Communication planning for development: an operational framework

Thesis

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COMMUNICATION PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT:
AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Open University,
Milton Keynes, United Kingdom, in the discipline of educational technology.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with communication planning for national development: specifically with the problem of utilising a developing country's communication resources to support an integrated programme of social, political and economic mobilisation. The research which it describes sets out to construct, and test, an operational planning framework, to include among its parameters decision-making processes and political factors as well as planning strategies for communication.

Following a literature search, a number of guiding principles in support of communication planning are hypothesized. These principles are then evaluated, modified and categorised, through comparison with selected communication projects and surveys, at levels ranging from the local to the national and regional. Subsequently, on the basis of this analysis, an experimental planning framework is devised, which is constructed around two basic axes: the first defining planning participants (including both planners and decision-makers), and the second defining the sequence of planning. A particular emphasis in elaborating this framework is on the relationship between communication and development planning, and on interactions between the various sectors concerned with national development.

An account is then given of a field test of the experimental framework in a developing country (Afghanistan), during which independent evaluations of both the framework and of its application were carried out.
Following an analysis of these evaluations, the framework is modified and a revised version proposed. Finally, an attempt is made to relate the planning framework to current concerns with popular access to communication resources, and participation in communication planning and management, as a guide to future application and evaluation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF PUBLISHED WORK


Sections of Chapter IX are adapted from "Local Broadcasting and Community Media", a paper written by the author for a forthcoming Education Sector Study of the World Bank (now in press), and from an unpublished review of open planning processes, prepared (with Majid Tehranian) for UNESCO, as a guideline for a future research programme.

Finally, an earlier version of the work appears, in an abbreviated form, in a publication of the UNESCO Press, Paris, under the title of "Communication Planning for Development" (in press).
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

PROBLEM DEFINITION

Research Objectives

This thesis is concerned with communication planning for national development: specifically with the problem of utilising a developing country's communication resources to support an integrated programme of social, political and economic mobilisation. It is therefore primarily operational, action-based research; its objective was to evolve a planning strategy which would catalyse the contribution of communication resources to the development process, while recognising the variety of constraints, particularly those of political action and decision making, which exist in real world situations. It set out to isolate an approach which, although based upon recognised planning techniques, particularly those of systems analysis, nevertheless still retained sufficient flexibility and pragmatism to respond sensitively to external pressures, many of them unpredictable or irrational.

As I shall explain later, the research was not based on a traditional hypothetico-deductive design, proceeding from the formation of stated research hypotheses. It was, nevertheless, logical and scientific in intent, within the constraints of its subject matter; it began by setting out hypothetical planning principles, which it used to construct an experimental planning model. If there had been a formally stated hypothesis, this would have proposed that it is possible to evolve a communication planning instrument, to be used at
the national level in developing countries, which embodies both technical planning supports and elements of policy formulation and decision-making. The objective of the research, however, was not simply to ascertain whether such a planning model was feasible, but also to assess its limits, and the kinds of circumstance and environment in which it might be usefully employed.

Selection of Research Area

My basic motivation for choosing this particular area of research was one of professional development: since 1966, I have been concerned with the planning of communication systems and institutions, particularly in the developing world. In late 1976, this responsibility was both formalised and extended through the creation, within UNESCO, of a Section of Communication Planning and Studies, of which I was designated Chief of Section. The appointment coincided with an emerging international interest in communication planning as a significant field of communication research, in response to a number of pressures and trends which are described in Chapter II. A particular emphasis was upon the need to plan, in a coherent and comprehensive way, for national communication systems, embracing not only the mass media, but also their relationship to a variety of audiences within processes of social and economic development.

Rationale for the Research

The main rationale for selecting this research topic, however, quite apart from a personal motivation, was one of need; from an early review of the literature, it was apparent that, in this new field, little was available in the way of established methodologies, and existing planning designs and techniques had to be adapted to the
communications environment. For this purpose, the most evident instrument upon which to draw was that of systems planning. Since the fifties systems planning, extended by computerized processes, has become the basis of most technological design, including telecommunications. It has, however, been found to be less effective an instrument in the design of systems with a human rather than a technological bias, and among these are included communication systems, both mass and interpersonal. The experience of those responsible for planning such systems is that, while technical components are adequately approached through networking and systems analysis, social planning is far less amenable, and the processes of policy formulation and decision-making, in particular, are less than responsive. Those who plan communication systems, therefore, tend to adopt one of two approaches. The first is to assume the validity of systems analysis and specific planning techniques, and to evolve strategies in much the same way as these would be evolved for any major industrial enterprise. The disadvantage of this approach is that it usually fails to take account of unforeseen human factors (political or personal). The second approach is more pragmatic: planning is confined to short-range operational plans, with little prior assessment in terms of the specification of objectives, evolution of alternative strategies and so on. In the past, this has been the most common pattern for communication planning, especially at the project level; communication in general (apart from telecommunications) has been markedly uninfluenced by planning and management theory borrowed from other contexts.

This situation produces something of a dilemma. On the one hand, it seems unfortunate, if techniques which have been found to be practically useful in other fields cannot equally be applied to the communication sector. At the same time, planning for its own sake is clearly
wasteful; the main business of planning is implementation, and if political and decision-making strands cannot be included in its parameters, not only are opportunities being wasted, but negative results may well be expected.

When I began this research, relatively little attention had been paid to the application of planning theory to communication problems, except in the area of educational technology. My working hypothesis therefore proposed that with due care a marriage of the two approaches might be possible, and some new techniques might usefully be evolved, not merely in such a way that they avoided confrontation with decision-making and political processes, but actually assisted such processes, by directing them towards a greater rationality. The research was therefore directed towards creating a planning framework which included decision-making as well as planning axes, and towards testing this framework in real-life situations.

Time Frame of the Research

The time frame of the study was from January 1976 to June 1980. It was initiated during nine months of full-time research leave, taken from January-September 1976 and spent in the East-West Communication Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, and in Europe. During this period, apart from my longer-term attachment to the East-West Centre (between February and May 1976), I also maintained contacts with, and made visits to, the Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, USA; Syracuse University, USA; and the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK. The remainder of the research was carried out on a part-time basis. Field work was planned and undertaken between October 1976 - January 1978, and the thesis was completed
between February 1978 - July 1980. Regular dialogue was maintained with the Open University, UK, throughout the entire period.

**Methodology**

The methodology evolved for the research is described in Chapter III, in broad outline, and particular aspects are discussed in context as they arise.

In summary, however, I began by isolating a number of concepts, which appeared to be important to communication planning and which might eventually be used as criteria in devising an experimental planning model. These were partly drawn from a review of the literatures of communication and of planning, and partly from my own personal experience as a media planner and manager. Subsequently, I grouped these concepts according to a simple model, which distinguished between the design of planning (i.e. the production of planning models or instruments), and the planning process (i.e. the ways in which such models are applied in practice).

I then attempted to check and expand these key concepts, by reviewing the ways in which they appeared to be illustrated in specific experiences of planning for communication. I did so by selecting eight recent communication projects, for which a reasonably comprehensive body of data on planning processes was available, and by analysing these to see where each concept, and the preliminary categorisation, was adequately supported, and where it was deficient. I then modified and expanded the concepts into the form of a series of hypothetical planning principles (13 at this time).

The next step was to take this analysis a stage further, by investi-
gating a communication planning survey which had taken place some years earlier in Thailand; as the objectives of this survey (a pre-investment study for the development of educational mass media) were similar to the basic objectives of my own research, this provided a useful check on the research project as a whole, and furnished more information on the planning process than was available from the project case studies.

From this second analysis, a revised and consolidated list of 17 hypothetical planning principles was established.

The next, critical stage was to use these principles, and other guidelines derived from the case studies, to evolve a general model, or framework, for communication planning. This was deliberately kept simple, in the form of a two-dimensional matrix, since it was to be used as the basis of a field test in a particular situation, during which it could be monitored and evaluated. The opportunity for this test occurred in Afghanistan, where, in 1977, UNESCO was asked to prepare a national communication plan covering an eight-year period, embracing all communications media. My own Section of Communication Planning and Studies was entrusted with this request, and for this purpose, I developed my basic model into a specific planning scenario. The survey was undertaken by a team of specialists, and it was monitored throughout by two independent evaluators, one concerned mainly with the utility of the planning instrument, the other with team planning processes.

Once the survey was complete, I compared and analysed these two evaluations, before returning to the planning model, to see how useful it had proved as a tool, and how it might be further modified. I discovered that, in general, it had been a useful guide, but the very fact that it was based on existing planning conditions and practices meant that it could only be
developed to a certain point: it was rooted in a centralist planning tradition, and could only be partially adapted to more modern, participatory forms.

Consequently, in the final stage of the research, I considered the more recent themes of access and participation in communication, envisaging approaches to planning which might be contemplated in the future.

Contents of the Thesis

The progress of this research is described in detail in the thesis. In Chapter II, I review the historical development of communication planning, and then describe, in Chapter III, the methodology which I employed. Chapters IV - V develop a set of hypothetical planning principles, through an analysis of earlier surveys, and in Chapter VI a preliminary planning model is evolved. Subsequently, Chapter VII describes the application of this model in Afghanistan, and its simultaneous evaluation. In Chapter VIII, the planning model is further refined, within its inherent limitations, and in Chapter IX implications for the future are considered.
Full references are provided to works quoted or drawn upon in the text, and four annexes include summary descriptions of the projects reviewed, the planning design used in Afghanistan, and the two independent evaluations conducted of this design.

Definition of Basic Concepts

Before embarking on the thesis proper, however, it should be helpful to consider some of the basic concepts with which the research was concerned. In a new field, questions of definition are usually critical: there is a need, not simply to define and localise the area of research, but also to ensure consistency and comparability in the use of terminology and the understanding of concepts. In this section, therefore, the critical terms of communication planning, communication policy, and development are defined: not in order to claim any special validity or universality, but so as to describe their use within the study, and especially their interaction and interrelationship.

Communication Planning

Communication is a concept elastic enough to include interpersonal, institutional and mass communication forms; and if it is viewed primarily as a process, it can be understood in very broad terms. The Preface to the "Handbook of Communication" (Sola Pool, Schramm, Frey, Maccoby, Parker, 1973 p.v.) describes it as one of those "relatively few fundamental and
encompassing processes through which virtually any social event can be portrayed).

However, the study of communication is a different and more restricted concern, which is largely a matter of perspective; seen as a field of investigation, rather than as a discipline, it can have a variety of entry points. From the viewpoint of the psychologist, communication is a need, comparable with other basic human needs. From a more philosophical viewpoint, it is seen as a right (leading characteristically to discussions of information flow and equilibrium). From the aesthetic viewpoint, it is a creative activity.

Communication planning adopts primarily a socio-economic view; characteristically it treats communication as a resource, capable of being allocated, conserved and re-distributed like other resources. This perspective can be broken down further still. In the first place, while the term communication is not intended purely to imply mass media, it is used here to denote the sum of those media channels and institutions which have a technological base. This is because the emphasis upon communication as a natural resource implies a commodity which is subject to production, marketing and distribution in some way. However, the understanding does go beyond that of mass media; it includes other technologically based items, such as computers, information systems, telecommunications and telephony (which have quite a different audience relationship from broadcasting or the press). Moreover, it goes beyond the basic premises of technology to include those aspects of human communication (information flow, diffusion etc.) which arise out of or surround the technological base, and which may also be the subject of planning.

Communication planning, therefore, implies the preparation of both long-range and short-range plans (i.e. strategic and operational) for the efficient and equitable use of communication resources, in the context of a particular
society's goals, means and priorities, and subject to its prevailing forms of social and political organisation.

A society in this case may be as small as a community or institution, or as large as a regional consortium. Obviously the resources of planning, the complexity of the planning process and the constraints placed upon it will vary in proportion to the planning universe, but it can be argued that in essence the same kinds of process apply at each level.

Planning does not, however, (or should not) take place in a vacuum, but in its execution has to take account of characteristic processes of decision-making, the allocation of financial and supporting resources, and economic and social behaviour. In other words, communication planning is both a theoretical and an applied discipline: it is subject to all the forms and pressures of compromise which characteristically operate in applied fields.

Communication Policy

As such it has a clear derivation from the concept of policy. For although communication policies exist in all societies, it is clearly the understanding of policy as being framed to provide some kind of social re-organisation which has stimulated the growth of interest in the field. In the development context, in particular, the view of policies is more prescriptive than analytical: if a policy is articulated it is in order that it may promote some kind of structural or social change. And this orientation, in turn, leads to a realisation of the need for planning, in order to help translate the policy statement into practical action.

Communication policies have been defined as sets of norms, standards and principles, which govern communication behaviour; particularly at an institutional level, they may be both overtly and implicitly expressed.
However, their relationship with planning is direct because: (i) planning, especially systems planning, is dependent upon the clear formulation of objectives; and (ii) objectives cannot be articulated with any precision unless overall goals and policies are clearly understood. While policies may exist, and be discussed, without planning, planning cannot be expected to take place without policies. For this reason, the account of policy offered below is of a particular kind. Its bias is not so much towards policy per se, or the description and normalisation of communication roles in society, but more towards that specific categorisation of policy which is an a priori facet of the planning process. It attempts to find a means of identifying the priorities, possibilities and pressures without which planning becomes an abstract and sterile exercise.

Development

The view which the study takes of the communication process is also intimately bound up with the concept of development, for it is the developing world which is most interested in radical, socio-economic re-structuring, and in which the imperatives of the development process are most pronounced.

The understanding of development adopted here may nevertheless cause some difficulty. While there are many definitions of development, unfortunately most of these are couched in abstract terms. Development, in theory, implies a telescoping of change in a given society, which will allow it, in a shorter span of time that would be the result of random historical growth, to escalate to the living standards, economic climate, social and educational level of industrialised societies. In practice, however, development has been most often equated with industrialisation and with technological innovation; it has been measured by the degree to which an "underdeveloped" society matches indices evolved by industrialised countries.
This simplistic approach has, of course, been challenged in many places, and much greater restraint is now exercised, to the extent that not only the appropriateness of a particular technology, but even the appropriateness of technology at all, are no longer taken for granted in resolving a particular country's problems. Today, at least in theory, the preference is to analyse the social environment and goal structure of a society and to see what specific prescriptions, among which technology is included, can best advance these goals. Questions of the quality of life, equity and social participation are now more commonly raised than hitherto.

This is not to say that technical assistance or commercial advisory programmes always reflect such discretion, or that task analysis is always complete, whether by donor agencies or by the country's leaders themselves. But it does reflect a climate of opinion.

For the purposes of this research an understanding of development was needed which did not make too many pre-judgements about the best manner in which to proceed. It should be an understanding which did not draw too arbitrary a line between the so-called 'developed' and 'developing' countries, as a main dilemma is how to use the capacities of the industrialised world in less skilled environments, to ensure a transfer of technology which concentrates on endogenous development rather than on a physical exchange.

By development, therefore, it seemed better to argue from a basic notion of reduction in inequalities: of opportunity, of resources, of information access, of capability. This kind of inequality is traditionally associated with the gap between technologically advanced and technologically poor countries, but it goes deeper. Within industrialised societies, there are similar inequalities between urban and rural societies, between social strata, or between groups. Development can generally be understood to attempt the reduction of such inequalities, through a planning process
whose objective is to accelerate the transition and to promote internal, endogenous growth. Communication planning for development implies the use of communication resources and technologies as part of this task.

Again, this does not imply that the possibility of planning for communication systems in industrialised societies is dismissed, or that these alternative planning needs are in any way subordinate. Indeed, the majority of the theories and methods which are drawn upon derive from the industrialised world, where they were first conceived and nurtured. The focus of the research, however, was upon the developing world.

This focus had substantial implications, and some advantages. In the industrialised world, where there is already a long-standing commitment to established media industries and infrastructures, policy-making and planning are inevitably a matter of re-alignment, gradual shifts of emphasis and cautious consensus. In the developing world - in spite of the problems raised by centralised planning and dirigistic habits of policy formulation - the possibility of radically re-structuring communication systems exists to a far greater degree.

The Reference Frame

In summary, the context of communication planning is illustrated by Figure 1, where a simple Venn diagram shows the basic influences which converge in its practice. Communication planning begins from two main axes: public and development policy, and the infra-structures of the communication system; it is concerned with the potential of communication as a mobilising and integrating force within society.

But it is further conditioned, and catalysed, by technology. While
FIGURE 1.
REFERENCE FRAME OF COMMUNICATION PLANNING
communication is a basic human activity, the incentive to plan for its allocation and conservation, and to institutionalize its forms, only arises in a society with a developed, or potential, technological base. The result is a partial overlay of communication resources and infrastructures upon goals of public development policy, catalysed by the contribution of technology. Communication planning lies broadly at their point of intersection, being (in theory) a process of formulating societal objectives, correlating these with the potential of the communication system and making use of technology to secure the best possible match.

Nevertheless, while the focus of communication planning lies at this central intersection, its interests spill over much more widely. The main concern of the field is to plan (at a variety of levels) for a communication system: a system being viewed, traditionally, as an assembly of parts connected together in an organized way, as an organic unit. The process is carried on within society, involving individuals, institutions and groups, and it is therefore a human activity system. But there are other ways of approaching systems thinking, in more analytic, less descriptive terms. In the words of P. B. Checkland "The apparently chaotic world is best understood as a complex of interlocking systems" (Checkland, 1972 p.50). This approach is less utilitarian, as it amounts to saying that virtually everything can be interpreted in systemic terms, but it has the virtue of emphasizing that any system (including a national communication system) is bounded by other systems, and that the overlap between them is quite as important as individual system behaviour.

An analysis of communication planning, therefore, has to take place at two levels, assuming two different viewpoints. It has initially to focus attention on a particular system of communication and the means by
which it can be observed and regulated, but it must also view communication in the light of contiguous, or larger systems (such as that of the development process, or the wider social system of which this is a facet). The inability to do so has been a source of confusion, inflexibility and inconsistency in much communication design.

Returning to Figure 1, then, this argument implies that research into communication planning should extend beyond the shaded intersection area, to consider each of the main spheres involved, and especially the balance and focus of their relationship.

Relationships

Figure 2 expresses the relationship in more dynamic terms (adapted from Parker, 1973 p. 640). The three nodes are somewhat differently presented, but they correspond in general terms to the original triad of technology, communication structures and public and development policy. Their interaction is, of course, continuous, but it will be seen that in this model policy analysis draws (among other things) upon research into communication processes and effects, and relates this to technological potential in formulating (and advocating) structural change. Other influences are also depicted. Communication research both services and conditions the growth and character of communication technology; public policy formulation moulds (directly or indirectly) media structures, depending upon the exercise of control in the society to which the model is being applied. All of these interactions had to be considered in the thesis and their historical development and association are discussed in the following chapter.
Communication media:
Techniques for effective use of communication technology

(POLICY ADVOCATE)

(PROCESS AND EFFECTS)

(SOCIAL EFFECTS, POLICY RESEARCH)

Communication research:
Behavioural science research on the process and effects of communication

Public policy analysis:
Historical, legal, economic, and political analysis of communication policy

FIGURE 2.
RELATIONSHIP OF RESEARCH, POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY
The search is organised in three strands. First, an account is given of the emergence of the field in its public (most frequently international) context, charted by reports and documents produced through a sequence of expert and intergovernmental meetings. Secondly, at a more conceptual level, the evolution of the field is traced through an analysis of its component academic disciplines, which have been drawn together to underpin the political debate. Thirdly, an account is given of the practical measures which have been taken (again primarily at an international level, though with increasing national recognition), to translate the emerging concepts into action and research programmes. It was considered important to analyse this sequence of events and processes, because they provided a context within which the research proceeded, and which guided its overall objectives.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF COMMUNICATION PLANNING

As part of the preliminary phase of this study, a review was made of a number of sources, in the fields of communication research, educational media and technology, development theory and planning and management theory.

A parallel review of the field of communication planning was, however, much more limited, because the field is so recent. Largely, this was a matter of tracing the historical development of the field, and considering the substantive reports and papers produced over the last decade. It is this secondary search which is summarised in the present chapter.

Historical Development

The history of communication policies and planning is one of gradual, sometimes barely perceptible, moves towards integration: towards the perception of coherent systems in communication.

The sequence cannot be pinpointed with any accuracy; it is largely a matter of growing consciousness. But it is implicit in such documents as the reports of UNESCO research meetings on mass communication, which often pick up with considerable accuracy the mood of a particular time. For example, a meeting of experts on mass communication and society, held in Montreal in August 1969, was still groping towards a principle
of comprehensiveness in communication research:

"More comprehensive, system-oriented research into mass communication is needed at all levels and in all areas. This includes the analysis of media organisation, ownership and financial support, the decision-making processes in media production ethics, the actual value systems of communicators, and their perception of their rôle in society. The ways in which such factors impinge upon the creative process involved in media production are of particular interest. It may also be useful to enquire into whether it would be advisable to bring about change, where indicated, in production and information structures to allow for a wider participation into management and decision-making processes on the part of the professional working elements of media units. The special contexts of the developing countries deserve special attention.

In addition to the actual process of mass communication there is need for research into the goals of mass communication systems and their possible future goals. Such "goal research" might help to clarify policies and objectives in relation to any given society, suggest to policy-makers and practitioners new bases for mass media performance, and stimulate more comprehensive theories with regard to mass communication in general". (UNESCO, 1969 p. 4)

The concept of "policies" for communication is already embryonic. But two years later, a consultants' committee, elaborating proposals for an International Programme of Communication Research, had moved to
a more sharply focused position.

"If something is socially significant then it should be self-evident that we need to know something about it. More questions arise: who governs and controls the media? Whose interests do they serve? What resources do they use? What is the nature of their products? What needs are being met and what are not met? These are just some of the general questions that should be central within any programme of communication research ......

In short, we need the knowledge that only research can provide before we can develop adequate communication policies. Ideally, such policies should be based on "total" knowledge, (i.e. on the operation of the media in the wider social-economic-political setting) and on "public" needs rather than on "partial" knowledge and "private" needs as is so often the case at present". (UNESCO, 1971 p. 4)

The commitment went deeper, of course, than communication research or even communication: it was part of a general preoccupation with development. But it had the effect of moving communication interests into specific and action-oriented fields. On the one hand, it produced the concept of "policies" - statements of communication behaviour at the societal level, which assume a direction and an impetus for communication systems. On the other hand, it introduced the concept of planning for communications, at a level which was more complete and holistic than ad hoc or institutional planning.

Policies (and the word is used with good reason in its plural form) are primarily political statements; they may be expressed finally as
goals and targets (indeed they must be, if planning is to proceed), but they derive from assumptions about the philosophy and social structure of their environment. The discussion of policies which has been heard in the seventies has normally occurred at a national, often international level; it relates to such issues as the balance of information flow, the transfer of technologies, and the activities of transnational enterprises. The discussion of planning, on the other hand, is less polemic: it is more concerned with the construction of frameworks and methodologies which assist the rational interpretation of policy.

The first 'official' description of communication policies is usually attributed to a UNESCO document 'Report of the Meeting of Experts on Communication Policies and Planning' - Paris, July 1972. It read:

"Communication policies are sets of principles and norms established to guide the behaviour of communication systems. Their orientation is fundamental and long-range, although they may have operational implications of short-range significance. They are shaped in the context of society's general approach to communication. Emanating from political ideologies, the social and economic conditions of the country and the values on which they are based, they strive to relate these to the real needs and prospective opportunities of 'communication'.

Communication policies exist in every society, though they may frequently be latent and disjointed, rather than clearly articulated and harmonized. What is proposed, therefore, is not something radically new, but rather an explicit
statement and deliberately prospective formulation of practices already established in society". (UNESCO, 1972 pp. 8-9)

One needs practice in the reading of international reports, which are framed in a particular set of circumstances; they tend to reflect a careful consensus of opinion, and hence of political systems, even when participants attend expert meetings in a personal capacity.

Thus, descriptions of communication policy may appear, prima facie, to be little more than a rationalization of existing practices. In fact, the text is saying something rather different. It is admitting that, without a clear analysis and articulation of existing structures and influences upon communication, we cannot plan at all in any meaningful or realistic way. Indeed, the same document goes on to discuss implications for planning:

"Beyond policies is strategic planning, which determines the alternative ways to achieve long-range goals and sets the frame of reference for shorter-range operational planning. Strategic planning translates into quantified targets and systematic approaches the general objectives of communication policies ......

Generally, the meeting noted two diametric positions between which individual countries would chose intermediary positions:

The intrusion of planning on communication services exclusively when the emergence of new technologies requires regulation and definition, or when broad new communication
services are required which will not be provided by a market economy;

The integrated centralized planning of the communication sector in all its dimensions as an essential part of the political and state-building process.

In reality strategic planning of communication would take place under constraints which operate to a greater or lesser degree in all societies. One difficulty encountered in long-term strategic plans is due to the rapid changes in technology and "consumer" attitudes. Another difficulty is that the goals, objectives and social functions for communication may require modification with changing economic and social conditions. A third difficulty arises from the fact that communication inevitably involves a blending of public and personal initiatives. Very often multiple objectives are being presented: the communication media are not simply providing a specific service or product: they will have to accept a variety of demands from economic, social, political and creative points of view. Planning procedures therefore have to be devised to accommodate this variety of objectives and to consider future technological developments.

At the same time, it was emphasized that such constraints should not be an argument to the point where governments and media enterprises neglect or reject the importance of strategic planning, otherwise a situation arises in which long-term commitments are made without due consideration of their implications. These are decisions which require public
acknowledgement and deliberate choice; they cannot be left entirely to the initiative of engineers, lawyers, or other specialists.

Operational planning translates policies and strategic plans to the commitment of material and human resources, into administrative and operational structures, into categories of programme output and ways of involvement beyond the production/distribution process itself (co-ordination with other agencies, reception, feedback). It covers recruitment and training of manpower and co-operation with specialists or institutions which may contribute essential services (technological institutes, industry, statistical and research services, etc.).

Strategic planning and operational planning are one continuous process, not merely the drafting of plans which are presumed to be definitive. While one plan is being applied the next one is in preparation, and there is continual feedback from this preparation to actual operation in the light of changing needs and technologies. This is, of course, a primary responsibility of "management", but management will need the advice and guidance of professional communication planners.

Conceptually, it would be most satisfactory if action could go successively through the indicated stages: policies, strategies, operational planning, budgeting. In reality, however, planning and operational application can precede the formulation of policies. The emergence of new technologies
particularly striking in the communication field, the initiatives of powerful enterprises, either publicly or privately owned and externally generated, and the immediate needs of communication networks to extend their range and improve their quality lead to action wherein the long-range effects have never been considered. Engineers and regulatory agencies often are not aware of the fact that their decisions, made within a limited context to achieve immediate ends, may determine the future of communication for decades to come. If operational planning and policies are not co-ordinated considerable wastage and conflict may result". (Ibid, pp. 12-13)

Although it is quoted at length, there is naturally a good deal still unsaid in this presentation. It does not attempt (nor could it, in its context) to cope with such questions as: what happens when the analysis of communication policies apparently reveals structures and pressures which work against individual or even collective goals? By what means and mechanisms are communication policies re-oriented and re-directed, and under whose authority?

There is, however, in these statements a clear recognition of a functional relationship: policies determine the context and objectives of planning; planning articulates and embodies policies. What is absent, largely for political reasons, is an admission of the fact that policies are more than sets of norms; they must (if they are to be more than abstract descriptions) include an evaluation of political structures, the means of arriving at and regulating policy.
Academic Evolution

It should also be useful to look at those academic trends which have led to some consensus of thinking on communication policy and planning. To do this, we introduce a new diagram, Figure 3, which traces the academic evolution of the field. In this diagram, four tiers are proposed, approximately chronological. The first tier simply depicts the traditional, pre-industrial separation of the academic world into humanities, sciences and mathematics. The second tier (mainly 19th and early 20th Century) shows the emergence of the social sciences, technology, and applied mathematical fields, which generally grew out of, or around, the rise of industrialization. The third tier isolates those more recent disciplines (themselves derivative from the second tier) which are most directly relevant to communication planning: these had their main origins in the 1930s, but there has been a considerable enlargement of their range since the sixties, prompted mostly by increasing social, economic and commercial pressures.

This is in no way a definitive diagram: it depicts only that gradual focussing down of knowledge and skills which has led to the communication planning field (the fourth tier).

Component Disciplines

In Figure 3 the outlines of the field's evolution are summarized in such a way that systemic relationships are emphasized. Something further,
FIGURE 3.

Evolution of Communication Planning
however, must be said about content. It is important to examine the field's component parts - utilizing the three main spheres of communication research, technology and the applied social sciences (including development and public policy analysis). In this way, the elements of 'policies' and 'planning' and their interaction should become better differentiated.

The discussion begins with communication studies, because the main drive towards communication planning has come from communication practitioners and researchers: it is they who share most readily a conviction of the importance of communication in human life.

Communication Studies

There is a temptation, in historical accounts, to delve back too far to find where concepts are born. However, some of the preoccupations of communication planning do reflect traditional approaches and tensions in the organization of knowledge, such as are mirrored in the university curriculum. The original renaissance perception of education was an integrated view but, as the boundaries of academic enquiry widened, a need to specialize was felt and the original holistic attitude was corrupted. This is a process which is mirrored in Figure 3.

During the twentieth century, the dangers of over-specialization were again recognized, mainly because the compartmentalisation of knowledge tended to inhibit transfer from one speciality to another. Some areas of scientific enquiry were advanced largely because of such transfers (e.g. studies of the sun benefited from the combined efforts of astronomers, physicists, chemists and geologists. Moreover, problem-oriented fields such as educational and economic planning have had, necessarily, to pool the contributions of economics, sociology, management studies, etc.,
because these were all components of the problem under review.

Communication planning falls within this category: indeed communication research in general is an aggregate of a number of disciplines which have been gradually added to its repertoire.

Communication studies tend to be both holistic and divisible; the field is multi-disciplinary, but not always inter-disciplinary. Some aspects of virtually all research fields impinge upon it: physical theories are the basis of technical progress (theories of light, sound, etc.); the applied sciences and technology inspire modern mass communication forms; the social sciences touch upon communication processes and effects; the humanities are concerned with content and creativity.

In pre-war years, relatively little research into communication was carried out, apart from studies of propaganda or media-commissioned audience exposure and readership studies. There was also some early work in the belles-lettres tradition which mostly contrasted majority and minority cultures, as in essays by T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis.

The impetus of the Second World War brought advances on many fronts. Electronics and information theory inspired some of the process models which were popular in the forties. Studies of innovation acceptance, especially in agriculture, pointed towards post-war diffusion models. The work of behavioural psychologists promoted learning theories which became important in instructional media, in studies of perception, and in skills training and indoctrination.

One significance of these new advances was the opportunity which they sought to create far more scientific approaches to communication.
theory, using laboratory techniques and statistical and survey methods, as distinct from the pre-war discursive strain. The antithesis between descriptive and 'scientist' approaches proved extremely divisive in later years.

By the late forties, the tradition of dealing with mass communication was becoming entrenched, partly inspired by fashion, partly by the availability of finance. The biggest financiers of media research have always been Governments (especially in defence contexts) or the media industries themselves, a pattern which has had a good deal to do with research bias. But within such limits, the diversity was considerable.

Nevertheless, right up to the sixties and beyond, much of the debate among communication researchers mirrored the old argument of the sciences versus the humanities. There were differences of attitude (and discrepancies in results) between research conducted under controlled conditions in the laboratory, and impact and opinion studies conducted in the external world. There were adherents to the principle of scientism, those who were looking for rigour in experimental design; and there were those who felt that the variables were too great for such a restrictive view to be taken.

From the point of view of communication planning, what was missing was a sense of direction: a problem-oriented approach, stressing the social, and especially the developmental, relevance of communication policy.

However, from the early sixties some of the earlier basic concerns of communication research - with content, objectivity, scientism - changed as encounters with the developing world and the imperatives of technical assistance (into which communication researchers were increasingly drawn)
focused attention on what communication might, in controlled circumstances, achieve. A trend initiated by Wilbur Schramm's classic book "Mass Media and National Development", written in 1962 and published in 1964, drew together commentators of very different persuasions. In Schramm's own words:

"We must remember that the full power of mass communication has never been used, in any developing country, to push economic and social development forward. This is the really exciting question .... the challenge of the evidence presented here". (Schramm, 1964 p. 271)

The strongest impetus for change came from a belief that mass media, because of their scale and penetration, could solve telescopically massive educational problems in the developing world, though initially claims were made for the potential of communication which were rarely matched in performance. Schramm's contention that no country in the developing world had yet realised the full potential of mass communications still, on the whole, holds good; it was confirmed, for example, by a recent study by Katz and Wedell.

"Broadcasting in the Third World would be better served if its managers were to be more independent in their judgements; were not to take for granted the suitability of solutions devised elsewhere; and were to think imaginatively about the potential contribution of the resources they command to the development of their countries". (Katz and Wedell, 1977 p. 245)

However, though the opportunities raised by the mass media were sometimes uncritically assessed, they were soon tempered by experience.
And while the tempering has been salutary, the sense of commitment - of the possibility of harnessing communication to specific social and developmental ends - has persisted.

Nor has it been confined, in recent years, to the developing world. Partly as a result of field experience, partly as an extension of functional analysis to communication behaviour, a new tradition of research has grown up which firmly links communication studies with social policy issues, sees the international ramifications of communication, and is both critical and objective about communication waste.

Some of this research deals with international perspectives, especially information flow (e.g. that of Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974 and Schiller, 1976). Some concentrates on the relationship between communication and social structure (e.g. Halloran, 1974), economic and market forces (e.g. Smythe, 1977), political organisation (e.g. Blumler and McQuail, 1968), cultural content (e.g. Williams, 1965 and Hall, 1975), or a combination of a number of these perspectives, as in the work of Golding and Murdock (1977). Much of it is Marxist-inspired and conceptualised. But all of it moves away from earlier preoccupations with content, to emphasise the primary importance of context.

This rather protracted discussion of the growth of communication research has been necessary, because it illustrates the evolution of conditions necessary to communication planning. Communication studies have produced over the years some descriptive paradigms of communication processes and some empirical methods for their analysis. But until a sense of the need for communication policy emerged - articulating both the understanding of communication's role in social and political processes, and the belief that communication resources could, and should, be mobilized in the support of societal goals - the need for communication
planning did not arise. Once the motivation was there, other fields were also seen to be relevant (as happened earlier in the case of economic and educational planning, upon whose models communication planning is evidently dependent and derivative).

Development Theory

The link between communication studies and the communication planning field is patently the social sciences, and especially economic and development theory. It is from economic studies that much of the impetus towards planning came in the first place, and certainly the particular view of communication highlighted in this study.

Development studies - like communication planning - have partly grown out of experience: out of dissatisfaction with early theories of economic growth and the procedures of technical assistance.

Our original conception of development, as a process of modernization, has been so much modified in recent years that it has become almost unrecognizable. The founding premise was that for development to take place, an analogue had to be created in a developing country of a modern industrial state, and in order to consolidate this process and to establish adequate controls emphasis must be laid upon centralized planning forms and the creation of fixed term development plans with precise goals.

Experience led to a revised understanding. The influence of the modernization theory was that priority lay with the establishment of a stable, industrial sector, supported by a range of metropolitan institutions. Given this base, at some stage a take-off point would be reached,
after which development could continue under its own momentum. It was assumed that, after the industrial base had been established, there would be a 'trickle-down' effect moving from the centre, gradually touching the whole population. But in practice this did not occur. The urban metropolis often thrived, but the rural poor were untouched and often became poorer. New problems were created - in particular migration to the cities and the emergence of new ghettoes.

It took a long time for this reality to be acknowledged. But once it was accepted, new kinds of development policy had to be evolved. This time, the main thrust was upon rural development and the integration of rural projects. The centralized planning structures and fixed development plans remained, but their contents changed: they had less to say about industrial growth and short-term benefits, more about social integration and appropriate technologies. At least in conception, if not always in practice, they were concerned more with the recipients of development programmes, and new concepts - of dialogue, of access and participation by development users - were introduced into the discussion. The evaluation platform was itself widened, and simple economic indicators were extended to include indicators of social and cultural growth. The process is incomplete, but the shift in emphasis now seems to be entrenched.

It has led, in particular, to the philosophy of the New International Economic Order and to the concepts of an 'alternative' or 'another' development, based on the encouragement of self-reliance rather than on the transfer of resources and technologies within a traditional global production and distribution system. It is summarized in many texts, one example being the excerpt below from a project proposal for a United Nations Development Strategy for the Eighties and Beyond.
"Briefly, the NIEO... aims at providing the kind of international economic relations which would ensure favourable conditions for the development of each society, be it in the North or in the South. The new concepts include the recognition that development cannot be reduced to economic growth, as necessary - if purposeful and socially sound - as that may be, but that it is rather a human-centred process aiming at satisfying human needs, both material and non-material, through self-reliance, endogeny, harmony with the environment, and structural transformations".

(Development Dialogue, 1978:1 p. 107)

Applied Social Sciences

Influential from a different viewpoint - that of methodology and technique - have been the management sciences.

These too have grown out of experience, in an attempt to improve casual and improvised approaches to the creation of institutions, production and distribution systems.

In earlier days, the emphasis of the management sciences was upon systems planning, but the purity of this approach was soon contaminated by contact with real-world industrial problems, and a more pragmatic line was substituted. It was clear that in the majority of cases business management could not be reduced to an arbitrary and absolute set of rules: too many uncertainty factors and value-based assumptions intruded.

A particularly useful aspect of management and business studies from the point of view of the communication planner was the area of decision-making and policy formulation, and the more controlled approach seen in
small group interaction studies, conflict resolution, and techniques for group planning. But other applied social sciences have also made their separate contributions. At the macro level, it is evident that the communication policy maker and planner must draw upon the field of sociology (especially the study of innovations), of political science, of psychology and the behavioural sciences, of organization and decision-making theory.

At the level of communication sub-systems, the list of potential borrowings is wider still. A field such as educational technology, for example, is of considerable value; the most complete project analyses available to date derive from the field of educational media, simply because it is here that systems thinking and application have gone further and traditions of evaluation are stronger. The same is true of studies of agriculture, health, population, etc., as seen from a communication standpoint. In some heavily promoted fields such as population studies, there is already a considerable literature on communication issues, including the planning of appropriate communication support systems.

Technology

The final group of influences is in the realm of technology itself, including both hardware and software considerations.

In communication planning, we are particularly concerned with the transfer of communication technologies from the industrialised to the developing world. The term 'transfer' is used here mainly because it is accepted terminology in the literature of technical cooperation, though even its proponents recognise its weaknesses. C V Vaitsos (1970) said of technology transfer that it was either a very loose concept, or
one which showed a limited understanding of the context of technological
development: it might even be considered diplomatic usage, giving a tone
of respectability to what was usually a straightforward commercial process.
Behind it, at any rate, is a fairly crude assumption: that the difference
between developed and developing countries is measured in indices of
technology. It is technology (in the broadest configuration of hardware,
techniques of production, and sustaining infrastructures of management
and information systems) which has produced, and maintains, the industrial-
ised world; to bridge the gap, a whole technological environment has to be 'transferred' in some way. The transfer may be effected through com-
mmercial channels, or it may be 'donated' (not necessarily with disinterest)
through technical assistance programmes.

This is a simplistic and possibly a somewhat arbitrary description,
and one has to bear in mind that communication technology does not fully
correspond to industrial technology. The products of communication tech-
nology are ideas, information or messages rather than physical products,
and the problem is not simply one of designing or selecting a technology to
suit local conditions: there is often a basic dispute as to what constitu-
tes the production need. Nevertheless, the description does seem to
match, in general terms, early communication transfer experience.

In the earliest stages (during the 50's and 60's) communication
technology was often treated in the same way as any other technology.
There was an emphasis on hardware, which was the basis of most project
approaches at that time, whether they were commercially sponsored or
part of aid programmes. However, the sale or donation of equipment was
often accompanied by the provision of foreign experts, who took with
them into the developing world prescriptive models of excellence based
upon their own professional experience. Often this was done with the
very best intentions; the work of the BBC (acting on behalf of the British Government) is a case in point. The organisational model of the BBC is based upon quality and sophistication of personnel, a variety of audiences, and a balance of political tensions, which is alien to most African states: yet it was often imposed, in post-colonial times, without question (cf. Golding, 1977). The same was true of the French broadcasting pattern in colonial territories (cf. Cruise O'Brien, 1976).

Nevertheless, more than a decade ago, technical assistance became generally more self-critical, and a period of transition began which was marked by a greater realism in promoting new technologies, together with greater rationality in reviewing their appropriateness. Some of this change in attitude came from the experiences of technical assistance programmes in general; in communication, other influences were also at work - curriculum reform, management by objectives, systems analysis - which changed the premises upon which recommendations were made.

The growth of realism was certainly salutary, and most of the projects of the late 60s and 70s benefited from it. Some of the earlier uses of mass media were stimulated by uncritical promotion, claiming that mass communications could help resolve almost any problem from shortages of schools and teachers to mass illiteracy. Though the claims were dubious, they have never been adequately investigated, because, while the potential of mass media was publicised extensively, far less was said about the system costs involved. Because governments were unwilling to commit large resources to the creation of educational mass media systems, because technical assistance programmes could not (or would not) cope with the volume of investment required to introduce or renovate a mass media system, action was promoted on a limited and experimental scale, on the premise that once the pilots had proven themselves, they could
be expanded. What was not recognised was that the pilot project could only prove itself within its own limited environment. The majority of pilot schemes introduced at this time were of short duration or of limited impact (and this applies to industrialised as well as to developing countries). One can instance educational television in Niger, CCTV in Ateneo de Manila in the Philippines, educational radio in Thailand, educational television in New Delhi. Without the advantage of economies of scale, they could not maintain themselves; lacking comprehensiveness, they did not furnish convincing evidence about large-scale futures.

The new realism, then, amounted to being more exact about what might be expected of a particular communication system. Not surprisingly, attention turned to smaller environments, compact countries and city states, where a whole educational system might be influenced within a measurable time by a media system which was within the economic resources of the country itself or of a technical assistance programme. A number of success stories in educational mass media stemmed from this new realism: El Salvador, Singapore, the Ivory Coast (or equally, the Open University in the United Kingdom, which itself operates as a closed and controllable system).

**Appropriate Technologies and Indigenous Development**

All of this led to a different understanding of 'technology' and hence of the concept of transfer.

The concept of 'technology' itself, once with exclusively hardware implications, was now taken to include aspects of knowledge, skill, experience, education and organizational structure, all of which had
heightened importance when technology transfer was considered. Of special significance was the evolutionary line of low-cost, self-help, intermediate, alternative and appropriate technologies (all of these concepts with differences of nuance, according to context and derivation, but all endeavouring to add a social and a cultural dimension to innovation). To quote from an OECD publication:

"The idea here is that the value of a new technology lies not only in its economic viability and its technical soundness, but in its adaption to the local social and cultural environment. Assessing the appropriateness of a technology necessarily implies some sort of value judgement, both on the part of those who develop it and those who will be using it, and when ideological considerations come into play, as they often do, appropriateness is at best a fluctuating concept ... (Jéquier, 1976 p. 19)

Such approaches go well beyond the traditional framework of technical assistance and technology transfer. In fact, 'alternative' technologies may be seen as antithetical to many aid structures, because they are founded on the premise that technology should be an endogenous creation of the countries themselves. The new approach is summarized in a keynote address to a seminar held in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1978, given by Francisco Sagasti:

"The increasing importance of technological progress in the economic growth of industrialized countries has been accompanied by a rapid concentration process, to the point where a few firms and government agencies dominate the majority of research and development expenditures and control
a substantial share of the existing stock of technology particularly in the dynamic industrial sectors ...

We still have to explore and understand better the way in which technology is being used as a dominant factor in North-South economic relations, but it is clear that the United States of America, the Western European countries, Japan, and even the socialist countries of Eastern Europe are primarily interested in offering their technology - coupled in some cases with food or capital - in exchange for the natural resources, the energy and the markets of the Third World. In exceptional cases Third World countries may be capable of furnishing their own capital and of providing their own food, but in all cases they will require access to the S and T (Science and Technology) knowledge that they are not capable of producing.

Therefore, against the possible benefits of science and technology for development - conquering disease, improving productivity, devising new materials and, in general, overcoming the constraints of nature - it is necessary to weigh the limitations imposed by the way in which S and T are inserted into an inequitable world order ...

All of these constraints on the use of S and T for development - which are the product of long historical processes closely intertwined with the emergence of underdevelopment - point out that Third World countries must organize themselves to develop their own endogenous S and T capabilities and to devise appropriate responses to the
pressures of the industrialized nations, thus establishing the basis for autonomous development". (Development Dialogue, 1979:1 p. 6)

The New Technologies

Another dimension for communication planning - and a new potential - is the new technologies. Technical developments in the communication sector (especially the silicone chip and the development of microprocessors) have revolutionised both macro and micro forms, so that there are now greater possibilities for both the large communication system (e.g. the satellite), or for small-scale systems which favour individual and community (e.g. the portapak camera, the video-cassette recorder). The tendency of the sixties was to consider only forms of mass communication, and mostly television; we are now concerned far more with information technologies going beyond mass media (computers, teletext systems), with micromedia and small-format technologies, and with integrated delivery systems which re-animate older media such as radio.

What is also important, however, is our attitude to technology, not merely as the instigator and precursor of mass communication forms, but as a planning instrument in its own right. In the past, we have tended to regard technology as the prerogative of the engineer, who invents new technologies in a vacuum, so that the planner can subsequently build around them. In the absence of defined communication policies, this is inevitably the case. But if societal needs are clearly expressed and objectives made specific, then the technologist can be included in the communication planning process. It is in such a context that experimental work with solar energy cells began for television, and it may be argued that the growth of interest in small-format media stems from a
realization by the technologist of demands made by users as well as by producers. A new development over the past five years has been the emphasis upon access to media by users and audiences, and upon participation in production processes. Recent technologies make this development possible, through their production of cheaper, more automatic, more portable and miniature media tools. In a wider sense, if the technologist can be a part of the communication planning team from the outset, then complete technical systems may be designed to user specifications. Moreover (and this is not specific to communications) electronic and computer technologies can be directly contributory to the planning process, making it more sophisticated, faster and more capable of formative evaluation through simulation.

Currently, therefore, the potential of the new technologies and the change in attitude towards technology transfer has produced a new political platform - that of self-reliance and endogenous development. Recent international conferences, like the Intergovernmental Conference for Cooperation on Activities, Needs and Programmes for Communication Development (held at UNESCO, Paris, in 1980) have been based upon this concept: the next triennial programme of UNESCO also underwrites the concept emphatically. This concept encapsulates much of what has just been argued - new attitudes to technical cooperation, new opportunities for technological development, a new balance in international forces. It is a flexible concept, with which communication planning has necessarily to deal.

**Systems Approaches**

Finally, and perhaps most relevant of all, are the planning techniques deriving from system approaches. The main source of such studies was in
the area of systems engineering, which is essentially a post-war pheno-
menon. It merged two traditions: of operations research, and of
systems analysis. The first was more concerned with the rational
utilization of existing technologies and resources, the second with
integrated planning, research and design; but both shared similar tools
of analysis, of logic and presentation.

For many years, the application of systems techniques in contexts
outside industry and technology was not foreseen, but by the sixties,
the habits of systems thinking had extended to many other areas. Society,
the polity, institutional forms were increasingly viewed in terms of
systemic relationships, and patterns of interaction and influence investi-
gated. Here, not only the methods of analysis, but also the techniques
of presentation (in models and systems diagrams), proved increasingly
useful. The kind of multi-dimensional planning which takes account of
human as well as technological systems and attempts to accommodate un-
certainties of social and political behaviour, and the ability to make
schematic representations of activities and parties involved in decision-
making, were to prove invaluable.

The Practice of Communication Planning

In developing a planning methodology, however, more pragmatic con-
siderations are also necessary. In essence, the rationale for development
planning is that development, irrespective of the economic or social
premises upon which it is founded, demands means of utilizing and con-
serving resources, and co-ordinating the institutions which manage
resources, in an integrated fashion. This is a position which is
accepted by the majority of developing countries, of whatever political
persuasion. The particular argument for communication planning is at
one remove from this central principle, being that: (i) communication resources, especially communication media, are comparable with other material and human resources; (ii) they are potentially significant within the development process, both as an economic activity in their own right and as a means of furthering other economic, social and educational activities; (iii) as such they will benefit from a planned and integrated approach; and (iv) suitable methods and structures need to be found to promote this integration.

It has to be admitted at the outset, however, that work on communication planning has been slow, restricted by both practical and methodological difficulties.

The theme of policies is probably more exotic and certainly more publicized than that of planning. UNESCO has, for example, organized three Intergovernmental Conferences on Communication Policies: one for Latin America and the Caribbean held in Costa Rica in 1976; a second for Asia held in Kuala Lumpur in February 1979, and a third for Africa held in Yaounde in July 1980. A similar exercise is planned for the Arab States, and possibly for Europe. Confrontations at the political level, largely arising from those policy issues which surround questions of information flow, technology transfer and the evolution of a New International Information and Communication Order, have made the earlier plans for an ordered sequence disputable, if not obsolete. The pattern of the future may well be changed by the outcome of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (a group of scholars and practitioners brought together by UNESCO after its 1976 General Conference), and by the 1980 Intergovernmental Conference for Cooperation on Activities, Needs and Programmes for Communication Development, which produced a consensus proposal for the establishment of an International Programme for the
Development of Communication.

These conferences are, nevertheless, in a somewhat different tradition. As political fora, they discuss a wide range of issues surrounding communication (information balance, research orientations, training, etc.), and come up with generalized recommendations, but they do not attempt to devise detailed policy statements. Before anything approaching such coherence can be envisaged, national policies must first be formulated and that situation is far from a reality. UNESCO has published a number of national communication policy studies, but these again tend to be descriptions of communication practice and philosophy: they are fragmented and relatively uncritical accounts of how communication agencies operate within set patterns of legislation.

The issues which are raised here are of a different order. They are concerned with developing mechanisms for the re-planning, re-orientation and re-formulation of communication systems, in the light of statements of policy which are specific enough to set parameters for future planning. That is an exercise which, while it inevitably operates within a political arena, attempts to take both the analysis and the prescription further than general policy boundaries. And for this, specific methodologies and techniques are needed.

There has been, so far, some groundwork in the development of economic guidelines for communication inventories, on the organization of communication planning data bases, and a study of communication indicators (covering social and cultural as well as economic dimensions) was completed by the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, in 1977 leading to a conference review by UNESCO in 1978 and to an interim publication (UNESCO, 1979b). A very useful activity also
undertaken for UNESCO by the East-West Communication Institute, Hawaii, was a review of planning methods in other disciplines (economics, education etc.), evaluating their relevance to the communication field, and this was later extended to a more detailed study of methodological adaption. There have also been a number of discursive anthologies and bibliographies of writings on the subject, usually attached to working conferences, and some prototype training programmes have been initiated, based on simulation planning exercises. Project workshops in Asia, Latin America and (in 1981) Africa are to be followed by an experimental course at the international level in 1982, designed to lead to more extensive post-graduate and post-experience courses.

There is, in this record, a sense of hesitancy, of fragmentation. This is not necessarily an indictment; we are embarking upon a new area of planning, and practical innovations are slow to materialize, even after the theoretical groundwork has been laid. The concept is, however, explicit (with some financial backing) in the new International Programme for the Development of Communication, proposed by UNESCO in 1980.

The Reality of Policy Formulation

A good deal has been said of the link between policies and planning, hardly anything of the acceptance of a policy platform in the first place. In the past, the communication sector has not generally been treated as a coherent sector in its own right, and it has not been accorded a particularly high place in the development hierarchy (a recent review of bilateral and multilateral technical assistance showed, for example, that communication development accounted for less than 0.5% of the total development allocation). It is, moreover, a field in which widespread
activity by the private sector is the norm, and by inference, in the public sector some potential for profitability, or at least self-sufficiency, is also commonly assumed. For communication policies to emerge, there must be a positive drive towards them, which has to be both motivated and financed.

This study is concerned with planning under conditions of technological opportunity, and it is evident that this drive can be of several kinds. It can, for example, be a response to commercial or market forces; the disciplines of the applied social sciences, of technology and of economics, came about partly because, once industrial structures were created, there were market incentives to study them further and plan for their optimization. However, this kind of drive has been mainly responsible (at least in capitalist countries) for more limited forms of operational planning - in communication, as in other fields. We are talking here of something rather different - of an integrated approach to communication planning which is concerned with the allocation and conservation of communication resources at a national level, and for this both social motivation and concomitant social policy are needed, with the possibility and acceptance of some regulatory means. This is something which has been associated, since the early years of this century, mainly with the socialist countries; but it has been encouraged, in the years since the Second World War by the imperatives of the development process, according to which countries which may be in no way socialist in political philosophy have nevertheless accepted the need for State intervention, responding to the stress of modernization.

In the developing world, communication planning is able to emerge as a focus of activity, not because the problems are necessarily more acute, but because the possibility of integrated planning for a comprehensive
sector like communication can at least be envisaged. In the industrialized world, outside of the socialist countries, communication industries are in many cases commercial, privately owned or corporately structured (especially in North America), and even where issues of public responsibility are legislated for, these are usually approached according to an individual medium or industry, rather than collectively. In the United States, where the vast majority of media industries are privately owned, the potential for regulation is particularly limited: usually to matters of technical behaviour (e.g. frequency allocation) or to antimonopoly. Investigations such as those conducted by Congress are political reviews, outside the Government's administrative structures. In the United Kingdom, the mechanism of the Royal Commission is similarly detached, its powers only recommendatory; again it is characteristically organized by industry or medium, and where controls exist (such as in the Press Council) these are often voluntary, the creation of the industries themselves. At best a corporation structure is evolved, as with the BBC. In the developing world, however, an acceptance of development imperatives has usually vested a far greater responsibility in planning ministries, co-ordinated in the bulk of cases by an economic planning board or its equivalent. While there is little tradition anywhere of treating communication as a coherent sector, or even as a significant sphere of development activity, structurally at least the potential exists in the developing world for a more comprehensive deployment of communication resources. Moreover, planning for communication in the developing world usually begins from a less entrenched position than in the West, consequently with less lobbying.

The Reality of Methodology

An equally important check against reality has to be made in the
field of methodology. It would be unwise to view systems analysis and its application to communication planning problems in an uncritical way, without recognizing doubts which have been expressed (in other fields where it has been applied, such as business studies) as to its viability. Such doubts are illustrated in the following statement by Martin Landau.

"It can be stated, in summary, that any indiscriminate legislation of end-states is as foolhardy as the indiscriminate application of means. Unless we understand the field-determined character of both, there will be those to pay the price of our conceit: for it is no more than to erect dream worlds even as we watch real ones collapse. A means-end relationship is an empirical proposition, a hypothesis into sheer speculation, but we lose the opportunity to observe consequences, and hence to build the knowledge that is needed. Effective development strategies depend, therefore, on accurate descriptions of systemic conditions and upon the construction of means-ends arrangements that are contextually or systematically relevant". (Landau, 1972 p. 173)

This is not an isolated quotation, and it seems clear that there are practical limits to the capacity of the planning process when dealing with human activity systems. These limits are of various kinds. Some are contextual, especially political (e.g. the nature of the society in which planning is expected to take place, and the philosophy which it adopts towards both communication and regulation in general). Others are institutional; planning can only operate successfully at specific levels (depending largely upon the control which the planner has over implementation). Others still are human, deriving from human caprice, irrationality, self-interest and fallibility (all the planning in the
world cannot compel a decision-maker to adopt rational criteria in making final judgements).

All of this has a major implication: that the parameters adopted for planning must face up to the challenge of realism, and adapt their premises accordingly. In consequence, they must also be reflected in research methodology.
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Once the initial literature search had been completed, the next stage, of devising a research strategy, inevitably involved some degree of compromise. While the strategy adopted should be based upon scientific method, it must also be flexible; it was important to recognise and distinguish between variables in the planning process, but without relying too heavily upon their separation, their dependence or independence. What was being tested was an operational approach used within a composite, real-life system, not a formal or mechanistic planning instrument.

Delimitation

The selection of research methodology therefore began with an exercise in delimitation. In the first place, it was important to specify the elements of the overall planning sequence which were to be considered, and these are perhaps best described diagrammatically.

In figure 4 the main elements of the planning and implementation process are summarised, in terms of a traditional systems model. They run from a preliminary gestation period, through stages of policy formulation, strategic planning and operational planning, to eventual implementation and evaluation. In Figure 4 the area considered central and critical to communication planning is enclosed by a box.

The gestation period, while important, cannot be legislated for in any precise sense; it is therefore excluded. Similarly, implementation and evaluation - although they must be planned in advance, in the sense of creating enabling structures - are still generally outside the limits of
FIGURE 4.

PLANNING PARAMETERS
the initial planning process. Attention was therefore to be concentrated on the phases of policy formulation, strategic planning and operational planning, as the main components of the formative planning process.

At the same time, the research need, as opposed to the planning need, would inevitably extend beyond this central core, if it were accepted that planning is not a self-contained activity, but intended to lead to practical and appropriate action. This would require the research strategy to include the area of implementation, since it is only through the evaluation of results that the adequacy of planning can be assessed and planning models refined. Thus, while the boxed section of Figure 4 defines the central concern of planning, research into planning would necessarily have to consider the whole sequence.

This argument led to a second delimitation, which contrasted planning theory and practice.

The distinction was between the conduct of planning and planning surveys (i.e. the production and implementation of plans), and theories of the planning process (i.e. the formulation, testing and refinement of methodologies of planning). Naturally, there is a close relationship between the two: methodological studies serve to catalyse the production of adequate plans, and the success of the latter is to some extent measured by the adequacy of the former. But this research was not to be concerned primarily with techniques of planning, or planning theory per se; it sought to develop an operational framework within which various planning styles and methods might be accommodated, according to prevailing societal values and planning traditions. In this process, if one accepted the basic distinction drawn by Middleton (1980) between rational/comprehensive planning (which moves in a predominantly linear and ordered sequence from
needs assessment through to evaluation), and incremental planning (which moves in small steps towards a consensus based on bargaining arrangements), the probability was that the rational/comprehensive mode would be emphasised, because it reflected the dominant pattern in the developing world, and was therefore the most attuned to reality. At the same time, it was hoped that the framework, as it emerged, would be flexible enough to accommodate to new and innovative planning styles, which extend beyond simple strategies of resource allocation, and in the final chapter of this thesis, the implications of the research are reviewed in terms of participatory, transactive and other radical planning approaches.

In research of this kind, however, strategy is determined by desired outcomes; where models are constructed, their formulation is governed by the kind of operational instrument which is ultimately sought, and this in turn places an emphasis upon their practical testability.

In this case, the desired outcome was to develop a planning strategy which would lead to (i) rational planning (in the sense of logical, consistent plans meeting predetermined objectives), and (ii) planning capable of implementation, carrying within itself both the motivation and the means for follow-up.

Such a strategy would clearly have to include both the design of planning tools (i.e. instruments of planning for both general and specific circumstances) and their application (i.e. the planning process would also have to be considered, to ensure relevant expertise in planning teams and the encouragement of consensus among lead figures (planners and political decision makers) and participants (the audience who are the subjects of planning, and who have an ultimate stake in the results of the plan). Additionally, the strategy must include means of evaluation, which in
this context was likely to imply, mainly, formative evaluation and the evaluation of processes (i.e. an assessment of the planning design as it emerged, and the subsequent monitoring and evaluation of its use). Quantitative and statistical techniques, and methods of summative evaluation, were less likely to be employed (for reasons described later in this chapter, when the research strategy is compared with more orthodox and controlled research designs.) Methodology needs are summarized in Figure 5.

Basic Assumptions

To develop the research strategy a stage further, it was then necessary to make some more specific assumptions as to eventual outcomes, in terms of the planning product.

The first assumption was that the creation of a planning model should be prefaced by an elucidation of basic planning concepts, derived from relevant literature and from personal experience, but evaluated and modified, as far as possible, through a detailed analysis of project case studies and of earlier planning surveys, and expanded, on the basis of this analysis, into a series of hypothetical planning principles.

The second assumption was that it would not be possible to evolve a planning model to suit all conditions and circumstances, even when these were confined to the developing world and focused on national level programmes. Accordingly, two steps in model construction were envisaged: the development, initially, of a generalised planning model (which would be termed a framework), and its subsequent adaptation, conforming to the demands of a particular environment, into a specific planning design (which would be termed a scenario). The terminology employed here was derived from planning literature, but employed in a novel sense: the term 'framework'
FIGURE 5.

METHODOLOGY NEEDS OF RESEARCH STRATEGY

Case Study Analysis
Concept Mapping
Model Building

DESIGN

EVALUATE

APPLY

Formative Evaluation
Process Evaluation

Framework and Scenario Construction
was chosen because it suggested an overall frame, or context, for planning, while the term 'scenario' had a more particular and local implication.

The third assumption was that the refinement of the planning model would depend upon field-testing and evaluation, which would ideally be a continuous process. At each stage of application, the local scenario should be evaluated carefully, and the results of this evaluation used to redefine both the framework from which it originated, and further adaptation into new scenario forms.

These assumptions were not hypotheses; while they would be tested to some extent experimentally in the ensuing research design, they were essentially guidelines for model construction.

Research Strategy

Given these assumptions, it was possible to evolve a more detailed research strategy, which is illustrated in Figure 6. Essentially, in the process which it describes, secondary analysis (of projects and actual planning surveys and exercises) was to be used as a guide in developing a generalised planning model or framework, which was then to be adapted for a particular field test. (In this case, it is important to note that the field test was an actual planning survey, devised to come up with a viable plan; it was not a pilot or laboratory study). Following the sequence of Figure 6, the various stages of planning were then to be evaluated, results analysed, and the final stage of implementation monitored and evaluated.

This was the ideal model upon which the research was based. However, one deviation occurred at a later stage, which should be acknowledged as early as possible. A field test was actually carried out in Afghanistan, and research into the methodology employed continued as far as the stage of production of operational plans. The original intention was to extend
PIVOTTI IN PRODUCT

LITERATURE SEARCH

HYPOTHESISATION OF PLANNING CONCEPTS

VALIDATION THROUGH ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES AND SURVEYS

ARTICULATION OF PLANNING PRINCIPLES

EVOLUTION OF PLANNING MODEL

FRAMEWORK

SELECTION OF TEST AND DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT OF PARTICULAR STRATEGY

SCENARIO

APPLICATION DURING ACTUAL FIELD STUDY

STRATEGIC PLAN

EVALUATION OF APPLICATION IN FIELD STUDY

OPERATIONAL PLAN (S)

ANALYSIS OF PLANNING CONTENT

IMPLEMENTATION

EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS OF EVALUATIONS

FIGURE 6.

OUTLINE OF RESEARCH STRATEGY
the study through to the stage of implementation, and to use the evaluation of results achieved (including some elements of summative evaluation) as a long-term means of assessment and adaptation. In the event, for reasons described later in the thesis, the stage of implementation was not reached, because of a series of political disturbances in Afghanistan, and field research was necessarily broken off after the planning phase had been completed; checks on the environmental factors associated with implementation were therefore not possible in this case.

In future, however, it should be possible to use the design in a different location, as the basis of a new scenario, in order to pursue the research to its logical and necessary conclusion.

