Resisting Financialization with Deleuze and Guattari

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Introduction

Deleuze and Guattari and Financialization

The French President François Hollande declared during the presidential campaign in 2012 that his main enemy was ‘finance’ (own translation) (Hollande, 2012a: 5). He therefore proposed to operate a series of measures to regulate finance, e.g., through means of a Tobin tax and to separate investment banks and retail banks (Hollande, 2012b). Hollande was not however able to implement such regulatory measures in particular because of the lobbying of French banks and the refusal of Chancellor Angela Merkel to implement Eurobonds (The Economist 2012a). The immediate context of the discussion was the extreme volatility of European sovereign debt markets, itself the result of widespread political, economic and social tensions and uncertainties (Haugh et al. 2009). In December 2017 – as I write this book – that is to say almost 10 years after the 2007-8 financial crisis Hollande’s attempt was the only one in any major country.

All this demonstrated a clear articulation between finance and politics. On the one hand, finance is a central problem for politics because financialization of the economy means any economic policy is directly faced with the fact that international flows of capital can cross borders (Bonefeld and Holloway 1995a). Dealing with finance is one of the major challenges of contemporary politics, even though politics seems powerless in front of finance, as Hollande’s failure to regulate it made perfectly clear. Flows of finance operate at the global level, whereas politics attempts to confront it at the national level (Holloway 1994). Financialization of capital therefore seems to reinforce the feeling that there is no alternative and that the world of capital is the only world possible despite the financial crisis of 2007-2008. It would be ‘easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism’ (Jameson, 2007: 199) which would lead to a ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher 2009).

The situation is not new. As a young person living a global city like Paris I was able to notice the financialization of my subjectivity. When I was ten years of age working class people could afford to rent a decent flat in my neighbourhood and middle class people could afford to own their flat. I remember that in the mid-1990s my math teacher could afford to buy a flat which would now cost around 1 million euros, i.e. almost 70 years of the French minimum wage (Smic 2014). I was able to feel the violence of
finance capital on my subjectivity. The financialization of housing has implied for me the end of my ‘right to the city’ (Harvey 2012), meaning the opportunity to live where I was born. I am no longer able to afford to live in my neighbourhood because financial capital was massively invested in the Paris real estate market in the last 15 years, for instance from Qatar (Barret 2014). This brought about a trebling of Paris real estate prices in the 2000s (De Beauzy 2013). The same story holds for anyone who does not come from wealthy family and who was born in the 1980s in London, São Paulo or Moscow.

It became increasingly clear to me – because of real estate speculation in Paris – that resisting the power of capital on my life entailed resisting financialization and the power of flows of capital to cross borders and escape State regulation. It seemed to me that a ‘resonance’ (Thoburn, 2003: 1) between a revolutionary understanding of Deleuze and Guattari and the Marxian literature on financialization would help elaborate a politics of resistance to financialization. My understanding was that Marxism provided the best political economy of capitalism and that Deleuze and Guattari provided the most effective political philosophy. Conversely, on the one hand, it seemed to me that a Marxist politics on its own was unable to elaborate a politics of resistance to financialization because of the crisis of Leninism and of social democracy, which failed to understand the struggles of the 1960s (Cleaver, 2000: 74). On the other hand, it seemed to me that a Deleuze-Guattarian politics, despite its remarkable understanding of the transformations of social subjectivity, required the framework of the Marxist political economy in order to fully understand the current centrality of finance for capital.

**Objectives**

My objective is to provide a critical reflection on financialization, which could assess how financialization operates and how it might be possible to resist it. I connect Deleuze and Guattari and Marx in order to provide a critique of financialization. My intention is to establish a ‘resonance’ between a revolutionary interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari and the Marxian literature on financialization (Thoburn, 2003: 1). Against critics of Poststructuralist philosophy and of Deleuze (Sokal and Bricmont 2004), I argue that the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari can bring about a relevant
conceptualisation of the complexity of the contemporary world through its processualist and materialist thought (Negri 2011).

The work of Deleuze and Guattari provides a very relevant political reflection with relation to capital in the current situation because of its acknowledgement of the struggles that developed in the 1960s and 1970s (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, 1987). For example, Deleuze was involved in the struggles of French prisoners through the Prison Information Group in the aftermath of May 68 (Dosse, 2010: 309-313). Guattari was directly involved in May 68 (Dosse, 2010: 171). French orthodox Marxism was suspicious of the new struggles in the 1960s and 1970s including May 68 and the Prison Information Group.

Marx and the Marxian tradition generate a political economic thought that is extremely useful to understand the dynamic of capital, which is marked by financialization. Arguably, the academic tradition working on Marx provides a relevant critical reflection on capital not provided by mainstream economics and Finance studies, which mainly argue that capital markets work and are grounded on the concep of *homo economicus* (for instance, Fama 1965). Finance studies tend to be practice-oriented as well. By contrast, Marxian concepts allow the operations and the transformations of capital to be historicised. I draw mainly on the Marxian literature on financialization, which seeks to understand the originality of this specific historical phenomenon that did not exist when Marx was writing *Capital* in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Financialization is a global and complex phenomenon. It has transformed the economy since the end of Fordism and the Bretton Woods financial system which was able to regulate international flows of capital (Bryan and Rafferty, 2006: 112). International flows of capital are able to cross borders. Capital operates through debt, in particular mortgages for subprimes as collateralised debt obligations, but as well student debt or private debt (Lazzarato 2012). Financialization implied an intensification of competition among capitals, and consequently an intensification of the exploitation of labour, in particular through derivatives (Bryan and Rafferty 2006) and the development of shareholder value governance (Froud and Williams 2000a, 2000b). Financialization also operated on the level of subjectivity (Martin 2002), the State (Martin 2007) and social reproduction, for instance through social impact bonds. The complex operations of
financialization on the economy, social reproduction and subjectivity will be extensively explained further.

