly related to their actions and by the knowledge they have concerning the feelings trusted others hold about the actions themselves. The weight of these two elements on people's intentions to behave in a specific manner may differ according to personal characteristics and/or behavioural contexts.

The applications of the model in the 1976 American Presidential election and in the 1974 British General election are briefly described in the next chapter. Making use of these descriptions the chapter will also set the scene for the Portuguese surveys.
CHAPTER IV

APPLICATIONS OF THE REASONED ACTION MODEL IN AMERICAN AND BRITISH ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PORTUGUESE STUDIES

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to give an account of the results of electoral research carried out both in the United States and in Britain which used the Reasoned Action model to predict and explain voting behaviour in these two countries; and second to set the scene of the Portuguese research against the American and British backgrounds.

However, before an account of the applications of the Reasoned Action model in the USA and the UK is given, attention should be drawn to a crucial difference between the electoral systems of the two countries, since such difference has important implications in the use of the model and the hypotheses which are generated.

When voters in the USA vote in a Presidential election they, usually, have to choose between a number of candidates two of which are endorsed by the two main political parties, i.e. the Democratic Party and the Conservative Party. The presidential candidate who wins the election appoints his government directly, choosing its Ministers from among persons who have not been elected by universal suffrage.
Although the two main candidates are likely to advocate policies which follow the policy lines of their respective parties, they are perceived as having a large degree of independence from their party bases. Attitudes toward voting for the presidential candidates are, therefore, expected to be more determinant of intention to vote than attitudes toward voting for parties.

In Great Britain, a government is formed by the leader of the party who won the election, from among the party candidates elected to Parliament in their respective constituencies, where, by and large, each party candidate is well known to the local population.

In such electoral system, voters who normally identify with a particular party may in some cases actually prefer the candidate of another party. However, voting for the preferred local candidate could increase the chances of helping to elect a government of a non-preferred party. Because of the implications of their vote in the formation of a government, attitudes toward candidates in the British electoral context may be unrelated to attitudes toward voting for the candidates.

In the British electoral system during General elections attitudes toward voting for parties, and not attitudes toward voting for presidential candidates as in the American Presidential case, should be more determinant of intention to vote.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 4.1 provides a brief description of the methodology and results of the application of the Reasoned Action model in the 1976 American Presidential election; Section 4.2 provides a brief description of the methodology and results of the application of the model in the October 1974 British General election; Section 4.3 summarises the results of the two applications. Section 4.4 provides the link between the applications of the model in America and Britain and its application in the Portuguese context setting the scene for the following chapters.

Section 4.1. The use of the Reasoned Action Model in the 1976 American presidential election

The study was based on interviews with residents of Champaign County, Illinois. The sample of respondents was drawn to represent different levels of various demographic variables such as socio-economic status and education.

Salient belief statements were first drawn from a small sample of the 88 respondents and the questionnaire proper was prepared to include:

1. measures of intentions to vote for each Presidential candidate
2. attitudes toward voting for each Presidential candidate
3. subjective norms toward voting for each Presidential candidate
4. beliefs concerning the stands of each Presidential candidate toward each belief statements
5. evaluations of the objects of each belief statement
6. normative beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted others toward voting for each Presidential candidate
7. motivation to comply measures to indicate the extent to which respondents were influenced by the opinion of trusted others in the decision to vote for each Presidential candidate
8. direct measure of attitude to each Presidential candidate
9. party identification

The questionnaire was administered one month and again one week prior to the election. In the week following the election, respondents were asked to reveal for whom they had voted.

In the 1976 American Presidential Election, the two main candidates were Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. Although the other candidates' names also appeared in the questionnaire, the results were analysed and discussed in relation to the two main candidates.

One week prior to the election 45% of respondents indicated their intention to vote for Carter and 41% indicated their intention to vote for Ford. 18% were undecided between Carter and Ford. After the election, 43% of respondents were found to have voted for Carter and 43% of respondents were found to have voted for Ford. The correlation between
differential voting intentions and actual voting for the two candidates was $r = .80$.

The differential intentions were accurately predicted from the model using a weighted combination of differential attitudes toward voting for the two candidates and from the differential subjective norm with $R = .83$.

Beliefs that voting for Carter and Ford will lead to certain outcomes related to the perceived stands of the candidates on electoral issues, and evaluations of these outcomes were used to estimate attitudes toward voting for each candidate. Prediction of the differential attitude scores from these estimates was found to be quite accurate, with $r = .79$. The predictive power of expected outcomes concerning the implementation of particular policies by either candidate together with the evaluation of such policies by respondents, does lend support to the main assumption made by the model of reasoned action i.e. that voters, in general, have knowledge about electoral issues, know what they themselves want and what the candidates' positions vis-a-vis the issues are.

Differential subjective norms, based on normative beliefs and motivation to comply measures, were also found to correlate with differential intentions, $r = .73$.

However the relative contribution of attitudinal factors and of subjective norms to intention, although significant on both counts, was found to favour a choice of candidate
based on beliefs about outcomes and evaluations of those outcomes rather than a choice based on normative factors. The attitudinal weight was found to be $w=0.61$ and the subjective norm weight $w=0.27$.

In this study the social influence component of intention was derived by considering normative beliefs and motivation to comply measures together. It was found that motivation to comply measures did not reveal any differences in the degree to which Ford and Carter voters were motivated to comply with any given referent. In other words, whereas respondents were able to indicate how trusted others wished them to vote they gave no significant indication as to a felt need to comply with their wishes.

When the effect of variables such as attitude to the Presidential candidates and party identification was considered, variables which are considered external and only having an indirect effect on intention, it was found that although significant, their effect was lower than the effect of the model's components. For example the correlation coefficients of the following external variables with voting intention were: attitude to candidate, $r=0.58$; attitude to party, $r=0.56$; party identification, $r=0.62$; prior voting history, $r=0.40$; liberalism-conservatism, $r=0.55$ and educational level, $r=0.32$.

Evidence of the knowledge respondents use in their assessment of the candidates' stands on electoral issues
was given by an analysis of their evaluations of the issues and of their beliefs concerning the stands attributed to the candidates. Out of the ten belief statements identified as major electoral issues, five presented significant differences between those intending to vote for Carter and those intending to vote for Ford. There were also five significant differences in the stands attributed to Ford and Carter. Only in two corresponding instances between the evaluation measures of belief statements and of the perceived stands of each candidate did Ford and Carter voters showed significant differences. Such findings demonstrate that voters in an election favour some of the policies presented and oppose others and chose the candidate who is more likely to implement those which are favoured.

However, Fishbein et al (1980) point out that there were "many instances of respondents who vote for a given candidate despite their beliefs that with respect to some issues there would be a distinct advantage in voting for the opposition candidate". Such evidence shows that voters may see advantages and disadvantages in voting for different candidates. Ultimately, however, voting preference is determined by the balance of advantages and disadvantages voters associate with each candidate.
Section 4.2 The use of the Reasoned Action Model in the October 1974 British General election

The study was carried out in four constituencies in the industrial North of England, chosen according to a predetermined set of criteria. Sex, age and socio-economic status were variables in the sampling of the 376 respondents. Interviews took place during the five days preceding the election and respondents who met sampling requirements were asked to complete the self-completion questionnaire. All questionnaires were collected prior to the election. In the week following the election, respondents were contacted again and most of them indicated their vote choice.

Belief statements were not elicited from a sample of the respondents as in the American study. Instead, 16 items were selected from the published manifestos of the three main parties, i.e. the Conservative, the Liberal and the Labour parties, and from press coverage during the first week of the electoral campaign. Given the importance of local constituency issues in the British electoral system, it may have been interesting to assess voters' evaluations and party stands on local issues vis-a-vis national ones. However, since in a general election, voters are not only voting for a particular local candidate but also to elect a government it may be sufficient to tap national issues.
The questionnaire proper contained among others the following measures:

1. attitudes toward voting for each candidate
2. subjective norms toward voting for each candidate
3. beliefs concerning the stands of each candidate on each issue
4. beliefs concerning the stands of each party on each issue
5. beliefs concerning the stands of each party leader on each issue
6. evaluations of the object of each policy issue.
7. normative beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted others toward voting for each candidate
8. motivation to comply measures to indicate the extent to which respondents were influenced by the opinion of trusted others
9. direct measures of attitude to parties, candidates and party leaders

Since due to a clerical error measures of intention were inadvertently omitted from the questionnaire actual vote choice assessed immediately following the election was used to assess the predictive power of the components of the model of reasoned action and the effect of external variables.

Attitude toward voting for the Labour Candidate correlated .85 with actual vote, and the correlation for the subjective norm was .63. The attitudinal component carried
more weight \((w=.77)\) than the normative component \((w=.12)\), which in fact was not found to have a significant effect. The correlations of voting for the Conservative candidate were .81 and .69 with attitudes toward voting for the candidate and subjective norms, respectively. The attitudinal component carried again more weight \((w=.64)\) than the normative component \((w=.27)\) in actual vote choice. However in the case of the Conservative candidate the normative component was found to have a significant effect \((p<.01)\). The inclusion of the normative component improved prediction of voting for the Conservative candidate slightly \((\text{from } r=.81 \text{ to } R=.84)\) but did not improve it in the case of the Labour candidate \((R=.85)\).

Beliefs that voting for the two main parties' candidates will lead to certain outcomes and evaluations of these outcomes were used to estimate attitudes toward voting for each candidate. Prediction of the attitude scores from these belief-based estimates were found to be quite significant showing correlations of .65 and .58 for the Labour and Conservative candidates, respectively. However, prediction of the attitude scores with respect to voting for the party leaders and the party from the same belief and evaluation measures were found to be more accurate, especially in the case of voting for the parties. Correlations between overall attitude toward voting for the Labour party leader and for the Labour party were .68 and .74, respectively; correlations between overall attitude toward voting for the Conservative party leader and for the
Conservative party were .62 and .67, respectively.

These results contrast with those obtained in the American survey. Whereas in the American elections, attitude toward voting for the Presidential candidates achieved higher correlations than those obtained in relation to the parties, in Britain the reverse is true. Attitudes toward voting for the parties are better predictors of voting behaviour than attitudes toward voting for the local constituency candidate or even for party leaders.

It may be argued that party leaders in Britain hold an equivalent position to that of Presidential candidates in the USA, and that, therefore, attitudes towards voting for British party leaders should have been found to better predictors of voting intentions then attitudes towards voting for the parties themselves.

However, these differences between the predictive power of attitudinal measures in the two countries can perhaps be explained in terms of the differences between the British and American electoral systems.

In the USA, when voters vote for a Presidential candidate they are directly increasing the probabilities of that candidate being elected. In Britain, the only voters who can vote directly for a party leader are those who live in the party leader's constituency. For a party leader to be elected to Parliament it is necessary that he/she receives the majority of votes in his/her constituency. However, in
order that a party leader becomes Prime Minister, it is necessary that his/her party wins the majority of seats in Parliament, i.e. that his/her party candidates defeat the other parties' candidates in the majority of constituencies. In these circumstances, it is understandable that attitudes towards voting for parties in Britain become better predictors of vote choice than attitudes towards voting for party leaders.

Subjective norms (excluding the motivation to comply component) were found to be highly correlated with respondents' voting behaviour, showing coefficients of .63 and .69 with respect to the Labour and Conservative candidates. However, when the weight of subjective norms in the prediction of vote choice was assessed in combination with the weight of attitudes towards voting for the candidates, it was found that although subjective norms carried a significant weight in predicting a person's vote for or against the Conservative candidate, \(w = .28\), the normative component did not appear to have a significant weight, \(w = .12\) in the prediction of voting for or against the Labour candidate.

In the British elections, as in the American elections, the attitudinal component was found to have a much more significant weight, i.e. .77 and .64 with respect to the Labour and Conservative candidates. Inclusion of the normative component improved slightly the prediction of voting for or against the Conservative candidate, from a
zero order correlation coefficient of r=.81 to R=.84. But its inclusion, as expected, did not improve the prediction in respect of the Labour candidate, with the zero order regression coefficient of r=.85 being unchanged to R=.85.

It should be noted that the analyses carried out in the British survey differed from the method used in the American study. In the American study, the model was analysed as a model concerned with choices among alternatives (pp.179, Fishbein et al, 1980) and thus results were obtained considering both candidates together. But as Fishbein et al (1978, pp.58) say, strictly speaking the model is not so much concerned with choices among alternatives "but rather with attempting to explain the formation of an intention to perform or not to perform a specific behaviour", i.e. voting for or not voting for a particular party or candidate.

Based on research in decision theory (e.g. Edwards, 1954, 1961), researchers in the British survey tested the "single behaviour" notion and concluded that the model could be applied both to choice situations and to single behaviours (pp.58).

The effect of external variables such as direct attitudes toward party, party leaders and candidates was found to carry no significant weight in prediction of vote choice (pp.60). The same was found in relation to other external variables such as age, sex, education, income and socio-economic status. These findings lend support to the
model's assumption that external variables should not affect behaviour directly but only indirectly by influencing the attitudinal or normative components, or the relative weights of the latter. By partialling out the relationships between the external variable and the model's two components, if the effect of the external variable is indirect, the correlation between the external variable and behaviour intention, which may otherwise be high, should be reduced to non-significance. In the British study the effect of all external variables was found to be non significant (pp.62).

Evidence of the knowledge respondents use in their assessment of the candidates' stands on electoral issues was given by an analysis of their evaluations of the issues and of their beliefs concerning the stands attributed to the candidates.

The mean evaluation of each of the 16 issues as a function of party identification produced significant differences in 14 of the issues. This indicates that people differed with respect to the policies which were being presented by the two parties' manifestos. According to results voters held remarkably accurate beliefs about the positions of the two major parties on most issues (pp.38). These two findings on their own could be interpreted as showing that voters merely acquired a knowledge of the parties stands and evaluated the issues according to their party line. However, there were issues which voters, irrespective of
party identification, evaluated similarly and in contrast with their parties' stands, showing, as in the American study, that voters assess the advantages and disadvantages of voting for each party with respect to what they themselves want and make their voting choice on the basis of a balance between the advantages and disadvantages offered by each party.

Section 4.3 Summary of the American and British tests of the Reasoned Action model

The two studies reported in the previous sections presented some methodological differences, i.e. sample size and composition, the method used to choose belief statements, i.e. elicited salient belief statements and non-salient party manifesto statements and the use of the model underlied by two different rationals, both as an analytical tool to predict choices among alternatives and as an analytical tool to predict single behaviours.

The implications of different electoral systems were also highlighted, especially in the hypotheses made concerning the relative predictive power of attitudinal measures.

On the other hand results lent strong support to the model, directly relating attitude to vote for or against candidates/parties and subjective norms to the formation of intention and actual vote. Both studies show that the normative component carries much less weight than the
attitudinal component in the formation of intention to vote for a particular referent.

The studies also show that within the subjective norm component measures of the motivation to comply with the opinion of trusted others do not add any significant weight to measures indicating knowledge on the part of voters concerning the voting preferences of trusted others. The two studies also illustrated the indirect effect of external variables on the two components of the model.

In comparison with the earlier Columbia and Michigan models, the results of the tests of the Reasoned Action Model revealed, contrary to the Columbia and Michigan findings, not only the indirect effect of party identification but also the subsidiary role of social influence factors on vote choice.

The results, like those obtained by the L.S.E. longitudinal study, clearly show that voters do reason about the advantages and disadvantages of voting for each candidate/party vis-a-vis the important policies they wish to see implemented.

Section 4.4 The Portuguese Scenario

The model was tested in two long established stable democracies where, two main parties have been able to provide alternative governments. Successive generations of voters have lived in democracy and have been used and
exposed to political debate over issues which affect their lives.

The Portuguese scenario presented sharp differences. The lack of democratic tradition meant that everyone, i.e., parties, party leaders and voters alike, was going through a period of self-instruction about the very democratic processes which were jointly being developed. There were no established democratic structures, no precedents, no tried ways to be used as guidance and support, no history of issues.

Unlike in the American and British scenarios, in Portugal there were four main parties and countless fringe parties. Also in Portugal the Portuguese Communist Party had very strong holds in the rural south, in the industrial belts around the big cities and more importantly in the Unions.

In the aftermath of the first two post-revolutionary periods the fight for power involved not only a fight among those parties interested in the consolidation of a parliamentarian democratic system but also a fight between them as a whole and the communists in spite of the fact that the latter had abided by democratic rule. Electoral life, therefore, involved choices between two distinct value and economic systems as well as between variations within one of those two systems.

Also, in the UK and USA Churches do not have a direct influence in the political process and religious belief may
only affect voters indirectly. In Portugal given the power of the Catholic Church and its long established influence, church guidance could be having a direct effect on voters' decision.

The Reasoned Action model bases voting decision on rational processes (linked to electoral issues and parties' stands) and on social influence. Electoral issues, are not isolated from election to election. On the contrary, they have a life history of their own reflecting the way political ideas develop, crystallize, are put into practice and in the process, are transformed (Himmelweit, 1985, p.8).

Bearing in mind the rapid sequence of Portugal's electoral events since the overthrow of the dictatorship and that the main issue for the right wing and socialist parties was the defeat of the communists and vice-versa, an issue that affected every aspect of political and social life, it is clear that there was no time, let alone stability, for the development, crystallization, practice and transformation of political ideas.

The lack of a relevant number of well differentiated issues, together with the fact that people were unable to list issues they considered important was particularly worrying.

In fact, when attempts were made to compile a list of salient issues invariably, part of the respondents referred
to the need to defeat the communists whereas others referred to the need to defeat the right wing.

However it should be noted that it was precisely because of these differences between both the British and American scenarios on the one hand and the Portuguese scenario on the other, and not in spite of them, that Portugal appeared to provide an exceptionally challenging ground to test the general applicability of the Reasoned Action model.

Chapter V describes the Method and Procedure used in the three Portuguese elections covered by this study. The methodological framework falls short of the rigorous standards which should have been applied. Nevertheless the procedures used represented, at the time, the only solutions which seemed possible within the constraints and obstacles posed by the difficult but extremely exciting climate in which the field work was carried out.
CHAPTER V

METHOD AND PROCEDURE

Introduction

The Method and Procedure chapter is divided into three sections and one Appendix. Section 5.1 describes the methodology used to obtain representative samples for the three electoral surveys. Section 5.2 details the measures and scales used in the three questionnaires. Section 5.3 repeats each list of electoral issues selected for each of the three elections already presented and discussed in Chapter I. The section also provides a general introduction for the four Results chapters which follow. Appendix 5, associated with this chapter, includes a translated version of each election questionnaire.

Section 5.1. Sampling procedures and the distribution of questionnaires

5.1.1 Sampling procedures

Difficulties concerning access to electoral rolls prevented a rigorous sampling of the population. Added to these difficulties there was a general mistrust of opinion polls of any type and of probing into opinions about political matters unless these were discussed among friends.
There was no tradition of opinion surveys and the problem was no doubt aggravated by the fact that under Portuguese Electoral Law the publication of opinion polls and voting surveys is forbidden (1).

In such circumstances volunteers among friends, acquaintances and work contacts in both private and public sector institutions were asked to distribute the questionnaires among colleagues, friends, relatives of both sexes and of all age groups.

The choice of volunteers was considered crucial and as far as it was possible they were representative of the party political spectrum, age groups, sex socio-economic and educational backgrounds.

5.1.2 The distribution of questionnaires

In the beginning of each election campaign, volunteers made preliminary contacts with respondents to prepare for the distribution and collect the questionnaires.

The distribution of the questionnaires took place during the last week of the electoral campaigns. Respondents completed the questionnaires and returned them to the volunteers at least two days before the election date.

(1) In the last few years, although Electoral Law continues to forbid the publication of poll results during the electoral campaigns, many newspapers publish regularly opinion surveys on political matters and people appear to be more relaxed about expressing their own views.
(However, in the first election covered in the Braga district, questionnaires were all returned four days prior to the election date to allow the researcher to come up to Lisbon in time to distribute questionnaires among volunteers in Lisbon and collect them prior to the election. Due to the death of the two AD leaders the distribution of questionnaires in the Lisbon area was abandoned). Volunteers delivered the questionnaires to the researcher on the eve of the election day, at the latest. No questionnaires were accepted on the day or after the election.

The 1980 Presidential election questionnaires were distributed in the district of Braga in the North of Portugal. Distribution took place both in the city of Braga and in rural areas of the district.

The district of Braga was chosen for the first survey due to the fact that the division of its electorate among the main political parties compared very closely with that for the whole country. In the 1980 General election, held two months prior to the Presidential election, the distribution of the popular vote in the district of Braga compared with that for the whole country was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BRAGA</th>
<th>WHOLE COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRS (socialist alliance)</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two hundred questionnaires were distributed but only 101 were returned completed. One hundred were used. The questionnaire excluded was answered by a respondent who did not intend to vote for either of the two main presidential candidates.

The 1982 Local elections questionnaires were distributed in three cities: Lisbon, the capital; Coimbra, a University city near the coast, 200 km North of Lisbon; and in Barreiro, an industrial city, 25 km South of Lisbon.

The Municipality of Lisbon was controlled by the AD although the alliance did not have absolute majority in the Chamber. In the 1979 Local elections the distribution of the vote among the main parties had been as follows: AD (right wing alliance) = 47%; PS (Socialist Party) = 23% and APU (communist alliance) = 25%.

The Municipality of Coimbra was also controlled by the AD closely followed by the Socialists who had been in control until the 1979 Local elections.

In the 1979 Local elections the distribution of the popular vote among the main parties had been as follows: AD (right wing alliance) = 43%; PS (Socialist Party) = 32%; and APU (Communist alliance) = 19%.

The Municipality of Barreiro was controlled by the APU who enjoyed absolute majority in the Chamber. In the 1979 Local elections the distribution of the popular vote among the main parties had been as follows: AD (right wing
alliance) did not run as such. Instead, the two main
parties of the Alliance, CDS (christian democrats) and PSD
(social democrats) ran separately] CDS (christian-
democrats)= 3%; PSD (social democrats)= 10%; PS
(socialists= 19%; and APU (communist alliance)= 63%.

Approximately 300 questionnaires were distributed, 100
questionnaires in each city. One hundred and eighty four
were returned completed. Of these only 173 were used. Due
to an oversight, during the collection of the
questionnaires no attempt was made to identify the city
where they had been distributed and, therefore, no
comparisons were made between the three groups of
respondents.

The 1983 General election questionnaires were distributed
in Lisbon. The distribution of the vote in the 1980
General election in the city of Lisbon among the main
parties had been: AD (right wing alliance)= 45%; FRS
(socialist alliance)= 26% and APU (communist alliance)=
21%. Out of the 300 questionnaires distributed only 184
were returned completed. Of the 184 questionnaires
returned only 157 were used.

No post electoral surveys were done after each of the three
elections to ascertain how respondents had in fact voted.
Due to the method adopted to distribute the questionnaires
it would have been difficult to control that only the
respondents who had completed and returned the
questionnaires would take part in the post election survey.
Furthermore, by and large, volunteers were reluctant to go back to respondents and ask them to divulge their vote choice, even though postage paid envelopes could have been made available for answering sheets to be sent direct to the researcher.

Section 5.2 The questionnaires

5.2.1 The measures used in the questionnaires

The questionnaires prepared for the three elections (see Appendix 5) followed closely the self-completion booklet used by Fishbein et al (1974) in the British study. Each questionnaire was preceded by a brief introductory note giving the name of the researcher and explaining the object of the research. Questions required cross type answers only and therefore the questionnaires could not be identified.

The questionnaires contained the following measures:

1. intention to vote in the election;
2. intention to vote for each presidential candidate (Presidential election questionnaire) or for each main party (Local and General elections' questionnaires);
3. attitudes towards voting for each presidential candidate (Presidential election questionnaire) or for each main party (Local and General elections' questionnaires);
4. attitudes towards each of the presidential candidates (Presidential election questionnaire) or towards each of
the main parties (Local and General elections' questionnaires);
5. attitudes towards the victory of each presidential candidate (Presidential election questionnaire) or towards the victory of each main party (Local and General elections' questionnaires);
6. evaluations of the object of each issue;
7. beliefs concerning the stands of each presidential candidate on each issue (Presidential election questionnaire) or concerning the stands of each party on each issue (Local and General elections' questionnaires);
8. Normative beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted others towards voting for each presidential candidate (Presidential election questionnaire) or towards voting for each party (Local and General elections' questionnaires).

Three categories of "trusted others" were used: most trusted relatives, best friends and the Church.

Motivation to comply measures were included only in the 1980 Presidential election questionnaire. They were dropped in view of the fact that many respondents either failed to answer the relevant sections of the questionnaire or expressed angry comments about their implications.

Respondents were also asked to provide information on party affiliation, past voting behaviour, sex, age and level of education by means of multiple-choice scales.
5.2.2 The measuring scales

Apart from the multiple-choice scales respondents were asked to use to indicate their party affiliation, past voting behaviour, sex, age and level of education, two types of scales were used: likely-unlikely scales and semantic differential scales.

Likely-unlikely scales

Seven point likely-unlikely scales were used to measure intentions to vote in the elections and intentions to vote for the presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election or for the parties in the 1982 Local elections and 1983 General election. The likely-unlikely scales were also used to measure beliefs about the presidential candidates' or the parties' stands on electoral issues and beliefs about the opinions of trusted others.

Respondents were asked to consider each belief statement and each intention statement and indicate their measure of agreement, disagreement or indifference with it by ticking one of three choice squares: "yes", "no", "don't know". They were asked to move on to the next statement if they had ticked the "don't know" square. If they ticked either the "yes" or the "no" square they were asked to tick one of the three choice squares in answer to a question about the probability of the statement being true or untrue. The choice probabilities indicated above each square were:
"high"; "fifty-fifty"; and "low". Scoring from +3 to -3 was attributed as follows:

"yes" / "high" = +3       "no" / "high" = -3
"" / "fifty-fifty" = +2    "" / "fifty-fifty" = -2
"" / "low" = +1           "" / "low" = -1
"don't know" = 0

Examples of intention statements:

Example of scale used:

Yes No Don't Know

If you answered "don't know" please move to the next section. If you answered either "yes" or "no" please indicate by ticking one of the following squares the probabilities of the statement being true or untrue.

High Fifty/fifty Low

"I intend to vote for ... (name of candidate or party depending upon the type of election) (N.B separate statements were given for each name)
Examples of belief statements:
1) Beliefs about candidates or parties' stands on issues:
"If elected, Ramalho Eanes, will be an impartial President".

2) Beliefs about the opinions of trusted others:
"My family thinks I should vote for the Socialist Party".

Semantic differential scales

Seven-point semantic differential scales were used to measure attitudes and to evaluate electoral issues. Range of scales +3 to -3.

Attitude measures:

a) attitude towards candidates in the Presidential election was measured by six semantic differential scales: good-bad; wise-foolish; beneficial-harmful; honest-dishonest; strong-weak; competent-incompetent.

In view of results, in the subsequent election questionnaires the number of semantic differential scales was reduced to three: beneficial-harmful; honest-dishonest and competent-incompetent.

b) attitude towards voting in the Presidential elections was measured by three semantic differential scales: good-bad; wise-foolish; beneficial-harmful.
In view of the results, in the subsequent election questionnaires, the number of semantic differential scales was reduced to one and changed into "positive-negative". This change was suggested by people who read the questionnaire and were asked to express an opinion as to its clarity. In Portuguese, the use of the adjectives "positive" and "negative" to qualify feelings toward behaviours is quite comparable to the affect measure of "good" and "bad".

c) attitude towards voting for each candidate in the Presidential election and for each party in the other two elections - same as for b) above.

d) attitude towards the victory of each candidate in the Presidential election was measured by three semantic differential scales: good-bad; wise-foolish; beneficial-harmful.

Evaluation measures

To evaluate each electoral issue used in the 1980 Presidential election questionnaire respondents used three semantic-differential scales: good-bad; wise-foolish; beneficial-harmful.

In view of the results, in the subsequent election questionnaires, the number of semantic differential scales was reduced to one: good-bad.
5.3. Electoral issues

The choice of issues was presented and discussed in Section of Chapter I. The list of the selected issues for the three elections is presented here for easier reference.

Issues selected for the 1980 Presidential Election

The ten issues selected were as follows:

1. A president should be impartial
2. A president should respect the Constitution
3. A president should use his right to veto bills judged to be unconstitutional
4. A president should risk political instability rather than give in to a government who act against the Constitution
5. A president should give unconditional support to the Government
6. A president should support a dictatorial form of Government
7. A president should support political stability
8. A president should support political instability
9. A president should support Revolution
10. A president should support a military coup
Issues selected for the 1982 Local Election

The ten issues selected were as follows:

"In the municipality where I live ...

1. housing should all be provided with piped water, electricity and sewage.
2. priority should be given to solving housing shortages.
3. more sport and socio-cultural facilities should be provided.
4. more playgrounds and creches should be built.
5. more schools should be built.
6. the important thing is to elect honest and hard working councillors who are interested in improving living conditions.
7. local authorities should be accountable as to the manner public funds are administered.
8. transport problems should be solved.
9. priority should be given to pollution control
10. Councillors should maintain very frequent contacts with local populations so that the most pressing problems are identified and solved.
Issues selected for the 1983 General Election

The eight issues were selected as follows:

"To solve the crisis and promote social welfare and justice...

1. the social contract between government, employers and unions should be celebrated.
2. patriotism and order should be strengthened.
3. social welfare policies based on the right of all to health, education and housing should be promoted.
4. the public sector should be reduced.
5. government should rule with purpose, authority and morality.
6. a new government should embark on a program of development of the country's natural resources in order to diversify production and create new jobs.
7. changes in labour laws including the strike law should be introduced.
8. a new government should increase the purchasing power of the people.