Comparison with Orthodox Educational Research

It should be useful, at this stage, to compare the research strategy employed with other research approaches, as it was clearly different in character from the norm of educational and of much social science research. While it employed standard research instruments (the case study, the construction of models, field experiments), it was not concerned primarily with the explanation of observed phenomena, nor was it able to operate in limited environments, with controlled variables. Nor could it be based upon a traditional hypothetico-deductive method, or proceed from the formation of research hypotheses. Such hypotheses seek to explain relationships between phenomena and are generally limited in scope, dealing with expected relationships between known variables. Here, the intention was not to explain events, but to invent and operationalise a means of planning for structural change.

At the same time, many of the criteria and assumptions of the hypothetico-deductive method were retained, and the approach was, in intention,
logical and scientific. The degree to which the methodology adopted was comparable with more traditional approaches can be seen in Table 1, where the stages of a more orthodox educational research experiment are compared with the communication planning study.

It is acknowledged that the hypothetico-deductive approach to educational research design has not been without its critics. A number of commentators have attempted to show that the social sciences are different in kind from the natural sciences, that they are less susceptible to scientific rigour, that they require intuitive and empathetic as well as intellectual means of understanding, and that, in the case of action and operational research, especially when pitched at a macro level, not only are quantitatively-based research methods not always appropriate, but the definition and separation of variables is not always possible (cf Bantock, 1965 pp. 153-174). The intention in Table 1, however, is not so much to draw an arbitrary distinction between two research approaches, as to characterise a typical approach to an educational problem which is micro in character, amenable to statistical enquiry, and testable in a relatively direct fashion, and then to compare this with the strategy of the present research.

On the evidence of Table 1 it will be observed that there is a good deal of similarity between the two research strategies, so much so that in most cases the same terminology can be used to identify each major phase of activity. In the case of the educational research design, the first concern is problem definition, in the sense of narrowing down a field and problem area; this is followed by a literature review. This is succeeded (in Phase Two) by the construction of hypotheses (sometimes with the assistance of exploratory pilot studies), and the establishment of analytical procedures whereby these can be tested. Subsequently, in Phase Three,
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<td>3. Set up and conduct pilot studies</td>
<td>2. Review the literature</td>
<td>3. Hypothesise basic planning concepts and principles</td>
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<td>2. Review the literature</td>
<td>4. Formulate hypotheses</td>
<td>2. Review the literature</td>
<td>4. Validate through analysis of case studies and surveys</td>
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<td>4. Formulate hypotheses</td>
<td>6. Define population and select representative samples</td>
<td>7. Select or develop method of measurement</td>
<td>6. Adapt planning model to specific environment for field testing</td>
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<td>6. Define population and select representative samples</td>
<td>8. Collect data</td>
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<td>7. Select or develop method of measurement</td>
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<td>8. Collect data</td>
<td>10. Correlate and analyse evaluations</td>
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<td>10. Test hypotheses for statistical significance</td>
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the hypothesis is operationalised: a population determined, a sample chosen, and means of measurement and assessment devised. From this point, in Phase Four, data collection proceeds, which is then processed and analysed (in Phase Five), and the results tested for statistical significance, before interpretations are made and inferences drawn (Phase Six).

The communication planning research design also begins with problem definition, though here the intention is to focus down, and set parameters to, a problem which is already known, since it is the mobilising force behind the research.

In the second phase, however, there are more radical differences between the two strategies. In the case of the communication planning research, it was not possible to set up experimental or pilot surveys, but only to hypothesise, from secondary data and personal experience, a set of basic planning concepts, which were then validated or modified by comparing them with project case studies or earlier planning surveys. They were then expanded into a list of planning principles, which were employed, not to formulate research hypotheses, but to help construct a general planning model - in this case, described as an 'operational framework' for planning.

In later phases, there was again a greater identity between the two approaches. In both cases, the next step was one of operationalisation: the adaptation of the general planning model to a particular set of circumstances in which it could be field tested, in much the same way as a hypothesis has to be operationalised to match a particular problem or environment, with testability as a major criterion. In the communication planning context, the framework was specifically adapted to become a
planning 'scenario', built around the demands, characteristics and constraints of a particular setting. Although precise means of measurement could not be devised, it was nevertheless possible to develop a means of process evaluation, which monitored both the deviations from the scenario during the field test, and the psychological and group processes experienced by the planning team, as well as patterns of decision making. This corresponded to the phase of 'application'.

Subsequently, the correlation and analysis of the two evaluations corresponded to the phase of data processing, and the modification of the planning design to that of interpretation.

In summary, therefore, while the research strategy adopted was innovative and to some extent pragmatic, its approach was still similar, in fundamentals, to more orthodox research designs and should bear comparison with these.

**Phasing of the Research Strategy**

To revert to the main argument, the next methodological step was to break down the activity sequence of Figure 6 into more detailed steps. This is illustrated in Figure 7 and the phasing evolved is related below to its time frame. As stated earlier in this chapter, while the original intention was to evaluate the Afghanistan project throughout its period of implementation, in the event this proved impossible. Consequently, this stage of the research has been eliminated from Figure 7. An expanded account of the methodology employed will be found later in the text, as each phase is described in detail, but it is considered important at the outset to present an overview of the methodological base, as a guide to the study's organisation.
FIGURE 7.
SEQUENCE OF RESEARCH

PHASE ONE
DEFINITION

PHASE TWO
MODEL CONSTRUCTION

PHASE THREE
OPERATIONALISATION

PHASE FOUR
APPLICATION

PHASE FIVE
ANALYSIS

PHASE SIX
INTERPRETATION

DEFINE PROBLEM

REVIEW LITERATURE

HYPOTHESIS PLANNING CONCEPTS

VALIDATE THROUGH CASE STUDIES AND ELICIT PLANNING PRINCIPLES

EXTEND BY REVIEW OF PLANNING SURVEY

CONSTRUCT PLANNING FRAMEWORK

ADAPT AS PLANNING SCENARIO

APPLY SCENARIO IN FIELD TEST AND EVALUATE

CORRELATE AND ANALYSE EVALUATIONS

MODIFY FRAMEWORK DESIGN

EXAMINE IMPLICATIONS FOR EVOLUTION OF FUTURE PLANNING STRATEGIES
Phase One
(January - March 1976)

This phase involved a preliminary search of the relevant literature in the fields of communication research, communication policies and planning; the theory of planning and management; and the field of development studies.

Phase Two
(March - September 1976)

(i) The hypothesisation, from a literature search and from personal experience, of a number of guiding concepts for planning, set within a simple matrix, which might be used to initiate model building.

(ii) The evaluation and modification of these concepts, through the selection and analysis of a sample of eight communication projects at a variety of geographical and institutional levels, to identify common conditions, problems and constraints. (The term 'project' was understood here as a communication activity which had been planned, implemented and evaluated - i.e. it had reached a definite stage of realisation). Although the focus of the research was upon communication planning at a national level in the developing world, it was considered that, initially, a wider cross-section of projects could be helpful. The analysis was based upon secondary data alone.

(iii) The expansion of the basic concepts, as a result of (ii) above, into a list of hypothetical planning principles.
A parallel review of a communication planning survey, to isolate particular problems, difficulties and constraints. (A 'survey' denoted the preparation of a comprehensive communication plan. Such an analysis, therefore, was likely to reveal more of the conduct and techniques of planning than a project analysis).

The revision, and consolidation, of the hypothetical list of planning principles, taking account of (iv) above, and oriented towards model building.

The construction of a theoretical framework for communication planning, pitched at a national level and oriented towards development objectives.

Phase Three
(October 1976 - May 1977)

In this phase, the framework was used as a base for the construction of a planning scenario, to be utilised in a field survey. This survey was pitched at a national level, conducted in Afghanistan.

Phase Four
(May 1977 - January 1978)

Phase Four involved the monitoring and evaluation of this communication planning survey in the field. (The writer acted as project officer for the survey and visited the survey team in Afghanistan on three occasions).
Phase Five
(February 1978 - June 1979)

In this period the evaluations of the Afghanistan field were compared and analysed.

Phase Six
(July 1979 - January 1980)

The final phase comprised:

(i) A refinement of the framework, taking account of the preceding evaluation.

(ii) The formulation of general conclusions on the validity of the framework, and its implications for communication planning research and application.

The writing of the thesis has been organised in such a way that its presentation, and chapter headings, follow this sequence.
CHAPTER IV

PLANNING PRINCIPLES: PROJECT CASE STUDIES

The development of a planning framework was approached with some caution, prefaced by the isolation, as hypotheses, of a number of guiding concepts for communication planning, their correlation with earlier projects and planning surveys, and their expansion into planning principles.

This exercise was based on the second of the assumptions proposed in Chapter III. There it was argued that at least two steps would be needed in formulating a planning instrument: the creation, in the first place, of a generalised model or framework; and its subsequent adaptation into a local planning design or scenario.

At this stage, a further assumption was also considered necessary: that a distinction should be made between the design of a planning framework, and its application. In other words, certain concepts would probably relate mainly to the theoretical development of a planning model, while others would be more concerned with constraints and difficulties attached to the planning process, once a planning team was in existence. Thus, by extension, certain guiding principles for planning would also be more theoretical or technical in character (e.g. on the formulation of objectives), while others would consider socio-political or psychological factors (e.g. relationships with decision makers, or the supervision of multi-disciplinary planning teams). While both kinds of experience would probably be found in an analysis of specific case studies, it was thought that the construction, in advance, of a simple model for their categorisation would be helpful,
both in the examination of data and their eventual use in constructing an operational framework.

The original model proposed for this purpose was extremely simple, and is reproduced in Figure 8. Essentially, this separated out the two elements of design and application, and further divided each into activities of model building (i.e. framework design) and model adaptation (i.e. scenario construction) on the one hand, while assigning the planning process (i.e. scenario application) and report production to the second segment of the diagram. In this way, the sequencing already proposed in Figures 6 and 7 was retained.

This model was then used as a matrix, within which to isolate some key planning concepts which, it would seem (on the basis of personal experience and planning literature), should be reflected in further model building.

Key Concepts

Using the matrix as a guide, project reports, planning literature, personal conversations and correspondence were explored to suggest critical experiences in each dimension. This led to a broad, and unorganised, selection of potential guidelines, initially more than fifty, which were reviewed to see where overlaps and duplications occurred. On this basis, a revised list of 31 points was produced.

This list was still considered too diffuse for analytical purposes, and a further reduction was made, following an exercise in concept mapping. In this process, associated, principles were clustered, and an attempt was made to define the nature of each cluster, by using a few key words: in this way it was hoped that the essence of a concept would be exposed, but
These concepts were not formulated subjectively, although they have to some extent been ranked and interpreted through personal experience. Essentially they derive from a range of literatures: from educational technology, planning theory, evaluation, business and management studies, political theory and philosophy. Thus, the concept of comprehensiveness is integral to the systems approach and to rational-comprehensive views of planning, as are questions of timing, phasing and sequencing (cf Kahn, 1969, Johnson, Kast and Rosenzweig 1973); opposing and critical views stress realism and flexibility in planning (cf Caflden and Wildavsky 1974, Berweniste 1972, Wiseman, 1978). Emphasis on the clarification of objectives is common throughout the literature of educational technology and curriculum design (cf Bloom, 1956, Gagne, 1965 and, for a recent review, Rowntree, 1974). Questions of interdisciplinarity, team working and group organisation are emphasised in the literature of social and business organisation (cf Miller 1976, Bandura, 1977). There is a considerable modern literature on user involvement, access and participation (cf Etzioni 1968, Freire, 1972, Enzenburger 1974, and, for a review in the communication field, Bordenave 1977, and Berrigan, 1977). While the need for evaluation is now incorporated (at least as a theoretical principle) into most project approaches (cf Jamison and McAnany, 1978), the recent literature of evaluation itself stresses realism, the importance of individuals in decision making processes, and the need for flexible and utilisation-focused strategies (cf Borich 1974 and Patton 1978), in much the same way that current literature on social organisation and innovation also emphasises a pragmatic approach (cf Gross, Giacquinta and Bernstein 1971, Pettigrew 1973 and Van Gunsteren 1976). But it is perhaps the literature of disjointed-incrementalist planning which most emphasises the need for flexibility and a blend of planning styles in dealing with specific policy and planning situations (of Lindblom, 1968; Archibald, 1970; Galloway and Mahayani 1977; Bates 1978).

Even in this abbreviated account of the derivation of concepts, overlaps between disciplines can already be perceived, reflecting a growing convergence of thinking on planning needs and priorities. In fact, many of the concepts could have been clustered further still;...... (back to original text).
not made too specific through premature verbalisation.

In fact, these concepts could have been clustered further still; many of them were interlinked (that of need, and devolution, for example; or flexibility and realism). But a further reduction was not attempted, for two reasons. In the first place, all the concepts are connected - they are all aspects of an-emerging view of the planning process. And in the second place, the purpose of isolating them was to help pinpoint clear and utilitarian principles. To group them too closely at this stage might hinder this process, by moving too radically away from specific perspectives of planning.

In Figure 9 the key concepts are placed within the basic matrix of Figure 8. A simple commentary on each is given below, but it should be emphasised that these commentaries are still at the level of hypotheses, and are in no way prescriptive.

**Framework Design**

**Flexibility**

This implies the need for a planning framework to avoid dogmatism, over-dependence on external models, or restriction to a limited set of planning techniques. For a framework to be practically useful, it should be capable of adapting to a variety of contexts.

**Comprehensiveness**

This suggests that communication planning should be considered holistically, not setting out to emphasise the claims of a particular...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAMEWORK DESIGN</th>
<th>SCENARIO APPLICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FLEXIBILITY,</td>
<td>PRIMARY OF PEOPLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPREHENSIVENESS</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFLECTION OF NEED</td>
<td>REALISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVOLUTION</td>
<td>INTERDISCIPLINARITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLARITY OF OBJECTIVES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION</td>
<td>REPORT PRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAXIMISATION OF RESOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURES</td>
<td>EVALUATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 9.**

HYPOTHETICAL PLANNING CONCEPTS
medium or technology, or acting solely in the interests of a single sector or project. Much project planning is limited in this way, beginning only at the operational level, with a technical proposal for a television service, a film institute, a rural development campaign. The danger with this kind of planning is that it may lead to duplication, or even run counter to the overall objectives of the educational or social system of which it is a part.

Reflection of Need

Planning should begin from a genuine assessment of need, rather than from the predispositions of donors and decision-makers. Otherwise communication systems may be created which are irrelevant to, and hence rejected by, their audiences.

Devolution

Planning should broaden its base of participation as far as possible, avoiding excessive centralisation and dirigism, and ultimately extending as far as individual users.

Clarity of Objectives

For planning to proceed efficiently, objectives must be stated precisely, wherever possible quantified or expressed in measurable terms (e.g. of behavioural change).
Scenario Construction

Maximisation of Resources and Infrastructures

Existing resources and infrastructures should be used wherever possible. While a new institution may be simpler to plan, it can be wasteful, not simply in the sense of duplication, but also in discarding an accumulated reservoir of experience.

Timing

Planning should pay careful attention to timing, both in initiating the planning process, and in phasing its component activities.

Coordination

Mechanisms for coordination and cooperative working should be built into planning design and legislated for in advance.

Scenario Application

Primacy of People

In planning and decision-making people are more important than techniques; the planning process has to allow for their quality and creativ-ity, and provide latitude for manouevre.

Support

The support of decision makers and people in positions of influence is necessary for planning to proceed effectively and lead to implementation.
Realism

Conversely, recognition has to be given, in adapting and applying a planning model, to the limitations of people, processes, institutions and infrastructures.

Interdisciplinarity

Communication, as a mixed field, involves a number of specialisms, and allowance has to be made for these to work together in multi-disciplinary teams.

Report Production

Evaluation

In the preparation of plans for a communication system, means of evaluation should be included, to allow for reconsideration and revision of the system in the light of experience.

Comparison with Project Case Studies

All these concepts were derived from research literature, reinforced and filtered by personal experience, and they were therefore already partly substantiated as guiding concepts. But each existed at a general level of abstraction; what was being looked for in this case was not so much validation, as a comparison with real-life situations, leading to their definition and formulation with greater precision, in the context of communication projects. It was important... (BACK TO ORIGINAL TEXT ON PAGE 85).
realism and incrementalism in planning (cf Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974). Emphasis on the clarification of objectives is common throughout the literature of educational technology (cf Bloom, 1956 and Gagne, 1965), and there is an equally voluminous literature on evaluation (cf Popham, 1974). Questions of interdisciplinarity, team working and organisation are emphasised in the literature of social and business organisation, especially in the work of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations (cf Miller, 1976), and there is a considerable modern literature on user involvement, access and participation (cf. Berrigan, 1977, for a review in the communication field).

What was being looked for here, however, was not only validation, but also a comparison with real-life situations. It was important, in constructing a viable and practical planning model, to see how far such concepts were actually borne out in actual planning situations, and how far they were critical to implementation. At the same time, each concept needed to be stated, and amplified, in more specific terms, as a working principle.

It seemed necessary, therefore, to conduct a more disciplined examination of a selected number of projects, rather than embark upon a search for verification.

Two kinds of case study were likely to be of assistance. The first was of the project review or evaluation: detailed descriptions of projects, evaluations of their planning and implementation. The second was of the planning survey: records of earlier attempts at planning in the communication sphere.

The remainder of this chapter, and the chapter which follows are
devoted to such analyses.

**Project Case Studies**

Projects are, in general, based upon project documents: particularly in the case of projects financed through technical assistance, the donors demand a coherent description of goals, objectives, and means of implementation. Increasingly, too, evaluation studies are also required by donors, though these are most frequently summative reports on project results, rather than accounts of planning and implementation.

Consequently, a reasonable spread of potential subjects was available, even though many of the descriptive data were fugitive, and some criteria were needed for their delimitation. In an exercise of this kind, with specific outcomes in view, random selection seemed inappropriate.

**Criteria**

Several basic parameters might be considered. There was firstly a geographical criterion: was a representative, world-wide selection of projects required? Secondly, there was a functional parameter: should the project be concerned with communication structures in general, with mass communication structures, or with a particular use of communication (e.g. for education)? Thirdly, there was a question of level of development: was the reference frame to be confined to developing countries? Fourthly, there was an institutional criterion, defining the scope of the project; which level, or levels, of organisation and scale were of interest? Fifthly, there was a political criterion: should a variety of socio-political backgrounds be included? Sixthly, there was a criterion of data sources and data availability. And finally, there was a question of
number: how many cases could be accommodated in a preliminary analysis?

Evolution of Parameters

These criteria were of two kinds. There were firstly criteria to be applied by the researcher, to delimit the choice of potential subjects; these defined the range and character of possible projects. Secondly, there were external criteria which acted as constraints upon the research, limiting freedom of choice.

In the first category were parameters such as geographical location, function, level of development, institutional setting, political context. In the second were questions of data access and constraints of number.

The first category was naturally the most critical, and in settling upon relevant criteria, it was necessary to return to expected outcomes. What was being sought was a range of project experiences through which a wide variety of concepts could be investigated; the emphasis should therefore be on comprehensiveness, rather than on representativeness. The objective was not to devise a statistical, quota-based sample of projects, or to secure comparability, but to spread the enquiry as widely as possible.

From such a perspective, geographical variety appeared to be a valid criterion. At the same time it need not be imposed too rigorously, by insisting upon an exact sampling of regions.

Something similar might be argued for function. Communication deals in particular with processes and forms assisted by technology; a special focus is therefore on mass communication media and their utilisation. But this broad focus also embraces a range of communication applications - to
broadcasting, to education, rural development etc. - and a planning design should be able to accommodate each or all of these.

The parameters of level of development, and of institutional setting, were less straightforward. It could be argued that, since the study was to be mainly concerned with communication planning at a national level in developing countries, the choice of case studies should reflect the same bias. However, it was also considered that, in analysing projects, there need be no attempt to secure comparability: the planning concepts which were being analysed were general, not confined initially to a particular social, economic or institutional setting. And if this premise was accepted, then it would seem that the original matrix for the selection of case studies should also be broad and should probably include both developing and industrialised examples, as well as a range of institutional settings. In support of this view, it could also be said that more information is available on planning and decision-making processes in industrialised societies than in the developing world, and that smaller institutional settings are likely to furnish more specific data than national levels.

The position was not clear-cut, and it was considered carefully before research proceeded. Finally, however, it was decided to include in the original matrix for the selection of case studies both developing and industrialised countries, and a limited range of institutional settings. In the event, three basic institutional categories were retained: the large-scale or national; the small-scale or institutional, and the consortium (to cover inter-institutional arrangements). The last category may seem forced, but it does in fact represent a form of organisation which is fairly common, and which raises special problems of coordination and association.
This range provided a matrix for choice which was expressed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Systems</th>
<th>Consortium Arrangements</th>
<th>Institutional Settings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialised Countries</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In completing this matrix, it was also assumed that a geographical spread of projects would be reflected, and a range of functions.

The question of political context has been left deliberately until last. This posed special problems; in theory, at least, the same kind of variety should be assumed as for geographical location. In practice, however, the communist world was eventually excluded because of extreme difficulty in securing adequate data. While descriptive accounts of projects in communist countries exist, they are rarely complete or unambiguous in presentation, and file references, personal interviews or data verification proved impossible. Such projects were not finally reflected in the matrix (though this did not mean that the eventual planning design would necessarily be inappropriate to a socialist society).

Turning to the criteria of data collection and number, several constraints were apparent. In most cases, projects are not monitored throughout the stages of policy formulation and strategic planning, and where such accounts exist (for example, as part of a project evaluation) they are often compiled post-hoc, with decision-making processes either glossed over or pre-digested. Moreover, in the case of some developing country projects, for reasons of political sensitivity, there is a
tradition of reticence in recording such formative processes.

Consequently, in selecting projects, it was important to choose cases for which either extensive descriptions already existed (including evaluation data), or projects which had been well documented throughout their history, and to which direct access might be obtained through reference to sponsors, administrators and evaluators.

It was not considered important (or feasible) for any real degree of comparability to exist between these cases. The data were largely secondary, and few evaluations had been completed, originally, with an accent on planning or decision-making strategies. Comprehensiveness was more important, and descriptive and subjective accounts were extensively used: in determining planning principles, intuitive judgements and observations based on experience are often the most useful.

Number was a final constraint. While a selection of projects was needed, to give a reasonably broad canvas for analysis, it was impracticable to make this list too large. From the basic matrix it was clear that at least one project must be chosen to exemplify each category (i.e. a minimum of six projects). But as the research was intended to focus upon national-level planning within a developing world context, it was considered that this category (A in the matrix) should receive greater attention. A minimum of three projects at this level was therefore suggested, which brought the total number of case studies to eight.

The Selection Process

A large number of projects were considered, and in selecting among them, the criteria cited above were employed; the most significant constraint proved to be data availability. However, an interim list of possibilities was compiled, as follows.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL</th>
<th>CONSORTIUM</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore Educational Media Service</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (Kuala Lumpur)</td>
<td>Group Resources of Women (Tobago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysian Educational Media Service</td>
<td>Centre for Production and Training in Adult Education for Television (Singapore)</td>
<td>Centre for Educational Technology, University Sains Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) (India)</td>
<td>Asian Mass Communication Information and Research Centre (Singapore)</td>
<td>Film and Television Institute of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Radio in Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructional Television in American Samoa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL</th>
<th>CONSORTIUM</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Open University of the United Kingdom</td>
<td>International Broadcasting Institute (now International Institute of Communications)</td>
<td>Children's Television Workshop (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Broadcasting in Australia (Australian Broadcasting Commission)</td>
<td>Agency for Instructional Television (USA)</td>
<td>Hawaiian Public Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Broadcasting in the UK (British Broadcasting Corporation)</td>
<td></td>
<td>European Broadcasting Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telekolleg, (Munich) Educational Broadcasting in Japan (Nippon Hoso Kyokai)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Broadcasting in the USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This list had then to be reduced by two thirds (although the same degree of reduction was not necessary in each category). The reduction required was as shown below, with the number of potential cases itemized first, and the number required given afterwards in brackets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATIONAL</th>
<th>CONSORTIUM</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPING COUNTRIES</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As anticipated, some bias became evident during this review. A large proportion of the projects was concerned with educational media, and this emphasis could be accounted for in two ways. Firstly, at the time when the study was initiated, more research work had been done in the field of educational media than in general communication fields — particularly work on issues of technology transfer and exercises in evaluation. Secondly, my own experience had been mainly in the educational media field, and it was through personal contacts that access was secured to a number of original project documents, semi-official evaluations, files and memoranda, which were likely to be of particular interest in analysing planning processes.

It was acknowledged that, not only could much of this bias not be removed, but it would also be unproductive to attempt to do so. For information about early planning processes, some kind of personal network was essential, and a detailed knowledge of past events, although subjective, could still be of value in interpreting policies and decisions.

However, some attempt to mitigate this bias was necessary in making the final selection. I thought it important to reduce the apparent emphasis
upon Europe and Asia, where I had spent most of my professional life, and
to select projects which, even if familiar, were no longer under my direct
influence or supervision. Bearing these two provisos in mind, the final
matrix proposed was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL CONSORTIUM INSTITUTIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVELOPING COUNTRIES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore Educational Media Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITE Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador ITV System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this final selection a reasonable spread of geographical, functional
and political variables could be claimed. While some bias towards educa-
tional projects was still apparent, in the final analysis the determining
factor was data availability. Extensive published materials, including
detailed evaluations, were available for the ITV system in El Salvador,
the Open University and the Children's Television Workshop, and a recent
study had been made of the Agency for Instructional Television. Reasonable
materials were also available on SITE (Satellite Instructional Television
Experiment) in India.

The Singapore Educational Media Service, the Asia-Pacific Institute for
Broadcasting Development, and Group Resources of Women (GROW) were all projects
known to me, and both file references and unpublished evaluation data were
available. I also had a long-standing, though intermittent, connection with the Indian satellite experiment, and had worked (as a senior producer) with the Open University during its formative stages.

Literature Search

Initially, a literature search was made, to obtain as complete a range as possible of background documentation. In most instances, there was considerable material on evaluation, and generally good documentation on operational planning and implementation (since these occur at a point when commitment to a project is firm, and a record has necessarily to be kept of project development). Far less was available on strategic planning, and even less on policy formulation and management, while what could be found often appeared to be a post-hoc rationalisation.

Unfortunately, research into planning is interested in precisely those areas where the least data are available. The focus of interest is on the planning process; implementation records are of interest mainly as they cast light on the satisfactoriness or otherwise of the early planning design, and evaluation data are of most use when they include elements of process evaluation, including the monitoring of administrative and decision-making processes. Such evaluations are still rare.

The next task was therefore to re-sift the available data, and to supplement it where there were discernible gaps. Personal requests were made to agencies, organisations and sponsors for additional material; in some cases a continuing correspondence or personal dialogue was initiated, and additional bibliographic references were sought.

The collected data was then categorised, according to the concepts
summarised and sequenced in Figure 9.

Nature of the Projects

A fuller description of each project appears in Annex 1, but it should be useful at this point to characterise them in brief.

The Singapore Educational Television Service (now the Singapore Educational Media Service) began operations in 1967: it was attached to the Ministry of Education, producing educational television programmes for transmission over the national broadcasting channel. The Service was conceived as an aid to educational reform, and a support to curriculum renovation; it emphasised utilisation and evaluation, and drew heavily on the teaching force in programme planning and production. Although a national service, it was dealing, in the Republic of Singapore, with a very limited population; while early transmissions, directed towards Lower Secondary classes, reached 81% of their target audience, this still involved an audience of only 64,000.

The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE), in India is one of the best known of recent media experiments; for a period of a year, from 1975-6, it broadcast programmes for four hours daily to rural audiences in 2,400 villages across six states, using a loaned, NASA satellite, which was part of an experiment in direct broadcasting techniques. Programme production was by a number of agencies, under the overall supervision of All-India Radio, and the experiment was fully evaluated; it was seen as a test of national capacity in both hardware and software domains.

The introduction of instructional television into El Salvador in 1969
was also conceived as part of a comprehensive educational reform programme; technical assistance was provided by USAID, and an extensive evaluation of the system was carried out by the Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University. Television programmes were gradually introduced, in step with curriculum renovation, and a massive effort was made in the area of teacher training.

The Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (originally the Asian Broadcasting Training Institute) was a regional venture, with UNESCO sponsorship and the backing of the Asian Broadcasting Union. Working from the base of the Malaysian National Broadcasting Training Centre, it set out to create a full programme of training courses for Asian broadcasters, at an intermediate and advanced level, in a new institute in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time it also extended basic training in Asian countries, using mobile training teams.

GROW (Group Resources of Women), in the island of Tobago in the Caribbean, was pitched at a totally different level. Stimulated by International Women's Year, it sought to use communication media in the island community, emphasising small-format media, local radio and press, as part of a social development process, tackling in particular problems of migration, unemployment and reduced morale.

The Open University, in the United Kingdom, is another internationally known project; in 1971, it began teaching students at a distance, using a mix of correspondence courses, broadcasting, local study centres, summer schools, and a variety of other ad hoc aids, to bring university degrees within the reach of mature students who did not necessarily have academic qualifications and who could only work part-time.
The Agency for Instructional Television, in the United States, was a consortium project, which grew out of earlier experience in setting up instructional television libraries. Incorporated in 1973, it brought together a number of State education agencies, to pool resources for the development of common-user materials, with production contracted to selected production agencies, but with corporate planning and extensive pre-testing.

Finally, the Children’s Television Workshop is best known for its 'Sesame Street' programme, which began transmissions in November 1979. The workshop, sponsored by a number of agencies, most of them private, set out to produce high-quality children's programming, which could still reach wide audiences (including ghetto audiences); it placed a great deal of emphasis on formative programme research, relying on an effective interchange between producers and researchers.

The summary given in Annex 1 (which should be consulted at this stage) is in no way an exhaustive history or evaluation; it is mostly a distillation of the main sequence of events during the planning stages of each project, and an account of scope, objectives and functions. Its purpose is to give the reader, who may be unfamiliar with the projects' evolution, a succinct account of their character and workings, prior to their examination in the light of planning concepts. It should be noted in particular that the projects are discussed from their origins until the end of the year 1976 only (i.e. the point at which the analysis of data was carried out).

In certain cases, extensive studies were produced after this date, notably the various evaluations of the SITE experiment. These have, however, been utilised only where they throw light on formative planning
processes, and changes in planning structure after 1976 (e.g. within the Open University) are not recorded unless they also illuminate this earlier period.

In the section which follows, each of the hypothesised planning concepts is taken in turn, and reviewed in the light of the project case studies, to see where they are supported, modified or unconfirmed. Full references are provided in the reference bibliography at the end of the thesis.

FRAMEWORK DESIGN

Flexibility

In the projects considered, a rigid, theoretical approach was generally avoided; there were few suggestions that a master plan should be evolved, to be followed without variation. The fact that the planning approach generally matched an orthodox systems sequence was rarely pressed (it was made more explicit in the cases of the Open University, of the AIT and of El Salvador, but probably this was as much the result of an assimilated systems planning tradition as of a specific planning methodology being adopted).

Within the Agency for Instruction Television, the cohesion of its staff and clientele led to a far less structured planning process. In the view of John Middleton:

"The general planning philosophy is pragmatic and responsive, not prescriptive. AIT does not have a master blueprint for the future. There is no written five-year plan. Instead, the agency's planning procedure is very much like what Harlan Cleveland has called
"Improvisation on a general sense of direction".  
(Middleton, 1979 p. 101)

The decision-making processes of the AIT were equally pragmatic.

"Operating a consortium project requires a form of management that is particularly flexible and responsible. It must support action at all stages of project development without establishing bureaucratic constraints. It must establish accountability without rigidity, and it must revolve around rapid and effective decision-making mechanisms".  
(Ibid, p. 99)

The CTW exhibited similar flexibility, largely because it operated within a closed system. Its organisers were implicitly confident of their general goals, and variations in policy did not need justification to a wider audience.

Richard Polsky characterised Lloyd Morrisett's approach to planning (as one of the main architects, and guiding representative of the Carnegie Corporation) as follows:

"During the planning period he initiated a process of checks and balances that was used each time an important decision was to be made. Usually this process involved a preliminary study first, such as the feasibility study of the project proposal. The purpose of these studies was to determine the desirability and feasibility of embarking on a particular course of action. From these investigations came written documents articulating the significant findings,
and these documents in turn were scrutinised by specialists who made further recommendations, some of which were adapted. Then the decisions were made." (Polsky, 1974 pp. 98-99)

Can such an approach be considered a planning 'model'? Gerald Lesser was dubious in the case of CTW.

"Sesame Street's model, like all models, may simply be imaginary, a pretence that we understand something we do not. We may wish to believe that a model we understand is at work because it makes us confident that we can achieve similar success by following the model in the future. On the other hand, believing that a program's success has resulted from a combination of personal genius, luck and good timing makes it seem accidental and difficult to duplicate. As uncomfortable as the notion may be, Sesame Street's success probably resulted from just such a combination." (Lesser, 1974 p. 240)

At the same time, it was obvious that Morrisett's approach was a personal variation upon the rational - comprehensive mode of planning, serving to emphasise that external models may act as sources of inspiration, even sources of methodology, but not as blueprints. This is implicit in the systems approach: a model which depends upon the definition of objectives, derived in turn from an analysis of problems, is bound to be independent, since no two countries will share identical problems.

This concept was reinforced by most of the projects reviewed. The Open University planners and its early staff members looked at a variety of distance models around the world, especially in the United States, but produced their own variant; as early as 1968, the report of the Planning
Committee emphasised a shift away from a media emphasis to a correspondence base. An American writer, commenting on the University's character in 1974, had this to say:

"The Open University's potential contribution to higher education, then, may not reside exclusively in its economic and technological dimensions. So far from the OU having to borrow from existing institutions, in the best case we may look forward to a situation in which the OU helps the rest of us reconsider our curricular assumptions". (Birnbaum, 1974 p. 42)

Some of the projects were virtually new creations: the Childrens Television Workshop, or SITE. Others built upon precedent, but in an innovatory way (the AIT, for example, grew out of the earlier NIT and NITL, but was transformed in the process). Both of these adopted a pragmatic attitude towards earlier models, avoiding their mistakes, where identifiable, and building upon their successes.

So the OU developed its course team approach and the CTW its producer/researcher axis. Those responsible for the first design of El Salvador worked in the knowledge of earlier failures in American Samoa (many of the same personalities had been involved in both). Other projects were slower to learn how to initiate. Singapore probably placed too much emphasis in its early stages upon the European and especially the BBC school broadcasting model, partly because its principal adviser stemmed from a BBC background, but soon learned to adapt. GROW was less fortunate. Devised as an experiment in community media, it was deliberately left without sharp objectives or precise focus, in the belief that the community itself would supply a sense of direction. Rather too late in its develop-
ment, it realised that local forms do not parthogenesise: initiatives arise spontaneously only in a productive and nurturing atmosphere. SITE occupied a midway position; dominated at first by an external systems model, it came to grips, possibly too late, with indigenisation. The AIBD was both successful and unsuccessful in avoiding external influence. As an organisation it had to be innovatory; its founding premise was that it should create a unique form of regional institute. It adopted new attitudes towards course construction (stressing modularity at a time when this was still novel) and based its training programme specifically upon regional need. Where it apparently failed, at least in its early stages, was in being unable to shake off the narrowness and professional mystique of broadcasting itself. This was not so much the result of an over-dependence upon external models, as an over-dependence upon Western broadcasting philosophy. In some ways it was probably inevitable, as the broadcasting organisations which it represented were themselves strongly influenced by that same philosophy: that 'professional' production and technical quality are critical, that archetypal organisational patterns exist in broadcasting from which departure is fraught with danger, that the 'practical' qualities of broadcasting are removed from, and superior to, the preoccupations of research (cf Golding 1977).

It was in the consideration of the CTW project that the transfer of communication models and technologies from the developed to the developing world was most directly discussed. At the time of the analysis, in 1976, communication technology transfer was not being studied systematically; it was not until 1977 for example that the UNESCO Collaborative Project on Technology Transfer and Communication was begun (including, incidentally, as one of its case studies an investigation of the adaptation of 'Sesame Street' to Mexico, in the series 'Plaza Sesamo'). But
Polsky had already, in 1974, isolated a key factor in successful transfers: basing the approach on a method of problem-solving, rather than a direct replication.

"Can the Workshop's formula for success be transferred to a new situation in public television? Of course the factors of timing, money, planning, the skills and power of the key planners, and the generous element of luck can never be duplicated exactly. But one important lesson of the Workshop experience is the way the project's architects approached their problems and solved them. Not having a formula to copy, they selected their goals carefully, analysed what would be needed to reach them, and continuously refined and clarified them as the project developed. Planners of subsequent projects might try following this approach to problem-solving. (Op. cit. p. 112)

However, in the developing world, flexibility may also be important for other reasons. Organisers work in the knowledge that policies may be changed overnight, for reasons of political expediency. The AIBD, for example, saw several shifts of emphasis, as new potential donors came upon the horizon, each with a separate network of interests to be accommodated. In Singapore, the Service rarely knew in advance what its likely resources would be; it had necessarily to create proposals with shifting parameters.

This pragmatic emphasis is probably not surprising in the communication field. Media management and production are themselves characterised by rapid decision-making, and a willingness to accommodate (sometimes to thrive upon) crisis, because deadlines are endemic to the production process. In communication, at whatever level, circumstances change very rapidly: the whole thrust of technology is towards accelerated change.
The circumstances of communication planning at the project level, however, often force a set of pragmatic responses, in which compromises and short cuts have to be made in order to allow development to take place at all. This was recognised both by the Open University, and by Singapore, where artificially imposed deadlines enforced the compression of timescales for planning to a difficult if not impossible degree. The main thrust of the project's controllers (in both cases) was to respond to the critical pressure, but at the same time to try to reinstate the possibility of a rational planning sequence as soon as possible. Hence, in the Open University, even at the time of the project's greatest pressure, an iterative planning cycle was already being devised by a group of systems analysts, and planning was seen by the organisers as essentially a long-term and structural need.

In Singapore, too, many short-cuts were taken to meet deadlines, but the decisions made at this time were not considered inviolate, and mechanisms for adaptation were created (for example, through a network of advisory committees, and through the evaluation system).

The AIBD provides an excellent example of flexible planning strategy; it continually reshaped its planning structures as its own conditions changed. SITE came to similar conclusions, after an early period during which (under the influence of the technologists) an over-simplistic systems approach was in danger of emerging. In the first days of preparation for SITE, systems analysis dominated in the ranks of the social scientists as well as of the engineers. Subsequently it was admitted that, while communication planning is best seen as an integrated exercise, different planning methodologies may be used to advantage for different aspects of the overall design. In engineering, relatively straightforward systems techniques may be applied; in the planning of materials production, evaluation, and
training, mixed techniques are necessary, because of the greater emphasis upon human and creative factors. Here a socio-psychological approach, stressing structural and organisational aspects of planning for innovation, appears more relevant.

But flexibility should not be confused with improvisation. It has to operate within known parameters, a framework of generally accepted goals, and a set of structures which can handle decision-making, including means of arbitration. In GROW, policy-making was certainly flexible, but so lacking in retaining structures and overall direction that very little decision-making was finally made: the project was left to find its identity by random processes.

This kind of open-endedness is very different from the case of El Salvador, where long-term orientations were clear enough for subsidiary changes of direction to be accommodated within the overall framework (e.g. on the administrative location of the ITV service, and on the location and control of the main production complex). There is a balance to be struck between flexibility and pre-planning, and a need to avoid crisis planning when possible. If a general systemic line, an overall framework which sets parameters for planning flexibility, does not exist, outcomes are likely to be diffuse and ambivalent (as occurred, for example, with GROW). To say that one should not place excessive reliance upon a particular planning methodology does not mean that one need not be conscious of the existence of planning method.

Comprehensiveness

One of the main arguments advanced in support of integrated communication planning is that it forces planners to see projects in their over-
all social context. Unlike operational planning, it does not start from the assumption that a project is, by definition, necessary and needs only a technical plan for development. It begins by querying the rationale for the use of communication media in relation to a range of social and educational problems.

There seem to be two ways in which planning pitched at the operational level may be limited or biased. The first is that it may overemphasise a particular medium or technology. The second is that it may concentrate on a specific project to the exclusion of other environmental considerations. Each of these possibilities was considered in turn.

Two of the projects reviewed appeared to reflect an emphasis, not so much on a particular communication technology, but on communication technology per se. These were the AIBD, and GROW.

In the various project and background documents produced in support of the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, a substantial emphasis was placed upon the contribution which media might make to development, but for the most part it was unspecific. Its arguments for training were, in fact, far more convincing than for communication itself as a development tool, and the viewpoints adopted were, understandably, those of committed broadcasting professionals. It was this overemphasis upon communication, on behalf of a particular clientele, which produced some of the most significant tensions between the Institute's planners and its potential sponsor (the United Nations Development Programme). Only in later stages did its organisers, as the result of a self-educational process, become more sensitive to issues of development communication.

According to several of its evaluators, GROW exhibited the same fault;
Hosein, for example, concluded:

"Grow made the mistake of thinking communication first, development after".

(Hosein, 1975 p. 45)

Its original conception (in the UNESCO work programme) had a strong media focus, and while a report produced by an original consultant (Kinane 1973) certainly did not overemphasise media use (on the contrary, communication was hardly mentioned at all), the approved project document, upon which the execution of internationally sponsored projects is necessarily based, was a wide-ranging but ambivalent document. The media emphasis was, however, firmly retained by the principal expert attached to the project, who came from a professional Canadian broadcasting background and saw his role very much in media development terms. The relationship of communication to social and development goals remained unclear for some considerable time; the confusion actually intensified as the project continued.

In the original project formulation, the notion of media as a tool for meeting specific objectives was pressed.

"The all-important point here was that media were not seen as an independent element, but as an indispensable tool which they themselves would have to learn to master in order to achieve strongly desired objectives." (Solomon, 1975 p. 23)

But the difficulty in defining these objectives led to considerable ambiguity in assigning a viable media role. A UNESCO Secretariat visitor in April 1975 concluded:
"As a preliminary to setting objectives on a scale which could be attempted in the time available, the first need was to determine the precise nature of GROW. Some difficulty has been experienced in defining the exact relationship of development tasks to media, ..." (Hancock, 1975 p.2)

Among the other projects, SITE was a more difficult case to pinpoint. Throughout much of its history, the project had a hardware emphasis: reinforced by its origins within the Indian Space Research Organisation and NASA. Many of the objectives set for the demonstration were technical, concerning in particular the adaptation of technology to Indian conditions and production potential. The starting point was television; the project was conceived more as an exercise in what television technology could achieve in a rural setting than as an attempt to analyse fundamental problems and match technologies to their solution (in such a case, radio would have been given a stronger emphasis, and satellite technology might not, at that time, have figured at all). Yet in its implementation, the technological bias was not as extreme as had been feared, and the ISRO team at Ahmedabad showed itself very sensitive to social needs. Their examination of technology was within a broad management and utilisation framework, and for this reason what was learned had a wider application than might otherwise have been expected.

In face, the case of SITE was transitional: the project gradually moved away from concentration on a single dimension, towards greater understanding of its social and educational context. A number of other cases exhibited the same sensitivity.

A principal strength of the El Salvador project, according to its evaluators, lay in its function as only one strand of a sustained programme of educational reform.
"The Salvadorean experience underscores the argument that the ITV or any other instructional technology must be conceived in terms of broad system needs or objectives. ITV was not simply imposed over traditional practices and structures in El Salvador; rather, it was coordinated with other major changes in the country's school system." (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 164)

The British Open University was first promoted as the 'University of the Air' and originally envisaged as a media-based university, but later, at the entry point of the Advisory Committee and especially of the Planning Committee, broadcasting media were assigned to a subordinate function, as the result of a more disciplined analysis of student problems and motivations and a greater emphasis upon the need for interpersonal communication.

The history of the Singapore project was similar; while from the outset television was strictly interpreted in terms of curriculum assistance (and indeed the Service pressed for curriculum revision as part of its developmental process), it subsequently redefined its functions and became, five years after its inception, the Singapore Educational Media Service.

Likewise, AIT was comparable. Its focus of attention was upon television (with support materials), but it was the context of television use which was most important: programming was the concern of educators, devised in response to articulated educational needs.

In these cases, communication media were demonstrably part of an instructional design, within which specific relevance could be argued for each component. This position is less true of projects which operate in looser systems. Even so, in the case of the Children's Television Workshop,
while no multi-media programme was originally envisaged and a good deal of the impact of the project depended upon the American cultural veneration of television, a great deal of attention was focussed on the objectives of the workshop and upon what television might, or might not, be expected to achieve towards attaining these objectives.

Understandings of the social role of a project can grow, and in doing so they often extend well beyond the sphere of communication. The Open University was quick to see that broadcasting was only one component in a mix of teaching strategies, all of which related to broader educational objectives. But a sense of the other systems of which it was a part were slower to emerge - for example, its relationship to other educational broadcasting initiatives, to the wider adult education world, or to the growing network of distance learning systems, focused by the work of the Centre for International Cooperation and Services. Even at the outset several commentators concluded that the success of the Open University would ultimately depend on the ability of its planners and organisers to perceive its role in relation to these broader needs and traditions, especially the educational system of the UK as a whole.

"The term most often applied to the OU by those who observe it from outside is 'innovative'... The real point, however, is not the innovations themselves, but their effect upon Britain's established and slowly evolving educational system: for they bring to that system certain concepts which are not only foreign, but to some extent opposed to its basic canons." (Van der Eyken, 1974 p. 28)

"The tradition of adult education in Britain is old and deep; it is also ambiguous. It has roots in both radical
democracy and a much more conservative ethic. The idea that only an educated citizenry can assume its responsibilities for self-government is different from the view that the nation's elites have the moral task of education. Both ideas co-exist in the OU ..." (Birnbaum, 1974 p. 34)

In fact the Open University was probably more sensitive in its formative stages to such issues (at a time when many personalities were involved in policy making and planning) than later in its history, when it had become an entrenched, closed system, managed by its own academics. Its problems eventually became localised, more often related to strategies for survival in a competitive higher educational world, than to educational and social philosophy.

This was particularly marked in the context of communication. The University tended to see broadcasting only in relation to its own courses, and not from the perspective of all educational and minority users of broadcasting. It devoted relatively little attention to the impact of new communication technologies, preferring to leave broadcasting considerations to its BBC partner, and it is partly for this reason that it later encountered so many problems over access to transmission time. This is an excellent illustration of the need to establish project identity in a broad and creative framework.

**Reflection of Need**

The concept is closely allied to that of devolution which follows: whether or not the reflection of need is genuine depends largely on the existence of adequate mechanisms for needs determination. The concepts are taken separately, however, because one is best approached in theoretical, the other in technical terms.
The first problem is: whose need is to be reflected? Every project has planners, sponsors, consumers, each of whom has a perception, explicit or implicit, of what is his need. Is the need which is finally to be reflected a synthesis of all these separate demands, or is it (in the spirit of Western democratic philosophy) the need of the user which counts at heart. And is there, in any case, any real conflict or discrepancy between all or any of these demands?

Reflection of need is consequently an underlying concept and criterion, but the implications for planning are largely (i) to find means of defining the concept - e.g. through needs assessment techniques which establish objectives; (ii) to find means of translating it into practice - e.g. through the creation of mechanisms which involve all parties in the planning process, not simply planners and decision makers; and (iii) to find means of evaluating success or failure. These implications are discussed in other, derivative concepts - such as that of devolution; that of clarifying objectives; or that of evaluation.

In many senses, therefore, the examination of this concept is necessary in order to lay foundations for more specific principles which follow. But in doing so, there are other distinctions to be made on the perception of need in different environments, particularly in the developed and the developing world.

Clients and Users

A first, fundamental distinction is between different attitudes to communication users. The notion that communication resources, their planning and production, should be extended right down to the level of the individual is very recent, so much so that it is discussed mainly in
Chapter IX of this thesis, which looks forward to the future. As the discussion of devolution will show, the idea of user involvement raises considerable problems, both structural and philosophical.

Even in the industrialised Western world, where there is a long-standing tradition of open discussion of such issues, there are relatively few precedents for genuine public involvement (at the individual level) in policy making and planning. One very difficult constraint is imposed by the question of scale: especially in national communication systems, how can this be achieved, except through a network of committees which are unlikely to be genuine popular representations? It is for this reason that so much stress has been placed in recent years on the localisation of media systems, which should, in theory at least, allow for a readier access by local communities to political processes and a better identification with strategies.

But in the developed world, while formulae for needs determination are by no means universal, at least there are ample precedents at the level of client involvement.

In the projects reviewed, most planning strategies were based upon a thorough analysis of client opinion, often through direct solicitation. The Children's Television Workshop, the Open University, the Agency for Instructional Television all followed an approach in which theoretical concepts, although important to project development, were nevertheless validated as far as possible by a process of needs determination which tended to play down external pressures, and emphasise user needs.

The forms of this determination varied: from the publication of Government papers, in the case of the Open University, to meetings of
clients, in the case of the AIT, or to the special series of seminars convened by Gerald Lesser in the case of the CTW. John Middleton characterised the AIT process as follows:

"The use of the materials developed by AIT depends on the degree to which they meet widely shared and significant educational needs. The business of determining needs is in itself complex, combining elements of educational design with the politics of negotiation. Then come the tasks of forming a consortium and of producing materials that meet the requirements of many agencies and still maintain quality and integrity of purpose. All of this is accomplished in a sequence of activities carried out so that the users of the materials are involved in the substantive aspects of development. This sequence - the consortium development process - is more than a set of procedures. It is also (as was observed earlier) a style of work reflecting commitment to the ideal of consortium participation."

(Op Cit, 1976 p. 23)

In the third world, however, a special difficulty arises from the nature of political control. User participation implies forms of democratic action, of freedom to dissent, of pluralism, which are by no means invariable in the developing world, whatever the predominant political philosophy. Different understandings of the nature of access, or of the acceptability of forms of control, frequently cloud the communication field, and they are discussed more exhaustively in Chapter IX. Incompatibility between Western and other versions of communication freedom has compromised many recent international forums, especially those of UNESCO (where the adoption of a declaration on fundamental principles of mass media became
a major political issue). Without entering into value judgements, it is important for the communication planner to understand the basic political mores of the communication environment in which he is working. User participation is not an abstract right, but one subordinated to cultural context. Thus, in the case of the GROW project, one observer argued that, when its originators were considering project orientations, there was a totally different understanding of what was implied by community media in the Tobagonian context from what would be accepted in the Western industrialised world.

"It is significant that when she (Sheilah Solomon) attempts to draft a set of suitable objectives, she begins her draft with the words "Communication is to be used to persuade women that they have a vital role to play in society ... " The inclusion of the word "persuade" shows that she is thinking of the project in development communication terms exclusively. She sees the project as being concerned to develop self-help, but linked to external development objectives, not to self-knowledge and the realisation of latent potential in individuals." (Hancock, 1975 pp. 2-3)

Technical Assistance

A further distinction between the industrialised and the developing world arises from the fact that, in the Third World, many projects are carried out under a technical assistance umbrella, which means that the issue of need is also clouded by the aspirations, and perceptions, of donors and financing agencies, quite apart from the imperatives of a development plan.

In the case of the GROW project in Tobago, for example, it has already been suggested that the project arose, not so much in response to demands
from Tobago society, as to the theoretical concerns of an international agency, looking for a context in which to locate an 'access' project. This is not to say that the need was not latent in Tobagonian society, but it was not made operational, nor were the circumstances of the project's creation centred primarily upon this need.

It may be argued that, in some senses at least, some of the other projects fell into the same category. The concepts underlying the AIBD were very much dependent upon arguments expressed in a working paper prepared by the UNESCO Secretariat for a meeting of experts held in Bangkok in 1966 and substantially endorsed in the final meeting report (UNESCO 1967); this paper envisaged a systemic relationship between national, regional and international broadcasting training.

There was no overt reason to challenge this formula, but it did not coincide with established practice in the Asian region, nor with the habits of bilateral sponsors. A new concept of this kind takes longer to crystallize than the span of a single meeting or even a sequence of meetings, and the evolution of the AIBD was for many years hampered by a preference among national broadcasting organisations for foreign-based as opposed to national or regional training. It is only in more recent years that the positions adopted by the Bangkok meeting, and corroborated by a subsequent meeting of experts held in Malaysia, have found acceptance.

SITE, in India, may also be placed to some extent in the category of the 'theoretical' project. It was called a 'demonstration': an experiment to assess the practical viability of a theoretical construct. It was, in many senses, carried by the massiveness of its political support, the volume of international interest, and the care of its executors. However, as a project it could be said to be imposed, as a theoretical perception
of popular need, rather than as an articulation of popular demand.

Even from this limited sample, it would seem that in the developing world the situation as regards 'needs' and their determination is somewhat different, and that political forces cannot be so easily discounted.

The reasons for this position are complex. In the first place, the level of communication consciousness (and of planning and systems consciousness) is not so keen as in the industrialised world. The population, including planners and leaders, is not so exposed to communication forms and alternatives, and traditions of planning are less well established. The developing world has had to learn from its industrialised counterparts and sometimes it has found the planning forms of the West unsuited to its own situations; it has therefore begun to look for alternative approaches.

Secondly, mechanisms for consensus are not so well developed: in many countries, confrontation at the sectoral level is sidestepped by allowing each sector independent action. There is often a tradition of mutual non-interference which is ill-suited to communication planning across a broad front. Moreover, consensus in the wider understanding - involving user consultation - is generally unknown in the developing world, especially in ex-colonial countries, and traditions of unilateral action are more commonly found.

Thirdly, the tradition of politicisation in all matters affecting national development is already strong in the developing world, and this factor must be included in any planning design. In the majority of cases, the local development ministry or economic planning board is the most powerful agency and must be involved directly in any plans for change. At the same time, the interests of technical assistance agencies - whether
bilateral or multilateral - also have their impact. There is a natural tendency among such agencies to emphasise commercial or political factors, so that these enter into the planning dialogue. Among the bilaterals, economic issues (e.g. equipment-related projects) have tended to dominate; among the internationals, political issues are more common (the promotion, for example, of a particular platform - such as access to the media, or the right to communicate - which figures prominently in an agency's programme).

Each of these conditions changes, to some extent, the context in which needs are determined. The identification of need may, in the developing world, be either locally determined or appear as the joint effort of a particular country and of a donor agency (or group of agencies). In some cases, the process may be very similar to that found in industrialised world projects: based on a method of problem analysis. This was the case in El Salvador and in Singapore, where a planning apparatus comparable with those of the West was assembled to set objectives and define an operational programme. It was also found in SITE, where a complex network of planning committees was devised and the process of setting objectives generally modelled on accepted systems approaches. The SITE example was particularly interesting in that, in spite of the political pressures and forces which were instrumental in creating the project, planning mechanisms were still evolved to temper the political motivation and create a unified programme.

In the case of technical assistance projects, it is also common for needs determination to be entrusted to an expert team, working with local counterparts and representing both the interests of the country concerned and of the donor agency. In the case of El Salvador, for example, the project was initiated by an AID-financed feasibility study, and followed up by successive expert missions at each stage of development.
However, when we come to the other examples - to the AIBD and to GROW - we can perceive other forces at work. For these were in their origins, not so much based on needs determination as on a desire to call attention to, and emphasise, platforms, strategies and theoretical approaches which were, for one reason or another, currently fashionable.

Such attempts may be justified (at least in theory) when promoting concepts which have been formulated at an international level and nominally accepted, but which have not yet entered into the consciousness of individual Governments, planners and communication agencies. But it should be acknowledged that, on its own, the promotional device is not justifiable unless it is coupled with, or followed by, a more sustained and detached analysis of need. In the case of the AIBD, this more exhaustive analysis followed, spread over a period of years; in the case of GROW, the theoretical formulation (framed internationally, pressing a universal 'need' for access to the media and community involvement) was transposed with much less ease to the local situation.

Devolution

This concept has several dimensions. For planning to illuminate and reflect genuine need, it has to be decentralised, forced away from the traditional top-down planning model with its circumscribed cadre of participants. But this decentralisation can exist at a number of levels, ranging (as was seen above) from the involvement of clients and institutional users of a system, to more participatory forms which emphasise public access. These levels of devolution are not so much hierarchial, as arranged along a continuum of time and social philosophy; they reflect changes in political thought, and corresponding changes in patterns of
social organisation.

None of the projects considered made any real attempt to involve the individual user in its planning and policy making processes. In theory, GROW set out to do so, but failed utterly. However, some of the projects in the industrialised world had more success in achieving a restricted kind of devolution, reflecting the clearer focus of the debate in the developed world. Mostly, this amounted to the creation of means to assure client involvement in organisation and management.

This was particularly true of the AIT, the CTW and the Open University - each of which was essentially a closed system, with a restricted clientele.

"A vital feature of AIT design procedure is client involvement throughout. As noted above, these clients are the education decision-makers, not the eventual audience. Involvement begins with the needs determination process and continues through production. At every stage consortium agency opinions are heeded. (Middleton 1979, p. 98)

But within this planning base, the development process was clearly stated.

"Two phrases are used at AIT to help describe the process by which promising ideas become projects: needs determination and curriculum consensus. Each represents an attitude or philosophy. "Needs determination" is used in place of the more common phrase "needs assessment". AIT does not formally assess the needs of education; that is, it does not undertake a complete review of state
and provincial curricula. Instead, AIT works with education agencies to determine areas of curriculum where there is significant need for improvement and where school television can play a role. Thus, the AIT list of program priorities is not a comprehensive statement of the needs of education in the U.S. and Canada. It contains, instead, areas of need where there is "curriculum consensus". (Ibid, p. 28)

The Open University found itself in a more difficult position in that, while it remained a closed system, its users were by definition isolated from each other. It began by organising itself along traditional university lines, which proved in many ways impracticable (from a general management point of view, not merely in terms of participatory forms). Later it attempted to create more open forms of management, but in doing so experienced considerable problems.

When a university has no students on its campus, and a sizeable faculty membership, the traditional mechanisms of an academic Senate may prove to be unworkable and the committee structure which emerges in its place equally ponderous. An insistence upon participation may, in the end, lead to inertia in decision-making. And while strategies for student involvement have been devised, through regional forums, and these affect short range planning, it is difficult to see how they can have a substantial effect upon long-term policy.

Perhaps the Open University encountered the problem most specifically in its attempt to find a working relationship between central and regional entities. It began rather late to consider its devolutionary needs, and this late start affected later developments.
"It is a matter of debate whether the University has struck the right balance between the regional structure and the central structure. To some extent this was inevitable, in view of the fact that there was no coherent plan for the regions - they evolved ..." (OU Consultancy Service, 1976 p. 6/12)

However, it has since been argued that only through the regional structures can the factors of student engagement and liberalised planning be catered for. At the same time, the University depends for its cost-effectiveness on factors which are mainly associated with centralisation (cf. production and distribution). The resolution of this tension - classic in fields where effectiveness is based, theoretically, upon central direction and mass production - is at the heart of the modern communication planning dilemma.

A case may in fact be made, in certain instances, for a restriction upon, rather than a liberalisation of, open planning forms. Polsky concluded of the Children's Television Workshop:

"The planning operation was not an exercise in democracy. The demands for the project did not come from the people. In fact there was no real demand for the project until after it had completed its product." (Op. cit. p. 108)

In other words, in the CTW model consultation was widened to include all those sectors of society which, it was felt by the organisers, might contribute something within their specialist roles to the setting of Workshop goals and objectives, but there was no attempt to introduce parent or child participation at the planning stage.
In each of the cases above, however, the understanding of the term 'user' was relatively restricted. In the more recent literature of access and participation, it implies the democratisation of media, and the opening out of media channels and management to the public at large. A major difficulty with this version of user-involvement is that it has tended to become an article of faith, which breaks down in its specific application. At the level of the community media experiment it may be practical enough, but when extended to, say, the level of the national broadcasting organisation, it produces immediate logistical and organisational problems. In the BBC 'Open Door' experiment, for example, the original position taken up by producers of the Community Unit - that they should act only as technical consultants, not intruding their experience upon amateur users - was modified by practical experience so that they assumed a more significant advisory role. Even the process of selection poses its difficulties; when there are more aspirants than available air-time, some kind of quota system has to be introduced. The difficulty was summarised by Frances Berrigan, in her review of community media experiments in North American and Europe:

"As the activity moves away from the simpler stages into a consideration of the future development of the medium, real problems come to light ... There is the question of the value of participation itself, and the difficulty of developing self-programming groups which carry on their activity once the animation process has ended. What is the structure which will give access to the equipment for those who want it? And which will allow participation at whatever level the individual chooses? Can participation at any of the levels, community, local, regional or national, bring about democratisation of the communication and information flow, or is it just an
exchange of one select group for another? What is the structure which will allow meaningful dialogues to be set up and which will be effective? Is participation in the media a way to overcome passivity? Because video seems to be within the grasp of every individual the problems it poses crystallise thoughts about 'access and participation' to the mass media as a whole". (Berrigan, 1977 p. 212)

The problem is therefore classic - of combining liberalisation with an adequate infrastructural base, to allow initiatives to develop without them being stifled because of a lack of basic technical expertise. It has been the experience of the various cable systems, for example, that the mere provision of an open access channel, by itself, is not enough; for the channel to be utilised and to make a significant community contribution some basic training programmes for users also have to be devised, and some elementary infrastructural support. The earlier distinction - between the relatively restricted involvement of users in a closed system, as contrasted with the difficulties of genuine democratisation - also applies in the developing world. But there, the situation is compounded by other social and political factors. In the case of a relatively closed system - such as the AIBD - user involvement in decision-making and management is possible, provided that it can be afforded (it has not happened in the AIBD for economic rather than political reasons). The situation is roughly analogous with that of the AIT.

The situations of El Salvador and of Singapore were similar to that of the Open University; as originally envisaged, they were confined to formal educational levels and operated in specific instructional settings. In both cases, over the years more was done to involve teachers in the basic planning process (in Singapore, for example, teacher/users were soon brought into programme planning committees).
Even in a massive experiment such as SITE, some user involvement was possible at the level of the various sectors concerned with project development, or with regional organisers, but clearly the involvement of the rural population for whom the experiment was intended was unmanageable, apart from the adaptation of a certain amount of needs assessment research, to determine appropriate programme (rather than system) choices.

It was, however, in the context of GROW that the greatest paradoxes were apparent. GROW was defined as a community project; it was seen as an attempt to transpose principles of democratic access and participation, devised experimentally in the developing world, to a novel Third World setting. Yet in practice it probably exhibited less in the way of participatory forms than most of the other projects considered. Partly this was due to inadequate management, to diffuse objectives, and to the absence of those retaining structures which have already been remarked upon as necessary to all community projects. But there were also other reasons.

In its first planning stages, the GROW project attempted to bring about a full exchange of viewpoints. The pre-survey brought together both formal and informal community groups, to explore specific proposals, producing an atmosphere which was described by one observer as 'electric' (Solomon, 1975). Plans were made later for a regular committee-structure, to ensure liaison between the project and other development concerns. However:

"Little attempt was subsequently made to build on this foundation, or to use contacts and confidence won through interpersonal communication to develop media inputs into the development programmes." (Solomon, 1975 p. 49)
In the case of a special activity (a community newspaper) which finally dominated the project, it was reported (of the associate media adviser) that:

"He assumed that their present attitude of non-involvement was the normal situation in Tobago, and made little attempt to involve them in the planning or execution of the newspaper venture. The work previously done by local committees was not brought to his attention, so that the newspaper, when it did appear, represented not a continuation of group involvement but a departure from it". (Solomon, 1975 p. 61)

In other words, devolution in the developing world is not simply a matter of transposing ideas of community access and development, and setting up ideal structures. The concept of involvement may be so new within a society, so contrary to traditional patterns of social organisation, that new and innovative forms are needed, created specifically to match an analysis of the society's goals. This is not a mechanistic process; it has to determine how far the concept of community animation is relevant in the first place, and if so, under what conditions.