My approach is not characterised by axiological neutrality because I wish to challenge financialization and the power of capital through a ‘resonance’ between the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, and a Marxian political economy (Thoburn, 2003: 1). I study Deleuze and Guattari for political reasons. As a result, this book will try to respond to the following question: How can a revolutionary interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari politicise financialization?

In attempting to answer this question, in the first part I provide a study of the reception of the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, which allows me to articulate a non-naïve and situated revolutionary engagement with the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. Next, in the second part, I apply this revolutionary reading of Deleuze and Guattari to financialization. Finally, I seek to elaborate a Deleuzo- Guattarian politics of resistance to financialization drawing on the social democratic experience of President Hollande in France and of the Occupy Wall Street movement.

**Reading Deleuze and Guattari**

The first issue that arises is how to read Deleuze and Guattari. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is extremely diverse and complex. Deleuze and Guattari refer to the history of philosophy, musicology, linguistics, biology, physics, psychoanalysis, ethnology, the cinema, mathematics, geometry, literature, economics, political economy, geography and history (1977, 1986, 1987, 1994). Their work however arguably belongs to the field of philosophy because it is characterised by the ‘creation of concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 8). Different methodologies or methodological practices are operated in academia in relation to reading French contemporary continental philosophy. It is useful to briefly review the main methodological practices in relation to reading French contemporary continental philosophy in order to explain more clearly what would be a faithful interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari.

Such a review will not provide a thorough analysis of all the possible ways of reading philosophy, which would probably require a monograph in its own right. Similarly, a number of methodological French contemporary continental philosophy practices
overlap. The idea is to confront and discuss the main methodological traditions of reading philosophy which are related to French contemporary continental philosophy. This should help contextualise and address the question of reading philosophy from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari. Symptomatology (Althusser and Balibar 1997), archaeology (Foucault 1989, 2002), deconstruction (Derrida 1997) and genealogy (Foucault 1977a, 1998a: 369) will be discussed. Deleuze and Guattari were familiar with these methodologies because they were practised in their immediate environment.

A first approach is Althusserian symptomatology, which draws on psychoanalysis to produce an interpretation of a philosophical text. The idea is that a text is a symptom or a pathological effect of an id or other deeper causes. This methodology was designed by Althusser and his collaborators to provide a novel reading of Capital (Althusser and Balibar 1997). Symptomatology allows for a critical selection of texts and concepts within the framework of an oeuvre. It provides coherence to the reading of a philosophical text or oeuvre through a bird’s eye view.

Accordingly, for Althusser and Balibar (1997), to providing a reading of a philosophical text would correspond to a psychoanalytic operation. The works of Deleuze and Guattari, however, strongly criticise the very notion of psychoanalysis and advocate the notion of schizoanalysis (1977, 1987). In particular, Deleuze and Guattari reject the interpretativist importance of the notion of Oedipus for psychoanalysis (1977, 1987). This form of symptomatology designed by Althusser and Balibar could produce a reading of Deleuze and Guattari. However, Althusserian symptomatology could not provide a Deleuzo-Guattarian methodology of reading Deleuze and Guattari because of the latter’s rejection of psychoanalysis (Dosse, 1997: 211; Holland, 2012: 133; Schwab 2007). As a result, the current argument cannot use Althusserian symptomatology.

A second approach is structuralist-archeological. Michel Foucault in The Order of Things (1989) and the Archeology of Knowledge (2002) operated a structuralist-archeological reading of philosophical texts. The idea was that a philosophical oeuvre is determined by a series of structures in the history of ideas, which Foucault defines as Renaissance, Classical and Modern ‘epistemes’ (Foucault 1989). For example, the philosophy of Descartes would have been determined by the Classical episteme which would have been marked by ‘representation’ (Foucault, 1989: 77). The singularity of a
specific philosophical oeuvre is not taken into account. It is possible to provide a structuralist-archeology of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari.


A third approach is genealogy. Genealogy was implemented by Foucault from the mid-1970s in particular in *Discipline and Punish* (1977a). Genealogy consists of a historical methodology that draws on Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1994). From this perspective, philosophical texts could be interpreted within the specific power relations in which they are inserted. For example, the philosophy of Beccaria is interpreted by Foucault as constituting a specific power-knowledge apparatus connected to panopticism and disciplinary power (1977a: 9).

Genealogy resonates with the works of Deleuze and Guattari because of its Poststructuralism (Williams, 2005: 112). A reading of genealogy from the perspective of the ontology of Deleuze and Guattari can be provided (Colwell 1997). However, Deleuze and Guattari on the one hand and Foucault, on the other, have two separate projects which is illustrated by the fact that Deleuze’s book on Foucault would be a ‘metaphysical fiction’ (Gros 1995). Deleuze and Guattari would have a different ontology of history than Foucault: ‘Insofar as he sees the critique and creativity which characterize thinking the impossible (whether in terms of genealogy or a mode of living) as historical, it is clear that Foucault locates possibilities for social transformation within history as well. This… directly opposes Deleuze’ (Taylor, 2014: 129). This implies that the genealogical method does not seem compatible with the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology.
More practically, a genealogy would imply extensive archival work on the oeuvre of Deleuze: ‘Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times’ (Foucault, 1998a: 369). This methodology would correspond to a historiographic work, which does not fall within the scope of this work. An intellectual biography of Deleuze and Guattari already exists, even if it does not perform a genealogy (Dosse 2010).