Since, as explained in Chapter I, a post-electoral coalition appeared inevitable, the 1983 General election questionnaire included an attitude measure of feeling towards the four possible coalitions: socialists and communists (highly unlikely but not impossible); socialists and social democrats (highly likely); socialists, social democrats and christian democrats (unlikely that the
socialists and social democrats together failed to win majority and would therefore need the christian-democrats; social-democrats and christian-democrats, in an AD revival (possible but highly unlikely so soon after the collapse of the alliance).

Respondents' feelings towards the four possible post-electoral coalitions were assessed by means of a "good-bad" seven point semantic differential scale.

The results obtained in the three election surveys are presented and discussed in the following four chapters, i.e. chapters VI to IX.

The way the four Results chapters are structured follows closely the main objectives of the thesis i.e. the investigation of the main determinants of vote choice among Portuguese voters underlied by the assumption that voters' knowledge of important political issues and social influence factors have major effects on voting intentions.

Thus, after a brief description of the samples used in the three Portuguese elections in Chapter VI and the presentation of the results of the tests of the Reasoned Action model in the three elections in Chapter VII, Chapters VIII and IX are devoted to the two most important levels of analysis within the context of the thesis: the level concerned with the predictive power of the measures used by the Reasoned Action model vis-a-vis other measures;
and the level concerned with the contribution of respondents' political knowledge and of the opinion of trusted referents to their vote choices.
CHAPTER VI

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLES USED IN THE THREE PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS

Introduction

Chapter VI presents a brief description of the samples used in the three Portuguese elections. The chapter is divided in three sections. Section 6.1 describes the sizes of the samples and their characteristics in terms of the following variables: sex, age, level of education, number of respondents in each voting group and percentage of respondents affiliated in a party. Respondents' past voting habits are described in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents a brief summary of the chapter.

Section 6.1 - Samples description

Table 6.1 gives a description of the samples used in the three elections in terms of size, sex, age, level of education, number of respondents in each voting group and number of respondents affiliated in a party.
Sample size

The size of the three samples, although small, compares quite favourably with the sample size used by Fishbein et al for the 1976 American Presidential Election—76 respondents—, and with the size of the sample used by the Fishbein et al study, in Britain, of 328 respondents for the General Election of October 1974. The British sample was larger in view of the requisites imposed by the country's electoral system.

Sex and age

The percentage of respondents in each sex group is quite acceptable. The disparity results, to a large extent, from the reported reluctance on the part of women to fill in the questionnaires. The age distribution of respondents has a higher incidence on the 25 to 44 years of age group which is also the group with higher number of voters.

Level of Education

The samples are biased in favour of the University level of education. This could indicate that respondents with a higher level of education were less reluctant to fill in the questionnaires.
Table 6.1

Description of the samples in the three elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Presidential Election(80)</th>
<th>Local Elections(82)</th>
<th>General Election (83)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>40.5%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18/24</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25/44</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45/-</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'O' Level</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'A' Level</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech. School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Respondents in each voting group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Presidential Election(80)</th>
<th>Local Elections(82)</th>
<th>General Election (83)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD (CDS+PSD)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRS (PS+)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (PCP+MDP/ CDE)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party Membership:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Presidential Election(80)</th>
<th>Local Elections(82)</th>
<th>General Election (83)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-party members:</td>
<td>79 (79%)</td>
<td>111(64%)</td>
<td>119(76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party members:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>7 (4%)</td>
<td>7 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>8 (8%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>11 (11%)</td>
<td>49 (28%)</td>
<td>23 (14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Differences in the sum of the percentages to 100% due to respondents who did not indicate their sex in the appropriate box.
The number of respondents in each voting group in the 1980 Presidential election were divided into voting groups (AD group, FRS group and APU group) according to the party they had voted for in the 1980 General election which was held two months prior to the Presidential election. The number of respondents in each group is fairly evenly distributed, although the AD group was larger than the PS and APU groups of respondents. The distribution of the questionnaires took place in Braga, where the right wing alliance enjoyed far greater support than the other two parties (see Chapter V, section 5.1.2).

In the 1982 Local elections respondents were divided into voting groups according to their intentions to vote for each of the three main parties, i.e. AD, PS and APU. The questionnaires were distributed in three cities, Lisbon, Coimbra and Barreiro (see Chapter V, Section 5.1.2). Although the AD and PS sample sizes were very balanced, the APU sample was considerably larger than the other two. It is possible that APU respondents were more interested in answering and returning the questionnaires than the other respondents, since the same imbalance occurred in the 1983 General election.

In the 1983 General election the distribution of the questionnaires took place in Lisbon, and respondents were again divided into voting groups according to their intentions to vote for each of the four main parties: CDS, PSD, PS and APU. Apart from the imbalance between the size
of the APU sample and the other group samples sizes, the CDS sample size was very reduced. Only 17 out of the 157 who returned completed questionnaires indicated their intention to vote for the christian-democrats (CDS). This low figure might have been due to the loss of popularity suffered by the CDS vis-a-vis the social democrats (PSD) after the collapse of their alliance.

Party membership

The percentages indicated show the disparity between the number of affiliated members of the PCP (Communist party) and that of the other parties. In terms of membership, the PCP is by far the largest party.

No analyses were carried out to determine the effect of the above variables, which according to the theory of reasoned action are external to and only have an indirect effect on voting behaviour.

6.2. Past voting behaviour

Past voting habits were considered by the two earlier models of voting behaviour, i.e. the Columbia model and the Michigan model (see Chapter II) to reinforce voters' party identification, the variable which was found to be the determinant factor of vote choice. The two measures were thus considered to be closely related.

However, data published by Butler and Stokes (1959) based on three electoral surveys carried out in the United States
and another three electoral surveys carried out in Britain shows that 27% of the American voters reported changes in their party identification while as many as 62% of British voters reported such changes.

In the Fishbein et al study (1980) of the 1986 American Presidential elections party identification and voting history were found to be highly related to vote choice ($r = .69$ and $r = .50$), respectively). However, when their respective weights were compared with the weights of the components of the model of reasoned action in vote choice, they were found to add little predictive power to the model. As Fishbein et al point out, consideration of party identification, for example, in addition to differential voting intentions raised the correlation with behaviour from $R = .80$ to $R = .84$ (Fishbein et al, 1980, p. 187).

On the other hand, in their study of the 1974 British General election, Fishbein et al, (1976, p. 62) conclude that "in contrast to his American counterpart, who appears to maintain a stable and enduring partisan orientation, the British voter appears to change his party identification as easily as he changes his voting behaviour". Party identification in Great Britain is closely linked to voting intentions.

It can be concluded, therefore, that even when party identification is closely related to past voting behaviour, this variable does not make a significant contribution to
the power of the Reasoned Action model in predicting voting intentions.

In the Portuguese case, given the lack of a democratic background, it is difficult to speak about "party identification" in the same terms as in the American and British contexts. Also, during the first 9 years of democratic rule (from 1974 to 1983) no large self reporting surveys were done on electoral decision. The only data available to assess vote swings are the electoral results themselves. Such results, however, do not show individual lability, only changes in overall party percentages of vote.

In the three Portuguese elections questionnaires respondents were only asked to provide information about their past voting behaviour by means of multiple-choice questions. No questions were included to assess respondents' party identification.

Although the contribution of past voting behaviour of Portuguese respondents to the prediction of voting intention will not be assessed it is of interest to note their past voting pattern.

According to the information supplied by respondents, the percentage of voters who switched parties between elections is not very high.

From the first elections for the Constituent Assembly 1975 (the Assembly charged with the draft of the new
Constitution) to the General Election in 1980, 22.4% of the sample said they had changed party. From the 1980 General Election to the Local Elections of 1982 only 13.2% of the sample respondents said they had changed party.

The pattern of voting of new voters, i.e. young voters who voted for the first time, is interesting. In the 1980 sample three were 29 respondents who had not voted in the 1975 Election for the Constituent Assembly. Of these 29 young voters, 13 voted for the AD (right wing alliance) in 1980, 5 voted for the FRS (The Socialist Front) and 11 voted for the APU (the communist alliance). That is to say 44.8% of the new sample voters opted for the AD, 17.2% for the Socialist Front and 37.9% for the communist alliance. Of the 15 new voters in the 1982 sample for the Local Elections, 6 (40%) voted for the AD, 4 (26.7%) voted for the PS (Socialist Party) and 5 (33.5%) voted for the APU.

In the questionnaire used for the 1983 General election study, respondents were asked to indicate how they had voted in the 1980 General election. It is possible to assess, therefore, the extent to which respondents' said they had changed party between two consecutive General elections.

Table 6.2 shows how the 1983 General election respondents said they had voted in the 1980 General election. The division of respondents into voting groups was done according to respondents' voting intentions.
Table 6.2

Vote choice in the 1980 General election of respondents in the 1983 General election divided according to voting intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote choice in the 1980 General election</th>
<th>Vote intention in the 1983 General Election voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD (CDS + PSD)</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRS (PS + small parties)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (Communist party + MDP)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New voters in 1983</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

94% of the respondents who in the 1983 questionnaire indicated their intention to vote for the CDS, had voted for the right wing alliance, AD, in 1980; the remaining 6% were young voters voting for the first time.

82% of the respondents who in the 1983 questionnaire indicated their intention to vote for the PSD, had voted for the right wing alliance, AD in 1980; of the remaining 18%, 14% were young voters voting for the first time, 2% had voted for the Socialist alliance (FRS) in 1980 and 2%
had voted for one of the very small parties not named in the questionnaire.

76% of the respondents who in the 1983 questionnaire indicated their intention to vote for the PS had voted for the Socialist alliance in 1980; of the remaining 24%, 9% were young voters voting for the first time, 12% had voted for the AD alliance in 1980 and 3% had voted for small parties.

94% of the respondents who in the 1983 questionnaire had indicated their intention to vote for the APU said they had voted for the APU in 1980; of the remaining 6%, 3% were young voters voting for the first time and 3% had voted for the Socialist alliance (FRS) in 1980.

Although there were some changes in vote choices, particularly among PS and PSD respondents the vast majority of respondents in the 1983 General election showed no intention of voting for a party different from the one they had voted for in the 1980 General election.

Section 6.3 - Summary of Chapter VI

In spite of the sampling method which was adopted, the characteristics of the samples used in the three Portuguese studies in terms of their representatives of sex, age and level of education groups were found to be acceptable. Some imbalances were noted in the relative size of voting groups.
In their short voting history, Portuguese respondents were found to have tended to vote for the same party. However, in view of Portugal's political background it would be premature to accept the significance of any impact which past voting habits could be found to have on vote choices. The more fundamental question is to assess whether respondents, in spite of their initial tendency to vote for the same party, appear to be aware of important political issues and of the implications of their vote choices in the resolution of such issues, since this awareness may have implications in their future voting behaviour.

The results of the tests of the Reasoned Action model are described in the following chapter, Chapter VII. These together with the analyses presented in Chapter VIII and IX will allow for a better understanding of the factors which appear to be determinant of the vote choices of Portuguese respondents.
CHAPTER VII

RESULTS OF THE TESTS OF THE REASONED ACTION MODEL IN THE THREE PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS

Introduction

Chapter VII describes the results of the Reasoned Action model in the three Portuguese elections.

According to the Reasoned Action model intention to perform a behaviour is a function of the attitude toward performing the behaviour and normative beliefs, i.e. the opinions of trusted others about performing the behaviour (1). In the case of voting behaviour, intention to vote for candidates or parties is a function of voters' attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties and of voters' normative beliefs about the opinions of trusted referents vis-a-vis voting for the candidates or parties. Expressed as a function, the Intention Model, one of the two components of the Reasoned Action Model, states that:

\[ VI = (A_{\text{vot}}) + (\text{NB})_{w1} + w2 \]

where

\[ VI = \text{the persons' intention to vote for the candidates or for the parties in an election;} \]

(1) motivation to comply measures included in the model were dropped. These measures were also excluded from the October 1974 British General election study.
A - the persons' attitudes toward voting for the candidates or the parties;

NB - the persons' normative beliefs about the opinions of trusted others vis-a-vis voting for the candidates or for the parties; and

w₁ and w₂ - theoretical parameters which indicate the relative weight of the two variables as determinants of voting intentions.

The other component of the Reasoned Action Model, the Attitude Model, states that the person's attitude toward performing the behaviour, i.e. the person's attitude toward voting for the candidates or parties, is in turn a function of two elements: voters' beliefs on candidates' or parties' stands on salient issues and of voters' evaluations of the issues. The relation between voters' beliefs and evaluations is expressed as follows:

\[
A_{\text{vot}} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} b_i e_i
\]

A_{\text{vot}} = the person's attitude toward voting for the candidates or parties;

b_i = the person's beliefs about candidates' or parties stands on each one of the issues;

e_i = the person's evaluations of each one of the issues;

N = the number of salient beliefs the person holds about "vot", i.e. voting for the candidates or parties.
Chapter VII is divided into four sections. Section 7.1 presents the results of the tests of the Intention and Attitude models in the 1980 Presidential election. Section 7.2 presents the results of the tests of the Intention and Attitude models in the 1982 Local elections. Section 7.3 presents the tests of the Intention and Attitude models in the 1983 General election. Section 7.4 provides a summary of the results of the tests in the three Portuguese elections and on overall comparison with the results of the tests in the 1976 American Presidential election and in the October 1974 British General election.

Section 7.1 - Predicting voting intentions in the 1980 Presidential election

7.1.1 The test of the Intention Model in the 1980 Presidential election.

Table 7.1.1 shows the coefficients of the multiple regression carried out to test the dependency of respondents' intentions to vote for the two presidential candidates on respondents' attitudes toward voting for the candidates and on respondents' normative beliefs in the 1980 Presidential election.
Table 7.1.1

Multiple regression coefficients of respondents' attitudes toward voting for the two presidential candidates (A vot) and of respondents' normative beliefs (NB), on respondents' intentions to vote for the two presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to vote for...</th>
<th>Zero Order Correlations</th>
<th>Beta weights</th>
<th>Multiple regression coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A NB A NB vot</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soares Carneiro (AD candidate)</td>
<td>.89 .73 .79 .14* .89 (N-86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramalho Eanes (PS candidate)</td>
<td>.80 .63 .68 .21** .82 (N-87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* not significant

** significant at p < .01

All the other coefficients are significant beyond p < .01

The zero order correlation coefficients show that attitudes to voting for the candidates and normative beliefs are highly related to voting intentions, although the relation between attitudes toward voting for the candidates and voting intentions is stronger than the relation between normative beliefs and voting intentions.
When the respective weights of attitudes towards voting for the candidates and of normative beliefs are assessed in terms of their respective contribution to the prediction of voting intentions, the weights of attitudes toward voting for the candidates (.79 and .68 for the AD and PS candidates, respectively) are found to be much more significant than the weights of normative beliefs (.14 and .21, respectively) on the prediction of voting intentions. In the case of the prediction of intentions to vote for the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, the weight of normative beliefs (w = .14) is not significant, and does not contribute to enhance the power of attitudes toward voting for Soares Carneiro to predict intentions to vote for him. In fact R.89 remained unchanged from r.89, the correlation coefficient between attitudes to voting for Soares Carneiro and intentions to vote for him.

In the case of the prediction of intentions to vote for the PS candidate, Ramalho Eanes, the weight of normative beliefs (.21) although significant, contributes only slightly to improving the power of attitudes to voting for Ramalho Eanes to predict intentions to vote for him. In fact, the correlation coefficient between attitudes to voting for Ramalho Eanes and intentions to vote for him (r.80) is only increased to R.82.

These results indicate that in the 1980 Presidential election attitudes toward voting for the two presidential
elections were by far better predictors of respondents' voting intentions than normative beliefs.

7.1.2 The test of the Attitude Model in the 1980 Presidential election

Table 7.1.2 shows the correlation coefficients between attitudes toward voting for the two presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about the candidates' stands on the issues ($\sum b e_i$).

Table 7.1.2
Correlation coefficients of attitudes toward voting for the two presidential candidates ($A_{vot}$) and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about the candidates' stands on the issues ($\sum b e_i$), in the 1980 Presidential election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soares Carneiro (AD candidate)</th>
<th>Ramalho Eanes (PS candidate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A_{vot}$ - $\sum b e_i$</td>
<td>0.87 (N = 86)</td>
<td>0.72 (N = 87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As predicted by the theory of Reasoned Action, attitudes toward voting for the candidates (i.e. objects) are highly related to respondents' beliefs about the probability that the candidates were associated with the issues (i.e. other objects).
Although very significant, the relation between attitudes toward voting for Ramalho Eanes and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about Ramalho Eanes' stands on the issues (.72) is not as strong as the relation between attitudes toward voting for Soares Carneiro and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about Soares Carneiro's stands on the issues (.87).

Section 7.2 - Predicting voting intentions in the 1982 Local elections

7.2.1 The test of the Intention Model in the 1982 Local elections

Table 7.2.1 shows the coefficients of the multiple regression carried out to test the dependency of respondents' intentions to vote for the three parties (AD - right wing alliance, PS - Socialist party and APU - communist alliance) on respondents' attitudes toward voting for the parties and on respondents' normative beliefs in the 1982 Local elections.
Table 7.2.1

Multiple regression coefficients of respondents' attitudes toward voting for the three parties (A) and of respondents' normative beliefs (NB), on respondents' intentions to vote for the three parties in the 1982 Local elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to vote for</th>
<th>Zero Order Correlations</th>
<th>Beta weights</th>
<th>Multiple regression coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>NB</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All coefficients are significant beyond p < .001

The zero order correlation coefficients show that attitudes toward voting for the three parties and normative beliefs are all significantly related to voting intentions, although the relation between attitudes toward voting for the parties and voting intentions is stronger than the relation between normative beliefs and voting intentions.

The weights of attitudes toward voting for the three parties and of normative beliefs on the prediction of voting intentions are all significant, although the weights of attitudes to voting for the AD (.66), for the PS (.50) and for the APU (.65) make a stronger contribution to the
prediction of voting intentions than the weights of normative beliefs on intentions to vote for the AD (.25), on intentions to vote for the PS (.26) and on intentions to vote for the APU (.28).

Although the contribution of respondents' normative beliefs on the prediction of their voting intentions was found to be significant, the power of attitudes toward voting for the parties to predict voting intentions was only slightly raised. In the case of the AD, the coefficient of the correlation between attitudes toward voting for the AD and intentions to vote for the AD increased from $r=.81$ to $R=.83$. In the case of the PS, the coefficient of the correlation between attitudes toward voting for the PS and intentions to vote for the PS increased from $r=.60$ to $R=.65$. In the case of the APU, the coefficient of the correlation between attitudes toward voting for the APU and intentions to vote for the APU increased from $r=.85$ to $R=.87$.

These results indicate that in the 1982 Local elections, as in the 1980 Presidential elections, attitudes toward voting for the three parties were by far better predictors of respondents' voting intentions than normative beliefs.

7.2.2 The test of the Attitude Model in the 1982 Local elections

Table 7.2.2 shows the correlation coefficients between attitudes toward voting for the three parties (AD - right
wing alliance, PS - Socialist party and APU communist alliance) in the 1982 local elections and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about the parties' stands on the issues ($\Sigma b e_i$).

Table 7.2.2

Correlation coefficients of attitudes toward voting for the three parties ($A_v$) and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about the parties' stands on the issues ($\Sigma b e_i$) in the 1982 Local elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AD (right wing alliance)</th>
<th>PS (Socialist party)</th>
<th>APU (communist alliance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A_v - \Sigma b e_i$ vot i i</td>
<td>.81 (N=144)</td>
<td>.61 (N=147)</td>
<td>.80 (N=146)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As predicted by the theory of Reasoned Action, attitudes toward voting for the three parties (i.e objects) are highly related to respondents' beliefs about the probability that the parties were associated with the issues (i.e other objects).
Although very significant, the relation between attitudes toward voting for the PS (socialists) and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about the Socialist party's stands on the issues (.61) is not as strong as the relation between attitudes toward voting for the AD and the APU and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about the AD and the APU stands' on the issues (.81 and .80, respectively).

Section 7.3 - Predicting voting intentions in the 1983 General election

7.3.1 The test of the Intention Model in the 1983 General election

Table 7.3.1 shows the coefficients of the multiple regression carried out to test the dependency of respondents' intentions to vote for the four parties (CDS - christian democrats; PSD - social democrats; PS - socialists and APU - communist alliance) on respondents' attitudes toward voting for the parties and on respondents' normative beliefs in the 1983 General election.
Table 7.3.1

Multiple regression coefficients of respondents' attitudes toward voting for the four parties (A) and of respondents' normative beliefs (NB), on respondents' intentions to vote for the four parties in the 1983 General election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to vote for</th>
<th>Zero Order correlations</th>
<th>Beta weights</th>
<th>Multiple regression coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A (vot)</td>
<td>NB</td>
<td>A (vot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS (christian democrats)</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD (social democrats)</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at p < .05
** not significant
All the other coefficients are significant beyond p < .001

The zero order correlations coefficients show that attitudes toward voting for the four parties and normative beliefs are all significantly related to voting intentions, although the relation between attitudes toward voting for the parties and voting intentions is stronger than the relation between normative beliefs and voting intentions.

The weights of attitudes toward voting for the four parties on the prediction of voting intentions are all significant (.40 on intentions to vote for the CDS; .72 on intentions
to vote for the PSD; .59 on intentions to vote for the PS and .71 on intentions to vote for the APU). The weights of normative beliefs on the prediction of intentions to vote for four parties appear to have had a different contribution vis-a-vis each of the four parties.

In the case of the CDS (christian democrats), the weight of normative beliefs (.37) on the prediction of intentions to vote for the CDS was highly significant and did make a strong contribution to the prediction of intentions to vote for the CDS. The coefficient of the correlation between attitudes toward voting for the CDS and intentions to vote for the CDS (.58) increased to $R = .67$ with the inclusion of normative beliefs in the regression.

In the case of the PSD (social democrats), the weight of normative beliefs (.14) on the prediction of intentions to vote for the PSD was just found significant ($p < .05$) but did not make a significant contribution to the prediction of intentions to vote for the PSD. The coefficient of the correlation between attitudes toward voting for the PSD and intentions to vote for the PSD (.82) did not change ($R = .82$) with the inclusion of normative beliefs in the regression.

In the case of the PS (socialists), the weight of normative beliefs (.11) on the prediction of intentions to vote for the PS was not found to be significant. In the circumstances, the coefficient of the correlation between attitudes toward voting for the PS and intentions to vote for the PS (.65) remained unchanged ($R = .65$). The inclusion
of respondents' normative beliefs did not improve the prediction of intentions to vote for the PS from respondents' attitudes toward voting for the PS.

In the case of the APU (communist alliance), the weight of normative beliefs (.25) on the prediction of intentions to vote for the APU was found to be highly significant \( p < .001 \) but only made a slight contribution to the prediction of intentions to vote for the APU. The coefficient of the correlation between attitudes toward voting for the APU and intentions to vote for the APU (.88) increased slightly to \( R = .90 \) with the inclusion of normative beliefs in the regression.

These results indicate that in the 1983 General election, as in the 1980 Presidential election and in the 1982 Local elections, attitudes toward voting for the four parties were far better predictors of respondents' voting intentions than normative beliefs. However, the fact that in the case of the CDS party in the 1983 General election, normative beliefs were found to make a strong contribution to the prediction of intentions to vote for the CDS, indicates that the influence of normative beliefs on voting intentions may be dependent not only upon particular electoral instances, i.e. electoral, cultural and historical contexts, as Fishbein et al (1980) suggest, but also upon differences among the parties within the same electoral, cultural and historical context.
7.3.2 The test of the Attitude Model in the 1983 General election

Table 7.3.2 shows the correlation coefficients between attitudes toward voting for the four parties (CDS - christian democrats; PSD - social democrats; PS - socialists and APU - communist alliance) in the 1983 General election and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about the parties' stands on the issues (Σbe).

\[ Σbe \]

Table 7.3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CDS</th>
<th>PSD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>APU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>christian democrats</td>
<td>social democrats</td>
<td>socialists</td>
<td>communist alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A vot i i</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=141)</td>
<td>(N=141)</td>
<td>(N=145)</td>
<td>(N=150)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As predicted by the theory of Reasoned Action, attitudes toward voting for the four parties (i.e. objects) are highly related to respondents' beliefs about the probability that the parties were associated with the issues (i.e. other objects).
Although very significant, the relation between attitudes toward voting for the PS (socialists) and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about the Socialist party stands on the issues (.63) is not as strong as the relation between attitudes toward voting for the CDS, the PSD and the APU and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about the CDS, PSD and APU stands' on the issues (.80, .84 and .75, respectively). This difference will be analysed and discussed in Chapter IX.

Section 7.4 - Summary of Chapter VII and overall comparison of the tests of the Reasoned Action Model in the American, British and Portuguese studies

The findings of the Reasoned Action Model tests in the three Portuguese elections give strong support to the assumptions made by the Model. Attitudes toward voting for the candidates in the 1980 Presidential election and for the parties in the 1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General election were found to be highly related to estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about candidates' and parties' stands on electoral issues ($\sum b_i e_i$). Also, attitudes toward voting for the candidates and for the parties were found to be very strong predictors of respondents' voting intentions. However, with the exception of one instance in the 1983 General election, the effect of normative beliefs on voting intentions was found to be very weak.
However, two points should be highlighted concerning the results in the 1982 and 1983 elections. In the 1982 Local elections, the relation between respondents' attitudes toward voting for the PS (Socialist party) and intentions to vote for the party, although very significant, was found to be less strong (.60) than the relation between the two variables with respect to the other two parties, AD (.81) and APU (.85) (see Table 7.2.1). In the 1983 General election, the relation between respondents' attitudes toward voting for the PS (Socialist party) and for the CDS (Christian Democrats) on the one hand and intentions to vote for the PS (.65) and the CDS (.58), although highly significant, were also found to be less strong than the relation between the two variables with respect to the other two parties, PSD (.82) and APU (.88) (see Table 7.3.1).

The underlying reasons for these relative weaker correlations found in the case of the Socialist party in the 1982 and 1983 elections and in the case of the CDS party in the 1983 election do not appear to be the same. In the Socialist party's case, the weaker relation between attitudes toward voting for the Socialist Party and intentions to vote for the party both in the 1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General election than that found for the other parties underlaid by a weak although significant relation between attitudes toward voting for the Socialist party and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about the party's stands on the
issues (.61 and .63, respectively, see tables 7.2.2 and 7.3.2). In the case of the Christian Democratic party, although the relation between attitudes toward voting for the CDS and intentions to vote for the party (.58) is weaker than that found in respect of the PSD and APU parties, (see table 7.3.1) the relation between attitudes toward voting for the CDS and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about CDS stands is quite strong (.80, see table 7.3.2). These differences are discussed in detail in Chapter IX.

On the whole the Portuguese results compare very favourably with the results obtained in the American and British studies.

Table 7.4.1 shows the results of the tests of the Intention Model in the October 1974 British General election study, in the 1976 American Presidential election study, in the 1980 Portuguese Presidential elections study, in the 1982 Portuguese Local election study and in the 1983 Portuguese General election study.
Table 7.4.1
Comparative table showing the results of the tests of the Intention Model in the October 1974 British General election, in the 1976 American Presidential election, in the 1980 Portuguese Presidential election, in the 1982 Portuguese Local elections and in the 1983 Portuguese General election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Intention to vote for:</th>
<th>Zero Order Correlations</th>
<th>Beta weights</th>
<th>Multiple Regression coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A vot(1)</td>
<td>NB(1)</td>
<td>A vot(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 British General elections (1)</td>
<td>Labour candidate</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative candidate</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 American Presidential election</td>
<td>Republican and Democratic candidates (differential coefficients)</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Portuguese Presidential election</td>
<td>AD candidates</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR candidates</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 Portuguese local elections</td>
<td>AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR (Socialist party)</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APU (Communist alliance)</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 Portuguese general election</td>
<td>CDG (Christian democrats)</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSD (Social democrats)</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS (Socialists)</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APU Communist alliance</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) the dependent variable in the British elections was actual vote choice not voting intentions
(2) Attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties
(3) Socioeconomic beliefs
* not significant
** significant at p < .05
*** significant at p < .01
all other coefficients are significant beyond p < .001
With the exception of the cases already highlighted concerning the results of the PS in the 1982 Portuguese Local elections and in the 1983 Portuguese General election, and the results of the CDS in the 1983 Portuguese General election, the other results of the tests of the Intention model in the Portuguese elections compare very favourably with the results of the tests of the model in the British and American studies.

In the five electoral studies, although attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties and normative beliefs were found to be significantly correlated with voting intentions (or vote choice as in the case of the British study), the weight of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties was found to be a much stronger determinant of voting intentions than the weight of normative beliefs. In most instances, the inclusion of normative beliefs in the prediction of voting intentions either failed to have an effect on or only increased slightly the power of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties to predict voting intentions.

Table 7.4.2 shows the results of the tests of the Attitude model in the October 1974 British General election study, in the 1976 American Presidential election study, in the 1980 Portuguese Presidential election study, in the 1982 Portuguese Local elections study and in the 1983 Portuguese General election study.
Table 7.4.2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Attitude Model in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 1974 British General election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976 American Presidential election *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980 Portuguese Presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982 Portuguese elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983 Portuguese election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) correlation coefficients of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties (A) and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about the candidates' and parties' stands on issues (∑ b e).