Clarity of Objectives

The importance of framing objectives is well accepted within the literature of systems planning and of evaluation, and its consideration here is mainly to establish how, in certain projects undertaken during the past decade, the task was approached and what difficulties were experienced. The methodology of setting and defining objectives has necessarily to be part of the framework design which follows.
In virtually all of the projects reviewed there was some mention of objectives and of their function. There were differences, however, in the degree of formality with which these were expressed. In certain contexts, the listing of objectives is a formal requirement at the stage of project preparation (e.g. within the UN system). Consequently, project documents for the AIBD and GROW contained such lists, though this did not necessarily mean that they were used as significant instruments within project thinking.

In El Salvador, the time at which the project was conceived, the fact that it benefitted from a considerable volume of US advice, and the nature of its evaluation meant that much of both project documentation and evaluation literature was couched in the language of curriculum development and educational reform. In this case, the planning of the project was very definitely conceived in terms of framing objectives and searching for appropriate solutions. Thus:

"El Salvador's decision-makers had three somewhat contradictory objectives in planning their Educational Reform; they wished to expand enrollments at the postprimary level; they wished to hold down budget increases, and if possible, to decrease costs per student; and they wished to improve the quality of education. If only the first two objectives were to be met ... ITV and the reform were unnecessary ... However ITV, introduced in the context of the reform, did satisfy the objective of improving quality." (Mayo et alia, 1976 pp. 159-60)

In the CTW, the approach was perhaps even more marked; after several extended staff meetings, a single unified document was developed: 'The Instructional Goals of the Childrens Television Workshop'. This goal
statement served as the producers', writers' and researchers' prime point of reference.

Singapore stemmed from a different tradition; it also came at an earlier time, and its original documentation did not use the same language. Nevertheless, one cannot assume that it is only when projects refer in specific terms to objectives that a process of planning through objectives is actually being considered. The style of planning in Singapore was actually more in keeping with the spirit of rational-comprehensive planning than a number of other projects which technically follow the systems formula. For example a major difficulty for GROW was the fact that its objectives were enumerated to satisfy a form (i.e. a prescribed document) rather than a need. On this point several observers were in agreement:

"It would almost certainly have been better not to have had a project document at all, but the forms of technical assistance dictate conditions and so a whole range of objectives was included in the hope that the community itself would, in the first year of the project's life, isolate specific priorities."

(Hancock, 1975 p. 3)

"Project documents are no doubt expected to conform to predetermined outlines, but in retrospect (and for the future) it might have been safer to allow the specific project areas to emerge from the work in the field while laying down concise and unambiguous objectives." (Solomon, 1975 p. 15)

Other projects were more at liberty to devise their own approaches. The AIT, working with a closer-knit nucleus of personalities, preferred to let its objectives crystallise as a function of its programme development pattern,
rather than to evolve a detailed structural plan. John Middleton summarised the process as follows:

"The AIT development system incorporates many - but not all - of the generally accepted features of 'scientific' instructional design. The basic design steps typical of this approach are: determine educational need and the context in which they are to be met, set objectives, conduct audience research, design prototypes to verify objectives, test revise and test again until objectives are met. The AIT version is technically weak at certain stages: objectives are not always clear, testing is partial, and testing after initial revision is generally lacking. But AIT design procedures are strong in other areas, notably learner verification and analysis of the context in which materials are used. They are especially strong in involving and satisfying users of the materials. (Op. cit. p. 98)

The Open University also followed a less formal approach (partly this was forced upon it by the nature of its original planning documents); it nevertheless attempted later to state its goals with more precision, and at the level of course production a more standard curriculum model was generally employed. SITE, from its earliest stages, worked through statements of objectives; these were included (for both programme and technical areas) in the original Memorandum of Understanding between NASA and the Indian Government.

Clearly, irrespective of formal terminology, the quality and precision of objectives are extremely important.
In consequence, their formulation is a technical exercise which raises a number of problems of articulation, of ranking and sequencing. Multiple objectives which attempt to cover all the tasks of a project can be confusing if there is no real discrimination between them. Probably the most coherent illustration of this problem occurred with GROW.

"Lack of clarity on ultimate objectives is the missing link that would have served to unify the bewildering grab-bag of Immediate Objectives, Areas of Activity and Specific Activities, listed for communication input ... Although they are not necessarily conflicting, it is still confusing to have four separate sections of the project document attempting to clarify what the project will in fact do ... The overall result is that the devil has a wonderful opportunity to quote scriptures for his own purpose - in other words, anyone can find justification for concentrating on any one aspect to the exclusion of others; one can also claim to be so paralysed by overwhelming expectations that one can do nothing at all." (Solomon, 1975 p. 14)

The lack of focus in the GROW project was quite deliberate: the project, as a community project, was not meant to lay down a direct, activist line. The point was in fact directly acknowledged in Tobago:

"I recognise that to frame the objective in the unequivocal way I have suggested would be to adopt a frankly activist approach ... I recognise too that the imprecision of the document stems not from a drafting failure but from the amalgamation of different philosophies of the methodology to be adopted by the project." (Solomon, 1975 p. 18)
But the same writer suggested that this partisan position might have been justified by the clear rationale which it would have given for specific media strategies.

"If, however, the overall objective had been made unmistakably clear, it might well have been possible to select for media treatment those aspects of all areas which best served to illustrate, or stimulate, initiative, self-reliance and self-education." (Ibid, p. 17)

Although the GROW project was clearly a special case, it was still a good example of how important it is for objectives to be clearly and unambiguously expressed; moreover, from the point of view of the evaluator, unclear objectives are problematic, because they do not offer a clear guide as to what should be evaluated. The generalised objectives encountered in the project documents of the AIBD were similarly unhelpful; they were a catalogue of possibilities, not a concise statement of project direction.

The problem appears to be one of framing objectives in such a way that they avoid being (i) vague goals, which can hardly fail to be approached - to some extent (as with SITE); or (ii) exhaustive lists, from which in practice some selection will have to be made (as in the AIBD and in GROW); or (iii) over-directive and highly specific statements, which may, if they are formulated too early in the development of a project, inhibit later growth. This is an issue with which any planning framework must deal, including a consideration of sequencing - i.e. at what stage are general goals sufficient, as a direction pointer; and when should these be translated into quantifiable targets, or specific, behaviourally-oriented tasks.
But this does not mean that objectives will not change, in definition or in emphasis, as projects develop. From an original catalogue of objectives, some may in practice achieve heightened prominence and others be underplayed. In the original India-US Agreement for SITE, for example, a number of general, instructional and technical objectives were listed; under the 'general heading' the following were included.

"General objectives:

The general objectives of the experiment are to: Gain experience in the development, testing and management of a satellite-based instructional television system particularly in rural areas and to determine optimal system parameters.

Demonstrate the potential value of satellite technology in the rapid development of effective mass communications in developing countries.

Demonstrate the potential value of satellite TV broadcasts in the practical instruction of village inhabitants.

Stimulate national development in India, with important managerial, economic, technological and social implications."

(Cowlan et alia 1973, p. 35)

In the event, it could be argued that, of these, the first was the most important: it was the experience of system design which was most valuable.
"None of us engaged in this experiment view it as an optimal operational system nor do we believe that one year's experiment will bring about large measurable social changes in the country. However, we do believe that through this experiment we will be able to learn how an ongoing system ought to be configured, installed and managed, and what are the necessary conditions for the programme to be effective."

(Yash Pal, 1974 p. 3)

Nonetheless, change should come about in response to genuine refinements of strategy, not simply to political shifts, as happened to some extent in Malaysia. The AIBD, through its various stages of project formulation, constantly redefined its objectives without any real changes being reflected in the project's organisational structure or in its programme: mostly these were made to satisfy the wishes of sponsors and the changing personalities associated with the Institute. So, in earlier project descriptions, the concentration was upon broadcasting; in later versions, the term 'communication' was generally used. Specific strands of activity were added or deleted as the emphasis moved from pure training to include (in theory) aspects of research and formative evaluation or information transfer. These could be meaningful changes, representing valid changes of philosophy; on the other hand, they could be purely tactical manoeuvres. If the latter, they could only confuse project planning, not being assimilated into the planning process.

SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION

Maximisation of Resources and Infrastructures

In most of the projects considered at least some attempt was made to capitalise upon the strengths of what was already available in the way of
The AIBD is a particularly good example. Even in its earliest days, it set out to map its functions in relation to other projects, but in later years, starved of funds, it maintained its identity almost entirely by working through existing institutions. In fact, although the Institute is a legal entity, it still has no independent physical existence; it operates in borrowed premises (in the campus of the Malaysian National Broadcasting Training Centre), it draws heavily upon national personnel, and it finds resources through a network of donors, bilateral and multi-lateral.

Conversely, the Open University 'saw itself originally not so much as a user of existing institutions (apart from the BBC), but as potentially threatened by them. The Vice-Chancellor, Walter Perry, was convinced that the University's most urgent problem was one of academic equivalence, to ensure the respect of the traditional academic establishment. Undoubtedly a good deal of doubt and ill-informed criticism was expressed in the early days by local authorities and adult education bodies - and from other sources too (e.g. publishers, who felt disturbed by what they saw as a rival publishing organisation). However, once the University had concentrated its energies upon winning over opposition, many of these anticipated tensions were dissolved. The publishers, for example, modified their attitude, once they realised that the OU had no intention of entering the textbook business and that the University could in practice considerably extend the range of the higher educational book market. Such difficulties might have been settled earlier had the original planners gone more deeply into extramural relationships.

Problems of this kind arose less obviously in El Salvador, because the ITV system was dealing with formal education, which already had its
fixed structures, and where coordination rather than institutional connection was needed. Nevertheless, there were some difficulties:

"Also at issue during the early stages of ITV was where to place overall responsibility for the new system. The Salvadoreans, aware of the many bureaucratic obstacles within their own Ministry of Education, argued for a new executive agency directly under the President ... The USAID representatives, on the other hand, were wary of granting the project too much administrative autonomy ... The debate was not settled on the merits of the argument, however, but rather by the fortuitous naming of Beneke as Minister for Education in July 1967, which ensured that IYV would receive strong support at the highest level." (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 28)

Singapore's position was similar to that of El Salvador, and the CTW and the AIT were both designed to maximise, often to exploit, existing initiatives. But somewhat different problems arose in the cases of GROW and of SITE, which were least successful in this regard.

At first sight, the situation should have been simple for GROW to resolve: as a community project, most of its resources were to hand and could be enlisted through personal contact. In practice, relatively little was done. It is still unclear why the radio resource of Trinidad and Tobago was not properly used (all the documentation suggests that it was available), and virtually no contacts were built up with Tobagonian community projects, apart from personal relationships set up by Olive Sawyer (a retired teacher, who had spent many years in the island). The community newspaper which was ultimately produced had more of the format of a tourist gazette and was actually printed outside Tobago.
In SITE, some of the same difficulties occurred at a macro level. An original split between ISRO and AIR meant finally that some broadcasting resources were inadequately exploited (e.g. the Poona Film and Television Institute, which was devoted almost entirely to training for the terrestrial expansion of television), and opportunities for cooperative working were lost. The same difficulty occurred in the context of evaluation.

"The initial design of the experiment called for a social evaluation to be conducted. Till two years ago we hadn't even begun. There were a number of agencies and university departments who, off and on, expressed a mild interest. We were torn between the need for keeping the evaluation experiment independent of us, and for ensuring that something did get started ...

(Yash Pal, 1975 p. 5)

It seems that for the pooling of resources between institutions working in the same general field more than goodwill is necessary: structures, and finally means of arbitration, are required (a point taken up in the discussion of coordination below).

**Timing**

Timing and phasing are critical elements in the systems planning tradition. They imply not simply the timing of the planning process as a whole, but also the phasing of activities within this process, in such a way that essential correlations are reflected, while still allowing an adequate interval for the completion of each task.

It was not expected, in a review of projects already several years
old, that much detail would be revealed about problems of phasing. However, it was thought that the timing of the overall planning process, and the phasing of principal blocks of activities - especially the relationship between policy formulation, strategic planning, operational planning and implementation - might be reasonably illustrated.

Initiation of Planning

The first question concerned the optimal point at which planning should begin, and this seemed, in these projects, to depend mainly on environmental considerations.

This has sometimes been expressed as the 'right time, right place' principle. It was stated quite explicitly by John Middleton in his evaluation of the Agency for Instructional Television.

"In sum, when AIT was formed, two necessary conditions for action existed: a widely shared need for higher quality school television; and a proven model to meet this need - the NIT consortium approach ... The relative speed with which the agency was formed after the Atlanta meeting ... testifies to the notion that the time is ripe for action".
(Middleton, 1979 p. 94)

This does not suggest that the 'right time' is a matter of accident; on the contrary, it is seen as the outcome of careful preparatory work. In Singapore, in India, in the United Kingdom, initiatives were also seized opportune1y, as preparatory work which had been in progress for some years apparently resulted in a suitable context for action. SITE was constructed around the potential availability of the ATS-6 satellite;
the Open University (in the terms of Harold Wilson's first proposal) was floated as an idea in a speech delivered in Scotland in 1965. In Singapore, the members of the Audio-Visual Unit at the Teachers Training College had been working on the idea of educational television since 1956, and their proposal was first mooted in 1963; by 1965-6 sufficient interest had been generated for the proposal to be acceptable, after the then Permanent Secretary for Education returned from a visit to the Centre for Educational Television Overseas in London. The Children's Television Workshop, instigated by Joan Cooney in 1967, came at a time when there was a growing concern for the state of children's television programming:

"(It was) sensed that American parents would be receptive to a new kind of television show that was cleverly produced but contained traditional instructional goals whose use in school could be easily appreciated by adults ... Although parents were not actively advocating such a show, many felt a need for it and would welcome its arrival." (Polsky, 1974 p. 106)

Identifying the 'right time and place' appears to be a matter of correctly assessing opportunities and of determining prevailing moods. But what was originally opportune can become less so over the years. Singapore suffered considerably when funds earmarked for educational television expansion were diverted to defence (following the announcement of British withdrawal in 1967), and the original impetus given to the AIBD by a succession of international meetings was dissipated as years passed, before anything solid had been achieved. It seems to be important, when a suitable context for action occurs, that it is exploited without delay. On the other hand, issues cannot be forced prematurely, or over-theoretically. GROW, in Tobago, was promoted mainly as a demonstration project; Tobago was selected as a location more because it met
a series of social and economic criteria than because it exhibited a basic drive towards such a programme.

Is there any common pattern to this principle?

In most of the projects analysed, there was a considerable interval between the first floating of an idea and its political acceptance. In the case of the Open University, this interval was at least four-five years (much longer, in fact, from the first stirrings of the concept in the thirties); in the case of the AIT the period of evolution amounted to seven years. In Singapore, first soundings in the fifties led to more specific proposals in 1963, with a delay of three years thereafter. In El Salvador there was a four-year gestation period; in India, something like nine years passed before the Memorandum of Understanding with NASA was signed in 1969.

These were not periods of complete dormancy, nor did discussions proceed at a constant pace. But at some critical stage in the developmental period, a point was reached at which the idea took a concrete hold, and thereafter the tempo increased.

This is a difficult process to control, and the best attempt at doing so, among the projects analysed, was probably made by the Children's Television Workshop. This had the advantage of being mainly a privately sponsored project, under the control of a small elitist group whose interest and influence, once secured, was enough to carry the proposal through its policy-making stages. Yet, even here the interval between Joan Cooney's dinner proposal to Lloyd Morrissett and Lewis Friedman (of WNDT) and Carnegie's eventual financial commitment was still almost two years: three and a half years elapsed before the commencement of 'Sesame Street' transmissions.
Policy Formulation and Strategic Planning

The project review also illustrated some of the general problems of phasing in the planning process, especially the relationship between its main components (cf Figure 4 in Chapter III). Of particular significance were problems of compression and condensation of certain stages. Overall, it seemed to be the stages of policy formalisation and strategic planning which were the most neglected, or rushed, because they were caught in a planning bottleneck. While the gestation period is of undetermined length, once this has crystallised, there is often considerable political pressure to move to an operational planning stage and to implementation without allowing time for the strategic planning process in which various options are considered. In a number of cases, the interval between an original policy decision and between operational planning was too short, and too little attention was paid to the exploration of options.

Among the projects analysed, the Children's Television Workshop appeared to be the most sensitive to this problem. Polsky reported:

"The Workshop was not planned in a crisis atmosphere. Two full years passed between the time the project was considered and the time it was publicly announced. An additional year and a half passed before 'Sesame Street' went on the air. The project's architects developed a plan that ensured that money and time would be available for a year and a half of pre-broadcast experimentation, which they hoped would increase the project's chance of success. This thorough and unhurried approach to problem solving was characteristic of all the planning... for the project." (Op cit p. 104)
Among the other projects, El Salvador managed to maintain a reasonable period for strategic planning, and the AIT was again cushioned by its unique decision-making processes. But in the cases of SITE and the Open University, the consideration of policy alternatives and options was rushed. In India, technical options were comprehensively explored, but software aspects received much more cursory consideration. The Open University, while it explored the social aspects of distance learning in some depth, paid far less attention in its formative stages to strategic options or to the magnitude of the operation being proposed. The work of the Planning Committee, which laid the real basis for action, was confined to nine months, and still many issues were left to be resolved pragmatically.

The case of the AIBD was rather different. While there was no shortage of time in which to explore fundamental principles, conflicting pressures from external agencies led to an over-emphasis, too early, on mechanistic considerations and far too little on policy matters (e.g. the relationship between broadcasting, broadcasting training and the development process). Partly this was due to the lack of a suitable forum within which such discussions might take place. Nevertheless, throughout the project's history, a series of arbitrary policy dead-lines were imposed, usually prompted by donor requirements, which meant that the many policy documents were rushed through, their nature mostly conditioned by questions of format.

In Singapore, and in Tobago, the time available for policy review and strategic planning was certainly inadequate. The gestation period in Singapore was lengthy and proposals were meticulously prepared by staff of the Audio Visual Unit of the Teachers' Training College. But once consensus was reached, policy decisions followed quickly and arbitrarily, with little detailed consideration of their means of implementation. In essence
the policy decision amounted to little more than an agreement to mount educational television; it was left to the project's planners to interpret this more specifically, in a very short space of time.

Operational Planning and Implementation

Similar trends were evident at the operational stage. In El Salvador, a real attempt was made to provide a reasonable implementation period, with nineteen months of run-up time. (There was an additional advantage, in the Salvadorean case, that the ITV project was part of a total educational reform package, and television therefore took its place in a larger scheme, with allowances being made for the training (in advance) of utilisers as well as producers and teachers.)

Similar conditions obtained for the AIT, which in practice adopted the tempo of its members' capacities. In general, the AIBD also had some operational latitude (though this was mainly because planning and programming within the AIBD always had a conditional character).

Other projects were not so fortunate. In SITE, crisis planning was the rule, with some leeway provided by the late delivery of the satellite, but with no firm implementation schedule (except in the technical sphere, which was well programmed and pursued). In the event, the reality of a launch date forced the implementation stages.

In Singapore, although there was finally little slippage, the interval allowed for operational planning and implementation was highly compressed, and it is surprising that opening transmission dates were actually met. Only eight months were available from the decision to launch the service to its inception: this period had to cover building, equipping, training and programme production. The organisers were saved, in all probability, by
the smallness of scale of the project and the limited size of the Republic.

The Open University was also troubled by over-compression; it had little more than eighteen months from the appointment of a nucleus of executives to its original courses (the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor only came in 1969, for an opening date of 1971). Networks produced for planning and implementation were often in arrears and no detailed development plan (important for a project of such a scale) existed.

Finally in Tobago, no real attempt was made, in the early stages, to map the implementation of the project at all; the introduction of even a bar chart plan came only half-way through its first phase (after some stirrings from the Trinidad National Commission for UNESCO and the UNESCO Paris Secretariat).

In summary, therefore, each stage of the planning and policy making process demands adequate time; but quite as important is the relationship between phases. Unless suitable safeguards are provided, strategic and operational planning will be collapsed and implementation rushed through once a policy decision is taken.

Coordination

Coordination is a concept fully explored in the literature of management and organisation, and the main purpose of the project review, in this instance, was to provide examples of needs and problems.

Coordination needs are both internal and external; they exist both within organisations, and between them (in relation to other institutions with parallel or associated roles - i.e. institutions which are part of the
same overall communication system).

They also exist for a variety of purposes. The most commonly expressed is the avoidance of duplication, and the improvement of communication channels between individual organisational units. But the function of coordination may also be interpreted much more positively, as an attempt to avoid conflict (by meeting crisis situations in advance), and to create a pattern of cooperative working through consensus.

Although few of the project evaluations dealt specifically with coordination problems (excepting Middleton's study of the AIT (1979) and Polsky's of the CTW (1974), there were many incidental references to difficulties encountered.

In most instances, some attempts were made to set up formal mechanisms for co-ordination. Harold Howe, at the inauguration of the Children's Television Workshop, is reported to have said,

"What is being launched here is the result of a highly complex interplay of committees and sub-committees."

(Polsky, 1974 p 3)

Internally, the Open University became a complex structure of interlocking committees, dealing with aspects of course production, management, finance, forecasting, etc. In a less complex way, El Salvador and Singapore did the same. But however complex the structure, the formal mechanism is unlikely to cover more than the surface of coordination needs, and informal networks are also essential. So, in the AIT:

"The communication needs of an agency like AIT are large.
In everyday operations, a large number of individuals are tied into AIT operations by telephone and by mail. These include educators in school agencies, broadcasters in public television stations, consultants on various projects, television production agencies, print and film duplication shops, evaluation teams ... This informal communication network is a significant factor in the accomplishment of a large volume of work by a small staff". (Middleton, 1979 p. 87)

Moreover, the situation is not static: there is constant change and adaptation, in response to shifting demands, as in the Open University.

"No one tidy chart can illustrate the complexity of the real situation because various objectives of the institution impose different infrastructures: consequently the system exists in a perpetual state of conflict. When the conflict is controlled to a state of creative tension, then the whole system works; the problem is to ensure that conflict does not become destructive. The University's efforts to modify the structure, through two major reviews, have resulted in improvements to the functions of one or more parts of the concomitant infrastructures. Further improvements can probably only be achieved by amending the existing charter". (OU Consultancy Service, 1976 p. 3/5)

In essence, it would appear that coordination is a matter of continuous, pragmatic adjustment between formal and informal networks. The formal network is important because it provides a framework within which personal interaction and role adjustment can take place. But informal channels are also needed, to provide additional flexibility, (while the
formal network is constantly developing and adapting).

For this reason, it seems important that coordination should be treated positively, even creatively, emphasising consensus and the possibility of achieving, through cooperative action, results which could not possibly be the work of a single agency acting on its own initiative (i.e. something approaching the concept of interdisciplinarity, to be discussed later). John Middleton characterised this view in relation to the AIT:

"The concept of consensus limits the degree to which - and the manner in which - AIT is an agency of educational innovation. AIT staff members see themselves as working in partnership with the schools to develop educational materials that fit needs as determined by school officials. The mission is not to "intervene" or to impose on education from the outside. Rather, AIT is a partner in reform and improvement initiated by persons within the structures of education. This non-reformist approach fits well with the consortium funding policy. Funds to support projects come from decision-makers legally responsible for the schools, not from external agencies intent on innovation and reform from outside (such as universities or federal agencies).

A state or provincial agency's participation in the needs determination process tends to lead to "psychological ownership" of the project. When a consortium series goes into use in the schools, it is common to find it presented to the community as a project of the state or province. AIT is often cited only in the credits on the
television program or in the teacher's guide. From the perspective of AIT, this is the way it should be. (Op cit pp. 28-29)

Coordination is frequently considered only as part of the implementation process, not of policy formulation and planning. It may appear easier, on the surface, to reduce the number of participants in planning and decision-making, but this can also produce problems at a later, operational stage, which could have been avoided had they been tackled earlier. If policy is formulated at a senior level, and the co-ordination of sectoral policies regarded as a subsidiary, largely technical process, as a result, the same arguments may have to be repeated in a number of situations and protracted attempts made to arbitrate between positions which may differ only marginally. While policy formulation may appear to be easier if restricted to a small group of decision-makers, it will help considerably in practice to enlarge the original membership of this group. Consensus is more easily achieved before sectoral attitudes have hardened.

This is especially true of relationships with external agencies. A project does not exist in a vacuum, (as argued in the discussion of comprehensiveness), and its success will frequently depend upon the skill with which it establishes compatible boundaries, avoiding duplication and capitalising upon the strengths of related agencies to make up for its own deficiencies. The majority of the projects considered took care in this respect, often ingeniously. The AIBD, for example, was much concerned in its earliest days with an apparent overlap of training functions with bilateral agencies, on the one hand, and with a regional agency based in Singapore (CEPTA TV, the Centre for Production of Adult Education Programmes for Television) on the other. The bilateral problem was offset by making special efforts to enlist the support of those Western training agencies (for example, the BBC) with which it might have appeared to be in
competition, and a network of personal relationships was created with other training institutions, in an attempt to avoid political difficulty through an extension of professional camaraderie.

However, one major failure of the AIBD was its inability to establish a productive relationship with the Development Support Communication Service in Bangkok. Some of this difficulty can be traced to differences in philosophy between the two organisations (the DSCS was concerned with development support, and minimised infrastructural development, especially of mass media industries). But it was compounded by the fact that the AIBD came into being largely as a UNESCO initiative, while the DSCS was a UNDP/UNICEF creation. Since UNDP, as a United Nations programme, was both a major supporter of UNESCO and a principal sponsor of AIBD activities (at least in its formative stages), the repercussions of this separation were considerable.

In Singapore, the Educational Television Service, as a national agency, had less to fear from external agencies, but was at some pains, from the outset, to involve all branches of the educational administration, and eventually, of development ministries. Moreover, a potential conflict with the broadcasting organisation, TV Singapura, was avoided by early consultation, especially by enlisting the goodwill of the then Director General of TV Singapura. Originally, school broadcasting (in radio) had been the prerogative of the broadcasters, but it was abandoned, following the secession of Singapore from Malaysia, because of poor utilisation. There was an urgent need for good relations, as a main broadcasting channel was to be used for ETV distribution.

In the case of El Salvador, communication channels already existed between the Salvador Government, the Ministry of Education, and
the US Agency for International Development (for example, the aid agency withdrew its original insistence upon a project pitched at the primary level after hearing arguments by the Salvadoreans for a secondary start). But in the United Kingdom, the Open University was placed, initially, in a difficult relationship vis-à-vis traditional universities and with the adult education movement. Although welcomed by some agencies (who were uninterested in part-time, external degree programmes - the University of London was one example) others resented the OU as an interloper, a possible means of lowering standards, and a potential rival for limited funds (a position exacerbated by the fact that the Open University received its funds directly from the Department of Education and Science, rather than through the University Grants Committee). This early distrust was eroded, at least in part, by the University's insistence upon equivalence in its academic qualifications (through the use of external examiners), and perhaps more so by the use of tutors and counsellors in a part-time capacity, most of them drawn from the higher and adult education establishment, and the use of university premises for summer schools and of further education centres for study groups.

The Open University also avoided what might well have been a difficult relationship with the BBC (unused to a 'partnership' relationship, after a long-standing tradition of independence in educational programme-making), by involving them as equal colleagues from the earliest stages of policymaking. (In this way the University's own organisational development was also aided, in that it had access to a management nucleus upon which it could draw for a variety of planning functions).

SITE was a more complex case. Created through the work of a series of interlocking committees at a Ministerial level (originating with NASCOM), it apparently became bogged down in the formalities of coordination with-
out resolving some major issues until very late in its development. Chief among these was the problem of responsibility for the production of programmes, which (according to the Rules of Business of All-India Radio) was an exclusive prerogative of the broadcasting organisation. The position had not been challenged previously (school television programmes in Delhi, and agricultural programmes in the Delhi area, were under AIR control); and the extension of the right to produce was fought lengthily and bitterly for several years. In the event ISRO (the space agency) produced a series of science programmes from two of its own studios, and was also largely responsible for an in-depth programming experiment in the Ahmedabad area, but this agreement was secured only after a period of in-fighting, and the problem was acute enough to delay the stock-piling of programmes for the satellite to quite acute proportions.

Until quite late in the day, there appeared to be some feeling that this was an ISRO rather than an Indian project; the position was not helped by the fact that, at an earlier stage, ISRO and AIR had produced rival plans and estimates of cost for satellite introduction as compared with other forms of broadcasting expansion. When genuine inter-agency involvement came, it sometimes came too late. It is surprising how little, in the final demonstration, certain agencies were involved in SITE: for example, the Film and Television Institute of India, based in Poona, nurtured by UNESCO and the Ford Foundation as a prototype broadcasting training project and an experiment in developing techniques of formative evaluation.

In contrast, the Children's Television Workshop was remarkable for the way in which it exploited the strengths of related agencies, while reducing its dependence upon their weaker links. The Workshop, for example, utilised the legal, administrative and distribution capabilities
of the Public Broadcasting System in the USA on behalf of 'Sesame Street' and its later programmes, but rejected any formal connection with the programme-making agencies of public broadcasting. It also involved members of the educational establishment most effectively, through the series of seminars arranged by Gerald Lesser.

To what extent can questions of co-ordination be legislated for? Formal co-ordination processes can be planned in advance; informal co-ordination processes evidently cannot, but their significance can still be acknowledged (e.g. by providing adequate opportunity, within the formal structures, for informal dialogue to take place).

Moreover, plans can be quite explicit about the exact nature, functions, responsibilities and levels of representation of at least the formal co-ordinating structures (points considered in later principles). This was done in Singapore and in the AIBD; it has also been institutionalised in the Open University.

However, legislation on its own is insufficient. The least successful project in this regard appeared to be GROW. GROW began with no real sense of identity or cohesion; it was meant to evolve a more precise role within its first year of operations, but in practice, made very little attempt to do so. It remained, on the whole, a coterie project, with little relationship, explicit or implicit, with other development initiatives.

Yet GROW was not planned in this way. It was only during the implementation stage that the priority attached to coordination needs lapsed.

"The project document should spell out the need for a local liaison group to work closely with the project team..."
throughout the life of the project ... Within such a group it should be possible to determine priorities which are valid for the society and to agree on strategies which are within the comprehension and technical grasp of the population...

The GROW project did in fact adopt this valuable approach in its pre-project investigations and early stages, but its significance as an integral part of project implementation was apparently not appreciated, and the liaison group was allowed to disappear ... (Solomon, 1975 pp. 24-26)

Support

The acceptance of projects depends to a large extent on the status which they are accorded in political and decision-making circles, and the extent to which advocacy is handled at an appropriate political level. The emergence of SITE, for example, owed a good deal, not only to the personal commitment of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, but also to the identification of the project with that forward-thinking image which the Indian Government was anxious to promote, coupled with a stress upon improving communication conditions for the isolated rural population which was a major political platform. Added to this were pragmatic factors. The satellite would allow for at least an interim period of rural communication, at a time when plans for terrestrial coverage of television broadcasting were long-term and already retarded; it would do so, moreover, with hardware costs substantially underwritten by the American Government and NASA. A second factor was the possibility during the satellite experiment, for the Indian Prime Minister to be seen in person by the rural people, and therefore to make direct political appeals (something which would be impossible through a programme of personal visits). Chitnis explained:
"Just 15 days after the beginning of SITE the Indian Independence Day was celebrated. On this day it is customary for the Prime Minister of India to hoist the national flag on the historical Red Ford and address the nation ... For the first time SITE made it possible for villagers in 2,400 villages to witness the event live on their television screens." (Chitnis, 1976 p. 4)

Such a high-level interest could sustain the impetus of the project, even when it was beset by internal agency rivalries and coordination difficulties; it could sustain it even after Dr. Sarabhai's death.

The same situation occurred in El Salvador when, by a fortunate combination of circumstances, Walter Beneke (who had first been attracted to the television medium during a period as Ambassador to Japan) became Minister of Education and was able to enlist the President, Julio Adalberto Rivera, in support of its adoption as part of a sustained programme of educational reform.

This level of support was subsequently maintained.

"A crucial factor in the development of El Salvador's ITV system was the support it received from the highest levels of Government. Fidel Sanchez Hernandez made the Educational Reform the major program of his presidency; and since Salvadoran presidents are constitutionally limited to a single five-year term, the ITV system had to be designed and implemented quickly in order to gain political visibility and approval." (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 165)
In the United Kingdom, although discussions of distance learning associated with broadcasting had been heard since the nineteen thirties, it was the interest of the Labour Government which first promoted the Open University (beginning with a speech delivered by Harold Wilson in 1963). In this speech, he proposed:

"What we envisage is the creation of a new educational trust representative of the Universities and other educational organisations, associations of teachers, the broadcasting authorities, publishers, public and private bodies, producers capable of producing television and other material."

(Wilson, 1963 n.p.)

Although much of the sustained pressure for the University came from others, especially Jennie Lee, Harold Wilson's support continued; not only did he legislate for early action (for example through the formation of a Ministerial Committee, followed by an Advisory Committee, all within the year 1965), but he also paid personal attention to finance.

This list can easily be multiplied. But the importance of status is not restricted to initial project formulation; it demands a continuing commitment. El Salvador, for example, saw a period of lower tempo after the departure of Walter Beneke from the Education Ministry. Too much reliance should not be placed upon an initial boost, especially one supported largely through foreign aid and interest (as happened partly in the case of El Salvador, but far more spectacularly in the case of the American Samoan instructional television system).

The other projects reviewed consistently suffered from a lack of support at a sufficiently high political level. Singapore spent a decade
in its cramped and inadequate original premises, in spite of its success, and the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development was similarly placed. It received, over the years, consistent support from its host country, Malaysia, and was maintained by the enthusiasm of a handful of donor agencies, but as a consortium project it was politically vulnerable. Being a regional body, the AIBD was necessarily the creation of a consensus of Governments, who acted first nationally and only second regionally. It was promoted vigorously by UNESCO, but international organisations do not have commensurate funds for support; the same was true of the other main sponsor, the Asian Broadcasting Union, a regional professional body with few resources. Bilateral interest in the project was intermittent (further diluted by a lack of interest among technical assistance agencies in regional projects, where few bilateral advantages were discerned), and even among the Governments of the region, an early competition for host-country status did not help to develop unity. Without heavy backing from the Malaysian Government, the institution could not have survived so long. Fortunately, it did so until the late 70s, when world opinion changed and the project finally became a viable intergovernmental body.

Realism

An emphasis upon realism in relation to planning and decision making processes is a reflection of the disjointed-incremental approach; it embodies both caution and pragmatism, recognising that not only may some of the results of planning be imperfect, but also that some matters are not immediately, or fully, plannable. It acts, therefore, as a check upon the creation, and implementation, of planning designs.

In the first place, it implies that, when basic policy decisions are taken, they should not be expressed in so intransigent a way that changes of
direction cannot be accommodated if necessary. This is true of such areas as finance. In the case of the CTW, Polsky stated:

"Morrisett and his associates refused to be locked into a budget arrived at early in the project when it later became evident that, to accomplish what they wanted to do, substantial additional money was needed." (Polsky, 1974 p. 104)

Some of the early experiences of the Open University were also relevant. An indication of structures, and estimates of finance, were necessary for policy decisions to be made in the first place, but these original estimates could not be treated as firm. Many of the original concepts (for example, the reliance on broadcasting) were modified once professional staff, especially the Vice Chancellor, were appointed. All the planning partners did not always recognise this limitation. The Open University was locked into a relationship with the BBC, whose planning processes were highly institutionalised, and in consequence the University was often pressed for detail (on programme quantity, studio use, etc) well before it was in a position to give meaningful replies.

Secondly, certain criteria, or recommendations, which are evolved as a result of planning, may turn out, in the event, to be impossible to implement. In SITE, original parameters laid down for the selection of villages for the experiment included social as well as technical criteria. But it proved difficult to obtain an adequate selection which matched even basic technical requirements, and in some cases village electrification had to be accelerated for the required total to be reached. Not surprisingly, many social parameters had to be discarded.
Many early decisions, if insisted upon too categorically, may have to be reversed later, at a price. In El Salvador, a decision was made on studio location, deciding between two centres – one near the capital, San Salvador, the other at fifteen miles’ distance. Initially the remoter site was chosen, because it was to share the same complex as a new national teacher training programme. In the end, the more prosaic factor of distance (coupled with lower altitude) made work difficult, and finally (in 1972) the whole production centre was moved back to Santa Tecla on the outskirts of the capital.

These observations appear to apply to planning in general; they are not specific to either industrialised or developing countries. They suggest that means have to be created for decisions either to be reversed, when they prove wrong, or for some matters to be planned only in broad outline, and supplemented later, when more information is available.

In the Open University, while it was clearly impossible for the Planning Committee to come to precise conclusions on the organisation of broadcasting, it was also clear that this need would ultimately arise; strategic planning, at the least, should allow for necessary professional advice to be made available in good time. But this did not happen in the case of the publishing, print and audio-visual department of the Open University. The overall situation was summarised, in a review of OU planning difficulties, as follows:

"It was impossible to visualise the eventual size and complexity of the organisation. This resulted in:

(i) decisions being made on an ad hoc basis rather than by forward planning,
(ii) regions developing individually, not to a regular coherent pattern.

(iii) scale of production not visualised, thus outside printers had to be contracted

(iv) storage and warehousing problems of course materials and Home Experiment kits."

(OU Consultancy Service, 1976 p. 2/4)

Realism therefore, seems to imply (i) the objective assessment of planning processes and institutions; (ii) the creation of failsafe or subsidiary planning mechanisms, to correct or extend planning in the light of experience; and (iii) the avoidance of excessive dependency on a limited number of institutions or individuals. It is closely linked to what is called, in management literature, the principle of redundancy (cf. Niskanen 1971, and Landau 1969, 1972). Edwin Parker applies this principle to communication processes in the following way:

"... Redundancy in the institutional structure, may be the least understood principle. In attempting to create flexible, decentralised institutions that provide reliable, efficient services, it should be remembered that the components of organisations (the humans and groups of humans) are unreliable. It is quite possible, in theory and in practice, to devise reliable systems out of unreliable components, provided there is sufficient redundancy in the structure. If one sub-unit of an organisation suffers from bureaucratic inertia and fails to adapt rapidly, there must
be another unit that can be assigned the task at hand. The existence of an alternative unit that could perform similar functions is the best way to ensure that the first unit doesn't develop the complacency and inertia that is often associated with monopoly power. Redundancy may seem a remote goal for developing countries that are striving hard to create the first organisational unit to accomplish some task. Redundancy may also seem counter-intuitive as a way to enhance efficiency because it appears insufficient to have duplicate facilities or organisations. But redundancy in organisations should be neither a remote goal nor a current inefficiency. Organising the available production staff into two or more independent production teams should lead to more initiative and a higher level of total output than a single production team. (Parker, 1977 pp. 66-67)

This postulates a pragmatic attitude to planning, which might be compared with the so-called "Murphy's Law" of engineering. The law is in three parts, namely: (i) nothing is as easy as it looks; (ii) everything takes longer than you think, and (iii) if anything can go wrong, it will. Yash Pal, in discussing SITE, specifically mentioned this law.

"The statements of this Law are primarily directed towards people who are committed to doing and accomplishing. It is the awareness of this which leads to checking and re-checking of designs, contingency planning tests and evaluation control, and the setting up of an operational system with feedback loops for corrective action. Unfortunately many people in developing countries, after having lived through decades of inaction
and dependence on aid and patronage, use precisely these statements to kill initiative and perpetuate an atmosphere of hopelessness. Through my experience in SITE I have come to believe in the applicability of a form of Anti-Murphy Law on a higher plane, given the right catalysis. We have found that some things which look impossible are doable. Others which should take a year according to past experience and conservative plans can be done in four months if we strike a new path. Bottlenecks are not like rigid capillaries; they open wide after a threshold of effort is crossed." (Yash Pal, 1975 p. 4)

In other words realism can also be interpreted in a more positive way, to emphasise that, quite apart from the provision of failsafe or corrective mechanisms, there comes a point when fresh thinking is needed, to question the established consensus, take a fresh look at objectives, return to basic principles. Irrespective of whether planning is right or wrong, it also seems important for it not to become a straight-jacket, inhibiting the flexibility of those who follow. As Yash Pal again remarked in the context of SITE,

"Even before we are half-way through in our programme production activity, I begin to sense dangers of lapsing into routine with what were in the beginning considered fresh innovations. As soon as things become strictly operational, complacency sets in and the initial sparks get extinguished". (Ibid, p. 7)

How far was such an approach characteristic of the projects under review? There were examples of ingenious responses to contingencies as these arose, and also examples which reflected compromise solutions to
situations of difficulty. In this way, the Singapore Educational Television Service created a separate production unit for educational broadcasting, because an earlier experiment with school radio (under the umbrella of the broadcasting organisation) had proved unsuccessful; it did not, however, attempt to create a separate distribution network. In the Open University, the early weakness in the operation of media support services led to some remodelling of this section (without tampering with the overall system, or even with the production delivery system in general). In Singapore again, the less effective functioning of the Teacher's Training College Audio Visual Unit led to a separation of this unit from the ETV service's operations. In the Agency for Instructional Television, each phase of organisation grew out of, or was modelled in response to, an acknowledgement of past limitations.

It has to be recognised that some crisis planning will occur even in the best regulated systems. But the positive approach taken by Yash Pal was also interesting. No difficulty, in his view, needed to be accepted at face value, as unnegotiable. In Singapore, the initial proposition - of developing a media service in eight months - was superficially an impossibility, but as with SITE, means were found of meeting deadlines while still allowing for the system to catch up upon itself later. The same was true of the Open University. David Hawkridge commented:

"Considerable planning risks had to be taken, in the hope that the new project would be quickly and generally successful. At the same time, the university found itself obliged to take deliberate steps to evaluate and improve upon its first prototype courses and systems.

This pattern of development is by no means new in the field of
technology, even if it has been rare in education. Countless machines have been designed quickly as prototypes, and the prototypes have been set to work in conditions which allow proper measurement of their efficiency". (Hawkridge, 1974 p. 70)

Primacy of People

Recent analysis of task and organisation strategy (cf Miller, 1976) emphasise the priority of people over technique, and the significance of informal encounters in the planning process. This was amply borne out by the projects reviewed: planning and policy making are creative processes, whatever techniques they adopt. Thus, Richard Polsky on the CTW:

"Because the members of this small planning group were so competent and worked so well together, there was a notable lack of false starts and trips down dead ends during the project's planning phase and production period. Those guiding the project were 'pros' - skilled, efficient and productive, and none needed the project to prove his ability since his ability was an established fact before became involved in the Workshop. In addition, they were aware of their limitations, and were quite willing to consult with others who knew more about an important question than they did ... (Op Cit p. 97)

Even more specific are the accounts of individuals critically involved in the projects. Joan Cooney of the CTW was described by Polsky:

"It was her intelligence, organisational ability, tact and energy that kept the project headed in the right direction ... She understood and had the vision of what the program could
be ... better than anyone else she could articulate it and had both the educational and television background to bring it together." (Op cit p. 59)

And Walter Perry, Vice-Chancellor of the Open University, was similarly characterised:

"He was no conservative academic and wanted the University to be more adventurous, less stereotyped and younger than the traditional university - but he also wanted their respect. Social purposes were not paramount. He simply wanted to create a University open to anybody, with no entry qualifications, whose degrees were of the same standard as others." (MacArthur, 1974 p. 14)

There was general emphasis in the project evaluations on experience, dynamism, involvement, creativity, doggedness, humour, (descriptions much the same, in fact, as those of good planners outside the communication sector).

Other accounts pinpointed the character of the planning group: for example, John Middleton, on the AIT:

"Decision-making is deceptively casual. Major decisions may be reached at lunch, in the hall, in an airport, or at a consortium meeting. Consultation among staff is highly informal: there are relatively few staff meetings. But the decision-making process has a firm foundation. Few decisions are reached without extensive informal discussion among the staff - and with representatives of the consortium
agencies. The philosophy and procedures of the consortium approach provide a basic framework for decision and action.

One of the notable features of the AIT style of operation is constant self-analysis. Staff members always seem to be working at two levels - at what they are doing and at how they are doing it. The process through which things are done is always under scrutiny. Changes in the process are not made casually, and when they are made, results are closely watched.

(Op cit. p.100)

These projects were all set in developed countries, where there was an emphasis upon reacting to, sometimes manipulating, the establishment.

But in the developing country projects, comparable experiences were reported - in Singapore and El Salvador in particular. Conversely, in the evaluation of GROW conducted by Sheilah Solomon, there was an indication of what may happen if a planner is, deliberately or otherwise, too low-key to be effective.

"The effect of this ... has been that there has been a remarkable lack of continuity and sense of purpose in project activities. Emphasis and direction have moved in phases, depending on the strength of the personality most closely associated with the project at any one time; the Senior Adviser merely adopted the protective coloration of each phase in turn. (Op cit. p. 37)

In the GROW case, the main planner was actually an external adviser, who was working under instructions not to assume an over-dogmatic role.
This raises a problem which will be dealt with extensively in the next chapter: planning conducted through technical assistance. Here, the El Salvador evaluators commented in a way which may set the tone for subsequent discussions:

"The Salvadoreans received technical assistance from some 60 foreign advisers, representing a number of countries and international agencies. The advisers were instrumental in getting the reform programmes under way, but their contributions varied markedly ... In most instances, the advisers themselves had to define their own jobs, and, in a sense, to legitimise their presence in El Salvador. To this end, the ability to speak Spanish was essential ... Empathy with Salvadoreans and their culture as well as flexibility in the exercise of one's job - two highly intangible qualities - also distinguished the more successful advisers. Technical expertise and experience - though given great weight in recruiting advisers - did not seem in retrospect to count for so much as the basic ability to work well with Salvadoreans". (Mayo et alia 1976 p. 52-53)

So, while similar qualities seem to be demanded of competent planners in both the industrialised and the developing world, differences of context lead to varying emphases upon these qualities and upon their combination.
Interdisciplinarity

The most complete experience of this concept was found in the Open University and in the CTW, where group working became an intrinsic part of their operational method.

In the case of the Open University, where courses were the product of a course team approach, group disciplines could be viewed in two ways: as a means of ensuring cross-disciplinary fertilisation; or as a division of labour in approaching a complex task. Both viewpoints were considered by Norman Birnbaum:

"The group or team mode of organisation has nothing intrinsically superior about it. Anyone who has suffered through meetings of academic committees, departments or faculties, will be tempted to effect a very slight modification in that citation from The Pickwick Papers about the law being an ass. However, nothing is eternally right about our present academic division of labour. The conflicts entailed in course production from the Open University may constitute necessary steps on the way to curricular re-thinking. The Open University's organisational experiment may form a new generation of academics, able to use a far wider range of concepts and methods, capable of relating knowledge to the aims of enquiry rather than to the rigidities of fixed disciplines ... (However) most interdisciplinary ventures ... have after a time become centrifugal; the claims of the disciplines reassert themselves. This tendency is, clearly, not absent at the Open University ... " (Birnbaum, 1974 p. 42)
In the Open University, the course team approach was probably adopted because it was the only way to meet production demands and timescales. Normal traditions of academic working would not have led to the necessary correlation of energies: the course team was not simply a theoretical exercise in interdisciplinarity, but also an organisational form which worked to tighten deadlines.

But once the decision to work corporately had been taken, many unforeseen problems arose. For example, a serious understaffing problem arose from the outset because it had not been realised that interdisciplinarity is not time-saving.

"In the first place, nobody had fully thought through the numerous implications of requiring academics to work together in large cooperative teams. Second, no one had fully pursued the implications of having to teach a heterogeneous population of students who were mostly trying to study in their part time ... (Thus) the staffing would ideally have to be increased by a factor of at least 3 or 4." (Lewis, 1974 p. 125)

Interdisciplinary working also created unfamiliar tensions: for example, between academics and producers.

"The techniques of communication used by the OU also need specialised skills and lead to similar tensions. In any task needing division of labour it is important to have a clear delineation of spheres of responsibility. This usually comes from trial and error over a period of time. The relationship between the BBC and the academic members of the University is defined as an 'educational partnership' ...
Suspicion and conflict can sometimes arise when the BBC producer urges one approach on media grounds and the academic urges another on intellectual grounds ..." (Castles, 1974 p 116)

There were, apparently, a number of ways of overcoming these problems. One was to evolve, and define, explicit roles for members of an interdisciplinary team, and to specify both their rights and their responsibilities. More than anything, this can help reduce those tensions which stem from unfamiliarity. Michael Drake observed, of Open University academics:

"Like most university teachers, they had been accustomed to operating in their own little private worlds of the classroom and the study. Now they were to be exposed - their writing spurned, their TV and radio performances mocked ... In one form or another this happened to every member of the team." (Drake, 1974 p 136)

In the Open University, part of the original difficulty of the course team for the social sciences lay in the reluctance of the team (and especially its leader) to establish any hierarchical structures, however temporary: in the first course team meetings, there was not even a Chairman. John Middleton, on the other hand, was quite specific about the benefits which accrued from a precise allocation of roles in the AIT.

"Operating several projects simultaneously with a small staff requires clearly defined roles and responsibilities". (Op cit p. 99)

Equally, for Middleton, continuity of personnel was important.
"Continuity of staff also has been a factor in building an effective management team for consortium projects. The complexities of the task are not mastered quickly: it takes time to become a fully functional member of the AIT family, one familiar with the consortium process and with leaders in education and broadcasting. Key staff members have been with the agency an average of eight years."

(Ibid p. 100)

This last is a difficult principle to maintain in the developing world, where shifts of personnel are frequent, exacerbated by shortages of competent higher and middle-level personnel. The position is in many cases worsened by the experience of training, especially overseas training. Frequently, planners and managers who receive overseas training as part of the phased development of a project are reassigned on their return (being now 'qualified' to assume different, senior roles), so that the whole rationale of the training programme is lost.

This emphasis on group dynamics is important, but it tends to underplay the very real advantages which can come from multi-disciplinary working, when it is approached in a creative way, concentrating more on its outcomes than on the simple avoidance of tension. This kind of creativity was seen, on many occasions, in the Open University, particularly after the course team tradition had been assimilated. But it was particularly marked in the Children's Television Workshop, whose group working method was deliberately designed to foster departures from a stereotype. Joan Cooney described some of the original thinking:

"Producers believe, or always had until CTW came along, in intuition, taste and experience as the means to successful
shows. And luck, always luck as the sine qua non of any big hit. What we were proposing was that material, as it was produced, be tested on the target audience for both appeal and educational value; that researchers report back to producers; and that producers modify or discard material based on these almost continuous reports from the field ...
(Lesser, 1974 p. xvi)

Not every member of the team approached the experience with confidence. David Connell, the executive producer, for example, had many initial qualms:

"I frankly was sceptical about the idea of researching every moment of a television show, and certainly of being told how to design it. There was the risk of intellectualising the material to death". (Lesser, 1974 p. 133)

Yet in the end, an open pattern of working developed for CTW members, in which a great deal of individual responsibility was combined with frequent, informal consultation.

In establishing such a network of relationships, clearly the original selection of personnel was critical; they were picked as much for their ability to work together as for their professional qualities. Group goal development was considered crucial, and the same criterion also extended to the selection of participants for the seminars upon which the identification of programme objectives was based.

"We were bringing thirty people together, and we couldn't have academic prima donnas. We needed information out of these meetings; we needed real discussion. So there were some people we didn't invite to the seminars, even though they were well
known, because we suspected they couldn't function well in a group situation". (Polsky, 1974 p. 74)

Here too conflict situations could arise, but once the sources of tension were removed, the experience of group working could be very productive as a means of focusing disparate energies. No other project displayed these qualities so fully. Some were less suited to interdisciplinarity (the AIBD, for example, which operated as a consortium across considerable distances); others (like GROW) had no real philosophy of team operations. Singapore and El Salvador were less self-conscious than the Open University or the Children's Television Workshop, but were based on a tradition of corporate curriculum planning. But among the developing world projects, it was probably SITE, with a highly complex system to devise and implement, that discovered most about the unexpected bonues of forced, interdisciplinary working.

"A management and operation system with innumerable small feedback loops is the only one capable of performing complex jobs. Group loyalties, academic antagonisms and conflicting interests dissolve once a direction is set and the stream begins to flow. People are invariably capable of doing much more than their promise in the beginning. Technical virtuosity is much more prevalent than we imagine. Jobs without challenges are botched, or don't get done. Targets with challenges are always exceeded." (Yash Pal, 1975 p.10)

**Evaluation**

As with a number of other concepts which have been thoroughly explored in the literatures of planning and educational technology, the project review was intended more to define practical experiences, and so elaborate a planning principle, than to seek validation.
A distinction should first be made between three kinds of evaluation: **summative** (evaluating the final outcomes of a project, and specifically its ability to meet stated objectives); **formative** (concerned to test and validate materials as they are developed, and improve performance while still in the design stages, before a wider production and distribution commitment is made), and **process** evaluation (which monitors processes of execution).

Of the projects reviewed here, several had a good or fair record in the traditional field of **summative** evaluation, though mostly these were in the field of instructional media, so that evaluation was mainly concerned with instructional effectiveness and learning gain. The El Salvador project was continuously monitored over a five-year period by the Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University; the results of this evaluation have since been published (Mayo et alia, 1976). The objectives of the evaluation were clear:

"Our study of El Salvador's ITV system was undertaken for three reasons: (i) to evaluate the effects of the new system on students, teachers and school administrators; (ii) to contribute data gained from this research to the future development of the ITV system itself; (iii) to derive general conclusions that might help other nations interested in applying ITV or some other instructional technology. These objectives were translated into specific research plans that guided the collection of field data over four years."

(Mayo et alia, 1976 p. 3)
Similarly, the Open University and the Children's Television Workshop (and in a simpler way Singapore) produced regular and extensive summative evaluations, describing learning gains and behavioural change (comparing these with comparable evaluations of more orthodox educational programmes and institutions. It was not surprising that these evaluations were conducted, as they were necessary to justify, politically, the premises upon which the programmes were founded: in the case of the Open University its Institute of Educational Technology had a specific role of monitoring and analysing student performance.

Summative evaluations are classic, and critical to the systems model, as part of the cyclic process which leads to revision and project regeneration. Formative evaluation, on the other hand, is much more recent, and has been mainly applied to projects in which there is a need to evaluate programmes or products as they are developed. The Head of Research of the Children's Television Workshop, Ed Palmer, distinguished between the two in the following way:

"Formative research is distinguished primarily by its role as an integral role of the creative production process. It is important to maintain a clear distinction between this type of research and summative research - that is, research undertaken to test the validity of theory, or the measurement of an educational product of practice. Research in the context of scientific validation is concerned with effects which have been hypothesized a priori within the framework of a broader deductive system, with the use of empirical and statistical procedures well enough defined as to be strictly replicable (at least in principle), and with the highest possible degree of generalisability across situations. While research carried out within the formative
context can possess these same characteristics, it
need not and it typically does not. The main criterion for
formative research recommendations is that they appear likely
to contribute to the effectiveness of the product or procedure
being developed ... (Palmer, 1974 pp. 326-7)

In the case of the AIT, John Middleton specified the formative research
approach employed, and explained why it was adopted.

"From discussions with staff members and review of evaluation
reports and methodologies, it is clear that AIT evaluation is
primarily intended to make sure both program and print mater-
ials meet the users' expectations of technical, creative,
and instructional quality. Thus far it has not attempted to
determine the extent to which an entire project achieves
measurable educational objectives. There are a number of
reasons for this. One is that the goals of the affective
education projects are generally stated in terms of the
kind of classroom discussion each program is expected to
generate - not the learning expected to take place. Determin-
ing whether these "discussion" goals are achieved has
been a major component of evaluation.

Then too, the conditions under which evaluation is
conducted make measurement of effects difficult (even for
formative purposes). A major constraint is budget. Less
than 10 percent of the Self Incorporated budget, for example,
was allocated to evaluation, and costs for revision of
programs were included in this figure. Furthermore, AIT
has control of materials only during the production stage;
thereafter, they are in the hands of user agencies. Evaluation of effects would have to take place after delivery of the full materials package to schools; it would require serious commitment to evaluation by school administrators and a substantial financial outlay by AIT if materials were to be recalled, revised, and redistributed.

(Op cit p. 67)

In theory, an evaluation research design should include both summative and formative components, as was ultimately the case with SITE. The SITE experiment was extensively evaluated during its one-year life, and even though the evaluation plan was only begun in 1973, after a series of false starts, the final tableau included a large input survey, a children's survey, a number of planning and management studies, studies of instructional programmes, and some in-depth communication studies, such as content analyses.

"The plan is conceived as an inter and multi-disciplinary exercise, involving about 100 anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, educationists and media researchers. It consists of two components: formative and summative evaluation ... Studies were undertaken to ensure adequate adaptation of this one-way communication medium to the requirements of rural Indian conditions. Feedback provides data on programme impact, audience composition, viewing conditions, etc. Summative evaluation from qualitative as well as quantitative approaches would provide very important inputs which will be necessary for facilitating the decision-making process regarding the configuration of an Indian national satellite for rural development ... The SITE evaluation is conceived of as an ongoing and not as an after-the-event activity.

(Chitnis, 1976 p. 2)
But in practice, constraints of budget and staff do not often allow for such a coherent approach, and priorities have to be set. David Hawkridge wrote of the Open University:

"There were many, many aspects of the Open University that needed to be evaluated, and some sort of priority list had to be drawn up. One way of ordering priorities would have been for us to put first the most expensive components of the system, on the grounds that what costs most should be improved first. Another way would have been to say that problem areas come first, and particularly problem areas defined by students who are the chief consumers in the system.

In fact we did not adopt outright either of these ways of ordering priorities. Instead, we helped to persuade the university to install 'dials and guages' wherever it seemed vital to find out what was happening in the university's very complex network. Judgements about the points where these measuring devices should be placed were made not only by the Institute, but also by many of the University's committees, on which the Institute has representatives". (Op cit pp. 70-71)

Unfortunately, as a result of this kind of selective exercise, the field of interest of greatest interest to planners, process evaluation (involving the monitoring of administrative, management, policy and planning mechanisms) has been generally neglected. The El Salvador evaluations paid some limited attention to this field, compiling an administrative history of the project, and in certain cases, case studies were compiled, mostly from secondary data, which looked at decision-making
processes retrospectively (for example Polsky's study of the CTW and Middleton's of AIT, both used extensively in this chapter). But the evidence is meagre.

The development of communication planning as an independent field seems very much dependent upon this area of evaluation being extended, especially upon monitoring arrangements being made during project planning stages.

The reasons for this need are self-evident. In the first place, while the methods of planning may be rational, the relationship between planning and implementation may be so tenuous; if decisions are taken which affect the coherence of the original plan, this in turn changes the assumptions upon which further planning rests. Thus, planning is not a one-time, rational process, but a continuing activity, in which the conditions and parameters for making judgements and taking decisions change constantly. This can be described as a kind of 'remedial planning': the constant updating of an ideal plan to assimilate modifications imposed upon it by experience.

For this process of remedial planning to be effective, evaluation is essential as a means of isolating and validating the assumptions upon which the conclusions of planning depend. The point was well made by the SITE project and the ITV project in El Salvador.

A mid-term report on SITE for USAID concluded:

"Although we are optimistic about the potential for success of SITE we are concerned that the information that SITE will provide may not be complemented by a searching
analysis of the long-term mass communication needs of India"

"If... an objective outside body, such as the Planning Commission, fails to continue vigorously with these analyses, a great deal of the information value of SITE will have been lost even if it is a technical and programming success".
(Cowlan et alia, 1973 pp. 66-68)

In El Salvador, too, the shape of the future was less clear than was the first five-year plan. To some extent this was due to the departure of Minister Beneke from the scene, and a slowing down in impetus for the project. There was, of course, always an implicit understanding that the ITV component would be extended, and some additional audiences, at the further and adult educational and primary levels, were gradually introduced to the system. But there was also a question of deciding how far some of the original premises upon which the reform was postulated were accurate: in particular the decision to begin at a secondary level, in an attempt to create more middle-level manpower (a decision which was at first queried by the US advisers). The evaluators of the project skirted around this problem somewhat carefully:

"In their original planning documents, Salvadorean planners emphasised the country's need for more middle-level technical manpower and through the Educational Reform they hoped to prepare young people for technical jobs in industry and agriculture. But by 1972 there were still relatively few technical jobs for Third Cycle graduates, who in any case were inclined to stay in school rather than enter the job market. If the country's high employment rate continues, and if there is no economic expansion to match the large increase in school enrolments, students will be forced to reconsider the kinds of middle-
level jobs they currently refuse as unsuitable ... Though conceding that unemployment is indeed likely to be a problem for Third Level graduates in the immediate future, Salvadorean planners believe that in the long run their economy will meet the challenge ... This expectation may or may not be fulfilled." (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 168)

The argument appears to emphasise the need for planning to be looked at, from the outset, in terms which are not time-specific. There is a tendency, in development programmes which are phased in regular Five Year sequences, to concentrate only on the short and middle term. But evidently circumstances do change, and there has to be some means not only of evaluating whether or not original objectives have been met, but also of whether those objectives were rational in the first place.

Conclusion and Articulation of Principles

On balance, most of the concepts proposed were reinforced by the project case studies, and these provided specific examples which were helpful in articulating them further. Some concepts were supported, but not illuminated in great detail; these were mainly concerned with the team planning process (more likely to be illustrated in depth by a planning survey analysis), or with aspects of policy-making and accommodation to practical constraints which, while they probably existed, had not been fully chronicled in the project evaluations.

Those concepts which were least satisfactorily reinforced concerned the reflection and determination of need, and devolution: both of them concepts stressed only recently in planning literature. The projects based in industrialised countries showed more concern for client involvement, but the involvement of system users was not fully reflected in any
project design. Devolution and decentralisation, when they occurred, were mostly at a relatively technical level. And in some of the developing country projects, it was difficult to ascertain whether these had arisen as a reflection of genuine need, or were the result of fashion and advocacy in project development and financing.

This did not imply that these concepts should automatically be rejected. Indeed, the political emphasis at present is very much on regionalisation, decentralisation and participation. Rather, it signified considerable difficulty and inhibition in incorporating such concepts, and therefore the need to build into planning designs specific aids to strengthen them. They are part of a transitional stage in communication development, when the need for change is increasingly recognised, but the traditions and inertia of the current system work against them.

The next stage, therefore, was to verbalise the concepts tentatively, in the form of planning principles, each of which should embody the main features, examples and emphasis of the project analysis. These could then be further explored, first through comparison with an actual planning survey, and subsequently used as guidelines and parameters in the construction of an experimental planning model. They are stated in Table 2.

The intention in constructing this table was to express each of the basic concepts in such a way that it embodied the main conclusions of the preceding chapter and defined each concept according to a perceived context and known limitations. With this enhanced precision the table could then offer a set of guidelines for social construction.
TABLE 2

FRAMEWORK DESIGN

1. Planning design should not be over-theoretical; it should be flexible, avoiding the uncritical use of external models.