A fourth approach is deconstructionist. It corresponds to an approach of reading philosophy inspired by the oeuvre of Jacques Derrida. It involves looking for contradictions in the sense of a specific text or oeuvre. For Derrida, there would always be ‘textual ambivalences that remain unresolvable and prevent us from understanding fully “what the author really means” ’ which the oral language would not be able to clarify, as there would always be ‘a difference between what is thought (or experienced or said or written) and the ideal of pure, self-identical meaning’ (Gutting, 2001: 292). In particular, in Of Grammatology Derrida operates a deconstructionist reading of Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages: ‘I have attempted to produce, often embarrassing myself in the process, the problems of critical reading’ (Derrida, 1997: 1).

There is a resonance between Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari because they share the same critique of representation and of Structuralism since all three belong to Poststructuralism (Williams 2005). Derrida on the one hand, and Deleuze and Guattari on the other, also share a critique of phenomenology (Lawlor, 2012: 104). Derrida considers Structuralism to be related to a metaphysics of presence (1997: 46). Patton argues that the Derridean deconstruction shares similarities with the Deleuzian philosophical practice, despite ‘undeniable differences of style and method’ (2003: 16).

Nevertheless, there seem to be broader differences between Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari do not share Derrida’s concept of ‘logocentrism’ (Gutting, 2001: 294) and understanding of texts (Alliez, 2003: 94). More generally, the approach of Deleuze and Guattari is more ontological, whereas Derrida operates a critique of metaphysics, that is to say of ontology (Patton and Protevi, 2003: 6). Even though a deconstructionist reading of Deleuze and Guattari is possible, a Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of Deleuze cannot use a deconstructionist methodology.
Even though these four different approaches could be used to operate a specific reading of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari or of its reception, none of these methodologies would be useful in providing a Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of Deleuze and Guattari, or a Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari. I shall examine below the Deleuzian theory of reading of ‘buggery’ and see if it is an operational methodology for my project (Deleuze, 1995: 6).

**Buggery by Deleuze and Guattari?**

Deleuze wrote a number of history of philosophy works on Hume (1991), Nietzsche (1983), Bergson (1988a), Kant (1984), Lucretius (2004), Leibniz (1993a), Foucault (1988b) and Spinoza (1988c, 1990). Perhaps these works could provide a methodology that would generate a Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari. This is how Deleuze talks about his understanding of a theory of reading philosophy:

I myself “did” history of philosophy for a long time, read books on this or that author… But I suppose the main way I coped with it at the time was to see the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous… because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I really enjoyed (1995: 6).

In other words, a Deleuzian reading of Deleuze could consist of ‘buggery’. The methodology of ‘buggery’ would not correspond to a truthful and faithful representation of the hypothetical meaning of the works of Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari were particularly critical about a foundationalist linguistics which would try to ground a truth-correspondence theory: ‘But for us, the unconscious doesn’t mean anything, nor does language’ (1995: 22). Accordingly, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is linguistically impossible to adequately represent reality or the meaning of a text.

It would probably be possible to provide a reading of the œuvre of Deleuze and Guattari which would ‘bugger’ their philosophy (Deleuze, 1995: 6). Arguably, applying the
methodology of ‘buggery’ to Deleuze and Guattari has been attempted, for instance by Brian Massumi (1992). However, this would entail major difficulties because Deleuze did not provide a detailed explanation of his methodology for reading texts within the framework of his history of philosophy. Trying to ‘bugger’ Deleuze and Guattari would imply trying to reproduce Deleuze’s methodological practice of reading Kant, Hume, Bergson or Nietzsche, but applying it to Deleuze-Guattarian texts. Applying the methodology of ‘buggery’ to Deleuze and Guattari would be a very ambitious and risky project, because ‘a thought’s logic isn’t a stable rational system’ which could be easily reproduced by language, in particular in the case of Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze and Eribon, 1995: 94).

The ‘buggery’ of the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari is a very complex project because Deleuze did not provide specific guidelines about it. Additionally, the notion of ‘buggery’ was developed by Deleuze in 1973 (1995: 12), i.e. many years after he had written his first books on philosophy in the 1950s. Perhaps the notion of ‘buggery’ corresponds more to a provocative definition, as opposed to a systematic methodology. Therefore, this project will not use the notion of ‘buggery’ as a methodological instrument.

There is another difficulty about reading the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari. Concepts are used differently in the same book, to say nothing of the oeuvre as a whole. For instance, in A Thousand Plateaus the concept of ‘line of flight’ is used specifically and differently in relation to psychoanalysis (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 14), to biology (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 55), to linguistics (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 89), to faciality (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 124), to the study of novels (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 186). Deleuze and Guattari refuse any essentialist understanding of concepts and philosophy: ‘It’s not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under one concept but rather of relating each concept to variables’ (Deleuze et al., 1995: 31). For Deleuze and Guattari a concept does not have an essence, that is to say the same and identical meaning irrespective of the context.

There is a self-referentiality of the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari which function dynamically and collectively, as opposed to individually. For instance, the notion of rhizome is to be understood in relation to the concept of arborescence in the first plateau.
of *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). There is an unavoidable ‘pluralism’ to the understanding of the concepts and of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari (Sibertin-Blanc, 2006: 16). There are always different possible understandings of a text by Deleuze and Guattari. According to Deleuze and Guattari, concepts, texts and situations always have different meaning because there is no transcendental or idealist construction of meaning and truth. Writing a commentary on the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari that would claim to provide the objective truth about it would not correspond to a Deleuzo-Guattarian methodology of reading.