* Unlike in the other elections, salient issues were used in the 1976 American Presidential election.
The results of the tests of the Attitude Model in the three Portuguese elections compare very favourably with the results obtained in the British and American studies. Apart from the case of the Socialist party (PS) in the Portuguese 1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General election, all the other results show very high correlations between attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about the candidates' and parties' stands on the issues. These very high correlations were obtained in spite of the fact that salient issues were not used in the Portuguese studies.

Although in the Portuguese studies the assumptions of the Reasoned Action Model were supported by the results of the tests of the model's two components, i.e. the Attitude model and the Intention model, it is necessary to ascertain whether the measures used by the model are better predictors of voting intentions than other measures such as direct attitudes to candidates or parties and electoral outcomes. The aim of Chapter VIII is to make such comparisons.
CHAPTER VIII

THE BEST PREDICTOR OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Introduction

To be of any practical use a model has to have predictive power. In this respect the tests of the Reasoned Action model presented in the preceding chapter and those carried out in the UK and USA appear to confirm its validity. However, when assessing its predictive power, it is necessary to demonstrate that the measures used by the model are indeed better predictors than other alternative measures and second, that the model, does indeed further our understanding of the processes which lead to electoral choice.

As described in Chapter II, earlier models of voting behaviour postulated determinants of vote choice which differed from those which are postulated by the Reasoned Action model. For example, according to the Columbia model (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) and Berelson et al, 1954) and the Michigan model (Campbell et al, 1960) vote choice is determined by party identification, although the models differ as to the type of social influence which, in turn, determine party identification. Both models considered, attitudes toward candidates, parties etc., to be consequences of party identification rather than determinants of vote choices.
According to Reasoned Action theory, direct attitudes to candidates and parties are highly related to voting behaviour. However, instead of being considered as a consequence of party identification, as suggested by the Columbia and Michigan models, Reasoned Action theory (Fishbein and Coombs, 1974) suggests that attitudes toward candidates and parties (as attitudes toward voting for candidates and parties) are related to people's beliefs about candidates and parties' stands on important issues ($\sum b e$). Therefore, it is necessary to show whether in the Portuguese surveys, as in the American and British surveys attitudes to candidates and parties are related to respondents' beliefs ($\sum b e$). If, as expected, the two measures are highly associated with each other it becomes necessary to assess the relative weight of direct attitudes to candidates and parties and of attitudes towards voting for the candidates and parties on voting intention to establish which of the two attitude measures is a better predictor of vote choice.

Together with the weights of these two attitude measures the relative weight of respondents' attitudes toward electoral outcomes will also be assessed. It is an important measure to consider when assessing the relative predictive power of attitude measures in voting intentions. It might be assumed that voters will wish their preferred
candidates or parties to win the election. However, when it comes to the actual electoral outcome there may be cases in which, in spite of the fact that voters intend to vote for a preferred candidate or party, they may not be totally unfavourable to the victory of another candidate or party. Should this be the case, then one would expect to find attitudes toward electoral outcomes to be not as good predictors of voting intention as attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 8.1 looks at the relationship between attitudes to candidates and parties and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about candidates' and parties' stands on the issues (Ωb e) in the three Portuguese elections.

Section 8.2 examines the relative weights of direct attitudes toward candidates or parties and of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties. It will also show the effect of attitudes toward electoral outcomes on the prediction of voting intentions. Section 8.3 examines the indirect effect of beliefs on voting intentions. In its summing up of the chapter, Section 8.4, refers to the role of external variables and introduces chapter IX which is devoted to a detailed analysis of the awareness of Portuguese respondents.

Appendix 3 is associated with this Chapter. The Appendix presents detailed descriptions of measures of attitude
towards the candidates and parties, of attitude towards voting for the candidates and parties and of attitude toward electoral outcomes, i.e. the measures used to assess the best predictor of voting behaviour in Section 8.2.

The description of the measures used in Section 8.3 to assess the relation between beliefs and voting intentions is presented in Appendix 4 together with all the other measures used to assess the political and social awareness of Portuguese voters to which the following Chapter, Chapter IX is devoted.

Section 8.1 - The relationship between attitudes to candidates and parties and estimates of these attitudes \((\sum b e)\)

Table 8.1 shows the correlation coefficients between direct attitudes toward the presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election, direct attitudes toward the parties in the 1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General election, and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about the presidential candidates' and parties' stands on the issues selected for each election \((\sum b e)\).
Table 8.1

Correlation coefficients between direct attitudes toward the presidential candidates (1980 Presidential election), toward the parties (1982 Local elections), toward the parties (1983 General election) and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about candidates' or parties' stands on the issues (be).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate/Party</th>
<th>Direct attitude (be)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980 Presidential election</strong></td>
<td>Soares Carneiro, AD candidate</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ramalho Eanes, PS candidate</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1982 Local elections</strong></td>
<td>AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1983 General election</strong></td>
<td>CDS (christian democrats)</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSD (social democrats)</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As expected, the correlations between direct attitudes toward the candidates and parties and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about their stands on the issues in the three elections are all highly significant.
In their study of the relationship between attitudes towards candidates and respondents' beliefs on candidates' stands about issues, Fishbein and Coombs (1974), obtained similar results. At the time, the American presidential candidates were Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson. The correlation coefficients between direct attitudes towards the candidates and estimates of these attitudes based on the candidates' stands on the issues \((\Sigma b e_i)\) were .87 and .69 for Goldwater and Johnson, respectively. In the 1974 British electoral study (Fishbein et al., 1976) the correlation coefficients obtained between direct attitudes to parties and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs on the parties' stands \((\Sigma b e_i)\) were .74 and .67 for the Labour and Conservative parties, respectively.

The correlations obtained in the British and Portuguese surveys are lower than those obtained in the 1974 American study, although all are high and significant. As pointed out by Fishbein et al. (1976) in the British study the lower relationship found may be due to the fact that in the British studies salient issues were not used (Fishbein et al., 1976, p.44).

However, in spite of the fact that in the Portuguese study salient issues were not used, it can be concluded that, as expected, respondents' attitudes toward the presidential candidates and the parties appear to be functions of respondents' beliefs on the stands which candidates and
parties were likely to adopt, if elected, on the selected issues.

Section 8.2 - Predicting voting intentions from attitudes toward candidates and parties, voting for candidates and parties, and electoral outcomes

As shown in the previous section, direct attitudes toward candidates or parties and estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs on candidates and parties' stands on the issues are highly related. The Reasoned Action model, however, suggests that behaviour (voting), is better predicted from direct attitudes toward the behaviour itself (i.e., voting for the candidates or parties) than from direct attitudes toward the objects themselves (i.e., candidates and parties). It is therefore necessary to test this hypothesis by assessing the relative weights of direct attitudes to candidates or the parties, and of attitudes to voting for the candidates or the parties in the prediction of voting intentions.

Table 8.2 shows the relative strength of direct attitudes toward the candidates or the parties and of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or for the parties in the 1980 Presidential election, 1982 Local elections and 1983 General election. (For a description of these measures see Appendix 3, Section 1).
Table 8.2

Predicting voting intentions from direct attitudes toward candidates or parties and attitudes toward voting for candidates and for parties in the 1980 Presidential election, 1982 Local elections and 1983 General election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to vote for:</th>
<th>Zero Order correlations</th>
<th>Beta weights</th>
<th>Multiple regression coefficient $R$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Attitudes to voting</td>
<td>Direct Attitudes to voting</td>
<td>Attitudes to voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Social Democrats (AD candidate)</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.18 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Labour Democrats (PD candidate)</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.08 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1982</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>-.82 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... PD (socialists)</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... PPD (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.63 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1983</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... CS (Christian democrats)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.000 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... PSD (social democrats)</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>-.11 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... PDS (socialists)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.04 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... PPD (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* not significant

All the other coefficients are significant beyond $p < .001$
As expected, attitudes toward voting for the candidates in the 1980 Presidential election and for the parties in the 1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General election were found to be better predictors of voting intentions than direct attitudes toward the candidates or parties. In most cases direct attitudes toward the candidates or parties were found to add no significant weight to the prediction of voting intentions. In the two cases where the weight of direct attitudes towards parties was found to be significant, its contribution to the predictive power of attitudes towards voting for the parties was very small. In the 1982 Local elections the weight of attitudes toward the Socialist party was found to make a significant contribution to the prediction of voting intentions. However, this contribution only increased the predictive power of attitudes toward voting for the Socialist party from \( r = .62 \) to \( R = .64 \). In the 1983 General election the contribution of attitudes toward the APU (communist alliance) had only a marginal effect on the predictive power of attitudes towards voting for the APU of voting intentions. The zero order correlation between attitudes toward voting for the APU and intention to vote or not to vote for the APU increased from \( r = .87 \) to \( R = .88 \).

The above results indicate quite clearly that once attitudes toward the behaviour, i.e. voting for the candidates or parties, are known prediction of voting intentions is not enhanced by adding measures of direct attitudes toward objects i.e. candidates or parties. Will
prediction of voting intentions be enhanced by adding attitudes towards electoral outcomes to measures of direct attitudes toward the candidates or parties and of attitudes toward voting for them? If voters are aware of the political implications of their vote choices, they should also be aware of the implications of the victory of candidates or parties for whom they do not intend to vote. It is possible that, at least in some cases, voters may hold favourable attitudes to certain electoral outcomes, in spite of the fact that they do not intend to vote for them. In the case of the Portuguese 1983 General election, it is possible that respondents who intended to vote for either of the two right wing parties, i.e. CDS and PSD, did not hold unfavourable attitudes towards the victory of the party between the two, they did not intend to vote for. If this is the case, then attitudes toward voting for candidates or parties, should on the whole, be better predictors of voting intentions than attitudes toward electoral outcomes. (For a description of measures of attitude toward electoral outcomes, see Appendix 3, Section 1).

Table 8.3 shows the effect of direct attitudes toward the candidates or parties, of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties and of attitudes toward the victory of the candidates or of the parties when these measures are considered together on the prediction of voting intentions in the 1980 Presidential election, 1982 Local elections and 1983 General election.
Table 8.3

Predicting voting intentions from direct attitudes toward candidates or parties, toward voting for the candidates or parties, and toward electoral outcomes in the 1980 Presidential election, the 1982 Local elections and the 1983 General election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to vote for</th>
<th>Zero order correlations</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Data weights</th>
<th></th>
<th>Multiple</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Attitudes</td>
<td>Attitudes to voting</td>
<td>Attitudes to outcomes</td>
<td>Direct Attitudes</td>
<td>Attitudes to voting</td>
<td>Attitudes to outcomes</td>
<td>Regression coefficient R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Renzo Castelo</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>-.29*</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UD candidates)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Renato Renzo</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>-.53*</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PS candidates)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.86*</td>
<td>-.51*</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.50*</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... PS (socialists)</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.604*</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-.50*</td>
<td>.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... ANO (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.88*</td>
<td>.53*</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.63*</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... CDU (christian democrats)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-.52*</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... PSD (social democrats)</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>-.25*</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... PS (socialists)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.53*</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.50*</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... ANO (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* not significant
** significant at p < .05
All the other coefficients are significant beyond p < .001

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As it can be seen from Table 8.3 attitudes toward electoral outcomes appear to be highly related to voting intentions in the case of the 1980 Presidential election and in the case of the 1983 General election. In the 1982 Local elections, however, attitudes toward electoral outcomes were found to be unrelated to voting intentions.

Of note the fact that in the 1983 General elections, the correlation between attitudes toward the victory of the Socialist party and voting intentions, although significant (.22) is much lower than the correlations found with respect to the other three parties. This may be indicative of the general less unfavourable attitudes of respondents towards the Socialist party which are reflected in their less unfavourable attitude towards the possible victory of the socialists.

When the relative weights of direct attitudes toward candidates or parties, of attitudes toward voting for them and of attitudes toward electoral outcomes are assessed in terms of their power to predict voting intentions it is clear that the best predictor of voting intentions is by and large attitude toward the behaviour, i.e. towards voting for the candidates or for the parties. Little is gained by adding the effect of direct measures of attitude to objects i.e. candidates or parties or the effect of attitudes toward electoral outcomes.
Section 8.3 - The relation between beliefs and voting intentions

Section 8.2 examined the relation between attitudes and intentions and the relative effect of those attitudes on the prediction of voting intentions. According to the theory of Reasoned Action attitudes which guide behaviour are determined by beliefs acquired about the objects (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Although the effect of beliefs on intentions to perform behaviours is considered to be indirect it is of interest to consider the relative contribution of respondents' beliefs on candidates and parties' stands on issues ($\Sigma_b\Sigma_{i\i}$) and respondents' normative beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted others as to whom respondents should be voting for. Since respondents' beliefs on candidates and parties stands on issues are the product of respondents' beliefs on candidates and parties' stands on issues and of respondents' own evaluations of the issues, they are in fact belief based attitudes. These beliefs, i.e. $\Sigma_b\Sigma_{i\i}$ and normative beliefs are indicative of two types of awareness on the part of voters. Their awareness of political issues, i.e. their political knowledge, and their awareness of the opinions of people they trust i.e. their social knowledge. Table 8.4 shows the relative contribution of respondents' political and social awareness on their voting intentions in the three elections.
Table 8.4

Predicting voting intentions from belief based attitudes on candidates and parties' stands on the issues ($\sum b e$) and normative beliefs (NB) in the 1980 Presidential election, 1982 Local elections and 1983 General election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intention to vote for ...</th>
<th>Zero order correlations ($\hat{b}_{nb}$)</th>
<th>Meta weights ($\hat{b}_{nb}$)</th>
<th>Multiple regression coefficients ($R$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>CPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND (bright wing alliance)</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS (Christian democrats)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP (social democrats)</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at $p < .05$

All other coefficients are significant beyond $p < .001$

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As expected, the dependency of voting intentions on beliefs is not as high as their dependency on attitudes (see tables 8.2 and 8.3). However, it is of interest to note that the relative weights of beliefs on candidates' and parties' stands on issues ($\Sigma_{i=1}^n b_{ei}$) and of normative beliefs (NB), appear to be more balanced than when the weight of normative beliefs is assessed together with the weight of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties. The weights of $\Sigma_{i=1}^n b_{ei}$ and normative beliefs both make a significant contribution to enhance the prediction of voting intentions.

**Section 8.4 - Summary of Chapter VIII**

The power of the Reasoned Action model to predict voting intentions was compared with measures of attitude and of belief. As expected, direct attitudes toward the presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election and toward the parties in the 1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General election, although highly related to beliefs about the candidates' or parties' stands on the issues, were found to make no significant contribution to the prediction of voting intentions when their predictive weights were assessed together with the predictive weights of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties.

According to the theory of Reasoned Action direct attitudes toward objects, i.e. candidates or parties in an election are external to the model. Although direct attitudes toward candidates or parties are assumed to be related to
beliefs about the candidates or parties' stands on important electoral issues they are not assumed to be related to party identification as the Columbia and Michigan models proposed. The Portuguese findings showed the strong relationship between direct attitudes to candidates or parties and respondents' beliefs on candidates and parties' stands on the issues. However, no attempt was made to relate direct attitudes to candidates or parties with party identification or indeed to relate other variables which are considered external to the model such as sex, level of education, age and past voting behaviour to voting intention. First, these measures, were found to make no significant contribution to the predictive power of the Reasoned Action model in the American and British studies. Second, the main concern of the Portuguese study was to assess the political awareness of Portuguese respondents, the effect of this awareness on their voting intentions and the extent to which voting intentions were affected by the influence that the opinions of trusted referents had on respondents.

The balanced effect of the political and social awareness of respondents (measured by respondents' beliefs on candidates' and parties' stands on the issues - \( \Sigma b \) and by the opinion of trusted others - normative beliefs) on respondents' voting intentions as described in the preceding section 8.3 of this chapter, provides a basis for the detailed discussion of respondents' beliefs to which the following chapter is devoted.

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CHAPTER IX
AWARENESS OF VOTERS: POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND
NORMATIVE INFLUENCE

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the detailed analysis of results with respect to two types of awareness, i.e. political awareness of important electoral issues and of the candidates or parties stands on them, and social awareness of the opinions of trusted others about electoral voting choices.

According to the model of reasoned action awareness derived from political knowledge determines voters' attitudes towards voting for candidates/parties. On the other hand, awareness of the opinions of trusted others, together with attitudes towards voting for candidates/parties, determine voting intentions.

Detailed analyses of the relevant data in the American and British studies have shown that voters in these two countries are aware of electoral issues, have their own opinions about them and know the stands that candidates/parties are likely to adopt towards the issues, if elected. These analyses have also shown that, at least in some cases, the perceived opinions of trusted others also have significant weight in determining voting intentions.
The results of the tests of the model in the three Portuguese elections covered by this study are comparable to the tests carried out in the American Presidential election of 1976 and in the British General election of 1974 (Chapter VII).

It now remains to be seen through a detailed analysis of respondents evaluations of the issues and of their beliefs about the candidates/parties stands on them how aware were the Portuguese respondents of the political processes at the time of the elections. A detailed analysis of respondents' normative beliefs will determine their awareness of the opinions of trusted others about their voting choices.

To establish whether respondents were aware of the political processes which were taking place at the time of the elections and of the implications of their vote choice it is necessary to ascertain:

1. voters' degree of uncertainty concerning electoral issues (in the present study this point is crucial since salient issues were not used) and the strength of their evaluations of the issues;

2. voters' degree of uncertainty concerning the stands which candidates/parties were likely to adopt on the issues and the strength of their beliefs, on the candidates/parties stands;
3. the combined effect of their evaluations of the issues and beliefs on the candidates/parties' stands on these issues on their attitudes to voting or not voting for the candidates/parties.

To establish whether respondents were aware of the opinions of trusted others it is necessary to ascertain respondents' degree of uncertainty on the opinions of trusted others and the strength of their beliefs concerning such opinions.

This chapter is divided in four sections. The first three sections, sections 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3, are devoted to examining the political awareness of respondents in each of the three elections. Each of these three sections assesses respondents' apathy versus their interest in electoral issues and in candidates/parties' stands together with the contribution of their knowledge in these matters to their attitudes towards voting for the candidates/parties. Section 9.4 assesses the social awareness of respondents in the three elections in terms of their beliefs about trusted others' opinions about whom they should vote for.

Section 9.1 - The Presidential Election of 1980 - how politically aware were the voters?

9.1.1. Apathy vs interest about issues and candidates' stands

Respondents' apathy is assessed by the percentage of "don't know" responses given when they were asked to evaluate the issues and to indicate the stands the presidential
candidates were likely to adopt on the issues, if elected.

Evaluation of issues (1980 Presidential election)

Table 9.1. in Appendix 4 shows the percent midscale (0) responses with respect to each of the ten electoral issues as a function of party identification, together with the percent positive (+) and negative (-) responses.

The average percent midscale responses shown by each of the three groups of voters divided according to party identification (AD = 12.9%, FRS = 12.2% and APU = 11.8%) indicates that, on the whole, the vast majority of respondents had feelings about the issues and were able to evaluate them.

In seven out of the ten issues the direction either positive or negative of respondents' evaluations is very similar. The vast majority of AD, FRS and APU respondents evaluated positively issues 1, 2, 3, and 7 feeling, therefore, that a President should be impartial, (issue 1) respect the Constitution, (issue 2) veto Government proposals which are unconstitutional (issue 3) and support political stability (issue 7).

Diagram 9.1.1 next page shows the common trend of the positive evaluations made by the three groups of respondents in respect of issues 1, 2, 3 and 7.
Percent positive evaluations made by AD, FRS and APU respondents of issues 1, 2, 3, and 7 in the 1980 Presidential election.

On the other hand, the majority of respondents in all three groups indicated that a President should not support a dictatorial form of government, political instability or a military coup (issues 6, 8 and 10 respectively), although almost one third of FRS and APU respondents had no feelings about the latter.

Diagram 9.1.2 next page shows how similar were the negative evaluations made by the three groups of respondents in respect of issues 6, 8 and 10.
In their evaluations of the remaining three issues, i.e. issues 4, 5 and 9, respondents do not show a common trend, either positive or negative. On issues 4 and 5, namely that a President should risk political instability rather than give in to a government who acts against the Constitution and that a President should give unconditional support to the government, respectively, the FRS and APU respondents showed similar feelings in the same direction whereas AD respondents appeared to be very divided among themselves. In order to highlight the difference between the FRS and APU respondents' evaluations on the one hand and those of the AD respondents on the other, Diagrams 9.1.3 and 9.1.4 on the next page show the positive, midscale and negative evaluations made by the three groups of respondents about these two issues.
Percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations made by AD, FRS and APU respondents of issues 4 and 5 in the 1980 Presidential election. AD respondents were clearly divided in their evaluations of issues on whether a President should risk political instability rather than give in to a government who acts against the Constitution (issue 4) and on whether a President should give unconditional support to the government (issue 5).
Given that the vast majority of AD respondents, like their FRS and APU counterparts, had shown clear preference for an impartial President, respectful of the Constitution who would not hesitate to use the veto to block government proposals considered to be unconstitutional, their somewhat unclear positions on issues concerning breaches of Constitutional practice may be unexpected. Only 3% of AD respondents felt that a President should not respect the Constitution and 85% felt that he should. However, 22% felt that the President should give in to a government who act against the Constitution and as many as 32% felt that the President should give unconditional support to the government.

This apparent incoherence should be considered in the light of the high percentage of "don't know" responses given by AD respondents on these two issues. It is possible that AD respondents were faced with conflicting choices. AD respondents showed they had a high regard for general principles connected with the exercise of the President's office. Simultaneously, however, they were facing a choice between two presidential candidates. One of them, the incumbent, Ramalho Eanes, who had been rejected by the AD leadership in view of his firm constitutional stands, offered little guarantee of bringing about, if elected, the political stability desired by the AD electorate. On the other hand, Soares Carneiro, the virtually unknown Army general backed by the AD, offered every guarantee that, if elected, he would keep the institutional harmony desired by
the AD leadership and would thus open for the first time prospects of political stability in the country.

If political stability was for the AD respondents the most important electoral issue, then it is plausible that in this particular electoral context they were prepared to accept the implicit contradictions between principle and practice. Some respondents accepted the contradiction quite openly; others may have used the "don't know" response to avoid contradicting themselves. If this were the case it is possible that respondents do not use the midscale point just for indicating lack of knowledge or indifference.

Issue 9, namely that a President should support Revolution, divided the three groups of voters among themselves. Fifty nine percent of AD respondents indicated negative feelings towards this issue whereas 80% of APU respondents showed positive feelings. The FRS respondents showed great divisions among themselves, and as many as 39% of them indicated they had no feelings about whether a President should support Revolution. Diagram 9.1.5 next page shows the percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations made by the three groups of respondents on issue 9 to highlight these differences between the groups.
Percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations made by AD, FRS and APU respondents of issue 9 in the 1980 Presidential election

The statement that "a President should support Revolution" left the concept "revolution" unspecified. Respondents could therefore interpret the concept in terms of the "April Revolution" or in more general, ideological terms.

APU respondents, given their party affiliation or their broad political sympathies, do, in principle, support Revolution as a means to achieve radical political change from a bourgeois system to a socialist system. Furthermore, they had wholeheartedly supported the April Revolution and continued to do so. It is understandable that a high percentage evaluated the issue positively.

It is apparent that the FRS respondents experienced difficulties with the statement. They also had supported
the April Revolution wholeheartedly. However, unlike their APU counterparts, they did not accept it as the beginning of a revolutionary process to Socialism, but as a single act leading to the restoration of parliamentarian processes favouring the establishment of universal social rights under a multi-party democratic system. It is highly probable, therefore, that the statement might have presented them with a conflict between the acceptance of the April Revolution and the rejection of revolution per se.

To a lesser extent, AD respondents may have faced the same conflict as their socialist counterparts, although most of them clearly rejected that a President should support revolution.

These results on the whole show that respondents had something to say about the issues. It should be noted, however, that ambiguity either in the way the issues are presented to respondents or in the political context of the elections themselves may lead respondents who are politically aware to use the midscale point.

Beliefs on candidates' stands (1980 Presidential election)

The level of respondents' awareness dropped when they were asked to state their beliefs concerning the likely stands of the candidates on each of the ten issues. Table 9.2 in Appendix 4 shows the percent midscale (0) responses by the three groups of voters divided according to party identification on the likely stands of the candidates on
each of the ten issues, together with the percentages of respondents who believed that the candidates were likely to have a positive or a negative stand towards the issues if elected. Diagram 9.2.1 illustrates the results.

Percent midscale beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the stand of the AD candidate (SC) and of the Socialist party candidate (RE) on the ten issues in the 1980 Presidential election

As Diagram 9.2.1 based on Table 9.2 shows, overall, almost one third of AD respondents were unaware of the AD candidate stands and also of the stands likely to be adopted by the candidate supported by the Socialist Party who had just completed four years in office.

On the other hand socialist respondents were on the whole very certain about the stands likely to be adopted by the candidate supported by their own party. 87.7% average
across all items of socialist respondents were able to attribute stands to their party's candidate, Ramalho Eanes, and 80.2% were able to attribute stands to the candidate supported by the AD, Soares Carneiro.

The vast majority of APU respondents were also able to attribute stands to the candidates. 87.8% of APU respondents, average across all items, were able to attribute stands to the candidate supported by the AD. APU voters were less certain about the stands likely to be adopted by the candidate supported by the Socialist Party, Ramalho Eanes, for whom they were advised to vote by the Communist party. However, as many as 76.3% of APU respondents, average across all items, were able to attribute stands to Ramalho Eanes.

FRS and APU respondents show great similarities in their beliefs concerning the stands the two candidates were likely to take on the ten issues as illustrated by Diagram 9.2.2.next page.
Percent positive beliefs of FRS and APU respondents on the stands of the AD candidate (SC) and of the Socialist party candidate (RE) on the ten issues in the 1980 Presidential election.

The diagram not only highlights the similarities between the direction of beliefs held by FRS and APU respondents as regards the stands likely to be adopted by the two presidential candidates, but also the differences the two groups of respondents believed to exist between the stands likely to be adopted by the candidates themselves.

Furthermore, the diagram shows very clearly that with the exception of issue 9, that a President should support Revolution, both FRS and APU respondents believed that if elected, the candidate Ramalho Eanes supported by the Socialist party, would adopt stands on the issues very
similar to those they desired, as indicated by their evaluations in Diagram 9.2.2. For ease of reference the Diagram also illustrates the percent positive evaluations of FRS and APU respondents.

It can be argued that the above results are to be expected since both FRS and APU respondents clearly intended to vote for Ramalho Eanes, and both the Socialist and Communist parties were highly critical of the AD candidate. However, it is interesting to note that in spite of the severe criticisms made by the AD leadership about the incumbent Ramalho Eanes, and of their vigorous campaign in support of their own candidate, Soares Carneiro, AD respondents' beliefs concerning the likely stands of the two candidates on the ten issues did not differentiate between the candidates as well as those expressed by FRS and APU respondents. This is illustrated in diagram 9.2.3. next page.

For ease of reference the Diagram also illustrates the percent positive evaluations of AD respondents.

It is clear that for AD respondents, at least in two of the issues, the incumbent Ramalho Eanes was expected to adopt stands more in agreement with the outcomes preferred by the AD respondents than those expected of the AD candidate. This is the case in issues 2 and 3, where the majority of AD respondents expected Ramalho Eanes to respect the Constitution and use the veto to block unconstitutional government proposals. As it is illustrated in the diagram,
the majority of AD respondents did not expect the AD candidate to respect the Constitution or veto unconstitutional government proposals (issues 2 and 3 respectively).

Percent positive beliefs of AD respondents on the stands of the AD candidate (SC) and of the Socialist party candidate (RE) on the ten issues in the 1980 Presidential election

On the other hand, the vast majority of AD respondents expected the AD candidate to support political stability, a most preferred outcome on the part of AD respondents and to reject political instability. In contrast, only about one third of AD respondents expected the Socialist party candidate, to actually support political stability.

The belief that the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, would bring about political stability if elected appears to have
been the overriding factor which, as electoral results showed, led most AD voters to vote for him. Only issue 7 concerning political stability offered little uncertainty and no divisions among AD respondents. It was also the only issue which did not cause uncertainty or divisions among AD respondents when they were asked to state their beliefs concerning the likely stand of the AD candidate.

However only the analysis of the products of the issue evaluations made by the respondents and their beliefs concerning the candidates' stands (b e i) allow conclusions to be drawn about the effect of an issue in voting. It is necessary now to examine the strength of respondents' evaluations and beliefs and assess the contribution of their combined effect on respondents attitudes towards voting or not voting for the candidates.

9.1.2. The contribution of political knowledge to attitude towards voting for the candidates (b e i) in the 1980 Presidential election.

Strength of feelings about the issues (1980 Presidential election)

As expected, the strength of feelings about the issues did not produce marked differences between the three groups of respondents. Table 9.3, in Appendix 4, shows the average strength of evaluations of each of the three groups of respondents on each issue.
Diagram 9.3.1 illustrates the mean differences in strength of the evaluations made by the AD, FRS and APU respondents on each issue.