2. Planning should focus on the whole communication system under review, and not confine itself to particular projects, sectors, media or technologies.

3. Planning should be based on genuine need, established through a variety of needs assessment mechanisms.

4. Planning should seek to devolve and decentralise its forms, involving as many agents as possible, with particular emphasis on system users.

5. Planning should begin with the establishment of clear and precise communication objectives.

SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION

6. Scenario construction should seek to maximise the use of existing resources and infrastructures.

7. Scenario construction should pay particular attention to timing and phasing.

8. Adequate arrangements should be made in scenario design for the cooperative and coordinated working of all agencies involved.
SCENARIO APPLICATION

9. In planning, people are more important than techniques.

10. To be successful, the planning process must have the interest of, and access to, influential people in key positions of decision making.

11. In planning, the limits of decision makers, planners, planning processes and institutions should be realistically recognised.

12. In communication planning, interdisciplinary working is important.

REPORT PRODUCTION

13. Plans should include mechanisms for evaluation, to allow for subsequent revision of the proposals being put forward.
The account given in this chapter may be regarded as an extended case study, similar in principle to those already analysed in Chapter IV, but dealt with at greater length and with a greater focus on the planning process. It is devoted to a specific communication planning survey (i.e. a review of communication resources and conditions, designed to lead to a long-term plan for communication development, covering an entire sector rather than individual projects). In theory, in an analysis of this kind, it should be possible to trace, more accurately and in greater detail than through project reviews, the mechanics of policy formulation and decision making, and the interactions involved in corporate or team planning. It should therefore also provide for an additional check on the principles articulated in Table 2, an opportunity to expand (and in some cases, to modify) them, and to add further principles, if these seemed justified. The chapter therefore leads towards a revised list of principles (presented in Table 4 at the end of the chapter), prior to embarking upon model construction for a planning framework in Chapter VI. In what follows
CHAPTER V

PLANNING PRINCIPLES:
ANALYSIS OF A PLANNING SURVEY

As a supplement to the case studies in Chapter IV, this chapter contains an analysis of a communication planning survey: an exercise designed to produce a coherent overall plan. In principle, in an account of this kind, it should be possible to trace, more accurately and in greater detail than through project reviews, the processes of policy formulation and decision-making. In what follows, the primary emphasis is upon the planning process, and no particular emphasis is placed upon the contents of the plan produced, beyond what is necessary to provide a context.

However, compiling such an account was not without its difficulties. There have been few comprehensive studies of communication systems as a whole, or even sectoral studies of such fields as educational communication. While many planning exercises have been focused upon individual institutions, these are only of limited scope; in addition, few of these studies (which are characteristically conducted by one or two consultants) have been monitored or chronicled.

Nevertheless, one case of comprehensive planning was known, which had been monitored fairly extensively throughout: this was a planning survey conducted in Thailand, concerned with educational mass media. It is used here to provide particular insights into team planning processes, and as a further check on the list of hypothetical principles in Table 2.
The analysis is based upon a comprehensive survey, completed between December 1973 and June 1974 and undertaken by Unesco under a Funds-in-Trust arrangement with the Government of the Netherlands. The survey was prefaced by a pre-feasibility study mounted in August 1973, which laid down guidelines for the main investigation; the study proper involved 23 consultants, including two Unesco members. Its final report was published in five volumes in June 1974.

I acted as Team Leader during the study and kept regular records of its progress, with notes of individual and team meetings. Reference was also made to the official dossiers retained from the study, and to several articles produced on its experience.

Further data were obtained through correspondence and interviews with team members, with Thai counterparts and with officials of Unesco and the World Bank, particularly in following up the progress of the study since its completion.

Background to the Study

The Thai Pre-Investment Study had its origins in discussions between the Ministry of Education and the World Bank, as part of negotiations for a major educational loan (in connection with the country's Third Development Plan). Educational radio had existed in Thailand for over twenty years, under the control of the Ministry of Education, and for more than ten years local and experimental national educational television transmissions had also been conducted. But these were relatively restricted in scope, and their educational impact was slight. Consequently, in discussions with the World Bank, the possibility of financing
a major educational media project was promoted (helped by the fact that the Thai officer principally concerned with negotiations had a long-standing involvement with, and a one-time responsibility for, educational broadcasting). It was tentatively agreed, during discussions in Washington in early 1973, that resources from the International Development Association would be made available for a comprehensive pre-investment study, and in March 1973 an informal agreement was also reached that Unesco should act as executing agency (during a visit to Paris by the same Thai official, then Under-Secretary for Education).

At this time, no commitment was made as to eventual financing of a media project by the Bank, either under IDA or IBRD terms, but there was an unwritten understanding of interest on both sides, as well as a recognition that more detailed planning would be needed if mass media were to have genuine educational significance.

This is the formal account of the survey's origins. Yet, in a similar way to the account given of the genesis of SITE and of the El Salvador project, a good deal can also be attributed to personalities and their interaction.

The guiding figure in the survey was the (then) Director General of the Department of Educational Techniques, Khunying Ambhorn Meesook, who had originally promoted the idea of educational radio in Thailand and had developed the educational radio service of the Ministry of Education over a number of years. She was heavily involved in negotiations with the World Bank for the Fourth Education Loan to Thailand, covering a number of programme areas, and she was supported by a Unesco adviser, Nicholas Bennett, who had considerable experience in the field
of educational planning in the developing world. Khunying Ambhorn urged the World Bank to include an educational media component in the forthcoming Education loan, but the Bank at this time was reluctant to embark upon a new field of activity. However, as a compromise, it did agree to finance a Pre-Investment Study, and the initial preparation for this study was entrusted to Bennett. She also enlisted the Unesco Secretariat (myself) in the project, on the basis of personal contacts going back for several years.

Relationships in the project were, therefore, more at a personal than an official level. While cooperation was officially between the Thai Government and Unesco (with the World Bank reluctantly involved, but taking a marginal place), in practice the development of the survey rested very much with Khunying Ambhorn, Nicholas Bennett and myself. The planning strategy adopted was worked out during a short pre-feasibility mission, financed by Unesco's Regular Programme, during which not only was a detailed planning design evolved, but a good deal of essential data was also gathered, to facilitate the work of the main team to follow.

It was during this pre-feasibility mission that the composition and sequencing of specialists was also worked out. In this case, however, original intentions - to involve Thai specialists more fully - were not fulfilled, and far more foreign involvement resulted than was anticipated or hoped.

For these reasons, the Pre-Investment Survey was an unusual, if not unique, exercise. Traditionally, an application to the World Bank for financing would have been prefaced by a study, at the operational level alone, of a project for developing a media
service; it would not have attempted to explore the development of media in relation to educational objectives and reforms as a whole. The fact that the personal and professional convictions of the main authors of the survey design were broader in scope was more influential in setting up an unusual (at that time) method of investigation and planning. Ironically, as will be seen later, the very novelty and comprehensiveness of the approach probably delayed the acceptance of the project by several years, because it departed so radically from World Bank traditions.

Original Objectives of the Study

The original objective of the study was to produce a framework, and elaborate a project, for the development of educational mass media in Thailand; the media system was to help improve the quality of educational provision and opportunity at both in-school and out-of-school levels, as part of a sustained programme of educational development and innovation to which the Government of Thailand was committed.

The outcome of the study was visualised as a complete project plan, with the full range of logistical and financial data likely to be required by whichever agency finally accepted the project (nominally the World Bank). This plan would necessarily include a detailed account of the project's objectives, its justification (including an economic justification), its organisational and institutional framework, some specification of programme and materials production, and phased proposals for staffing and training, utilisation, evaluation and research. Complete schedules of equipment and facilities would also be prepared, and the entire project phased across a seven-year period, including a projection
of technical assistance needs.

Apart from developing its own internal logic, the report would also have to conform to the procedures of the financing and executing agencies involved, which would include (particularly for the World Bank) a detailed economic analysis, with some consideration of cost benefit and cost efficiency.

These requirements are common to all projects; the special interest of this particular study was its context, and the means by which the end result was to be achieved.

The study was to be undertaken, first of all, within the framework of a radical programme of educational expansion for Thailand, then being prepared by the Ministry of Education and covering both formal and non-formal educational sectors. It had therefore to be associated with other educational planning initiatives and to be entirely consistent with their proposals (some of these were also the subject of Bank negotiations).

Secondly, it was to be derived from as objective an evaluation as possible of the existing educational media system, and was to build upon what was already in place, in so far as this was considered effective or potentially effective.

Thirdly, the process by which the project was created should reflect maximum involvement of the Thai Government and in particular the Ministry of Education. It should follow a formula of cooperative decision-making - by which, once system objectives had been established, various alternatives which might meet these objectives should be discussed at all relevant government levels,
and preferred solutions identified in a step-by-step sequence.

Fourthly, while the structure and presentation of the report would follow the requirements of those agencies which were known to be interested in implementation, it should be a viable document in its own right, useful and sufficient for other sponsors (and also serving as a handbook for project realisation).

To meet these conditions a planning sequence in three main phases was devised, as follows:

(a) a data base would be established which would give all necessary information for the planning team, both to evaluate the present system and to plan for a new one;

(b) the objectives of the educational and social system in relation to media use were to be precisely determined;

(c) the relevance of the present media system with regard to these objectives was to be evaluated;

(d) after reconciling (b) and (c) a new set of educational media objectives was to be determined;

(e) a matrix of media possibilities for meeting or assisting with these objectives was to be devised, and each variant costed and evaluated;

(f) the Thai Government was to be asked
to compare the alternatives proposed, and to decide upon preferred strategies;

those strategies selected were to be investigated in greater detail, and their cost and potential analysed more elaborately;
a second evaluation by the Thai Government should then lead to a single preferred strategy;

finally, this chosen strategy should be planned in considerable detail, to meet the logistical, financial and organisational requirements of both the Thai Government and other interested sponsors.

It will be seen that, in this sequence, the final project planning stage (which in other circumstances might occupy the whole of the time available) came only after a sustained process of investigation. No timings were stated in the original proposal, because it was known that these would be subject to external pressures, but it was assumed that, if a total period of one year were available, activities (a) to (e) would occupy approximately three months; activity (f) two months; activity (g) a further two months; activity (h) a further two months, and the last segment (i) would occupy at least three months. Such a phasing, it was believed, would allow adequate time for consideration of different stages of the study by the Thai authorities, in order to reach interim decisions.
It was also assumed that the study would be carried out by a relatively large team of consultants, some of whom would be nuclear (i.e. with sustained roles which would continue throughout the survey) and others more specialised (recruited to cover specific requirements). It was emphasised that, while the team's composition could be partly envisaged from the start, for specialised roles in particular, some flexibility must be retained, to permit changes in direction which could, and should, result from the expanded decision-making process.

Conduct of the Study

Scheduling

Plans for the study were first developed during a pre-feasibility survey in August 1973, financed under Unesco's Regular Programme. Prior to this, informal correspondence had been exchanged between the Thai Ministry of Education and the Unesco Secretariat, but this was amplified and formalised by a four-man mission, consisting of two members of the Unesco Secretariat (Communication and Education Sectors), a Unesco educational planner based in Thailand, and an external engineering consultant. The main purpose of the pre-feasibility survey was to expand the study's Terms of Reference (which had already been drafted by the Thai Ministry of Education, in order to negotiate with the World Bank), but in the event it went somewhat further. Principally it did so because, even at this early stage, it was realised that pressures of time would be considerable, if a full document were to be prepared and published by June 1974.

Accordingly, the pre-feasibility study undertook the following tasks:
(a) to collect as much data as possible on the existing media situation in Thailand and to identify future reference sources;

(b) to evaluate in general terms the existing media provision;

(c) to collate and analyse whatever published material was available on the objectives of the Thai educational system;

(d) to relate (c) above specifically to media possibilities;

(e) to prepare an overall matrix of possible media strategies, based primarily upon the cost of alternative proposals, and to furnish notes upon both cost and potential;

(f) to prepare modified Terms of Reference for the study and make proposals for team composition.

Even before the study began, there was some modification to the original scheme. It was already accepted, albeit reluctantly, that the entire exercise must be completed in nine months, rather than the estimated twelve. Activities (a) to (e) would still be allocated three months, commencing in October 1973, with activity (f) reduced to one month. Activities (g) to (i) would then have to be condensed into a single, continuous period of three months, culminating in a report-writing period of one month, during May 1974, with publication and submission in June.

This would inevitably reduce the amount of formal consultation with the government, and place a greater emphasis on continuous, informal consultations. The original three main phases of the
study would virtually be collapsed into two new phases -

First Phase - Activities (a) to (e); Second Phase - Activities (g) to (i) - broken by a period of discussion by the agencies of the Thai Government. This break-point would then become the only distinct period of policy refinement, involving the elimination of alternative strategies.

This new phasing was reflected in the drafting of the Pre-Feasibility Study, and later agreed between Unesco and the Thai Ministry of Education; recruitment of consultants also proceeded along these lines. However, political disturbances in the country in October 1973 again interrupted the schedule at the very last minute, and further modifications had to be made, leading to a starting date as late as December 1973. In all of this, the terminal date of the study, fixed by the schedule of negotiations with the World Bank, could only be delayed marginally (by about six weeks, if the Thai authorities were to review the study's recommendations prior to meeting the Bank's appraisal team). The eventual timescales adopted are shown in the table below, which gives both planned dates (as agreed in the Pre-Feasibility Study) and actual timings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date Planned (In Pre-Feasibility Study)</th>
<th>Actual Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original negotiations on Pre-Investment Study with World Bank</td>
<td>March 1973</td>
<td>March 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal discussions with UNESCO</td>
<td>March-April 1973</td>
<td>March-April 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Feasibility Study</td>
<td>July 1973</td>
<td>July 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Pre-Investment Study - First Phase</td>
<td>October - December 1973</td>
<td>December 1973 - January 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of alternative strategies in Interim Report to Thai authorities</td>
<td>January 1974</td>
<td>February - March 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Pre-Investment Study - Second Phase</td>
<td>February - April 1974</td>
<td>April-May 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion and publication of final report</td>
<td>May 1974</td>
<td>June-July 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission to Thai authorities</td>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>July 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal by World Bank team</td>
<td>August 1974</td>
<td>September 1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The effect of the late start is reflected above as a delay in the completion of the Interim Report, in spite of a further reduction of the First Phase by another month (from three to two months). The attempt to return to schedule in this way was unfortunately lost in the process of consultation with the Thai authorities and in decision-making; a month proved, in the event, to be quite inadequate. The Second Phase consequently began in April 1974 and was again reduced to a two-month period, followed by a highly condensed period of report writing in June. It can be seen that the mode of operation envisaged in the original design was still retained, but only by intense compression of time-scales and a reduction in the number, and scope, of alternative propositions analysed.

In order to maintain continuity, a small core group of four specialists was employed throughout the period January 1974 to May 1974; this included experts in utilisation and transmitter engineering. I acted as team leader, but unfortunately I could not be spared for the whole of the mission and became virtually a commuter to Thailand. The deputy team leader was the educational planner and economist (Nicholas Bennett), who was resident in Bangkok and had several years' experience of the Thai educational and planning system.

Other consultants were appointed for shorter periods, on an ad hoc basis. Of the 23 consultants who finally worked on the project (including the Secretariat members) these were finally drawn from the following countries: United Kingdom 2; Canada 2; Australia 3; USA 3; Singapore 1; the Netherlands 1; Greece 1; and Thailand 1. In theory, every consultant also had a full-time Thai counterpart, with some experience in
his particular specialism. The final range of specialisms within the project (some of which were not identified until quite late) were as follows: educational media systems; educational planning and economics; curriculum planning; media utilisation; media in adult and non-formal education; rural sociology; media evaluation; media research; educational radio production; educational television production; rural broadcasting; audio-visual, print and support media; community media; development communication; distance education; broadcasting transmission systems; broadcasting production systems; media administration; architecture; and systems analysis. In some cases more than one specialist was recruited within a single category, since the project was divided into stages which did not necessarily suit every consultant's availability.

The major documents produced in connection with the study were, in summary, the Pre-Feasibility Report (report of the pre-feasibility study team), the Interim Report (first report of the main Pre-Investment Team, produced after the first phase of the study itself), and the Pre-Investment Report (the final report of the main team). The complete Pre-Investment Report was published in five volumes (Summary; Educational, Social and Media Background; the Project; General Appendices; and Technical Appendices), issued in offset by Unesco, Paris.

Methodology

It is impracticable in a chapter of this length to review the methodology of the study in detail (for which reference should be made to the five published volumes, and also to the Pre-Feasibility and Interim Reports - cf. Bibliography). But an account can be
given of its basic assumptions and working principles. The underlying assumption was that principles of coherent systems design, and the maximal involvement of the Thai Government, could best be followed by a process of gradual elimination of alternative strategies. At each stage of differentiation, these would be related to educational and social objectives, with key issues pinpointed and critical decisions left to the country authorities.

(a) Pre-Feasibility Study

Thus, at the initial stage of the Pre-Feasibility Study, a matrix of media possibilities was prepared, approximately costed, and annotated from points of view of both equity and efficiency. This matrix was related to main strands of production, distribution, and reception.

A Steering Committee formed by the Thai Ministry of Education (including members of other relevant Ministries and departments concerned with broadcasting and economic planning) then reviewed the Pre-Feasibility Report and its recommendations, before isolating seven alternative media strategies to be studied by the main team. (The original matrix was in graphical form, with axes of production - distribution - utilisation - and radio - television - other media, and contained a large number of media permutations. A media strategy therefore represented a critical path through the matrix, fixed according to system objectives and cost).

(b) Pre-Investment Study - First Phase

By the time the main Pre-Investment Study began, a number of basic decisions had already been taken by the Thai Government.
It was, for example, already decided that broadcast terrestrial distribution would be proposed, not satellite or the physical distribution of tapes. Similarly, a mix of central and regional production centres was envisaged and, very importantly, arguments put forward by the Pre-Feasibility Team in favour of an independent educational radio transmission network (to offset the random nature of commercial broadcasting in Thailand) had already been accepted. Finally, requests by the team for financial parameters had led to a ceiling of US$ 20 million being imposed for the ensuing project.

The first phase of the main study, which actually began in December 1973, had therefore discounted from the outset the notion of an ideal system. It was understood that the final project must be acceptable to all the varied interests involved, not purely a theoretical construct.

During this first phase three major activities were carried out. First, a good deal of relevant information was gathered and analysed, relating to the educational system, its problems and objectives; the media system and its educational uses; the social, cultural and economic situation in different regions of the country; the administration of educational projects and mechanisms for interdepartmental cooperation (particularly at the district and village level); and the spread of reception equipment. All available previous research relating to educational media in Thailand, their production, distribution, utilisation and evaluation, was identified and analysed. In addition, information on the current provision of media and reception equipment in the schools (and the extent of their utilisation) was collected through a specially designed
Secondly, the characteristics of various types of media and their applicability to the Thai situation were studied. Through this process, combined with an analysis of the existing problems and objectives of education and the curriculum reform process, objectives of the educational media system for both in- and out-of-school purposes were identified and elaborated, including proposals on the most effective media for specific kinds of education and subject areas.

Thirdly, on the basis of this analysis, the seven alternative strategies considered viable by the Government after its consideration of the pre-feasibility survey were analysed and evaluated.

Although these three strands are reported sequentially, as only two months were available they had in practice to be conflated, with as much interaction between them as could be secured through personal dialogue between team members. This interaction showed that, if anything, the reduction of media strategies to seven at such an early stage had been precipitate; although it had been done to mitigate the pressures of team working and of time, in practice it tended to confuse the issue by coming down too firmly, too soon, in favour of particular media combinations, at a time when overall objectives were still diffuse. More rigorous discussion showed that the so-called seven strategies were made up of eighteen separate media strands, each of them relevant to the Thai situation, but capable of being put together in far more than seven ways. It was therefore decided to place these, once again, in a media matrix, with the same axes as before (of production - distribution - utilisation,
and radio-television - other media), and with appropriate annotations. This was, in effect, a compromise: it avoided premature judgements on the media mix, but presented information in a way which was still suitable for decision-making, since it could be considered in a graphical format and was similar to the matrix produced, and reviewed, by the earlier Pre-Feasibility Study. The only difference was that options were fewer and more detailed.

The team commented upon the matrix in relation to its educational findings and also indicated, as before, a preferred critical path, but left final decisions open to the Thai authorities. Its report was presented in summary as well as in its full form, as by this time even basic documentation ran to over 500 pages. A translation of essential sections and recommendations was also prepared.

(c) Pre-Investment Study - Second Phase

During February and March the Ministry of Education studied the proposals and accepted the strategy preferred by the team, with some relatively minor alterations, and on a number of occasions the team, or its leaders, met with Ministry committees to explain particular points. (The alterations were based on financial considerations; they affected such options as the distribution of audio-cassette recorders and of TV receivers throughout the school system). One issue upon which the team found itself at variance with the Thai authorities was that of colour v. monochrome television working. On a principle of cost, the Ministry of Education opted for black and white operations, but the team was anxious to ensure at least colour production facilities, as these would be extremely expensive to
install at a later stage, involving costly conversions of premises, and it was felt that, in time, colour working would be inevitable. (This point was conceded after a number of exploratory debates). The team had also raised a number of specific questions which needed answers before further planning could proceed, and the responses to these questions were used as parameters for the next planning stage, commencing in April. Mostly these questions were on matters of organizational control and coordination, and on the physical siting of premises.

The project had, by this time, been refined to a point where its main components were seen as (i) an independent radio network for education, consisting of central production resources and a subsidiary regional network, serving the interests of both in and out-of-school education, including development communication; (ii) a limited educational television resource, based on existing and projected facilities outside the education sector and phased according to national television development plans - again catering for both in and out-of-school needs; (iii) experimental work in the area of local and community media; (iv) the provision of supplementary print and audio-visual materials, keyed to the mass media provision; and (v) provision for prototyping and evaluation. The main impetus of the system was to be towards the qualitative improvement of education and towards social development, showing specific linkages to curriculum reform and general development plans, with improved interaction between educational and social systems as a key goal.

Throughout April and May, the team was able to concentrate its attention on the preparation of a detailed main project and associated sub-projects (the reason for dividing up projects in
this way was an assumption that, while the main media system would probably be financed by a single donor, other donors might well be prepared to contribute to particular areas, while still accepting the logic of an integrated system as described in the report).

By the end of June, complete project outlines had been formulated, including:

(a) objectives and justification for the main project;
(b) staffing and training;
(c) programme and programme preparation schedules;
(d) equipment and technical specifications;
(e) details of buildings, including draft architectural plans;
(f) a description of proposed utilisation procedures;
(g) full recurrent and capital cost information;
(h) loan and technical assistance requirements;
(i) proposals for an evaluation system and for research procedures;
(j) an operational plan, including details of phasing.

Whatever could not be included within the report itself was retained in a background dossier. The final report thus had two main functions: first, to act as a project request document, to be presented to foreign aid donors; and second, to serve as a handbook for project implementation, which could be used later by Thai officials.

The report was made available to the Thai Government by July 1974 and was the substantative document for discussions with the World Bank during a review mission mounted by the Bank in the
Autumn of 1974.

Constraints Upon the Study

The constraints experienced during the study can be divided into three categories: those which were realised from the outset, but were either felt to be unavoidable or were accepted as being negotiable; those which were realised as the study proceeded and which were, to a greater or lesser extent, counteracted; and those limitations - and errors - which were realised in retrospect. They are described below in the same order.

Constraints realised from the outset

Time

The main constraint which had to be accepted was that of time; it was this which led the pre-feasibility survey team to undertake far more in the way of preparatory work than it had anticipated. For the same reason, the identification of consultants was begun even before the survey had been finally negotiated; and the background data which would be needed for the study were also identified and stockpiled, as far as was consistent with limited local resources. A questionnaire was also devised and sent out to schools, asking for information about reception equipment and its utilisation, but this had to be done hastily and the questionnaire was not piloted in advance.

In view of the fact that the project was still not implemented by the end of 1976, something more should be said on the nature of the time constraint. It may well be asked: why was timing so
important, if in the end the decision to proceed was deferred indefinitely? The main point at issue was the confirmed schedule of overall negotiations with the World Bank, involving not only the media project, but also other educational projects (and indeed projects outside the education sector, arising from the country's Third Development Plan). It was felt by the Thai Ministry of Education and Unesco planners that the commitment of other sectors of Government and of the World Bank to a Pre-Investment Study, and even more so to a follow-up investment project, was precarious enough for its success to be totally neutralised by a delay in completion. The choice therefore appeared to be one of proceeding with the study on limited timescales, or not proceeding at all. It may be that this argument was over-stated, and that reactions to time pressures were too subjective, but to those involved they appeared to be genuinely convincing.

It can also be said that the study was concerned, not with whether or not to introduce or expand educational media, but with how and when to expand them. While part of the study was devoted to an analysis of media potential, this was done in order to convince donors of their viability; the main executing agents were, by inference, committed in advance.

**Leadership**

A further constraint which was known and accepted concerned the leader and deputy team leader of the study. The Ministry of Education was anxious to make use of my services, as a member of the Unesco Secretariat with previous experience in Asia in the educational media field and with prior knowledge of the Thai
situation. I could not be spared for the duration of the study, but it was agreed that I should join it at key points (i.e. for several weeks at the beginning and end of each phase, and for the whole of the final report writing, totalling a period of some three to four months); I would also supervise work, including the hiring of consultants, from Paris. My availability was planned as carefully as possible to coincide with critical stages of the study, but this left little latitude to cope with crises or changes of plan. The deputy team leader, on the other hand, was resident in Thailand, so that he was always available, but he had nevertheless to combine work on this project with other responsibilities for educational planning, and for the negotiation of other World Bank projects. This meant that he was normally free for consultation, but could not be so much a regular member of the team as other full-time consultants. Since the planning and direction of the study were very much the outcome of joint discussions between the leader and the deputy team leader, such planning had to be confined to periods when both were in Thailand, or conducted by correspondence and cable (which necessarily led to some ambiguities).

Constraints realised during the conduct of the Study

Phasing

The first constraint highlighted during the course of the study was probably the realisation that, whatever had been done to mitigate the pressures of time and limitations on leadership, this was not adequate. The study had opted for a model of phased development, requiring regular consultations with the Thai Government, a model which had (once it was begun) to be continued, otherwise the whole scheme would be invalid. This situation was not helped by the political difficulties which delayed the project's beginning.
There appeared to be no complete solution to the time problem, beyond increasing individual workloads far beyond desirable levels, and on occasions taking some shortcuts (for example, delimiting the range of alternative strategies, or reducing the breath pauses scheduled for the Thai Government to take stock, with the consequent disadvantage of steering the Government in the direction of a particular strategy earlier, and more positively, than would have been ideal).

There could of course be two possible explanations for this state of affairs. The first is that this kind of study takes longer than anticipated (even longer than originally planned, before events curtailed options). The second is that the team was in some ways inefficient, being required, or allowed, to cover options in too great a detail (or lacking sufficient professional experience to cover the ground without extensive research, adaptation and acculturation). Both of these explanations appear to have some validity, and both are discussed later.

Direction

The position of the leader and deputy team leader certainly caused considerable difficulty. There were periods when the deputy team leader had to cope with critical situations and a workload quite beyond his expectations: there were also periods when full-time consultants felt without direction. Thus a form of crisis planning tended to develop, in which periods of intense activity often coincided with my return from Paris. This is not atypical of studies of this kind, but unfortunately its momentum did not always match the dynamic of the planning design (which saw
periods of sustained work alternating with relative periods of quiet while the Thai Government considered what had been done so far).

It has been argued that consultants of the calibre assumed by such a study should be in a position to work unaided, without overt direction. In traditional situations this may well be true, but the complexity of this study, and the novelty of its subject area and design strategy, worked against it.

Technical Assistance Procedures

A further constraint stemmed from the procedures adopted for project design and for financing. In order to mount projects of this nature at all, relatively detailed project documents and plans of operation have to be written, and it is often difficult (unless the sponsoring agency is extremely sympathetic) to build in very much flexibility. In this case, the sponsor was originally to be the World Bank, and negotiations and project design followed this assumption (e.g. the Bank's proforma costs were used for consultants). However, rather late in the day, the Thai Government decided to use part of a technical assistance grant from the Government of the Netherlands to finance the study (which was better financially for the Government, since it did not involve interest repayments, but necessitated a new agreement with Unesco under a Funds-in-Trust arrangement). In practice the Netherlands Government was extremely cooperative in easing administrative procedures, but clearly the late change of plan led to difficulties.
Consultants and Team Working

It was realised during the first planning stages that there would be difficulty in hiring specialised consultants, partly because of the shortage of time, but particularly because consultants were needed for periods ranging from one to six months.

In practice, the difficulties proved even worse than expected. There is no readily available data bank of suitable specialists, and a good deal depended upon the team leader's own experience and upon his personal grapevine. The final composition of the team had far too great a preponderance of European specialists (not by intent, but partly through unfamiliarity with specialists from other regions, and the related fact that often five or six alternative choices were necessary).

Consultants from developing countries were few; in many fields, they apparently did not exist at that time, as the disciplines were too new, or too rarefied. Indeed, in some areas (e.g. economists specialising in communication media) there are still few available specialists in any country, and some element of learning on the job has to be accepted.

One factor which was not seriously predicted (for short missions of this kind) was that of culture shock. Two consultants left the project after only a few days, apparently unable to cope with the culture and with the nature of the study.

More predictable was a degree of insularity in the team's working, which led consultants to group together as a small sub-
culture in both working and leisure hours. For reasons of convenience they worked in a single open-plan office, and for reasons of economy they either occupied the same hotel or lived in shared apartments. Apart from the deputy team leader, none spoke Thai, and while several were interested in the culture and made some effort to come to grips with it, others made such attempt. In any case, the pressure of work was against such assimilation.

It can be argued that such a degree of insularity is not only inevitable, but has its advantages. Consultants cannot be on call for twenty-four hours a day and they have both a need, and a right, to relax in the fashion of their own culture. Moreover, this is a two-sided situation; compromises have to be made by local counterparts as well as by consultants. Some cultures (such as the Thai culture) are private, with a dislike of public statement or public intimacy, and decision-making may be associated with the extended family, with blood lines, with status, with religious practice, as well as with career considerations. It could easily be offensive, as well as ill-judged, to attempt to break into this pattern over a relatively short period. On balance, more could have been done to minimise the effects of insularity by providing shared working accommodation (for consultants and counterparts) and by selection procedures which emphasised cultural adaptability, but the argument should not be overplayed.

The position of counterparts was however critical. It had originally been planned that every consultant would have a full-time Thai counterpart, and it was hoped that this would both reduce the alienation of external experts and increase the Thai
involvement. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Only one or two officials from the Ministry of Education were seconded full-time to the project, and these had necessarily to cope with all team members (especially in areas where other ministries were involved, when even part-time Thai personnel were not always available).

Such a situation was very damaging, as it restricted the involvement of the host country in a study which was premised upon maximum involvement. Involvement is something which is demanded at all levels: of decision-making, of working specialisms, of administration. It is not merely a question of motivation or commitment; unless there is a continuous sharing at the early planning stage, the rationale behind decisions which inevitably include elements of compromise will be forgotten, and the process of implementation will be made far more difficult.

The limitations placed upon involvement therefore produced difficulties of many kinds. While reports (or summaries of reports) were always considered (and explained) at a senior level, there was only limited understanding of the detailed analyses and conclusions of the study at more junior levels, and an opportunity was lost for a form of in-service training which could have had benefits far beyond the reduction of team insularity. This situation might have been prevented, had it been possible under technical assistance procedures to pay counterpart personnel, but the standard assumption is that counterpart contributions are the recipient government's responsibility.

Some other difficulties affecting consultants and counterparts were generally anticipated by the team leader and deputy team
leader, and by those with prior experience of developing country studies involving large teams. Personality difficulties were bound to occur, some of them arising from the tensions which always arise within a miscellaneous group, but others stemming from professional insecurity. In large teams some consultants are bound to be better, or more relevantly qualified, than others, and this study was no exception. Working in a team setting requires a number of skills beyond specialist experience, the chief of which are the ability to accept group working and corporate decisions, and the flexibility to work outside a particular specialism (to make up for inevitable gaps in group experience). Such difficulties can only be resolved on the spot.

It is likely that many of these difficulties were exacerbated by the selection procedures adopted by international organisations. Consultants can rarely be interviewed; they have to be contracted on the basis of paper qualifications, supplemented by personal reports if available. Political considerations of nationality and of overall team balance also come into play, sometimes as importantly as professional experience.

However, these standard difficulties were compounded in the case of the Thai study. As a result of the phased decision-making model, in some cases different consultants within the same specialism had to be recruited for Phase One and Phase Two of the study (since the same expert was not always available for both periods). Naturally enough, the second specialist was not always in agreement with what had been planned by his predecessor, and at times this reaction intensified into a desire to "reinvent the wheel". Some consultants engaged upon the second stage of the study (which came after alternatives had been produced, and a
particular strategy decided upon) tried repeatedly to go back to first principles and to query decisions already finalised, and while their objections were often perfectly rational, they sometimes led to unprofitable discussion and some friction.

Another difficulty caused by phasing largely affected the first period of the study (December 1973/January 1974). It was properly a difficulty of system design, although it was not understood as such when it first emerged. The difficulty was caused by the fact that the objectives of the Thai educational system were not in themselves particularly clear, and in order to work out suitable media strategies, the whole planning base of education had first to be analysed. It was revealed, for example, that although there had been a number of changes in the country's Development Plan and in its educational development goals, these were not reflected in the curriculum, which had often remained static even when goals and targets had been radically modified. This state of affairs was quickly apparent to the educators on the team and was hardly surprising, but it produced a feeling of frustration and inadequacy in some of the media specialists, who were not able to continue with their work until the problem of objectives had been satisfactorily resolved. For a few weeks, the problem was not acute, because an evaluation was being made of the technical and human capacity of the existing media services, but this review could not go on indefinitely; thereafter, from a producer's point of view or from that of an engineer, it was difficult to understand why the planning process could not proceed more rapidly. Media professionals knew only too well the inflexibility of the timescales imposed upon the project, and realised that they were being called upon to develop, within a period of six months, complete plans for a large-scale
media system. Given such imperative deadlines they resisted very strongly the idea that they should wait for objectives to be confirmed, alternatives to be considered and strategies to be evaluated before entering into detailed technical planning; indeed, in some cases they resisted the concept of presenting alternatives altogether, since they felt that, from their own experience, they could stipulate what the preferred strategy should be.

In few cases were these constraints altogether surprising; it was the extent of the difficulties, rather than their nature, which was sometimes unexpected. There were few precedents in the field of educational media for working with large teams of people on planning exercises of this complexity (mostly team work is conducted at a practical, operational level), and most problems simply had to be met, explored and countered as the study proceeded.

One aspect of phasing which could be modified in the course of the study has already been described in the comments on scheduling and methodology; this was a reduction in the number of alternative strategies to be explored, and the limitation of 'breath pauses', during which the Thai Government was to consider interim recommendations. It is doubtful, nevertheless, whether this reduction of scope was enough, in view of the other pressures experienced. The most difficult period of the entire study was that immediately prior to the production of the Interim Report (when a vast amount of data had been collected, but could not be adequately analysed until the work on educational objectives had been completed); at this time many team members were anxious, because they could not see the shape of the final
product or even the route by which it could be reached. The production of the Interim Report therefore represented a major hurdle after which matters eased, although perhaps as an overreaction to its pressures, more specific recommendations on final media choices were offered to the Thai authorities than would have been ideal.

Limitations realised after the event

Report Publication

Several further limitations, or errors of judgment, became apparent at the time of report writing and printing. Ideally there is a buffer period at the end of a project before a summary report is completed: a time when the considerable amount of data which has been collected can be sifted and gaps filled, before final writing and editing begins. In the case of the Thai study this was not possible, and report writing was actually proceeding (to meet printing deadlines) as the last planning stages took place.

It may be argued that the report was, in any case, too long. However, a call for a reduction in volume is not necessarily met by arbitrary cutting of pages; compression would require restructuring and careful editorial selection, which takes time to achieve.

Phasing

This was again a practical reflection of the overall difficulty in phasing, which, in spite of numerous adjustments, did not
sufficiently allow for the realities of media planning. It was clear in retrospect that activities should have been even more carefully separated out; probably at the time of establishing educational objectives and media strategies, only educational planners and educational technologists should have been present. These have a common understanding of the nature of educational problems, which practitioners do not necessarily share. It would probably have been better, even given the reduced time scales, to have confined the first phase of the study to specialists in educational media systems, educational planning and economics, media utilisation, evaluation and research, rural sociology and media in adult and non-formal education, and to defer the arrival of producers and technicians to a second phase. In this way a first stage of the project could have established educational media objectives; a second stage would have worked out alternative media strategies; and a third phase would then have elaborated the final project design.

Against this, it can be argued that the pressure from engineers, producers and technicians to come up with specifics was a necessary and productive stimulus, without which the urgency of defining objectives would not have been acknowledged. But in this particular case, the pressures were too diverse and contradictory to be anything but confusing. Moreover, the pressure from an engineer or producer is not primarily to declare the objectives of a system; it is rather a specific plea of 'Let me get on with designing a building', or 'What programmes do you want me to produce?' If this situation is not delicately handled, any suggestion that there may be more than one way to achieve an objective may easily be construed as a criticism of professional competence.
An expanded phasing and division of labour would also have had advantages for team working, since this would have reduced to a minimum the tensions arising from group activities. It would equally have given team members more time and leisure to associate themselves more personally with Thai counterparts, to search them out if necessary, to work with them professionally, and to immerse themselves more in the country's educational and cultural situation.

**Team Composition**

A further drawback which was not immediately apparent was caused by the limited spread of nationalities reflected in the team - partly by the paucity of Asian consultants, but also by the emphasis upon European tradition. There are two traditions in educational media, the European and the American, and creative planning for new media systems should ideally blend these two traditions more fully than was possible in the event. The European tradition is strong on programming and media performance; the American is stronger on utilisation, teacher involvement and research-based operations. A wider spread of representatives of both backgrounds should have produced a better synthesis, and if this could have included more Asian experts (who themselves mirror the two main strands of American and European influence) the result should have been better still.

**Training and Promotion**

It was also apparent that some opportunities were lost for training and promotional work. The study would have been an ideal milieu for internships for Asian consultants, if this could have
been arranged financially; furthermore, if more opportunities for promotion had been created (i.e. group lectures and presentations of the thoughts of the mission to representative Thai agencies) more innovative approaches might finally have been included than was the case.

Data Base

Like most studies, the survey suffered from a lack of hard information, and it was unfortunate that more specific compilations of data (certainly a better use of questionnaire surveys) could not have been organised. The questionnaire survey which was undertaken occupied a great deal of time and energy, but still missed some opportunities. Had an evaluator with statistical competence been included at a very early stage (i.e. at the time of the Pre-Feasibility Study), he might have had the chance to devise special formats, which could both produce data for the study and anticipate later demands.

Presentation

Another difficulty which had been predicted earlier concerned the presentation of the report. There is always a paradox in the presentation of a complex report (with close reasoning and extended references, summarising months of specialist study), if this document is also to serve as a basis for decision-making. The complete report is needed for project implementation and for professional inspection at the agency level, but decision-makers cannot be expected to cope with such detail. Alternative versions are needed, and fortunately from the outset a summary volume of the report was proposed, which could be used for senior decision-makers
with restricted time (and in many cases limited interest, if the field of educational media was outside their sphere of responsibility). However, similar arrangements should have been made for preparatory and interim documents (perhaps even more important, as these were the basis of critical mid-project decisions), and more should have been done in the way of translation into Thai. These factors were realised, but the necessary logistical support was unfortunately not available.

Involvement of Financing Agency

A final constraint did not become fully apparent until quite late in the day; this was the lack of involvement of the ultimate financing agency (in this case the World Bank). Ultimately, a large study involving 23 consultants was followed by a month-long Bank review mission, consisting of only six members, some of whom were unfamiliar with the political situation of Thailand, did not have time to digest the report properly, and were even in some cases unfamiliar with Bank policies and procedures (since several external consultants were employed). The appraisal mission disagreed with a number of elements in the report which had been the subject of protracted negotiations with the Thai authorities, and the Government declined in January 1975 to accept the mission's judgments. Probably this confrontation could have been avoided had Bank representatives worked throughout with the main Pre-Investment Study Team. As a result of these disagreements, negotiations for the actual project were unduly protracted, and ironically projects which had received far less attention and study were accepted in the meantime with relatively few queries. Partly this must be attributed to the mixed financing arrangements, whereby the Pre-Investment Study was financed by one agency (the Netherlands
Government), and a second agency (the World Bank) was expected to finance the major project to follow. This could only reduce the interest and sense of involvement of the World Bank at a very critical stage.

The political difficulties in fact led to final impasse for the project. An unofficial attempt to reopen negotiations with the World Bank in November 1975 produced a tentative response from Washington, but once it was learned that the Thai authorities still wished to include an educational television component, negotiations were again suspended. There were also further objections in Thailand to the desire of the Ministry of Education to set up an independent radio network (expressed by the Public Relations Department, as the main broadcasting agency of the country, which saw an opportunity for expanding its own network being compromised), and in the draft Appraisal Report offered by the Bank in March 1976, communication media figured only in a pilot radio project addressed to rural audiences.

It was not until 1978 that a major project, which included only a radio component, was incorporated into the Fifth Education Loan to Thailand. In this project a new radio network was featured which was to be entrusted to the Public Relations Department. Further delays in processing and recruitment meant that the project finally began to move forward only in 1980.

Comparison with Planning Principles

The Thailand survey has been described at length because, when research was begun, it was probably a unique example of a comprehensive planning survey in the communication field, and
certainly unique in the amount of data which it furnished on the planning process.

While the survey was not modelled on a particular planning framework (apart from the matrix which it used to present cost and strategy alternatives), it did implicitly follow the kind of organisational sequence which can be reduced to model form. The analysis has emphasised planning difficulties, and so illuminated that part of the research which is concerned with the mitigation, or circumvention, of constraints upon formal planning processes. It should be useful, therefore, to relate the analysis directly to the planning principles already proposed, and to see where further modifications, or expansions, may be justified.

In doing so, the same categorisation is followed as in Chapter IV, and the same numbering of principles.
Framework Design

In general the Thai study was not over-theoretical in approach (Principle 1); it was not committed to any particular planning methodology, but was loosely based upon systems planning concepts, and its use of networking was confined, in the main, to the phasing of project activities in the final plan. Some care was taken to avoid rigid, linear planning designs which are difficult to change in mid-stream. Not only do the actual circumstances of planning change as they proceed (e.g. in Thailand, there was continuing uncertainty as to the scale of whatever project might ultimately be envisaged, and the locus of project control), but the actual environment of planning, and the results of its early experiences, tend to change planning parameters. In the Thai case, the planning matrix which was evolved presented some fundamental, comparative data on the costs of different media possibilities; this attempt to concretise the basic problem stimulated decision makers to rethink their needs, and so changed the subsequent conditions of planning. This is not necessarily attributable to indifference or ineptitude on the part of decision-makers; partly it is due to an inherent difficulty in the communication sector in visualising the problems and potential of communication technologies until they are presented in a concrete form.

This need for flexibility was also reflected in the final survey and planning design. Much of the document was concerned with the institutionalisation of a planning framework which would be sensitive to change, and at least a few of the project proposals were devoted to experimental areas (such as community media) which, while located within a common overall structure, still provided an opportunity to create an independent momentum.
There was, however, some criticism in World Bank commentaries upon the report that the organic unity of the project (Principle 2) had not been broadly enough conceived (especially the relationship between media and curriculum development). Nevertheless, the survey report did go much further towards encouraging systemic unity than its original Terms of Reference implied, and it deliberately expanded its own time-frame in order to define more precise educational system objectives than were originally available. Ambiguity in such areas as curriculum stemmed largely from the fact that, while the survey was taking place, comparable planning was being undertaken in the associated fields of curriculum development and adult education, and little more could be said about relationships until the findings of other planning studies were known.

At the same time, communication as an end in itself was substantially played down. In the original Terms of Reference for the survey, the media, per se, figured too prominently, and television technology in particular was emphasised to the exclusion of other components. This emphasis was much softened during the survey period, and the relationship of media to curriculum reform, social development and community animation was as clearly articulated as possible, given the generality of plans and provisions for these areas.

It is debatable whether the project stemmed initially from need, (Principle 3), or from political convenience, or both; certainly elements of the eventual proposal (especially the insistence upon using television for education, upon which implementation ultimately foundered) had a political bias. However, the conduct of the study was such that, while political
elements were recognised and acknowledged within the project design, a determined attempt was still made to relate project planning directly to educational and social needs, with a special emphasis laid throughout upon the extension of education and development to deprived rural areas and to adult audiences.

In this whole issue the survey was caught, uneasily, between the stronger political motivations of the Thai authorities and the more theoretical concerns of the World Bank.

The survey also did what it would to decentralise planning (Principle 4) wherever possible: for example, through the introduction of structured means of feedback, through the creation of local planning and policy review committees and in particular through the introduction of some experimental projects in the field of community media. Such initiatives came, however, more as the result of team enthusiasms than as the outcome of local, political pressures. Thai society is traditional, hierarchial and Buddhist, and the concept of devolution, or of user involvement, was simply not understood.

The survey clearly demonstrated the need to proceed through a careful articulation of objectives (Principle 5), and much of its early difficulty arose from the fact that, at the outset, overall educational objectives had been inadequately clarified. Much time was wasted (and the specialist talents of technical experts under-utilised) because of the necessity to crystallize these objectives before specific planning could begin; this was justified in the eyes of the team leader and his deputy, but not always appreciated as such by other team members.
Scenario Construction

There was a sustained attempt (Principle 6), to make use of existing infrastructures where these appeared to be viable (e.g. linking communication development to the adult education and non-formal education movement, and basing media development upon known patterns of social interaction, as revealed by a separate sociological analysis). This was not easy, in view of the complexity and rigidity of the Thai social structure.

The one major exception to this principle was deliberate: the recommendation to create an independent radio transmission network for education, rather than rely upon existing broadcasting structures. This argument was based upon the demonstrated incapacity of traditional broadcasting channels to support educational development over a period of some fifteen years. It was known at the time that the proposal would cause some political dissension, as proved to be the case (with the Public Relations Department). Possibly the same recommendation would not have been made had the study been an overall national communication survey rather than a sectoral analysis; any reform of the PRD model was outside the team's terms of reference and beyond the Ministry of Education's sphere of influence, so that a sectoral or independent solution to the problem had to be found. When the project was finally approved, in 1978-9, the radio network was placed under the direction of the PRD.

The timing advantage of the study (Principle 7) was eroded during its execution. The association of the survey with the negotiation of a major World Bank loan for education was both opportune and deliberate, and it coincided with a renewed interest
in communication media for national development. But its actual beginnings were interrupted by the October 1973 coup, and its execution coincided with a period of political instability.

With regard to phasing, the study was rushed; although it attempted to cope with successive time compressions systematically, and reduce its scope of activities accordingly, in the event this was not enough. Compromises over timing often have to be accepted, but an agreement to reduce time-scales has to be matched either by a proportionate increase in resources, or by a limitation on planning demands: in Thailand, this was not adequately negotiated.

The major difficulty of the survey was in fact one of phasing. Apart from breaking down activities into essential components and sequences, basic human interactions have to be allowed for; this is not a mechanistic process, but includes some acknowledgement of the biases, habits and preconceptions of decision makers at various levels. In such cases, systems analysis is only a guide, and in the Thai context the time reduction meant that (i) the amount of dialogue between planners and decision-makers was reduced; and (ii) not enough time was allowed for the implications of alternative strategies to be fully assimilated before decisions were made. This severely weakened the process of consensus. Because the survey was located (institutionally) within the Ministry of Education, it was seen by other agencies as a sectoral study, even though its Terms of Reference impinged considerably upon other sectors (Principle 8). Many attempts were made to enlist other agencies in the study, but with limited success. Counterparts were not found outside the Ministry of Education on anything like
a full-time basis, and the level of these counterparts was in many cases inferior. It is doubtful, for example, whether the Public Relations Department (as the organisation primarily responsible in Thailand for broadcasting services) ever fully realised the implications of the survey, since at later meetings with the World Bank, the PRD claimed that it had not been fully briefed on the team’s recommendations and regarded the apparent consensus reached on an independent Ministry of Education radio network as not being binding. Meetings with the economic planning authorities were also, unfortunately, infrequent and largely ceremonial, and even within the Ministry of Education there was some confusion as to the survey’s role. Thus, while a clear set of relationships was exposed in the final report, this could not be said to have been even tacitly agreed by all concerned.

All of this impacted upon the issue of coordination. However, in the case of technical assistance projects, coordination demands go further still. The net must, ideally, draw together financing and executing agencies in a properly structured dialogue, and in Thailand this patently did not happen. It was unfortunate that the original donor (the World Bank) was replaced at the very last minute by the Netherlands Government, and while the latter did not in any way interfere in the planning cycle, the World Bank equally had no direct part in the main planning process. For this reason, the Bank’s eventual appraisal of the project report was inadequately informed, scanty and insensitive to the Thai political climate.
Scenario Application

The Thai survey revealed more about the difficulties of team working than about individual planners, (Principle 9), but it did expand, quite considerably, upon the qualities to be demanded of foreign planning specialists. In brief, it suggested that their abilities should be as follows: (placed, subjectively, in order of importance)

(a) the ability to work in a team, to respond flexibly to arguments advanced by other team members, to abide by corporate team decisions.

(b) adaptability to unfamiliar cultural situations and an ability to relate to local people at all levels.

(c) the ability to work beyond a narrow professional discipline, and to relate academic and professional experience, practically, to new environments and unfamiliar problems.

(d) specialist experience and qualifications.

(e) prior experience in a developing country.

This is not to say that professional competence is unimportant, or prior experience in the developing world; rather, it is to emphasise that sympathy and adaptability are the most essential qualities. The study fully endorsed the need for status and political involvement (Principle 10). It was, from its inception, politically oriented; it owed much to the persistence of Khunying Ambhorn Meesook, the senior civil servant who worked for several
years with officials of the World Bank, trying to gain acceptance of the Pre-Investment Study approach (and its financing at low interest IDA loan rates). She also influenced successive Ministers and Permanent Secretaries of Education to support her initiative; her personal position was not always unopposed, but at the time of the study she was in a commanding position to push the project forward and press for decisions to be made at appropriate times. The fact that a senior Unesco planning adviser (Nicholas Bennett) was also influential within the Ministry of Education and involved in the survey was also significant, in that it eased the study's bureaucratic passage. This advantage did not remain, however, as Khunying Ambhorn Meesook was later moved laterally within the Ministry's hierarchies, and other commitments prevented her from figuring regularly in team dialogue. The Minister of Education at the time (until his resignation from office, after illness, during the survey's execution) was not a strong advocate and did not involve himself with any frequency in the policy issues raised.

In addition, the survey never commanded a strong involvement from other Ministries, from the National Economic Development Board, or from senior politicians and members of Cabinet, so that overall the degree of status which it secured must be considered mixed. And in the years which came after the Survey, no single influential figure emerged to press the project's claims.

If anything, therefore (Principle 11), a serious over-assessment was made of the time and capacity of decision-makers to absorb the substance of the material upon which they were making decisions, and so to come up with a rational set of recommendations. Decisions are not always made solely according to rational criteria, and the nuances of decision making, and the
manner of weighting priorities, have to be carefully reviewed. This was not always the case in Thailand, and even sections of the Ministry of Education were often unclear as to the justification for particular decisions. Nonetheless, the sequencing of the project and its breakdown into specific decision points had two major advantages: it forced consideration of strategic alternatives at critical stages; and it made it impossible for the Thai authorities to dissociate themselves from the eventual project proposals (as has happened on other occasions, when these are developed totally by foreign teams). A comparable lack of realism was demonstrated by the planning design, in the assumptions which it made about the involvement and participation of Thai counterparts. Indeed the weakness of the Thai participation was commented upon by a member of the counterpart team:

"On the counterpart side, we did all we could to secure counterparts for the specialists, and we got them, officially with written approval, from each Individual's superior. In practice, however, it was impossible to have the counterparts working with the specialists full-time or even part-time, because these officials were not released from their normal duties.

Another weakness in the exercise I must mention is the poor coordination among government departments which must have been extremely frustrating for our specialists. And the last point I should like to mention is that officials in my own department who were directly concerned with the project, myself included, failed to get involved in the Study, partly because we still had our normal responsibilities to
cope with, but particularly because we found ourselves bogged down with administrative chores connected with the project. What we should have done was to create a completely separate administrative unit with a staff working full-time in it, and under no circumstances allow professional people to get involved in administration. Such an arrangement would have ensured more active participation on the part of the professional staff, and would have prevented the criticism that the project was a 'foreign experts' project and not a Thai one."

(Bhonghbibhat, 1976 p.67)

This is not an unusual situation. Very often, a recipient Government agrees nominally to release full-time counterpart personnel, yet in the event these are only part-time, expected to continue with normal functions. A determined stand might eliminate this obstacle, but sadly donor and executing agent are often at odds. There is at times a tension between the funder (who feels that his money justifies him in being autocratic) and the executor (who resents his lack of control over finance), which inhibits any common platform.

The level of representation at policy-making meetings was likewise an area of difficulty. Because this was a Ministry of Education project, on the whole educational representation was adequate, but other Ministries, possibly quite deliberately, often dispatched junior officers with only limited authority to meetings. This failure cannot be attributed solely to the Education Ministry; the weakness would seem to lie in the fact
that a communication survey was pitched, organically, at a single Ministry level, while its sphere of activity lay across a much broader spectrum.

It is not surprising that the Thai study illustrated most clearly those aspects of planning methodology which concern group working and inter-disciplinarity (Principle 12): as one of the earliest integrated studies in the communication field it had to grope towards solutions, rather than find them ready-made.

A main difficulty occurred in the identification of consultants: both as individual specialists and as group members. Flexibility was extremely important; the abrupt departure of two consultants, for example, and the inability to replace these immediately, meant a complete re-allocation of functions for remaining team members and some reordering of roles. This problem is compounded in the case of technical assistance projects, where both consultants and local counterparts are working together and the complexities of group operation become proportionately greater (in reality, two groups may be created, each with its own dynamic, and a major problem is to establish bridgeheads between the two). In Thailand, the following conclusions emerged on matter: of team working, most of them practical and specific:

(1) The role of consultants must be established at the earliest possible stage. In some cases, they will be working primarily as advisers, monitoring the basic work and decisions of counterparts; in other cases, they may be serving virtually as technical consultants, contracted to perform a particular task. Irrespective of the pros and cons of each approach, an understanding by each consultant of his personal role is important.
(2) Patterns of team working should be carefully studied and adjusted to suit the particular composition of each group. There are no invariable rules to govern the choice of, say, open-plan working, the frequency of team meetings, or the degree to which direction is needed from the team leader. Yet it is important to establish such patterns early, on the basis of a sensitive response to the team's corporate identity.

(3) The principal members of any comprehensive planning exercise should be full-time throughout.

(4) In technical assistance projects, as representative a group of consultants as possible should be obtained for a planning team, and this mix should reflect both cultural traditions in the industrialised world, and representativeness of the developing world.

(5) Advance briefing and orientation of consultants are essential.

(6) Physical environment is important to team working; it should be both studied and, if necessary, argued for (e.g. the placing of consultants and counterparts together or in proximity to the main institutions involved).

(7) The appointment of a team leader is crucial; apart from wide-ranging professional competence, he must be able to act as a sympathetic leader, experienced in group dynamics.

In a team situation, it is the match of expertise and personalities which is most important. For example, in the Thai
case, it might be asked whether the planning task would have been better served by a smaller team of consultants, operating more homogeneously over a longer period, but without the varied specialisms which were actually available? Pros and cons can be argued for both approaches.

A larger team of specialists is easier to find, it embraces a fuller range of technical disciplines, it has a better, built-in capacity to deal with wastage (in the sense that one or two less competent consultants will have fewer adverse results overall). At the same time, it makes for less continuity, less team involvement, and less understanding (because of the relative shortness of each consultant's work) of the whole system design. Most of the decisions in the Thai study were taken because of time pressures, but in another context, should a different combination be chosen (accepting fewer consultants for longer periods, in the hope that each would cover, through his own efforts, fields outside his immediate professional discipline)?

Part of the difficulty stems from the complexity of planning. It has been argued (among others, by the World Bank) that the Thai study was too complex in design, and it is true that, for some short-term members (and for some casual Thai participants) the intricacy of the planning, and the permutations of choice, represented a major hurdle. It has to be accepted that more in the way of explanation and education should have been attempted. But can communication planning ever avoid being complex when, apart from being a new discipline, it is also trying to reconcile so many variables, including social and political as well as economic and technical forces? Moreover, is not a complex design often necessary in order to secure flexibility of planning, to
avoid premature decisions, preconceptions, unfounded assumptions? In such circumstances it may equally be argued that only a long-standing acquaintance with the evolution of the planning design, and the parameters affecting its modification and adaptation, will allow consultants a coherent role. In the case of Thailand, it has already been noted that some members who participated in the second stage were not fully attuned to its conception and questioned even its basic premises. This is not unexpected; however good or bad they were professionally, they could hardly have penetrated the intricacies of the design in the time available.

**Report Production**

Finally the Thai survey attempted to deal, seriously and comprehensively, with evaluation (Principle 13), bringing appropriate specialists into the planning team and building it into the eventual project design. Indeed, the study was, in many ways, ahead of its time in the attention which it paid to evaluation, and yet it was still not sufficiently aware of evaluation demands. In particular, the evaluation specialist was not appointed to the group early enough, nor was he available throughout; the data which he needed were not available at the beginning of the survey, and specific instruments devised to produce additional information had not been tested. (The failure of a questionnaire to include an appropriate Thai word for 'videorecorder', for example, led to meaningless returns being supplied by schools during a survey of existing audio-visual facilities.)

The study also confirmed the need for **process evaluation** of actual planning surveys. Although the survey was chronicled in general terms, it is unfortunate that no more systematic monitoring was undertaken.
This has been true of most such studies (apart from the limited attempt, in El Salvador, to produce an administrative record and history of the project). It is relevant to note, for example, that the opinions of the El Salvador researchers on consultant selection corresponded to the observations made above, but in both cases such judgements were subjectively based. A critical part of the present research has been directed towards such evaluations.

**New Principles**

From the above, it appeared that several of the principles summarised in Table 2 of Chapter IV could be usefully modified or expanded before embarking on further model building. Prior to this, however, the experiences of the survey also suggested that some additional planning concepts should be highlighted and included as supplementary planning principles. These concerned (for **scenario construction**) relationships with special interest groups, especially donor agencies; the acquisition of adequate data sources for planning; the education of decision makers; and (for **report production**) the need to orient planning reports towards implementation.

These new concepts are amalgamated with the earlier version of Figure 9 in a new Figure 10 below. They are discussed individually in the section which follows, and in doing so, where relevant, the project case studies are again reviewed, to see if they throw some additional light.

**Scenario Construction**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRACTICAL DESIGN</th>
<th>SCENIC APPLICATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>FLEXIBILITY</td>
<td>PRIVACY OF PEOPLE</td>
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<td>COMPREHENSIVENESS</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
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<td>INVALIDATION OF IDEA</td>
<td>RESOLVE</td>
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<td>EVOLUTION</td>
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<td>CLARITY OF OBJECTIVE</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCIENTIFIC CONSTRUCTION</td>
<td>REPORT PRODUCTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAXIMIZATION OF RESOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURES</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIMING</td>
<td>IMPLEMENTABILITY</td>
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<td>COORDINATION</td>
<td>EVALUATION</td>
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<td>RECOGNITION OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS</td>
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<td>ADEQUACY OF DATA BASE</td>
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<td>MOTIVATION</td>
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**FIGURE 10.**
HYPOTHETICAL PLANNING CONCEPTS (REVISED POST THAI SURVEY)
Recognition of Special Interest Groups

The need to recognise the priorities and special interests of funding and donor agencies, as well as the variety of agencies involved in planning and implementation, was amply demonstrated by encounters with the World Bank. This was particularly marked because of the Bank's absence from the planning team, owing to a last minute shift in funding for the survey. It could be (and was) argued that the degree of economic justification required by the World Bank was excessive, but realistically, potential donors have their own internal requirements and these needs have to be satisfied. Nevertheless, an insistence by an agency upon fulfilling, literally, technical requirements in the way of project documents can have an unfortunate impact upon a project's growth. In the Thai study, an insistence (by UNESCO and especially by the World Bank) upon having precise descriptions of consultancies far in advance, upon following a protracted procedure for clearances, and especially upon retaining a traditional format for project presentation, all proved inhibiting. The classic tradition of project and operational planning placed too great a stress on defining a final product, and too little on the process of empirical investigation, based primarily upon problem definition.

The need to apply techniques of economic analysis to communication planning raised particular difficulties. The donor audience assumed throughout by the report was the World Bank, and the Bank traditionally insists upon a degree of cost-benefit and cost efficiency analysis which is difficult to meet in the communication sector, especially in projects which (like the Thai proposal) are concerned more with qualitative than with quantitative gains. Unit costs are relatively easy to derive for a formal school system making use of communication media; they can be extrapolated, though less precisely and convincingly, for non-formal
audiences. But cost benefit analyses became artificial in situations where a communication system is being proposed as the only available means of meeting a particular social objective. This was the case in Thailand; the arguments for using mass media (their immediacy, wide penetration, equity, popular appeal, etc.) reinforced the view that only through such channels could the majority of rural audiences be reached, and even in the school sector, they were seen as the only rapid means of securing teacher upgrading and an extension of new curricula. Cost-benefit calculations were included in the Thai report (for example, the relative cost of training teachers by orthodox as compared with media-based channels was compared), but the calculations were known to be contrived.

Adequacy of Data Base

The importance of an adequate data base for planning was also highlighted by the Thai survey; this is a recurrent problem in the communication field, especially in the Third World. One of the criticisms made of the rational-comprehensive approach to planning is that for it to be successful a considerable body of valid data is required, which cannot be assumed to exist in developing countries. Two writers on development themes conclude:

"A basic characteristic of poor countries is a pervasive lack of essential information. Budgetary data are rarely trustworthy ... Statistics are largely unreliable when they are available, which is seldom." (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974 p. xii)
In developed countries, conversely, there is often a surplus of data: a more characteristic difficulty is information overload. Adequate mechanisms exist for the collection and retrieval of a broad range of statistical items.

In the Third World, these procedures are not well established, and often special arrangements have to be made. For this reason alone, it is important to know the kinds of information needed, so that means to obtain it can be created in sufficient time, as well as methods of processing the data once collected.

The adequacy of the data base provided was questioned by a number of participants in the Thailand Preinvestment Study: not so much because of a shortage of data, except in some specific areas (such as transmission patterns), but because of a lack of prior editorial work, and in some cases the non-availability of data in translation (since the majority of the team were unfamiliar with the Thai language). The study was fortunate in that a Pre-Feasibility Survey had collected together a considerable amount of background information and had gone some way towards assimilating and re-ordering its contents; had this not been done, the data problem would have been extreme. But the process was not taken far enough, and in particular highly desirable correlations were not made. A great deal of energy was originally devoted to examining earlier research literature on educational media in Thailand, without achieving any very concrete results (these earlier studies were often marginal, and usually not comparable owing to the varying methodologies employed). More useful for the benefit of the team was a sociological presentation of Thai cultural values, especially in rural areas, though the depth of this investigation was disappointing.
Among the earlier project reviews, a good example of the importance of a complete and detailed data base came from SITE, which did far more than most projects to collect socio-economic information about its audiences, and to use this as a basis for both technical and programme planning. But the model according to which villages were to be selected for the experiment, employing criteria on village size, composition and location, often proved inadequate in specific cases, and many adaptation had to be made.