The existing literature is full of commentaries (Badiou 1999; Bogue 1989; Buchanan 2008; Hallward 2006; Hughes 2009; Khalfa 2003; Sibertin-Blanc 2006; Stivale 2011; Williams 2003; Žižek 2004) and provides fewer studies of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari. Therefore, the project of this work will not consist of constructing a commentary on the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari, but rather it will provide a study of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari.

Studying the reception of an oeuvre as opposed to providing a commentary on an oeuvre emphasises the idea of context and pluralism. The latter implies that there are always different and irreducible ways of reading a specific text or a specific oeuvre. Studying the reception of an oeuvre entails an acknowledgement of the fact that different readings exist. Otherwise, analysing a reception would not make any sense. The analysis of the reception therefore tries to understand why there are different ways of understanding a text, i.e. of constructing the meaning of a specific text or oeuvre. Context is often important in order to study the reception of a specific text or oeuvre. Analysing the reception of an oeuvre means putting more emphasis on the context of the reception of a text than providing a commentary, which implies being more concentrated on the text.

To study the reception of Deleuze and Guattari will allow me to apply a situated and non-naïve application of the philosophy of Deleuze to financialization, as I shall explain later. To study the reception of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari is a way of indicating from where I speak, from where I read and understand Deleuze and Guattari. Similarly, it is a way of recognising that my own work is part of a broader tradition. To study the reception of an oeuvre implies a form of modesty in relation to interpreting
texts and as well a form of non-naïve relationship with texts. Reading a text always implies a situated construction of sense.

**Analysis of the Reception of Deleuze and Guattari**

In the following section, I shall explain how I shall perform the analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari. First, I shall explain why I decided to study a specific reception of Deleuze and Guattari, as opposed to others. Next, I shall review and then reject a number of reception studies methodologies which have already been used on Deleuze and Guattari.

Since the 1990s, there has been a huge number of publications drawing on Deleuze in social sciences and humanities. On the 25 November 2013, the entry ‘Deleuze G*’ in the Social Sciences Citation Index generated 2,174 results. In particular, 257 results were given for geography, 139 for sociology, 106 for cultural studies and 103 for anthropology. Similarly, on the same date, the entry ‘Deleuze G*’ in the Arts and Humanities Citation Index generated 5,132 results. In particular, 263 results were given for literature and 162 for ‘humanities multidisciplinary’.

Consequently, for practical reasons it would be practically impossible to deal with all of these fields using a careful textual and qualitative analysis, as opposed to a quantitative study, which does not correspond to my project. I need to concentrate on a specific field, if I wish to operate a careful qualitative and textual analysis, which I shall explain later in this chapter. The field I have chosen is political philosophy. It can be arguably maintained that the philosophical reception of Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvre is the most relevant because both the authors produced primarily philosophical texts through a ‘creation of concepts’ (1994: 8). Deleuze and Guattari’s books were directed primarily, but not exclusively, at a philosophical audience. After all, it is not by accident that Deleuze and Guattari decided to choose *What Is Philosophy?* as the title for their last book and not *What Is Psychoanalysis?*, *What Is Sociology?* or *What Is Literary Criticism?*. It demonstrates the commitment of Deleuze and Guattari to define their theoretical practice as philosophical.

According to Deleuze and Guattari there is a strong connection between philosophy and politics. In a way, philosophy is always political because it creates concepts: ‘A
concept’s full of a critical, political force of freedom’ (Deleuze et al., 1995: 32). Similarly, Deleuze defines *Anti-Oedipus* as a ‘book of political philosophy’, even though it deals extensively with psychoanalysis, ethnology or history (Deleuze and Negri, 1995: 170). According to Deleuze and Guattari, producing an ontology or concepts about being and becoming cannot be separated from a political understanding of the world. I will therefore mainly focus on the reception of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari from the perspective of political philosophy. Studying the reception of Deleuze and Guattari by political philosophy seems relevant in being able to connect it to a critical approach of financialization, which I understand as being to a large extent a political issue. The reception of Deleuze and Guattari by aesthetic philosophy or the philosophy of science would have been less directly connected to the question of financialization than political philosophy.

Below, I shall discuss different methodologies of reception which have been applied to Deleuze and Guattari (Brott 2010; Cusset 2008; Dosse 2010; Lambert 2006; Sørensen 2005). These methodologies partly overlap. Next, I shall explain what type of methodology I use to provide a reception of Deleuze and Guattari. I shall not engage in a general discussion of reception studies, as this would require too much space.

A first type of analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari focused on the field and institutions that produced a specific reading of Deleuze and Guattari (Cusset 2008). Cusset tackled the question of the reception of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari and more broadly of French theory in the United States (2008). Accordingly, his idea was to analyse the social construction of the analysis of Deleuze and Guattari in the American academy. This allowed him to understand the relations of power in the specific social field of American academy.

Cusset’s analysis drew mainly on a methodology inspired by Pierre Bourdieu, which is positivistic and thus not compatible with the works of Deleuze and Guattari, which are critical about positivism (Cusset, 2008: xiv). For instance, Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ seems incompatible with the Deleuzo-Guattarian critique of Structuralism (1977, 1987). Similarly, Simone Brott in an article focused on the importance of the reception of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari in the field of architecture using an oral history methodoloy (2010). Even though this positivist type of work is useful, it does
not provide a Deleuzo-Guattarian analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari. In particular, Deleuze and Guattari provide a Poststructuralist and critical analysis of language, which entails a critique of the truth-correspondence theory (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 76). The current work will not operate this methodology of reception.