Mean strength of the evaluations made by AD FRS and APU respondents on each issue in the 1980 Presidential election

FRS and APU respondents showed no difference in the strength of their evaluations, except, as expected, on issue 9 that a President should support Revolution. While APU respondents clearly believed that a President should support revolution, the division among the FRS respondents concerning this issue is clearly illustrated by the zero mean. The differences between the AD group means and the means of the other two groups of respondents are differences in strength rather than in direction, with the exception of issue 9, since AD respondents did not believe that a President should support revolution.
Issues 4 and 5 that a President should risk political instability rather than give in to a government who acts against the Constitution, and that a President should give unconditional support to the government, had caused divisions among the AD respondents as discussed in the previous subsection. The low mean values of +.4 and -.1 reflect those divisions rather than general apathy.

Strength of beliefs about candidates' stands (1980 Presidential election)

The mean belief strength shown by AD, FRS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the two presidential candidates on each issue is shown in table 9.4, in Appendix 4.

Diagrams 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 next page illustrate the differences in mean belief strength between the AD, FRS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by each presidential candidate on each of the ten issues.

It is evident that FRS and APU respondents were in total agreement as to the stands they believed Soares Carneiro, the candidate supported by the AD, would be likely to adopt, if elected, on each issue. It is also evident that both groups of respondents were also in total agreement as to the stands they believed Ramalho Eanes, the candidate supported by the Socialist party, would be likely to adopt, if elected, on each issue.
Mean strength of beliefs of AD, FRS and APU respondents on the stands of the AD candidate (SC) and of the Socialist party candidate (RE) on each of the ten issues in the 1980 Presidential election.

On the stands attributed to Ramalho Eanes, the AD respondents agreed with the FRS and APU on all but three stands. On two of these, i.e. the stands on issues 7 and 8 that a President should support political stability and that a President should support political instability, the
differences are in the strength of beliefs rather than in their direction. On issue 1, that a President should be impartial, the AD respondents believed that Ramalho Eanes would not be impartial whereas both FRS and APU respondents believed he would be.

On the candidate Soares Carneiro supported by the party they identified with, AD respondents showed some measure of agreement with the beliefs expressed by FRS and APU candidates on five issues, i.e. issues 1, 4, 5, 8, 9. The strength of AD respondents' beliefs was, however, significantly lower than that shown by the other two groups. Like their FRS and APU counterparts AD respondents believed that Soares Carneiro would not be impartial (issue 1); that he would not risk instability rather than give in to a government who acted against the Constitution (issue 4); that he would support the government unconditionally (issue 5); that he would neither support political instability (issue 8) nor Revolution (issue 9). Unlike the FRS and APU respondents, AD respondents believed that Soares Carneiro would respect the Constitution (issue 2), would use the veto to oppose unconstitutional government proposals (issue 3) and would not support a military coup (issue 10). On issue 7, whereas FRS and APU respondents appeared to be undecided as to whether Soares Carneiro would be likely to support political stability, AD respondents strongly believed that he would.
In fact when the sets of beliefs expressed by AD respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the two candidates are analysed it is clear that AD respondents strongly believed that Ramalho Eanes, the candidate supported by the Socialist party, would use the veto to block unconstitutional government proposals, that he would not support the government unconditionally and that he would be opposed to a dictatorial type of government, the three issues which involved the Presidency directly with the government. The AD respondents appeared to be, therefore, quite aware that Ramalho Eanes would be likely to adopt these stands as he had shown himself capable of during the previous 11 months of AD government, and in so doing continue the instability which had characterised political life in the country for so long.

On the other hand, in relation to the candidate supported by the AD, Soares Carneiro, the AD respondents strongly believed that, if elected, he would give his unconditional support to the government. As shown by the way they evaluated the issue AD respondents were deeply divided about it. However they appeared to accept the AD candidate's lack of impartiality in order that political stability could be achieved.

The contribution of evaluations and beliefs to attitudes (1980 Presidential election)

Table 9.5 in Appendix 4 shows the contribution of each belief held by respondents regarding the stands likely to
be adopted by the candidates on each issue to overall attitude to voting for the candidates. This contribution is assessed by the product of respondents evaluations of the issues and their corresponding beliefs concerning candidates' stands.

Diagrams 9.5.1 and 9.5.2 next page illustrate the contribution of respondents' evaluations of issues and beliefs on the candidates' stands on each issue to respondents' attitudes towards voting for each candidate.

As Diagrams 9.5.1 and 9.5.2 next page show the products of FRS and APU respondents' evaluations and beliefs about the presidential candidates' stands on the issues are all positive in relation to Ramalho Eanes, the candidate supported by the Socialist party, and all very negative in relation to Soares Carneiro, the candidate supported by the AD alliance, showing very clearly the effect of the political awareness of FRS and APU respondents' on their attitudes towards voting for each of the two presidential candidates.
Mean contribution of AD, FRS and APU respondents' evaluations and beliefs on the stands of the AD candidate (SC) and on the stands of the Socialist party candidate (RE) on each issue to attitude towards voting for the two candidates in the 1980 Presidential election.
The effect of AD respondents' political awareness on their attitudes towards voting for each of the two presidential candidates is not so explicit. The fact is that the products of AD respondents' evaluations and beliefs about the stands likely to be adopted by each of the two presidential candidates make a positive contribution to their attitudes toward voting for both of them.

It is necessary to examine the effect of the type of issue on the contribution that evaluations of outcomes and beliefs made to attitudes towards voting for the candidates to understand why most of the AD respondents intended to vote for the AD candidate.

The ten issues can be divided into four main types according to whether they prescribe presidential duties, presidential rights, specific relations between the Presidency and the Government or reflect the anxieties and fears of radical interventions in the political scene.

Issues 1 and 2 that a President should be impartial and should respect the Constitution refer to presidential duties; issues 3 and 4, that a President should use the veto to block unconstitutional proposals and risk instability rather than give in to a government who acts against the constitution refer to rights that can be exercised by the President; issues 5 and 6, that a President should give unconditional support to the Government and to a dictatorial type of government, refer to the nature of the relations between Presidency and
Government viewing the former as controlled by the latter. The last four issues that a President should support political stability or political instability per se, revolution and a military coup are of a more general kind but closely related to anxieties resulting from the lack of stability in the country and fears felt at the time about the possibility of radical interventions, i.e revolution and military coup.

Table 9.A below shows the mean contribution to overall attitude to voting for the presidential candidates as a function of type of issue and party identification.

Table 9.A

Mean contribution to overall attitude to voting for the presidential candidates as a function of type of issue and party identification in the 1980 Presidential election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of issue</th>
<th>Soares AD voters</th>
<th>Carneiro (AD) FRS voters</th>
<th>Ramalho AD voters</th>
<th>Eanes (PS) FRS voters</th>
<th>Eanes (PS) APU voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pres. duties</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pres. rights</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relat. between Presdcy and Gov.</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Stabi- lity</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-.6</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that AD respondents' attitude towards voting for the candidate supported by the Socialist party, Ramalho
Eanes would be more favourable than their attitude towards voting for the candidate supported by their own party if only specific issues concerned with presidential duties and rights and relations between the Presidency and Government were taken into account. It is clear that at the time of the election, AD respondents were more concerned with general questions related to political stability than with questions concerned with the way the future President should exercise his power.

Section 9.1.3 Summary of Section 9.1 (1980 Presidential election)

Summary: Political awareness in the 1980 Presidential election

On the whole respondents showed that they were aware of the issues which had been selected for their evaluation and of the stands the presidential candidates were likely to adopt on them.

Judging by expressed beliefs of AD respondents the vociferous electoral campaign made by the AD leadership against the incumbent did not to have the desired effect on the AD electorate. Their efforts to promote their own candidate were not uncritically accepted either. The AD respondents showed remarkably little trace of being affected by the AD campaigns. The majority did not feel compelled to believe that the incumbent had been a bad President in order to decide to vote for the AD candidate; nor did they feel compelled to believe that the latter...
would make necessarily a good President in order to vote for him. On the contrary, they showed independence of judgement and awareness as to the reasons which made them decide to vote or not to vote for either of the candidates.

The effect of the death of the two AD leaders on electoral results

As stated in Chapter 1, three days prior to the Presidential election the main leader of the AD coalition, the social democrat Prime Minister, Sa Carneiro and the number two of the christian democrats, Adelino Amaro da Costa, were killed in a plane crash after taking off from Lisbon to go to Oporto for the closing rally in support of their presidential candidate.

At the time, many observers expressed the opinion that the deaths of the two charismatic AD leaders, had been responsible for the defeat of the AD candidate. They argued that some AD supporters might have felt that the country needed time to adjust to the loss of a strong leader. It was argued that since the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, was an unknown figure who during the electoral campaign had failed to impress public opinion, some AD supporters might have thought that, in the circumstances, political stability would be better served if the incumbent were returned to the Presidency.

On the other hand, other observers expressed the view that the deaths of the two leaders would benefit the chances of
the AD candidate of winning the election at the first ballot, on the grounds that the AD electorate, especially those who intended to vote for the incumbent, would want to respect the last wish of the dead leaders.

The funerals took place on the eve of the election amidst general consternation. Wide TV coverage, the grief and shock expressed in the statements and eulogies of friends and political foes alike, were thought to have a likely emotional effect on voting decision.

The two opposing arguments as to the possible effect of the deaths on the election results cannot be entirely dismissed and it is conceivable that some voters were affected either way. However, the questionnaires used in the Braga district were all completed and returned by the morning of the day of the accident, a few hours before it happened. AD respondents feelings showed that on the whole they had not blindly followed the AD leadership arguments in favour of the AD candidate or against the incumbent. It is therefore plausible to assume that the deaths of the two AD leaders did not have a significant effect on electoral results.

Section 9.2 The Local Elections of 1982 - how politically aware were the voters?

9.2.1. Apathy vs interest about issues and parties' stands

Respondents' apathy is assessed by the percentage of "don't know" responses given when they were asked to evaluate the
issues and to indicate the stands the three main parties were likely to adopt on the issues if elected.

Evaluation of issues (1982 Local elections)

Table 9.6 in Appendix 4, shows the percent midscale (0) responses with respect to each of the ten electoral issues as a function of intention to vote for each party, together with the percent positive (+) and negative (-) responses.

The average midscale responses shown by each of the three groups of respondents, (AD = 9.6%, PS = 2.6% and APU = 1.4%), indicates that the large majority of respondents had feelings about the issues. Respondents also show a very high degree of concordance in the direction of their feelings. This is to be expected in view of the nature of the issues themselves. Diagram 9.6.1 next page shows the percentage of respondents which within each group evaluated the issues positively.
Beliefs on parties' stands (1982 Local elections)

As in the Presidential elections of 1980, the level of respondents' awareness dropped considerably when they were asked to state their beliefs concerning the likely stands of the candidates on each of the ten issues.

Table 9.7 in Appendix 4 shows the percent midscale (0) responses by the three groups of voters divided according to intention to vote on the likely stands of the parties on each of the ten issues.

The average level of uncertainty expressed by AD and PS respondents concerning the stands the parties they intended to vote for would be likely to adopt on the issues, is quite high 22% and 30% respectively. APU respondents
showed very low levels of uncertainty with respect to the APU stands. Only 8 percent of APU respondents, overall, stated that they did not know which stands the APU were likely to adopt.

In relation to the parties they did not intend to vote for AD and PS respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty whereas APU respondents showed much less. Diagrams 9.7.1 and 9.7.2 illustrate the apathy shown by AD and PS respondents.

**Diagram 9.7.1**

Percent midscale beliefs of AD respondents on the stands of the AD, PS and APU on the ten issues in the 1982 Local elections
Percent midscale beliefs of PS respondents on the stands of the AD, PS and APU on the ten issues in the 1982 Local elections

AD and PS respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty in relation to the stands likely to be adopted by the three parties, i.e. AD, PS and APU. 39 and 36 percent of AD respondents were uncertain of the stands likely to be adopted by the PS and APU respectively (Diagram 9.7.1).

PS respondents showed even higher degrees of uncertainty. As many as 44 and 41 percent were uncertain of the stands likely to be adopted by the AD and APU, respectively (Diagram 9.7.2).

APU respondents, on the other hand, showed much less uncertainty about the stands likely to be adopted by the AD.
and the PS on the issues. Diagram 9.7.3 illustrates the point.

#### DIAGRAM 9.7.3

Percent midscale beliefs of APU respondents on the stands of the AD, PS and APU on the ten issues in the 1982 Local elections

Only 9 percent of APU respondents, overall, were uncertain of the AD stands on the ten issues and 21 percent, overall were uncertain of the PS stands on the ten issues.

#### 9.2.2. The contribution of political knowledge to attitude towards voting for the parties (b.e.) in the 1982 Local elections.

#### Strength of feelings about the issues (1982 Local elections)

Table 9.8 in Appendix 4 shows the average strength of evaluations of each of the three groups of respondents on each issue. As expected, the strength of feelings about
the issues did not show marked differences between the three groups of respondents. The significant differences found between the mean evaluations of the three groups of respondents are differences in the strength of the evaluations rather than in their direction. Diagram 9.8.1 illustrates the similarities in the strength of feelings expressed by the three groups of respondents on each of the ten issues.

Mean strength of the evaluations made by AD, PS and APU respondents on each issue in the 1982 Local elections

Strength of beliefs about parties' stands (1982 Local elections)

The mean belief strength shown by AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the three parties on each issue is shown in table 9.9 in Appendix 4.

The strength of respondents' beliefs on the three parties'
stands on each issue is illustrated in the following three diagrams. Diagram 9.9.1 shows the average belief strength of AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the AD on each issue.

Mean strength of beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands of the AD on each of the ten issues in the 1982 Local elections

It is clear that whereas AD respondents believed that the AD would support all the ten issues if elected, PS and APU respondents, especially the latter, did not believe that the AD would support the desired policies on any of the issues. Diagram 9.9.2 shows the mean belief strength of AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the PS on each issue.
Mean strength of beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands of the PS on each of the ten issues in the 1982 Local elections

PS respondents believed that the PS would support all the ten issues if elected. AD respondents believed that the PS would be able to support some of the issues, and APU respondents did not believe that the PS would support any of them.

Two points should be noted about AD and APU respondents' beliefs about the PS stands. The negative beliefs expressed are quite mild and, although PS respondents did not believe that the AD were capable of implementing the right policies to solve the needs and problems expressed in the issues, AD respondents showed a moderate degree of confidence in the Socialist party to tackle them.
Diagram 9.9.3 shows the mean belief strength of AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the APU on each issue.

Mean strength of beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands of the APU on each of the ten issues in the 1982 Local elections

APU respondents who showed that they did not believe that either the AD or the PS would be capable of tackling the issues appeared to be extremely confident that the APU would be capable of satisfying the needs and solving the problems expressed in the selected issues.

PS respondents showed some degree of confidence in the APU's ability to solve some of the problems. On the other hand, AD respondents' beliefs about the APU's stands on the issues were unexpectedly mild in view of the deep ideological differences between the two alliances.
The contribution of evaluations and beliefs to attitudes (1982 Local elections)

Table 9.10 in Appendix 4 shows the contribution of each evaluation combined with each belief held by respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the AD, the PS and the APU on each issue to their attitudes towards voting for the three parties. The following three diagrams illustrate these results.

Diagram 9.10.1 shows the mean contributions to attitudes which result from the combination of respondents' evaluations of the issues with their beliefs on the AD stands.

Mean contribution of AD, PS and APU respondents' evaluations and beliefs on the AD stands on each of the ten issues to their attitudes towards voting for the AD in the 1982 Local election
Diagram 9.10.2 shows the mean contributions to attitudes towards voting for the PS which result from the combination of respondents' evaluations of the issues with their beliefs on the PS stands.

Mean contribution of AD, PS and APU respondents' evaluations and beliefs on the PS stands on each of the ten issues to their attitudes towards voting for the PS in the 1982 Local elections.

Diagram 9.10.3 next page shows the mean contributions to attitudes towards voting for the APU which result from the combination of respondents' evaluation of the issues with their beliefs on the APU stands.
Mean contribution of AD, PS and APU respondents' evaluations and beliefs on the APU stands on each of the ten issues to their attitudes towards voting for the APU in the 1982 Local elections.

In view of the fact that there were no significant differences in the direction of the evaluations made by the three groups of respondents, the contribution of their political knowledge to their attitudes towards voting for the parties followed very closely the beliefs expressed by respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the three parties on the issues.

Diagram 9.10.4 next page shows the overall average contribution made by the political knowledge of AD, PS and APU respondents to their attitudes towards voting for the three parties (overall averages shown in Table 9.10 in Appendix 4).
Overall average contribution of respondents' political knowledge to their attitudes towards voting for the AD, the PS and the APU in the 1982 Local elections

The results expressed in diagram 9.10.4 reflect the apathy of AD and PS respondents and their lack of strong feelings against the APU at local government level. In contrast, APU respondents showed not only a keener interest in local affairs but also little uncertainty as to the party they wished to see in charge of them.

Section 9.2.3. – Summary of Section 9.2 (1982 Local elections)

Summary: Political awareness in the 1982 Local elections

As explained in the Method (Chapter V), the sample used for the 1982 Local elections was drawn from three Municipalities. It is not possible to assess whether
respondents' beliefs and attitudes differed significantly according to the Municipality where they lived in view of the fact that the returned questionnaires were not properly identified.

However, results indicate quite clearly the apathy and uninterest of AD and PS respondents and the interest and involvement of APU respondents in local political processes.

At local level, the APU has gained the reputation of being efficient, hard working and concerned with the welfare of local populations. The alliance has been able to increase the number of municipalities under its control in spite of the anti-communist campaigns waged by the right wing and the Socialist party in an effort to reverse the tendency of the electorate to abstain (the level of abstentions in local elections is much higher than in general elections) or to actually vote for the APU. The right wing parties and the PS have supported each other in some instances where their combined weight could have a chance of making the APU lose control of municipalities. The mild negative attitude of AD respondents towards voting for the APU, together with the mild positive attitude of PS respondents towards voting for the APU may be explained by the awareness of these two groups of respondents of APU efficiency in local administration. In not showing great interest about what party is in charge of local administration, AD and PS respondents do not appear very
concerned with the fact that the Communist party, by far the largest party of the APU alliance, may hold the power of deciding policy at the local level. APU respondents, in contrast, show very clearly that they want the APU to be in charge and reject quite strongly the other two parties, especially the AD.

Section 9.3 - The General Election of 1983 - how politically aware were the voters?

9.3.1. Apathy vs interest about issues and parties' stands

As explained in the previous sections, the apathy of voters was assessed by the percentage of "don't know" responses given when respondents were asked to evaluate electoral issues and to indicate the stands the four main parties were likely to adopt on them if elected.

Evaluation of issues (1983 General election)

Table 9.11 in Appendix 4 shows the percent midscale (0) responses with respect to each of the eight electoral issues as a function of voting intention for each party, together with the percent positive (+) and negative (-) responses. After each issue, in brackets, is shown the party who proposed it.

The average midscale responses shown by each of the four groups of respondents, (CDS= 3%, PSD= 5%; PS= 19% and APU= 10%), indicates that, by and large, the majority of
respondents had feelings about the issues.

Christian-democrat (CDS) and social-democrat (PSD) respondents showed, overall, very little uncertainty about the issues; equally, the vast majority of APU respondents also appeared to have something to say about them. On the other hand almost one fifth of Socialist respondents showed uncertainty.

Diagram 9.11.1 illustrates the percent positive evaluations made by the four groups of respondents, CDS, PSD, PS and APU on each of the eight issues.

Diagram 9.11.1 shows quite clearly that CDS and PSD respondents were little uncertain about the eight issues. PS and APU respondents' evaluations were not as clear cut.
This, in part, could have been due to the nature of the issues selected.

For example, issues 2 and 5, on the need to promote patriotism and order (issue 2) and on the need for a future government to rule with firmness, authority and morality (issue 5), are value-laden issues affirming general principles of conduct. The association of these principles with the electoral campaigns of the CDS and PSD, respectively, presented no problems for the CDS and PSD respondents. However, the association of the two issues with the right wing parties could have affected PS and APU respondents in different ways, especially issue 2 on patriotism and order reminiscent of the slogans of the Dictatorship.

Some PS and APU respondents may have evaluated the issues independently of the electoral context as general principles of conduct; others may have evaluated them as right wing stands and opposed them on those grounds; others may have abstained from stating an opinion to avoid the conflict between the two interpretations. On reflection, therefore, the inclusion of value-laden issues should have been avoided.

Other divisions among PS and APU respondents are of much greater interest. APU voters show a marked division in their evaluations of issue 1, on the need to introduce the Social Contract as a means to pacify industrial relations.
The APU leadership was highly critical of this proposal presented by the Socialist party. Nevertheless only 35% of APU respondents evaluated the issue negatively. It remains to be seen whether APU respondents correctly identified the APU stand on the issue.

The evaluations made by socialist respondents on two of the issues need to be examined in the light of the gradual shift of the Socialist party to the centre of the political spectrum. These were issues 4 and 7, concerned with the need to reduce the public sector (issue 4) and to change labour laws thus permitting a more flexible approach to the hiring and firing of workers (issue 7). As explained in Chapter I, the dimension of the public sector and the existing labour laws highly protective of workers' rights were included in the 1975 Constitution approved by three of the main parties (PSD, PS and PCP). The CDS abstained. Soon after the General election of 1976, the social democrats (PSD) began their campaign against the spirit and text of the 75 Constitution, with special emphasis on the public sector and labour laws. Quite rightly from their point of view the notions of a free market and minimal state intervention in the economy were incompatible with the agreed constitutional prescriptions on these two questions.

The AD, the coalition between the christian-democrats and the social-democrats, won Parliamentary majority in the 1980 general elections. When the Constitution was revised
in 1982 with the AD in power, in spite of enjoying an absolute majority in Parliament, the AD lacked the two-thirds majority needed to approve major changes in the Constitution. With the support of the Socialist party to make-up a two third majority in Parliament, the AD was able to introduce a number of moderate constitutional changes.

However, in spite of their demarcation from the communists and the general shift to the centre, the socialists did not agree with the radical changes proposed by the AD on the public sector and labour laws. The result was that these two points remained largely unaltered amidst strong criticisms on the part of the AD who blamed the economic ills of the country on constitutional impediments to their economic strategy.

It is against this background that the evaluations made by socialist respondents on issues 4 and 7 should be considered and analysed. Although most of them (62%) agreed that labour laws should be changed, only 47% of socialist respondents did so with respect to the need to reduce the public sector, and as many as 34% showed indifference. It is difficult to believe that as many as 34% of socialist respondents were not aware of the issue, or did not have an opinion about it. It is possible that by abstaining from giving an opinion either way they were reflecting the lack of definition on the part of the socialist leadership, on these two issues. The socialist leadership supported some privatizations and some changes.
in Labour laws but was unclear as to the extent of such measures.

It is highly likely therefore that in their evaluations of the issues respondents are influenced by factors related to the particular political context at the time of the election, i.e. ambiguous party stands, conflict between party stands and respondents' opinions etc.

It is also of interest to consider how respondents evaluated the issues which were more emphatically supported by each party. Table 9B shows the average percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations of each pair of issues supported by the four parties by respondents divided into groups as a function of respondents' voting intention.

Table 9.B
Average percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations of each pair of issues supported by the four parties by respondents divided into groups as a function of voting intention in the 1983 General election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>CDG RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>PSD RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>PS RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>APU RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDG Issues</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
<td>95 3 3</td>
<td>50 25 17</td>
<td>28 17 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD Issues</td>
<td>97 3 0</td>
<td>91 7 2</td>
<td>64 22 14</td>
<td>31 10 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS Issues</td>
<td>91 6 3</td>
<td>90 9 1</td>
<td>87 11 2</td>
<td>72 10 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU Issues</td>
<td>97 3 0</td>
<td>99 1 0</td>
<td>82 18 0</td>
<td>96 3 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

230
As expected the vast majority of CDS and PSD respondents evaluated the four pairs of issues positively. PS and APU respondents showed much less indecision as to the pairs of issues supported by their respective parties, and more were in favour of the pair of issues proposed by each other's parties of those proposed by the CDS or PSD.

Of the eight issues used only four can be considered as having discriminative power between the parties' positions. As already pointed out, the two value-laden issues may have confounding effects on respondents' assessments.

In addition issue 3, concerning the need to extend health services, housing and education to all is generally accepted by all the parties. As it is phrased, the issue refers to a general principle and does not involve a choice between specific policies directed at its implementation. It is to be expected that in these circumstances all respondents would evaluate the issue highly.

Issue 6, concerning the need to develop the country's natural resources in order to diversify production, introduced first by the APU alliance, was quickly adopted by the other parties. Again it is a general proposal against which it is difficult to argue. Differences of opinion were likely to emerge, however, on the methods advocated by each party to implement the general policy. Such methods were not explicitly explained to the electorate. More importantly, the issue as it was
presented to respondents did not differentiate between the methods each party would employ to implement it.

The four remaining issues were more concerned with specific policies and should have produced better differentiated evaluations between the four groups of respondents.

Issue 1, introduced by the PS, concerning the need to celebrate a "social contract". This proposal, although accepted by the CDS and PSD remained very much linked to its proponent, the Socialist party until the end of the electoral campaign. The APU remained the only critic.

Issues 4 and 7 supported by the CDS and the PSD concerning the need to reduce the public sector and change existing labour laws, were strongly attacked by the APU and criticised by the PS on the grounds that the proposed changes were too radical and extensive.

Issue 8, concerning APU's position on the need to increase the purchasing power of the people, was contested by the Socialist leadership who advocated the need for strict austerity measures to curb inflation and prepare the ground for a slow but sure economic recovery. CDS and PSD leaders argued that such measures would not be needed if their proposed changes in public ownership and labour laws were introduced.

Table 9.C shows the percent positive, midscale and negative evaluation of issues 1, 4, 7 and 8 as a function of respondents' voting intention.
Table 9.C
Percent positive, midscale and negative evaluation of issues 1, 4, 7 and 8 as a function of respondents' voting intention in the 1983 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>% CDS VOTERS</th>
<th>% PSD VOTERS</th>
<th>% PSV VOTERS</th>
<th>% APV VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Social Contract</td>
<td>82 12 6</td>
<td>80 18 2</td>
<td>78 19 3</td>
<td>47 18 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reduction of public sector</td>
<td>94 6 0</td>
<td>89 9 2</td>
<td>47 34 19</td>
<td>6 3 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Change Labour Law</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
<td>93 4 3</td>
<td>62 19 19</td>
<td>11 11 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Increase purchasing power</td>
<td>94 6 0</td>
<td>90 2 8</td>
<td>75 25 0</td>
<td>92 6 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CDS and PSD respondents were overwhelmingly in favour of the reduction of the public sector and of the liberalization of labour laws. Also as expected most of them favoured the increase in the purchasing power of the population, and the introduction of the social contract.

By and large, PS respondents favoured the introduction of the social contract proposed by the party they intended to vote for but 75% of them favoured the increase in the purchasing power of the people, showing that they did not agree with the Socialist party's warning about the need for strict austerity measures. The divisions within socialist respondents as to the reduction of the public sector and the liberalization of labour laws are evident, especially in relation to the former.
The large majority of APU respondents favoured the adoption of measures to increase purchasing power of the people supported by the party they intended to vote for, opposed the liberalisation of labour laws and the reduction of the public sector and were divided as to the introduction of the social contract.

In their evaluations of policy issues, only CDS and PSD respondents were following closely the positions of the parties they intended to vote for. However, the crucial point is to see whether PS and APU respondents, who showed some deviations from their respective parties' lines on some of the issues, were indeed aware of their parties' stands.

Beliefs on parties' stands (1983 General election)

Table 9.12 in Appendix 4 shows the average percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs respondents divided according to voting intention held in respect of the stands the parties were likely to adopt, if elected, on the eight electoral issues.

Overall, respondents appeared to be aware of the stands likely to be adopted on the issues by the parties they intended to vote for. The midscale point was only used by 3% of CDS voters, 12% of PSD votes, 18% of PS voters and 7% of APU voters. More socialist respondents appeared to be uncertain of their own party stands than the other groups of respondents in relation to the stands likely to be
adopted by the parties they intended to vote for.

The level of uncertainty expressed by respondents in relation to the stands of the parties they did not intend to vote for is illustrated by Diagrams 9.12.1, 9.12.2, 9.12.3 and 9.12.4 which show the percent midscale responses of each group of voters divided according to voting intention with respect to the stands likely to be adopted by each party on each issue.

CDS respondents on CDS, PSD, PS and APU stands
PSD respondents on
csd, PSD, PS and APU
stands

Percent midscale beliefs of CDS and PSD respondents on the stands of the CDS, PSD, PSD and APU on the eight issues in
the 1983 General election
Percent midscale beliefs of PS and APU respondents on the stands of the CDS, PSD, PS and APU on the eight issues in the 1983 General election.
CDS, PSD and APU respondents (Diagrams 9.12.1, 9.12.2 and 4) were less uncertain about the stands of the parties they intended to vote for than about the stands of the parties they did not intend to vote for. PS respondents (Diagram 9.12.3), on the other hand showed themselves to be equally uncertain about the stands likely to be adopted by the four parties.

When the overall levels of uncertainty of all respondents as a single group are averaged across the eight stands and across the four policy stands, it appears that approximately one third of respondents were uncertain about the socialist party stands, as Table 9.D shows.
Table 9.D

Average levels of uncertainty expressed as percent midscale beliefs by all respondents across the eight stands and the four policy stands of the four parties in the 1983 General election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>EIGHT ISSUES</th>
<th>FOUR POLICY ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ambiguous positions of the Socialist party seemed to have had an effect on all respondents' beliefs about the party's stands on the issues. The level of uncertainty remained high in relation to the Socialist party stands on the four policy issues.