"Out of a total of 35,000 villages in the cluster areas we had identified about 3,500 candidate villages to be physically visited so as to select the final number of 2,400. The selection criteria were quite simple. We needed the villages to have electricity, at least a large fraction of them, we needed them to be accessible by jeep during most of the year; we needed them to have a public building in which the TV set could be installed; we needed a nearby location for the antenna from where it could look at the satellite without any obstruction in the way. Further, the villages had to lie within a radius of 40 km from a pre-selected sub-centre. There were four sub-centres in each of the six clusters. By February 1974 we had visited about 1,200 of the villages and were horrified to find that a very small fraction of these qualified for selection according to our criteria ... At this time, therefore, a rather horrendous exercise was started: changing the criteria back and forth and going over all the village lists all over again." (Yash Pal, 1975 p. 12)

Motivation

It also became clear, in the course of the Thai survey, that the
involvement of lead figures and decision makers could not be left to chance: a positive attempt should be made (and incorporated into the planning design) to motivate these key figures, and to educate them on communication planning concepts.

In the first place, far more might have been done to educate decision-makers in the overall aims of the exercise and its particular approach. Moreover, what was done in the way of briefing and orientation was not properly structured. Apart from demonstrations and tutorials of the 'teach in' variety, no special promotional or descriptive literature was produced beyond a one-volume summary of the final report, and the fundamentals of the project - why educational media should be considered in the first place - were not widely explored from the outset.

The concept was also poorly exemplified in the project case studies. In Singapore, a few isolated seminars were given; in SITE, study programmes were arranged for senior decision-makers (especially in the technical field) and seminars were set up using visiting international personnel. In the AIBD some attempts were made to influence opinion during special seminars (for leading trainers and administrators) and specific appeals were made at ABU meetings, even at regional UNDP meetings.

In one case, however - that of the Children's Television Workshop - a careful promotional programme paid off handsomely. The education of decision-makers was part of an overall programme of promotion and publicity, compiled with the precision of an advertising campaign and structured according to specific audiences. Of particular interest was the series of seminars held in Cambridge and New York and organised by Gerald Lesser: these were actually double-edged tools, designed primarily to solicit the opinion of leading educationists in specific problem areas, but having
a secondary spin-off in enlisting their support and direct interest.

It is this kind of educational programme - which educates by involving decision-makers in a problem-solving situation - that seems the most productive, because it attracts support by making an intellectual appeal: it is not merely promotional.

Report Production

Implementability

Finally, in the context of report production, a concept was suggested which is described (somewhat clumsily) as 'implementability'. It suggests that a report should be organised and written in such a way that it actually facilitates implementation: that it contains within its pages the seeds of its own development. What does this mean? At the most obvious level, it implies that the recommendations of a report should be expressed in concrete terms, indicating how they should be achieved, at what pace, with what phasing and so on. It also suggests that means of financing should be clearly considered, with projects which are (in developing countries) likely to be sponsored externally laid out independently, expressed in formats which their sponsors prefer.

But at a second, non general, level, it implies that the report should include other elements which facilitate implementation, such as the training programmes which are needed to provide a reservoir of capable personnel. And at a third and non complex level still, it suggests that the report should make allowances, not simply for the implementation of a project, but for its continuance, once the initial boost of external financing, extra resources and expertise is over and the project is left to stand on its own feet. It is from this understanding that the modern emphasis on self reliance and endogenous development derives: the
insistence that it is the development of innate capacity which should be stressed by communication planning, rather than the technical evolution of what may be a short-lived, externally supported project.

Much was learned at the simpler levels above from the organisation and reception of the Thai report. While an attempt was made to present it in such a way that different categories of user could extract the information which they most needed, the overall report was too large and complex (witness the fact that the World Bank review mission did not have the time to analyse or assimilate its contents fully). Some difficulties were experienced over final report writing and publication; there was inadequate time and finance, and it would have been better had the report been completed and published in Thailand, so that final editorial consultations could have been made. The production of a summary volume proved extremely useful, but in future exercises it was clear that far more attention should be paid, at the time of project preparation, to the format and presentation of reports destined for multiple audiences and purposes. Nevertheless, the Thai study did attempt to lay foundations for implementation extremely thoroughly. It contained full proposals for training at a variety of levels, and in its annexes were included, for example, handbooks of how to approach evaluation or the development of community media, in forms specifically suited to the Thai environment. While the concept of self-reliance was not explicitly quoted (the study came too early for that), it was nevertheless implicit in its recommendations.

Reverting to the earlier project reviews, to what extent did they also illustrate this rather difficult concept? The majority directed their planning reports quite explicitly towards their sponsors, and were meticulous in putting forward training strategies, detailed operational
plans and so on. Both El Salvador and Singapore emphasised local, rather than foreign training, following the principle that this was more likely to produce specialists with techniques firmly rooted in local problems. The El Salvador evaluators commented:

"In the first five years of the reform, more than 30 Salvadoreans took advantage of overseas training. The value of this training was hard to judge, both for the recipients themselves and for the groups that sponsored them. Benefits seemed to vary with the applicability of the training experience to specific Reform needs, and with the capabilities of the participants. The majority of the trainees unquestionably profited from their experiences abroad, but many questioned afterwards whether this training had really prepared them to do their jobs better than before". (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 54)

However, the same commentators also had something explicit to say about the development of self-reliance,

"The Salvadorean experience clearly shows the advantages of putting local people in charge of developing all aspects of a local ITV service, rather than relying on outside advisers. El Salvador did receive substantial foreign assistance in the early years; but after four years, an experienced Salvadorean staff was firmly established, and the outlook for continuing and expanding the ITV system was better than in other countries that had relied more heavily on foreign experts to do the actual production and teleteaching." (Mayo et al, 1976 pp 166-7)
Such an approach has its intrinsic difficulties; it takes longer to secure results.

"It would seem that if a country wants to learn by doing (which has advantages over the long term) it must allow enough time before going on the air to train production teams, to let them gain experience, and to test and remake as many programmes as possible." (Mayo et al, 1976 p. 167)

The remark was applied to the production process, but it is generalisable to other planning areas. The argument was perhaps best summarised by Yash Pal, speaking of SITE.

"In India, as also in many other developing countries, there are a lot of jobs to be done, and a lot of people who want something meaningful to do. Somehow they seldom get together. We blame it on our educational systems, on the non-existence of adequate training programmes.'Training' is one of the most insidious concepts in manpower development ...

If two years ago I had asked a committee to select young engineers, fresh out of college, who should be able to organise our cluster offices, deal with innumerable technical problems in the field, look after logistics, interact with people at all echelons of the State Government, and play host to the Chief Minister of the State at the time of SITE inauguration, we wouldn't have found a single candidate. But this is precisely what many have done with credit even though they were recruited because they had studied and understood microwave communication or video techniques. In fact all of us are familiar with this
paradox because very few of us are doing what we were educated for ... I have come to believe that if you want to retain a degree of freshness in your programmes, do not over-professionalise your activities. In fact, never leave everything to 'experts' alone when you are embarking on something new, because experts, by very definition, are wedded to something which is old."

(Yash Pal, 1975 p. 12)

The concept of self-reliance has gained, in recent years, widespread political acceptance, such approaches as third country training, unknown ten years ago, have become part of the dogma of technical assistance, and international organisations are rapidly bringing the reign of the long-term expert to an end, replacing him with short-term consultancies and TCDC (Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries).

While much of the writing attached to the concept is polemic, and the reality of TCDC is far from secure its very existence points to a mood of change.

Conclusion

The experiences of this survey were not noticeably different, overall, from the analyses of Chapter IV, and on some points (e.g. the importance of lead figures, the importance of timing and phasing, the need for flexibility in the design of planning instruments) there was very close agreement between them.

However, because the Thai survey was a planning survey, it naturally threw much greater light on the planning process, and it was possible, as
a result of this analysis, to refine the expression of those principles concerned with scenario application and the presentation of planning reports, to make them more precise and utilitarian. Consequently, in Table 4, a synthesis is made of both expanded and new principles, as a basis for the work of model building which begins in Chapter VI.

**TABLE 4**

**FRAMEWORK DESIGN**

1. Planning design should not be over-theoretical; it should be flexible, avoiding the uncritical use of external models.

2. Planning should focus on the whole communication system under review, and not confine itself to particular projects, sectors, media or technologies.

3. Planning should be based on genuine need, established through a variety of needs assessment mechanisms.

4. Planning should seek to devolve and decentralise its forms, involving as many agents as possible, with particular emphasis on system users.

5. Planning should begin with the establishment of clear and precise communication objectives.
TABLE 4 (contd.)

SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION

6. Scenario construction should seek to maximise the use of existing resources and infrastructures.

7. Scenario construction should pay particular attention to timing and phasing.

8. Adequate arrangements should be made in scenario design for the cooperative and coordinated working of all agencies involved.

9. The special interests and preconditions of all interested agencies and donors should be reflected in scenario design.

10. Scenario design should include means of securing an adequate data base.

11. Promotional activities, including the education of decision makers, should be included in scenario design.

SCENARIO APPLICATION

12. In planning, people are more important than techniques.

13. To be successful the planning process must have the interest of, as well as access to, influential people in key positions of decision making.
14. In planning, the limits of decision-makers, planners, planning processes and institutions should be realistically recognised. This implies the careful analysis of decision making patterns, the involvement of a broad spread of local personnel, and their continuous representation at appropriate levels in planning processes.

15. In the organisation of planning teams, an approach which emphasises interdisciplinarity is important. For this to be effective, it is important for team members to be assigned specific and stated roles and responsibilities.

PLANNING REPORTS

16. Plans should be organised in such a way that they facilitate implementation. This implies the inclusion of detailed proposals for financing, project development, training and the eventual achievement of self-support, organised in such a way that both donors and recipients are provided with the categories of information which they require, presented in the format most suited to their needs.

17. Plans should include mechanisms for evaluation, to allow for subsequent revision of the proposals being put forward. As part of this design the planning process itself should be evaluated.
CHAPTER VI

MODEL CONSTRUCTION:
ELEMENTS OF AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

Model construction for an operational planning design involves two components: those who plan, and the planning process itself. It was considered, therefore, that the substance of model building would be the interaction between these two axes.

Initially, guidance was sought from the hypothetical principles proposed in Table 4. Although they related to all aspects of the communication planning process, some were specifically ascribed to Framework Design, emphasising flexibility and the avoidance of over-theoretical models; holism in planning; needs assessment and devolution; and the importance of proceeding through a clear articulation of objectives. Taken together, these suggested, in relation to planning participation, that the range of participants should be interpreted as broadly as possible, and in relation to planning method that, while focussed broadly on systems planning, this should be framed in flexible terms, avoiding doctrinaire planning approaches.

Reduced to its simplest components, therefore, it appeared that a planning framework would include a minimum of two strands: one time and activity-based, the other distinguishing principal participants.
Participants

A functional division was first made between planning and decision-making, since it was a basic assumption of the study that a planning framework must accommodate elements of both planning methodology and of decision-making, if it were to be a realistic instrument.

A further distinction which, from the analysis of earlier projects, appeared to be of importance was between communication planning and development planning, since it had been argued that communication planning must be seen within the total context of development planning, and the orientations and methodologies of both reconciled.

At this point, therefore, the participant axis was left with principal roles of communication planning, development planning and decision-making. In the case of development planning and decision making, further sub-divisions could also be considered. Development planning exists at both central and sectoral levels: indeed, communication can itself be considered one such sector. The overall communication plan has therefore to accommodate, not simply communication structures and organisations, but the communication needs of other development agencies. Should there be, in this case, a further distinction between central and sectoral development planners?

On balance it was felt that, while the distinction would be important in preparing a local scenario, practices vary too considerably at the level of a basic framework for it to be reflected, at least at this preliminary stage.

In decision-making, there was also a possible further distinction to be drawn between political decision-making, and public/user consultation,
an issue which was also stressed in the project analysis. The significance of this issue will be elaborated later (especially in Chapter IX), but it is still only rarely incorporated in decision-making patterns, especially in the developing world, (as was illustrated by the project analysis). It seemed advisable, therefore, for the preliminary stage of framework construction, to propose a consolidated strand of consultation and decision making.

There was also a question of the organisation of participants. While in the developing world, the units responsible for development planning are clear (planning ministries, or economic planning units), as are the main decision-making units (Ministers and Cabinets, or their equivalents), this was less so with regard to communication planning, which, as argued in Chapter II, has rarely been seen as a coherent field of activity, and is therefore not reflected as such in organisational terms. However, it was assumed that, while the major personalities and agencies involved in communication planning might not have been confirmed, at least some nucleus could be identified as gatekeeper and prime mover for the communication planning exercise. This could be termed the communication planning agent, though it might be nothing very elaborate or grandiose. It might be a single research institute, a small sub-unit in a development planning office, even an external consultant. The main function of this agent, however, would be to collect, generate and synthesise information from a variety of sources in such a way that it would be useful to the subsequent planning process.

Planning Method

The second strand concerned the range of planning techniques which might be accommodated in the framework.
Planning techniques are numerous and varied, but they have been categorised usefully (in Middleton 1980) as radical-comprehensive, disjointed-incremental, transactive and participatory, and radical. These represent a gradual movement towards openness in planning, but it is the first two categories which are most relevant, as these reflect the main current approaches.

Rational comprehensive planning is dominated by the systems approach: it seeks, through rational procedures, to move in a sequence beginning with needs assessment and terminating in evaluation. It operates through the articulation of objectives, the setting of goals and targets, and the division of tasks into discrete, generally sequential units. It is primarily linear, but in the emphasis which it lays upon evaluation and the subsequent revision of plans, is also iterative; it does not see any planning process as complete or terminal. It proceeds, usually, through the establishment and consideration of alternatives, which are weighed and compared before selecting an optimal strategy (usually a synthesis of alternatives). Its characteristic tools are those of systems planning: cost-benefit and cost effectiveness analysis, resource allocation, networking and programme budgeting techniques (e.g. PERT and PPBS), discounting, input-output analysis. In its modern variants, it also draws upon the techniques of futures research, including versions of the Delphi approach, scenario construction and trend extrapolation, although these techniques are also used within more participatory and radical planning styles.

Disjointed incrementalism is the antithesis of this approach. It argues that systems planning does not lead to implementation, because it is dealing with artificial issues, ignoring the realities of policy and decision-making: that it requires high degrees of certainty of data and
theory which are impossible to secure in developing countries (cf Friedmann, 1973). The approach therefore proceeds through a series of discrete bargaining arrangements, discarding the comprehensive systems view in favour of a series of sectoral dialogues, using such traditional means as budgeting negotiations (cf Lindblom, 1968). The rationale for the disjointed-incremental approach is succinctly stated in the following critique:

"(The) paradox of planning is that it is expected to create the conditions necessary for its own success ... The stock-in-trade of the planner is the big model. Sometimes it appears that the larger and more complex the model (though actually it may be no more than a long list of variables) the more important the planner ... The planner makes his way by talking about the need to consider the future in present decisions. Yet poor countries have great difficulty understanding where they are (even where they have been) in terms of income, expenditure, manpower and the like. Instead of helping solve real problems in the recent past, planners may work hard to create what turn out to be imaginary future problems as a way of gaining additional influence over forthcoming decisions ...

... If planning is a universal tool, planners find it reasonable to ask why their countries cannot live up to the requirements of rational decision-making ... They do not stop to enquire whether the apparent successes of planning in richer countries may not in fact be attributed to other factors, nor whether the tasks confronting those societies are analogous to those in poor countries". (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974 pp. 284-5)
These two approaches, it was considered, represented the dominant pattern in the developing world. At a policy level, the legitimacy of the rational comprehensive method is accepted and actually built into organisational models for planning. Because of its acceptance in the West, and in the work of the United Nations Development Programme and other UN agencies, many developing country planners have been taught to use only this method. At the same time, the more pragmatic, incremental mode reflects reality in many day-to-day environments, particularly when one penetrates below the leading, Western-trained, upper cadre of economic planners.

The other planning approaches are particularly associated with the West, and are not so much techniques of planning, as responses to a growing concern with popular participation. Participatory and trans-active planning stress, on the one hand, the involvement of clients and users in planning, placing a premium on personal and social satisfaction as well as economic good and political equity. At the same time, they also stress the importance of planning as part of human growth and development. They therefore emphasise maximum decentralisation, micro-planning, the creation of a variety of consultative mechanisms, and considerable reliance on interpersonal dialogue. Such approaches are set, principally, in broad-based democratic societies. Radical planning goes a stage further still. It either proposes the reduction of the role of Government in planning to a minimal level, with control resting with the people (cf. Schumacher 1975, and Illich 1973), or it encompasses much broader political and social conflicts, including class conflict and issues of dependency (cf. Freire 1972).

On review, it was considered that the framework, supposedly capable of adaptation to a variety of political and social situations, should not
attach itself to any one planning mode. Nevertheless, being concerned with realism, especially the relationship between planning and decision making, and being focused on the developing world, on balance it would most often be concerned with rational-comprehensive and incremental planning: indeed, it might be perceived as an attempt to synthesise the two. Framework, and especially scenario construction would depend heavily upon rational planning, as the main source of planning technique. But in framework application, stressing the interaction between planners and their clients and controllers, it would have to adopt the caution of the pragmatist and incremental planner, recognising that forces counter to rationality would be at work.

As a generalised tool, it was unlikely to encompass the political drives of radical planning. Issues of participation and access, however, were likely to pose a particular problem: in a transitional stage, where themes of public and individual participation in planning and Government are stressed universally in the developing world, where self-reliance is a major international platform, but where practical progress towards these goals is inhibited by entrenched political forms, finding a balance between the two would inevitably create a major problem.

**Development of a Framework**

Consequently, it was decided that the two major strands could best be expressed in the form of a two-dimensional matrix. The horizontal axis would be one of time and activity: the vertical one of participation.

The sequence of the time and activity axis was already determined, but that of participation was less obvious. It was decided that develop-
ment planning would be best presented as a central core, occupying an intermediate position between communication planning and consultation and decision making. Additionally, it was assumed that in the majority of cases communication planning would be initiated by a communication agency or unit of some kind, and that in most cases this unit would continue to be the prime moving force. Thus, it would be best placed at the top of the axis. The matrix finally evolved was therefore as shown in Figure 11.

In each of the boxes in this matrix a summary of major activities had then to be inserted. Although each of these entries would be in itself a complex sequence of tasks, which would need further breakdown, the grid should still serve as a guide to some major functions required of the framework, namely:

(i) Showing the relationship, and sequence, of various blocks of activities which were contingent in the planning and implementation process;

(ii) Showing activities which were to be examined con-jointly (i.e. from the viewpoints of communication planning, development planning and decision-making);

(iii) Clarifying the combined relationship of (i) and (ii) above, in a systemic planning process.

In other words, item (i) above would be a reflection of the horizontal or lateral axis of the grid; (ii) a reflection of the vertical; and (iii) would inter-relate both axes.
FIGURE Nº 11 - BASIC PLANNING MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Policy Formulation</th>
<th>Strategic Planning</th>
<th>Operational Planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication Planning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Planning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultation and Decision-making</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In practice, this seemed to imply two specific approaches. The first was to prepare for planning by structured research into development policy and programmes, existing communication policies (both implicit and explicit), and surveys of communication support in a variety of sectors. The second was to work through a process of consensus, based on the preparation and reconciliation of a series of alternatives: in other words by preparing draft strategies and plans (rather than generalised statements of policy), which could be discussed and modified by all those involved.

Commenting on the Framework

When these guidelines were related to the matrix of Figure 11, the following basic model was produced (Figure 12). Figure 12 was still crude: it sought only to summarise the main activities which should be undertaken, and the main relationships involved, in the policy-planning segment of a traditional systems planning design. The expansion of the blocks of Figure 12 into a detailed set of relationships, entering into dialogue between the various interested agencies, was something which could only be adapted to a particular, local situation, at the level of a planning scenario. However, each of the main activities isolated in Figure 12 could still be amplified in some detail, before the process of adaptation was attempted.

This amplification is attempted below, in relation to the three main blocks of policy formulation, strategic and operational planning. Its intention is to specify, in broad terms, the nature of the activities included and of the kinds of dialogue which they imply. All the activities in the blocks demand a series of interactions between the various agencies concerned: these are indicated (in Figure 12) by bi-directional arrows. In the evolution
FIGURE № 12 BASIC PLANNING FRAMEWORK

BLOCK ONE
Policy Formulation

Articulation of Communication Policy

Review by Development Agencies (Central and Sectoral)

Discussion and Ratification of Communication Policy

PRE-POLICY RESEARCH

Communication Development Planning

Planning

BLOCK TWO
Strategic Planning

Preparation of Strategic Alternatives

Preparation of Operational Planning Framework (Including Evaluation)

Review of Alternatives (Central and Sectoral)

Review of Operational Planning Framework and Production of Sectoral Plans

Discussion and Selection among Alternatives: Ratification of Approved Strategy

BLOCK THREE
Operational Planning

Preparation of Operational Planning Framework

Discussion and Ratification of Operational Planning Framework and Sectoral Plans
of the scenario which follows in Chapter VII, this interaction will be examined more precisely; here, it is simply assumed that the objective which prefaces the discussion of each block can only be achieved through extended consultation.

It must be emphasised that this formulation is hypothetical, based more on logic than on precedent. Particularly in the area of communication policy, there is little in the way of prior example to fall back on: whatever statements exist (in particular the monographs produced by UNESCO in its series on communication policy) are basically descriptions of existing institutions, regulatory provisions and philosophical and political positions, which do not attempt to reconcile disagreements or integrate sectoral variations. Later elements, such as operational planning and implementation, pose a lesser problem; they are founded on well-established procedures, both in the context of communication and in other fields. In each case, an overall objective for the block is stated, followed by a descriptive commentary, suggesting ways in which to proceed.

Pre-Policy Research

The activities of Figure 12 are preceded by what was earlier described as a 'gestation' period, during which the pressure to formulate communication policies and plans builds up, appropriate planning structures are created, and some basic data are collected. This gestation period is likely to be different in each communication planning environment, and it is therefore excluded from the basic model.

Block one: policy formulation

Overall objective: To evolve a statement of communication policy in
which general goals and targets for the overall communication system are specified to the best possible satisfaction of all interested agencies, institutions, and bodies.

The first stage in formulating communication policy is one of structured data collection and synthesis: an activity which should be completed before the process of consensus seeking is begun. Such an exercise is likely to reveal inconsistencies which should be the basis of intersectoral discussion.

It is not assumed, at this early stage, that a position on communication policy can be fully agreed which will reflect total agreement among sectors. In a field such as communication, where there is no tradition of centralised planning, the most that can be hoped is the elaboration, in fairly specific terms, of the main positions to be agreed, so that decisions of principle can be taken, and in particular priorities assigned.

The kinds of data which need collection are reflected in Table 5.

The data base has been deliberately set wide, as it is information that will be required perennially for communication planning, and a good deal of attention should be paid to its storage and coding, in such a way that access is simple and cross-referencing possible. The next step, therefore, is to categorise data in such a way that it relates more obviously to the main areas of concern for communication. This relationship is shown in Figure 13.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF DATA REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td><strong>SOCIAL RESEARCH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td><strong>MARKET AND COMMERCIAL STRUCTURES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td><strong>INFORMATION STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td><strong>MEDIA STRUCTURES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td><strong>EDUCATION PLANS AND STRUCTURES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PLANS AND STRUCTURES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TELECOMS AND TRANSPORT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. URBAN AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>Urban and rural development policies; regional policies; agricultural patterns and practices; extension work and structures; community development plans and structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA</td>
<td>Population size, growth, attitudes to control; birth and death rates; statistical breakdowns by sex, age, occupation and social stratification.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The result of this initial ordering of data should be to provide the following:

- a statement of explicit policies now in force (that is a description of infrastructures and summary of constitutional or regulatory provisions).

- a review of implicit policies (for example, those apparent from social research or embedded in societal and developmental goals).

- a summary of sectoral policies that impinge upon communication (for example, education, rural development, telecommunications, and the relevant orientations of the commercial sector).

The analysis should also highlight a number of inconsistencies and conflicts. These should also be described in the policy statement, with annotations (for example, how they have arisen, how they may be resolved, how immutable they appear to be), but without prescriptive recommendations. The outcome should be a clear, relatively short, but statistically supported statement of current conditions and mores.

The fact that this analysis has been pitched at a national level does not materially affect the character of analysis at other levels, only its complexity. At the national level more data are needed; more co-ordination is required; more feedback is needed between institutions. At other levels (for example, sectoral), many of the information sources illustrated will not be relevant if policy is problem-oriented. Yet even in this analysis links with national policy formulation have to be
forged, even if this national policy has to be inferred because it has never been properly articulated.

All of the above implies continuing dialogue between communication and development planners. But it also includes the first phase of decision-making: an examination of the preliminary statement of policy and its interpretation, including the reduction of inconsistency. Even at this stage, there is already room for decisions against particular aspects of policy, once these are recognized to be contradictory. Whatever policy organ is available, it will inevitably have to include means for negotiation and arbitration. Where contradictions occur, their eradication will not benefit all parties uniformly. Subsequently, a revised statement, not yet an agreed strategy but one at least free of ambivalence, may be returned to the planning agency for revision (that is, for improved wording and amplification). This new statement requires analysis of a somewhat different order than before. The six separate categories indicated in the lower column of Figure 13 now require cross-referencing, comparison, and where possible testing, to see what kind of common picture emerges.

Figure 14 illustrates this process. What it amounts to is a gradual reconciliation of separate political statements, and their equation with capacities (the ability of the infrastructure to support the goals) and with constraints (social attitudes and regulatory conditions). It should end with a clear statement of goals and targets.

In most cases, there will be in existence a coherent statement of overall development objectives, relatively well amplified and quantified. Similar sectoral statements (for example, for each ministry
FIGURE No. 14
ESTABLISHMENT OF GOALS AND TARGETS

- TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
  ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL CAPACITY

- REGULATORY PROVISIONS
  SUMMARY OF REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS

- SOCIETAL AND DEVELOPMENT GOALS
  STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL/DEVELOPMENT GOALS

- SECTORAL GOALS
  STATEMENT OF SECTORAL GOALS AND POLICIES

- SOCIETAL ATTITUDES
  SUMMARY OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND ASPIRATIONS

- ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
  ASSESSMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

A → B → C → D → E → F
or industry) will exist, but these will rarely have been compared and negotiated. This process of negotiation is illustrated in block A of Figure 14. The bargaining that it involves (since there are bound to be contradictions between the various positions) is in the hands of decision-makers, but the willingness to bargain rests upon the ability of planners and researchers to point out fundamental inconsistencies. Block A in the diagram therefore conforms to an agreed position after negotiation.

This is modified by other evidence. Social research, or articulated social pressures, may show popular resistance to some assumptions; and the degree to which this is, or can be accommodated will depend upon the political system of the society concerned and upon its degree of maturity. The new synthesis is in block B.

Regulatory provisions (legislation, subscription to international or regional codes) may produce a new version, block C. While contradictions may have existed for some time (for example, in copyright), once they are pinpointed they have to be faced and then either accepted or rejected.

The final set of modifications is pragmatic. A particular set of goals implies certain sustaining structures, technical and organizational (each of which, of course, also implies a financial base).

If a technical capacity for electrification or for media production is inadequate, it either has to be improved or the goals have to be correspondingly reduced. The same is true of organizational capacities. Thus two further versions, blocks D and E, are produced. Out of this process comes a final version, F, that at least has the virtue of con-
sistency. It will not be firm, but it should provide a reasonable base upon which other levels of planning can build.

Every stage of this process necessitates regular interaction between and among the researchers (who derive the basic data), the planners (who organize it and perceive implications), and the decision-makers (who face up to these implications). The process is likely to be delicate and often long-winded.

**Block two: strategic planning**

**Overall objective: To develop a strategic plan for the communication system**

This block of activities focuses first upon the setting of objectives as a guide to the articulation of strategy. The main character of objectives, if they are well framed, is that they assist not only planning but also implementation and evaluation. They lay down criteria which imply specific outcomes, courses of action, needs, methodologies.

Objectives are derived from an analysis of needs and goals; they point the way toward system design. In many ways, the preparation of objectives is a habit of thinking that translates diffuse notions of "what ought to be done" into precise statements of "what has to be done". This translation is important in order to make clear the implications of ambiguous thinking: to point up in advance irrelevant outcomes and to help frame alternative approaches that may be properly compared, as the basis of strategic planning. But it is also important as a means of introducing members of other disciplines into the planning and implementation process, especially those from technical fields who find it difficult to work without clearer specifications.
The preparation of objectives is therefore a critical stage, and it is not a one-time process. At each stage of planning and implementation, the same precision is necessary; each set of objectives will subsequently be translated into sub-objectives.

Once the basic catalogue of objectives is prepared, however, it is suggested that it should be reviewed at once by the decision-makers before it is exhaustively quantified. This procedure should avoid redundancy and provide a further opportunity for checking planners' proposals against other understandings, including the politician's grasp of possibility.

The transition from objectives to strategic planning is partly one of quantification (setting precise goals and targets), and partly one of organisation (consolidating objectives into coherent groups). It is a process which is amply described in the literature of curriculum design and educational technology, and is not considered at length here. However, it is suggested that, once objectives have been validated, a series of alternative strategies should be devised to ease the transition. The best way to allow decision-making groups to discover their real positions is to provide them with some choice and to let this focus down their thinking and judgement. They will not, in all probability, prefer a particular alternative but will wish to synthesize permutations of each.

**Block three: Operational Planning**

**Overall objective:** To develop an overall operational plan, and individual plans at the sectoral level.

Figure 15 depicts both the preparation of strategic plans through the examination of alternatives, and the gradation to operational planning.
FIGURE No. 15
PLANNING THROUGH ALTERNATIVES

SECTORAL AND INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONAL PLANS

OVERALL OPERATIONAL PLAN

APPROVED STRATEGIC PLAN

FRAME STRATEGIC PLANS

ALTERNATIVE A

ALTERNATIVE B

ALTERNATIVE C
Essentially, this is a process of concretisation: the translation of a strategy first into a macro-framework, which designates agencies and mechanisms for implementation, and subsequently its expansion into operational plans for each sector or agency involved.

Operational plans are, by definition, precise and their characteristic components are listed in Table 6. However, this does not mean that they are immutable. They may be amenable, in the first place, to extensive testing by researchers either in the form of simulations (not necessarily computer models) or through pilot experiments. Simulations can cover all aspects of planning, from the conceptual to the strictly material (for example, from the projection of a particular curriculum approach to the verification of budgets for construction work). Piloting normally involves the implementation of a limited component of a plan, in a controlled situation, which allows it to be extensively evaluated before the whole of the plan is put into effect.

A particular need in operational planning, therefore, is to combine precision with flexibility, in the knowledge that circumstances may well change at the time of implementation, and modifications made to planning designs, which must be introduced in such a way that the integrity of the system is not overly disturbed.

A great deal of this flexibility depends upon the adequacy of whatever evaluation system has been designed, so that difficulties and problems are identified early, and on the arrangements made for co-ordination between operational agencies during the implementation process.

In the past, evaluation has been traditionally summative: implying that it gives up its data too late to be of practical use. The recent
TABLE 6

COMPONENTS OF OPERATIONAL PLANS

1. OBJECTIVES (Long-range and short-term objectives, categorised into main and subsidiary groups, with quantification, phasing and time scales attached).

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION (An overall review and summary of the project and of its anticipated outcomes).

3. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION (A rationale for the project and its means of policy determination, including quantifiable and statistical determinants, and cost comparison, benefit and efficiency analyses).

4. ORGANISATION (Organisational infrastructures, existing and projected, and institutional framework for implementation).

5. TECHNICAL COMPONENTS (including designs at macro level):

6. CONSTRUCTION COMPONENTS (including designs at macro level).

7. STAFFING AND PERSONNEL COMPONENTS (including selection and training needs).

8. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING (including budgetary cycles, loan arrangements, material costs and salary structures).

9. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND NETWORKS (on both time and systemic frames, using programming and networking techniques).
TABLE 6 (contd.)

10. **ARRANGEMENTS FOR CO-ORDINATION AND RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER PROJECTS** (using networked as well as descriptive formats).

11. **ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVALUATION** (formative, process and summative)

12. **STATISTICAL ANALYSES AND SUMMARIES** (including (i) basic data upon which the plan is based; (ii) statistical and comparative projections of outcomes; (iii) illustrative data - e.g. salary scales, sample construction costs; (iv) relevant data on regulatory needs (e.g. telecommunications); and (v) agencies and institutions involved in plan formulation.)
stress upon formative evaluation suggests that as many checks as possible should be run in advance upon system performance.

A critical task at this stage, therefore, is not only to evaluate prototype versions of the communication system plan, but also to devise an evaluation framework to run parallel to, and feed into, system implementation. Evaluation processes throw up judgements that may cause decision-makers to alter their consensus in many different ways, seen in terms of programmes (from policy down to administration), of institutional relationships (at the vertical level), or of co-ordination arrangements (at the horizontal level). Some of these changes may take a long time to effect: major policy changes, for example, may require substantial redefinitions of role and have to await a complete reappraisal of communication policy. Other items may be trivial enough to be included without causing any system disturbance (for example, a change in co-ordination patterns). Nevertheless, it is important both that change should be accommodated in system design as early as possible, and that planning frameworks should be flexible enough to incorporate shifts of emphasis.

A diagrammatic illustration is given in Figure 16. Here, evaluation is represented somewhat externally from the triad of policy-making, planning and implementation, in order to illustrate its impact on policy and planning at all levels.

Figure 17 refers to the issue of coordination. At the policy making level, this can usually only be achieved through personal involvement; at the stage of implementation, large numbers of agencies and institutions are concerned, and the more separate these levels of activity become, the more critical is the need for horizontal connections. It is only too easy for activities, once disconnected and having some
FIGURE N° 16

EVALUATION RELATIONSHIPS
FIGURE N° 17

COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION

[Diagram showing the flow of policy, planning, implementation, and evaluation with coordination and integration needs]
independent life, to move out of phase, dissociated from the whole. So, monitoring arrangements and warning signals are important, not just to continue the evaluation process, but also to keep track of the system's diverging parts and to assess the significance of component failure.

Figure 17 also makes a distinction between coordination and what is termed 'integration'. In the sense of avoiding duplication and redundancy, and ensuring the coherence of the overall strategic plan, it is at the stage of implementation that coordination needs in the traditional sense are greatest. But the idea of integration is more conceptual; it suggests that there has to be a unity of perception of the needs and goals of the communication system, which can only come from interdisciplinary thinking and working. While the same formal needs exist for regular meetings, exchange of correspondence and so on, the level and quality of representation of those involved needs to be higher, and the mechanistic aspects of the process are much less significant. The issue is explored further in Chapter VII, in the Afghanistan field test, and again in Chapters VIII and IX which review the model and its implications for the future.

The Implementation Process

The final arrow leading out of Figure 12 is directed towards implementation, which has been left out of the basic framework as being outside the immediate planning environment. Nevertheless, much of the discussion of operational planning has to be in anticipation of the implementation process. Successful implementation depends upon adequate pre-planning, and the link between the framework and its realisation should be close and direct.
Expansion of the Basic Framework

It would have been possible, even at this preliminary stage, to have expanded upon the basic model of Figure 12, reflecting the preceding commentary and adapting it to network form.

However, it has been emphasised that these are hypothetical, not prescriptive comments, and it was thought best to leave the framework as it stood, in a relatively simple form, while awaiting a field test to expand it into a more direct and detailed scenario.

Limitations of the Framework

It is difficult in accounts of this kind, edited retrospectively, to avoid reorganising the research process and, with the benefit of hindsight, rectifying flaws in conceptualisation and methodology which were only gradually perceived. A number of features of the planning framework, as originally devised, were inadequate, and were found to be so through the experience of Afghanistan. These are fully recorded in Chapter VII, and reflected, as far as possible, in the reconsideration of the planning model which is attempted in Chapter VIII.

At the same time, certain limitations were recognised in advance, though it seemed impossible to incorporate them in the planning framework with any degree of adequacy, for two reasons. These related, in the main, to the dimensions of need and user involvement in the framework: encompassed by the broad concept of public participation.

In the first place, the development of the framework coincided with
an opportunity, in Afghanistan, to test a systematic planning model. Unfortunately, as will be explained later, this opportunity occurred with little warning; the time constraints were extreme. Secondly, the opportunity in Afghanistan was in relation to a planning request which had been, to a considerable extent, structured in advance, with a heavy emphasis on media resource planning and little consideration of public participation. Thirdly, the political structures of Afghanistan, at the time dictatorially governed, were such that, however the planning design were framed, there would be little possibility of introducing more than nominal elements of participation.

Moreover, the whole issue of participation in planning was at that time (as it still is) in a process of flux, with a good deal of theoretical discussion of needs and rights, but very little of operational opportunities. In consequence, much of this argument was put aside for subsequent consideration, in the full knowledge that it would, in the final analysis, radically affect the refinement, and transferability, of the planning framework.

Nevertheless, it is important, even at this stage, to indicate the reservations which were felt about the planning model as it was being developed. It was realised that, first of all, the framework was essentially two dimensional: it correlated activities and roles over a period of time, but ignored other dimensions of co-ordination, integration, and structure. It did not differentiate readily between and among the many levels of analysis and decision-making that must be pursued in a complex planning network, especially one pitched at a national level where many agencies and institutions are involved, often hierarchically.

Figure 18 therefore provides a simple three-dimensional analogy,
LEVELS OF DECISION MAKING AND COORDINATION

SYSTMS PLANNING (AS EXPRESSED IN FIGURE 12)

HORIZONTAL LEVEL OF COORDINATION

VERTICAL DECISION MAKING
although as a model it is only illustrative and not intended to be complete. Its purpose is to make clear that the kind of network envisaged in Figure 12 also penetrates downwards and sideways through the institutional and decision-making structures of a society. We can best approach this idea by assuming that the network of Figure 12 is overlaid across the top surface of Figure 18 (as marked), but that, like a motif, it imprints through other levels.

Quite clearly, all the activities isolated in Figure 12 have ramifications at many different levels of organization. The setting of objectives, for example, is a function of a large number of separate agencies, each of which is required to evolve its own planning mechanisms and to construct its programme in accordance with overall goals. Such levels of decision-making are illustrated in the vertical axis of Figure 18. The pyramidal and hierarchical nature of most national structures also calls for a lateral planning framework devoted to the co-ordination of various subsystems, and this is expressed in the horizontal axis of Figure 18. Both dimensions have to be acknowledged and reconciled within the planning process for it to be successful. But in fact the constraints go still deeper.

There is also the impact of evaluation and feedback. If there is continuous monitoring and assessment of the planning and implementation process, this permits constant modification and sensitivity to changed circumstances and demands: consequently, the time-based continuum of the planning process is false. It does not have a beginning and an end as shown in Figures 12 and 18, but is basically cyclic and repetitive. Moreover, the analogy of imprinting, used to clarify Figure 18, is itself incomplete because, while a version of the planning network will be found in each institution or agency at each organizational level, in fact the specifics of the network will be different in each case. Figures 12 and 18
map an overall process, to which connected agencies will relate in different ways. Not every agency will be involved to the same extent in policy formulation; or rather, different policy demands will be made at different levels. One aspect of this situation is somewhat roughly illustrated in Figure 19 which emphasizes that the most significant items of policy formulation (in rational comprehensive planning at least) occur at upper organizational strata; it is not until we come to implementation that lower levels are fully engaged.

This argument may immediately be queried by those who resist hierarchical planning. It will certainly have been noted that the models of Figures 18 and 19 assume a pyramidal structure which is now, of course, being vigorously challenged in many societies, irrespective of ideology. The problem of participant or open planning is to make of the vertical structure a genuine two-way or multi-way flow, moving policy formulation and planning processes upward as well as downward (indeed, originating with an upward movement). To whatever extent open planning is successful, the penetration of Figure 12 through Figures 18 and 19 will become proportionately more complex.

Finally, therefore, it may be helpful to introduce a categorisation of different dimensions of planning, which will be much more fully explored in Chapter IX.

These are:

1. **Vertical** - answering organizational and structural needs, to correlate planning activities at various levels from the national down;
2. **Horizontal** - developing mechanisms for co-ordination and integration, as between different agencies and organizational forms.

3. **Cyclic and Iterative** - exploring the feedback principle in planning, and reducing linearity;

4. **Open and Participatory** - exploring principles of open planning, decentralization, and periphery-centre movements.

Of these dimensions, the main emphasis, at this early stage, has been given to the vertical and the horizontal, though the planning framework also pays some attention to cyclic and iterative forms of planning, particularly in the context of evaluation (and the problem of iteration, as will be seen, became critical in the context of the Afghanistan survey).

But open and participatory forms, at this stage have been relatively little considered. In accounting for this omission, a number of different constraints are important: the overall lack of public representation, public literacy in decision-making, social mores. There are however two overriding practical constraints. In the first place, planning and decision-making can only operate with a relatively restricted cast; the number of participants has to be limited, and often only symbolic user groups can be involved in a consultation process. Secondly, public participation cannot be expected to extend practically into all stages of negotiation: characteristically it occurs at the beginning of a policy-setting process, and in discussing relatively advanced drafts of policy documents. Each society has its own way of dealing with these constraints (community representative bodies, commissions of enquiry, etc), and the situation is in most societies in a state of continual flux. Characteristic
mechanisms (and the principles underlying their creation) are dealt with in Chapter IX, but the constraints which exist in developing countries, where not only are infrastructures for public consultation fewer, but the prevailing political ideology may itself be inhibiting, were immediately apparent, even before the Afghanistan field test.

The purpose of introducing this discussion at this particular stage is not to set up a framework in order to annihilate it, but rather to make clear some of the limitations that must be placed upon it. It was not always possible to retain at every point perspectives of planning which went beyond the time and activity frame of the basic network. Obviously, more will have to be said on categories of activity that must be differently interpreted at specific organizational levels, and on problems of co-ordination, as well as methodological constraints. More must certainly be said about participant planning. But the biggest constraints of all stem from the complexity of the structures with which planning has to deal, and their shifting dynamics as circumstances and social options change. These constraints cannot always be programmed in advance: they are mentioned here to ensure that they are recognized and that the necessary reservations are made in putting the framework to use.
The first major application of the framework was in Afghanistan in 1977, when it was adapted to scenario form, as the basis of a project executed by UNESCO (in association with ITU), financed under a Funds-in-Trust Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The objective of this project was (in the formula of the original project document) 'to assess the overall needs of the Republic of Afghanistan, in the production, distribution and utilization of communication media (including radio, film, press, publishing, television and other audio-visual resources, etc.), and taking account of associated services and infrastructures (e.g. telecommunications, printing facilities, field and extension services, manpower and training requirements)'. As a result of this assessment a report was to be produced, recommending a phased and integrated development programme for communications over a medium-term period, and specific proposals were to be made for project financing. In particular attention was to be paid to problems of policy formulation and coordination between different sectors with communication interests.

The actual time-span to be covered by the survey led to a good deal of debate. Immediately before the project, discussions between the team leader and the UNESCO Secretariat, followed by conversations in Kabul with the Ministry of Information, resulted in a proposal to extend the planning period from five to twelve years (i.e. to attempt to evolve a longer-range plan). In practice, lack of data and difficulty in assessing
variables of both technological and political change made this proposal impossible to sustain, and finally, in producing the report, an eight-year period was chosen.

The report of the survey mission was produced by UNESCO, Paris, in March 1978: it reviewed communication development in both the media sectors and the user sectors, in relation to the country's overall economic development priorities and programmes, under the title of "Communication Planning for Afghanistan: an eight-year projection of communication development" (UNESCO, Paris 1978). It was divided into three volumes, comprising an initial summary and list of projects suitable for both internal and external financing; the main document, consisting of sectoral and inter-sectoral reports; and a final volume of annexes. Individual sections within the report discussed (among the user agencies) agriculture, rural development, public health, education, women's programmes and arts and culture, and (among the media agencies) graphic production, the press and news agencies, publishing, telecommunications and broadcasting (radio and television), film, audio-visual facilities and advertising, as well as common problems of training, management and coordination.

At the time of writing (early 1980), the report had not been widely distributed or acted upon, largely because of political events in Afghanistan. However, the discussion within this chapter and the chapter which follows is essentially of the planning of the survey, and of difficulties experienced in scenario application: it does not reproduce elements of the actual plan and is not primarily concerned with content.

Background to the Project

The Afghanistan communication system survey had a relatively long run-up
period and was not originally designed as a test of any specific planning methodology: this was a later adaptation. Discussions first began in Kabul, between UNESCO and the local office of the United Nations Development Programme, as early as October 1974; it was then anticipated that the survey would be conducted with UNDP financing, but this proposal was abandoned in December 1975, at the time of UNDP's liquidity crisis. At that stage, postponement until 1976-1977 was envisaged. In 1976, however, the project was submitted to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, for funding under a Funds-in-Trust arrangement (still for UNESCO execution), and in December, the Afghan authorities made a formal request for the proposal to be considered. After some administrative delays, a formal agreement was signed on 25 April 1977, and the survey was scheduled to begin on 13 June 1977.

However, as with the Thai survey described in Chapter V, there was a hidden, unreported aspect of these negotiations, and personal interests and interactions had far more to do with the development of the project than is apparent from the prosaic account. The pressure for the survey did not come, initially, from the Afghan Government, not even from UNDP (although UNDP, once involved, proved an enthusiastic supporter). The first approach to Afghanistan was made by a UNESCO functionary, Lloyd Sommerlad, who was embarking on a programme of communication policies and planning and was anxious to find a field location for experimental work. It was Sommerlad, too, who later turned to the German Government for financing, through established UNESCO channels, once UNDP's liquidity crisis made UN financial involvement impossible.

At that time, the theory of communication planning was embryonic, not to say crude, and it was seen by Sommerlad in rather simplistic terms of resource allocation. This caused some difficulties, in that the original
proposal put forward to Afghanistan (developed by Sommerlad and his staff) dealt with communication system planning exclusively in media terms, and included among the planning team only media specialists, apart from a team leader and economic adviser. No thought was given to the involvement of the user sectors, to questions of utilisation or evaluation, and very little consideration was given to Afghan participation in the planning process: in particular little attempt was made to formulate the project in an idiom which reflected the peculiar Afghan situation.

This created considerable problems at the time of preparing the scenario, as the budget for the project had been settled on the basis of the earlier proposal, and these negotiations had left both the Afghan authorities and UNDP with a very restricted idea of what was involved (i.e. they saw it as a purely technical exercise in resource planning and distribution).

A further difficulty arose in relationships with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Integrated communication planning inevitably includes discussion of telecommunications, as the main distribution channel for a number of mass media, but within the UN system the mandate for telecommunications rests exclusively with the ITU. On hearing of the Afghanistan project, the ITU protested vigorously that its mandate was being eroded, and eventually the Union was admitted into the project as an associate executing agency. Unfortunately, the ITU did not become actively involved in the conceptual development of the survey, preferring to sub-contract its interest to an American consultancy firm, and as a result, the element of telecommunications planning in the project was handled almost independently, requiring considerable sleight of hand when it came to synthesising the final report.
The Scenario

By a fortunate coincidence the Afghan survey coincided with the need to mount a field study of the planning framework and for this purpose a special scenario was produced in the UNESCO Secretariat (by myself).

Basically, this scenario laid out an operational design for the survey and consisted of a timetabled sequence of 33 activities to be completed in the 25 weeks allocated to field planning activities.

The process of adaptation was begun by considering the basic set of principles, especially those grouped under the heading of scenario construction. These reflected two principal themes, one concerned with the identification and coordination of planning and decision-making agencies, the second with phasing.

Each of these affected the expansion of the basic framework into scenario form. The first emphasised that, within the broad main categories of communication planning, development planning, and consultation and decision making, special attention must be paid to the inclusion of a sufficient number of agencies, the isolation of agencies in key positions, and the orchestration of contacts among them. Even at the level of a scenario, this could not be attempted too precisely, but it was assumed that a framework for coordination could at least be set. Primarily this affected the participant axis in the planning framework.

The dimension of phasing related to the second axis, which was time and activity-based. It urged realism in determining the intervals between activities, to allow decision making processes and their outcomes adequate time for assimilation.
Format

The solution found in terms of format was to retain the basic matrix of Figure 12 but to expand it in the form of a network. This network (Figure 20) broke the blocks of activities in Figure 12 down further: principally, to point up the main relationships between planners and agencies, and their sequencing. Subsequently, the main activities were also summarised in tabular form, in Table 7.

Both of these diagrams were still kept as simple as possible, as they were intended for generalists and decision-makers as well as planners, and must be readily understood.

Scenario Commentary

The scenario was originally produced in July 1976, at a time when it was anticipated that the Afghan project would begin before the end of the year. Because of urgent deadlines, it had to be produced without the benefit of advance field studies in Afghanistan and with only restricted background documentation; it was, however, quite specific about its functions:

"The purpose of this scenario is two-fold. Firstly, it is intended as a guide for the planning team, providing a breakdown and phasing for essential activities of the study. Secondly, it is conceived as a reference frame, and a norm for evaluation in order that the survey may be monitored throughout. Previous studies of communication planning have had to depend largely upon secondary data, as the progress and conduct of planning surveys have rarely been monitored in situ."
The scenario is based upon two main principles. It seeks, in the first place, to secure a compromise between careful pre-planning and scheduling, and flexibility: to profit from detailed creativity, leaving the planning team with genuine responsibility and decision-making capacity. At the same time, it tries to accommodate dimensions of policy and decision-making within its planning strategies, taking account of pragmatic as well as theoretical constraints." (Hancock, 1976 p. 1)

The scenario dealt independently with both the construction of a planning design and the process of its application.

Scenario Design

On system design, it had the following to say:

"The key to the approach is seen in Figure (20) and Table (7) (to which the scenario is essentially a commentary).

Figure (20) is a simplified network of the planning process, set within a two-dimensional matrix. In this matrix, the vertical axis is one of time, covering a pre-planning period (basically of data collection and synthesis before the survey), and three main phases beyond. Phase One is a policy-making period, during which communication policies are set and articulated, goals and targets evolved and objectives specified. Phase Two covers the strategic planning phase, during which alternative strategies are developed, preferred alternatives chosen, and an overall framework devised. Phase Three is the
## FIGURE 20

### PLANNING SCENARIO FOR AFGHANISTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEK</th>
<th>POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT PLANNING</th>
<th>COMMUNICATION PLANNING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRE-SURVEY (1-2 months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Collect Data</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Analyze Policies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Supplement Data</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Formulate Draft</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Discuss with (7)</td>
<td>Discuss with (6)</td>
<td>(5) Discuss with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Body and Modify</td>
<td>Planning Body</td>
<td>Counterpart team and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Modify</td>
<td>modify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>(8) Expand policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>statement to goals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and targets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>(10) Derive and state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>(12) Quantify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>(14) Formulate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>alternative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strategic approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>Discuss and (16)</td>
<td>(15) Review</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modify</td>
<td>alternatives</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>with full team and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Discuss with Policy</td>
<td>(17) Prepare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Body and Select (18)</td>
<td>format for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preferred Strategies</td>
<td>decision-makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>(19) Evolve Macro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17</td>
<td>Review and Modify</td>
<td>(21) Evolve Phased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Plan (26)</td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(23) Research for</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(24) Evolve Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(25) Prepare Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Format for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEEK</td>
<td>POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING</td>
<td>DEVELOPMENT PLANNING</td>
<td>COMMUNICATION PLANNING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(27) Prepare Detailed Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(29) Synthesise Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Draft of Final (32) Report</td>
<td></td>
<td>(33) Finalise and Submit Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## The Scenario: TABLE 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description of Activity (Summary)</th>
<th>Team Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>Discuss draft policy statement with counterparts</td>
<td>Deputy Leader (Economist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td>Systems Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning and Policy Body and Modify</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>Expand to include goals and targets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss and modify with Planning Body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Derive and State Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>Quantify Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>Formulate alternative strategic approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>Review alternatives with full team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Prepare Format for Decision-Makers</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>17-18</td>
<td>Discuss with Policy Body and Select Preference</td>
<td>Deputy Leader - Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>19-20</td>
<td>Evolve macro framework</td>
<td>Rural Com. Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td>Telecom. Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Evolve phased strategic plan</td>
<td>Radio-TV Progr. Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td>Print &amp; News Ag. Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>Research for Operational Plan</td>
<td>Film &amp; A-V Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evolve evaluation framework</td>
<td>Evaluation Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare Plan for decision-makers</td>
<td>Systems Analyst</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 7 (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description of Activity (Summary)</th>
<th>Team Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Prepare detailed Operational Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Synthesise Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Review Report with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td>Team Leader Deputy Leader - Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Prepare Report Format for Decision-Makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Review with Policy Body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25+</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Finalise and Submit Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
final period of preparing phased operational plans. The horizontal axis represents the environment of planning. It comprises firstly the communication planning setting (i.e. the planning team and counterparts): secondly, the development planning context (e.g. economic and central government planning); and thirdly, the policy-making and decision-making environment (i.e. government itself).

Figure 20 therefore, traces the course of the survey through its separate planning phases, in relation to both planning and decision-making forums." (Ibid pp 1-2)

Process

On process, the scenario was far less specific, largely because of the paucity of available information on Afghanistan. It began with a discussion of constraints.

"Certain constraints have either been recognised or directly introduced into the survey. It has had to be accepted that the time available is short, and the numbers of specialists small, for a study of this magnitude.

A more deliberate restriction derives from the nature of decision-making and decision-making agencies. It has been accepted that the time of senior politicians and members of government is limited, and that the possibility of consulting activity with policy-making bodies (and involving these in decisions, at various critical points of the survey) is correspondingly restricted. Consequently, the number of such consultations has been reduced to what is considered a practical minimum, less than which cooperative
decision-making would have been more nominal than real. (On the other hand, far more dialogue has been assumed with central and sectoral development planning agencies, to whom access is easier. It has also been assumed that in communication planning itself, full-time counterpart specialists to the external team will be available throughout the survey - and this is considered a vital factor for the project's success.)"
(Ibid, p. 2)

The scenario was nevertheless specific on the character of the planning and decision-making which it assumed would be adopted, and the kinds of policy-making machinery which might be created.

"The purpose of the network shown in Figure 20 is to pinpoint key activities and decision points, as these occur within a phased planning process. It is not intended to be exhaustive, nor does it (nor can it) contain all the casual interactions between sectors upon which the sensitivity of the survey must depend. Similarly, it does not include other components of briefings, visits, etc., which will be necessary for external specialists. However, even within those activities highlighted in the network of Figure 20 several kinds of consultations are envisaged. The discussions of the communication planning team, for example, are seen as regular, daily dialogues (and group, preferable open-plan, working is recommended for the team and its counterparts). Discussions with the development planning agencies are of a different order. In Figure 20 the term "planning body" is used as a convenient shorthand to include consultants with a number of planning agencies (some of which may be specifically created or convened to assist with the survey). Firstly
it is urged that a representative of the Ministry of Planning should be appointed as a permanent link with the team, and if possible made available full-time to work as a regular team member. At a more formal level meetings with the Ministry of Planning will be needed to consider particular sets of proposals and to modify these before they attain a wider circulation. It is also recommended that, for the most critical planning meetings, a Co-ordinating Committee should be formed, including representatives of the various ministries concerned (e.g. Information and Culture, Education, Agriculture, Communication, etc.), as well as the Planning Ministry, to ensure that sectoral opinion is adequately voiced. The particular level of debate for each activity is indicated in the commentary which follows.

The term "policy body" is used in a similarly generic fashion, to denote a high level of political consultation, appropriate to the options being discussed. Only four occasions are proposed in this scenario at which such a high level of policy discussion is considered essential (as opposed to nine occasions for more formal meetings of the "planning body"). It is hoped that, if the importance of these policy meetings is adequately stressed from the outset, satisfactory arrangements can be made for them to be maintained. In all probability, no single existing body will be suitable for such discussions, and a special Cabinet-level committee may have to be created, ad hoc, to consider the alternatives being proposed and decide orientations. Again, it is the level of representation which is primarily being urged here.

In summary, what is being proposed is as follows:
(1) **Communication Planning:**

A team made up of external specialists and **full time** counterparts, drawn (at a middle professional level) from the various Ministries concerned with communication issues.

(2) **Development Planning:**

(i) A permanent officer placed with the communication planning team;

(ii) A small ad hoc committee formed within the Planning Ministry, to review particular drafts produced by the team, and to relate these to central planning issues;

(iii) A Co-ordinating Committee, formed (at a senior professional level) from the various ministries (and private agencies, if appropriate), concerned with communication issues. This committee, convened by the Planning Ministry, but with nominees from each participating Ministry, would meet on about nine occasions (cf. the scenario and Figure 20 to review critical drafts produced by the communication planning team, after informal negotiations and discussions were complete.

**Policy and Decision-Making**

A high-level body convened to discuss major policy issues
arising during, or as a result of, the survey. This committee would meet on only four occasions; its composition would be subject to advice received from the Afghan Government, through the intermediary agency of the Planning Ministry."

(Ibid pp. 3-4)

The remainder of the scenario broke down, in further detail, the activities envisaged by Figure 20 and Table 7 in a commentary form related to individual tasks or groups of tasks. It is reproduced in full in Annex 2.

Scenario Application

The application of the scenario took place between June - December 1977, as part of the Afghanistan Communication System Planning Survey. Administrative responsibility for the project lay with the newly formed Section of Communication Planning and Studies in UNESCO's Division of Development of Communication Systems (in the sector of Culture and Communication). Twelve consultants participated in the survey over a six-month time-span; they came from the USA (5), the United Kingdom (3), Turkey (1), Indian (1), the Philippines (1) and Liberia (1). Additionally, as UNESCO project officer I made a total of four individual visits to Kabul during the course of the survey. Not all consultants participated for the whole length of the study: only the team leader and his deputy (an economist) were present throughout. Actual dispositions are shown in Table 8 (which also shows the source of local counterparts).

The scenario was discussed in advance with the team leader (Dr Leslie Sargent (USA) and guided the team's work in Afghanistan. In these discussions it was emphasised that the scenario was not intended as a rigid
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARRIVAL (1977)</th>
<th>DEPARTURE (1977)</th>
<th>FOREIGN SPECIALIST</th>
<th>COUNTERPARTS (S) BY DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>Radio Afghanistan - production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Deputy team leader/economist</td>
<td>Educational broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Systems analyst</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Broadcasting</td>
<td>Rural development (2) Afghån Films Department of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Film and Audio-Visual</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications Radio Afghanistan-transmission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>News Agency and Press</td>
<td>Bakhtär News Agency Newspaper representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Rural development</td>
<td>Rural development (2) Public health (2) Agriculture Women's organisations Adult education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Education and evaluation</td>
<td>Educational broadcasting Adult education Radio Afghanistan-audience research Agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
design to be followed meticulously, but more as a guideline for project planning, to be modified as circumstances dictated.

Intrinsic to the study at this stage was a comprehensive independent evaluation. It was considered imperative, if the framework were to be properly field tested and later extended to other planning situations, that all departures from the original scenario should be monitored and explained, and the effectiveness of the approach thoroughly assessed. In practice, two separate kinds of evaluation were incorporated. The first, conducted by Kiran Karnik (a systems planner from the Satellite Applications Centre, Ahmedabad, India) was of a more formal kind: Mr Karnik's function was principally to record, in network form, departures from the planned scenario and the reasons cited for these departures. The second evaluation was more intimately concerned with process and team working and was conducted by Dr. A. Bates, Institute of Educational Technology, The Open University, UK. Dr Bates' report was more concerned with how the theoretical framework stood up in the field than with an evaluation of the whole process of planning for communications development in Afghanistan, even though the two were evidently closely linked. It is worth noting that, although Karnik and Bates overlapped in Kabul for a considerable period of time, and naturally discussed the project in the course of their normal assignments, their final reports were independently completed. Both are reproduced in full in Annexes 3 and 4.

Although the evaluations were conducted separately, however, there was inevitably some overlap between the concerns of both researchers. The operational activities of the framework could not always be discretely separated from the process of application, nor was either evaluator required to limit his observations to a single focus.
Karnik began by describing his task in the following terms:

"One of the implicit aims of the project was, therefore, to study the applicability and usefulness of the scenario: specifically, to use this project as a field trial of the suggested planning framework, as a learning experience regarding how best to use such planning techniques, what modifications are required and what elements are missing, etc. This necessitates a comparison of the plan with what was actually done and an analysis of the reasons for deviations. It is important to know whether the deviations from the original plan were due to conceptual reasons, or factors in the local situation, or pragmatic operational constraints."

(Karnik, 1978 p. 21)

Karnik began by describing the sequence by which the planning survey was carried out. He did so with reference to three specially constructed networks reproduced below (Figures 21-23).

"Since the draft policy document was not ready when the project started, the original plan contained in the scenario had obviously to be modified. A new PERT/CPM chart was therefore prepared by the team. As work progressed, changes had to be made even in this modified network. A simplified version of the network representing the actual planning process is shown in Figure 21 and this best summarizes the actual experience in the execution of this project. (This simplified network does not show the meetings and discussions held with
various levels of the government at a number of times during the project.)

The first few weeks were taken up by the process of trying to determine the overall communication policy of the country. Since no clearly defined and articulated communication policy seemed to exist, this task had to begin with data collection. Based on various policy documents of the government and interviews with important officials, a draft paper on communication policy was prepared. This raised certain specific policy questions and the intention was to get answers to these from a Minister-level policy body. In the absence of such a body for this project, and delays in meeting individual Ministers, definite answers could not be got immediately. In view of the time constraints, the team decided to go ahead on other fronts without awaiting high-level policy guidance. This mode of working simultaneously on different tasks had to be followed throughout the project.

Since the tasks of getting the overall communication policy and objectives seemed to be rather difficult and time-consuming, it was decided to try and determine these on a sectoral basis. This decision was also based on information that, by and large, different sectors were free to make their own communication policies and objectives within the broad general framework of overall government policy. Accordingly, efforts were initiated to determine the communication policies and objectives of each relevant sector. Based on these sectoral inputs, an attempt was made to put together an overall picture in terms of communication policy. However, it became clear that a sectoral - as
opposed to global - approach would have to be used. Accordingly, goals and target audiences were determined on a sectoral basis. None of these existed: they had to be 'treated'. Existing sectoral strategies too had to be determined, and goals and targets revised in the light of these. This was an iterative process involving policies, objectives, goals and targets. Based on these, preliminary future sectoral strategies and operational plans were formulated.

Some areas of overlap and duplication between sectors were noticed and this issue (with possible options) was referred to the policy level. In the absence of immediate decisions on all these issues, the team went ahead by assuming the choice of a particular option.

After choosing from the various possibilities a preferred strategy for each sector in consultation with representatives of that sector, detailed sectoral operational plans were prepared along with a preliminary macro-framework. The finalization of an evaluation framework preceded these tasks. Sectoral plans were then integrated into a final overall macro-framework. In some cases this required some modification of the sectoral plans and thus this was basically an iterative exercise. Simultaneously, a preliminary overall phased plan was evolved and the main recommendations were discussed with the government. Based on these, a preliminary report and final overall phased plan were prepared. After this, the writing of the final report was taken up." (Ibid, pp. 11-13)

The remainder of Karnik's evaluation was largely taken up by a com-
mentary on the deviations perceived. He divided these into conceptual situational and operational components, and summarized his observations in tabular form (Table 9). Figure 22 also showed, in network form, deviations from the original scenario, while Figure 23 compared planned and actual major activities.