A second type of analysis of the reception of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari consisted of analysing its effect on academia or society. This is what François Dosse performed at the end of his biography on Deleuze and Guattari (2010: 502). It was quite close to Cusset (2008) and Brott (2010), even though it did not take into account the power relations within the field that operated the reception. Dosse (2010) listed the academic journals and the scholars who were actively working on the works of Deleuze and Guattari in the early 2000s. The work was based on an empirical analysis of archives and interviews according to a methodology corresponding to history. Even though this work was useful, it corresponded to a form of historic positivism that is criticised by Deleuze and Guattari. In particular, Deleuze and Guattari have an ontological understanding of history which implies that subjective becomings are not reducible to historic causality (Taylor 2014). Therefore, I will not operate this methodology of reception.

A third type of analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari consisted of the critique of other interpretations in order to defend a specific interpretation. Gregg Lambert provided a critique of the interpretations of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* by Fredric Jameson, Hardt and Negri and Badiou in order to defend his own interpretation (2006: vii–viii). Lambert claimed that he had found ‘three central propositions… at the basis of all of Deleuze and Guattari’s works’ (Lambert, 2006: 12). Lambert implicitly argued that he had provided a truthful interpretation of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari, which he opposed to other interpretations which he suggested were false. This position corresponded to a hermeneutic realism, which is in contradiction with the critique of the truth-correspondence theory operated by Deleuze and Guattari (1977, 1987). Therefore, I will not use the methodology of Lambert.

Cusset (2008), Brott (2010) or Lambert (2006) did not reflect on the problematics of writing a reception of Deleuze and Guattari within the framework of a Deleuzo-Guattarian methodology or within a framework that would be compatible with Deleuze
and Guattari. By contrast, in an article Bent Maier Sørensen analysed the reception of Deleuze and Guattari in Organisation Studies and tried to provide a Deleuzian methodology in order to produce a study of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari in this specific field (2005). Sørensen used the Deleuzian notions of ‘territory’ and ‘abstract machine’ to analyse the reception of Deleuzian Organisation Studies (2005). Sørensen was aware that he needed a Deleuze-Guattarian methodology to engage with the question of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari. My methodology is close to Sørensen’s attitude, even though I shall not attempt to exactly reproduce his methodology, as I shall explain in the next section.

My methodology of reception will also be close to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of mapping, even though it will not exactly correspond to it. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the methodology of mapping is not only textual or geographical, but rather ontological. Any type of reality or process can be mapped. Cartography or mapping does not only constitute a theory of reading texts or philosophy, but also involves engaging with specific objects or material realities. Mapping means producing a cartography of a ‘territory’ and its assemblage (Stivale, 1984: 31). This assemblage can be textual or material or a combination of both. Mapping constitutes an ontological methodology.

The map evaluates the ‘coefficients’ of intensity and of change of a specific reality in a rhizomatic fashion (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 12). Producing a map entails being transformed by the map and not being a neutral observer with a bird’s eye view, as a realist social scientist producing a representational tracing would be. Producing a map is related to operating a schizoanalysis: ‘Cartography can only map out pathways and moves, along with their coefficients of probability and danger. That’s what we call “schizoanalysis,”’ this analysis of lines, spaces, becoming’s’ (Deleuze et al., 1995: 34).

However, I shall not exactly use this methodology of mapping because Deleuze and Guattari do not provide specific guidelines about it. Second, my reading of the political philosophy reception of Deleuze and Guattari will prioritise a political interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari as well as an exegetical characterisation combined with a political contextualisation in relation to authors and texts. This approach is close to mapping and draws on the Autonomist Marxist tradition of reception studies (Cleaver 2000).
The Methodology of the Reception of Deleuze and Guattari

The first part consists of a study of the reception of Deleuze and Guattati by political philosophy. This study will be close to Sørensen’s analysis of the reception of Deleuze by Organisation Studies (2005) and to the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of mapping (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977, 1987). These two methodologies provide Poststructuralist approaches to an analysis of reception as they share the Deleuzo- Guattarian critique of the truth-correspondence theory. I did not exactly reproduce Sørensen’s methodology because my study puts more emphasis on the notion of political reading of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari, whereas Sørensen’s objective is to map the territory of the reception of Deleuze in Organisation Studies. I did not exactly reproduce the Deleuzo-Guattarian methodology of mapping for reasons explained above.

My analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari is strongly influenced by Harry Cleaver’s Autonomist Marxist analysis of the reception of *Capital* (2000). Cleaver operates a ‘strategic’ reading of the reception of *Capital:*

> The concept of a strategic reading here is very much in the military sense because it seeks in Marx’s thought only weapons for use in the class war… To paraphrase Karl von Clausewitz’s terms, strategy allows us to grasp the basic form of the class war, to situate the different struggles which compose it, to evaluate the opposing tactics in each of those struggles, and to see how the different tactics and different struggles can be better linked to achieve victory (2000: 29).

Cleaver’s analysis of the reception of *Capital* prioritises political objectives, that is to say the struggle of the working class against capital:

> Yet I would monopolize the term “political” here to designate that strategic reading of Marx, which is done from the point of view of the working class. It is a reading that self-consciously and unilaterally structures its approach to determine the meaning and relevance of every concept to the immediate development of working-class struggle (2000: 30).
My analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari is both political and strategic, even though not in the exact sense of Cleaver (2000), because I shall prioritise an anti-capitalist and revolutionary reading of Deleuze and Guattari against other readings, which either depoliticise Deleuze and Guattari or associate their oeuvre with capitalism. My analysis of the reception of Deleuze prioritises the idea that there is a ‘resonance’ between Deleuze and Guattari and Marx (Thoburn, 2003: 1). This means that a series of creative connections can be operated between theses oeuvres. This does not mean that other interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari are epistemologically false and that I am right. This would not be compatible with the Deleuzo-Guattarian Poststructuralist critique of realism and of truth-correspondence theory (1977, 1987). Some readers provide overtly realist interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari (De Landa 2004, 2010). I however would argue that there is a number of textual pieces of evidence of a Deleuzo-Guattarian Poststructuralist critique of realism, for instance the plateau on ‘the postulates of linguistic’, which draws extensively on Hjermilsev (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 75-110).