The large majority of CDS and PSD respondents believed that their respective parties would support and implement the policies needed to fulfill the targets expressed in the eight issues. Diagram 9.12.5 next page shows the percent positive beliefs of CDS and PSD respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the CDS and PSD on each issue.
Percent positive beliefs of CDS and PSD respondents on CDS and PSD stands on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election

The vast majority of CDS respondents not only believed that the CDS would implement all the eight issues but also that the PSD, if elected, would also do so. The majority of PSD respondents believed that the PSD would implement the measures needed to fulfill the eight issues. On six of the issues, PSD respondents also believed that the CDS would implement the correct policies. However, on two of the issues, namely the introduction of the Social Contract (issue 1) and on the increase in the purchasing power of the people (issue 8), PSD respondents appeared to be divided as to the CDS ability to implement the correct policies.

This shows that whereas CDS respondents believed that the victory of the PSD would ensure the fulfilment of the eight
issues, in the same way that the victory of the CDS would, PSD respondents believed that if the CDS were to win the election the CDS would not carry out the desired policies on two of the issues. In other words CDS respondents did not differentiate between the positions of the CDS and the PSD, whereas PSD respondents showed important divergences on two policy issues.

Diagrams 9.12.6 and 7 next page illustrate percent positive beliefs of CDS and PSD respondents, respectively, on the stands likely to be adopted by the PS and the APU on the issues.
Percent positive beliefs of CDS respondents on the stands of the PS and the APU on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election

Percent positive beliefs of PSD respondents on the stands of the PS and the APU on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election
CDS and PSD respondents did not believe that either the PS or the APU, if elected, would fulfill the eight issues. On the two issues supported by the PS, CDS and PSD respondents, especially the latter, gave an indication that the PS would introduce the Social Contract (issue 1) and policies which would extend health, education and housing programmes to all (issue 3). In fact, in relation to these two issues, over 50% of PSD voters believed that the PS would implement the correct policies.

It is clear that the vast majority of CDS and PSD respondents believed that their parties held very similar stands on the issues and that the PS and the APU, especially the latter, if elected, would not adopt the desired stands on the issues.

The direction of beliefs held by PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the PS and the APU is illustrated in Diagrams 9.12.8 and 9.

Diagrams 9.12.8 and 9 next page show the percent positive beliefs of PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the PS and the APU, respectively, in respect of each issue and of each other's party.
Percent positive beliefs of PS respondents on the stands of the PS and the APU on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election.

Percent positive beliefs of APU respondents on the stands of the PS and the APU on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election.
The large majority of PS respondents believed that the PS would introduce the Social Contract (issue 1) and extend health, education and housing programmes to all (issue 3), the two issues proposed by the PS. They also believed that the PS would implement policies directed at the development of the country's natural resources (issue 6). On the reduction of the public sector (issue 4) and on the changes in labour laws (issue 7), the two most controversial policy issues, just over one third of PS respondents believed that the Socialist party would reduce the public sector and nearly half believed that the PS would introduce changes in the labour laws. Clearly, PS respondents, who were divided in their evaluations were also divided in their beliefs about the PS stands on the two issues.

Contrary to expectations, however, over half of PS respondents believed that the PS would increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 8), in spite of the repeated warnings made by the socialist leadership that strict austerity measures would have to be introduced, at least during the first two years after the election.

In relation to the APU stands and in line with CDS and PSD respondents' beliefs, most PS respondents did not believe that the APU would develop the natural resources of the country (issue 6) or that the APU would increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 8), the two issues proposed by the APU.

Also in line with CDS and PSD respondents, most PS
respondents did not believe that the APU would reduce the public sector (issue 4), change labour laws (issue 7) or introduce the Social contract (issue 1), identifying quite correctly the stands of the APU on these three issues.

As it can be seen in Diagram 9.12.9, the vast majority of APU respondents believed that the APU would develop the natural resources of the country (issue 6) and would increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 8), the two issues on which the APU based their strategy for the economic recovery of the country. APU respondents also believed that the APU would not reduce the public sector (issue 4) and would not introduce changes in labour laws (issue 7). Although nearly 50% of APU respondents had evaluated positively the introduction of the Social Contract (issue 1) the vast majority quite correctly did not believe the APU would introduce it.

The vast majority of APU respondents appeared to know very well the positions of the APU on the four policy issues (issue 1, 4, 7 and 8) and on the two general issues concerning the extension of health, education and housing programmes to all (issue 3) and the development of natural resources (issue 6). Indecision was felt when respondents were asked to express their beliefs on the APU stands on the two value laden issues.

In relation to the Socialist party stands, nearly half of the APU respondents believed that the PS would introduce
the Social Contract (issue 1) and over half of the APU respondents believed that the PS would reduce the public sector (issue 4) and introduce changes in labour laws (issue 7). In relation to the PS stand on the introduction of the Social Contract (issue 1) the beliefs of APU respondents are in line with those expressed by PSD and CDS respondents. However, in relation with the PS stands on the reduction of the public sector (issue 4) and on the labour laws (issue 7) the beliefs held by APU respondents differ from those held by CDS and PSD respondents, who believed that the PS would not reduce the public sector and would not introduce changes in the labour laws.

The two left wing groups of respondents (PS and APU) were clearly much more apart in the beliefs they held about each other's parties' stands than the two right wing groups of respondents (CDS and PSD) in relation to the beliefs they held about each other's parties' stands.

The direction of beliefs held by PS and APU respondents in relation to CDS and PSD stands is illustrated in the two following diagrams.

Diagrams 9.12.10 and 9.12.11 next page show the percent positive beliefs of PS and APU respondents, respectively, on the CDS and PSD stands on the eight issues.
Percent positive beliefs of PS respondents on CDS and PSD stands on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election.

PS and APU respondents who showed very distinct beliefs about each other's party stands on the issues held very similar beliefs concerning the stands they believed the CDS and PSD would be likely to adopt, if elected.
The majority of PS and APU respondents believed that the CDS and the PSD would reduce the public sector (issue 4) and would introduce changes in the labour laws (issue 7), identifying very clearly the positions of the parties on these two policy issues. By and large, PS and APU respondents did not believe that the CDS and PSD would introduce the Social Contract (issue 1) would promote policies to extend health, education and housing to all (issue 3), would develop the country's natural resources (issue 6) or that they would increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 8).

Summing up, respondents, on the whole, were able to identify the stands of the parties, especially those on the four policy issues. The CDS and PSD respondents held very similar beliefs not only on the stands likely to be adopted by each other's parties, but also on the stands they believed the PS and the APU would adopt on the issues, if elected. On the other hand, the PS and APU respondents did not hold similar beliefs on the stands likely to be adopted by each other's parties but held very similar beliefs on the stands they believed the CDS and PSD would adopt on the issues, if elected.

The direction of respondents evaluations of issues and beliefs about parties' stands on them highlight three important points in the Portuguese political scene at the time: the traditional division between Right and Left on public ownership and workers rights; the lack of strong
divisions between the two right wing parties; and, the split within the Left with the socialists trying to move to a more middle-of-the-road position.

This move by the socialists to the centre of the political spectrum is illustrated by their evaluations and beliefs on the PS stands on public ownership and the liberalisation of labour laws. The Socialist party supported some reductions in the public sector and some changes in labour laws but was vague as to their extent. Judging from socialist respondents evaluations 47% of them supported reductions in the public sector but only 34% believed the party wanted to introduce them. Likewise 62% of socialist respondents wanted changes in labour laws but only 47% believed the Party wanted to introduce them. CDS and PSD respondents did not believe the Socialist party wanted to reduce the public sector or liberalise labour laws. On the other hand, APU respondents believed the Socialist party would.

It is clear that by adopting an undefined position on ideological issues, the Socialist party was creating confusion not only among the broad socialist camp but also in the electorate as a whole. On the other hand, the right wing parties, as perceived by CDS and PSD respondents, had become too undifferentiated, especially in the opinion of CDS respondents. The instability within the Socialist electorate and the lack of differentiation on the part of the CDS electorate vis-a-vis the PSD which were detected by this study at the time of the 1983 General election were to
have important consequences. These will be described in the Epilogue where political developments after the 1983 General election are briefly presented.

It now remains to be seen how the product of respondents' evaluations of issues and beliefs about parties' stands contributed to their attitudes towards voting for each of the four main parties.

9.3.2. The contribution of political knowledge to attitude towards voting for the parties (b e i) in the 1983 General election

Strength of feelings about the issues (1983 General election)

Mean evaluations of the eight issues made by respondents divided according to voting intention are shown in Table 9.13, in Appendix 4. Diagram 9.13.1 next page illustrates the similarities and differences between the CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents.
Mean strength of the evaluations made by CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election

In the strength and direction of their evaluations, and as expected, CDS and PSD respondents show no significant differences between themselves.

PS respondents evaluated the eight issues positively although, in relation to some of the issues, their mean strength of feeling is significantly different from the mean strength of feeling of CDS and PSD respondents.

APU respondents evaluated six of the issues positively. On these, the significant differences noted in comparison with the mean strength of feeling shown by the other three groups of respondents are differences in strength and not in the direction of the evaluation. However, as expected,
APU respondents evaluated negatively issues 4 and 7 related to the reduction of the public sector and to changes in the labour laws (issue 7) respectively. APU respondents also evaluated negatively the value-laden issue on patriotism and order (issue 2).

Strength of beliefs about parties' stands (1983 General election)

Mean strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the four parties on the issues is shown in Table 9.14 in Appendix 4. Diagrams 9.14.1 to 9.14.4 illustrate respondents' belief strengths.

Diagram 9.14.1 next page shows the belief strengths of the four groups of respondents divided according to voting intention on the stands likely to be adopted by the CDS on the eight issues.
Mean strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the stands of the CDS on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election.

CDS respondents believed very strongly that the party they intended to vote for would implement policies to fulfil the needs expressed in the eight issues. PSD respondents, on the whole, also believed that the CDS would implement such policies. However they were not very confident in the CDS's ability to increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 2). PS and APU respondents strongly believed that the CDS would reduce the public sector (issue 4) and change labour laws (issue 7). But they did not believe that the CDS would introduce the Social Contract (issue 1), would extend health, education and housing programmes to all (issue 3), would develop the natural resources of the country (issue 6) or would increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 8).
Diagram 9.14.2 illustrates the belief strengths of the four groups of respondents divided according to voting intention on the stands likely to be adopted by the PSD on the eight issues.

Mean strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the stands of the PSD on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election

PSD respondents believed strongly that the party they intended to vote for would implement policies to fulfil the needs expressed in the eight issues. CDS respondents also held very strong beliefs that the PSD would implement such policies. In fact CDS respondents' mean strengths are not significantly different from those of PSD respondents' on six of the eight issues showing that they hardly differentiated between the two parties.
PS and APU respondents strongly believed that the PSD would reduce the public sector (issue 4) and would change labour laws (issue 7). PS and APU respondents were rather neutral in relation to the PSD's ability to introduce the Social Contract (issue 1) and did not believe that the PSD would extend health, education and housing programmes to all (issue 3), would develop the natural resources of the country (issue 6) or would increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 8).

Diagram 9.14.3 illustrates the belief strengths of the four groups of respondents divided according to voting intention on the stands likely to be adopted by the PS on the eight issues.

Mean strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the stands of the PS on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election
PS respondents believed that the PS would implement policies to fulfil the needs expressed in all the eight issues with one exception, namely, they did not believe that the PS would reduce the public sector (issue 4), although PS respondents' strength of feeling on the issue was positive.

The strengths of beliefs expressed by PS respondents on the PS stands, however, is generally mild. The other three groups of respondents also held mild beliefs, either positive or negative, on PS stands. This mildness felt by all respondents in relation to the stands likely to be adopted by the PS could have been due to a general mild disposition towards the Socialist party. However, as the percent analysis as shown, the mildness in belief strength in relation to the PS stands resulted rather from the uncertainty and divisions among all respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the PS.

Diagram 9.14.4 next page illustrates the belief strengths of the four groups of respondents divided according to voting intention on the stands likely to be adopted by the APU on the eight issues.
Mean strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the stands of the APU on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election

The APU respondents strongly believed that the APU would develop the natural resources of the country (issue 6) and would increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 8), the two issues strongly supported by the APU during the electoral campaign. APU respondents also strongly believed that the APU would implement policies to extend health, education and housing programmes to all (issue 3). In spite of having evaluated the introduction of the Social contract (issue 1) positively APU respondents quite correctly showed that they did not believe the APU would support it. APU respondents showed very clearly that they did not believe that the APU would reduce the public sector (issue 4) or that the APU would introduce changes in the labour laws (issue 7).
CDS, PSD and PS respondents strongly believed that the APU would not reduce the public sector (issue 4) and would not introduce changes in labour laws (issue 7). On all the other issues, by and large, it is clear that CDS, PSD and PS respondents believed that the APU would not adopt the right policies to solve the economic crisis and restore social justice.

The contribution of evaluations and beliefs to attitudes (1983 General election)

Respondents evaluations of the issues combined with their beliefs about the stands of the parties on the same issues give a measure of the contribution of their political awareness to their attitudes towards voting for each party.

Table 9.15 in Appendix 4 shows the contribution of the product of each evaluation and each belief held by respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the CDS, PSD, PS and APU on each issue to their attitudes towards voting for the four parties.

The average contributions of evaluations and beliefs to attitude to voting for each of the parties across all items give an indication of the overall attitude towards voting for each party by each group of respondents. Diagram 9.15.1 next page shows the average overall contribution of respondents awareness of issues and parties' stands to their attitudes towards voting for each of the four parties.
Overall average contribution of respondents' political knowledge to their attitudes towards voting for the CDS, PSD, PS and APU in the 1983 General election.

It is clear that the CDS and PSD respondents held very positive attitudes towards voting for each other's parties and that they held quite negative attitudes towards voting for the APU. PSD respondents' attitude is less negative than the CDS respondents' attitude towards voting for the PS.

It is equally clear that APU respondents held very positive attitudes towards voting for the APU and very negative attitudes towards voting for either the CDS or PSD. Although their attitude towards voting for the PS is negative, it is not as extreme as their attitude towards voting for the CDS and PSD.
PS respondents appear to hold milder positive attitudes towards voting for the party they intended to vote for than the other groups of respondents towards the parties they intended to vote for. Also, unlike the other groups of respondents, their attitudes towards voting for the CDS, PSD and APU hardly differentiate between the parties. These results indicate the existence of strong divisions between the left and right within the socialist electorate.

9.3.3 Summary of political awareness findings - 1983 General election

Summary: Political awareness in the 1983 General election

By and large, respondents showed that they were aware of issues and parties' stands on them in spite of the fact that the issues selected were not salient and the value laden issues could have presented problems to two groups of respondents.

The two most significant points highlighted by respondents in their assessment of their desired outcomes vis-à-vis the positions assumed by the parties are the instability within the socialist electorate on the one hand and the fact that in spite of the failure of the AD alliance which precipitated the 83 general election, the respondents who intended to vote for its two main parties, CDS and PSD, remained confident in them.
Post-electoral coalitions (1983 General election)

As a post-scriptum to this section it is of interest to refer to respondents' attitudes toward four possible post-electoral coalitions. It will be remembered from the Method (chapter 5) that because most observers prior to the election had commented upon the inevitability of a post electoral coalition between the Socialist party (PS) and Social Democratic party (PSD) as the only means to ensure the formation of a stable government, the questionnaire included a section in which respondents were asked to indicate on a seven point scale their feelings about each of four possible coalitions. Table 9.E shows attitude means of respondents divided as a function of voting intention.

Table 9.E

Attitude means toward four possible post electoral coalitions as a function of respondents' voting intentions in the 1983 General election (Range + - 3; N = 157).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible coalitions</th>
<th>CDS</th>
<th>PSD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>APU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS + APU</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS + PSD</td>
<td>-.3</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS + PSD + CDS</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.6</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD + CDS</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CDS and PSD respondents appeared to prefer a post-electoral coalition between their two parties although both groups accepted that their coalition could be enlarged to accommodate the Socialist party.

CDS respondents' attitude towards a coalition between the PSD and PS is very mildly negative, whereas both PSD and PS respondents are marginally in favour of it. All but the APU respondents are against a coalition between the PS and APU.

The percentage of respondents who expressed positive, midscale or negative feelings about the four possible coalitions is shown in table 9.F.

Table 9.F

Percent positive, midscale and negative attitudes towards the four possible coalitions as a function of respondents' voting intentions in the 1983 General election (N=157)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible coalitions</th>
<th>CDS +</th>
<th>0 -</th>
<th>PSD +</th>
<th>0 -</th>
<th>PS +</th>
<th>0 -</th>
<th>APU +</th>
<th>0 -</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS + APU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS + PSD</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS + PSD + CDS</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD + CDS</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In clear opposition to the opinion of the PSD leadership and agreeing with the position of the CDS leaders the vast majority of CDS and PSD respondents favoured a coalition of their two parties on their own or with the Socialist party included.

PSD respondents were fifty fifty on a coalition between their party and the Socialist party but only 16% opposed it.

PS respondents did not show much enthusiasm for post electoral coalitions. However, one third supported a coalition with the PSD but over 50% of socialist respondents were undecided or indifferent. Only 12% of socialist respondents supported a coalition of the APU with the APU unlike the overwhelming majority of APU respondents who supported a post electoral coalition with the Socialist party.

As it had been predicted by the majority of political observers, after the election, the Socialist party (PS) who received 36% of the votes and the Social Democratic party (PSD) who received 27% of the votes formed a coalition headed by the socialist prime minister, Mario Soares. This coalition became known as the "Bloco Central " (Central Block), but only lasted for 2 years.

The feelings among PSD and PS respondents on the possible post electoral coalition between their two parties are quite understandable if their beliefs about the two...
parties' stands on the issues are taken into account.

Diagrams 9.12.12 and 9.12.13 (based on Table 9.12 in Appendix 4) illustrate the point.

PSD respondents on PSD and PS stands

PS respondents on PSD and PS stands

Percent positive beliefs of PSD and PS respondents on PSD and PS stands on the eight issues in the 1983 General election

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The two parties' positions, in the opinion of PSD and PS respondents, were indeed very far apart.

Section 9.4 - How aware were respondents of the opinion of trusted others? - The extent of social awareness and influence in the three elections.

The social influence component used three categories of trusted others in order to assess the social awareness of respondents and its influence on voting intentions. The three categories were: trusted relatives, best friends and the Roman Catholic Church.

It should be noted that the way the questions were phrased can only give an indirect indication of possible social influence effects on respondents' decisions. The questions assess the degree of awareness on the part of respondents as to what trusted others think they should do. In the first two election questionnaires respondents were asked to state whether they would wish to conform to the opinion of trusted others, but the vast majority of respondents either did not answer or simply used the midscale point to avoid answering. In fact many respondents were upset with this part of the questionnaire since according to their reports it implied that they were not capable of deciding for themselves.

Therefore, the effect of respondents' awareness of trusted others' opinions on behaviour can only be inferred from a belief that if there is awareness as to what people we
trust want us to do this awareness will have weight in the decision making process. In other words, if we value the opinion of relatives for whom we have great consideration and if we value the opinion of our best friends, it is plausible to infer that their opinions do matter to us.

Given the important status of the Roman Catholic Church and its long and widespread influence in Portugal it was necessary to assess its impact on respondents' vote decision. By 1980 the Church had regained much of the strength lost during the immediate aftermath of the Revolution.

The Church took strong stands against both the Communist and Socialist parties and had been openly advising catholics to vote for the parties of the AD right wing alliance, CDS and PSD, and for the Alliance itself after it was formed. However, during the 1980 Presidential Election campaign, the Church, abstained from advising the catholic electorate. This restraint, according to the explanation supplied by the head of Information Services at the Lisbon See, was due to the fact that the two presidential candidates with more chances of winning the election, were both good and respected catholics.

In broad terms, the electorate had been giving a clear indication that the Church's influence on vote decision was not as strong as it might have been assumed. In a predominantly Catholic country where, according to estimates, about 90% of the population is baptised and a
majority defines itself as Catholic (a considerable proportion is not regular church goers but still identifies itself with the catholic religion), more than half of the population had not been following the Church's strong appeals and advice.

This, however, does not invalidate the possibility that in some cases, especially in the rural areas, strong pressure was exercised on local people. Such cases usually occur in villages where people have been traditionally dependent upon local dignitaries, sometimes members of the Church, for work, favours etc. Total dependence upon Church's advice on religious grounds alone may therefore be a rare occurrence.

The question that is interesting to this study, is to assess the awareness of respondents as to the Church's positions and by implication in comparison with their awareness of positions of relatives and friends vis-a-vis their vote decision infer, the extent to which the Church may be considered as having influence in vote decision.

The section is divided into three subsections each concerned with social awareness results in each of the three elections.

Section 9.4.1 - 1980 Presidential election - how socially aware were the voters?

Table 9.16. in Appendix 4 shows the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs indicated by respondents as
to how each social influence factor, i.e. trusted relatives, best friends and the Church, wanted them to vote for each presidential candidate. Respondents are divided into groups according to party identification.

Diagrams 9.16.1, 9.16.2 and 9.16.3 show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents divided according to party identification on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, FRS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and Church on voting for the AD candidate Soares Carneiro, in the 1980 Presidential election

AD respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty in all the categories of trusted others, whereas FRS and PS respondents only showed light levels of uncertainty with respect to the opinions of the Church about voting for the AD candidate.

The majority of AD respondents believed that their more trusted others wished them to vote for the AD candidate but AD respondents were much more unsure about the opinions of their best friends, reflecting perhaps the existence of conflicting opinions among themselves.

On the other hand FRS and APU respondents show very little uncertainty about the opinions of trusted relatives and best friends on voting for the AD candidate. Most of them
believed that their trusted relatives and best friends did not think that they should vote for the AD candidate.

The vast majority of AD, FRS and APU respondents who expressed beliefs about the Church's opinion believed that the Church thought that they should vote for the AD candidate.

Diagrams 9.16.4, 9.16.5 and 9.16.6 next page show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents divided according to party identification on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the Socialist party candidate, Ramalho Eanes.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, FRS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and Church on voting for the Socialist party candidate, Ramalho Eanes in the 1980 Presidential election.
AD respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty about the opinions of best friends on voting for the PS candidate; this was to be expected in view of the high levels of indecision shown, in the same category, about voting for the AD candidate.

FRS and APU respondents believed, on the whole, that their trusted relatives and friends wanted them to vote for the PS candidate, Ramalho Eanes.

Extremely high levels of uncertainty were expressed by all respondents on the opinions of the Church about voting for the PS candidate. Those who expressed an opinion, however, believed that the Church did not want them to vote for the PS candidate.

The high levels of uncertainty expressed by all respondents on the opinion of the Church on voting for either of the two candidates might have been due to the fact that the Church, during the election campaign, abstained from giving advice.

Table 9.17 in Appendix 4 shows the average strength of beliefs expressed by respondents divided according to party identification in respect of the opinions of trusted relatives, best friends and the Church as to how they should vote for each presidential candidate.

FRS and APU respondents strongly believed that their trusted relatives and best friends wished them to vote for Ramalho Eanes, the candidate supported by the Socialist
party, and not to vote for Soares Carneiro, the candidate supported by the right wing alliance, AD. AD respondents who had shown more uncertainty as to the opinions of their trusted relatives and of their best friends, believed, overall, that these wished them to vote for Soares Carneiro, the AD candidate. The difference between the average strength belief means of the three groups of respondents with respect to family and friends are, as expected, highly significant \( p < .001 \).

On the other hand, the difference between average belief means of the three groups of respondents with respect to the opinion of the Church as to how they should vote is not significant. The three groups of respondents believe that the Church would wish them to vote for the right wing candidate, Soares Carneiro and not for the Socialist candidate, Ramalho Eanes.

Section 9.4.2 - The 1982 Local Elections - how socially aware were the voters?

Table 9.18 in Appendix 4 shows the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs indicated by respondents as to how each social influence factor i.e. trusted relatives, best friends and the Church, wanted them to vote for each party in the 1982 Local Elections. Respondents are divided into groups according to voting intention.

Diagrams 9.18.1, 9.18.2 and 9.18.3 next page show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of
respondents divided according to voting intention on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the AD party.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and the Church on voting for the AD in the 1982 Local elections

The vast majority of AD respondents believed that their trusted relatives wanted them to vote for the AD. They were much less sure about the opinions of their best friends. PS respondents showed high levels of uncertainty, especially in relation to the opinions of their best friends on voting for the AD. APU respondents were very certain that their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them to vote for the AD.

As far as the Church opinion was concerned, all respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty, especially AD respondents. Of those respondents who expressed an opinion, the majority believed the Church wanted them to vote for the AD.

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Diagrams 9.18.4, 9.18.5 and 9.18.6 show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents divided according to voting intention on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the PS party.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and the Church on voting for the PS in the 1982 Local elections

PS respondents showed themselves divided as to the opinions of their trusted relatives, and great uncertainty as to the opinions of their best friends about voting for the PS.

AD respondents believed that their trusted relatives did not want them to vote for the PS but showed great uncertainty as to the opinions of their best friends.

APU respondents believed that both their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them to vote for the PS.

As far as the opinions of the Church are concerned, AD, PS and APU respondents showed high levels of uncertainty, although of those who expressed an opinion the overwhelming
majority believed that the Church did not want them to vote for the PS.

Diagrams 9.18.7, 9.18.8 and 9.18.9 show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs by respondents divided according to voting intention on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the APU alliance.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and the Church on voting for the APU in the 1982 Local elections

APU respondents believed that their trusted relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for the APU. AD and PS respondents believed that their trusted relatives did not want them to vote for the APU. As far as the opinions of their best friends were concerned, AD and PS respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty, although of those who expressed an opinion the majority believed that their best friends did not want to vote for the APU.

AD, PS and APU respondents all showed high levels of uncertainty about the Church's opinion on voting for the APU. Those who expressed an opinion all believed that the Church did not want them to vote for the APU.
Table 9.19 in Appendix 4 shows the mean strength of beliefs expressed by respondents divided according to voting intention on the opinions of trusted relatives, best friends and the Church on voting for the AD, the PS and the APU.

AD and the APU respondents indicated strong beliefs that the relatives they trusted most and their best friends wanted them to vote for the parties they intend to vote for. PS respondents appeared to believe more strongly that their relatives and best friends did not wish them to vote for the AD and APU than that they wished them to vote for the PS.

The three groups of respondents indicated again that they believed that the Church wished them to vote for the right wing alliance and not for the Socialist party, PS or the Communist-led alliance APU. The significant difference found between the belief strength means of the three groups of respondents concerning the opinion of the Church that they should vote for the right wing alliance, AD, is a difference in strength rather in the direction of the beliefs.

Section 9.4.3 - The 1983 General Election - how socially aware were the voters?

Table 9.20 in Appendix 4 shows the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs indicated by respondents as to how each social influence factor i.e trusted relatives,
best friends and the Church, wanted them to vote for each party in the 1983 General Election. Respondents are divided into groups according to voting intention.

Diagrams 9.20.1, 9.20.2 and 9.20.3 next page show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs by respondents divided according to voting intention on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the CDS party.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and the Church on voting for the CDS in the 1983 General election.

The majority of CDS respondents believed that both their trusted relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for the CDS, although they were more uncertain about the opinions of their friends.

PSD respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty about their trusted relatives and best friends opinions on voting for the CDS. Of those who expressed an opinion, the majority (nearly half of the respondents) were certain that their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them to vote for the CDS.
PS and APU respondents were very certain that their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them to vote for the CDS party.

On the whole, respondents were very uncertain about the opinion of the Church, especially PSD respondents. Over 80% of PSD respondents showed they had nothing to say about the Church's opinion. Those who expressed an opinion believed the Church wanted them to vote for the CDS.

Diagrams 9.20.4, 9.20.5 and 9.20.6 show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents divided according to voting intention on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the PSD party.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and the Church on voting for the PSD in the 1983 General election
PSD respondents believed that their trusted relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for the PSD although approximately one third were uncertain.

CDS respondents were very uncertain, especially in relation to the opinions of their best friends on voting for the PSD.

Approximately one third of PS respondents believed that their trusted relatives and best friends wished them to vote for the PSD and APU respondents were very certain that their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them to vote for the PSD.

As far as the Church's opinion was concerned well over fifty percent of all respondents showed uncertainty. The majority of those who expressed an opinion believed the Church wanted them to vote for the PSD.

Diagrams 9.20.7, 9.20.8 and 9.20.9 next page show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents divided according to voting intention on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the PS party.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and the Church on voting for the PS in the 1983 General election

About two thirds of PS respondents believed that their trusted relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for the PS party. As many as 20 percent, however, were sure that their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them to vote for the PS.

By and large, CDS, PSD and APU respondents believed that their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them to vote for the PS, although about one quarter were uncertain.

CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents showed again very high levels of uncertainty concerning the Church's opinion. Of those who expressed beliefs about it, all believed that the
Church did not want them to vote for the PS party.

Diagrams 9.20.10, 9.20.11 and 9.20.12 show the percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents divided according to voting intention on the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the Church on voting for the APU alliance.
Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and the Church on voting for the APU in the 1983 General election

All respondents were quite certain about the opinions of their trusted relatives and best friends about voting for the APU. APU respondents believed that their trusted relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for the APU. CDS, PSD and PS respondents were equally certain that their trusted relatives, and best friends did not want them to vote for the APU.