The Process Evaluation (Bates)

As Bates was more concerned with the dynamics of team planning, his approach was markedly different from that of Karnik. He summarized the methodology of his study as follows:

"Basically, the method used has been a form of participative observation, as controlled and systematic as possible, supported by semi-structured interviews of project personnel, and the careful collection and filing of records.

The evaluation was carried out by myself, as one of the specialists recruited by UNESCO to work on the planning survey team ... As a full member of the team, I had direct and easy access, on an informal and friendly basis, both to other foreign specialists on the team and in other agencies, and to Afghan nationals in the education sector with whom I was working. In this way, it was possible to obtain at least indirectly reactions of various people concerned to the way in which the planning survey was being carried out, and also to obtain a good knowledge of the way decision-making was carried out in the Afghan government sector.

As well as this informal observation, formal semi-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS OF SCENARIO</th>
<th>REALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conceptual</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. It is possible to draw up a long-term (10-15 years) communication plan.</td>
<td>The possibility has been proven; there is, however, the problem of getting bogged down in the present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Communication planning is a systematic process that can be carried out in a &quot;linear-sequential&quot; mode.</td>
<td>Communication planning can be done in a systematic, planned manner, but the steps are often iterative and not sequential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No mutual interaction exists between the main elements (policy, objectives, strategy): a one-way only relationship is assumed.</td>
<td>There is interaction between these, especially when an explicit, coherent communication policy does not already exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. International experts coming in only for brief periods and with no prior knowledge of the local situation can prepare a relevant long-term communication plan.</td>
<td>A plan has been prepared and hence the feasibility of this is proven. Its quality and relevance cannot be assessed at this stage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Decision-making is based on rational, logical analysis: on cost-benefit studies, for example.</td>
<td>Decisions on important and basic matters are made on arbitrary or political considerations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situational</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. A coherent communication policy exists, and can be culled from official documents.</td>
<td>An explicitly, coherent communication policy did not seem to exist: the task of trying to cull it directly from documents was an impossible one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The host country has a high level of interest in the communication planning exercise, and attaches importance to it.</td>
<td>This, unfortunately, did not seem to be the case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continued ......
TABLE 9 (cont'd)

8. The host country has a desire to participate actively in the decision-making and alternative-choosing processes involved in communication planning.

This was not evident - possibly because this was not considered an especially important project.

9. Full-time counterparts will be available, and the whole planning process will be carried out by a joint national-international team.

No full-time counterparts were available, and much of the basic planning was done by the international consultants.

10. A high-level policy group can be convened to meet a few times (3-4 times) during the project to provide guidance and make decisions.

This was found to be impossible. The only Minister-level group that was convened met days before the end of the project.

Operational

11. A 6 months-long study can produce a good, long-term communication plan for the country.

While 6 months is a very short period for producing such a plan and more time is certainly desirable, the project has shown that it is possible to prepare a plan in 6 months.

12. The media experts are required for a shorter time and can leave before the "user" sector experts.

In retrospect it would have been better for the "user" sector experts to come before the media experts and finish most of their work (in terms of finally assessing media needs) before the media experts arrive - or at least before they leave.

13. It is possible and desirable to have all "sector experts" (i.e. excluding the generalists) arrive at the same time.

It is not possible, nor desirable (see 12 above).
structured interviews were held with six of the seven foreign specialists on the team whose field-work extended for more than two weeks, at the end of their mission, before leaving Afghanistan. The team leader was interviewed in England after all the field-work had been completed and the final report had been drafted.

The team leader kept a daily diary. Although the diary was personal and its confidentiality was maintained, the team leader was able to draw on this to verify points of detail and to support some of the more general conclusions he made during his interview.

Records of all committee meetings, including minutes, notes of meetings with Ministers and senior government officials, briefing or "action" papers prepared by members of the project team, notes of the project team's staff meetings, and other papers relevant to the planning survey, were carefully maintained and made available for the evaluation.

Mid-way through the project, when six members of the team had spent at least one month each on the project, a staff meeting was held specifically to discuss the evaluation of the planning survey so far.

Members of the team were told at the beginning of their mission that there would be an attempt made to evaluate the planning process as it happened, but it was also made clear that the evaluation was not concerned with the individual performance of members of the team, but with the structuring
of the planning exercise. The foreign specialists approved of the idea of such an evaluation, although some were rather sceptical about whether it was possible to do, or whether it would make much difference to future projects. Members of the team had been sent the scenario in advance of their mission, but, with the exception of the team leader, they were not given the planning framework in full, partly because of bulk, and partly because it was not thought necessary for the foreign specialists to be aware of the theoretical basis of the framework. Indeed, it was thought that a more independent evaluation of the planning process would be achieved if they were unaware of some of the assumptions behind the framework." (Bates, 1978 pp. 8-11)

Bates then proceeded to describe the process by which decisions on policy and strategy were taken, and the difficulties which they encountered.

"There were three levels at which it was attempted to create structures for deciding on planning strategies and policies: Ministerial, Departmental (i.e. presidents), and operational.

The project was formally attached to the Ministry of Information (of which Radio Afghanistan was then a department). However, there were only two formal meetings arranged between the team leader and the Minister. The first was held in September, and was attended by five presidents from the Ministry, two UNDP officials, and the team leader and deputy
team leader. The main purpose of the visit was to obtain advice on government communication policy (a set of questions having been sent to the Minister by the team in advance of the meeting). At this meeting, the team requested the minister to arrange an inter-ministerial meeting of Ministers in November to discuss the team's major proposals.

The second meeting was held in November. This was short, and lasted just 20 minutes, before a cabinet meeting. In the end, the inter-ministerial meeting never occurred, at least during the period of the project.

One meeting was also held with the Deputy Minister of Planning, and several meetings were held with Ministers in the Ministry of Education. Apart from these, it was not possible for any other meetings to be arranged at a Ministerial level with members of the planning team.

At the President of Departmental level, a President's Communication Council was established, to assist with the project. Presidents from 14 different departments, plus three representatives from three other departments, were members. It was hoped that the Council would meet once a month, but in fact it met three times during the project. Table 10 sets out attendance at the meetings.
The stated aim of the Presidents' Communication Council was to confirm the accuracy and authenticity of the information collected through the Communication Coordination Council, and to guide the direction of the study. In practice, though, the team came to expect the Presidents' Communication Council to resolve or agree to communication policies identified or proposed by the team. Unfortunately, however, this did not in general occur.

### TABLE 10 MEETINGS OF PRESIDENTS' COMMUNICATION COUNCIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AGENDA ITEMS</th>
<th>Presidents</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1st</td>
<td>Discussion of sector objectives and communication policies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 26th</td>
<td>Likely demand for media from each sector</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 24th</td>
<td>Five inter-sectoral proposals from team</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The stated aim of the Presidents' Communication Council was to confirm the accuracy and authenticity of the information collected through the Communication Coordination Council, and to guide the direction of the study. In practice, though, the team came to expect the Presidents' Communication Council to resolve or agree to communication policies identified or proposed by the team. Unfortunately, however, this did not in general occur.
At the first meeting, each of the sectors gave useful additional information about policies and clarified possible points on which the team were not sure. The meeting also provided an opportunity for sectoral presidents to find out about the policies of their departments or sectors, if they did not know these already. It was also used by the team to request further information about counterparts and strategic planning.

At the second meeting, the Presidents were asked to specify their likely demand for different media. However, although a form setting out the information required had been circulated prior to the meeting, it was received by most presidents only a day or two before the meeting. Nevertheless, a number of sectors were able to respond in general terms. However, it was clear that for most sectors, it was going to be difficult to provide this information, because a number of broader policy issues, involving several sectors, needed to be resolved first. For instance, educational radio broadcasts would depend to a large extent on the availability of sets being increased.

At the third meeting, the Presidents' Communication Council was asked to consider five major proposals formulated by the planning team, that cut across or required agreement from a number of sectors. This was a particularly important meeting for the planning team, since these proposals were seen by the team as essential foundations for the development of an integrated communications planning strategy for Afghanistan. The five proposals were as follows:
- the issue and shared use of community radio sets
- the establishment of a permanent Communication Co-ordinating Council
- the establishment of a communication and audience research service
- the establishment of an inter-agency system of training centres for village level workers
- the establishment of a "wall newspaper" containing development information from all agencies

It was clear from the discussion which took place after the brief introduction of each proposal that in Afghanistan it was going to be very difficult to get different Ministries or agencies to share facilities, if it meant loss of autonomy. However, the proposals were discussed, and the planning team did get an accurate reflection of how the proposals were likely to be received, even if the likely reactions were not to the liking of the planning team.

However, the team leader was worried about the outcome of the third meeting in particular. It can be seen from Table 10 that although overall attendance had dropped only slightly from the first meeting (from 12 to 9), the level of representation had declined considerably, only three presidents attending the October meeting (and one of these left after half an hour). Given the difficulty being felt at that stage of getting contacts at a Ministerial level, it was considered all the more disappointing that clear-cut decisions, especially regarding co-operation between sectors, could not be reached through the Presidents' Communication Council.
However, if attendance of presidents at the Council meetings was disappointing, generally presidents were accessible to individual members of the planning team who wished to see them. On several occasions, in fact, presidents themselves requested meetings with individual members of the team, either to keep themselves personally informed, or to seek advice or assistance on particular issues.

Finally, the last structure devised to obtain wide involvement of nationals in the project was the establishment of a Communication Planning Council. In all, 15 different agencies were represented on this Council. Members of this Council were used as information sources for development of a communication policy and objectives statement. Members were operational personnel at the "director" level - persons involved in the daily execution of communication activities for their respective ministries. The Council met six times between June and September (roughly every two to three weeks). Table 11 summarizes attendance at meetings, and Table 12 indicates the extent of involvement of various departments and individuals.

It can be seen from Table 11 that although there was a slight drop (from 19 attending the first meeting, which was slightly unusual, being the first, and therefore attracting several presidents as well, to 13 for the last), the numbers of individuals attending held up well. The number of departments represented decreased from 11 for the first meeting, to 8 for the last. However, some which were not represented at the first meeting were represented at later meetings, and
vice-versa, 15 departments in all being represented in at least one meeting.

However, more than just token participation was required. As one of the Afghan members pointed out in the second meeting, "irregular attendance by a section could cripple the project's effectiveness", and it was agreed by the Communication Planning Council members that the Chairman (a President from Radio Afghanistan) should get in touch with any missing members, and that UNESCO team members should also try and ensure that sectors were represented. Table 12 indicates the extent to which continuity of Afghan membership of the Communication Planning Council was achieved.

TABLE 11 : MEETINGS OF COMMUNICATION PLANNING COUNCIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>ATTENDANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 21</td>
<td>Introduction to project-request for information on current communication policy</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11</td>
<td>Links between CPC and Presidents explained - request for specific sectoral objectives</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25</td>
<td>Depts. reported on their general objectives, target audiences, main obstacles to communication</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13</td>
<td>Request for sectional budget data-2 groups discussed overlap between sectors and problem of facilities</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 22</td>
<td>Continuation of earlier discussion, around specific questions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 19</td>
<td>Four problem areas raised for discussion</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Attendance refers to Afghan nationals only - UNESCO team members were also present at each meeting).
## Table 12: Continuity of Attendance at CPC Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department/Ministry</th>
<th>No. of Times Represented</th>
<th>No. of Individuals Attending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio Afghanistan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakhtar News Agency</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Broadcasting</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Women's Association</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Communications</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Agriculture</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Film</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Journalism, Kabul University</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min of Health</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Statistics Office</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Information - Publications</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Planning</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all, 35 different individuals from Afghan government agencies attended CPC meetings. Of these, 15, from 10 different agencies, attended at least half the CPC meetings. Virtually all the relevant Ministries and Departments were represented at half the meetings, and ten were represented at two-thirds of the meetings. Although the team leader was disappointed that attendance was not greater, it does seem that attendance was at least as good as could be expected, given the day-to-day pressures on the operational people who were members of CPC. Certainly, the CPC did ensure that at least someone in each sector was aware of what the UNESCO team were proposing and thinking, and had the opportunity to put forward their own sector's views and information, if they wished.

It is more difficult to judge the more qualitative aspect of the extent to which CPC led to avoidance of overlap, and co-
operation between different departments. It was a constant frustration for the UNESCO team, or at least the team leadership, that during both the CPC and the Presidents' Communication Council meetings, there was so little apparent willingness to co-operate between the different sectors ... On the other hand, frank and sometimes heated discussions on the need for and possibility of co-operation and the use of shared facilities did occur, sector objectives, and obstacles to the effective use of communications in each sector, were discussed, and it would be surprising if those 15 members who regularly attended went away without a much better understanding of the communication planning process, the possible roles of communication in development, and the likely advantages and disadvantages of co-operation and shared use of facilities." (Ibid pp. 20-39)

Both evaluations were completed shortly after the end of the survey and submitted to UNESCO, both as a guide to the future development of the Afghan project and to assist with methodological studies. Although based primarily on records kept during the period of the survey, the authors consulted with team members, mainly by correspondence, as a further check on factual accuracy. The evaluations were also circulated to the team by the UNESCO Secretariat, asking for verification of points of detail, as well as for reactions to the conclusions reached. The replies to this request were taken into account in the subsequent analysis.

Analysis of the Field Test

The starting point for an analysis of the Afghanistan field test
was, therefore, the substance of the two evaluations produced. The main conclusions of each evaluation were, first of all, summarised, before being compared according to the original parameters of design and application. In each category, positive and negative factors and reactions were noted.

Scenario Design
Positive Factors

Both authors concluded that the scenario gave the survey a focus and sense of direction at a time when its objectives and methodology were still unclear (this being the first exercise of its kind). Bates observed:

"The overall approach of the proposed framework was clearly right, within the context of an external, technical aid project. The emphasis on precision in policies, qualification of objectives, participation in planning, validation of proposals by the government, and practical operational plans, proved invaluable as goals to which the team should strive. It made clear, particularly to the team leader, what the team should try and do ... ... The framework - or rather the scenario - was very useful to the team leader for setting out steps that could be taken to force the team to push for the identification of clear sectoral objectives, consultation with Ministries, counterpart involvement. Although the team was strong enough to ignore the scenario when it did not fit the circumstances, it did provide clear goals to aim for. It cannot be assumed that foreign specialists are clear in what is required in the development of a communication planning
survey, and such guidance is necessary." (Op cit pp. 63-5)

Karnik went further, to stress the utility of the scenario as a basis from which deviation might be patterned, and as a necessary instrument for breaking down activities, or differentiating between and sequencing tasks.

"Firstly, it provided a clear plan and direction at the inception of the project itself: a critical time when various pressures and the effects of "culture shock" can lead to frenzied but chaotic working, in the absence of a definite plan.

Secondly, it provided a base to deviate from. For the essence of successful planning lies not in having a fixed, immutable plan, but in having a basic plan from which one deviates in a conscious and intentional manner as dictated by circumstances. In this case, for instance, a new plan and network was drawn up within the first few weeks of the project itself, but this new plan was based on the original scenario.

Thirdly, it provided a detailed "work break-down structure" in the form of the tasks required to be carried out. Even as the original plan underwent various modifications and changes, this listing of tasks proved invaluable - both as inputs for new plans and as a check-list of work to be performed.

Finally, except for the policy - objectives stage, the planning framework could be applied - by and large - almost as designed." (Op cit pp. 28-29)
Negative Factors

The evaluators were also unanimous about certain deficiencies in the framework. In the first place, they found it too linear, and therefore inhibiting to a planning process which should have an iterative character. Bates observed:

"Indeed, the most serious weakness of the framework is the sequencing and nature of the network. Although it was accompanied by qualifying statements about it being only a guide, and the need for it to be used flexibly, it did turn out to be much too linear and too simplified in practice in its assumptions about the planning process. It is not moreover a logical deduction from the main principles set out in the framework. It certainly does not reflect a cyclical approach to planning. One must question seriously the "normal sequence of planning by objectives, moving from policy to goal statement, strategic and operational planning, prototyping and implementation." This is an ideal, a post-hoc rationalization of a much more involved and complex process which, if charted out in detail in advance, will almost certainly be impossible to follow, if an acceptable project document is to be achieved. Of course, it is valuable for a team to have a model of what they should be aiming for, but this particular network did not reflect the reality of planning". (Op cit p. 57)

Karnik developed this point in more detail, referring to problems of formulating policy. It was a key principle of the scenario that the
survey should begin with a communication policy statement already in existence: prepared and endorsed in advance by the Afghan authorities. Although a certain amount of advance data collection was undertaken by the UNESCO Secretariat, no specific policy statement was finally compiled, and the team leader and his deputy were faced, upon arrival in Kabul, with the need to organize this in situ, thereby either delaying other activities in the planned network, or forcing tasks to run concurrently. Karnik argued:

"The figures highlight the step-by-step, linear-sequential mode of the original plan, in contrast to the approach of tasks-in-parallel adopted in reality. It also shows the considerable time which had to be devoted to the task of determining communication policies. In terms of both time and effort, this was a major deviation from the scenario, which had assumed that a draft policy statement would be ready even before the project started, so that it would only need to be discussed, modified and formally ratified. The project team did draft a policy document in the first few weeks, but unfortunately this could not be discussed at the policy level for a long time. It was this delay that necessitated the strategy of working simultaneously on several fronts rather than on a task-by-task basis.

However, while the initial reason for working simultaneously on policy, objectives, goals and targets was merely the result of operational exigencies (the time constraint), later it was found to be a conceptual necessity. This was because a definite "communication policy" did not exist when the project started: it had to be created."
The same was true of objectives and goals. In this process, the team found that the relationship between these was not a unidirectional, linear-sequential one of the type shown below and assumed in the scenario.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{POLICY} \rightarrow \text{GOALS & TARGETS} \rightarrow \text{OBJECTIVES}
\end{array}
\]

Rather, it was a complex interacting relationship, and each of the factors could be arrived at only on an iterative basis. Thus, the relationship can be symbolised as below:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{POLICY} \not\rightarrow \text{GOALS & TARGETS} \not\rightarrow \text{OBJECTIVES}
\end{array}
\]

It is debatable as to whether policy should (or even can) be influenced by objectives or by goals and targets; however, the fact is that in a real-world situation, "policy" is necessarily an amalgam of the desirable and possible, of philosophy and pragmatism, of achievable targets and populist goals. In such a situation, the interplay between the three (as shown above), is not only inevitable, but even necessary. In fact, the three can be considered as part of a single package and not as easily separable, distinct units. This was the approach the team was finally forced to adopt.

In situations where a pre-defined, clearly articulated communication policy does exist, the linear, uni-directional flow model may be valid. However, one should note that there are few countries in the world fulfilling this pre-requisite. In all other situations, varying amounts of iterations with other factors
will be necessary before "policy" can be "created".

Both Bates and Karnik emphasized that not only must policy be the result of an iterative process, carried out over a sustained period of time, but that much of this process must be devoted to the establishment of sectoral policies which in turn need to be reconciled within a comprehensive communication policy. Karnik observed:

"The scenario was based primarily on an "up-to-down" planning process. This "planning from above" was implicit in the logical flow from communication policies (overall) to objectives, goals, targets and alternative strategies. Though not explicitly stated, these seem to be at the global or total - system (as opposed to sectoral) level. In actual practice, the team was forced to follow a contrary course and resort to "bottom-up" planning: policies and objectives had to be determined at sectoral levels, since no overall communication policy existed. Having begun in this mode, it was carried further and even strategies were worked out only at the sectoral level. It was only after a preferred sectoral strategy had been selected, and operational plans prepared for each sector, that an overall macro-framework was put together. Thus, though the process was not strictly a "bottom-up" one, it did involve a sectoral-to-global approach and not vice-versa". (Op cit p. 19)

Bates came to a similar conclusion, in the context of his discussion of process.
"The problem was that most departments did not have a communications policy. Some had limited communications facilities but these had been provided to meet short-term requirements for specific projects, and nearly all facilities had been bought from funds from overseas aid for such projects. What the sectors did have (though even then often only in the most general terms) was a sectoral policy, or set of priorities, for development tasks and target audiences. The media sectors also, of course, had general policies, but these were related primarily to their own survival or expansion, and not to development goals, except in the vaguest of terms.

The first task therefore of the team's development specialists was to derive a set of sectoral communication policies - in other words, to suggest how the use of communications media could assist in the achievement of the development priorities of the different departments. The media specialists on the other hand concentrated on technical and management aspects". (Op cit p. 47)

Indeed, Bates was somewhat sceptical of the concept of communication policy at all, certainly as an a priori consideration in designing a communication planning strategy.

"First of all, it was clear that communications policies did not exist, either implicitly or explicitly, in Afghanistan when the project began. Indeed, the main result of the exercise, and perhaps its most important outcome, was that it forced through consideration of communications policies in various sectors, and related these to development goals. Indeed, in most of the development sectors, people were unaware
of the role that communication media could play in achieving their development goals. It was unrealistic then to assume that communication policies were there already, to be handed down and given to the team when it arrived. One of the major functions of the team was to assist the various sectors in the development of communication policies.

Indeed, on reflection, it should appear self-evident that such a project would not have had such a strong justification if Afghanistan did have clear communications policies. Knowing what you want to do is always much harder than doing it. This of course does not mean that there were no communication policies at all. Radio Afghanistan and Bakhtar News Agencies had their own policies, but these had not been related to specific development goals and objectives, except for increasing national cohesion and identity. Until communication policies are related to specific development goals of the various development departments, there will obviously be difficulties in getting such development departments as agriculture, health, education, etc., to take a communication planning exercise seriously." (Op cit pp. 54-58)

This situation prompted both evaluators to come up with specific suggestions for change in the sequencing and phasing of consultants.

"Certainly, it would be better to reduce the phase 1 period, just bringing in the team leader four to six weeks in advance to make practical arrangements and find and brief appropriate counterparts. The development sector specialist should then arrive, followed two to four weeks later by the
media sector specialists. As well as aiming to suggest specific projects and goals for communications media, the team should aim at suggesting structures to improve the planning and utilization of communications media for development". (Bates Op cit p. 59)

"A better use of the consultants would have been possible if the user sector consultants had come before the media consultants, done some work on media requirements - on their own, and in consultation with the media experts when they came - and then provided these as inputs to the media experts for their planning. Some iteration in such cases - between the desirable and the possible - is obviously-essential, and this can be done only if the user sector requirements of media support are fed into the media experts' planning." (Karnik Op cit p. 32)

In much of this discussion there was an apparent unease with the assumed 'rationality' of the planning framework. While a declared objective of the framework was to extend the systems approach as far as was compatible with pragmatic recognition of the realities of decision-making, there was some evidence in both evaluations that this may not have been taken far enough. Karnik commented:

"The scenario implicitly assumed that decision-making is a logical, rational process which takes account of costs and benefits. However, as almost everywhere in the world, important decisions were based not on economic analyses, but on political or arbitrary factors ... ... A larger problem that arises for a long-term planning project is the degree of immutability of policies and objectives. In the rapidly changing world environment, with exponential rates of change
in technologies, can fixed policies and objectives be laid down at all? Especially in developing countries, the rate of change is extremely rapid, both in the technological and socio-economic spheres. Change can be even more rapid and drastic in the field of politics. In such cases, what is the temporal validity of a policy or of objectives?"

(Op cit p. 23)

Bates had a similar attitude:

"The network does not allow sufficiently for planning being an on-going process. Obviously, in a project limited to a specific period of time, specific projects and proposals for the use of communications media must be put forward, and decisions are required from government officials during the lifetime of the project to enable such proposals to be made within the overall context of existing government policy. However, government is an on-going process, with an ever-shifting frame of policy, priorities, and political philosophy. The network relied too much on quick, one might say hasty, "one-off" decisions from government about a range of policies which needed careful consideration and discussion, particularly since they were usually put forward in a foreign language. The network emphasized too much products, in the way of projects, ending with a single "preferred" communication strategy, and not enough process, i.e. establishing permanent structures within government which would facilitate the planning process to accommodate changes in policy (although it must be said that the team did end up by proposing a num-
Scenario Application

Positive Factors

Bates identified successful outcomes in applying the framework, mainly its ability to involve its executors fully, especially team members. He saw a particular advantage in this planning approach for personnel at an operational level.

"The project did involve people at an operational level, and a number of people at the president level (i.e. heads of government departments). Influence on this level of government, in a country as politically unstable as Afghanistan was at the time, is important. While Ministers may come and go, the operational people are more permanent, and may themselves become heads of departments later". (Op cit p. 64)

Essentially, therefore, he regarded the survey as an educative process.

"The project proved to be an invaluable educative process - it made Afghans at all levels of government think more clearly about what they wanted, needed and expected from communications in assisting development.

... Although there was less involvement of Ministers than was necessary, the framework is clearly right to push for their involvement. Without it, no communication plan would stand
a chance of being implemented". (Op Cit p. 64)

Bates also considered that the management of the planning team in the field had been efficiently conceived and carried out.

"To some extent, of course, this depends on the qualities of the team leader, but there were several steps taken which greatly enhanced the coherence of the team of foreign specialists, and facilitated the development of proposals which cut across sectoral interests. First of all, office accommodation was secured at Radio Afghanistan which provided desk space for all the consultants in two rooms, close to each other. Therefore most specialists were able to meet each other on a daily, working basis. Secondly, during Phase 2 and 3, when there were usually at least six foreign consultants working on the project at any one time, regular weekly staff meetings were held, usually with an agenda and an opportunity for each specialist to report to the others on his or her progress, problems and discoveries. These meetings were held by most of the specialists to be extremely valuable. It enabled frustrations to be talked through and shared, but most of all it allowed for an interchange of experiences of how Afghan culture worked, and of the development of a common approach and understanding of communication planning." (Op cit pp. 39-40)

Negative Factors

Inevitably, both Bates and Karnik had more to say about problem areas: it was in the application of the generalized planning model that the Afghan scene had to be most carefully studied.
The most serious deficiencies noted by both evaluators related to the status ascribed to the survey, at a senior and political level. Bates commented:

"This is a much more intractable problem than the sequencing and steps in the network.

... Several of the foreign specialists believed that the reason for the difficulty in getting in to see Ministers was because the project was not offering tangible resources, in the sense of immediate development projects. It had no carrots to offer.

... (But) Whatever the reasons, this particular project did not have political support or status; there was no senior Minister rooting for it." (Op cit pp. 60-61)

This general statement was related more specifically by Karnik to questions of the institutional base for the project, and to patterns of decision-making.

"The plan was drawn up on the basis of the Planning Ministry being the focal point of the project; it was also assumed that the counterpart Coordinator would be from the Ministry of Planning. As it turned out, the Ministry of Information and Culture - and Radio Afghanistan (RA) in particular - was the focal point. To what extent this change affected the project is not immediately clear; however, it does seem clear that the Planning Ministry may have been a more preferable base because of its inter-
Ministerial and coordinating role. It may have also added to the prestige and importance of the project, since the Planning Ministry is responsible for deciding on fund allocations for all developmental activities". (Op cit p. 24)

However, Bates, while agreeing with Karnik's point in general, was not all that optimistic about the impact of a change of base.

"Even if the project had started with the full support of the Ministry of Planning, there would have been problems in getting high-level involvement. One reason why it was difficult to get Ministers together, it was suggested by one member of the team, was due to the tense political situation in Afghanistan. This feeling was not altogether exaggerated, as six months after the project, there was a revolution in which the President and at least one other Minister were killed.

Nevertheless, there are serious practical problems in getting high-level involvement. Long-term planning exercises do not have the urgency of day-to-day problems that Ministers have to tackle, nor do they offer immediate prospects of grandiose schemes which bring political rewards. How much time can such a project really expect of Ministers? It was suggested that Ministerial involvement is needed only twice: at the beginning and at the end, the first time to give the project a political push, the last time for endorsement of or clarification of policy. It would seem though that where there is little devolution of responsibility for decision-making, a midterm meeting of Ministers would also be needed. Whatever detailed proposals though that are made for Ministerial involve-
ment, this should be written into the official project agreement between UNESCO and the national government).

(Op cit pp. 61-63)

This leads on to the second, major problem which was described by Bates concerning the nature of decision-making in Afghanistan, especially means of securing consensus on policy. The problem was graphically illustrated in the case of two documents: first, the statement of overall communication policy which was meant to be fundamental to the survey; and second, the draft proposals for action (both sectoral and inter-sectoral) which were circulated, in order to prepare a macro planning framework.

Bates first summarised the lengthy procedure which led to the elaboration (unsuccessfully, in the event) of an agreed policy document.

"Arising from the first meeting between the UNESCO team and department heads on June 21st, a questionnaire was sent to each sector requesting a listing of sectoral communication policies. The response was very poor; even the few questionnaires that were returned had little information of use or relevance. After several attempts, the team leader managed to get a meeting with one of the Presidents from the Ministry of Planning on July 13th. Although he was unable to give any
specific policy guidance, he did clarify that, basically, each Department was free to make its own policies, so long as they were within the broad policies enunciated in the Constitution, etc.

Fortunately, two days earlier, at the first "business" meeting of the Communication Planning Council, the team had already decided that because of the time constraints, each department should be asked clearly to state its specific sectoral (as distinct from communication objectives) and target audiences. Thus, without waiting for finalisation of the communication policy statement, the team had decided to move on to the "objectives" phase.

In this way, derived from the information provided by each sector and discussions with Afghan officials, on August 10th the team produced a draft paper on Communication Policies and Objectives. However, it indicated a number of areas of duplication and overlap, and a number of overall policy issues were clearly still to be resolved. Since, at this time a high-level policy body had not been established (nor, in fact, at any time during the project), on the advice of the PCC, it was decided to approach the Minister of Information. To force through decisions more quickly, the team prepared a document assuming certain policy decisions, unless informed otherwise. A meeting eventually took place with the Minister on September 3rd. Two of the policy issues were resolved on the spot. The third, concerning the duplication of effort at the village level, could only be resolved through a meeting of several ministers, which the Minister
promised to arrange. This however did not take place during the life of the project. However, a Communications Policies and Objectives in Afghanistan statement, in a revised form as a result of this meeting, was drawn up and included in the annex to the team's report. This statement was however never formally endorsed by the Afghan government (except by default). Furthermore, being couched in very general terms, and being finalised as late as it was, it proved to be of little use to the sectoral specialists who arrived in August."(Op. Cit. pp. 44-41)

The next problem was to get the proposals discussed and options chosen. The proposals were circulated to Presidents of the various departments at the end of September. It was in practice difficult to get a detailed discussion of the various proposals with individual presidents, although this did vary from department to department. Reactions varied from complete acceptance without any discussion to total avoidance of any discussion or even consideration of the proposals. Language was obviously a problem. Some of the proposals were lengthy and detailed. Foreign specialists had to rely largely on interpreting or guessing the real reaction to proposals.

It was however possible, as a result of the stages worked through so far, to begin to draw out from the discussions and various sectoral proposals a number of general, strategic proposals, which cut across sectors. Thus, at the Presidents' Council Meeting of October 24th, it was possible to put forward for discussion five major inter-departmental proposals. These were not mutually exclusive, and could stand or fall on their own merits. They would however, in most cases (such as the
establishment of regional training centres for village-level workers) facilitate many of the individual sectoral proposals. As already mentioned, reactions of both the CPC and the PCC to the sharing of resources and the development of co-operative inter-departmental projects were not encouraging."

(Op Cit, pp. 48-50)

Subsequently, Bates provided an analysis of these difficulties. It was impossible, through subjective commentaries upon a local bureaucratic structure, to determine what was, or was not, unique to Afghanistan and what was more generalisable. He made the reasonable assumption, however, that conditions experienced by the team could not be attributed solely to Afghan conditions, and that they therefore needed to be incorporated more adequately into future versions of the planning models.

"The hierarchical nature of decision-making in the government had several consequences. Firstly, decisions were always referred upwards. Secondly, below Ministerial level, there were likely in any one Ministry to be up to 15 or 20 presidents, all attempting to get the Minister's attention or decisions. Inevitably, then, it took time to get even meetings arranged. Thirdly, there was a reluctance to make decisions which created precedents or suggested initiative. While this may be true of most governments, it was exceptionally pronounced in Afghanistan. The team leader was moved to write in the report:

'... members of the team improved in their ability to understand the seeming reluctance of the individuals to provide information or to comment on prop-
osed plans. This self-protectiveness in a society coping with many difficult problems is understandable. The individual's fear of reprisal appears to be stronger motivation than hope that he will be rewarded by a system which can afford few monetary inducements. A salary scale which pays a department president the equivalent of perhaps $80 a month does not leave much scope between this and a bare subsistence level to offer incentives for enterprise. Job security is more important than innovation. '(UNESCO, 1978 Vol II, p. 6)

Fourthly, sectoral autonomy was particularly strong, making arrangements or plans requiring co-operation or the sharing of facilities between departments particularly difficult. Again, the team leader commented:

'The sectoral 'chief' exacts almost feudal loyalty from his people and, in the bureaucratic sense at least, he is likely to punish undue consorting with other sectors or sharing with them proprietary information or facilities ... It would appear that the 'committee' structure so beloved by Western politicians and educators is not a viable decision-making machine in Afghanistan. In the first place, the member of the conference is speaking not for himself but as a representative of his agency. He is thus reluctant to express any view unless specially so commissioned by his superior. For a subordinate to attempt to guess what such a decision may be is not considered a wholesome exercise ... And this is not the way to make
plans anyway (say the social mores): plans are made by the leader and carried out by his subordinates; strong leaders do not parley - they act.' (UNESCO, 1978, Vol II, p. 5)

This has been spelled out at some length because the framework does depend very largely on co-operation between sectors, on people having the authority to make - and being willing to make - decisions, on the willingness of individuals to subordinate narrower sectoral interests to a broader, common good. It is dangerous to assume that Afghanistan is massively an exception amongst developing countries. While it may be more extreme, some of the tendencies can be found in many organisations, both in developed and developing countries".
(Op Cit pp. 50-52)

A final set of observations by both evaluators was specific to the kind of survey undertaken in Afghanistan, involving groups of foreign consultants, ostensibly working with local counterparts (i.e. the traditional technical assistance project). In practice, none of the Afghan counterparts was made available full-time, and in some critical cases (e.g. the planning ministry) there was finally no counterpart. The evaluators concluded that the counterpart formula (which was crucial to the scenario) was unsuccessfully applied, though Bates was most detailed in his analysis.

"Counterparts are seen as the means by which planning discussions, knowledge of planning procedures, and most important of all, national involvement in the planning exercise, are permeated through the system at all levels. The counterparts will remain after the foreign experts have gone, and therefore
should be able both to understand the background to the planning issues, and also to carry through the operationalization of the plans for communications development.

Unfortunately, however, this aspect ... did not work out as planned ... 

First of all, the counterparts could not work full-time with specialists. They all had their own work to do, often in departments with a heavy load of work which could, for various reasons, only be done by the counterpart ... 

Perhaps more importantly, the counterparts were not at the right level ... As the team leader pointed out, the ideal level for the counterpart would have been the sectoral president. However, this was clearly impossible. Presidents of sectors already had impossible work-loads, and a regular day-to-day involvement with foreign specialists was clearly out of the question.

Another unfortunate consequence of this situation was that in general, the counterparts did not adequately liaise between the team of foreign specialists and their presidents. Often, they were unaware themselves of policy within their own department, and if they were able to get in to see their president, their own operational difficulties and requirements were likely to take precedence over reporting on the team's work.
Partly as a consequence of the hierarchical nature of decision-making, and partly because the information did not usually exist, counterparts were often unable to carry out one of the main functions laid down for them in the framework, which was to provide data for the foreign specialists on facilities and policies, particularly if the information required went outside the narrow sector for which they themselves were responsible.

Lastly, with few exceptions, most counterparts were not fully involved with or committed to the planning exercise. Particularly since most counterparts were working at the operational level, immediate problems naturally took precedence over long-term planning". (Op Cit pp. 24-27)

Implications for the Planning Model

The two evaluations were focused on the scenario, but in assessing its strengths and weaknesses, they inevitably commented far more broadly on the planning process. In discussing the implications of their work for revising the planning framework, therefore, initially at least the broad categories of design and application will be retained. Subsequently, this discussion will be related to the list of principles consolidated at the end of Chapter V, and then, in Chapter VIII which follows, used in revising the planning models employed, to the extent that they still appear to be useful.

Implications for Planning Design

A particular problem in assessing these implications was to decide
which issues were peculiar to Afghanistan, and which were more generalizable to other contexts. In approaching this problem, the networks produced by Karnik, showing deviations from the original planning sequence, were the most useful starting point. Both networks occupy the same time-scale: the main objective of the survey was met, in that a detailed report was produced within the time-span allocated. In broad outline, this followed the initial sequence of activities proposed, moving from the setting of objectives to the evolution of a strategic plan (a macro framework), and so to a group of individual projects for submission to donors. The means by which it did so, however, were in many ways radically different from the strategy proposed in the planning scenario.

The most significant departure concerned the establishment of communication policy. In the original version a policy document was to be agreed prior to the team's arrival in Afghanistan; in practice, such a document was never really agreed at all. The planning team nucleus, arriving in the country to find that no such statement existed, set about preparing one, using its own resources, but this draft was never confirmed at a senior policy level. Indeed, while the original scenario scheduled four ministerial-level policy meetings (already reduced to a minimal level, after the experience of Thailand), in the event this also proved to be over-optimistic, and only two such occasions were actually provided. (Even these were at a level below the Cabinet-type discussion originally foreseen - essentially these were short ad hoc meetings with the Minister of Information). Thus, for the scenario to be made workable at all, it was necessary to abandon the assumption that communication planning must reflect a consensus across Ministries, on communication policy.

This potentially disastrous position was circumvented in two ways. In the first place, the team was forced to assume, after leaving a
decent interval for reactions which were not forthcoming, that its proposals on a number of policy issues were, in principle, acceptable, since nothing negative had been heard about them.

But it also tried not to place too much reliance on such an assumption, which might well (using the analogy of the 'agreement' reached in Thailand to establish a radio network independent of the Public Relations Department - an agreement which did not stand up once it was put to the test) be revoked if ever publicly affirmed.

It did so by working, as far as possible, through the establishment of sectoral objectives, a process somewhat underplayed in the original scenario. At this level, it was possible to work in a more operational way, as some indication, at least, of intersectoral reactions to the team's proposals was possible through the meetings of the Communication Planning Council.

In practice, what did this mean for the scenario? Firstly, its linear, step-by-step precision broke down very rapidly. It was replaced by a series of more circular, iterative processes, which mirrored much more accurately the reality of decision-making. (In fact, both framework and scenario had recognised that, within each block of activities, iterative processes were at work. However, it was felt that they were too complex and too informal to reproduce in network form, and the fact that there was iteration and repetition between major blocks, as well as within them, was not fully acknowledged).

Secondly, the existence of parallel activities, with only tenuous connections between them (at a conceptual rather than operational level), was emphasised. Sometimes this was a pragmatic response to a difficult
situation, such as the communication policy issue, but it also reflected a methodological problem, which might well go beyond the context of Afghanistan. The establishment of sectoral policies, for example, did not proceed through a logical process of gradual consensus: rather, each sector worked in parallel, and consensus came very much at the end of this process, far less structured than planned.

Third, the process of bargaining and consensus seeking, on which the participant axis of the framework was based, did not in practice figure substantially in Afghanistan, except to a very limited extent in the work of the Communication Planning Council. The only real attempt at interdisciplinarity occurred within the planning team itself, which was, on the whole, a tightly-knit group.

How much of this was peculiar to Afghanistan? Probably, the country was somewhat unusual in its total lack of a platform for intersectoral action; at the policy-making level, decisions were taken only by Cabinet, and usually only at the Presidential level. It was this which was largely responsible for the subsequent coup. Decisions tended to be made either pragmatically (emphasising short-term advantages and priorities), or dictatorially, and so were quite unsuited to the strategy of the planning framework, which was trying to move, if not towards overt participatory planning, then at least towards consensus planning.

Afghanistan was also unusual, to some extent, in the extreme laissez-faire attitude adopted by the planning ministry towards sectoral autonomy: a tradition of allowing each sector independence, unless this caused a flagrant breach with other units (or offended the President). The planning ministry was, unlike many developing countries, neither strong nor forceful in imposing coordination; it was mostly concerned with the generation of foreign assistance. This could, however, have been perceived earlier,
probably even before the study began, as it is a pattern particularly associated with the least-developed countries (it is also found, for example, in Nepal in the same region). Partly it arises from a shortage of trained planning personnel in the development and economic Ministries; it also stems from an unusually high dependence upon foreign aid.

However, the ways in which the team leader bypassed this difficulty not only revealed basic flaws in the planning design, but also suggested some new concepts. The most important of these was the realisation that no single link in a planning chain can be made so critical that, if it is not completed, nothing else can follow. In the case of Afghanistan, this link was the production of a communication policy statement, and without the tactical qualities of the team leader the whole survey could have foundered at this stage.

This was also a problem which might have been foreseen. There are few, if any, cases in the world where communication policy documents have been prepared and agreed, beyond the level of descriptive statements which generally ignore dissension and duplication. The emphasis placed upon it in the planning model was unfortunate, but a succession of UNESCO conferences and publications had emphasised the importance of communication policy, and this element was therefore exaggerated in the scenario (as an ostensible trial, and eventual vindication, of an official position, without really taking account of the realities of Afghanistan). To some extent, this was inevitable in a UNESCO-executed project; the original negotiations for the survey (conducted by Lloyd Sommerlad) had the same emphasis, and there were many internal pressures for the survey to be forced into such a model. It should, nevertheless, have been resisted earlier and more strongly.
The second lesson was the importance attached by the survey to processes of iteration, and especially to the introduction of parallel activities, with fewer explicit and structured connections between them. This flexibility was, in fact, written into the planning framework, but it was assumed that, at the level of a scenario, the planning design would have become sufficiently localised to allow for the sequencing of activities in more precise terms. In practice, it appeared that, even at the scenario level, the planning instrument would have to be more of a guide to planners, less of a linear and programmed device.

The third lesson was the need to enlarge upon the establishment of sectoral objectives, as a prelude to articulating communication policy (and in some cases, as an alternative). Although this need was particularly forced in Afghanistan, it seems to have implications for most other contexts. It also exists at two levels: at a relatively technical level, implying that the process needs more attention and specific treatment in scenario design; but also at a theoretical level, suggesting that the establishment of policy is not a precursor of strategic planning, but actually part of the planning process. It is, in many ways, a practical reflection of the participant axis in the planning framework, a means by which the needs of consultation, consensus seeking and interdisciplinary working are formalised and expressed in operational terms.

Implications for Planning Application

The Afghanistan survey was far more successful in organising its own planning processes than in coping with local political and decision-making traditions. The survey arose almost accidentally, coinciding with a need to test the planning framework, and very little prior analysis was carried out of social and political organisation in the country. This was recognised from the outset, but it was unfortunately only possible to collect
background data in Paris, so that the volume of local data available to the team leader was largely unvalidated. An attempt was made to collect more informal material, by contracting a UNESCO associate expert (working on an educational radio project) to put together an additional dossier, but he did not fully understand the purposes of the exercise and his work was not finally very useful. I tried myself to arrange for a visit to Kabul before the survey began, to supplement this data, but constraints of time made this impossible. Moreover, the survey was very much underbudgeted, in such areas as data collection and evaluation, because of its original emphasis on media resource planning.

In many ways, therefore, the survey began at a disadvantage, certainly in comparison with the earlier Thai survey. It had fewer resources to carry out what was finally a much larger task, and the country was relatively unknown to the planning team. (I had paid a few earlier visits to Kabul myself, but always in connection with a specific project and never for more than a few days). Moreover, there was no one on the ground with a particular interest in the survey (unlike the Thai situation, where the deputy team leader had been resident in the country for many years), apart from UNDP personnel whose interest was broad and political.

In Afghanistan, therefore, the team had to learn about decision-making structures and patterns in situ, as the survey proceeded. Often, what was learned came too late to affect the planning dynamic; it certainly came too late to be reflected adequately in scenario design.

Perhaps most important of all, the team leader had no direct entree to senior political circles. He was constantly compromised by this difficulty; even at the sectoral level, access to the Minister of Information was not easy, and contact was never made with the President. Therefore,
although plans had been made for promotional and educational programmes for decision makers, these could never be put to the test. The level of representation at planning meetings was rarely appropriate (at first, there was not even a reliable means of deciding how inappropriate, as the sectoral cadres were unknown). Obviously, as the survey proceeded, more was learned, but usually too late to be acted upon. And even when it was known, the project did not have sufficient support or status for the issue of representation to be pressed.

What was pre-plannable, however, was the organisation of team working, and here the experience of Afghanistan was much more positive. Curiously, in spite of the severe practical constraints on working, the level of team interaction was better than in Thailand. Some of the same personality problems recurred (one consultant left without properly fulfilling his role; another was poorly chosen, being a practitioner rather than a planner; in some cases consultants arrived too late, or were resident for too short a period.) The needs of the user Ministries were seriously under-estimated in the original plan, and the single consultant in the area of rural development was overwhelmed by the massiveness of her task, devoting most of her time to disentangling existing organisations and structures. But in general, the group was cohesive, committed to the survey, and very much in tune with its conceptual base. Much of this cohesion could be traced to the difficulty of living in Kabul, attempting to penetrate a complex, unusually alien system, in an atmosphere where, it was evident, political support for the survey did not really exist. The position vis a vis counterparts was much as in Thailand, but in one or two cases - especially the counterpart to the team leader, the engineering head of Radio Afghanistan - there was genuine interest and commitment, which was translated into active, almost full-time support.
The earlier difficulty experienced in Thailand of relationships with donor agencies was not repeated. The German Government, which financed the study, had long-term interests (at that time) in radio expansion, and welcomed the insights which the study might provide; it did not involve itself to any great extent with the survey, but was interested throughout to hear about progress. Other international agencies were also interested in the eventual plan, as a means of establishing lines of project finance, and in certain cases (e.g. the World Bank and UNICEF) actually delayed country programming until the plan was complete.

The most serious difficulty in terms of external relationships lay in the respective roles of the two executing agencies for the survey: UNESCO and the ITU. As reported above, the International Telecommunication Union insisted upon a technical involvement with the study, to protect its mandate in the telecommunications sphere (always a point of contention with UNESCO, which, in the ITU view, often crosses the boundary line between the two). But the Union did not follow up this involvement in operational terms. The consultant employed by the ITU did not work closely with the team (in fact a succession of short-term consultants arrived, each with a different view of the project and its priorities), and there was little contact, apart from financial negotiations, at the Secretariat level.

Finally, an even more difficult situation arose, which could have had a disastrous impact on the survey. The ITU consultant was especially interested in satellite potential, and produced a plan which recommended satellite distribution; this cut across an existing ITU regional initiative based upon terrestrial microwave (a Pan-Asian project, coordinated from the ITU regional office in Bangkok). In consequence, the ITU refused categorically to allow any sections of the consultant's report to be used
in the final plan, and UNESCO was compelled to employ, from its own financial resources, an independent consultant to prepare an alternative version. The project therefore illustrated yet again the very real need to build into planning strategy the claims and priorities of external groups with special interests.

Comparison with Original Principles

In the chapter which follows, the lessons learned from Afghanistan will be applied directly to the planning model and a number of revisions and reformulations proposed.

Before this is done, however, it should be useful to return to the consolidated set of planning principles proposed at the end of Chapter V, to see how these were borne out in Afghanistan and in particular to isolate any new principles.

In the context of framework construction, certainly no principle was denied: circumstances in Afghanistan made a flexible, untheoretical approach particularly important, and the need to establish clear communication objectives was considerably reinforced. The first UNESCO design over-emphasised media technologies, and it appeared that the revisions carried out to this original plan were not sufficient to redress the balance. However, the survey illustrated very well the importance of moving away from purely media and technical considerations, and taking full note of the Afghan social structure. A media analysis alone would have done little more than reproduce the technical features of a number of existing Western communication systems, and the analysis of existing structures carried out by the team revealed, in many instances, projects originally financed under bilateral or international agreements which
were flawed in this way. Afghan Films, for example, was initially a USAID project, with a small output, equipment inappropriate to the country (with very little in the way of field equipment, for a country with a difficult terrain and a scattered, often migrant population), and poor utilisation. The new television system which was under way as the survey proceeded, planned and constructed by the Japanese, was again a prestige, technical assistance project, focused on the urban elite of Kabul, with a reasonably planned technical infrastructure (highly derivative from Japanese models), but with little consideration of programming apart from what might be available from foreign sources.

Not surprisingly, there was very little consideration of user involvement, even at the client level. Development planning was not decentralised to regional levels; urban planners rarely went outside Kabul. Even the survey was not a reflection of local need, as the result of an accommodation between international agencies (notably UNESCO and UNDP, with the German interest coming later).

The planning team did what it could, from its own perspective, to base planning on at least a theoretical perception of the needs of deprived, especially rural audiences, but it was unable to consult with the ultimate users of the system, or to establish any mechanisms for needs assessment.

The principles associated with scenario construction were all reinforced: indeed, the deficiencies of the survey were in many cases the result of these not being adequately reflected in scenario design. Sometimes they were simply not implementable. For example, this was true of the need for an adequate database, first confirmed in Thailand; in Afghanistan, not only was it impossible to secure such a base in time,
but the existence of many of the data required, especially quantitative, was in any case doubtful. Basic demographic data, even accurate maps, could not be assumed to exist, or relied upon when they were produced. In such cases, the planning process has to adapt to data scarcity, and improvise as best it can.

The need for pragmatism in scenario application was confirmed in other ways. The plan to educate decision makers, built upon the Thai experience, collapsed in practice, as reported above, and attempts to reflect the interests of external groups, again modelled on the Thai example, proved inadequate to deal with the entrenched political interests of the ITU. As in Thailand, a conscious attempt to involve local personnel at appropriate levels was compromised by existing patterns of organisation. In this situation, the principle of interdisciplinarity in team organisation proved especially important, as the only means by which an adequate report could finally be produced, in the face of numerous constraints.

Much had been learned, however, from the Thai experience in the matter of report production, and this was well applied. Although the report had finally to be produced in Paris, the result was much better than in Thailand; it was shorter, contained a simpler summary volume, and was focused directly on the needs of donor agencies (it was organised, in fact, in the form of a series of projects, but without compromising the integrity of the communication system proposed). The survey was thoroughly and usefully monitored, and the final report also described the planning process in detail, for the benefit of those who might have to go over the same ground in the future.
The Thai survey, although produced in 1975, did not lead to agreement on a project until 1978-9. The Afghan survey, completed in 1977-8, was overtaken by political events and will at best lie dormant for a number of years, until a stable Government decides to review its contents. (The attitude of recent Government has been that any document produced under earlier regimes cannot even be considered, let alone adapted or implemented).

In the circumstances, it is obviously important for planning studies to describe, in some detail, the processes by which decisions are reached: otherwise, changes in personnel and decision making cadres will make the sequence of decision-making obscure, "when plans are finally acted upon.

Expansion and Extension of Principles

Much of the above suggested an expansion of the basic principles, showing some re-ordering of emphasis. Modification was obviously necessary in the discussion of objectives (originally Principle 5 in Table 4), and in the discussion of flexibility, (Principle 1).

However, three lessons from the survey, relating to scenario construction, were sufficiently important to incorporate in new principles. These concerned the need for parallel planning processes; the avoidance of over-dependence on particular activities or blocks of activities in scenario construction (e.g. the issue of communication policy), and finally a new concept arising from the discussion of pragmatism.

This last point concerned the need to build redundancy into scenario construction: an embodiment, in scenario design, of the concept of realism and pragmatism already discussed in the context of scenario application. The concept had been interpreted earlier more as an attitude of mind, a
need to retain balance and perspective in applying planning models, but it seemed, on the basis of Afghanistan, that it might be more directly incorporated, into both the planning design itself and into the institutional mix which is the result of planning. Caiden and Wildavsky, in fact, discuss this point in a consideration of the concept of redundancy, and isolate various functions which it may perform: as a reserve (the ability to deal with unforeseen contingencies), as an alternative (to ensure variety and competition), as security, as a duplicator (to ensure ready availability of data), and as a facilitator of change (to hedge against uncertainty).

They conclude:

"The presence of overlap is normally regarded as a sign of inefficiency; the existence of competing mechanisms for performing the same tasks may suggest that they could be performed at low cost. But reliability, the probability that a given function will be performed, depends upon a certain amount of redundancy. Otherwise, if there is only one existing mechanism, the first breakdown will result in failure to finish the job ..."

"Redundancy in rich societies is found everywhere, though it is not usually thought of in these terms. It may be seen in over-capacity, in variety and competition which provide alternative ways of getting things done, and in the overlap and flexibility connected with a high level of supporting sources."

(Caiden & Wildavsky, 1974 pp. 49-50)
While the argument is focused on the results of planning and on implementation, it seems equally applicable to the planning process: in the case of Afghanistan, without redundancy and the possibility of conducting planning processes in parallel, there would have been no plan.

A revised list of twenty principles, taking account of the above, is therefore provided in Table 13, in readiness for the reconsideration of the planning framework in Chapter VIII.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>TABLE 13</th>
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<td>FRAMEWORK DESIGN</td>
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1. Planning design should not be over-theoretical; it should be flexible, avoiding the uncritical use of external models.

2. Planning should focus on the whole communication system under review, and not confine itself to particular projects, sectors, media or technologies.

3. Planning should be based on genuine need, established through available needs assessment mechanisms.

4. Planning should seek to devolve and decentralise its forms, involving as many agents as possible, with particular emphasis on system users.
TABLE 13 (contd)

5. Planning should proceed from the establishment of clear and precise objectives. In this process, the establishment of clearly defined sectoral objectives is the first requirement.

SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION

6. In scenario construction, no single activity or group of activities should be made critical. It is important to avoid creating a situation in which, if one activity is not completed, nothing else can follow, so that the overall product – the plan – cannot be attained.

7. Scenario design should avoid linearity, making allowances for iterative and repetitive planning processes, and planning activities which run in parallel.

8. In scenario construction, elements of redundancy must be included, and reflected in the final plan.

9. Scenario construction should seek to maximise the use of existing resources and infrastructures.

10. Scenario construction should pay particular attention to timing and phasing.

11. Adequate arrangements should be made in scenario design for the cooperative and coordinated working of all agencies involved.

12. The special interests and preconditions of all interested agencies and donor agencies should be reflected in scenario design.
13. Scenario design should include means of securing an adequate data base.

14. Promotional activities, including the education of decision-makers, should be included in scenario design.

SCENARIO APPLICATION

15. In planning, people are more important than techniques.

16. To be successful the planning process must have the interest of, as well as access to, influential people in key positions of decision making.

17. In planning, the limits of decision-makers, planners, planning processes, and institutions should be realistically recognised. This implies the careful analysis of decision making patterns, the involvement of a broad spread of local personnel, and their continuous representation at appropriate levels in planning processes.

18. In the organisation of planning teams, an approach which emphasises interdisciplinarity is important. For this to be effective, it is important for team members to be assigned specific and stated roles and responsibilities.

PLANNING REPORTS

19. Plans should be organised in such a way that they facilitate implementation. This implies the inclusion of detailed proposals for financing, project development, training and the eventual achieve-
ment of self-support, organised in such a way that both donors and recipients are provided with the categories of information which they require, presented in the format most suited to their needs.

20. Plans should include mechanisms for evaluation, to allow for subsequent revision of the proposals being put forward. As part of this design the planning process should itself be evaluated.
In this chapter, two basic questions are considered. First, and more specific, what has been learned in the course of research about the planning design upon which the field test was based (including both the development of the planning framework, and its adaptation into scenario form?). Second, and more fundamental, what is the utility, and validity, of planning designs of this kind in the particular context of communication planning for national development in the third world? Is it possible, for the future, to contemplate the gradual extension of the strategy employed, or an alternative version? Or are the difficulties encountered too great for the methodology to be pursued?

The chapter begins with an examination of the first question, partly because it arises directly out of the evaluations analysed in Chapter VII, but also because it is within this assessment that an answer to the second, more fundamental query is likely to be found.

In the course of the Afghanistan evaluation (encapsulated by the revised list of planning principles at the end of Chapter VIII), a number of basic problems were revealed about the planning framework, especially its operational scenario form. In relation to the two axes originally devised for the framework (of participants and of activity) two major points emerged. For the participant axis, it was clear that the original triad of development planners, communication planners, and decision-makers, was inadequate: it needed both further breakdown and expansion (this had been sensed as early as Chapter VI, but was rejected at that time, as being too premature to be acted upon).
Conversely, for the activity axis, it appeared that the original categories of policy, strategy and operations should be left at this broad and general level, to allow for the accommodation, in each category, of a range of cyclic and iterative functions.

Both points affected the interaction between the two axes, which was not only critical to the development of a planning scenario, but also the area of greatest difficulty. The scenario, while recognising that many of its component activities would be cyclic, was nevertheless expressed in predominantly linear and sequential terms. This had two effects on the Afghanistan survey. In the first place, it implied that some actions which were fundamentally iterative were in fact linear. And secondly, it did not allow sufficiently for activities to be conducted in parallel. In consequence, it inferred that there was, in the planning process, an ordered sequence of activities, so that failure to complete certain actions would render the rest of the sequence inoperable (in other words, that there was a critical path).

These three observations clearly had fundamental implications for the development of the framework. But they were also linked to other, more deep-rooted issues.

One concerned the idea of communication policy. While the difficulties experienced in defining communication policy in Afghanistan were mostly related to the critical path issue described above, they raised a more profound question: was the idea of communication policies really only a political device, possibly useful in categorising a societal position, but not as an operational instrument?

Other problems stemmed from the concepts of access and participation,
in particular the tensions between planning and control, and freedom of expression. A cardinal assumption of the framework was that it should be capable of adaptation to a variety of social and political structures; in practice, as a tool, was it only fully appropriate to a centrally planned system, with little admission of public participation?

Even in the first steps towards model construction (in Chapter VI) some of the constraints on the framework had been noted: that it was a two-dimensional model, which had to be imprinted into other dimensions of society, if decentralisation was to occur. It was also noted, in the review of project case studies, that the concepts of reflection of need and devolution were the most inadequately illustrated. The problem here was, therefore, whether any version of a framework and scenario could cope with the addition of decentralised planning, or with an increased participation base. These latter issues are extremely complex, and it was thought best to begin in this chapter with the more technical issues relating to model building and application, pointing up deficiencies and constraints in the framework, and seeing to what extent it might be reworked (and hence to what extent it would continue to be useful). The other, more conceptual issues relate, in most cases, to versions of social development which go well beyond the status quo, and hence beyond operational models which deal, by definition, with existing patterns of social organisation. These certainly need to be discussed, but outside the context of model building; they are therefore mainly left to Chapter IX which follows.

Communication Policies

However, one issue which should be discussed at this stage, before the framework is reconsidered, is that of communication policy. Problems
arising from the concept of communication policies have been raised on a number of occasions in this thesis, and it is important, for the sake of the argument which follows, to make a distinction between policy and communication policies. The first is an essential element in the planning process: the formulation of objectives needs to be preceded by some articulation of policy, providing broad directions and orientations, otherwise there is a very real risk that objectives, while internally consistent and precise, may not reflect political and social will.

Communication policy, however, is different in character; at best it is more of a theory, or model, of communication structure than a planning instrument. While deriving from the orthodox systems understanding of policy (i.e. that coherence of perspective and unity of view are important in proceeding towards specific action and quantification), it has been transmuted into a political formula. Attached to the concept by this time are definitions of the nature and function of communication which are prescriptive, part of the mythology of international organisations (notably UNESCO) in their treatment of communication issues, and also part of a set of polemic arguments conducted at the international level, in particular between the United States and the third world bloc (especially the group of Non Aligned Countries). While these understandings go well beyond any mechanistic version of policy-planning processes, doubts cast upon the idea of a mandatory stage of formulating 'communication policies' do not mean (nor can they within the systems argument) the automatic rejection of the idea of policy per se, as a part of planning strategy.

This being said, quite apart from its significance as a potential stumbling block within the networking process, the issue of communication policy needs some additional consideration. Much of what has been written
about it is prescriptive rather than operational; while it has been defined in such a way that it may be made applicable to both socialist and pluralist societies (by stressing the fact that it covers implicit as well as explicit policies and norms, and is supposedly only descriptive of communication institutions and processes, even when these are laissez faire in character), in practice the formula is most easily applicable to socialist countries, or to mixed economies where (as in much of the developing world), there is a strong tradition of centralist development planning.

In the case of Hungary, for example, a UNESCO monograph found little difficulty in equating overall political norms and structures with communication processes.

"Mass communication is taking a more and more central place in the life of Hungarian society, because of the ongoing process of democratization, the increasing political activity of citizens, the differentiation of their cultural demands, the rising standard of living and the extension of leisure time as well as the integration of certain elements of the scientific-technical revolution into everyday life.

The rapid development of mass communication has resulted in a transformation of the structure of the Hungarian communication system, the electronic media gaining ground to the detriment of the classic types of media, mass communication in general gaining ground at the expense of a more traditional type of transfer of information and culture. None the less the communication system has remained an integrated whole, incorporating new and traditional channels alike, and both communication policies and communication
plans relate to the whole of this complex system.

Communication policies reflecting the value and norm system of socialist society are formulated at various institutional levels, regulating communication processes by provisions of law, the adoption and application of certain principles and by economic and administrative measures. These policies constitute a more and more coherent system of regulations and they rely, to a growing extent, on complex social planning.

In the process of elaborating and implementing communication policies socialist society uses experimental methods to meet challenges without historical precedents in the domain of information and culture. Development of the communication system is an integral part of the cultural revolution which is in turn part of the political-social revolution. To quote Marx: 'The revolution of the people is total: every sphere makes its revolution in its own way; why should the press as such not do the same?' (Szecsko and Fodor, 1974)

But in other cases, the tension between planning (identified with control) and pluralism (identified with freedom of expression) is more difficult to resolve, and communication policy statements only highlight this tension. Thus, in the case of Ireland:

"The prospect of more elaborate 'communication planning' in the public sector is greatly dependent on the level of social and political understanding such a policy would be likely to command. While planning now commands a wide degree of acceptance in Irish
society, public approval of its extension to the sensitive area of mass communication policy might pose major problems.

Nevertheless, the Devlin report expressed the view that '... the role of government in a modern society becomes more and more concerned with the economic, social and cultural development of the people' ... This view was the basis of the recommendation that a Department of National Culture be established with responsibility for the Irish language and its associated culture, the national heritage, recreation, and 'the arts and cultural media', including RTE.

An acceptance of this proposal would radically alter the entire context of public policy formation in respect of mass communication media, which must now be accepted as a primary influence on the cultural evolution of modern societies; and, in the case of the publicly owned broadcasting services particularly, the environment within which the media institutions define their own policy." (Stapleton, 1974).

In democratic socialist countries such as Sweden, the argument is taken further, because the State has felt obliged to try to reconcile the two positions, and in doing so has encountered serious economic obstacles.

"It is a cardinal precept of democratic ideology to have the mass media, in interaction with their public, provide many-sided information and mould opinion independently of the government.
At the same time it is obvious that the opportunities of so doing are becoming more and more restricted.