Cleaver criticises the political economic and the philosophical readings of Capital on political grounds, not because they are epistemologically false, but because they are written ‘from capital’s perspective’ (2000: 31). Althusser or Marcuse are criticised not for the lack of knowledge of their philosophical reading of Marx, but because of their lack of working class political strategy (2000: 46). Similarly, I shall criticise the interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari provided by Badiou (1999) or Hallward (2006), because of their refusal to politicise the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, and not because they failed to understand it.

As argued above, I shall study the reception of Deleuze and Guattari by political philosophy because it would be almost impossible to operate a quantitative analysis of all the receptions of Deleuze and Guattari, because of the number of publications. More importantly, as my project is connected to contemporary politics, the political philosophy reception of Deleuze seems one of the most relevant fields to study, as opposed to ontology or literary criticism for instance.
I strategically organised my analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari into three main interpretative positions: an elitist, a liberal and a revolutionary one. The elitist interpretation argues that the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy should be reserved for an elite of professional philosophers who would not be interested in transforming the world. The liberal interpretation argues that the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy is compatible with capitalism and the liberal tradition. Finally, the revolutionary interpretation, which I advocate seeks to use Deleuze and Guattari to transform the world.

These three positions are interpretative tendencies, as opposed to Platonist eternal Ideas. I do not argue that the interpretations provided by the authors that I analysed always corresponded to the three interpretative positions which I identified. My methodology to analyse the political philosophy reception of Deleuze and Guattari is qualitative. This means that it is not exhaustive and that not all authors will be covered. I selected the authors and the texts which seemed to me the most representative of the three main interpretative tendencies that I identified within the framework of my strategic reading.

I tried to provide a faithful analysis of these representative texts and authors through a careful textual exegesis. I strived as much as possible to be faithful to the arguments of the authors. I analysed, in particular, their philosophical projects and the concept which they operated. This implied providing quotes of the interpretative positions that I analysed. I tried to be descriptive in relation to the authors and the texts I analysed. Trying to provide a faithful exegesis of each philosophical interpretation of Deleuze entailed selecting a limited number of representative authors for each interpretative tendency because of lack of space. This specific qualitative approach implies a degree of arbitrariness in the choice of texts and authors.

At the same time, I tried to politically contextualise the description of the philosophical concepts which I provided. The political contextualisation of a conceptual position contributes to its clarification and its understanding. This corresponds to the Marxist tradition of characterising ideas prior to political contextualisation. Cleaver’s analysis of the reception of Capital provides a political contextualisation of the readings of Marx; for example, Althusser’s position is explained in relation with his role in the French Communist Party and orthodox Marxist politics in the 1960s (2000: 47).
My analysis of the political philosophy reception of Deleuze and Guattari is an analysis for practical reasons among many other possible analyses. In particular, and as Cleaver did for Reading Capital Politically (2000: 11), I only selected texts in English and French because I am not sufficiently acquainted with other languages. Obviously, there may be relevant untranslated work in Italian, German or Portuguese.

**Applying my Deleuzo-Guattarian Reception Study to Financialization**

In the second part, I shall apply a revolutionary interpretation of the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy to the object of financialization as described in the Marxian literature. This analysis will be situated and contextualised by the analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari. I do not claim any epistemological superiority and do not pretend that my own reading of Deleuze and Guattari is more truthful or more legitimate than others. Yet, studying the different possible readings of Deleuze and Guattari will allow me to grow aware of the situatedness of my own reading without the illusion of a bird’s eye view.

Applying my revolutionary understanding of Deleuze and Guattari to the question of financialization will in the first part demonstrate the interest and originality of my analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari. This will show that producing an analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari can have direct and practical relevance in understanding a complex contemporary social phenomenon such as financialization.

It is necessary for historical and epistemological reasons to read the Marxian literature on financialization to understand this specific phenomenon. The Marxian literature on financialization was mainly written in the 2000s, which means it was able to fully integrate the development of financialization. By contrast, Deleuze died in 1995 and Guattari in 1992, and so could not possibly predict the future and witness the whole historical development of financialization.

A critic might question the relevance of the work of Deleuze and Guattari in relation to financialization. I would provide at least three responses to this objection. First, through a ‘resonance’ between Deleuze, Guattari and Marx, a Deleuzo-Guattarian approach can be connected to the Marxian literature on financialization, which provides a very
specific engagement with the question of financialization. Second, the work of Deleuze anticipated some of the arguments made by the Marxian literature on financialization, through an analysis of the questions of credit and debt (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, 1987) and most of all through an understanding of the end of Fordism with concepts such as societies of control (Deleuze 1992a). Third, Deleuze and Guattari provide a social theory which allows for an understanding of the contemporary transformations of subjectivity within the framework of financialization.