Again, the levels of uncertainty about the Church's opinion are very high. Of those who expressed beliefs about it, all indicated that they believed the Church did not want them to vote for the APU.
Table 9.21 in Appendix 4 shows the mean strength of beliefs expressed by respondents divided according to voting intention in respect of the opinions of trusted relatives, best friends and the Church as to how they should vote for each party, i.e. the CDS (Christian Democratic party), the PSD (Social Democratic party), the PS (Socialist party) and the APU (Communist-led Alliance).

Each group of respondents believed that their trusted relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for the party they intended to vote for and not for any other party. CDS respondents are the only exception, since their mean strength of beliefs on the opinions of their trusted relatives and best friends on voting for the PSD is also positive although marginally so.

As far as the opinion of the Church on voting for each of the four parties, CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents believed that the Church wanted them to vote for the CDS or to a lesser extent for the PSD. They also believed that the Church did not want them to vote for the two left wing parties, especially the APU.

Section 9.4.4 - Summary of Section 9.4

Summary: Social awareness in the three elections

The main finding is that, as expected, the majority of respondents do not appear aware or interested in the opinion of the Church as to how they should vote. Some
respondents in all the three elections have shown that they were aware of the Church's advice. Of these, the majority showed that they believed the Church wished them to vote for the two right wing parties, especially for the CDS. However, the level of uncertainty among respondents was so high that it should be concluded that, on the whole, respondents did not appear interested in the position of the Church.

Respondents were aware of the opinions of trusted relatives and best friends which, on the whole, were in line with respondents' vote intention.

PS respondents showed strong beliefs that trusted relatives and friends did not wish them to vote for either the CDS or the APU; the strength of their corresponding beliefs concerning the PSD, were less negative, though.

CDS respondents showed very strong beliefs that trusted relatives and best friends did not wish them to vote for either the PS or the APU but the strength of their corresponding beliefs concerning the PSD is slightly positive. The very close positions of CDS respondents to the PSD party detected in the analysis of the political awareness of CDS respondents prior to the 1983 General election are also noted here. It is plausible to assume that CDS respondents were feeling pressure from their PSD relatives and friends to vote for the PSD.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS AND EPILOGUE

Introduction

The detailed analyses contained in Chapter IX concerning the political and social awareness of Portuguese respondents who took part in the three voting behaviour studies showed, as expected, that respondents appeared to be aware of important electoral issues and of candidates or parties' stands on them. Although some respondents were aware of the Church's position vis-a-vis the main parties the influence of the Catholic Church was not acknowledged by the majority of them. Respondents' showed awareness of the positions of trusted relatives and best friends vis-a-vis their vote choices. However, as the results of the tests of the Reasoned Action model indicated (Chapter VII), the political awareness of respondents was found to be a much more significant determinant of voting intentions than their social awareness. These results, as shown in Chapter VII, Section 7.4, are comparable to the results obtained in the American and British voting behaviour studies based on the Reasoned Action Model, and therefore support the main argument of the thesis that Portuguese voters, like their American and British counterparts, do make reasoned vote choices based on knowledge of current electoral issues and of the stands candidates and parties have on them.
Although the results of the three voting behaviour studies carried out in Portugal just prior to the 1980 Presidential elections, the 1982 Local elections and the 1983 General elections, were obtained using the Reasoned Action model and had as main referents the applications of the model in the 1974 British General election and the 1976 American Presidential election studies, they should also be considered in relation to the other social psychology models of voting behaviour described in Chapter II, i.e. the Columbia, the Michigan and the Cognitive Models.

Irrespective of the assumptions on which the four models of voting behaviour are based, the Columbia, the Michigan, the Reasoned Action and the Cognitive models have aimed at explaining the psychological processes which determine vote choice. The development of the models took place at different times and in different contexts. As suggested in Chapter II, time and context influenced the way the models themselves were constructed. However, in their common aim of defining the determinants of vote choice they acknowledged the same one fundamental point, i.e. that implicit in the act of voting there is a choice among two or more alternatives. If such choice among alternatives exists then the probabilities are that not the same candidates or parties will always win the elections. If vote shifts exist, and they do, what causes them to occur? Whims on the part of voters? The influence of young voters? A felt need on the part of voters to be governed by
new faces? A sense of fairness on the part of voters to give all alternatives a chance?

The four models cope with vote shifts in different ways. Their suggestions will be used as a framework to the general discussion and conclusions of the three Portuguese voting behaviour studies, bearing in mind the value of each explanatory approach to further our understanding and improve prediction of voting behaviour in any given context at any given time.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 10.1 examines the explanations for vote shifts offered by the Columbia, Michigan, Reasoned Action and Cognitive models. Section 10.2 assesses how well the Portuguese results fit the vote shift explanations offered by the four models. Section 10.3 will examine the set of criteria established by the authors of the Cognitive model to assess its validity in relation to the Portuguese findings. Section 10.4, Epilogue, examines the Portuguese results within the context of political and electoral developments from 1983 to the present day.

Section 10.1 Vote shifts - the explanations offered by the Columbia, Michigan, Reasoned Action and Cognitive models.

The four voting behaviour models described in Chapter II offer explanations to account for vote shifts from election to election.
For the Columbia researchers vote choice was directly determined by party identification which in turn was determined by the various social, ethnic, religious etc. groups a person belonged to. Vote shifts were attributed to the effect of cross pressures resulting from the conflicting opinions between these various groups.

The Michigan researchers, who like their Columbia predecessors, had found party identification to be the main determinant of vote choice (Chapter II) introduced an interesting electoral classification to explain vote shifts. According to their classification, there are "maintaining" elections, "deviating elections" and "realigning elections". A "maintaining election" is described as one in which the "events surrounding the campaign ... seem signally devoid of circumstances that can generate forces running counter to existing partisan loyalties" (Campbell et al, 1960, p.531).

"A deviating election" is one in which the basic division of partisan loyalties is not seriously disturbed, "but the attitude forces on the vote are such as to bring about the defeat of the majority party" (p.533). However, as Campbell et al point out" a deviating election should not be taken as evidence of a secular decline in the importance of party identification".

"A realigning election" (a classification first introduced by Key, 1959, and adopted by the Michigan researchers) is characterised by the appearance of a "more or less durable
realignment" of party loyalties. Such shifts in basic partisan commitments are infrequent although as Key observes and Campbell et al quote "every election has the effect of creating lasting party loyalties in some individual voters, but it is "not often that the number so affected is so great as to create a sharp realignment". (p.534).

The Reasoned Action model and the Cognitive model, by virtue of the assumptions they make about the voters themselves, consider vote shifts to be due to the voters' assessment of each electoral campaign in terms of what the voters believe to be the most important problems that need to be solved and of whom, among the candidates or parties, is more likely to adopt the right policies to solve them.

Unlike the Columbia and Michigan models which view people as passive voters, only jolted into change either by a conflict of opinions between third parties or by undefined contextual forces, the Reasoned Action and the Cognitive models consider people as active decision makers, who in spite of the influence of their past voting history, social pressure factors, values and beliefs are aware of political processes and through their vote, seek to obtain solutions to important problems.
Section 10.2 How well do Portuguese results fit the vote shift explanations offered by the Columbia, the Michigan, the Reasoned Action and the Cognitive models

As we have seen, in the short history of the Portuguese democracy, from the first legislative general elections of 1976 to the General election of 1983, two major vote shifts occurred. The left wing majority in Parliament in 1976 gave place to a right wing majority in 1980. The right wing majority in 1980 reverted to a left wing majority in 1983. As shown in Chapter VI, Section 6.2 the shifts among the electorate appeared to have mainly occurred among social democrat and socialist voters.

It is difficult to assess the impact of cross group pressures assumed by the Columbia researchers to cause vote changes, on the shifts which occurred in Portugal between 1976 and 1983. The questionnaires used for the three Portuguese studies did not probe directly into the effect of cross group pressures on respondents vote choices. However the measures used to assess the effect of social influence on voting intentions included three important social groups, i.e. trusted relatives, best friends and the Church. Since the global influence of these groups on respondents' voting intentions was found to be marginally significant in only some cases, it is highly improbable that the explanation suggested by the Columbia researchers for vote shifts can be applied to Portugal.
The vote shift explanation offered by the Michigan researchers, can be applied to the Portuguese shifts. The 1980 General election can be considered as "deviating" election, since in 1983 voters maintained their original partisan lines of 1976. The very fact that just prior to the 1983 General election christian democrat and social democrat respondents wished their parties to continue their alliance (AD alliance) may be considered as evidence of strong partisan loyalties among voters. Equally, the strong and clear indication on the part of the communist alliance voters (APU alliance) that the APU would be the only party likely to adopt the necessary policies, both at local and national level, lends further support to the Michigan finding concerning the overriding effect of party identification on vote choice.

The Michigan explanation of vote shifts could be applied to shifts at the Local elections level. However, how would the 1980 Portuguese Presidential results fit in with the Michigan classification? In two months, an important percentage of the electorate who had returned the AD alliance to power with a reinforced majority in Parliament, did not vote for the Presidential candidate supported by the AD. It could be argued that since the AD had been helped in the 1980 General election by socialist "deviators" the defeat of the AD presidential candidate could have been due to the return of the "deviators" to their old party.
In other words, the Michigan classification can explain every shift that occurs. That is to say, the classification includes every possible electoral outcome i.e. the maintenance of the status quo from election to election, fluke results and major electoral upheavals which in subsequent elections establish a new status quo.

The Michigan classification although it explains different types of vote shifts does not further our understanding of their causes.

In contrast, the explanations offered by the Reasoned Action Model and the Cognitive model not only explain the vote shifts registered in the Portuguese elections but also help to further our understanding of how Portuguese voters come to their voting decisions. Within the context of the tests of the Reasoned Action model in the three Portuguese elections using the 1980 Presidential election example, irrespective of whether the respondents who had "deviated" in the 1980 General election to the AD were the ones who in the 1980 Presidential election returned to their old party (or parties) causing the AD presidential candidate to lose the election, the analyses of belief based attitude measures \( b \) towards the two presidential candidates allow us to understand why a percentage of AD voters did not back the candidate supported by the party they had voted for in the 1980 General election. Table 9.A in chapter IX, Section 9.1.2, showing the mean contribution to overall attitude towards voting for the two candidates as a
function of type of issue and party identification illustrates this point very clearly.

Overall, AD respondents' mean contribution to attitude towards voting for the AD candidate and for the PS candidate, based on respondents' evaluations of issues and their beliefs about the candidates' stands on them, was 1.7 and 1.5, respectively. When the type of issues is taken into account it is clear that insofar issues related to the actual performance of the President i.e. the way the President discharges his duties, uses his rights and relates himself to the Government are concerned AD respondents held stronger positive attitudes toward the candidate supported by the AD (1.3, 1.4, 2.6 as opposed to .8, and 1.9 respectively). It is only when general issues related to political stability are examined that we understand why the majority of AD respondents opted for voting for the AD candidate. On stability issues the mean contribution to attitude towards voting for the AD candidate of 3.2 was much stronger than the mean contribution to attitude towards voting for the PS candidate of .8. We not only understand why the majority of AD respondents voted for the AD candidate but also understand why some AD respondents did not. In other words, by assuming the active participation of voters in the political electoral process, the Reasoned Action model affords the possibility for vote shifts to be predicted and explained on more precise and rational grounds than those offered by the Michigan classification.
In calmer electoral contexts the assumptions of the Reasoned Action model also allow us to understand voters' choices in a more coherent fashion. If we take as example the Portuguese 1982 Local elections under the Michigan classification, the elections would be classified as "maintaining elections" since when the research took place no vote shifts were high enough to change the composition of the previous mandates. The fact that the elections "maintained" the status quo does not help us understand why it was maintained nor whether voters perceive Local elections in the same way as Presidential or General elections are perceived. Belief based attitude measures (b.e.) on the other hand help us further understanding of these questions.

For example, as indicated in Chapter I, Section 1.3.4., the percentage of abstentions in Local elections is greater than in General elections. The more generalised apathy among AD and PS respondents found in the 1982 Local elections (Chapter I, Section 9.2.1) helps explain the drop in turnout percentages. Also, the milder negative feelings expressed by AD and PS respondents towards each other and toward the communist alliance appear to indicate that voters' perceptions of local politics are not as strongly ideologically based as, for example, in General elections. The apathy of the AD and PS electorates not only in relation to Local elections per se but also in relation to the role of the communists at local level is perhaps responsible for the combined efforts of the Christian
Democrat, Social Democrat and Socialist parties to force the Communist party, wherever possible, to lose control of Municipalities.

The advantages of the assumptions made by the Reasoned Action model concerning the active involvement of voters in important electoral issues to explain vote shifts over the Michigan classification are clearly demonstrated by the Portuguese 1983 General election results, especially when these are assessed within the context of the voting behaviour of the electorate in subsequent elections.

As already pointed out, in accordance with the Michigan classification, the Portuguese 1980 General election was a "deviating" election since in 1983 the percentages of the popular vote obtained by the four main parties reverted to the 1976 General election levels. In other words, the Michigan model would simply have found that voters had "deviated" in 1980 had gone back to the parties they identified with in 1983. Since respondents' attitudes toward parties were highly related to voting intentions (Chapter VIII, Section 8.2) the assumption made by the Michigan model that vote choice is determined by party identification would have been upheld.

However, the belief based attitude measures (b e) which underlie the assumptions of the Reasoned Action model allow us to understand the 1983 electoral results within the political context of the time.
A percentage of the electorate had in fact deviated in 1980 in order to attain political stability. The AD alliance failed to provide it and plunged the country into a grave economic and social crisis. There are indeed strong signs that the main 1980 "deviators" were socialist voters (Chapter VI, Section 6.2) and it is highly probable that these "deviators" returned to the socialist camp in 1983. The important point here is to establish how well they identified with the Socialist party.

As indicated in Chapter IX, Section 9.3.1, the respondents who indicated their intention to vote for the Socialist party showed high levels of indecision and divisions among themselves regarding the Socialist party stands on issues such as the reduction of the public sector, the changes in labour laws and the increase in the purchasing power of the people. These findings which can only be obtained through a detailed analysis of respondents' evaluations of important electoral issues and of their beliefs on the stands likely to be adopted by the parties on the issues reveal that respondents not only were unsure of the Socialist party's positions but also that they held different perceptions of those positions. As it will be seen in the next section, these findings are of crucial importance to understand the subsequent electoral behaviour of voters who in 1983 voted for the Socialist party.

The explanation offered by the Michigan model based on the assumption that party identification is the sole
determinant of vote choice and on the rationale suggested to explain vote shifts will be shown to be too simple to account for the electoral shifts which voters caused after 1983.

At this stage it should also be pointed out that the analyses carried out on belief based attitude measures (beliefs) provided by Christian Democrat respondents also assist us in understanding the subsequent behaviour of the Christian Democrat electorate, and in so doing further our understanding of electoral processes placed in an historical perspective. As shown in chapter IX, Section 9.3.2, although Christian Democrat respondents showed no divisions among themselves or uncertainty regarding the stands of the Christian Democrat party on the issues, they were found to hardly differentiate between the party they intended to vote for (CDS) and the Social Democrat party (PSD).

The following section, Section 10.3, is devoted to examining the results of the three Portuguese studies within the framework of the Cognitive model. As shown in Chapter II, Section 2.3.3, although the Reasoned Action model and the Cognitive model have important methodological differences they share common assumptions, i.e. that voters not only identify important political issues but also are aware of the candidates' or parties' positions on them.

In view of these similarities between the Reasoned Action and the Cognitive models it is important to see how well
the Portuguese results fit the Cognitive model criteria for evidence of the determinant effect of political knowledge, and not party identification, on vote choice.

Section 10.3 How well do the results of the Portuguese studies fit the Cognitive model criteria for evidence of the determinant effect of political knowledge on vote choice

As explained in Chapter II, the Cognitive model built on evidence gathered in a longitudinal study lasting 23 years is a complex model requiring a great deal of information about respondents' early socialization processes, past voting habits, value systems as well as their knowledge of issues and parties' stands on them.

The analyses which resulted from the longitudinal study enabled Himmelweit et al to establish the validity of the cognitive model's assumption that voters' cognitions are the most important determinant of their vote choices on four major findings (Chapter II, Section 2.3.2) which are discussed here in the light of the results obtained in the Portuguese studies.

First, the longitudinal sample showed a high degree of volatility from election to election. Himmelweit et al concluded that high volatility in vote choice would not be expected to occur if early socialization were to have a determinant effect on vote choice. In the Portuguese
studies, respondents' reports' on past voting behaviour habits did not show high volatility in vote choice. However, it should be pointed out that whereas the longitudinal study covered five British general elections Portuguese voters, before the 1983 General election had only voted in three General elections in a political context very different from the British one.

The second major finding of the longitudinal study that supports the Cognitive model assumption that voters' based their vote choices on reasoning processes, showed that voters were able to perceive correctly the differences between the parties' stands on non-consensus issues. As pointed out in Chapter IX, Portuguese respondents were able to perceive the differences in candidates or parties' stands on non-consensus issues. In the 1980 Presidential election there were three non-consensus issues ie that a President should risk political instability rather than give in to a government who acts against the Constitution; that a President should give unconditional support to the government and that a President should support Revolution. (Chapter IX, Section 9.1.1) and respondents were able to attribute the correct stands to the two presidential candidates (Chapter IX, section 9.1.1).

In the 1982 Local elections there were no non-consensus issues. As expected with consensus issues, respondents believed that their respective parties were more likely to adopt the required stands than the other parties.
In the 1983 General election there were two major non-consensus issues i.e. that to solve the crisis and promote social welfare and justice the public sector should be reduced and changes in Labour Laws including the strike law should be introduced. Respondents were able to attribute correctly the stands of three of the four parties on these two issues (see Chapter IX, Section 9.3). The uncertainty shown by all respondents on the Socialist party stands on the two issues reflects the ambiguous position of the party vis-a-vis the two issues during the election campaign rather than respondents' lack of awareness.

The third major finding which attests to the validity of the cognitive model can not be applied to the Portuguese studies since it is based on information gathered about the past voting history of respondents and their attitudes on vote choice in each election (see Chapter II, section 2.3.2).

The fourth and last finding which attests to the validity of the Cognitive model is in the words of Himmelweit et al the finding that establishes "unequivocally a causal link from attitudes to behaviour". As explained in Chapter II, Himmelweit et al showed that when voters express attitudes which are at variance with those expressed by the majority of those voting for the same party, the likelihood of them defecting to another party in a subsequent election is increased.
Given the characteristics of the Portuguese surveys no analyses can be made directly to test this fourth criterion. However, there is quite strong evidence from the Portuguese 1983 general election results that respondents who intended to vote for the Socialist party were deeply divided on some of the stands likely to be adopted by the party (Chapter IX, sections 9.3.2 and 9.3.3). Table 9.12 in Appendix 4 illustrates these divisions. In at least three important issues (issue 4 on the reduction of the public sector, issue 7 on the changes in labour laws, and issue 8 on the increase in purchasing power of the people) there were substantial divisions within the socialist respondents as to the likely stands which the Socialist party would adopt. It will also be remembered that the majority of socialist respondents showed uncertainty or were opposed to a post electoral coalition between the Socialist party and the Social Democrat party (Chapter IX, section 9.3.3). It is possible, however, to examine the relevance of these findings together with political developments after the 1983 election.

If, as Himmelweit et al suggest voters who are at variance with the party they vote for, are more likely to change their vote choice, then it is highly probable that a considerable percentage of socialist voters who in 1983 voted for the Socialist party would be likely to change party in the next election. This because, it would be highly unlikely that the Socialist party, if elected, would
have the ability to satisfy the different expectations of the divided socialist electorate.

After the 1983 General election, the Socialist party (who received 36% of the popular vote) entered into a coalition with the Social Democrat party (who received 27% of the popular vote) known as the Bloco Central, and introduced severe austerity measures, thus reducing the purchasing power of the population. Socialist respondents were divided on these two measures.

The Bloco Central government soon became very unpopular and the socialists, the larger party in the coalition took most of the blame for the consequences of the economic stagnation in which the country was plunged. By 1984, a new party was created under the auspices of the President Ramalho Eanes, the winner of the 1980 Presidential election covered by this study. (In 1984, General Ramalho Eanes was in his last year of his second mandate and would therefore be prevented by the Constitution to run for a third term).

The new party, Partido Renovador Democrático, (PRD) sought to fill in the vacuum, which according to its leaders, was being created within the centre-left in view of the right wing policies being pursued by the Socialist party within the Bloco Central coalition. The PRD also aspired at restoring honest political practice in Portuguese politics. According to PRD leaders there was a need to put a stop to widespread corruption and political favouritism.
Opposed by the Socialist party and the right wing parties, the new PRO party did not attract much criticism from the Communist party. In fact the communists were in broad agreement with the aims of the PRO. The Bloco Central fell in 1985 and its failure was followed by a General election which was held on October 6 of that year. The Socialist party was severely punished. Its 1983 36% share of the vote was drastically reduced to 21%. The new PRO party obtained 18% of the popular vote, undoubtedly at the expense of the Socialist party.

It is therefore plausible to assume that a considerable percentage of the voters who in 1983 had decided to vote for the Socialist party but were already at variance with Socialist party's policies changed their vote to the PRO party.

If this was the case, then it follows that the most important criterion defined by Himmelweit et al to establish a causal link between attitudes based on political knowledge and vote shift can be applied to results obtained from tests of the Reasoned Action model. Although applied discreetly and on different samples, the measures used by the Reasoned Action model can reveal the extent to which respondents are at variance with the stands the parties they intend to vote for are likely to adopt. It is plausible to assume that major vote shifts can be predicted from a detailed analyses of respondents.
evaluations of important issues and their beliefs concerning the parties' stands on them.

Section 10.4 Epilogue

The main argument contained in this thesis that Portuguese voters make reasoned vote choices based on political knowledge has been supported. It was argued (Chapter II, Section 2.1.3) that a distinction should be made between two basic types of political knowledge, i.e. deep, ideologically based, political knowledge and surface, more practically based, political knowledge. In theory, all voters may possess the two types of political knowledge. In practice, it is more realistic to assume, and there is plenty of evidence to support the assumption as shown in Chapter II, that only an elite minority possesses the two types. The vast majority of voters may lack the theory but the important question is whether they are able to identify important political issues which divide the parties or candidates and choose among the latter the one party or the one candidate whose positions on the issues are more similar to the voters'. The Portuguese respondents like their American and British counterparts showed that they do possess this type of political awareness, and that this awareness appears to be the most determinant factor in their vote choices.

The three elections covered by this study were held at a crucial time in the development of democratic rule in Portugal. Amidst the political confusion of the first
post-revolutionary years Portuguese voters, through their
votes, were trying to achieve much needed and desired
political stability. For the first time in their lives,
real alternatives were being presented to them, at national
government level, at local government level and at
Presidential level.

Politicians, institutions and the electorate were all
learning to adapt to new modes of coexistence based on free
expression and equal rights. While the political parties
made their bids for power, entered into seemingly stable
coalitions which resulted in failure, the electorate calmly
went to the polls and gradually took the initiative.

In the General election of 1980 it consolidated the right
wing alliance (AD) in power. But denied the AD complete
control of the main political institutions by electing a
socialist-backed President, two months after the AD
victory. After the collapse of the AD alliance in 1982,
the General election of 1983 brought about an undesired
coalition, the Bloco Central. After its collapse, in 1985,
the socialist electorate split almost in half. The social
democrats who with 30% of the vote formed a minority
government after the 1985 elections lost a vote of
confidence in Parliament in April 1987 moved by the new PRD
party and supported by the socialists and communists. The
electorate, who was enjoying the fruits of the economic
recovery which had started after the 1985 election (partly
due to the strict austerity measure imposed by the
socialists and partly by very favourable external conditions, i.e. the drop of the dollar and of oil prices), showed in a drastic way their displeasure at the concerted action on the part of the PRD, the Socialist party and the Communist party to bring down the Government. By means of a major vote shift in the 19 July 1987 the Portuguese electorate gave an absolute majority of votes and of seats in Parliament to the Social-democrats. Table 10.4 shows the percentage of the popular vote each party received in the 1983, 1985 and 1987 general elections.

Table 10.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>PRD</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<td>APU*</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>----</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU*</td>
<td>----</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* the APU, the alliance between the Communist party, the left wing socialists MDP/CDE and independents was replaced by a new alliance between the Communist party, the Ecologist party and independents. Since, the MDP/CDE, the left wing socialists who split from the APU alliance, running in the 1987 election on their own, only received .6% of the popular vote, the considerable drop suffered by the Communist party and its new allies cannot be attributed to the defection of MDP/CDE votes.
In four years and three elections the Portuguese electorate caused a major upheaval in the relative strength of the main political parties. The majority of christian democrats, who showed themselves so close to the social democrats in the 1983 election (see chapter IX, Section 9.3.2) went over to the social democrat camp. The PRD lost 13 percent points from almost 18% of the popular vote in 1985 to just under 5% in 1987. The communists lost in four years 6 percent points from just over 18.1% to just over 12.1% in 1987. The socialists, after their collapse in 1985 when they lost almost 16 percent points of the popular vote, in 1987 recovered only 1.4% to obtain 22.2% of the popular vote.

In their rapid democratic apprenticeship the Portuguese electorate finally managed in 1987 to elect a single majority government. It is plausible to assume that the PSD government elected in 1987 will be able to stay in power for the full four year mandate. If this happens it will be the first time since Democracy was restored in 1974 that a government survived its full mandate. Will the Portuguese accept their newly acquired political stability without question or will they be looking for alternatives in 1991? Judging by the results of the three Portuguese surveys, it is quite possible that if they are not satisfied with their stable majority government the electorate will not hesitate in picking a different
alternative provided a credible one presents itself. The Portuguese sank their majestic ship on 25 April 1974. Since then they have undoubtedly learnt to live with their feet wet.
APPENDIX 1

THE DICTATORSHIP: A BRIEF ACCOUNT

1. The Dictatorship, from 1926 to 1974 - Salazar and Caetano

1.1. Corporativism

The first steps towards the dictatorship were taken after the military coup of 1926 which put an end to 16 years of successive Republican governments following the overthrow of the Monarchy in October 1910.

The Generals responsible for the Coup invited in 1928, Antonio Salazar, a Professor of Law at the University of Coimbra to head the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Two years later he became head of government. By 1933, a new Constitution prepared by a young lawyer, Marcelo Caetano, laid down the principles of the Portuguese Corporate State.

The Corporate State was based on seven major State institutions, i.e. the Corporations: Police, Governmental Bureaucracy, the Military, the Church (Roman Catholic), the Unions (representing the big economic interests), Industry and Commerce, and Agriculture. Of these seven Corporations, the most prominent and important pillars of the corporate edifice were the Military, the Church and the "Unions". The Dictator exercised control over all of them.

The seven Corporations collaborated in harmony. Between themselves, through the influence and power they exercised,
they were able to control all "national activities". In a speech delivered to the Secretariat of National Propaganda in 1938, Salazar clearly indicated the supremacy of the State and emphasised the economic procedural aspects of the new regime:

"The State has the right to foster, harmonise and control all national activities ... We wish to advance toward a new political economy, working in harmony with human nature, under the authority of a strong State which will protect the higher interests of the nation, its wealth and its labour, both from capitalist excesses and from destructive Bolshevism".

(In Delzell, 1970 p.333)

In practice, this meant a continuous and ruthless elimination of all kinds of opposition to the regime while capitalist procedures remained archaic and retained, in some respects, almost feudal types of exchange (Perlmutter, 1981).

1.2. Political life and opposition during the regime

In any authoritarian state, all political parties are banned with the exception of the regime's party. The party, however, is no more than an adornment, a docile mouthpiece of the policies the Dictator wishes to implement.
During Salazar's time the regime's party was called, Uniao Nacional (National Union). Its name was changed by Salazar successor in 1969 to Accao Nacional, i.e. National Action.

The Dictator, as President of the Council of Ministers, exercised supreme control. The Dictator's policies were discussed in the Assembleia Nacional (Parliament) and endorsed. The President of the Republic had no power.

Elections took place both for the National Assembly and for the Presidency. However, electoral suffrage was restricted on account of level of education, property ownership etc. Registered voters only accounted for 19.5% of the population in 1969 (Figueiredo, 1975).

Although political parties were banned, prior to elections the opposition had limited freedom to campaign. Electoral rolls were not kept up to date and the opposition was not allowed to supervise ballots. The forces of the opposition which contested the elections were not organised as parties, but as movements such as the Movimento de Unidade Democratica (Movement of Democratic Unity) in the forties and the democratic movements CDE and CEUD in the sixties. Well known figures ran from time to time for the Presidency as opposition candidates. However the performance of the opposition at the polls was always weak, amidst accusations of rigged results. Changes in government were produced, not by elections, but by the intervention of the dictator.
Apart from the opposition forces which came to the fore at the time of elections there were other types of continuous resistance and opposition. The most significant since the start of the dictatorship was the Communist Party, which had been founded in 1921. Operating in secret, the Communists became an influential form of permanent and untiring resistance. More fragmented but also very important, was the open challenge on the part of some democrats, descendants of the political parties of the first Republic. Within the military there were a considerable number of coup attempts to overthrow Salazar. They all failed. Workers protested and went on strike, although forbidden by Law. In the sixties the students protested.

All forms of resistance, protest and opposition were crushed, often brutally by the military, paramilitary and various police forces of the State. Of the latter the most feared was undoubtedly the PIDE, the state's secret police, the new Inquisition (Figueiredo, 1975). Many communists and non-communists suspected of being communists died in the prisons where the use of torture was widespread. Well-known opponents were silenced behind bars and many went into exile.