The financial concentration of newspapers constitutes a patent threat to diversity of opinion. In addition, the remaining monopoly papers are known from experience and available research findings to adapt to their monopoly by glossing over the editorial profile, by turning into 'community papers', to borrow an American term.

The growing parliamentary pressure put on the broadcasting media has had a similar effect. The Swedish experiment of 'stimulating rivalry' between two television channels has not provided any solution.

The only counteracting factor is the growing interest in specialized publications. However, these can do no more than exert an indirect influence on mass communication itself (with the mass media editorial staffs acting as middlemen). Furthermore these publications reach only the already enlightened or convinced.

So far the solution tried has involved various attempts to keep newspaper competition alive, but if the Swedish experience is any guide, such efforts cannot amount to anything more than a rearguard action. The sums required to maintain the status quo are already considerable; given the dynamism inherent in competition, the amounts must be constantly increased, and soon the limit will have been reached to what the national economy can bear." (Furhoff, Jonsson and Wilsson, 1974)
In the end, the attempt to define communication policy in a pluralist society can become extremely diffuse and theoretical, leading to bland statements of apparently irreconcilable objectives. This statement from two German writers (in a UNESCO monograph describing communication policies in the Federal Republic of Germany) might well be accused of 'double-think'.

"The more complex society becomes, and the less a communications system functions in a self-evident and self-regulating manner, the more essential an intentional and systematic communication policy becomes in the sense of ordering structural policy. However, such structural policy may not restrict social communications freedom in any way. It should, instead, make the conditions available for its best possible development. Different social groups, organizations and institutions, not primarily the State, can be representative agents of communication policy. But, even a democratic State will increasingly see the necessity of aiding the claim of each individual to an equal chance at participating in the process of social communication."
(Mahle and Richter, 1974)

In essence, the more pluralist the society, the more difficulty it will have in reconciling the two poles of communication policy: the idea of coherence and conservation, on the one hand, and of free expression and variety, on the other. Thus, while the concept of communication policy may be considered an operational concept in a communist society, because its rational base is synonymous with societal attitudes towards planning, in a pluralist society it becomes more of a descriptor, even a figure of speech, because the planning needs of such societies are at a different level, more pragmatic and more discrete. Consequently, if the search - as in this thesis - is for a model of planning which has some pretensions
to generality, the concept of communication policies cannot be made
integral to that model, and a more restricted definition of policy
has to be adopted.

The argument has been conducted at some length, because it was felt
to be critical in the definition of planning strategies. How acceptable,
or applicable empirically, the UNESCO-inspired concept of communication
policies will become in the future is a matter for speculation, but in
this chapter, the articulation of policy is a technical understanding,
denoting a preliminary stage in setting objectives.

With this definition in view, then, it is possible to turn directly
to the planning framework.

The Planning Matrix

Reconsideration of the planning design began at the same point as
Chapter VI, in order to redefine, and modify, each component of the
design process in turn. There, the original starting point was a two-
dimensional matrix, which took as its axes planning participants, and a
time-activity sequence.

The Participant Axis

Initially, it had been decided to restrict this matrix to three kinds
of participant communication planners, development planners, and decision-
makers. In view of the time constraints and tentative nature of the
Afghanistan field test, this limitation was probably justified, but in
the light of the Afghanistan evaluation, it was evident that the original
tried should be expanded. On the one hand, an expansion of communication
planners was necessary, to take account of the importance of sectoral debate and negotiation revealed in Afghanistan. On the other hand, a more refined account of decision making cadres was required (particularly some consideration of the dimension of the client and user, which was originally reflected only in the term 'consultation'.)

In Figure 24, a revised matrix is proposed, in which the participant axis is enlarged to include, first of all, policy makers, development planners and communication planners at the sectoral level.

At the same time, the dimension of the user is expanded to differentiate between sectoral and general users. Essentially this refers to the discussion of 'clients' and 'publics' found in Chapter IV, when project case studies were analysed and planning principles examined; the sectoral user is primarily the 'client' of this earlier analysis, while the term 'general user' synthesises a variety of publics. Thus, the client user is one directly involved in a communication project or system, because of his association as sponsor or institutional partner. The general user, on the other hand, is involved, not through a specialised interest or through sponsorship, but through his membership of the communication audience.

The interaction of these participants is, naturally, likely to be different at each stage of the planning sequence. For this reason, it cannot be generalised; not only do some activities involve different permutations of participants, but their interrelationship is also different in each context.
Time Activity Axis

In Figure 24, however, the time activity axis of the matrix is left broad, principally because of the emphasis, in the Afghanistan evaluations, on the parallel and iterative nature of planning processes. At this stage, the broader the categorisation, the more capable it is likely to be of accommodating parallel and cyclic processes.

At a later stage, a further breakdown is clearly necessary, but if carried out within these three retaining divisions, it is less likely to force linearity where it is inappropriate.

A Revised Framework

The next stage of the review was to attempt to expand the matrix of Figure 24 into a revised framework, much as the original matrix of Figure 11 was adapted (in Chapter VI) into Figure 12.

However, the original framework of Figure 12 was no more than a set of summary descriptions of general activities, set in the three blocks of policy, strategy and operations, and interrelated at a crude level. It was followed by a prose commentary which advanced, hypothetically, a number of directions and assumptions for the scenario.

The revised framework, if a useful model was to be possible at all, should presumably go somewhat further. Since Figure 12 was first constructed, much had been learned through the Afghanistan experience; some assumptions were at less hypothetical a level, and some of the interactions were better known, (as evidenced by the expansion of the participant axis of Figure 24).
At the same time, more was known about the utility, and limitations, of the format chosen, mainly as a result of the Afghanistan Scenario (Figure 20). It had been established, for example, that this format, with its breakdown into highly specific activity blocks, imposed too much linearity upon the process, particularly when activities were numbered sequentially. In the scenario, parallel processes were difficult to accommodate. The format did not allow for interrelationships or levels of planning to be expressed.

However, even at the time of formulating Figure 12 many of these limitations had been recognised, and it was then found necessary to use the diagrammatic model as a starting point, which would emphasise systemic unity, while using a prose commentary, supplemented at times by individual diagrams describing individual, internal processes, to explain the nuances of particular elements of strategy, or to expand upon questions of relationship.

To some extent, therefore, the same double-headed approach could be used to support a revised framework. The problem was: how far could this be pushed, to take account of the additional experience gained in Afghanistan, while skirting round those limitations already discussed of linearity, parallel planning and the avoidance of critical paths?

Not surprisingly this problem - and the actual revision of the framework - caused considerable difficulty. But it was thought important enough to be pursued, for several reasons.

The basic justification was that, in presenting and analysing the results of the research, questions of detail, specific instances and accounts of processes were probably as important as a validation, or
rejection, of any set of assumptions or hypotheses. It was important to determine whether planning approaches of the kind being applied were useful in the developing world, but equally important to know in what way, with what constraints; since the research was action-based and problem-oriented, its utility would lie in the pointers which it gave towards future problem-solving. Therefore, it seemed adviseable to press the framework as far as possible, regardless of the difficulties involved, because the very act of doing so would be informative about these constraints.

Moreover, the framework could not reasonably be detached from the overall design process adopted in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan evaluators confirmed the usefulness of the *scenario* in planning, but the scenario was evolved as a result of work carried out on the framework; if other scenarios were to be prepared, they would need to be based on equally solid foundations. It was not simply a framework which was being considered, or a scenario, but a planning strategy based on a comprehensive design process.

In the end, therefore, a second-stage model of the framework was produced, still in a tentative and experimental form, and this is reproduced in Figure 25.

**Major Blocks**

Figure 25 retains the three main blocks of Figure 12, distinguishing between the critical processes of policy formulation, strategic and operational planning. In general, these can be considered linear and sequential, in the sense that, within the formula of rational, systems planning, each of these stages represents a crystal-
lisation of thought, allowing the next stage to proceed more efficiently. At the same time, none of these processes is self-contained; they are conducted in parallel, and in so doing spill across into each other. More important still, none is a one-time process; they continue in a cyclic form, and each is therefore subject to repeated redefinition and reformulation. The linearity in such cases is, in fact, more conceptual than temporal; the argument is illustrated in Figure 26.

Figure 26 characterises the process by incorporating the function of evaluation. The diagonal line in the figure shows the traditional systems sequence, from policy through to strategy and hence to operational planning (leading on to implementation). But each of these stages is also depicted (by lines which continue vertically downward) as continuous; at critical points each process is temporarily suspended, in order to be embodied in a policy statement, a strategic formulation, or an operational plan, but the processes continue beyond, subject to continual refinement.

The means of monitoring this ongoing process, and of acting upon its conclusions in the form of revisions to the original statement, formulation or plan, are provided by evaluation. At each critical stage, some form of evaluation (of process or of product, formative or summative) is conducted, feeding its results back, after processing and summation, to various levels of the system. (The final set of arrows leading out of the base of the diagram indicates that this is also a continuing process, repeated over time.)

This does not imply, of course, that evaluation is the only influence which will affect the policy making and planning processes. Policy is likely to be modified by changes in social perceptions and trends; strategic planning by new methodologies (like forecasting techniques) or new tech-
FIGURE 6. LINEAR AND ITERATIVE PROCESSES

FIGURE 26. LINEAR AND ITERATIVE PROCESSES
nologies (which change the potential mix for the communication system); operational planning and implementation by new processes and techniques (which allow plans to be prepared and realised more quickly and more efficiently). But it is evaluation which formalises and disciplines the process of review; if policy making is continuous, its conclusions have still to be summarised from time to time, or they will never impact upon the system with which they are concerned.

**Component Activities**

These three major blocks are, however, further subdivided in Figure 25 into a series of nine activity lines, for each of which a prose commentary is provided. The criterion for isolating these activities was one of significance and relevance in the process of scenario construction.

The activities are not sequential, nor is there any presumption that they are contingent (i.e. the commencement of each line does not necessarily assume the completion of its predecessor, nor is it assumed that failure to complete one line invalidates the remainder of the sequence).

Each line is also related to the second, participant axis of Figure 25, to indicate the main groupings of participants at each stage. However, the interrelationship and interaction of participants is not illustrated (it cannot be in a simple two-dimensional format, whose main function is to demonstrate the coherence of the overall design), and this interrelationship will be pursued in the commentary which follows.

In Figure 25, therefore, the number assigned to each group of component activities is for reference purposes, not to indicate sequence.
In each line, in fact, several activities may be taking place simultaneously (e.g. the preparation of sectoral and overall objectives), and each may continue for different periods of time (the blocks are formal, not time-specific). Moreover, activities involving some groups of participants, for example at the sectoral level, may be continued out of phase with the central level, if there are delays in the parallel process. The main directional line through the diagram is shown as emanating from the central communication planning agency, as this has been defined as the main coordinating, motivating and initiating force, but a dotted line connecting sectoral planning activities proceeds independently along its own path.

Commentary on Figure 25

The commentary below refers directly to each activity line, but as a general guide, Line 1 relates to the establishment of a data base and to needs assessment; Line 2 comprises policy formulation, both sectoral and central; and line 3 the setting of objectives. In Line 4, a synthesis is proposed of sectoral and overall objectives, before planning moves on to the framing, and reconsideration, of alternative strategies in Line 5. A further synthesis is proposed in Line 6, culminating in Line 7, in the broad statement of strategy which has been termed a macro-framework. Finally, Line 8 defines the overall or macro plan, and subsequently Line 9 leads on to operational planning (and so to implementation, which is outside the matrix.) No attempt is made to isolate such functions as evaluation, which have already been characterised as continuous, and applicable in some form or other within each block.

It should be emphasised that both this framework and the commentary which follows are still experimental and tentative. They are less hypo-
thetical than their predecessors in Chapter VI, since they represent an attempt to overcome deficiencies revealed by field testing, but even so, much of their substance is still at the level of empirically based recommendations. This is inevitable in research of this kind, which seeks, over time, to improve operational tools through repeated field-testing and evaluation. The framework is, therefore, supportive and not prescriptive.

BLOCK ONE - POLICY FORMULATION

Line 1 - Data Base

The formulation of policy should begin, as confirmed in both Thailand and Afghanistan, with the establishment of an adequate data base as possible. In figure 25, the communication planning agent is shown as the initiator and prime mover of this process, but drawing upon all other participants in the system to broaden its resource base. (Throughout Figure 25, in fact, the communication planning agent is shown as the central thread, creating and sustaining the momentum of planning. This agent may be a single individual or a group, based in the economic development planning unit or in an information agency; it may be a consultant team, a research institute, an intersectoral task force or committee. But in any planning exercise, some agency has to take prime responsibility for setting planning in motion, and pressing for it to meet its deadlines).

The difficulty of obtaining adequate data sources was also well illustrated by both the Thai and the Afghan surveys, but in the discussion of data needs in Chapter VI, the main emphasis was on data gathering and processing. While this aspect is important, it places a premium on statistical and quantifiable data, and less on the needs of system users. It is for this reason that Line 1 shows interconnections between the
communication planning agent and all other system participants, to stress not only data collection but also needs assessment research.

Such research may, of course, amount to little more than soliciting evidence from representative public groups, and this is a perfectly valid source, but special difficulties occur in fields like communication notably in the development world. In the first place, it is difficult to ask the public to specify what it wants, or needs, in the form of a communication system, particularly if this means distinguishing between a variety of alternative forms, each with different cost and benefit implications, and in some cases based upon unfamiliar technologies. The task (much as was the case when devising programme formats in India, for the SITE experiment, when many members of the audience had never been exposed to a television programme, often not even to a film programme) is to find out ways of asking questions which illuminate, in an objective fashion, what audiences need, without being prescriptive or paternalistic about what is good for them.

Bella Mody, introducing a needs assessment study which she conducted for the Rajasthan cluster of villages (her study was produced in December 1974 as part of the preparatory work for SITE) had this to say:

"In this study, more than 75 district and block officials were interviewed on the most pressing needs of villagers whose satisfaction came within the purview of their department, ongoing schemes they were responsible for, how well/badly these schemes were functioning, reasons for this, major bottlenecks in implementation, the role and functioning of panchayats and co-operatives, and the kinds of tasks they thought TV would do for them. Data on caste and communal compositions and
barriers, and opinions on villagers' responses to new schemes and government officials was also sought. The interview schedule, an adapted version of a previous schedule used for the same purpose in the Kheda district of Gujarat, was open-ended and took approximately an hour to administer. However, our interviewers reported that officials continued to talk about related aspects of their work for much longer. Insights gathered from the total contact and published material have been taken into consideration in reporting the findings per cluster." (Mody, 1974 p.3)

The problem is not one of questionnaire design, or of technique. It is rather a problem of assessing the capability of audiences and publics to respond to questions put to them, of designing appropriate vehicles for meaningful responses, and of finding ways around the dilemmas of unfamiliarity, reticence and passivity.

The picture, or synthesis, which emerges from needs assessment and data collection will not, of course, be complete: it will require supplementing as planning proceeds. But it should provide a reference bank of basic data which will help in planning the detailed scenario and act as a reservoir for planners as they begin their work. It should also be extremely useful in identifying the agencies which can best be involved in planning (since the data gathering process will both reveal critical agencies and those representatives who are most interested in the subsequent task).

All this is summarised, diagrammatically, in Figure 27, which shows the merging of different kinds of data source (subjective and objective) in a synthesised form.
DATA COLLECTION AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT

SECTORAL PLANNERS -> DATA AND POLICY BASE

DEVELOPMENT PLANNERS -> DATA AND RESEARCH BASE

RESEARCH INSTITUTES -> NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND STATEMENT

USER GROUPS -> SYNTHESIS
The formulation of policy, and the articulation of objectives, have been considered extensively in the course of this thesis, and the arguments will not be repeated here. As a result of this discussion, in Line 2 the consideration of sectoral and overall policy is kept separate, though with obvious important connections, and the base of consultation and participation is left as broad as possible. Within the simple boxes of Line 2, a complex set of interactions has inevitably to take place, which will need to be programmed specifically in each environment, and even with careful preparation, as was seen in Afghanistan, there can be no guarantee that more than a nominal consensus on priorities will be reached at this stage.

Many delicate and long-winded relationships are involved: between the communication planning agency and overall policy makers, for example, and between policy makers and the public. Bearing in mind the earlier discussion of communication policy, while some kind of limited consensus on priorities and emphasis may be reached over a relatively short period of time (and must be, for serious planning and implementation to proceed), the discussion of communication policies in their wider, socio-political sense has no such limitation: it implies an extended dialogue over a lengthy period, constrained by cultural habits.

Even in the more restricted sense of confirming priorities, the Afghanistan project showed how difficult it can be to obtain serious consideration by decision-makers, and to achieve consensus. Proposals for motivation, for the education of politicians, have been emphasised, but they will not necessarily be taken up or lead to concrete results.
If necessary, as in Afghanistan, an interim assumption may have to be made that agreement has been reached on certain policy positions, and failsafe procedures written into the planning design, to allow for modifications at a later stage, if this apparent consensus is denied.

The setting of objectives has also been considered at length and it will be noted that in Line 3, while the sectoral participation base has been left broad (because the sectoral user has been identified with clients and institutional users), in the setting of overall objectives, public involvement has been excluded. This is a precise and frequently technical process, and it was noted in several of the project case studies (e.g. in the discussion of the Children's Television Workshop) that too broad a base of participation at this stage is likely to confuse the clarity and utility of the result.

Line 4 - Policy Synthesis

In most situations (clearly evidenced in Afghanistan), after a complex exercise has been completed which involves a number of participants, some form of synthesis is needed, partly to group and categorise the points made and decisions taken, but also to ensure that the same understanding of consensus is shared by all concerned. As the goal of Lines 2 and 3 was to secure a marriage between sectoral and central/intersectoral policies and objectives, responsibility for this synthesis is assigned to the central communication planning and development planning agents, as these have the best overall perspective and the least partisan stake.
Line 5 moves towards a more concrete stage of planning, as activities focus down on system possibilities. Its principal concern is to formulate strategic options, and to proceed from these to an overall strategy which reconsiders conflicting demands. The process was described in Chapter VI (Figure 15); it is based on preparation and analysis of concrete options, which makes negotiation and synthesis easier, because it is focused on practical issues.

In the Thai survey, the approach worked relatively well, apart from time constraints which meant that the bargaining process had to be rushed. It was the approach through concretisation which proved most useful in Thailand, as it brought the pattern of decision-making closer to decision making styles which were familiar in other contexts. It is a dilemma of communication planning that it often seems over-complex to the politician, because it involves technical considerations and system designs which are out of his normal reference frame. However, Thailand was essentially a sectoral study, and it was in Afghanistan that the complexity of achieving intersectoral consensus was fully revealed. In the first place, each sector moves at its own pace, and sectoral planning cannot be made contingent on the habits of other sectors, or of central agencies. Secondly, achieving consensus across sectors, each with a different set of priorities and a different understanding of communication potential, is far more difficult than reconciling the demands of separate agencies within a single sector, where at least a general milieu is shared. In Afghanistan, it is doubtful whether this process of consensus ever really began in earnest. Additionally, planning across sectors implies that
some intersectoral mechanisms will also be needed: to provide for
coordination, for joint action in areas which cut across the interests
of several agencies, for general evaluation and review.

Line 5, therefore, subsumes a number of parallel activities within
each sector, and a good deal of dialogue between them and the central
planning and development agencies.

The process is not likely to be a simple matter of formulating
alternatives in a single round, and then reconciling the set of all
sectors; it will probably involve a number of false starts, parallel
discussions, revisions and gradual modifications. Essentially, in
this process the communication planning agent is both catalyst and
synthesiser. It is only at a central level that some coherence of view
can be maintained, seeing each sectoral initiative in the context of
an emerging communication system. But it is also important for the
communication planning agent to act as adviser, explaining something
of the potential of communication channels and forms in relation to
sectoral problems, offering advice on technical needs, and helping
analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each draft of the strategic
alternatives as they evolve. The initial dialogue is likely to
be between the communication planning agency and each sector in turn,
a dialogue which will continue for some time, before the demands of
a number of sectors are considered together, and the process of
negotiation begun. It is at this later stage that other central plan-
ning and decision making agencies are brought into the picture; if they
are involved too early, before the sectors have properly crystallised
their own positions, undergone their own consensus-seeking process and
defined their priorities, the result will be confusion.
The synthesis of decisions on strategy which is again proposed (for the same reasons as in Block One) is assigned, on this occasion, to the communication planning agents at both central and sectoral levels; at this point, the planning exercise has narrowed down much more directly to consider communication possibilities and structures.

Line 7

Macro-Framework

In this activity line a crucial stage of harmonisation is reached. Demands have been fed in from a variety of sources, and the overall synthesis will inevitably be one of adaptation and compromise, as no system can give total satisfaction to all its users.

The line therefore reflects a more than usually elaborate process of discussion, drafting and modification, in a search for an agreeable formula. The macro-framework represents the last stage of political validation; as a generalised description of the communication system proposed, it is drafted at the planning level, but offered up to decision makers and users for their commentaries and agreement, before being transcribed into technical form.

BLOCK THREE - OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Line 8 - Macro Plan
Line 9 - Operational Plans

This final block moves into more familiar territory. From the broad outline of the macro-framework, modified by consultation with decision-makers and users, a master plan is produced (by the two communication planning agencies together), before operational plans are prepared at
both sectoral and intersectoral levels. The macro-plan is, therefore, a critical document. It translates into specific and technical terms the orientations of the macro-framework, and sets out to provide a coherent description, to which operational planners can refer, of the entire system to which their institutions are attached. It also includes provisions for intersectoral mechanisms (which are certainly, on the evidence of Afghanistan, likely to be recommended in the course of intersectoral planning); the detailed operational plans for these umbrella institutions will probably rest with the central communication planning agency. By the time the stage of operational planning has been reached, it is likely that this agency, however tentative and limited it may have been in its formative stages, will have increased in size and responsibility, and be able to take a lead role in such areas as training, evaluation, research and forward planning, where intersectoral arrangements are likely to be both more efficient and more effective.

Conclusion

It will have been noticed that, as the commentary on Figure 25 proceeded, it became more and more general in character. This is not unexpected, as with the move from policy and strategy to operational planning, locality and specificity become progressively more important.

In any case, it would seem that this is as far as Figure 25 can be pressed, without falling into some of the conceptual and logical traps already described. It is, therefore, an appropriate time at which to address the second of the two basic questions raised earlier: on the utility of such a model for communication planning in the third world.
This research began, not with an hypothesis, but with a set of questions, concerning the possibility of fusing planning techniques with a sensitive response to external pressures, especially those of decision makers and decision making processes. In Chapter II, I stated:

"If there had been a formally stated hypothesis, this would have proposed that it is possible to evolve a communication planning instrument which embodies both technical supports and elements of policy formulation and decision making".

The methodology adopted to investigate this problem was to work from the general to the particular: to begin by evolving a general planning framework, supposedly capable of being applied to a variety of social and political contexts. This was then to be adapted, for each planning problem as it arose, into a unique, time-based scenario, created to match a particular set of circumstances, not transferable to other environments.

The assumption of this approach was that the generalised framework, at least, might be found to be widely useful, in that it might provide a format within which an individual scenario could be organised. It would therefore be valid at the level of guideline and technical support. In the event, the Afghanistan evaluation did show that the scenario had been useful in organising the planning team's activities. In Karnik's words:

"It provided a clear plan and direction at the inception of the project itself; a critical time when various pressures and the effects of culture shock can lead to frenzied working, in
the absence of a definite plan ... It provided a base to deviate from". (Op cit, p. 28)

In a broad sense, then, the quasi-hypothesis could be held to have been supported in the field test. But in this kind of research, I have argued, it is the manner of support which is ultimately of the greatest interest. For it was not, finally, the generalised framework which was of the most use, but the localised scenario. And in order to understand that phenomenon, a good deal of qualification is needed: any attempt to detach the framework (or, for that matter, the scenario) from its context could lead to erroneous conclusions.

It may, for example, be argued that if it was the scenario which was practically useful, then the generalised framework was no more than a bridge, a resting point en route to scenario construction. In a sense, this is true: the framework on its own existed only to facilitate the construction of an operational, scenario form. This was not fully understood in the original set of assumptions made when the research began, but it was adequately confirmed by the Afghan experience.

Yet conversely, the scenario could not have been created in a vacuum. It depended upon the earlier project analysis, the articulation of planning principles, the development of a planning matrix. And the same is likely to be true of later adaptations; in order to become specific, to take full account of both local conditions and general constraints upon planning, they need to be rooted in a solid conceptual base. It is finally the overall planning strategy, and the full planning design, which are critical. If anything can be said as a result of the Afghanistan experience, it is that this particular model of planning proved to be useful, in spite of its primitiveness, its constraints, and its mistakes. It can be inferred,
It seems therefore that Figure 25 is as far as one can go in illustrating this process. It should be left in an incomplete form, not expanded into a more complex network; as a simple matrix, part diagrammatic and part descriptive (taken together with its accompanying commentary), it represents an interim but critical stage in a process leading towards scenario construction. On its own, like other components, it is weak, incomplete, ambiivalent. but the sum of all components, co-existing in an evolutionary design, should be helpful in creating specific planning strategies.

In Chapter 1, it was stated that the objective of this research was to evolve a planning strategy or instrument which would catalyse the contribution of communication resources to the development process, while recognising the variety of contraints, particularly those of political action and decision making, which exist in real world situations. The test of the adequacy of such an instrument is that it should be capable of application in the developing world, by planners and planning teams, working with the support of the planning tool alone (i.e. without interpretation or guidance from its creators), and that its use in this way should be considered helpful and viable by these same planners.

In the case of Afghanistan, a planning strategy (the scenario) was devised by the researcher and handed over to the Afghanistan planning survey team for them to use independently. In the opinion of the survey's evaluators, the scenario enabled the team to operate more effectively in a strange envirorm nt and to produce a plan which, in their opinion, had potential for implementation. To this extent, therefore, the objective of the research was met.

To what extent may it also be considered useful and applicable in other situations? I would conclude that, following the refinements introduced as a result of the Afghanistan evaluations, the instrument has a higher chance of successful use and replicability than in its original setting. Within this thesis, a set of instruments is contained which can be used as the basis of further planning designs, covering a variety of situations in the developing world, provided the instruments are seen as facilitating, rather than blueprint models.
In the first place, there is the developmental model of Figure 25, and its associated commentary (in Chapter VIII), which provide a broad framework for the collection and processing of information at various stages of the planning process. Secondly, to facilitate the expansion of this figure into a country or problem-specific scenario, there is a set of guiding criteria, which are embodied in the revised list of principles summarised in Table 13. These are guides, not only to the process of scenario construction, but also to the management of communication planning teams and processes in the field.

Finally, in the account given of the Afghanistan planning survey (and especially in its two evaluations), there is an example of scenario construction and application which illustrates, in a concrete manner which cannot be assured by Figure 25 and Table 13 alone, the process of adaptation.

If these three elements are taken together, I would conclude that, at the very least, they will provide a focus and a framework for action by independent planning teams, and that they are also likely to lead to the production of a coherent plan, with potential for implementation. On this final issue, however, a specific measure of utility and validity has still to be established by further field tests, as the Afghanistan plan has not yet been followed through.

At this point, then...
reasonably, that later adaptations of the model may also be useful, if they adopt the same general strategy, while at the same time attempting to avoid the flaws of their predecessor. But this model is not a two-dimensional format: it is essentially the complete process which has been recorded in this thesis, not any one of its component parts.

In fact, while the model set out to create a generalised framework, it concluded by extending the concept of an 'operational framework' into a more dynamic form, an operational design process rather than a specific format. This is not, of course, to say that other planning models are inappropriate; but the research has little directly to say about them, either in conformation or in opposition.

It seems therefore that Figure 25 is as far as one can go in illustrating this process. It should be left in an incomplete form, not expanded into a more complex network; as a simple matrix, part diagrammatic and part descriptive, it represents an interim stage in a process leading towards scenario construction. On its own (like other components) it is weak, incomplete, ambivalent. Co-existing in an evolutionary design, the sum of all components was demonstrably helpful (in the opinion of the Afghan evaluators), and valid in the sense that the design led to the construction of a communication plan (this being the main objective of the Afghanistan survey). Its validity in other contexts remains to be proven (and whether or not it actually leads to successful implementation also remains to be seen, as the Afghanistan survey has not yet been followed through).

At this point, then, it is appropriate to turn to the other limitations of the framework: limitations which were recognised in advance, and which the design did not, in Afghanistan, attempt to overcome. They are discussed, as independent conceptual problems, in Chapter IX, but
before this discussion is begun, it may be asked whether or not, in the future, the model of the planning framework could possibly accommodate some of these needs?

It has been stressed that the framework design, as it stands, does not extend beyond two dimensions; it does not easily reflect moves towards decentralisation, and it is not easily adaptable to processes of social transformation which adopt radical and participatory planning forms. Yet, if planning is to be opened up further, and communication users more fully involved, it has to reflect activities conducted at many different levels of society. The problem in relation to the matrix of this research is illustrated by Figure 28, where a three-dimensional framework is shown. Collaboration, coordination, participation would all have to take place within this setting, implying an elaborate routing of activities throughout the model.

Even though Figure 25 did not attempt to go so far, could it in theory - if a different set of assumptions were made - do more to accommodate such processes? Probably it could, with the aid of computer models, be made much more complex, capable certainly of accommodating more than two dimensions and a far larger spread of local variables. But in doing so, it would refine itself to a point where it might well defeat one of its main objectives: to provide an instrument for planners and decision makers in the developing world, where the ability to use refined tools is limited, and where the data upon which these tools depend for their success are scarce. The basis of the planning approach adopted in this research has been rational-comprehensive in character, relying heavily on systems planning approaches, but the scepticism of the incrementalists has also been noted, and responded to wherever possible, primarily by
LEVELS OF PLANNING

- POLICY
- STRATEGIC
- OPERATIONAL
- NATIONAL LEVEL
- REGIONAL LEVEL
- LOCAL LEVEL

FIGURE 28
keeping the planning design simple. The design has been based upon a status quo which reflected, it was thought, the reality of planning traditions in the developing world.

However, even if a decision were made to refine the model to accommodate greater local variety in existing planning situations, it is doubtful whether it could also accommodate variables of potential social change, responding to structural changes in participation as these gradually emerge in the developing world. It is important to recognise these changes, and to consider their ideological base: that is the function of Chapter IX. I would conclude, however, that a planning design, at the present time, will be more useful if it is kept simple enough to be operated by developing world planners and decision-makers, without raising their dislike, scepticism, or non-comprehension. Even in the industrialised world, where data bases are larger, considerable difficulty has been experienced in using computer models to accommodate complex social processes. For planning to be realistic, and practically useful, it cannot prove too far or too deeply into potential or hypothetical forms of social organisation; it has to be ready to respond to such changes when they take place, but at the macro level, at least, and in pluralist societies, it should be a reflection of balance and of a status quo, neither too reactionary nor too liberal.
CHAPTER IX

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

This final chapter is speculative: it attempts to highlight those features of communication planning for development which go beyond the practical limits of the framework, because they are only latent or implicit in current forms of political and social organisation, and so are not reflected in planning structures. They are discussed more as parameters for the construction and evaluation of future planning designs, and as indicators for research and field testing, than as specific and tangible guidelines.

Dimensions of Planning

In Chapter VI, a distinction was made between four dimensions of planning, which were characterised as follows:

(1) **Vertical** - answering organizational and structural needs, to correlate planning activities at various levels from the national down;

(2) **Horizontal** - developing mechanisms for co-ordination and integration, as between different agencies and organizational forms.

(3) **Cyclic and Iterative** - exploring the feedback principle in planning, and reducing linearity;
(4) **Open and Participatory** - exploring principles of open planning, decentralization, and periphery-centre movements.

The evolution of the framework design mostly assumed a twodimensional, pyramidal structure, based upon a centre-periphery relationship which is the general planning norm. In consequence, the discussion has been mainly of vertical and horizontal planning styles, and to a certain extent (in the revised version of the planning framework presented in Chapter VIII) of cyclic and iterative planning. Following a development tradition which is still rooted in centralist planning, it has proved impossible to evolve a framework which has deep-seated and integral elements of participatory planning; the framework was conceived with a deliberate emphasis on current planning modes, on the patterns of technical cooperation, and on the reality of decision-making.

However, this centralist planning norm is now being challenged in many societies, irrespective of ideology, even though the challenge is still theoretical rather than operational.

The overall problem to be resolved is how to create within the pyramid structure a genuine two-way or rather multi-way flow, moving policy formulation processes upwards as well as downwards (indeed originating with an upward movement).

This is not only a theoretical problem: it has important practical implications. Arguably, if it is not met, many of the principles which have been explored will have little real chance of being practised: goal sharing and the common perception of problems demand participation from the earliest stages of policy formation.
However, the problem does separate out into two relatively discrete stands: one more concerned with strategy and structure, the other with the tension between theory and implementation within the constraints of a social system. Of the four dimensions cited above, while all should benefit from the opening out of planning processes and the achievement of greater representation and participation, the first three are particularly concerned with mechanisms for co-ordination, integration, and the monitoring and evaluation of planning, while the fourth has more complex social and ideological ramifications.

This final chapter begins, therefore, by reviewing the more traditional problem areas of co-ordination and integration, in relation to the first three categories of vertical, horizontal and cyclic planning.

**Horizontal, Vertical, and Cyclic Planning**

Co-ordination difficulties arise from two causes: a lack of identification and value sharing among those involved, regarding the significance or priority of the overall task; and a lack of information and communication exchanged between them.

Both of these difficulties can recur throughout the entire system, extending from policy formulation through to implementation; both make different demands. Identification demands a common goal structure, a shared perception of priorities in the communication planning task. It can only come from a thorough and sustained interaction between parties. This need is at its most critical in the policy formulation stage, but if an analogue of the same understanding is not found at other levels of action, in turn the implementation stage will not succeed, because it will reflect the work of separate agencies, each working to differentiated
patterns and most probably in mutual competition.

Information and communication needs are less value-oriented; they demand a sufficient sharing of information to allow parts of the overall system to function both independently and in unison. This activity is more in keeping with older, traditional concepts of co-ordination, whereas identification needs are of a different order. If in communication planning for development we are envisaging a coherent system in which there is an organic and functional relationship between component parts, not a loose association, then we are in many cases talking of integration rather than co-ordination. Admittedly there is a fine line separating the two, and the term 'integration' can have an inhibiting effect upon institutions which are willing enough to connect their work through a common programme, but nonetheless prize their individual autonomy and identity. These provisos apart, the term 'integration' is still used here to distinguish those forms of co-ordination which demand subordination to common tasks, rather than a simple dialogue. Co-ordination, therefore, refers more to horizontal planning, and integration to vertical, since the former demands collaborative planning between agencies, while the latter implies a unity of theme and policy across a whole structure.

An evaluation by John Middleton on the Agency for Instructional Television (Middleton, 1979) suggested several principles underlying successful co-ordination, which amounted in summary to the following:

(i) that co-ordination is most successful when common goals, criteria, philosophies, patterns of needs determination, problem perceptions and corporately evaluated patterns of experience exist among the agencies involved;
(ii) that when it comes to the specifics of production, centralized control will lead to better products.

(iii) Ergo, that overall, a sensitive balance between participation and control in planning has to be struck.

The implication is that there are certain activities (e.g. production) which demand centralization of control, and that the acceptance of such centralized arrangements will be readier if other determinant processes (of policy formulation prior to production; or of evaluation, post-production) have been based upon fully participant formulae.

Although these principles were derived from a context of media production, they seem to have some relevance to overall communication planning for development (which is also a task and product-oriented process, even though its tasks and products are far more numerous and the agencies involved much more diffuse). Integration is most needed at the fundamental stages of policy and planning, while implementation depends upon co-ordinated arrangements between separate production agencies. In other words, the planning stages demand a pooling and synthesis of ideas, designed to lead to a coherent understanding of what the communication system is to achieve; implementation necessarily breaks down into separate but related groupings.

The resolution of both of these needs requires management and administrative frameworks, but of somewhat different kinds. The more traditional function of 'co-ordination' is normally served by committee and data exchange networks, though in practice even these do not always operate as regularly or effectively as might be wished. The deeper
sense of 'integration' assumes sustained, task-force structures, where goal sharing comes about through regular contact and shared experience; it assumes the kind of profile which should emerge from a communication planning team comprised of many different disciplines, or from a commission or working party at an inter-agency or inter-ministerial level. This structure is actually easier to visualize at senior policy levels, where agencies are fewer and appropriate membership simpler to identify. At lower levels (e.g. among supporting institutions) added difficulties may be caused by distance, an inability to perceive common loci of interest and pressures of operational work.

There is one derivative need which also has to be met and this we may term cohesion. The cohesive need is to forge links between the two concepts of integration and co-ordination. Put more directly, it means impressing the sense of an overall policy (and an overall plan) upon all parts of the system, so bringing together what might otherwise be seen as discrete exercises, particularly when the phase of implementation is reached. Communication planning, it has been argued, is a matter of reconciling the whole of a communication system with, on the one hand, its component (and individually active) parts and, on the other hand, the social system which it serves. It may also be argued that at the time of policy formulation this functional relationship will be naturally exposed. But it certainly cannot be assumed that this systemic perception will automatically be maintained throughout implementation, with its inevitable (and necessary) decentralization of energies.

It does seem, therefore, that throughout the communication planning process there should be some common strand of planning and executive responsibility which can penetrate the entire framework and devote itself to drawing together loose ends, as well as to promoting a consciousness of the overall design. This is a further reason why, in the earlier
discussion of structures, a professional communication planning unit was recommended, preferably set within a central economic planning agency. The same concept may also be extended to regional levels. At all levels, such a unit would patently be directly involved with the planning process itself, but it would have other responsibilities further down the line. It would act as a channel for feedback (of information and of opinion), from regional and local to upper levels and vice-versa. It would serve as a means of dissemination and promotion - of overall plans and priorities as these emerge, and of the rationale upon which they are based. It would seek to bring together catalytically institutions and agencies with relevant roles in the planning and implementation process. It would try to identify opposite numbers in these agencies (if they were not specifically assigned to co-ordination functions) and to build its work upon a personal net.

It is this kind of permanent presence which ensures cyclic planning. Within its own limits, the framework has already suggested that there is more to planning than the simple elimination of disorder: in proposing, for example, the means of reaching concrete objectives, or establishing a range of alternative choices to assist in the process of decision making.

But the complexity goes much further. In a sense, all decision-making is concerned with the management of uncertainty - uncertainty as to the planning environment, policy decisions, planning boundaries. Uncertainty is normally reduced by obtaining more information (through surveys, research etc.), through formulating objectives and policy guidelines, and through attempting to pinpoint and guide contingent and related areas of decision-making.

Such processes are not, unfortunately, tidy. Elements for strategic
choice are collected unpredictably, and within the framework which has been advanced, there are many cyclic processes at work: numerous exchanges within each of the activities identified, as new information is collected or assimilated or new alternatives, possibilities or combinations are raised. These exchanges are too informal, too ad hoc, to be 'planned' for in any meaningful way.

The essence of the cyclic planning process, therefore, is characterised by the concept of evaluation, already discussed extensively. While evaluation is necessary for every step of decision-making, it has been argued that there is a parallel need for evaluation of the planning framework as a whole, which will allow it to assess its performance and so modify its general orientation. It is only by such means that one can both plan for flexibility, and respond to flexible planning.

**Consensus**

A key concept in this rather abstract discussion is that a principal goal of planning should be the achievement of consensus among the various planning participants.

The distinctions between horizontal, vertical and cyclic planning forms were made to reduce misunderstanding and ambivalence. But they are finally part of a total planning system, which seeks, through interaction, monitoring and debate, to produce both plans which reflect the maximum degree of common agreement among planning participants and the widest possible acceptance of the resulting compromise. It is therefore important to define the planning base as broadly as possible, on the grounds that all those who are the subject of planning should also be involved in the planning process, and to establish mechanisms whereby
the results of planning can be constantly reviewed, to allow for revision and change.

As a goal this is admirable, though the means of achieving it are more complex, demanding a sensitive balance between agencies, involving the right planning participants at the right time in the right places. In this process, too much involvement of too many people acting in unfamiliar or inexpert roles can be as unproductive as too little.

Open and Participatory Planning

The area of debate can, in a simplified form, be represented diagrammatically, as in Figure 29. This diagram shows the levels at which planning decisions may be made, in contexts ranging from the international to the local. The vertical dimension is one of organisational connections; the horizontal axis is one of coordination and consultation. In both of these dimensions, principles of feedback, evaluation and of multi-way flow are to be stressed, with varying possibilities for participation in each context (these being indicated by the device of circularity). Not surprisingly, it is the discussion of circularity that moves on to the most precarious ground.

In the earlier analysis of communication projects and surveys (Chapters IV and V) the difficulty of realising goals of participation and user involvement has already been amply illustrated. Among the basic principles proposed as a guide to framework construction, two were particularly deficient in practice; they are reproduced below in Figure 30.

These two principles are clearly counterpointed: the establishment of need as a starting point for planning design can only be accomplished
FIGURE 29.
PARAMETERS OF PLANNING DECISIONS

VERTICAL PARAMETERS
Decisions
International
National
Sectoral
Spatial/Regional
Local

HORIZONTAL PARAMETERS

CIRCULAR PARAMETERS
Planning should seek to devolve and decentralise its forms, involving as many agents as possible, with particular emphasis on system users. Planning should be based on genuine need, established through a variety of needs assessment mechanisms.

FIGURE 30
USER INVOLVEMENT PRINCIPLES - STAGE ONE
through a proper consultation with, and involvement of, system users, and conversely, the involvement of users is not self-justifying, but seeks to evolve communication systems and structures which are genuinely reflective and supportive of individual needs.

This assumes a perception and a definition of communication planning which is far less directly associated with the deployment of economic or social resources, far more concentrated upon individual and group satisfaction. The two are not necessarily incompatible, but their correlation is difficult in that it demands an accommodation of individual and societal priorities and aspirations. This kind of perspective is currently defined in terms of participatory or 'open' planning, of which a definition has been attempted as follows:

"Open planning, in contrast to other forms of planning, is a process of decision-making on the rational and democratic allocation of a society's limited resources to reach certain objectives by establishing targets and plans, designed through the active consultation, participation and inter-action of the key actors in the planning process, i.e. the planning experts, the public at large, the people's representatives, and those critical sectors of the population directly affected by the plans. As such, open planning should be considered constantly open in at least three different senses:

a) open to the participation of the key actors or citizen-clients;

b) open to feedback from results, both material and ideological;
c) open to evaluation and revision.

If this definition is accepted, open planning would then be considered as a heuristic process for the achievement of consensus on society's goals, objectives, plans, programmes and projects within given time and resource constraints. It can be achieved within a variety of social and economic systems and through different communication means and channels, but its rational and democratic essence cannot be ignored. In studying the unity and variety of the open planning experiments taking place in different historical contexts, we may therefore focus on the interaction of the environment and processes of planning as well as on the level to which capacity, access and participation in communication have been reached in planning decisions."

(Tehranian, 1980 pp. 4-5)

The definition may appear somewhat cumbersome, but it separates out into two component parts: a general definition, and a series of qualifications, intended to help evaluation and the establishment of criteria.

The definition has much in common with recent definitions of the development process overall, which also lay stress on individual as well as national development. The emphasis is clearly expressed by Juan Diaz Bordenave, in the following passage:

"Development is the deliberate social process of transforming the production mode of society and its resulting institutions, through the conscious participation of the whole population in the effort of building a just, solidaristic and autonomous social structure in which conditions exist for all
its members to achieve their full realization as human persons." (Bordenave, 1978 p. 7)

The pressure to consider 'another development' is mounting; the 1981 General Assembly of the United Nations is committed to consider 'alternatives' to the development process, and an International Foundation for Development Alternatives has been established, headquartered in Switzerland. The search for a New World Economic Order has therefore moved towards the consideration of practical, not simply rhetorical platforms, and with recent debates in UNESCO (including the work of the MacBride Commission, and especially the proposal to create, within the framework of UNESCO, an International Programme for the Development of Communication) the debate upon the New International Information and Communication Order has entered a similar phase. But the position relative to communication is complicated, because of the considerable interpenetration of communication systems with technology, and the traditions of technology transfer. In the words of Denis Goulet:

"Is the technological universe ... blindly condemned to grow in present modes, or can technological maturity be reached within patterns of steady state? The question is whether qualitative improvement can replace quantitative growth as the driving force of the evolutionary dynamism of technology?"
(Goulet, 1977 p. 3)

In the context of communication, this situation raises problems at two separate levels. Reverting to Figure 30, this can be subdivided further into two hemispheres, as shown in Figure 31: one touching upon questions of philosophy and ideology, and the second those infrastructures and mechanisms which can help incorporate ideology.
Planning should be based on genuine need, established through a variety of needs assessment mechanisms.

Planning should seek to devolve and decentralize its forms, involving as many agents as possible, with particular emphasis on users.

User involvement principles - stage two

Ideological and Political System

Figure 31
The problem of considering such questions in the context of open planning is, of course, considerable. On the one hand, a perspective of communication need is being adopted which is no more than latent in the majority of, it not all, societies. The emphasis upon individual participation and gratification also leads to a potential conflict with national interest which is not easily resolved. Further, such tensions must be resolved in a different way in each society, depending upon a host of environmental, political and temporal factors. In the circumstances, therefore, there is little opportunity to do more than lay down parameters for the consideration of open planning in each particular environment.

A Taxonomy of Open Planning

At the same time, given the plurality of forms which may be considered under the general rubric of participation, the different ideological positions, political and social systems which give rise to these forms, and the various infrastructures which could be devised to assist in their realisation, it may be as well, at this point, to attempt a simple taxonomy. And in order to relate this taxonomy to the earlier argument, and to emphasise the primacy of relationships between its components, rather than a linear categorisation, it may also be useful to express it diagrammatically, by working from the same base as before (Figure 31), but by superimposing upon this figure a number of defining, qualifying, or expanding factors. This is begun in Figure 32.

Ideology and Political System

Initially, the parameter of ideology and socio-political philosophy is broken down into three components of economic organisation, political organisation and social development. The first two of these define
FIGURE 22

USER INVOLVEMENT PRINCIPLES - STAGE THREE

ECONOMIC ORGANISATION

POLITICAL ORGANISATION

SOCIAL ORGANISATION

USER INVOLVEMENT

NEEDS IDENTIFICATION

IDEOLOGY

INFRASTRUCTURE
dominant patterns of economic behaviour and of political structure; the third refers more to the level of social development (i.e. the movement from a traditional to a 'developed' society). The success of open planning as an organized activity depends on a number of environmental parameters which include the role of government vis-a-vis the market, the level of consciousness and organization of voluntary associations such as trade unions, political parties, professional groups, and the degree of community-wide participation on the discussion and resolution of issues of common interest.

Economic and political organisation can be discussed together, as they are closely associated, particularly in the role of government vis-a-vis the market in planning. The following simple distinction between market-oriented, government-oriented and mixed market and government orientation, is an attempt to distinguish between three different environments of planning prevalent in the world.

The market-oriented structures of planning are clearly more common in the so-called capitalist world. Here, a further distinction can be made between fully competitive markets (typical of the earlier stages of capitalism), oligopolistic markets and monopolistic markets. Each different structure clearly imposes its own constraints on open planning processes, but it is reasonable to generalize that such constraints increase as one moves from fully competitive to oligopolistic and monopolistic market situations.

By contrast, government-oriented structures of planning are more typical of, but not exclusive to, the socialist countries. Here, again, a further distinction can be made between styles of government planning by identifying three major types: comprehensive, indicative and interactive.
Comprehensive government planning encompasses all areas of social and economic life; indicative planning confines itself to setting the most important social and economic targets, but demands that autonomous public or private bodies observe them; interactive planning, by contrast, assigns a leading but not exclusive role to government in determining goals and targets. Generally speaking, it seems that prospects for open planning improve in the transition from comprehensive to indicative and interactive environments of planning.

The third category of planning environments, which are termed market and government-oriented, is typical of the less developed countries (LDCs). The traditional/modern dichotomy in the social and economic life of most LDCs clearly imposes severe limits upon the degree of market or government reach and penetration. Although most governments in LDCs use the rhetoric of planning, the fact remains that the defects of the market and the shortcomings of government bureaucracy make it virtually impossible to design or implement their social and economic plans effectively. Realistically speaking, therefore, planning activities in the LDCs may have to be considered in the context of their dualistic social and economic structures. The degree of dualism varies enormously from country to country, but the constraints and possibilities for open planning are profoundly related to differences in the traditional and modern sectors of social and economic life. Paradoxically, there are perhaps greater opportunities for open planning in the traditional sectors, where community ties are still viable and strong. The typical situation, however, reveals an imperfectly competitive market and ad hoc government interventions, often legitimized by planning and democratic rhetoric.

In turning to the third factor, of social development, a rather different focus emerges, as this is concerned first and foremost with the degree of social readiness for participation. In this respect, at
least three different states of readiness can be identified: pre-mobilized, mobilized and post-mobilized. The pre-mobilized populations, most often situated in the rural areas of traditional societies, are generally characterized by a conservative reluctance to participate. The strategy of open planning in such contexts would therefore have to concentrate primarily on consciousness raising. By contrast, mobilized populations often show an enthusiasm for participation which may lead to frustration. An appropriate strategy for open planning in such contexts might be to focus on constraints and the reconciliation of conflicting pressure group demands. The post-mobilized populations are typically those which have in broad terms attained their immediate social goals and are therefore reluctant participants in planning activities that might seem either too remote or too threatening to their current privileges.

The identification of these different social environments for planning admittedly depends more on intuitive judgement than on empirical analysis. However, it should not be too difficult to recognize three distinct socio-historical situations, which correspond roughly to the circumstances of pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial societies.

This being said, in a given context the same categories may apply far more to certain sectors of the population than to others. In other words, in any country, we may find sectors of population that are pre-mobilized, living side by side with those that are mobilized or post-mobilized. In the United States, for instance, the rural blacks in the South were largely pre-mobilized during the thirties, while the Northern industrial cities reflected a high level of mobilization. Since no society is fully integrated, the level of mobilization may vary enormously from social class to social class, or among ethnic or racial groups. Possibilities for mobilization also vary from issue to issue; some issues
are participation-prone, some tend to be national and some local or parochial in scope.

Infrastructure

Turning now to the bottom category (in Figure 32) of infrastructure, Figure 33 expands this category into three components which define different kinds of intervention: they have been labelled the level of intervention, the point of intervention, and the means of intervention, and they relate in particular to the earlier discussion of dimensions of planning.

The level of intervention is a parameter which has been explored on several occasions during this thesis; it refers to a range of institutional or social organisations which exist from local to national levels. These were expressed diagrammatically in Figures 18, 19 and 28.

The point of intervention has also been considered. The characteristic systems planning model includes five critical stages: need or problem identification; policy formulation; programme and project development; implementation; evaluation and revision. Participation can occur at any stage, in some form or other. However, openness at one level does not necessarily mean openness at others. Participation of certain actors may be more critical at certain levels than at others. For example, need or problem identification is, properly speaking, a community-wide concern. But policy formulation may concern only those directly affected by the decisions taken. Programme and project development should be achieved as a result of the interaction of planning experts and their citizen clients. Implementation is primarily the domain of the executive agencies. By contrast, evaluation and revision are both a community-wide activity and the duty of specially charged independent evaluators.
Figure 3.1.

User Involvement Principles - Stage Four

Level of Intervention

Point of Intervention

Infrastructure

Means of Intervention

User Involvement

Ideology and Political System

Needs Identification

Economic Organisation

Political Organisation

Social Organisation
Finally, the means of intervention is mostly a technical factor, although one which is heavily dependent upon the contextual constraints of economy, polity and social readiness. Intervention may be on a scale which begins with face-to-face community dialogue, passes through simple mediated forms (low cost technologies, small format media) and ends with newer, often still embryonic forms of technological participation, (e.g. combinations of computerised and cabled systems, which have the potential for individual response and interaction on a massive scale. In the main this technology exists, but its practical development is still at an experimental level. Nevertheless such systems as the cable system in Columbus, Ohio (QUBE, which gives some limited possibility for local opinion sampling) or the planned cable network for the Boston area (which would also include an interactive component) illustrate the possibility of technological solutions to the problem of soliciting individual opinion on a metropolitan scale.

Type and Objectives of Participation

This then is the framework in which participation may be broadly considered. But the taxonomy is still short of two critical parameters which define the core issues of user involvement and needs identification. In relation to the ideological apparatus, these are they type of participation which the user is being called upon (or desires) to provide, and the purposes and objectives of this participation. Both are included in Figure 34.

Such parameters are clearly at a different level from those considered above; they do not simply define a context in which participation takes place, or delimit supporting structures, but focus upon the rationale and character of participatory action.
Type of Participation

The first criterion in this final group, type of participation, defines the involvement of the user, and so conditions, to a considerable degree, the kind of strategy and infrastructure foreseen.

Here, three basic types of participation may be identified: cognitive, affective and operational. Cognitive participation, (i.e. the general awareness of issues and possible alternatives), does not automatically lead to (though it is a pre-condition for) effective participation. For reasons of their own, many aware people may decide not to participate in certain decision-making processes. By contrast, affective participation is often tied to strong community feelings and implies trust and confidence in group decision-making processes. It is, however, in operational participation that cognitive and affective types interact, hopefully leading to effective roles in the processes of identifying and resolving problems.

Different structures of decision-making often set different processes in motion. A market-oriented system is likely to be associated with management-centered decision making processes that emphasize corporate rationality and planning. A government-oriented system is often associated with the domination of a technocratic elite that focuses on 'social' efficiency and 'public' rationality at the cost of democratic participation. A mixed system, in so far as it is often open and vulnerable to political pressures, tends to rely primarily on the solidarity of a particular political elite.
Objectives of Participation

The most important grouping of the taxonomy has been left until last: the purposes and objectives of participation. These may be considered initially as threefold:

(1) To expand the physical and institutional capacity of a communication system;

(2) To integrate the competing interests and objectives of the community through participation, communication and consensus formation.

(3) To mobilize communication resources for the goals and objectives of development plans;

To Expand Communications Capacity

On the premise that communication planning is concerned principally with those aspects of social communication which are technologically mediated or institutionally arranged, any expansion in their capacity may be considered amenable to open planning efforts. However, it should be noted that certain technologies and institutional arrangements lend themselves better to these purposes than others. For example, the expansion of uni-directional technologies and bureaucracies of mass communication (broadcasting in particular) at the expense of interactive communication systems (telephone, local press, publishing, voluntary associations etc) may in fact limit rather than expand open planning possibilities.

In this context, therefore, it might be useful to make a further distinction between macro, micro and meso media. While the macro media
(satellites, large information processing systems, broadcasting, the national press) tend to address large and undifferentiated audiences, the micro media (voice and videotape cassettes, telephone, small copying and printing facilities, Citizen Bands, etc.) are most prone to private use. By contrast it is the meso media (community radio, community multimedia centers, rural or local press, wall posters and newspapers, and most traditional media of communication) that lend themselves best to forms of interactive communication. In the LDCs, community power is often overshadowed by the development of centralized state power and the private pursuits of citizens. As a result, community or meso media remain least developed. But the success of open planning efforts depends vitally on the creation of these missing linkages between national objectives and private pursuits.

To Integrate Competing Interests and Objectives

Since communication provides a major channel for the reconciliation of competing interests and objectives in the processes of development, a second function of the media in open planning is to recognize and integrate conflicting social forces. How far and effectively are existing technological and institutional capacities utilized in the processes of decision making on a society's goals, objectives, development strategy and programme selection? What, in other words, are those consultative and decision making organs that facilitate information exchange and communication in the planning process? These certainly include policy and planning organs in a number of spheres of decision making: the international or multinational sphere, the public sector, the private sector and community organizations, as well as connections between them. Legislative, executive and judiciary organs in the government sphere, all organized enterprises in the private sector, and a variety of voluntary associations.
and pressure groups (such as political parties, trade unions, media groups, university centres) are also worthy of note.

To Mobilize Communication Development Resources

Once discussion has run its course and decisions have been reached on development planning objectives, it is the role of communications to mobilize human and material resources to implement the plan. This obviously includes the mobilization of information and communication resources, but such resources are different in character from most others. While scarce, they can expand through active utilization. While subject to imbalance, they are widely distributed throughout society in informal channels and social networks. While quickly obsolescent, they can be regenerated and recycled through constant use.

A rational mobilization strategy might therefore be expected to focus on unity of purpose through plurality of expression, although the actual course of historical development does not always reflect this strategy.

Some Tentative Examples

It is not possible here to explore each of these factors, or permutations of factors, in relation to a whole canvas of social organisation: that is a major task for the future. However, in a sense the very exercise of developing a crude set of classifications has begun that task, because the identification of its component parts has normally to be achieved by relating each to a characteristic milieu. It is clear, for example, that in the main, in industrial, capitalistic societies where there is a broad base of ideological acceptance, the pressure to increase participation is mostly expansionist or integrative: the type of participation
sought is both cognitive and operational. In socialist societies, participation is commonly assumed to be intrinsic to the social fabric; its purposes are therefore considered expansionist, and the mode cognitive. In developing countries, on the other hand, the objective of participation is primarily seen as mobilising, and the main thrust of involvement is affective.

The critical element in the taxonomy is, however, that of establishing objectives: while the first level of Figure 34 establishes the economic, political and social character of the social unit under review, and the bottom level designates appropriate infrastructures and points of intervention, it is the purpose of participatory communication which is finally of the greatest interest, and which defines the function of open planning. It is on this issue that the next section of this chapter concentrates, by considering characteristic examples of participation, and distinguishing between expansionist, integrative, and mobilising forms.

**Expansion of Communication Systems**

The most common examples of the expansionist objective are associated with the development of telecommunications, and among these the best known example comes from Australia.

The Australian Telecommunications Commission published in 1975 a report entitled TELECOM 2000, which was subtitled 'an exploration of the long-term development of telecommunications in Australia'. A tentative, long-range plan, put forward for discussion, it explored in some depth participatory formulae.

Various models have been proposed for open planning by a public
utility, since without community participation, the utility interacts with the community solely at a public relations level. This characterizes the way in which public utilities have traditionally operated, but in a changing social climate this stance is becoming less tenable. The Australian report put forward concrete alternatives.

"The first level of participation requires that the utility communicates interactively with the public, disseminating information about its activities, presenting alternative solutions to current problems, offering choice about future directions and actively seeking responses. This approach would include structured discussions with community groups having a special interest in communications, sampling of community opinion through interviews and surveys, sometimes extended by the appointment of consumer advisory committees or nominating consumer or union representatives on the board of directors of the utility. Although decision-making remains with the utility, it is at least enhanced by a greater awareness of, and sensitivity to, external perspectives and needs. The process can be represented by the model in Figure 35.

The next level of participation could be the establishment of an (ideally) independent decision-making body, knowledgeable in the public utility field, which would weigh arguments from both the utility and the public, balancing the financial and other interests of the utility against the social and environmental values of the community. In the absence of such a body, and where there is intense conflict, the courts are sometimes called on to adjudicate, or a commission may be created by
FIGURE 35
BASIC CONSULTATION MODEL (TELECOM 2000)

FIGURE 36
INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKER MODEL (TELECOM 2000)

FIGURE 37
COMMUNITY GROUP MODEL (TELECOM 2000)
a government to hear evidence and rule or recommend on a specific issue.

In some countries, permanent telecommunication tribunals or commissions have been established. Experience shows that safeguards are needed to prevent such bodies becoming bureaucratic, extending their power base, or being unduly conservative. Also, permanent tribunals have traditionally been primarily concerned with government regulation, adjudicating on the competing interests of big power blocs, rather than with the direct interests of the community or users. It is interesting that recent court-mandated changes in the US Federal Communications Commissions' procedures actively encourage citizen participation in communication issues, and may be ushering in a new role for that Commission.

The independent decision-maker model is represented in Figure 36.

Whilst this arrangement ostensibly gives the community equality of advocacy, in practice the community usually lacks the technical, organizational and financial resources to mount an equally powerful case. Another criticism is that the creation of a third-party adjudicator immediately casts the utilist and the community into conflict roles, rather than establishing conditions where each seeks the other as mutually supportive and both try to work towards an acceptable solution.

Many variants are possible in seeking to improve on this
model. In one variant, initiatives or recommendations are made by the community group itself. This puts pressure on the utility to interact strongly with the community in the development and evaluation of alternatives since the utility may not submit recommendations to the decision-maker, only technical information. This arrangement is represented in Figure 37.

Both models (Figures 36 and 37) imply that there are issues that cannot be resolved mutually. However, many decisions could be made through the creation of ad hoc local groups having representation from both the utility and the local or regional community, with recourse to the independent tribunal only as a last resort. The initiative to set up local machinery for co-operative decision-making rests largely with the utility, since public action is usually only mobilized in opposition to a decision already taken.

The ability to anticipate issues of public sensitivity and concern requires a heightened social awareness on the part of the utility, whilst the need to examine what might be seen as purely technical issues from an entirely different standpoint, requires the generation of a multi-disciplinary approach within the utility planning organization. Working within a mixed team of engineers, economists and social scientists is a challenging and frequently difficult assignment, but rewarding for all members in opening up new perspectives on common problems. Fostering of this approach would seem to be a fundamental pre-requisite to successful
mutualist planning with community groups.

For telecommunication issues of national significance, and particularly where the utility is government-owned - and, therefore, may also be an instrument for implementing national economic and social policy - it would not be appropriate for an independent tribunal to be the final decision-maker. Involvement of government in this way would only be necessary for major issues requiring new or changed legislation or, if within the ambit of existing legislation, where the subject would nevertheless be considered of sufficient importance to justify parliamentary debate.

In principle, government should be society's ideal representative body for resolving national issues. But government needs to be properly informed before embarking on courses of action with potentially far-reaching social and economic consequences (and that could only be reversed at substantial national cost). Here the independent tribunal could perform an intermediary role where submissions from all interested sectors could be studied, a thorough examination of alternatives made and recommendations framed for government approval. This arrangement is indicated in Figure 38.

(Australia Telecommunications Commission, 1975, pp. 150-152)

The models put forward by TELECOM 2000 were not advanced purely theoretically: practical constraints and problems were also acknowledged. One of these is the difficulty of defining a 'community' in the context of open planning; telecommunications systems cut across communities and boundary problems arise. Some aspects of telecommunications systems
FIGURE 3B
INDEPENDENT TRIBUNAL MODEL
(Telecom 2000)
planning can be taken out of centralised control (e.g. local cable television and distribution systems): others (e.g. telephone services) can only be partially devolved, being dependent on national networks for their support.

There are also problems of local decision-making: achieving consensus across the varied opinions of minority groups. Here the local political machinery has probably to be involved, rather than a separate mechanism for decision-making on telecommunications matters. There are conflicts when options are chosen which are not 'least cost'; who is to pay the difference in price: the utility, or the local community? And not least, there are problems to be faced by the utility itself. Open planning is bound to be expensive in resources, but has no immediate economic spin-off; even more difficult is the adjustment which the utility has to make to the culture of open planning, which is a considerable challenge to traditional patterns of management.