A revolutionary reading of Deleuze and Guattari that aims at creating a ‘resonance’ with Marx (Thoburn, 2003: 1) needs to agree with the helpful description of financialization provided by the Marxian literature. At the political level of a reflection on resistance to financialization, a fruitful dialogue can be established between a Deleuzo-Guattarian revolutionary reading and a Marxian political economy of financialization. In particular, my reflection informed by a revolutionary understanding of Deleuze and Guattari can help transcend the political shortcomings of the Marxian literature on financialization, which relies mainly on party and class politics (Bryan and Rafferty 2006; McNally 2009). This creative transcending of political impasses can be considered an example of resonance. The most interesting political insights in relation to resistance to financialization are connected to the question of debt and of ‘debt struggle’ (Caffentzis 2013a; Graeber 2011a; Lazzarato 2012).

I shall operate a discussion of Foucault’s analyses of neoliberal governmentality (2007, 2008) as well as of his critique of orthodox Marxism, because it is connected to Deleuze and Guattari’s own Poststructuralist politics. Foucault as well as Deleuze and Guattari were able to understand the transformations of the struggles in the 1960s unlike orthodox Marxism. Foucault as well as Deleuze and Guattari tried to conceptualise what had happened in May 68 through a critique of orthodox Marxist politics (Deleuze and Foucault 1977; Deleuze and Guattari 1977, 1987; Foucault 1977b). By contrast, orthodox Marxism had been suspicious of May 68 and the new struggles in the 1960s (Cleaver, 2000: 65; Dosse 2010).

The last chapter will elaborate on a Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of resistance to financialization drawing in particular on the question of debt, on the notion of event and on itinerant politics. I shall try to elaborate on a Deleuzo-Guattarian
politics, which will draw on two recent attempts to resist financialization, i.e. President Hollande’s social democratic politics in France and the Occupy Wall Street movement. This Deleuzo-Guattarian elaboration of a politics of resistance to financialization is a modest task, which is also exploratory as there is as yet no established field of research. It shall try to avoid two main problems of philosophical engagement with politics, i.e. ‘speculative leftism’ (Bosteels 2005) and the blueprint.

‘Speculative leftism’ implies that political philosophy cannot provide practical recommendations in relation to politics (Bosteels 2005). In other words, philosophy would not have anything to say to militants in terms of political strategy. This position is sometimes practised by French contemporary philosophy defending ideal principles such as ‘democracy’ (Rancière 2007) or the ‘communist hypothesis’ (Badiou 2010) without any clear practical and strategic recommendations. By contrast, the objective of the blueprint is to apply to politics a philosophical reflection as performed by Lenin in What Is To Be Done? (1969). The idea is that philosophy can provide a precise political methodology, for instance a vanguard party of professional activists that would lead the proletariat to revolution. By contrast, elaborating a Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of resistance to financialization implies a series of practical reflections on contemporary experiences such as Hollande’s social democratic politics or the Occupy Wall Street movement.

In the second part of the book, I propose a specific reading of Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts such as event, itinerant politics (in the last chapter) or the Deleuzian engagement with orthodox Marxist politics. I also operate a reading of specific Foucauldian concepts such as governmentality. My reading of these texts is political and strategic, even though I try to provide a faithful exegetical engagement with texts. I select texts and interpretation to elaborate a Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of resistance to financialization. As the second part of the book is grounded on the first part, the application of the analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari to financialization validates the first part.

I would argue that there is a Deleuzo-Guattarism which is not a closed system that would operate deductively. I see the work of Deleuze and Guattari as an ‘open’ body (Deleuze et al., 1995: 32) and with no definitive and systematic accounts of the world.
The two joint books *Anti-Oedipus* (1977) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) will be the most discussed and analysed, because they provide the most extensive analyses on capitalism and politics in the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari. Connecting Deleuze and Guattari and financialization implies an emphasis on *Anti-Oedipus* (1977) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) and therefore on the joint works of Deleuze and Guattari.

Despite the argument of Stengers (2011: 141), it seems difficult to me to separate the concepts of Deleuze from the ‘operative constructs’ of Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* (1977) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987). Deleuze and Guattari criticise the idea that it would be possible to differentiate individual authors in *A Thousand Plateaus*:

> Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd… To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied (1987: 3).

As Genosko argues (2012: 166), the most fruitful interpretative strategy consists in operating rhizomatic connections between a series of texts written by Deleuze and Guattari (1977, 1986, 1987, 1994), but also by Deleuze writing alone (for example, 1992a, 2004), by Guattari writing alone (1996) and to a lesser extent by Deleuze and Foucault (1977) and by Guattari and Negri (1990).

**List of Chapters**

The intended project is to explore how a revolutionary interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari can help politicise financialization. I shall seek to provide a study of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari by political philosophy in order to ground a non-naïve and situated revolutionary reading of Deleuze and Guattari, which I wish to bring into resonance with the Marxian literature on financialization. Finally, I elaborate a Deleuze-Guattarian politics of resistance to financialization which takes into account the Marxian reflections on financialization. In the second part of the book, I
apply my revolutionary reading of Deleuze and Guattari to financialization. The application of my first part to financialization entails a practical validation of my study of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari.

The first part of this book consists of an analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari by political philosophy. The field of political philosophy broadly construed is chosen because it seems relevant for a project that seeks to politicise financialization. I operate this study of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari with a specific methodology which is close to Sørensen’s analysis of the reception of Deleuze and Guattari by Organisation Studies, to the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of mapping and to Cleaver’s study of the reception of Capital. At the end of the first part, I am able to situate my revolutionary interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari.