Towards the end of the sixties, reflecting the growing discontent felt among prominent industrial and business sectors, a handful of members of the National Assembly, known as the "Liberal Wing" started to question the regime's archaic economic policies and sought to push for
much needed reforms. Mild as their protests were, they
nevertheless represented the first open breach within the
ranks of the regime (as members of the National Assembly
they all had to belong to the regime's party). They were
not put in prison, but had to resign.

1.3. Conditions in general

It was Salazar's stated belief that learning would destroy
the peaceful and uncomplicated existence of peasants. Four
year primary education, compulsory by law, was never really
enforced, especially in the rural areas. Illiteracy rates
at the time of Revolution were estimated at well over one
third of the population and only a very small minority had
access to higher education. This was specially true of the
rural interior regions of the country isolated from the
more developed coastal centres by a deficient and, in some
cases, non-existent transport network system.

In the sixties, throughout rural Portugal over one third of
the population still lived at subsistence level. Land
distribution still reflected the system which had evolved
with the Christian reconquest in the 12 and 13th centuries.
Fragmentation of holdings in the northern half of the
country and extensive farmlands, the latifundia in the
South. (Figueiredo, 1975). In 1954, according to
Estatistica Agricola, 50% of Portuguese holdings were of
less than 1 acres; 38% between 1 and 5 acres; 7% between 5
to 10 acres; 4% more than 20 acres but less than 50; 1%
more than 50 acres. Only 0.3% of the holdings were larger
than 200 acres. Included in this minute 0.3% "were the properties of the four greater landlords in the country who between them owned 235,000 acres, the same amount of land held by 50,400 farmers" (Figueiredo, 1975).

Due to their geographical position the coastal areas between Lisbon and Oporto had always enjoyed far more development than the interior and the South. By the late fifties early sixties, the main industrial belts of Lisbon, Oporto and Setubal (a city 50 km south of Lisbon) had developed in sharp contrast with the rural areas of the interior. The exodus from the rural regions to the big industrial centres went on relentlessly, and with it grew the shanty towns, especially in the periphery and in some of the old quarters of Lisbon and Oporto.

Industrial development as well as land was concentrated in the hands of a few powerful families, who enjoyed the protection of the regime and were simultaneously part of it.

During the sixties, emigration, a permanent feature in Portuguese history by tradition to Brasil and the colonies, also took place in large scale to the more affluent European countries. By 1972 an estimated 1.2 million Portuguese had settled in Europe. By 1974 there were over 1 million Portuguese working in France alone. (Figueiredo, 1975).
A small but important proportion of emigrants was made of young men who fled the country to avoid conscription into the Army, who since 1961 were fighting against the liberation movements in Angola, Guine-Bissau and Mozambique.

Change and modernization took place to tradition and order, and were only allowed to take place as long as they did not represent a challenge to the regime and its main pillars: the Church, the Unions and the Army.

The Roman Catholic Church enjoyed a much privileged position and regained the power lost during the first Republic until the 1926 coup. Salazar, a staunch catholic himself, before the 1926 coup had been a member of the CADC (Centro Academico de Democracia Crista - Academic Centre of Christian Democracy) founded in 1901. Another member of CADC was Manuel Cerejeira, a young man who later became the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon for the duration of Salazar's rule. The CADC was the intellectual centre of Catholic opposition to the Republic. Salazar and Cerejeira's friendship lasted a lifetime.

Extremely conservative, the Church exercised their power mainly in the rural areas of the northern half of the country. Peasants in the South, anti-clerical by tradition, were never brought to the fold in significant numbers. The Church distributed their own papers and periodicals to over 2 million subscribers and operated their own Radio Station - the Radio Renascença. Opposition
within the Church against the regime was practically non-existent. By and large the Church endorsed the regime's policies, supporting them in their teachings extolling the virtues of poverty, resignation and acquiescence.

The "Unions" represented big economic interests which were practically concentrated in the hands of a few families. The non-existence of independent unions, the illegality of strike action and the patron/client nature of labour relations reinforced the exploitation of labour. Figueiredo in his book quoting OEDC figures for 1970/1971 writes: "through institutionalised trade unionism, collective bargaining and pressures inherent in the consumer society, (in the industrialised advanced countries of the OEDC) labour had achieved a share of some 70% of the national income, while capital earnings took 30%; in Portugal, the proportion was almost reversed with capital earnings taking 55% and labour including the managerial classes, less and 45%".

The Army, apart from restricted opposition, remained on the whole stable and loyal to the regime. The colonial wars, however, were to subject the Army and the regime to pressures which they could not withstand.

Conscription increased from 2 to 4 years; young men of all social strata were being killed and maimed. Many deserted. Much needed resources for economic development were channeled to the war effort.
In 1969, due to ill health, Salazar was replaced by Marcelo Caetano. Some of his early actions tried to correct some of Salazar's most glaring injustices. He promised some reforms but these did not satisfy his opponents. In fact, open opposition to the regime grew and revolutionary groups started bombing campaigns in Lisbon and other cities.

Dissatisfied with the intransigence of the regime in starting negotiations with the liberation movements in the colonies in face of the military impasse in the wars, and with the loss of prestige over the granting of higher pay to non-commissioned officers, the army middle ranks finally and successfully revolted in April 1974.

2. Post scriptum

Many details and important events were omitted from this brief description. Its main aim was to convey a general impression about the type of dictatorship which had controlled Portuguese economic, social and political life until April 1974 so that developments after the Revolution could more easily be put into perspective.

The Dictatorship had forged its hold on the country with the help of the Army, the Church and the "Unions". After 1974, the Army reaffirmed its prestige and power in the new democratic scenario imposed by their own action. The Church hierarchy, pushed to the background in the immediate post-revolution months, continued to exert a powerful influence in the more conservative rural areas of the
Centre and the North. The main economic and political structures of the old regime were brought down.

Democratic Unions were created and great changes in labour relations took place. The various unions affiliated themselves in either of the two Trades Unions confederations: the CGTP-Intersindical (Confederacao Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses), of communist and leftwing socialist tendencies, which operated in a semi-underground manner during the last two years of dictatorship; and the UGT (Uniao Geral dos Trabalhadores) of centre left and right wing tendencies.

It is not surprising that a mass explosion of political activity took place immediately after the Revolution. By July 1974 there were around 75 political parties. But the main political forces to emerge, with the exception of the Christian Democrats, reflected the opposition factions which had opposed the regime:

PCP - The Portuguese Communist Party, influential in the interior flat lands of the South (Alentejo) and in the industrial belts of Lisbon, Oporto and Setubal. Its Secretary General, Alvaro Cunhal, a lawyer, had suffered long prison sentences and torture during the Dictatorship, but lived in exile, in Chechoslovakia, at the time of the Revolution. The PCP is a member of the International Communist Movement.
PS - The Socialist Party, influential in the middle-classes and sectors of the working class up and down the country. Founded in 1973 abroad by Mario Soares and other democrats. Mario Soares, its Secretary General until 1985, (when was elected President of Portugal), a lawyer was one of the most outspoken opponents of the regime and suffered various terms of imprisonment. The PS is a member of the Socialist International.

PPD/PSD - The Social Democratic Party was formed after the Revolution by some members of the so called "Liberal Wing" in the former dictatorship's parliament. It is an uneasy coalition of the more dynamic business interests of the coastal zone and the more traditionally conservative trades, small businessmen and peasants of the central and northern regions. Its leader was Francisco Sa Carneiro, a lawyer, who died in 1980 in a plane crash. The PPD/PSD is affiliated in the Liberal International.

CDS - The Christian Democratic Party was also formed after the Revolution by members of the younger generation of the old regime. They represent Catholic traditionalism, and big economic interests with influence in the rural areas of the Northeast and in parts of the urban bourgeoisie. Its founder and leader in 1982 was Diogo Freitas do Amaral, a young professor of law, a disciple of Marcelo Caetano. The CDS is affiliated in the Union of the Christian Democratic Parties.
APPENDIX 2

The Post-Revolutionary years - Calendar of main events

adapted from

"Portugal, the Revolution in the Labyrinth", edited by Jean Pierre Faye from the papers of The Russell Committee for Portugal, 1976.

1974

April 25

The National Salvation Junta is invested with powers of government and General Antonio Spinola, a conservative, is appointed President of the Junta.

May 15

General Spinola is appointed President of Republica.

May 16

First Provisional Government, presided over by Prof. Palma Carlos (a well known lawyer, founder of the Independent Social Democratic Party - PSDI - a right wing conservative party, with very little following).

July 10-17

Show of strength by Spinola with the Ministers: resignation of Palma Carlos and the PPD ministers with a view to forming a strengthened "Spinolist" government headed by Col. Firmino Miguel, Spinola's right hand man.
July 12
The MFA (Armed Forces Movement who overthrew the dictatorship) forms the COPCON: The Operational Command of the Continent (the MFA's military defence force) under the direction of Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, a sympathiser of extreme left-wing positions.

July 18
Second Provisional Government, presided over by Col. Vasco Goncalves (communist sympathiser) appointed by the MFA Assembly who had refused Spinola's suggestion to appoint his right hand man. The MFA Assembly offered Spinola a choice between Major Melo Antunes (a moderate socialist) and Col. Vasco Goncalves. Spinola chose Goncalves, judging Antunes to be too "Marxist".

September 10
Speech by Spinola appealing to the "silent majority".

September 28
Presidential show of strength by Spinola, who arrogates full powers to himself with the support of the GNR (the Republican National Guard) and the Tancos paratroopers, summons the head of the COPCON (Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho) and the Prime Minister (Vasco Goncalves) to the Belem Palace (the Presidential Palace) and has them put under arrest by his right hand man, Col. Firmino Miguel.
At the Sao Bento Palace, seat of the MFA Assembly and of the government, Melo Antunes organises the rescue of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

The people put up barricades against the forces of the coup d'etat. Spinola resigns. General Costa Gomes, the General Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, becomes President of the Republic and holds the two functions.

Third Provisional Government, presided over by Col. Vasco Goncalves.

1975

January 14-20

The quarrel over having one single trade union body: The PCP (communist party), the MDP (left wing socialist movement) and the MES (another left wing socialist movement) demonstrate in favour of an united trade union congress. The PS (Socialist Party) and the PPD (the Social Democratic Party) take up opposing positions.

The MFA pronounces itself to be in favour of one Union Congress, the Intersindical. The Provisional Government ratifies this position by introducing a bill.

March 11

Military show of strength by Spinola: The Air Force, leaving the Parachute Troops' College base at Tancos, bomb and attack the Lisbon Artillery Regiment, the RALIS. The people are mobilised around its barracks. Failure of the Spinolist putsch. Lt Col Firmino Miguel and Major Sanchez
Osorio, chief organisers of the plot, take to flight. Gen. Spinola is driven to the airport by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, and asks Brazil for asylum, passing through Spain on the way.

The MFA's coordinating commission becomes the Council of the Revolution, an advisory Council to the President.

March
Ordinances on the nationalisation of the banks are started.

April
Ordinances on the Agrarian Reform.

April 25
First free elections held in Portugal since the 1926 coup d'etat to elect, through proportional representation, a Chamber with the sole object of drafting a new Constitution.

Fourth Provisional Government, presided over by Col. Vasco Goncalves.

May 19
Beginning of the conflict between the editorial staff (socialist) and the Workers' Commission (mainly UDP - extreme left wing) of the newspaper Republica.

June
Radio Renascenca (a Catholic Broadcasting Lisbon Station) is occupied by a Workers' commission incited by the UDP.
July 8
The MFA publishes a handbook on popular power and the Workers' Commission.

July 9
The newspaper Republica is published once again, directed by the Workers' Commission (with UDP tendencies) and an editor appointed by the MFA.

July 11
Resignation of the socialist Ministers from the fourth provisional government. Governmental crisis.

July 12
Formation of a National Secretariat of Workers Commissions.

July 18
Speech by Mario Soares the influential leader of the Socialist Party at Oporto.

July 19
First arson fire in a PCP centre at Rio Maior.

July 21
A triumvirate with full powers, is set up by the MFA: the President, Costa Gomes, the Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves, and the head of Copcon, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

August 1
Demonstration by Workers' Commission and by districts.
August 7

Document of the Nine (the nine being a group of moderate socialist officers of the Council of the Revolution), or Melo Antunes' document is published in Jornal Novo.

August 8

Fifth Provisional Government, presided over by Vasco Goncalves

August 11

The Nine are suspended from the Council of the Revolution.

August 13

The COPCON document, written by Major Tome (UDP) and made public by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

August 15

Elaboration of the Synthesis-Document, by Melo Antunes and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

August 18

Speech by the Prime Minister, Vasco Goncalves at Almada.

August 23

Programmatical Lines of Action, drawn up by the Fifth Government.

August 25

Formation of the FUR: United Revolutionary Front. The PCP, who join it on August 25, leave it on the following day, but the MDP (allies of the PCP) the MES (socialist movement, the PRP (leftist), the FSP (socialist splinter
A group, the LCI (4th International) and LUAR (revolutionary leftist grouping) remained on it.

**August 28**
Letter from Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, head of the COPCON, to the Prime Minister, Vasco Goncalves. Disagreement in the triumvirate.

**September 4-6**
The MFA's general assembly is cut short at Tancos. Vasco Goncalves resigns. The Group of Nine has the majority in the Council of the Revolution. The "Goncalvists" are excluded.

**September 19**
*Sixth Provisional Government*, presided over by Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo (socialist).

**September 27-28**
Congress of Workers' Commissions.

**September 30**
On the orders of the Sixth Government, the armed forces occupy the radio and television stations in Lisbon.

**September/October**
Appearance of the SUV (Soldiers United will win) in Porto, primarily to oppose the replacing of General Corvacho (Goncalvist) with General Pires Veloso (Conservative) at the head of the Northern Military Region.
October 22

The Workers' Commission with UDP leanings recaptures the Radio Renascenca (the Catholic station) held by the Army. The SUV demonstrate in Lisbon in favour of Popular Power.

November 8

On Government orders, the Tancos paratroopers blow up the Radio Renascenca transmitters, held by the Workers' Commission.

November 9

The Tancos paratroopers and their sergeants rebel against the military hierarchy which imposed on them the order to blow up the transmitters.

November 10

The 123 para officers from the Training Base leave Tancos to regroup at Sintra, in the suburbs to the west of Lisbon. They begin to make contact with Pires Veloso (Northern Military Region), Morais e Silva (Chief of Staff of the Air Force) and Jaime Neves (Amadora Commando Regiment) in preparation of the "25 November".

November 12-13

Demonstration by construction workers at the Palace of Sao Bento (Parliament): confinement of Ministers and of the Prime Minister Pinheiro de Azevedo. The Azevedo Government "strikes" as a protest, for an unlimited period, demanding "the powers of government from the President".
November 16
Demonstration called for by Workers' Commissions from Lisbon's industrial belt, supported by the FUR, the SUV and the PCP.

THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 25

November 21
A surprise vote by the Council of the Revolution, triggered by the military right wing and the Group of Nine, dismisses Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho from the Command of the Lisbon Military Region but he remains head of the COPCON.

November 22
The Amadora Comandos, with Jaime Neves at their head, announces their refusal to obey the commandant of the COPCON in future. In Oporto, the socialist leader, Mario Soares accuses the PCP of being the "chief saboteur of the Revolution" and demands action by the President of the Republic. The Secretary General of the Communist Party leaves Lisbon that day for a visit to Warsaw.

November 24
"The team of professionals" (Le Monde) built up around Lieutenant-Colonel Ramalho Eanes, settle in the Amadora Comandos' barracks, in charge of which is Colonel Jaime Neves. This "operational command in the shadows"(Le Monde 17 Dec. 1975) comprises Colonel Garcia dos Santos (transmissions) Lieutenant-Colonel Ferreira da Cunha (information) Major Loureiro dos Santos (liaison with the President) and the Command of the Lisbon Military
Region), Firmino Miguel (Spinola's right hand man during the aborted coup d'etat of September 28, 1974) and Aventino Teixeira, a member of the MRPP (a Maoist party). Fighters take off from Lisbon air bases and the Central Military Region, to concentrate at the Cortegaca Base near Oporto, at the disposal of the commandant of the Northern Military Region General Pires Veloso.

**November 24-25**

During the night, at Rio Maior, 80 km to the north of Lisbon, the association of agricultural land-owners (a right wing association) blocks roads, railways, the main road to the North, and threatens to cut off the capital's water and electricity supply.

**November 25**

During the night, units of the Paratroopers' Training Base at Tancos, to the north-east of Lisbon, receive by radio messages (of unknown origin) the order to occupy the air bases of the Lisbon and Central Military Regions. The military right wing (headed by the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Morais e Silva) and the Group of Nine, finally confirm the dismissal of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho as Commandant of the Lisbon Military Region. The President summons Otelo to the Presidential Palace. The Amadora Commandos leave their barracks and in radio messages announcing that their action is in the name of the President of the Republic take over a few military installations. The President, during the night proclaims the state of emergency and the occupation of military
installations proceeds during the morning of November 26.

**November 27**
The unions call for a general strike. Troops from the Northern Military Region, under General Pires Veloso's command, come to reinforce those in the Lisbon Military Region.

**November 26-28**
At Setubal, a large working class city to the south of Lisbon, a committee of struggle stirs up popular resistance and controls the town for three days.

**November 26**
All newspapers cease to be published except the Luta Popular the MRPP's mouthpiece (Maoist).

**November 27**
COPCON is disbanded.

**December 6**
Lieutenant-Colonel Ramalho Eanes, an officer unassigned since the Spinolist coup d'etat on 11 March, is appointed Army Chief of Staff, with the rank of General.

**APRIL 76**
The new Constitution is approved and the first free elections to elect Parliament are held on April 25, two years after the overthrow of the old regime. On June 27, General Ramalho Eanes wins the first free Presidential Elections.
APPENDIX 3

Descriptive measures

Appendix 3, related to chapter VIII presents detailed descriptions of the following measures:

1. Attitudes toward candidates and parties and attitudes toward voting for candidates and parties

1.1 Presidential Election of 1980

1.1.1 Attitudes toward the presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election
1.1.2 Attitudes toward voting for the presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election

1.2 Local Elections of 1982

1.2.1 Attitudes toward the parties in the 1982 Local elections
1.2.2 Attitudes toward voting for the parties in the 1982 Local election

1.3 General Election of 1983

1.3.1 Attitudes toward the parties in the 1983 General election
1.3.2 Attitudes toward voting for the parties in the 1983 General election
2. Attitudes toward electoral outcomes

2.1 Presidential Election of 1980
2.2 Local Elections of 1982
2.3 The General Election of 1983

1. Attitudes toward candidates and parties and attitudes toward voting for candidates and parties

1.1. Presidential Election of 1980

1.1.1 Attitudes toward the presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election

In the Presidential Election of 1980 the Presidential candidates were evaluated on six scales: good-bad; wise-foolish; harmful-beneficial; honest-dishonest; weak-strong and competent-incompetent. The five first scales were used by Fishbein et al, for the voting behaviour study in the British General Election (1974). The competent-incompetent scale was added since it was thought to complete the characteristics assumed to be essential for an evaluation of the candidates and parties in terms of their qualities to do the job well.

Very high correlations between the six semantic differential scales were obtained. The two factor analyses carried out on each set of six semantic differential scales used to measure respondents' feelings toward the two presidential candidates only extracted one factor in each case. In the case of the Socialist Party candidate,
Ramalho Eanes, 75% of total variance was explained by the first factor, with N=96. In the case of the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, 81% of total variance was explained by the first factor, with N = 96.

Table 1.1 shows the means of attitudes toward the two presidential candidates of respondents divided into groups according to their vote choice in the 1980 General election.

**Table 1.1**

Means of attitudes toward the two 1980 Presidential candidates expressed by respondents divided into groups according to their vote choice in the 1980 Presidential election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANDIDATES</th>
<th>VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soares Carneiro</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(supported by the AD)</td>
<td>St.D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramalho Eanes</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(supported by FRS and APU)</td>
<td>St.D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* the differences between the means of attitudes of the three groups of respondents toward Soares Carneiro are significant, p < .001.

** the difference between the means of attitudes of FRS and APU respondents is not significant. The mean attitudes of the AD respondents is significantly different from the attitude means of the other two groups, p < .001.
1.1.2 Attitude toward voting for the presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election.

In the Presidential Election of 1980, attitudes toward voting for the two main candidates were measured by three seven point semantic differential scales: good-bad; wise-foolish; and beneficial-harmful.

Very high correlations between the scales were obtained and the factor analyses carried out on each set of three semantic differential scales used to measure respondents' feelings towards voting for the two presidential candidates only extracted one factor in each case. In the case of the Socialist Party candidate, Ramalho Eanes, 93% of total variance was explained by the first factor with N=96. In the case of the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, 96% of total variance was explained by the first factor with N=96.

Table 1.2 shows the means of attitudes toward voting for the two presidential candidates of respondents divided into voting groups according to intention to vote.
Table 1.2

Means of attitudes toward voting for each of the two presidential candidates by respondents divided into groups according to their vote choice in the 1980 General Election (scale +3 to -3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANDIDATES</th>
<th>AD N=38</th>
<th>FRS N=27</th>
<th>APU N=30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soares Carneiro (AD Candidate)</td>
<td>Mean 0.82</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D 0.82</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+3 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td>3 (-3)</td>
<td>2 (-3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ramalho Eanes (PS Candidate) | Mean -0.53 | 1.3 | 1.2** |
|          | St.D 0.92 | 0.77 | 1.1 |
|          | +1 +3 | +3 |
| Range | 3 (-3) | 3 (0) | 4 (-1) |

* the differences between the means with respect to the FRS and APU groups of voters is significant at p < .001.

** the difference between the means with respect to the FRS and APU groups of voters is not significant.

1.2 Local Elections of 1982

1.2.1 Attitudes toward the parties in the 1982 Local elections.

In the 1982 Local Election questionnaires attitudes toward the three main parties (AD-right wing alliance; PS-socialist party, and the APU-communist alliance) were measured by three seven point semantic differential scales
i.e. harmful-beneficial; honest-dishonest; and competent-incompetent.

Table 1.3 shows the means of attitudes toward each party in the 1982 Local Elections expressed by voters divided according to voting intention.

Table 1.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD (N=45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>Mean 1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D 1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 3 (+3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialist party)</td>
<td>Mean -.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D .79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 4 (-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>Mean -1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D 1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 3 (-3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* the differences between the means of the three groups of voters are all significant beyond p < .001.

** the differences between the means of AD and APU respondents is not significant. The difference between the mean of PS respondents and the means of the AD and APU respondents is significant beyond p < .001.
1.2.2 Attitudes toward voting for the parties in the 1982 Local election.

Since the three semantic differential scales used in the Presidential Election questionnaires were found to be highly correlated between each other, the questionnaires used for the Local Elections of 1982 to measure attitudes toward voting for the parties only used one scale "positive-negative". The use of this scale rather than the "good-bad" scale is explained in Chapter 5. Method, section 5.

Table 1.4 shows the means of attitudes divided according to voting intentions toward voting for the three parties, AD (right-wing alliance), PS (Socialist party) and APU (Communist alliance) of respondents divided according to voting intention in the 1982 Local elections.
Table 1.4

Means of attitudes toward voting for each party in the 1982 Local election expressed by voters divided according to voting intention (scale +3 to -3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALLIANCES</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>APU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=48</td>
<td>N=45</td>
<td>N=76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>Mean 1.87</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td>-2.40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D 1.00</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 3 (0)</td>
<td>4 (-3)</td>
<td>6 (-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=44</td>
<td>N=45</td>
<td>N=74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>Mean -0.63</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>-0.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D 1.16</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 5 (-3)</td>
<td>4 (-1)</td>
<td>4 (-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=47</td>
<td>N=45</td>
<td>N=78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>Mean -2.06</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D 1.03</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 4 (-3)</td>
<td>6 (-3)</td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* the differences between the means of the three groups of respondents are significant beyond p < .001.

** the difference between the means of the AD and APU respondents is not significant. The difference between the mean of PS respondents and the means of the AD and APU respondents is significant beyond p < .001.
1.3 General Election of 1983

1.3.1 Attitudes toward the parties in the 1983 General election

In the General Election questionnaires, attitudes toward the four main parties (CDS - christian democrats; PSD - social democrats; PS - socialists and APU - communist alliance) were measured by three seven point semantic differential scales: harmful-beneficial, honest-dishonest and competent-incompetent.

Table 1.5 shows the means of attitudes toward each party in the 1983 General Election expressed by voters divided according to voting intention.
Table 1.5

Means of attitudes toward each party in the 1983 General Election expressed by voters divided according to voting intention (scale +3 to -3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS (Christian St.D.)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD (Social St.D.)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialists)St.D.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communists St.D.)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All differences between the means of the four groups of voters are significant beyond $p \ll .001$ with the exception of the differences between the means of CDS, PSD and APU respondents' attitudes toward the Socialist Party (PS).
1.3.2 Attitudes toward voting for the parties in the 1983 General election.

The questionnaires for the General Election of 1983 used one "positive-negative" seven point semantic differential scale to measure respondents' attitudes toward voting for each party.

Table 1.6 shows the means of attitudes toward voting for the four parties, CDS (christian-democrats), PSD (social-democrats), PS (socialists) and APU (communist alliance), of respondents divided according to voting intention in the 1983 General election.
Table 1.6

Means of attitudes toward voting for each party in the General Election of 1983 expressed by voters divided according to voting intention (scale +3 to -3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>CDS (christian democrats)</th>
<th>PSD (Social democrats)</th>
<th>PS (Socialists)</th>
<th>APU (Communist MDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=17</td>
<td>N=44</td>
<td>N=32</td>
<td>N=60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
<td>-2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST.D.</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+3</td>
<td></td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>2(+1)</td>
<td>4(-1)</td>
<td>3(-3)</td>
<td>2(-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>-2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST.D.</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>3(-1)</td>
<td>3(0)</td>
<td>5(-3)</td>
<td>2(-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST.D.</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td></td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>4(-3)</td>
<td>5(-3)</td>
<td>3(0)</td>
<td>4(-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-2.94</td>
<td>-2.15</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST.D.</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>1(-3)</td>
<td>6(-3)</td>
<td>4(-3)</td>
<td>3(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences between the means attitudes of all the four groups of voters towards voting for the four parties are significant beyond \( p < .001 \) with the exception of the following mean differences:

- Attitudes means of CDS and PSD voters towards voting for the PS \( p < .01 \)
- Attitudes means of PSD and APU voters towards voting for the PS \( p < .01 \)
- Attitudes means of CDS and PSD voters towards voting for the APU \( p < .05 \)
2. **Attitudes toward electoral outcomes**

2.1 **Presidential Election of 1980**

In the 1980 Presidential Election attitudes to each possible electoral outcome were measured by three seven point semantic differential scales: good-bad; wise-foolish and beneficial-harmful.

Very high correlations between the three semantic differential scales were obtained. The factor analyses carried out on each set of three semantic differential scales used to measure respondents' feelings towards the victory of each of the two presidential candidates only extracted one factor in each case. In the case of the Socialist party candidate, Ramalho Eanes, 92% of total variance was explained by the first factor, with N= 96. In the case of the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, 97% of total variance was explained by the first factor, with N= 95.

Table 2.1 shows the means of attitudes towards each of the two possible electoral outcomes of respondents divided according to their vote choice in the 1980 Presidential Election.
Table 2.1

Means of attitudes toward the victory of the two 1980 presidential candidates expressed by respondents divided according to their vote choice in the 1980 General election (scale +3 to -3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANDIDATES</th>
<th>VOTERS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>FRS</td>
<td>APU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=38</td>
<td>N=26</td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soares Carneiro</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-2.7*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AD candidate)</td>
<td>St.D.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>3(-3)</td>
<td>2(-3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramalho Eanes</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.9**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PS candidate)</td>
<td>St.D.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>3(0)</td>
<td>4(-1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* with respect to the AD candidate the differences between the attitude means of the three groups of voters are significant beyond p < .01

** with respect to the PS candidate the difference between the mean of AD respondents and each of the means of the other two groups of respondents is significant beyond p < .001. The difference between the means of FRS and APU respondents is not significant.
2.2. Local Elections of 1982

In the 1982 Local Elections questionnaire, attitudes toward the three possible electoral victories were measured by one "good-bad", seven point semantic differential scale.

Table 2.2 shows the means of attitudes towards each of the three possible outcomes of respondents divided according to their voting intention.
Table 2.2

Means of attitudes toward the victory of the three parties in the 1982 Local Elections expressed by voters divided according to voting intention (scale +3 to -3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD N=49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD (right wing alliance)</td>
<td>Mean 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 6 (-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialist party)</td>
<td>Mean -.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D 1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 5 (-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communist party)</td>
<td>Mean -2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St.D .7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range 3 (-3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* the differences between the means of the three groups of voters are all significant beyond p < .001

** the differences between the means of the AD and APU respondents is not significant. The difference between the mean of PS respondents and the means of the AD and APU respondents is significant beyond p < .001.
2.3 The General Election of 1983

In the 1983 General Election questionnaire, attitudes toward the four possible electoral victories were measured by one "positive-negative", seven point semantic differential scale.

Table 2.3 shows the means of attitudes towards each of the four possible electoral outcomes, of respondents divided according to their voting intention.
Table 2.3

Means of attitudes toward the victory of the four parties in the 1983 General Election expressed by voters divided according to voting intention (scale +3 to -3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES</th>
<th>VOTERS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>APU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=17, N=44, N=32, N=61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS (christian democrats)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (+3)</td>
<td>4 (+3)</td>
<td>3 (-3)</td>
<td>2 (-3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD (social democrats)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (+2)</td>
<td>3 (+3)</td>
<td>4 (-3)</td>
<td>2 (-3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (socialists)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (-3)</td>
<td>5 (-3)</td>
<td>3 (+3)</td>
<td>4 (-3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU (communist alliance)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (-1)</td>
<td>6 (-3)</td>
<td>3 (-3)</td>
<td>4 (+3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CDS and PSD voters on CDS - p < .001
" " " " PSD - p < .001
" " " " PS - p < .01
" " " " APU - p < .05
PS and PSD voters on APU - p < .05
APU and CDS voters on PS - p < .05
APU and PS voters on CDS - p < .05
APU and PS voters on PSD - p < .05
APU and PSD voters on CDS - n.s.
Appendix 4

This Appendix is related to Chapter IX
and it contains the following tables:

Table 9.1 - Percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations of the ten electoral issues as a function of party identification in the 1980 Presidential election

Table 9.2 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs on candidates' stands on the ten electoral issues as a function of party identification in the 1980 Presidential election

Table 9.3 - Mean strength of the evaluations of the ten issues as a function of party identification in the 1980 Presidential election

Table 9.4 - Mean belief strength of the stands of the two presidential candidates on the ten issues as a function of party identification in the 1980 Presidential election

Table 9.5 - Mean contribution to overall attitude towards voting for the candidates resulting from the mean products of respondents' evaluations of issues and beliefs on the candidates' stands on the issues in the 1980 Presidential election
Table 9.6 - Percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations of the ten electoral issues as a function of voting intention in the 1982 Local elections

Table 9.7 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs on the parties' stands on the ten electoral issues as a function of voting intention in the 1982 Local elections

Table 9.8 - Mean strength of evaluations of the ten issues as a function of voting intention in the 1982 Local elections

Table 9.9 - Mean belief strength of the stands of the three parties on each of the ten issues as a function of voting intention in the 1982 Local elections

Table 9.10 - Mean contribution to overall attitude towards voting for the AD, PS and APU resulting from the mean products of respondents' evaluations of issues and beliefs on the parties' stands on the issues in the 1982 Local elections

Table 9.11 - Percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations of the eight electoral issues as a function of voting intention in the 1983 General election
Table 9.12 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs on the parties' stands on the eight electoral issues as a function of voting intention in the 1983 General election

Table 9.13 - Mean strength of the evaluations of the eight issues as a function of voting intention in the 1983 General election

Table 9.14 - Mean strength of the beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the stands of the four parties on each of the eight issues in the 1983 General election

Table 9.15 - Mean contribution to overall attitude towards voting for the CDS, PSD, PS and APU resulting from the mean products of respondents' evaluations of issues and beliefs on the parties' stands on the issues in the 1983 General election

Table 9.16 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, FRS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and Church as to how they should vote for each candidate in the 1980 Presidential election

Table 9.17 - Mean strength of beliefs of AD, FRS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and the Church on voting for each candidate in the 1980 Presidential election

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Table 9.18 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and Church as to how they should vote for each party in the 1982 Local elections

Table 9.19 - Mean strength of beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and the Church on voting for each party in the 1982 Local elections

Table 9.20 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and Church as to how they should vote for each party in the 1983 General election

Table 9.21 - Men strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and the Church on voting for each party in the 1983 General election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>% AD VOTERS</th>
<th>% FRS VOTERS</th>
<th>% APU VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BE IMPARTIAL</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RESPECT THE CONSTITUTION</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. VETO GOVT. PROPOSALS</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RISK POLITICAL INSTABILITY</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. GIVE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. SUPPORT DICTATORIAL GOVT.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. SUPPORT POLITICAL STABILITY</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SUPPORT POLITICAL INSTABILITY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SUPPORT REVOLUTION</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SUPPORT MILITARY COUP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AVERAGE: 12.9 12.2 11.8
### Table 9.2 - Percent Positive, Midscale and Negative Beliefs on Candidates' Stands on the Ten Electoral Issues as a Function of Party Identification in the 1980 Presidential Election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Soares Carneiro (AD Candidate)</th>
<th>Ramalho Eanes (PS Candidate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%AD Voters %FRS Vot. %APU Vot.</td>
<td>%AD Voters %FRS Vot. %APU Vot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Be impartial</td>
<td>32 15 53 3 4 93 0 3 97</td>
<td>33 17 50 82 11 7 75 16 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Respect the constitution</td>
<td>37 48 15 4 14 82 0 3 97</td>
<td>45 35 0 100 0 0 88 12 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Veto govt. proposals</td>
<td>35 42 23 7 11 82 9 13 78</td>
<td>75 22 3 93 0 7 75 22 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Risk political instability</td>
<td>13 45 42 0 7 93 10 6 84</td>
<td>47 20 13 79 14 7 66 34 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Give unconditional support to govt.</td>
<td>75 20 5 100 0 0 100 0 0</td>
<td>0 20 00 4 11 65 6 22 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Support dictatorial govt.</td>
<td>13 17 70 71 22 7 100 0 0</td>
<td>5 8 87 0 4 9 6 3 9 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Support political stability</td>
<td>90 10 0 36 43 21 37 25 38</td>
<td>27 55 18 82 7 11 75 22 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Support political instability</td>
<td>0 15 85 14 36 50 31 28 41</td>
<td>18 45 37 7 14 79 21 4 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Support revolution</td>
<td>0 37 53 7 16 73 0 16 84</td>
<td>33 47 20 14 47 39 19 52 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Support military coup</td>
<td>0 45 47 39 43 18 53 28 19</td>
<td>18 40 42 14 15 71 3 44 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>29.4 19.8 12.2</td>
<td>30.9 12.3 23.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 9.3- MEAN STRENGTH OF THE EVALUATIONS OF THE TEN ISSUES AS A FUNCTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES A PRESIDENT SHOULD</th>
<th>AVERAGE ATTRIBUTE EVALUATIONS (RANGE +3, -3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD VOTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. BE IMPARTIAL</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU,FRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RESPECT THE CONSTITUTION</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. VETO GOVT. PROPOSALS</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RISK POLITICAL INSTABILITY</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. GIVE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT TO GOVT.</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. SUPPORT DICTATORIAL GOVT.</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. SUPPORT POLITICAL STABILITY</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU,FRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SUPPORT POLITICAL INSTABILITY</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU,FRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SUPPORT REVOLUTION</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SUPPORT MILITARY COUP</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS APU,FRS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEANS OF THE THREE GROUPS OF RESPONDENTS ON EACH ISSUE ARE SIGNIFICANT BEYOND P<.001 UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED IN EACH CELL.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES A PRESIDENT SHOULD...</th>
<th>AD VOTERS</th>
<th>FRV VOTERS</th>
<th>APV VOTERS</th>
<th>AD VOTERS</th>
<th>FRV VOTERS</th>
<th>APV VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BE IMPARTIAL</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RESPECT THE CONSTITUTION</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. VETO GOVT. PROPOSALS</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RISK POLITICAL INSTABILITY</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. GIVE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO GOVT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. SUPPORT DICTATORIAL GOVT.</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. SUPPORT POLITICAL STABILITY</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SUPPORT POLITICAL INSTABILITY</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SUPPORT REVOLUTION</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SUPPORT MILITARY COUP</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEAN BELIEF STRENGTHS OF THE THREE GROUPS OF RESPONDENTS WITH RESPECT TO EACH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ARE SIGNIFICANT BEYOND P<.001 UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED IN EACH CELL.
**TABLE 9.5 - MEAN CONTRIBUTION TO OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARDS VOTING FOR THE CANDIDATES RESULTING FROM THE MEAN PRODUCTS OF RESPONDENTS' EVALUATIONS OF ISSUES AND BELIEFS ON THE CANDIDATES' STANDS ON THE ISSUES IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>SC - AD CANDIDATE</th>
<th>RE - PS CANDIDATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD VOTERS</td>
<td>FR8 VOTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. BE IMPARTIAL</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. RESPECT THE CONSTITUTION</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. VETO GOVT. PROPOSALS</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RISK POLITICAL INSTABILITY</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. GIVE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT TO GOVT.</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. SUPPORT DICTATORIAL GOVT.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. SUPPORT POLITICAL STABILITY</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SUPPORT POLITICAL INSTABILITY</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SUPPORT REVOLUTION</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SUPPORT MILITARY COUP</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All differences between the mean contributions to attitude towards voting for each presidential candidate are significant beyond P<.001 unless otherwise stated in each cell.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>%AD VOTERS</th>
<th>%PS VOTERS</th>
<th>%APU VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL AUTHORITIES NEED TO...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. PROVIDE WATER, ELECTRICITY TO ALL</td>
<td>96 4 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BUILD HOUSES FOR ALL</td>
<td>94 6 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. BUILD SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND SPORT CENTERS</td>
<td>85 15 0</td>
<td>91 9 0</td>
<td>98 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. BUILD PLAYGROUNDS AND CRECHES</td>
<td>94 6 0</td>
<td>96 4 0</td>
<td>99 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. BUILD SCHOOLS</td>
<td>89 11 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. BE REPRESENTED BY HONEST COUNCILLORS</td>
<td>92 6 2</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. BE ACCOUNTABLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS</td>
<td>87 11 2</td>
<td>98 2 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PROVIDE SOLUTIONS FOR TRANSPORT PROBLEMS</td>
<td>87 11 2</td>
<td>96 4 0</td>
<td>96 4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SOLVE PROBLEMS RELATED TO POLLUTION</td>
<td>85 13 2</td>
<td>93 7 0</td>
<td>93 7 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE POPULATION</td>
<td>85 13 2</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
<td>100 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>AD VOTERS</td>
<td>PS VOTERS</td>
<td>APU VOTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>APU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL AUTHORITIES NEED TO...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVIDE WATER, ELECTRICITY TO ALL</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILD HOUSES FOR ALL</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILD SOCIAL, CULTURAL CENTERS</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILD PLAYGROUNDS AND CRECHES</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILD SCHOOLS</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE REPRESENTED BY HONEST COUNCILLORS</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE ACCOUNTABLE IN ADMIN. OF PUB. FUNDS</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVIDE SOLUTIONS FOR TRANSPORT</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLVE PROBLEMS OF POLLUTION</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH POPULATION</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 9.7 - PERCENT POSITIVE, MIDSCALE AND NEGATIVE BELIEFS ON THE PARTIES' STANDS ON THE TEN ELECTORAL ISSUES AS A FUNCTION OF VOTING INTENTION IN THE 1982 LOCAL ELECTIONS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>IAD Voters</th>
<th>PS Voters</th>
<th>APU Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide water/electricity to all</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Build houses for all</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Build social, cultural and sport centers</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>NS APN</td>
<td>NS AD, PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Build playgrounds and creches</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Build schools</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>NS AD, APU</td>
<td>NS AD, PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Be represented by honest councillors</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Be accountable in the administration of public funds</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Provide solutions for transport problems</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Solve problems related to pollution</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>NS APN</td>
<td>NS AD, PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Maintain close contacts with the population</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All differences between the three groups of respondents are significant beyond p < .05 unless otherwise stated in each cell.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Authorities Need To...</th>
<th>AD Voters PS Voters APU Voters</th>
<th>AD Voters PS Voters APU Voters</th>
<th>AD Voters PS Voters APU Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide Water/Electricity</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Build Houses for All</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Build Social-Cultural and Sport Centers</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Build Playgrounds and Indoor Schools</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Represent Voters</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Be Represented by Honest</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Councilors in Administration</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Provide Solutions for Transg. of Public Products</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Solve Problems Related to Agriculture</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Maintain Close Contacts with the Population</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average Belief Strength (Range: -3.0 to 3.0)**

- All differences between the three groups of respondents within the same row are significant.
- All differences between AD, PS, and APU voters are significant.
- All differences between the three groups of respondents are significant.

*Note: The table values represent the average belief strength on the stands of the three parties on each of the ten issues as a function of voting intention.*
### Table 9.10 - Mean Contribution to Overall Attitude Towards Voting for the AD, PS and APU Resulting from the Mean Products of Respondents' Evaluations of Issues and Beliefs on the Parties' Stands on the Issues in the 1982 Local Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>AD Voters</th>
<th>PS Voters</th>
<th>APU Voters</th>
<th>AD Voters</th>
<th>PS Voters</th>
<th>APU Voters</th>
<th>AD Voters</th>
<th>PS Voters</th>
<th>APU Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide water, electricity to all</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Build houses for all</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Build social, cultural and sport centers</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Build playgrounds, and creches</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Build schools</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Be represented by honest councillors</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Be accountable in the administration of public funds</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Provide solutions for transport problems</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Solve problems related to pollution</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Maintain close contacts with the population</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All differences between the three groups of respondents are significant beyond p<.001 unless otherwise stated in each cell.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>% CDS VOTERS</th>
<th>% PSD VOTERS</th>
<th>% PS VOTERS</th>
<th>% APU VOTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO SOLVE THE CRISIS AND PROMOTE SOCIAL WELFARE AND JUSTICE ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. SOCIAL CONTRACT SHOULD BE CELEBRATED</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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| 2. PATRIOTISM AND ORDER SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED | 2.2 | 1.9 | .7 | -.9 |
| 3. HEALTH, EDUCATION AND HOUSING SHOULD BE PROMOTED | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.6 |
| 4. THE PUBLIC SECTOR SHOULD BE REDUCED | 1.8 | 1.7 | .6 | -2.0 |
| 5. GOVERNMENT SHOULD RULE WITH PURPOSE, AUTHORITY, MORALITY | 2.6 | 2.3 | 1.1 | .4 |
| 6. COUNTRY'S NATURAL RESOURCES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED | 2.4 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 2.4 |
| 7. CHANGES IN LABOUR LAWS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED | 2.2 | 1.9 | .8 | -1.7 |
| 8. THE PURCHASING POWER OF THE PEOPLE SHOULD BE INCREASED | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 2.0 |

ALL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GROUP MEANS SHOWN FOR EACH ISSUE ARE SIGNIFICANT BEYOND P<.001, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED IN EACH CELL.

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All differences between the group means shown for each issue are significant at least beyond p<.05, unless otherwise stated in each cell.
TABLE 9.16 - PERCENT POSITIVE, MIDSCALE AND NEGATIVE BELIEFS OF AD, FRS AND APU ON THE OPINIONS OF FAMILY, FRIENDS AND THE CHURCH AS TO HOW THEY SHOULD VOTE FOR EACH CANDIDATE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1980 (N=100)

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<td>(PS CANDIDATE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(FRIENDS)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(CHURCH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(AD CANDIDATE)</td>
<td>3  72 25</td>
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<td>RAMALHO EAMES</td>
<td>(PS CANDIDATE)</td>
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**Table 9.18 - Percent Positive, Mid-Scale and Negative Beliefs of AD, PS and APU on the Opinions of Family, Friends and The Church as to How They Should Vote for Each Party in the 1982 Local Elections (N=172)**
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</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 9.20 - PERCENT POSITIVE, MIDSCALE AND NEGATIVE BELIEFS OF CDS, PSD, PS AND APU ON THE OPINIONS OF FAMILY, FRIENDS AND THE CHURCH AS TO HOW THEY SHOULD VOTE FOR EACH PARTY IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTION (N=150)
Table 9.21 - Mean strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and the church on voting for each party in the 1983 general election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>CDS</th>
<th>PSD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>APU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Family)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>-1.05</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
<td>-2.66*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>-2.90</td>
<td>-2.34*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td>-1.51</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>-1.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU</td>
<td>-2.81</td>
<td>-2.51</td>
<td>-2.65</td>
<td>1.61*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Friends)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
<td>-2.23</td>
<td>-2.72*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-2.93</td>
<td>-2.52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>-2.25</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>-1.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU</td>
<td>-2.44</td>
<td>-2.23</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>1.98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Church)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>1.71*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.98**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>-1.31</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>-.83</td>
<td>-.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at p<.001
** significant at p<.05
Appendix 5

Text of the questionnaires

This appendix contains detailed information about the texts of the three questionnaires used in each of the three elections. The questionnaires were very similar and contained the same questions. A master questionnaire is used; differences introduced in each questionnaire are indicated whenever appropriate.
QUESTIONNAIRES

Introductory Note

This questionnaire has been prepared by Maria Manuela Portugal Lopes d'Oliveira who is researching into the voting behaviour of the electorate and the factors which may influence voters in their electoral decisions.

The researcher has a degree in Psychology and works in the British Open University. This research is part of her current work towards a PhD.

This questionnaire is NOT used for public opinion survey purposes. Respondents are not required to identify themselves and their answers are strictly confidential. In fact, as you may verify answers are all given by means of crosses inserted in the small squares presented throughout. In this way your handwriting cannot be identified.

The researcher takes the opportunity to thank you for your help and cooperation in completing the questionnaire.

(Party membership)

"Section 1 - In this section I would like to know whether you are a member of a political party.

Yes   No

If you answered "Yes" which of the following parties are you a member of?"
### Past voting behaviour - 1980 Presidential Election

"Section 2 - In this section I would like to know for whom you voted in previous elections. In order to simplify, insofar as the elections held prior to December 1979 are concerned, the questions ask whether you voted in any of the parties who are now members of the three main alliances: AD, FRS, APU

#### 1975 - Elections for the Constituent Assembly

Have you voted for any of the parties of the:

- AD
- FRS
- APU
- ANOTHER

Didn't vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1980 election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSD/PPD</th>
<th>CDS</th>
<th>PPM</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>UEDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ASDI MDP/CDE PCP OTHER

### 1982 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PPM</th>
<th>CDS</th>
<th>PSD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>PCP</th>
<th>UDP</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1983 election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDS</th>
<th>PSD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>PCP</th>
<th>UDP</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

385
1976 - General election
Have you voted for any of the parties of the:
AD   FRS   APU   ANOTHER   Didn't vote
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

1979 - General election
Have you voted for any of the parties of the:
AD   FRS   APU   ANOTHER   Didn't vote
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

1980 - General election
Have you voted for any of the parties of the:
AD   FRS   APU   ANOTHER   Didn't vote
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No

1976 - Presidential election
For whom did you vote in 1976?
Ramalho Eanes   ANOTHER   Didn't vote
Yes No Yes No

386
(Past voting behaviour - 1982 Local elections)

"Section 2 - a) - For whom did you vote in the previous Local elections?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AD parties</th>
<th>FRS parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) For whom did you vote in the previous General elections?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AD parties</th>
<th>FRS parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c) For whom did you vote in the Presidential elections?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate 1</th>
<th>Candidate 2</th>
<th>Did't vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Ramalho Eanes</td>
<td>Another</td>
<td>Did't vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Soares Carneiro</td>
<td>Another</td>
<td>Did't vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Past voting behaviour - 1983 General election

"Section 2 - For whom did you vote in the previous General election of 1980?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>APU</th>
<th>ANOTHER</th>
<th>Did't vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Intention to vote in the forthcoming election

"Section 3 - In this section I would like to know whether you intend voting in the forthcoming (Presidential; Local; General) election.

In order to answer, please read the statements and cross the square under the alternative which corresponds to what you intend to do.

"I INTEND VOTING IN THE (Presidential; Local; General) ELECTION".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
If you answered 'don't know' please move to next section. If you answered either 'yes' or 'no' please indicate by ticking one of the following squares the probabilities of the statement being true or untrue."

(Likely/unlikely scale)

High  Fifty/fifty  Low

Intention to vote for candidate/party
(Intention to vote for a particular Presidential candidate - 1980 Presidential election or party - 1982 Local elections and 1983 General election).

"Section 4 - In this section I would like to know if you intend voting for any particular candidate (party).

In order to answer, please read the statements and cross the square under the alternative which corresponds to what you intend to do."

1980 Presidential election

Statements "I intend to vote for......" (Aires Rodrigues, Ramalho Eanes, Carlos Brito, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, Galvão de Melo, Soares Carneiro and Pires Veloso) each followed by a likely-unlikely scale
1982 Local election
Statements "I intend to vote for......."
(AD, PS, APU)
each followed by a likely-unlikely scale

1983 General election
Statements "I intend to vote for......."
(CDS, PSD, PS, APU, ANOTHER)
each followed by a likely-unlikely scale

(Attitude towards electoral outcome)

1980 Presidential election
"Section 5 - In this section I would like you to give me an idea of what you feel about the most probable results of the election either in the first or second ballot. According to the forecasts the two candidates more likely to win the election are Ramalho Eanes and Soares Carneiro. Therefore this section only mentions them."

1982 Local election and 1983 General election
"Section 5 - In this section I would like you to give me an idea of what you feel about the most probable results of the election."
Text which follows was common to the three questionnaires:

"In order to answer please read the following statements. Under each statement you find three scales. Please cross the square in each of the scales which corresponds to what you feel about the possible victory of each (presidential candidate; party).

"A victory for..... would be......"
1983 General elections

Separate statements for CDS, PSD, PS and APU followed by the three semantic differential scales

(Evaluation of electoral issues - 1980 Presidential election)

"Section 6 - In this section I would like to know what you feel about some questions related to the way a President should act and to the type of relations which should exist between the President and the Government. In order to answer, please read the following statements and cross the square underneath each alternative in each scale which corresponds with what you feel."

"An impartial President is......"

Semantic differential scales

extremely good to extremely bad
" wise to " unwise
" beneficial to " harmful

(In the questionnaire proper each of the following statements was followed by the same three seven point scales:

"A President who respects the Constitution is"......

"A President who vetoes Government proposals which are unconstitutional is"......
"A President who risks political instability rather then give in to a Government who acts against the Constitution is"......

"A President who always supports the Government is"......

"A President who supports a dictatorial form of Government is"......

"A President who supports political stability is"......

"A President who supports political instability is"......

"A President who supports Revolution is"......

"A President who supports a military coup is"......

(Evaluation of electoral issues – 1982 Local elections and 1983 General election)

"Section 6 – In this section I would like to know what you feel about each of the following statements. In order to answer please read them and cross the square underneath each alternative in each scale which corresponds to what you feel".

1982 Local elections

Statements: "In the municipality where I live......

... housing should all be provided with piped water, electricity and sewage

... priority should be given to solving housing shortages

... more sport and socio-cultural facilities should be provided
... more playgrounds and creches should be built
... more schools should be built
... the important thing is to elect honest and hard working councillors who are interested in improving living conditions
... local authorities should be accountable as to the manner public funds are administered
... transport problems should be solved
... priority should be given to pollution control
... councillors should maintain very frequent contacts with local populations so that the most pressing problems are identified and solved".

1983 General election

Statements: "To solve the crisis and promote social welfare and justice......
... the social contract between the government, employers and unions should be celebrated
... patriotism and order should be strengthened
... social welfare policies on the right of all to health, education and housing should be promoted
... the public sector should be reduced
... the government should rule with purpose, authority and morality
... a new government should embark on a program of development of the country's natural resources in order to diversify production and create new jobs.

... changes in labour laws including the strike law should be introduced.

... a new government should increase the purchasing power of the people.

In the 1982 and 1983 elections each statement was followed by one semantic differential scale only:

Semantic differential scale: extremely good to extremely bad

(Beliefs about the candidates' or parties' stands on the issues listed in section 6)

"Section 7 - In this section I would like to know what you feel about the stands which the candidates (parties) would be likely to adopt if elected on the issues raised in the previous section. In order to answer please read the following statements and cross the square underneath the alternatives which correspond closer to what you feel".

395
"If elected (1) will (2) ........ ........

(1) name of presidential candidate in the 1980 Presidential election questionnaire and of party in the 1982 and 1983 elections

(2) statement of the issues listed in Section 6

Separate statements were included for each presidential candidate and each party showing each issue. Every statement was followed by a likely-unlikely scale.

(Attitude towards the candidates or parties)

"Section 8 - In this section I would like to know your opinion about (the two candidates most likely to win the election; the three main parties; the four main parties). In order to answer please cross the appropriate square of each scale".

1980 Presidential election

Ramilho Eanes

Semantic differential scale

Extremely good
" wise to " unwise
" beneficial to " harmful
" honest to " dishonest
" weak to " strong
" competent to " incompetent
Soares Carneiro

Semantic differential Extremely good to extremely bad
scales " wise to " unwise
" beneficial to " harmful
" honest to " dishonest
" weak to " strong
" competent to " incompetent

1982 Local elections

A D

Semantic differential Extremely beneficial to extremely harmful
scales " honest to " dishonest
" competent to " incompetent

P S

Semantic differential Extremely beneficial to extremely harmful
scales " honest to " dishonest
" competent to " incompetent

A P U

Semantic differential Extremely Beneficial to extremely harmful
scales " honest to " dishonest
" competent to " incompetent

1983 General election

1982 Local elections format used for the four main parties: CDS, PSD, PS and APU

(Attitude towards voting in the elections)

"Section 9 - In this section I would like to know how you feel about voting in the forthcoming (Presidential; Local; General) elections.
Please read the statement and cross the square underneath the alternative in each scale which corresponds closer to how you feel.

1980 Presidential election

Statement: "to vote in the Presidential election will be"...

Semantic differential
Extremely good to extremely bad
" wise to " unwise
" beneficial to " harmful

1982 and 1983 elections

"to vote in the (Local; General) election will be"...

extremely positive to extremely negative

(Attitude towards voting for the candidates or parties)

"Section 10 - In this section I would like to know how you feel about voting for (the two candidates most likely to win the election; the three main parties; the four main parties). In order to answer please read each statement and cross the square underneath each alternative in each scale which corresponds closer to how you feel."
"to vote for (1) will be"...

Extremely good to extremely bad
" wise to " unwise
" beneficial to " harmful

(1) name of presidential candidate in the 1980 Presidential election questionnaire and of party in the 1982 and 1983 elections.

Separate statements were included for the two presidential candidates and for each party according to election.

(Beliefs about the opinions of trusted others on voting in the election)

"Section 11 - In this section I would like to know whether you think other people you know want you to vote in the... (Presidential; Local; General) election. Please read the following statements and cross the appropriate squares underneath each alternative

"My family thinks I should vote in the...(Presidential; Local; General) election"

Each statement included a category of trusted other: family; friends; Church; and was followed by a likely-unlikely scale.
(Beliefs about the opinions of trusted others on voting for each presidential candidate or each party)

"Section 12 - This section is very similar to the one you just completed. Now, I would like to know what you think about whom your family, friends and Church would wish you to vote for. In order to answer please read the following statements and cross the appropriate squares underneath each alternative".

"My family thinks I should vote for (1) "

(1) name of candidate or party

Each statement included a category of trusted other: family; friends; church; with the name of each candidate or party, depending on the election questionnaire.

Each statement was followed by a likely-unlikely scale.

(Attitude towards the four possible post-electoral coalitions in the 1983 General election questionnaire)

"Section 13 - In this section I would like to know how you feel towards the four possible post-electoral coalitions. In order to answer
please read the following statements and cross the appropriate squares underneath each alternative.

"A post-electoral coalition between the PS and the APU would be"......

Extremely good to extremely bad

"A post-electoral coalition between the PS and the PSD would be"......

Extremely good to extremely bad

"A post-electoral coalition between the PS, the PSD and the CDS would be"......

Extremely good to extremely bad

"A post-electoral coalition between the PSD and CDS would be"......

Extremely good to extremely bad

Personal data

"Section 13 - In this final section it would be helpful if you could let me have a few personal details by crossing the appropriate squares in each sub-section."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>18-21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35-44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55-64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above 65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Level of education: Primary school

- YES
- NO

- Secondary school (up to 2nd year)
- Secondary school (up to 5th year)
- Secondary school (up to 7th year)
- Technical school
- University

Thank you

(End of questionnaire)
REFERENCES


Faye, J. P. *Portugal, the revolution in the labyrinth*. Ed. from the papers of the Russell committee for Portugal. Spokesman Books, 1976.


Miller, G.A. The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits of our capacity for processing information. *Psych. Rev.*, 1956, 63, 81-97.


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9.12.12 - PSD respondents on PSD and PS stands
9.12.13 - PS respondents on PSD and PS stands

Diagrams 9.16.1 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, FRS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and Church on voting for the AD candidate Soares Carneiro, in the 1980 Presidential election

9.16.1 - Family
9.16.2 - Friends
9.16.3 - Church
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9.16.4 - Family
9.16.5 - Friends
9.16.6 - Church

Diagrams 9.18.1 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and the Church on voting for the AD in the 1982 Local elections

9.18.1 - Family
9.18.2 - Friends
9.18.3 - Church

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9.18.6 - Church 278

Diagrams 9.18.7 - Percent positive, midscale and 280
9.18.8 and 9.18.9 negative beliefs of AD, PS and
APU respondents on the opinions of family, friends and the
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9.18.7 - Family 279
9.18.8 - Friends 279
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9.20.1 - Family 282
9.20.2 - Friends 282
9.20.3 - Church 283
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9.20.4 - Family 284
9.20.5 - Friends 285
9.20.6 - Church 285

Diagrams 9.20.7 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and the Church on voting for the PS in the 1983 General election

9.20.7 - Family 287
9.20.8 - Friends 287
9.20.9 - Church 288

Diagrams 9.20.10 - Percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of CDS, PSD, and APU respondents on the opinion of family, friends and the Church on voting for the APU in the 1983 General election

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9.20.10 - Family
9.20.11 - Friends
9.20.12 - Church

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