In the second chapter (‘The Elitist interpretation of the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari’), I examine a political interpretation of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari, which limits it to philosophy. This position argues that the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari operates a novel philosophical understanding of the world not connected to the idea of politically transforming the world. It is a depoliticising understanding of Deleuze and Guattari. This position (Badiou 1999, 2004; Grosz 1993; Hallward 2006; Jardine 1984; Mengue 2003; Žižek 2004) is held either to dismiss the political relevance of the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari or to dismiss the very idea of politics from the perspective of the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. According to this position, the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari is essentially reserved for an elite of professional philosophers who are seen as disconnected from the political processes of collective decisions.

In the third chapter (‘The liberal interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari’), I examine a political interpretation of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari which associates their oeuvre with capitalism. According to this interpretative position (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; De Landa 2010; Garo 2011a; Jameson 1997; Patton 2000; Tampio 2009), the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari is compatible with capitalism and the market. In fact, the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari could provide an efficacious philosophy of capitalism. It could complement the liberal philosophical tradition (Patton 2000; Tampio 2009). Otherwise, this interpretation is operated by anti-capitalist thinkers in
order to criticise Deleuze and Guattari’s alleged connection with capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Garo 2011a; Jameson 1997). This position associates the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari with capitalism either to praise it in order to say that it allows an interesting understanding of the market from a pro-capitalist perspective or either to dismiss it from an anti-capitalist perspective.

Nevertheless, in the fourth chapter (‘Deleuze and Guattari: revolutionary philosophers’), I consider a third political interpretation of the œuvre of Deleuze and Guattari which consists of a revolutionary reading. This third interpretative position is revolutionary (Massumi 1992; Negri 2011; Nunes 2010; Pignarre and Stengers 2011; Read 2003; Sibertin-Blanc 2006, 2009; Thoburn 2003; Tiqqun 2011). In other words, this interpretative position maintains that the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari seeks to transform the world and existing dominant social relations. This interpretative position is anti-capitalist and aims at using Deleuze and Guattari in order to supersede capitalism. This interpretative position is held by authors coming from different revolutionary traditions such as anarchism, communism or the Autonomist movement. My work corresponds to this position. However, my revolutionary interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari seeks to make it resonate with Marx because I wish to apply a Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of resistance to financialization. This contrasts with anti-Marxist revolutionary interpretations of Deleuze (Tiqqun 2011).

In the second part, I apply a non-naïve and situated revolutionary reading of Deleuze and Guattari to financialization. This implies engaging with the Marxian literature on financialization, because it provides the most relevant critical expertise on this topic. In fact, the works of Deleuze and Guattari were written before the full development of financialization unlike the Marxian literature on financialization. Nevertheless, the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari provide relevant concepts to reflect on resistance to financialization. It is useful to draw on Foucault as well as on Deleuze and Guattari because they shared many Poststructuralist concerns in relation to orthodox Marxist politics.

In the fifth chapter (‘Understanding financialization’), I shall engage with the Marxian literature on financialization. First, I shall explain how financialization replaced the Bretton Woods financial system and how it was linked to neoliberalism (Mirowski
2009, 2013). Next, I shall explain how financialization is connected to derivatives as a form of commensuration between capitals (Bryan and Rafferty 2006) which allows the exploitation of labour to be reinforced. Additionally, I shall show how financialization permeated social reproduction, subjectivity (Martin 2002) and the State (Martin 2007). Financialization is also connected to debt (Caffentzis 2013a, 2013b; Lazzarato 2012). The Marxian literature suggests that resistance to financialization can be brought about by class politics and a revolutionary subject.

In the sixth chapter (‘Anticipating financialization’), I seek to show that Deleuze and Guattari were not able to predict financialization for historical reasons. The understanding of finance proposed by Deleuze and Guattari was rather limited. Some scholars use the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari to provide non-critical account of finance. I disagree with them because of my revolutionary interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari (Armstrong et al. 2012; Hillier and Van Wezemael 2008; Lozano 2013a, 2013b; Vlcek 2010). By contrast, I sympathise with scholars who use Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts to provide a critical engagement with finance (Bay 2012; Bay and Schinckus 2012; Ertürk et al. 2010; Ertürk et al. 2013; Forslund and Bay 2009; Holland 2013; Lightfoot and Lilley 2007; Shaviro 2010). Deleuze and Guattari however were able to anticipate some of the aspects of financialization with concepts such as ‘machinic enslavement’ and ‘societies of control’. Foucault was also able to anticipate some of the aspects of financialization through his reflection on neoliberal governmentality (2007, 2008). Furthermore, the politics provided by Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault allow the shortcomings of the politics of the Marxian literature on financialization to be criticised.

Finally, in the seventh chapter (‘Resisting financialization’), I seek to elaborate a Deleuzo-Guattarian revolutionary politics of resistance to financialization. This final chapter is practical and exploratory. Therefore, I draw mainly on two recent political experiences: French President Hollande’s social democratic attempt and failure to regulate finance and the Occupy Wall Street movement. Debt seems the most practical strategic objective in relation to resisting financialization (Caffentzis 2013a; Graeber 2011b; Lazzarato 2012). I therefore draw on Occupy Wall Street to argue that a Deleuzian politics of resistance could try to confront financialization through an ‘itinerant politics’ and through an ‘event’.
There are accounts of politics and subjectivity inspired by Marx, but I would argue that the Poststructuralist approach of Deleuze and Guattari is more effective, in particular because of its materialist understanding of the question of difference. This point will be illustrated – *inter alia* – by the use of the concepts of ‘event’ and ‘itinerant politics’ in the final chapter. Overall, I would be more sympathetic with Marxian analyses that move away from the Hegelian teleology.

Therefore, contemporary finance is substantially different from the finance which existed at the time of Marx or Lenin and which was not as central in the accumulation of capital.