However, after the publication of the original TELECOM 2000 report, the National Telecommunications Planning Branch of the Australian Telecommunications Commission solicited comments from many sectors of Australian society, and published a digest of reactions in July 1978. They found widespread support for the concept of open planning among all segments of the community, including businessmen, government, academics, the media and people within the utility, although some opposition also came from entrenched groups of managers and technologists. Their summary of reactions was categorised under five headings: community consensus; social effects; open planning as part of the planning process; the relationship between open planning and specific problems affecting telecommunications; and the capacity of the utility to absorb open planning. They concluded:
"COMMUNITY CONSENSUS. The notion that all control over decision making should be given to the community presupposes the possibility of developing a single community view. This would be an uncommon event, and, if it did happen, an authority like Telecom Australia could only ignore the community view at its peril. In most planning problems competing and conflicting interests are at stake - a compromise may be possible but consensus is usually not. A programme of public participation that is designed without taking into account the wide differences among interest groups will surely fail - through attempting to obtain agreement where none is possible.

The responses we have received reveal important groups affected by Telecom's policies with quite different interests, value perspectives and views of the future. Should Telecom and the economy be predicated on economic growth? Competition or monopoly? Rapid technological development or cautious social evaluation of new technologies? These are just a few of the issues on which people are seriously divided. Telecom cannot act purely on the community consensus because there is not one. On the other hand it should not act independently of community viewpoints either.

THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS. Only relatively recently has there been widespread concern at the social effect of telecommunications. The concern has arisen in parallel with mounting questioning of technological development in other areas and in response to a perceived dramatic development in telecommunications known in the popular jargon as the 'wired city'. The wired city embraces visions of
videophones, interactive cable television, and push-button information services in the home. In this climate, increased social responsiveness in a hitherto principally technological area was seen as essential. Open planning was viewed as one way of understanding the needs of those affected by Telecom's policies. Our support for the principle of open planning remains unabated by our increased understanding of the pitfalls of open planning.

OPEN PLANNING AS PART OF THE PLANNING PROCESS. It will be clear by now that we see open planning as part of the planning process rather than a substitute for it. Open planning is seen as providing a framework for understanding the diverse needs of the Australian society - in some cases helping to resolve conflict. For people affected by Telecom's policies it promises greater access to information and an acknowledged receptivity to the needs of consumer groups. In many cases great effort will be required of Telecom to consult those affected - not only through reports like TELECOM 2000 aimed at opinion leaders, but through more active research methods and group meetings.

PARTICIPATION DEPENDS ON THE PROBLEM. As we discussed in TELECOM 2000 the type of open planning programme depends vitally on the problem being examined. People's capacity to participate and their interest in telecommunications planning is resolved to a great extent by the type of problem being examined. For example, the siting of exchange facilities, public telephones or television masts is of interest principally to those within close proximity. Their interest will tend to lie not in the
technical aspects of each possibility but in the effect on their life, e.g. aesthetic or altered TV reception. The choice of who should participate is not difficult in theory at least: anyone with a demonstrated stake in the planning problem or its outcome. The difficulty lies in deciding whose interests should prevail.

TELECOM'S CAPACITY FOR OPEN PLANNING - A USERS COUNCIL?
Many respondents doubted Telecom's capacity to implement open planning in view of its bureaucratic structure and technological emphasis. We voiced similar fears in TELECOM 2000. Some steps have been taken in establishing district management units and in increasing the marketing emphasis of the Customer Services Section of Telecom: both steps being aimed at improving responsiveness to consumer needs. Open planning has received support from the Commission, but the details of implementation have still to be worked out. The cynicism that people expressed about NTP's motives for proposing open planning, though understandable, was misplaced. However, many of the problems in implementing open planning remain and require priority and experience in participation to solve.

Discussion on the need for a users' council was inconclusive. There was considerable doubt by academics, businesses and government about the effectiveness of a users' council; though there was some support for the concept among academics. We feel that the creation of a tame users' council remote from the technical aspects of decisions would be undesirable. On the other hand we believe that social factors currently receive
lower emphasis than technical ones, and a strong users' council might be one effective way of bolstering expertise in that area". (Australian Telecommunications Commission, 1978 pp. 36-44)

Integration of Policies and Objectives

Since the above comments were published, the Australian Commissioners have approved most of the recommendations of TELECOM 2000, including those on open planning, though implementation will take a long time - one respondent suggested 15 years as being realistic, in view of the fact that changes of attitude as well as process are involved. Nevertheless, a start has been made, and the Australian experience can be considered at least partially successful in arousing public interest in the communication sector.

However, it was still dealing with relatively uncontroversial aspects of participatory planning: the expansion of technical services. While the report recognised many potential areas of conflict between different sections of the population (in particular, conflict between local and national users), it was still looking for consensus at a relatively parochial level. There is little fundamental conflict between different audiences as to the desirability of some kind of infrastructural expansion, only as to its form. The objective of integration is more complex, because it is seeking consultation, and ultimately consensus, among potential users of a wider range of communication infrastructures and services, in a framework which includes ideological attitudes towards the use of communication channels as well as technical means. The end product, which the consultation process is meant to illuminate, is less well defined, and the emphasis is more on appropriate mechanisms for
consultation and social regulation. Thus the approach frequently encountered is at a relatively traditional level: it simply contemplates extending the nucleus of policy formulation in the communication sector to include a variety of user groups in a quasi-committee structure. It is in essence an extension of the earlier discussion on co-ordination problems, and it has been expressed most concretely in the idea of Communication Policy Councils. The theme is explored in a recent UNESCO publication:

"What needs to be regarded as essential, then, is the building of policy formulation structures and mechanisms which are interconnected, interrelated and work in such a fashion that the policies as a whole allow for specific parts of the communication system to operate freely, responsibly and effectively without either coming in conflict with other parts or with the overall philosophy or ideology. In fact, safeguards may have to be built at various levels — individual, community, institutional (especially media), national, regional and international. For these and other reasons, it is suggested that every country should aim at setting up a national communication policy council....

It is important to remember that the exact nature and composition of any such communication policy council, and even the nomenclature for such a co-ordinating body, would differ in detail from country to country, depending upon the specific set of circumstances in which a country's communication system finds itself, including the aims and goals which that country's own philosophies and policies may dictate. There would perhaps be general agreement,
however, that the wider the representation of the various components of the communication system, the greater the chances are of the conclusions and plans of such a coordinating body, or bodies, being accepted and acted upon. It is for this reason that, beside organizations directly involved with professional communication and information activities, there should be also representatives of political and social organizations, financial institutions, legal and civil groups, media receivers, general public, etc." (UNESCO, 1979a pp. 27-8)

One of the few specific experiences quoted in the same study was in Finland, where in 1972 an exploratory Committee for Communication Policy was established. Seventeen members were appointed by the Government (on a part-time basis), comprising communication research and journalism interests, mass media industries, telecommunications and technology concerns and the law. The committee was active between 1972-74 and produced five separate reports, mainly covering the structure and economy of the Finnish media. Kaarle NORDENSTRENG, writing on the experiment in the same UNESCO monograph, concluded:

"The experience of the Finnish Committee suggests that the main role and function of such a body probably lies in its potential to feed the decision-makers and the general public with factual and solid information about relevant aspects of communication policies. In other words, it might be understood as a body for research and documentation rather than for making final policy proposals. The latter depend essentially on more general socio-economic-political developments, such as the "energy crisis" and difficulties in
State economy experiences after the setting-up of the Committee. It seems to be ill-founded to count on a coherent and logical promotion of communication policies regardless of the rest of the social arena.

The early 1970s were evidently in Finnish society an exceptionally favourable period for the communication field to gather political "momentum", but it would be both naive and frustrating to believe that this situation will continue unchanged. Even if it would seem advisable from an expert's point of view to develop and implement a 'grand design' for national communication policies, it certainly is a more realistic approach to let the political balance of forces determine when and what kind of policies should be implemented.

Whenever there is potential for a significant political move, it might be advisable to set up on an ad hoc basis another Committee composed of politicians to concentrate on the political clearance of the policy measures in question. But in any cases it is beneficial to have the basic facts and alternatives mapped out either by a specialized body like the Finnish Committee or by some other arrangement producing the necessary studies and documentation, e.g. through academic and other research institutions." (Ibid, p. 24)

Nordenstreng's conclusions are of interest, because they lay stress on the development of infrastructures for consultation, which can interpret, in an ad hoc way, situations as they arise and advise political and decision-making bodies on reaction rather than evolve overall policy designs. This
approach is at the same time similar to, and distinct from, the assumptions and conclusions of the planning framework which was evolved to fit developing country contexts. The framework's emphasis on flexibility, on sensitive mechanisms for consultations and coordination and on the need to respond pragmatically to changing situations is identical; so is the emphasis which it places upon interweaving planning and decision-making bodies and platforms. But in the developing world, it has been argued that the idea of general and comprehensive communication planning is more conceivable. Both the examples considered so far have been drawn from industrialised countries and this is hardly surprising; a drive towards expansion of services is most likely to be encountered in societies where there is already a considerable infrastructure for communication. Similarly pressures for enlarged public consultation are also most likely to be vocalised in advanced, industrial societies.

**Mobilisation**

In the developing world, the overt pressure is more likely to be towards mobilisation, interpreted generally as increased commitment by a population towards development goals. These may be said to have evolved as part of a process of social consultation, but they are much more likely to reflect consensus among sectoral planners, led by development economists. Their intention, in involving communication channels, is primarily to enlist these in support of the development programme.

There are many examples extant of plans to harness communication media and channels in this way, (e.g. 'plans drawn up in Guyana, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Iran, Papua and New Guinea, in many cases by UNDP-supported agencies, under the general rubric of 'development support communication'.) They range from fairly simple, generalised statements,
to rather sophisticated coordination programmes. There are fewer examples of evaluated programmes (and indeed evaluation is difficult, as communication variables cannot easily be separated from other developmental factors). Perhaps the greatest range of examples lies in the field of population communication, reflecting an international financing bias.

As an illustration, however, a plan conceived at a local level may be most informative, because it dealt with the problem of 'bottom-up' or participatory planning in the sense of popular motivation.

A study prepared for UNESCO, based on a Philippines municipality (Rosario-Braid and Mariano, 1979), set out to suggest a detailed process whereby planners' perceptions of problems and needs could be matched with popular demand. A case study of the role of communication in the development of an integrated five-year development plan, it set municipal planning in the context of the National Development Plan.

The study was based on Tuguegarao, a municipality at the south central tip of Cagayan Province, largely devoted to agriculture. With a population of just over 65,000, most of them unskilled farm workers, it was made up of 34 barangays (the smallest political unit in the Philippines). Initially, the authors reviewed the general development planning process.

"Tuguegarao's Development Plan was the result of the joint efforts of various government agencies. The Municipal Development Staff (MDS) under the Office of the Mayor collected the primary data on land use and secondary socio-economic data which served as the socio-economic profile (SEP) of the municipality. These were obtained from the
various local offices such as the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAECON) and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). Space requirements were made on the basis of Planning Standards provided by the Human Settlements Commission (HSC). The SEP and the plan were divided into major sectors. Sectoral plans, programmes, and projects were identified, prioritized, and incorporated with financial requirements.

The data gathered were collaged with the help of the Municipal Engineer's Office. The MDS prepared the entire plan by sectors after which it was submitted to the Mayor. Based on guidelines issued by the National Co-ordinating Committee (NCC), the Mayor and the Municipal Planning and Development Board (MPDB) members commented on the plan and forwarded it to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Regional Office for further comments. The latter convened the Regional Technical Review Committee composed of all the regional directors to comment on the plan. The plan was subsequently revised and returned to the MDS after which the Mayor convened the MPDB to a meeting prior to its submission to a public hearing and eventual approval by the Community Council, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) ....

The public hearing conducted at the session hall of the municipal building was held for a day with representatives from various government agencies, the media, barangay captains, employees and the local residents in attendance. Members of the MDS, the MPDB and the SB
took turns in presenting the sectoral plans. In motivating the people to participate in the public hearings, letters of invitation were sent to the different sectoral representatives and announcements were made through the local radio stations. It is during this stage when the people were provided the opportunity to react to the plan or to suggest alternative plans. After the public hearing, the SB members incorporated all the suggestions made and returned the plan to the MDS which submitted it to the NEDA Central Office for examination and approval. This whole process is summarized in the following diagram (Figure 39 )." (Rosario-Braid and Mariano, 1979 pp. 6-12)

This account is of a relatively traditional approach to integrated development planning, but the study was specifically interested in communication processes. Communication needs, in this context, were seen to be of three kinds. Firstly, there was a basic need for information and data collection and transmission. Secondly, there was internal, inter-agency and inter-institutional communication, on which organizational capacity is based. Thirdly, there was communication support, embracing mass as well as interpersonal media.

In Tuguegarao, the range of communication facilities was generally good: it had been chosen as a regional growth centre partly because these facilities were more developed than in other municipalities. It had an active regional public information office, a news centre, two local newspapers, three local radio stations, and a lively community life.

Given this pattern of planning and the available range of communication media and channels, the study came up with a plan, half analytical,
half prescriptive, for communication support to the development planning process, again with some use of flow charts.

"Communication should support the various phases of integrated development planning. We have identified at least five major planning phases with their respective specific activities and the communication support needs through a flowchart (Figure 40). The two activities on the left margin of the flowchart are called "pre-planning" because they refer to preliminary activities which have to be done prior to the actual planning.

The planning process assumes that the MDS coordinates all the activities and that sectoral chairmen and working committees teams have been organized to oversee and develop each sectoral plan. As will be noted, the communication supports to each of the major activities mentioned are also indicated ......

**Bottom-Up Planning**

The analysis of the planning process shows the need for barrio-level interactive mechanisms. This would ensure that interaction among the people, local leaders, and extension workers is encouraged. One such mechanism is by making available such physical settings like the barangay halls or ACDO offices and enlisting the help of local facilitators who would catalyse the articulation of people's needs and aspirations. Barangay captains and the ACDOs may serve the function of crystallizing people's opinions, so that these are communicated to higher level planners.
and concerned authorities.

The following flowchart (Figure 41) describes how planning at the barangay level could take place with the active participation of the people and the help of barangay, SN officials, and the ACDOs. We have emphasized the need to mobilize the ACDOs and SN officials in helping the people to articulate their needs which could be done through regular meetings. Likewise, for small-time projects which automatically get implemented, the people are immediately informed through radio, the print media, barangay and SN officials and the ACDOs, so that they would know that their problems/needs are being attended to..

Finally, communication should be able to motivate the people so that their priority needs may be reflected in projects which are submitted to the planning body. Here, public officials and the mass media could play a significant role". (Ibid, pp. 35-37)

In this example, one of the pitfalls of discussions of participation is evident: differences in the understanding of the concepts as between the industrialised and the developing world. There is some danger in the use of such terms as 'participation', 'access' and 'democratisation', without setting them in a societal context. 'Participation' in the developing world may imply the involvement of local people in support of an agreed development programme, but include only nominally the right to dissent from its premises and priorities. This does not square with the usual Western understanding, but it cannot be rejected out of hand, simply
FIGURE 41  BOTTOM-UP PLANNING MODEL (PHILIPPINES)

1. Barangay council mobilizes people to participate in planning.

2. People compile and discuss their problems/needs and submit to barangay captains.

3. MDS and its officials meet to help people compile themes.

4. Barangay captains study problems/needs; categorize and group by sector, urgency, cost, translate into projects.

5. Problems urgent, but could not be undertaken by barangays? Yes:

- Barangay captains assign other barangay officials to make necessary arrangements/prepare project estimates and inform people about action being done.

- Barangay captains endorse list of problems requiring municipality and regional government decision and larger financial outlay.

- MDS incorporates people's problems in each sectoral plan.

- MDS holds public hearings to finalize the sectoral plans with sectoral representatives and people in attendance.

- MDS incorporates comments/suggestions; submits plan to NEDA Regional Office for review.

- MDS Regional Office comments on plan; convenes RTAC for final comment.

- RTAC examines the plan, returns to MDS for revision.

- MDS revises the plan and submits it to NEDA Central Office for approval.

- NEDA Central Office approves/ modiﬁes plan; returns to MDS for implementation.

- MDS assigns regionals ofﬁces/sector concerned to implement projects.

- Sector/agency concerned implements projects.

NOTE: Indicates communication support.

Legend:
- MDS: Municipal Development Services Office
- NEDA: National Economic and Development Authority
- RTAC: Regional Technical Advisory Committee
because it reflects a different set of cultural and social values.

**Ideological Challenge and Political Change**

However, it may be argued with some justification that the taxonomy, and the examples which have been put forward, largely ignore what is often regarded as a cornerstone of participatory or open planning: its function within processes which challenge political ideologies, forms of political organisation and social mores and norms. In the context of communication, this may imply two kinds of challenge: of the organisation and conduct of communication systems, and of society as a whole.

Figure 34 included, at the top of the diagram, an item labelled 'ideology and philosophy', but in distinguishing between different forms of participation in planning, this concept needs to be explored much more fully. The earlier discussion considered aspects of change over time, but mostly in the context of interaction between users and planners/producers/policy makers etc, working through a complex set of mechanisms for consultation, which would allow for both a more adequate definition of need and for the resolution of different kinds of need - in particular individual as compared with institutional or societal. It tended to assume that the overall form and character of this ideology are broadly accepted by the members of a society, and that objectives are principally focused on improving the base and manner of participation. In fact, many, if not the majority, of the experimental forms of communication access and participation have derived from a challenge to the status quo.

Not surprisingly, this is also a distinguishing feature of much communication research. The original approaches to communication and development also took as their starting point a conservative platform.
on the relationship between the media and social change, as evidenced in the work of Lerner (1958), Schramm (1964) and Rogers (1962). For example, in Schramm's terms:

"Free and adequate information is not only a goal, it is also a means of bringing about social change. Without adequate and effective communication, economic and social development will inevitably be retarded, and may be counter-productive". (Schramm, 1964 p. ix)

Implicit in this kind of statement was an acceptance of the goals and value systems of Western, especially American society, and a conviction (also implicit) that the final goals of developing societies would inevitably correspond. This 'dominant paradigm' was somewhat modified over the years, as some of its components were challenged and discarded - for example, as the essentially one-way flow model of communication was rejected. The intricacy of diffusion processes was stressed by Rogers, (1971) and the idea of reciprocal communication was embodied in 'convergence' models of communication, which stressed feedback and dialogue. But still the assumption was of technology as an exogenous factor. Golding concluded of such models:

"(They are) both ahistorical and ethnocentric, they extrapolate findings about the media in advanced societies to circumstances elsewhere which they perceive as mere embryonic microcosms of western capitalism". (Golding, 1974a p. 63)

Partly this was attributable to the early stage of development of communication research. Marxist traditions of criticism were, for
example, equally crude and reductionist.

"Whatever else the immense output of the mass media is intended to achieve, it is also intended to help prevent the development of class consciousness in the working class ... the fact remains that 'the class which has the means of material production at its disposal' does have control at the same time of the means of mental production; and that it does seek to use them for the weakening of opposition to the established order." (Milliband, 1977 p. 50)

But gradually, in all research traditions, the importance of context, especially the social and economic environment of communication industries, was increasingly emphasised. Halloran, for example, argued that an adequate sociological analysis of the structures and operations of mass communications involved placing them in a 'total social context', by tracing their connections with social institutions at all levels, from family to economy (Halloran 1974). Raymond Williams described the field as the study of interactions between the spheres of culture, polity and economy (Williams 1974). Stuart Hall treated media products as messages in code, symbolising and expressing relationships between media organisations and political and social institutions and processes, consequently making statements about the nature of society (Hall 1973a). Dallas Smythe underlined the relationship of media products to the objectives of monopoly capitalism, regarding them as a kind of inducement to recruit and maintain the attention of loyal members of the audience (Smythe, 1977). The position was summarised by Golding and Murdock when they argued for a consolidated approach to communication research which took full account of social context, ideological position and economic organisation and dynamic.
"Our central argument ... is that sociologists interested in contemporary mass communications need to pay careful and detailed attention to the ways in which the economic organisation and dynamics of mass media production determine the range and nature of the resulting output. In proposing this we are not arguing that economic forces are the only factors shaping cultural production, or that they are always and everywhere the most significant. We do not deny the importance of the controls and constraints imposed by the state and the political sphere, or the significance of the inertia exerted by dominant cultural codes and traditions. Nor do we deny the 'relative autonomy' of production personnel and the pertinent effects of professional ideologies and practices. Nevertheless for us the crucial term in this couplet is 'relative'. In our view any sociological analysis of the ways in which the mass media operate as ideological agencies which fails to pay serious attention to the economic determinants framing production is bound to be partial."

(Golding and Murdock, 1979 p. 198)

In all of these later research positions (although they are considerably differentiated in matters of emphasis) there is a critical common thread. While some of the researchers have been personally committed to a particular ideology, usually socialist, all of them believe that communication research must be located within, and interpreted through, an adequate and questioning analysis of the social and economic conditions in which communication messages and products are framed.
Access and Participation

In the following section, therefore, of the three objectives of expansion, integration and mobilisation, only the latter two will be considered, and these from a rather different perspective: that of the debate on access and participation to communications media. The inspiring principle of this debate is the concept of 'democratisation', whose origins are perhaps best expressed in the model of 'conscientisation' of the people, as articulated by Paolo Freire (1972).

A special difficulty arises from the rather paradoxical nature of the access debate. As Frances Berrigan put it, in a book written for UNESCO a few years ago:

"Its advocates share a common mood and tone, at once romantic, radical and missionary. They see the individual as trapped within social forms and the media as a passport to freedom. They express themselves characteristically in image and metaphor. Yet in reality, access is a matter of operation as well as ideology. It involves practitioners, technicians, entrepreneurs, as well as thinkers and social reformers.

This is not to say that the romance and radicalism are unimportant; they are not only the one common link between many different experimenters and experimental forms, but also a motive force behind what is being done. Consequently (research) which goes beyond the philosophy of access into practical detail and analysis has both to understand and resolve this paradox, if it is to be more than yet another
contribution to a debate between interested parties."

(Berrigan, 1977 p. 15)

This tension between thinker and practitioner has had a marked impact on the development of participatory media. While the thinker articulated ideals and aspirations, the practitioner looked for operational forms. And because he was unable to penetrate traditional mass media channels, he sought alternative formats in low-cost, small-format technologies: community video, local radio, local cable television systems and so on. Since the inspiration for participatory media was one of social reform, not surprisingly they were first developed in the industrialised world. The manner of their development substantially affected their adaptation to developing countries, so much so that it will be as well to begin by briefly reviewing their historical development.

The Growth of Community Media

In the west, the forms of community media now extend from local to quasi-national levels, and include both radio and television. National systems have moved well beyond the simple 'phone-in' programme, to experiments such as that in Denmark, where the national radio organisation set up a "Radio Workshop" with its own production and editing facilities, designed for access to the public (both in using the technical facilities, and in air time on the second network). The BBC offers air time on television to minority groups and the assistance of technical staff and producers who are there only to give technical assistance in realising the groups' objectives, not as editors or censors. Another television series in Finland presents the opinion of minority groups in the form of a debate in the presence of the host community. But the trend has gone furthest at the local community level, in the proliferation of video groups, usually
expressing political or social convictions. Sometimes these groups replay their programmes through a local cable network; sometimes they use them as resource material in public meetings or community events, or as the nucleus of a local library.

However, some of the experiences of the West also laid the foundations for an adaptation of the same principles to the developing world. The Canadian "Challenge for Change" programme undertook what is probably its best known work in Fogo Island, off the coast of Newfoundland, husbanded by the Extension Department of the Memorial University. Its main thrust was to use the media to reflect communities to themselves, as a kind of public introspection out of which new insights and community building forces might emerge, and in the course of this work far more became known of the role of the group 'Animator', as neutral observer and stimulus rather than active participant. The first period of Fogo was conducted on film, but after 1971, the advantage of videotape production (cheaper, and with instant replay) was proven, and film was reserved only for items which were to be preserved as records, or shown to wider audiences. The techniques evolved in this long experience have since been spread, not only through North America, but to programmes in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Validation in the Developing World

The problems involved in this transfer were considerable, because of basic differences between conditions in the industrialised countries and less developed countries. In most Western industrialised countries, community development projects concentrate on those sections of the community which are 'out of step' with the rate or level of development which the majority have achieved. But in most developing countries deprivation
is on a much larger scale. It is often rooted in traditions which have yet to be challenged, and the implications of redistribution of the benefits of development are that there is likely to be a reduction in economic and social position for those currently in power in favour of the disadvantaged majority.

Partly because of this implication, the position of developing world Governments towards practical examples of participatory projects in the communication field has been more marked in public statements than in tangible experiments.

There is no doubt that by now, the doctrines of access and participation are part of the litany of development, in such forms as UNESCO. The 'official' position is well summed up by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, which was set up by UNESCO, presided over by Sean MacBride and completed its report in 1980. The final recommendations of the Commission include the following passage:

"Implementation of national policies should be carried out through three complementary communication patterns: first, from decision-makers towards different social sectors to transmit information about what they regard as necessary changes in development actions, alternative strategies and the varying consequences of the different alternatives; second, among and between diverse social sectors in a horizontal information network to express and exchange views on their different demands, aspirations, objective needs and subjective motivations; third, between decision-makers and all social groups through permanent participatory mechanisms for two-way information flows to elaborate development goals and priorities and make decisions..."
on utilisation of resources. Each one of these patterns requires the design of specific information programmes, using different communications means." (UNESCO, 1979 pp. 448-9)

But in practice, in spite of international conferences on communication access such as a UNESCO meeting in Belgrade in 1977, most of the projects and experiments which have been undertaken so far have been on a very limited scale. To some observers, there is something of the contrived in this situation: for example, Juan Diaz Bordenave writes:

"Thus we see readily available international financing for projects related to Intermediate Technology, Appropriate Technology, Participatory Communication Systems, etc. But one can also easily observe that most of these new technologies and projects are not used to facilitate the conscientization of the people on their oppressive structural situation and on their potential for political struggle for liberation. To achieve pragmatic goals of better agriculture, better health and better formal and non-formal education, yes. Conscientization, Politization, Political Action, No! On the contrary, those reformist projects in general occur at the same time that police repression increases, as in the case of El Salvador at this precise moment." (Bordenave, 1980 p. 18)

What Bordenave is suggesting is a kind of 'pseudo participation': the adoption of formats originally devised to allow for community expression and challenge, and their deliberate harnessing to the propagation of a single development message. The attempt is therefore to engage public participation in a predetermined formula, rather than to encourage original and vigorous debate. Not all developing country
experiments have been of this kind (there have been notable exceptions in Tanzania, especially in the short-lived 'Year 16' video programme), but it is true of many.

So, to commentators like Bordenave, the major problem is now one of translating what started out as 'alternative' forms of communication to a more comprehensive level, including the forms of mass communication. Bordenave himself put the point explicitly in the Latin American context:

"We realized that it is impossible to really democratize the media and put them at the service of the people, within the capitalist system." (Ibid, p 12)

An American researcher, Robert Hornik, voiced the same doubts in a more expansive way:

"I share the implicit doubts about the equation of the use of locally controlled/appropriate/low cost technology with outcomes of autonomous development and self-reliance. The assumption that the organization of the use of communication in projects (as opposed to the social, economic and political influences which provide the context in which they work) is primarily responsible for their success or failure to generate self-reliant development relies on no evidence that I know, nor is it particularly persuasive. The place to look is at the purposes of technology-based programs and the political commitments to those purposes as reflected in available resources. A given technology system can be made to serve a wide variety of purposes; the technological determinism which suggests that a mass medium cannot be used in a
way which permits individualization, two-way address, and flexibility in local implementation as well as useful development outcomes at least equal to most alternatives, is misleading. I suspect the problem of converting a mass media-based system to the purposes of self development are rather less than the problems of expanding previous locally-based projects so that they reach the mass of a population. And both sets of problems pale before the obstacles to achieving the political and economic commitments crucial to success with either." (Hornik, 1980 p. 2)

Implications for Planning

What is contemplated here is not primarily a reform of communication processes, but a comprehensive reform of social planning. Ultimately this implies the remodelling of communications, but only along with many other components of the social system. If the same discussion is related to the objectives of mobilisation and integration, what is being urged is a transition between the two: the development of sufficient self-confidence in a developing society to allow the single-minded concerns of mobilization to diversify.

This discussion was recently related to development policy and planning needs in a paper written by Majid Tehranian. In it, he sought to make his account more concrete by taking a set of development goals as characteristically perceived by politicians and central planners, and expressing these same goals in terms which might be employed if they were viewed from the bottom instead of from the top of the social pyramid. (Table 14)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Goals Viewed from the Top</th>
<th>Development Goals Viewed from the Bottom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National power and security</td>
<td>Individual choice and freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social mobilization</td>
<td>Social mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identity, integration and unity</td>
<td>Sub-national (ethnic or group interest) identity and solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth (rise in national income)</td>
<td>Income distribution and social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political socialization</td>
<td>Political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property and business rights</td>
<td>Public and consumer rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational and professional advance</td>
<td>Educational and professional opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information control</td>
<td>Information access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority rule (where electoral democracy has moved in)</td>
<td>Minority rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central control and direction</td>
<td>Regional and local autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and artistic direction (sometimes censorship)</td>
<td>Cultural and artistic creativity (sometimes subversion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological and cultural control</td>
<td>Intellectual and artistic freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Teheranian commented on this table:

"It is by no means exhaustive, nor does it represent any hierarchy. The list is sufficient, however, to show the kinds of tension that the developmental process generates between the Government, which sets the communication policies, and the public, which is expected to observe those policies but may have its own views. These sets of objectives are not, of course, irreconcilable. For the process of reconciliation to be effective, however, a missing link of communication should be provided."
Planning may be said to be of three kinds: reactive, inactive and proactive. In reactive planning, the planners are often reacting to a set of past events as perceived at present. Inactive planning, typical of the situation in many developing countries, consists in going through the formal motions of designing a plan only to put it aside and go on doing what you were doing before. Proactive planning is obviously future oriented; it involves not only correcting the past but also anticipating the future. It is this kind of planning that is critically dependent upon information and communication." (Tehranian, 1978 p. 28)

The transition towards this kind of planning is clearly extremely difficult, but it may be that, if a basic self-confidence can be secured, the developing world may be in a better position than its industrialised counterpart to put it into practice.

In the industrialized world the tendency has been to stress participation in political activity and to leave planning somewhat aside as the technical prerogative of professional cadres. The inference has been that greater political participation will necessarily lead to planning based upon different, more liberal parameters. The same is true of industrial organization, where worker participation has been construed more in terms of access to decision-making bodies, which act upon the technical advice of planners, than as direct involvement in the planning process. In this assumption there seems to be at least some danger of control through mystification by planners.

The position (in the industrialized world) with respect to private mass communication enterprises is even worse. Traditionally, consumer interests have been reflected only in the demand analyses of market
research, and the pressures of organized consumer groups have been mostly concentrated upon messages (e.g. advertising or environmental issues) or the activities of large business concerns (e.g. the multi-national corporations). Apart from the concerns of minority groups, such as those involved in public broadcasting campaigns, there has been little impetus towards a comprehensive overview of communication planning, as a pre-requisite to other specific kinds of reform.

In the developing world, the position has been rather different, though the same traditions of verticality have been maintained, sometimes with more rigidity than in the West. Where notions of participation exist, they mostly do so in the sense of feedback, attached to extension work and delivery-centred development programmes. Every rural development or family planning communication model has its feedback component (by which is meant the return of opinion and reaction from the village to the production centre, so that programme success can be evaluated and elements of phasing, pace, motivation, face-to-face working and so on can be continuously adjusted). The model is itself direct and persuasive; the feedback occurs within that persuasive context. Often, the feedback system is very complex, involving a careful co-ordination of the activities of field workers with the generation of communication messages.

Nevertheless, in the third world, the kinds of structures which have been created, often sectorally, for extension work do appear to carry within them a basic potential for greater participation in communication (and development) planning, if these are finally consistent with the aspirations of their societies. There are, in many cases, local mechanisms - for discussion, for administration, for social organization, for decision-making - which could be expanded to include both the upward movement of ideas and representative participation in planning activities.
In the multi-step, reciprocal process envisaged here, some principles of construction would be important. There would have to be, first of all, a good deal of latitude and flexibility in arrangements; at local and regional levels, theoretical models of organization are unlikely to work, as they must deal with residual factors of local culture, social organization, special interests, status and the local innovation threshold. Moreover, a highly decentralized structure would be necessary, giving identity to each level of the chain, including the ability to be accountable for its own affairs. Participation will only be valued if it contains responsibilities as well as rights.

Consequently, to whatever extent is organizationally feasible, some elements of decision-making must be implanted at the local level, and the tendency towards centralization which is implicit in current planning resisted. This is in most cases a long-term proposition, but one which might ultimately produce a model more as symbolized in Figure 42. Here, the policy planning sequence is seen far more rotationally, implying a full dialogue at national, regional and local levels before subsequent stages of planning and implementation proceed. The model is, of course, again crude; it begs questions of which matters can be planned at local levels and which cannot, of the degree to which regional variations from a national norm are technically and economically possible, or of where the mechanisms for arbitration may lie. But it is an indicator of overall direction. And while such a model cannot be anticipated in developing country contexts in the immediate future, there are at least two preconditions for its eventual emergence: namely a care and a desire to avoid over-specificity in the early planning stages, and a positive attempt to build into a communication system viable local institutions with broad areas of responsibility.
Implications of Technology

A final word may also be said on technological opportunity. It is evident by now that the micro forms of community media are insufficient to ensure participation; they tend in some ways to create a ghetto. It is also evident that for participation to be introduced adequately into mass media, change in overall social organisation is necessary: pressure within the communication system alone will not suffice.

Nevertheless, in this process, new developments in technology may themselves help, and a good deal of research attention has been focused in the past few years on widening the popular base of access. Some forms of communication technology which seemed, at the time of their introduction, the prerogative of the industrialised world have now been adapted to suit smaller audiences and developing world communities.

The first of these is the satellite. The satellite programmes of PEACESAT in the Pacific (using a satellite for audio connections between remote Pacific territories, linking university campuses), the experiments in two-way radio communication for medical purposes in Alaska, the various experiments surrounding the NASA satellite ATS-6 (especially the Indian satellite experiment), the emergence of low cost and mobile satellite ground stations and the new satellite demonstration projects of the US Agency for International Development - all of these have eroded the original image of the satellite as a rich country's tool.

A particular need for the creation of opportunities for the local community itself to move out into the broader world. Improved telecommuni-
cations may provide part of the answer, and in some countries, steps are now being taken to strengthen these systems. In Alaska there is now a network of 120 satellite ground stations which provide open channel communications to every permanent community of twenty-five or more. In India there are plans to install public telephones in villages of over 2,500 people, and in district and sub-district headquarters, with priority in under-privileged areas. In Kenya and Tanzania there are plans to extend postal and telephone services to all villages and in several Latin American countries (Columbia, Ecuador and Costa Rica) development plans include the installation of public telephones in rural areas and additional exchange systems.

The relationship between group media and broader transmission systems, especially the telephone and radio, is not peripheral. At the simplest level, a community group which has defined its goals can use the telephone to make contact with decision-makers. By linking group media activities with local radio, there can be a platform for wider discussion and the stimulation of other people to participate in on-going activities, even if these have not been touched directly by group media projects. Programming from local radio and television can find an entry into regional broadcasting channels, when issues have reached a certain point of development, and because of the way in which societies are organised, this level of communication is more likely to make an impact on authority.

Perhaps of equal significance for the future are the technological developments which have led to miniature forms of communication equipment, more portable camera and video recorders, and the spread of optical fibre transmission systems. The emergence of digital technologies, the growing application of the silicone chip, have helped create smaller production systems, more sophisticated distribution systems, and greater storage and access capacity. Combinations of the computer with other production, transmission and distribution systems are also significant. While these develop-
ments are as yet only partially applicable in the developing world, they promise a great deal for the future. Once the investment price has lowered, developing countries are in a better position than their industrialised counterparts to create new communication systems, because they have less commitment and interest in older forms and infrastructures. The process of adaptation has, in any case, begun. A recent programme of UNESCO has brought together a consortium of developing world engineers to design a genuinely low cost camera and recorder system. In India, the Space Applications Centre has a flourishing programme in communication technology adaptation, looking for cheaper and simpler, but above all indigenous ways of producing communication tools. It was in Indonesia that the electronic blackboard was first developed (a device which allows for the transmission of simple visual information via telephone or radio links).

It may be argued that the growing emphasis upon self reliance and endogenous growth in the developing world, in the technological as well as in other spheres, is founded as much upon political and expedient grounds as was much of the earlier dialogue on access and participation. At the same time, moves towards self-reliance do substantially increase the possibility of introducing a genuine element of participation into developing countries, if only because they delimit the area of decision making (taking away some of the constraints of traditional patterns of technology transfer), and emphasise the creation of local technologies and communication systems, which demand concrete forms of planning and implementation. Any trend which emphasises the need to formulate precise objectives is likely to improve planning and expand its base of participation.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis a continuum of planning approaches has been considered, ranging from traditional models of operational and project planning, through an experimental framework for overall system planning, to the far more tentative arena of open and participatory planning. The needs for research and application are different in each context.

Operational and project planning have a long history and are well researched in a number of fields. The main requirement for the communication sector is one of application, rather than of methodological development: methods and techniques evolved in other fields need more specific adaptation, through both simulation and field trial, to communication problems, accompanied by evaluations which seriously analyse the special conditions of the communication environment.

Interest in overall system design, although much more recent, has also increased considerably in recent years. As a field of action it has also been absorbed into the official programmes of the international agencies (notably UNESCO), and accepted as a platform by the developing countries, in particular the Group of Non-Aligned Countries. It was discussed by the 1980 Intergovernmental Conference for Cooperation on Activities, Needs and Programmes for Communication Development, and endorsed as a mainstream activity by the Conference's Final Recommendation (which was adopted by consensus, though with considerable reserve from a number of countries, especially donor countries). Communication planning is therefore likely to be fully embodied in the work of the upcoming International
Programme for the Development of Communication, which was proposed by that same Conference, and it is already included as a substantive operational item in the draft of the 1981-83 communication programme of UNESCO.

It is gratifying that an activity which figured barely, if at all, in international programmes six years ago has now been endorsed so widely as a legitimate field. Nevertheless, this euphoria, which has a largely political base, should be treated with some caution. Communication planning is not a universal prescription for all countries or for all situations. The UNESCO programme proposes assistance for national communication planning in a number of developing countries over the next three years, but the execution of this programme may well be subject to the same kinds of practical constraint as has been the case with programmes on access and participation. Key concepts and issues which have a demonstrably democratic ring are less easily accepted in reality, when they require not only the commitment of nation-states, but also an agreement to let citizen participation challenge governmental orthodoxy. Among recent UNESCO programmes, it is those projects in the participatory field which have been the most under-implemented; requests simply do not arrive, or if they come from non-governmental agencies they fail to secure the approval of the host government (UNESCO being a consortium of governments, and its programme therefore subject to government approval).

The same position may very well be true of communication system planning, if it is executed in the manner suggested by this thesis, prefaced by (and derived from) an objective analysis and synthesis of communication policies. Indeed, the only country which has so far undertaken such a comprehensive policy and planning review is Afghanistan, and the resulting plan has, for self-evident reasons, not been implemented.
Similar surveys have been discussed (for example with Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Jamaica, Malaysia), but in the event each proposal has been reduced to a project or sectoral exercise, which has in no case embarked upon an analysis of policy fundamentals, as a prelude to revitalising a communication system.

It has been emphasised throughout this research that the framework which it considers is specifically concerned with developing countries, where the commitment to radical structural and societal change at least exists in theory, and where the forces of inertia are apparently fewer. But at the developing country level, too, there are many practical reservations, and it is a matter for speculation as to how far these reservations can be honestly overcome.

Whatever new attempts are made to plan comprehensively, it is important that these should be monitored and evaluated throughout, to enlarge the dimensions of what is still a tentative and primitively expressed framework. Unfortunately, the up coming UNESCO programme, with a heavy emphasis on practical action, significantly reduces the volume of research proposed for this area, apparently confident that enough has already been done for planning and research.

The position in the field of open planning is even more difficult. At present UNESCO is engaged upon a global review of open planning approaches and is attempting to compile case studies of experiments, broadly following the taxonomy advanced in Chapter IX. There is, of course, a considerable literature available on the field of access and participation, but it is heavily concentrated upon local experiments, especially on alternative technologies, and has little to say about planning processes. In this field, for a number of years to come, the focus
of research will probably have to be upon the collection, analysis and synthesis of case studies (usually a difficult task, as the examples are fugitive, mostly at local community levels, often the work of practitioners without involving planners or researchers, rarely described or monitored in detail, and often short-lived). Critical in all of this is a more general acceptance of the need for evaluation and research into project design and implementation. This is not an easy habit to encourage: few technical assistance agencies even contemplate, let alone insist upon, such an association, but prefer to continue with projects which are based upon broad, unquestioning and simplistic assumptions about the nature of communication, which mostly reflect obsolete models of diffusion.

In consequence, an associated need is for training, not so much to produce communication planners, but rather a variety of specialists with an adequate and sympathetic knowledge of parallel and related fields to their own, who can work comfortably in multi-disciplinary teams. A limited number of research institutions have begun to create such programmes, usually at a post-graduate or post-experience level, and there are plans for an international programme to begin in 1982, following a series of regional workshops which is nearing completion, under UNESCO auspices.

Similarly, there is a need for a broader, more sensitive and more detailed pattern of information exchange. The present pattern of institutional exchange is inadequate: far more is done through personal networks of interested scholars and planners. But the legacy of separate research traditions - especially the contrasted North American and European positions - which has for so long inhibited the development of communication research, persists. Possibly the fora of the international agencies are still the best means of overcoming this disability, if they can be enticed to go beyond a superficial level of confrontation, and divert at least part
of their efforts to a more objective academic exploration, and a non-ideological exchange of personnel.

Finally, it can be said that the field lacks, at present, a sense of coherence, of systemic unity - in short a philosophy. Mention was made earlier of a continuum of planning, but the interrelationship of the parts of this continuum is rarely discussed. The more we analyse planning methods and compile case studies of specific projects and processes, the more complex it will become to relate these organically, even with the assistance of computer models. Nevertheless, the main need is to relate the various initiatives and motivations of planning more thoughtfully, to underpin common interests and foci. In order to avoid some of the earlier traps of unquestioning ideological acceptance, and a sterile concern with purely technical issues, we need an imaginative and comprehensive view of the whole planning environment, reflecting all those shifts of emphasis and perspective that were broadly outlined in Chapter IX.
1. SINGAPORE EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION SERVICE

In 1956/7, an audio-visual department was set up for the first time in the Singapore Teachers Training College. At that time, a limited educational radio service already existed in Singapore, under the control of the Ministry of Culture, but it was generally acknowledged that this was not effective in the schools, and its programmes were finally discontinued. The new Audio-Visual Unit was asked to investigate the introduction of educational television into the Republic, and its first proposal was put forward in 1963. This submission was considered over a period of years until, in 1966, approval for the Service was given by Cabinet. It was established at this time that the new ETV Service would be operated by the Ministry of Education, but that programme distribution would utilise the country's main broadcasting network. In a small country of some 225 square miles, distribution was not in any case considered a major problem.

The Cabinet decision also intimated that the Service would come into operation in 1967 (i.e. after a lapse of only eight months, if it were to correspond with the beginning of the academic year). An adviser was quickly recruited from the United Kingdom's Centre for Educational Television Overseas (at that time an independent body, with a portion of its overseas programme financed from Ford Foundation funds). The adviser (Alan Hancock) worked from April 1966 with the deputed Head of the ETV Service, Lian Fook Shin, and members of the Audio-Visual Unit, to develop the basic
proposal in greater detail and to begin a highly compressed programme of operational and budgetary planning, building and equipment, training and programme development. The Service was to be housed in a new block, then in the course of erection in the Teachers Training College; a first essential was to ensure that architectural plans (already completed in outline) could be adapted to educational television usage. Budgetary lines had also to be established rapidly, and equipment tendered and ordered. A training programme was initiated for production staff, which recruited a large number of interested teachers to a series of part-time courses; from the experience of this training programme, the final selection of producers was made. However, programme development occupied the bulk of the time available. The Service was seen as an aid to qualitative educational reform and to the introduction of new curricula; there was no teacher shortage as such in the Republic, but there were serious weaknesses in certain areas, particularly science and mathematics. Programming was therefore curriculum supportive, but not in the form of direct teaching; it was to be accompanied by a range of printed support materials. A strong emphasis was upon the fostering of national cohesion (Singapore being a new State, having relatively recently seceded from Malaysia). Programmes were initially to be directed towards the first two Secondary levels, and all teachers at these levels were brought into the TTC campus, towards the end of the year, for brief orientation courses in the use of educational media. A quarterly magazine was also started, under the title of 'ETV Singapura'.

General policy for the Service was evolved by an Advisory Committee, meeting at a senior policy level at least once a year. Specific series planning was in the hands of Programme Committees, meeting far more regularly; these included curriculum specialists, members of the school Inspectorate, school principals, content specialists and the series'
producers. Producers were ultimately responsible for programme presentation, though on matters of curriculum orientation, they were subject to the direction of the Programme Committee and its Chairman.

Although impeded by what appeared to be impracticable deadlines and budgetary delays, the Service began transmissions in January 1967, broadcasting ten series a week to Secondary 1 and 2 classes over TV Singapura's Channel 8. The majority of programmes were repeated at least three times to ease timetabling difficulties, and programmes were devised in several languages (not dubbed, but produced in a different language according to each subject's requirements). English, Chinese and Malay all figured within this framework. Government and aided schools were issued with television receivers, and a basic evaluation system was set up, in which a rotating sample of schools reported weekly on all series, following a structured questionnaire. The results of these evaluations were later summarized in the Service's magazine; from 1967 onwards they were computerized and their format extended. They gave a general picture of reactions to programmes, but did not attempt to measure learning gains: primarily they operated as a check on programme quality and teacher/pupil reaction, which was followed carefully in the preparation of new series.

The Service was somewhat influenced, in its early days, by the fact that its principal adviser had come from a BBC educational broadcasting tradition, and programme presentation reflected this influence. However, partly because training was conducted locally and was problem-oriented, within a short space of time the Service developed its own style, responding to the demands of the Singapore curriculum. Utilisation training, rushed in the formative stages, was improved in 1967; a series of specialist seminars was held, as well as the first of many courses in ETV script-writing for teachers. (The tradition of the Service was that scripts,
and presentations, of programmes were in the hands of teachers working part-time; producers - though also teachers by background - had broad responsibilities, covering as many as three series per week, and help from specialists was necessary if programme quality was not to suffer). In August 1967, four inspectors from the Ministry of Education also spent a month surveying utilisation practices in the schools, reporting back to the Service to help determine future programme planning.

Plans were made in 1967 for the expansion of the Service down to the Primary level and these were agreed in principle. Unfortunately, the withdrawal of UK military aid put unforeseen pressures on Government, and the expansion phase was postponed (in the event for many years). A report on the Service produced in 1968 by a consultant for the Ford Foundation (Meade 1968) commented favourably on progress, but stressed that producers were working beyond capacity, dependent on inadequate equipment and facilities. Producers were highly motivated (they were helped by winning two special prizes in 1967 and 1968 in the annual Japan Prize competition), but they could not sustain the same pace indefinitely.

Nevertheless, in spite of these drawbacks, programming was extended, in 1971, to the primary levels and to the Pre-University level, not so much by expanding programme hours or budget, as by utilising time and resources made available through repeating previous series. All series had been extensively remade after the first year of transmissions, and again, to a lesser extent, after the second year. But by 1969-70 the majority were sufficiently acceptable to schools to be retransmitted with little more than updating. The primary programmes were produced in small units, stressing activity and group learning, and they proved very popular. A further development also came in 1970, when an Instructional Materials Library was opened at the Service: this was seen as the first phase in
developing a comprehensive multi-media facility.

The report of a joint Singapore/UNESCO feasibility study in 1971 specifically proposed the expansion of the Service into a Singapore Educational Media Service (SEMS), but it was not until 1973 that this step was finally taken. While small financial increments allowed the Service to extend its materials library, move experimentally into new programming areas, and acquire extra videotaping and telecine facilities, the planned major expansion of effort into an integrated multi-media facility was continually delayed. Apparently, the Service did not figure sufficiently high in the country's list of priorities.

In 1973, a new project was launched, which promised to change this state of affairs: CEPTA-TV (Centre for Production and Training in Adult Education for Television). A joint venture between the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany and the Singapore Government, this project had been in the planning stages since 1969, though originally as a combined venture between the Foundation and the Ministry of Culture (i.e. the broadcasting Ministry). In 1972, the Singapore interest was transferred to the Ministry of Education, and for the first time a link-up between CEPTA-TV and SEMS became a possibility. CEPTA-TV was in part a regional association for South-East Asia, designed to offer programmes for use on regional television screens in the adult and non-formal education sectors, but the combination of SEMS and CEPTA-TV, especially from the point of view of physical facilities, was attractive. On the Singapore side, the Head of the Singapore Educational Media Service was appointed as Director of CEPTA-TV, and plans were made to develop a joint facility, which envisaged, among other things, the eventual integration of educational broadcasting in Singapore into a lifelong education process, operating on an independent education channel.
The development of CEPTA-TV was to prove onerous (in particular, progress on its regional front), and further integration did not come quickly. Under the terms of the basic Agreement, the Singapore Government was to provide the site and buildings for a new production complex, but delays on this facility were lengthy. Finally, in 1976, approval for the necessary finance was given.

After its original momentum, therefore, the ETV Service was forced to sustain itself over a long period of time at a more restrained level, concentrating on improvements in programming, limited expansions into new territory, a better range and integration of media. Some bureaucratic revisions were made which were to prove helpful (the integration, for example, of Ministry of Education audio-visual services, including the audio-visual inspectorate). But a major boost was lacking, and there were still many frustrations.

The proposed integration between CEPTA-TV did not take place; when the regional association moved to new premises, the Singapore Educational Media Service moved to CEPTA-TV's old studio complex, which at least helped to resolve some of its production problems. In the meantime, changes in video technology, especially the development of videocassettes, substantially affected future planning for the Service, in a small country where physical distribution of audio-visual materials presented less of a problem than in most developing country environments.
India's interest in practical applications of space technology dates from the early sixties, when the first active space research programme began, through the initiative of the late Drs. Vikram Sarabhai and Homi Bhabha. The first earth station was built at Ahmedabad in 1967, with UNDP assistance. At that time, most materials and technical expertise were imported, but the experience gained was such that the first commercial station at Arvi was constructed largely with indigenous equipment.

Television in India was confined for many years to the city of Delhi, where a school programme began in the mid-sixties. In 1967 a pilot agricultural TV project (Krishi Darshan) also began in the Delhi area, with 80 community sets distributed around the countryside, as a first follow-up, in TV, of the earlier farm forums on radio. But it was not until the mid-seventies that television extended to the Bombay, Amritsar and Srinagar areas, and later to Calcutta, Lucknow and Madras. While the radio network in India is comprehensive, the build-up of terrestrial TV transmissions has been relatively slow.

In 1966, a UNESCO expert panel proposed a pilot project for educational and development purposes using a space satellite. This panel had countries like India specifically in mind, because of their size and diffuseness; an annexure to the final report made particular mention of Indian potential. Subsequently, in 1967, a UNESCO mission visited India, and in cooperation with an Indian team produced a report recommending considerable television expansion and an accelerated training programme. In the same year, a study team sponsored by the Indian Department of Atomic Energy visited the USA and France, for an on-the-spot study of satellite developments, and concluded that it was technically feasible to launch an educational TV experiment with a suitable satellite (such as
ATS - F or G, then under development with NASA). The attraction of this satellite, which was experimental, was that it was a direct broadcasting satellite (i.e. it was to make provision for relaying TV signals directly to the ground, to individual community receivers, rather than to a terrestrial transmitter which would then rebroadcast in the traditional way). Thus, a genuinely rural experiment might be mounted, independent of the expansion of the Indian terrestrial TV network, which not unnaturally was extending primarily through the major cities and only afterwards to country areas.

In 1968, an Inter-Ministerial Committee was set up, entitled NASCOM (National Satellite Communications Group). The group included representatives of potential user Ministries, of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), of the communications authorities and of All India Radio (AIR). It subdivided its activities into a number of smaller working groups and reported favourably, after six months, on the viability of the satellite experiment, having completed a good deal of preliminary work on such problems as village selection, maintenance, programme production needs and training. It recommended that an agreement should be concluded with NASA (the US Space agency), and this was signed on September 19th 1969. According to the memorandum of understanding, the general objectives of the experiment were perceived as:

(i) gaining experience in the developing, testing and management of a satellite based instructional TV system, especially in rural areas;

(ii) demonstrating the potential value of satellite technology in the developing world;
demonstrating the potential value of satellite broadcast TV for instructional purposes;

(iv) stimulating Indian national development in management, technological, economic and social areas.

(Cowlan et alia 1973, p 35)

The original timetable proposed called for satellite availability in late 1972 or early 1973, which would have forced an accelerated pace of development. However, for technical and budgetary reasons, the project was delayed until 1974, which allowed for a longer run-up time. In the event, this delay led to temporary inertia in India, particularly in software aspects of the experiment, and in the years before 1974, when a massive effort was begun, repeated doubts were expressed by a variety of external agencies on the slowness of production and evaluation preparations. One major factor was disagreement on production responsibility. Under the Rules of Business of AIR, broadcasting production rested exclusively with the national broadcasting organisation, and it was not until 1973/4 that this principle was partially eroded, leaving AIR in supervisory authority, but with some production being delegated to the Indian Space Research Organisation itself (and subsequently, some other production responsibilities to other agencies, including the Ministry of Education).

The Agreement made available to India four hours of programming daily, for a period of one year from August 1975 to July 1976. (The satellite was actually launched in 1974, but was used over an initial year for experiments in the United States, after which its orbital position was changed). ISRO was responsible for all developments of a technical nature on the ground and set up two earth stations (transmit-
receive) in Ahmedabad and Delhi to transmit programmes to the satellite. 2,400 sets were installed in villages in six States, to receive community programmes, news and current affairs, school and teacher education series, agriculture, health education, family planning and various socio-cultural themes. For four hours per day the satellite provided one video and two audio channels, allowing for some language differentiation, and programmes were produced in three base production centres created by AIR (supplemented by two small studios operated by ISRO).

The ISRO organisation was characterised from the outset by its homogeneity and innovativeness, especially in the technical field. A standard 3-metre antenna for community-reception was designed very early, and at a later stage, more sophisticated technologies were developed, including the local fabrication of larger antennae. But programming and evaluation strands were much slower to emerge, partly because of coordination difficulties among the many agencies involved in the experiment. Although a sizeable evaluation programme was finally undertaken during the project, this did not really get under way until late 1973, after ISRO had set up its own evaluation cell. Similarly, in programming, stockpiling began in earnest only in 1974, after a senior AIR executive was specially designated to take over production responsibility, and it was in the same year that utilisation training programmes also began under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and the Centre for Educational Technology of its National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT). Many of the ambitious original plans for formative evaluation to take place during programme construction did not materialize; there was a good deal of work on needs assessment and some pre-testing of materials, but production demands were such that programmes could not be remade after piloting, only later programmes in the series modified.
Nonetheless, the experiment began on schedule in 1975 and continued to the end of the allocated year. A considerable amount was learned of the difficulties of operating such a large-scale system, and of implementing a phased developmental programme calling for considerable inter-agency cooperation. Research components included technical evaluation, needs assessment and input research (e.g. carrying out audience profile surveys as a preliminary to programme planning), an extensive feedback study, based on a daily interview schedule covering a panel of 100 villages, an impact study on children (mostly affecting the morning instructional programmes), a programme content study using message system analysis techniques, and a series of smaller in-depth studies on communication processes and effects (the latter confined to particular clusters).

The results of the evaluation were not complete by the end of 1976 (the cut-off point of the present analysis), but even in mid-stream it was reported that satellite TV continued to attract large audiences, usually between 100-200 and on some occasions up to 500-1,000. In children's programmes, despite the need to produce an 'all-purpose' programme covering children between 5+ and 12 years, the attraction of the medium and its novelty were such that audiences of 95 continued to be reported, even after 8-9 months of exposure. The satellite was used, linked via an improvised terrestrial hook-up, to broadcast the Prime Minister's address to the nation for the first time on television in August 1975. A programme of teacher-training, carried out in conjunction with the satellite experiment by the Centre for Educational Technology of NCERT, reached 22,106 teachers (against a target of 24,000) in over 2,000 centres. On occasions when floods made maintenance work on defective receivers difficult or impossible to carry out, villagers carried them on stretchers, or ferried them by boat, to reach maintenance teams.
The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment was not seen by its creators as an ideal experiment. Very little in the way of learning gains could be expected, for example, after such a short-term exposure. The main advantage of the experiment was the experience which it provided of management and development problems.

Originally SITE was meant to be followed almost immediately by the launch of India's own domestic satellite. This proved to be financially and logistically impossible, and the problem of continuity was only partially resolved through the priority extension of terrestrial transmitters to at least some of the rural clusters which received SITE programmes. This was particularly marked in the Kheda region, near Ahmedabad, where the original developmental group attached to the Space Applications Centre continued to provide a daily one-hour programme, half of which was produced from its own studios.
3. INSTRUCTIONAL TELEVISION IN EL SALVADOR

The possibility of introducing instructional television (ITV) into El Salvador was discussed in the Salvador national press as early as 1960, but it was not until 1962 that some definite steps were taken. At that time, Walter Beneke, Salvadorean Ambassador to Japan, had become interested in the educational television work of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), and he was able to arrange for a team of Japanese engineers to visit El Salvador. This team recommended the establishment of a national ITV system, and in 1963 President Julio Rivera set up an Educational Television Commission, ostensibly to prepare a national plan for ITV by 1964. The work of the Commission dragged; some Salvadoreans were sent to Japan for training, but were without positions on their return, and although a Department of Educational Television was created in 1974 within the Ministry of Education, for two years it had neither leader nor budget. Matters progressed only when Beneke returned from Japan, and was himself appointed Chairman of the Commission.

In 1966, a decision was made that ITV should be introduced initially into the Third Cycle of Education, Grades 7-9, on the grounds that the country was mostly in need of a middle-level and technical work force, to promote its industrialization programme. The Commission also recommended that ITV should be administered by an autonomous institution reporting directly to the President, so as to sidestep the apparent inertia of the Ministry of Education. By 1967, some experimental programme production had begun, using rented commercial studios. However, in April 1967, the (then) President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez participated in a meeting of Government leaders of the Americas, and heard Lyndon Johnson speak of the possibility of financing a pilot ITV project somewhere in Latin America. He suggested El Salvador, and this was later corroborated by
an AID survey team, recruited through the National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB, 1967). This team also came out in favour of a primary, rather than a secondary, target audience, but after a lengthy debate the Salvadoreans won their case in this respect. Meanwhile, Walter Beneke was appointed Minister of Education, and at this point arguments against Ministry of Education control evaporated on both sides.

The agreement for the project was signed in 1968. Under its terms, USAID agreed to contribute 653,000 dollars to the start-up costs of ITV, mostly for equipment. A back-up loan of 1.9 million dollars was also negotiated for the construction of facilities, and various kinds of technical assistance expertise were agreed (the latter not confined to US assistance).

ITV was not, however, a project in its own right, but part of an extensive programme of curriculum reform, which included the preparation of new curricula, teacher training, educational administrative reform, the diversification of technical education, and various forms of materials production. Nevertheless, ITV was to play a highly significant part in this process because, under the pressure of technical and programming deadlines, it was able to push other, more inert parts of the system forward, and hasten delivery (especially of curricula). One of the first acts of Minister Beneke was to close most of the normal schools for teacher training, which had been over-producing primary school teachers, and establish a new centralised normal school in a single campus. Here, first short-term, and subsequently one-year, courses for secondary teachers were initiated, including curriculum and pedagogic training, principles of education, methodology, and ITV utilisation.
In September 1968 a temporary TV studio was equipped, and the first 20 members of the ITV staff began on-the-job training, under the supervision of the first batch of advisers. A tentative revision of the seventh-grade curriculum was completed in November, and the ITV production teams began work, with three months in which to complete programmes and classroom support materials for pilot ITV transmissions. ITV was introduced into 32 seventh-grade classes when school reopened in February 1969, utilised by 100 teachers who had undergone the crash utilisation training programme. Simultaneously, a more extensive nine-month retraining programme began for a further 250 teachers, ready for the next academic year.

Progress in 1969 was hampered by the war between El Salvador and Honduras, as this caused a blockage of aid funds which was only lifted in 1970 (so creating a year's delay in completing the second TV studio). Still, in February 1970 the reform curriculum was extended throughout the seventh-grade, with ITV in 216 out of 400 classrooms, and the original pilot classes began a revised eighth-grade, also with ITV support. In October of this year, the Salvadorean National Assembly gave the final authorisation for the AID loan to finance new studio and transmission facilities, and the next stage of the project was able to move forward, albeit belatedly. The following year brought a major reorganisation of the Ministry of Education and a new system of oriented promotion for students, with some modernisation of test methods and evaluation. The extension of curriculum and of ITV continued, with re-training for primary school teachers now beginning (using television) and re-orientation for school directors. However, in July of this same year, a teachers' strike began, in pursuit of higher pay and reduced workloads. There was considerable disorganisation throughout the system, and ninth grade programmes went off the air for much of the year. It was not until September 1971 that the strike was finally settled, and even afterwards
many schools remained disorganised.

At this time, Beneke resigned as Minister of Education and transferred to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Nonetheless, his main task had been completed, and the extension of both ITV and the new curriculum continued generally according to plan. In 1972, a new Five Year Plan was prepared for the country, which included the extension of ITV to the Second Cycle, and also its expansion into adult education. By this time the new production complex had opened and there was more time for retraining studio personnel, thus helping to improve production standards (which had never had time to stabilise). The original impetus had been reduced by this time, with a much slower expansion into new levels, especially non-formal levels, though there was a definite need for a period of consolidation, as the system was taken over in entirety by the Salvadoreans.

The success of El Salvador was confirmed, in both management and learning contexts, by a lengthy series of evaluations carried out, as the system developed, by the Institute of Communication Research, Stanford University (Mayo et alia, 1976). In a period of four years (up to 1972) some 10,000 students had completed grades 7-9 with television. As a result of the overall Reform, considerable improvements were registered throughout the school system, and ITV was a strong egalitarian influence in this process, as it was one of the few resources distributed equally across the country, being available to 70% of all Third Cycle students. The most impressive gains in learning were on general ability tests, where ITV students gained between 15-25% more than did their non-ITV peers in the Third Cycle. Learning was influenced by student background factors such as family wealth and parental level of education, but ITV, introduced always in the context of the overall reform, was judged
more important than any other community or classroom variable in predicting student learning. There were gains on both individual subject tests, and on tests of numerical, verbal and nonverbal reasoning abilities, though there was no apparent improvement in reading skills. (Some of this was attributed to variable programme quality by the project's evaluators, and specific recommendations were made for improved training programmes and better salaries for production personnel.)

The evaluators attributed success in this project to a number of factors. Paramount among these were the commitment of Walter Beneke, the emphasis upon utilisation, the association of ITV with a total educational reform programme, and the phased introduction of all reforms. On the whole, too, although doubts were cast upon the individual efficacy of foreign advisers, their contribution to the programme was felt to be important. There had, however, been some doubt cast on the exclusive concentration of ITV upon the Third Cycle in its early stages, rather than on primary or non-formal levels. Although this concentration was justified on manpower planning and economic grounds, in fact economic expansion did not match the increased school enrollments.

Much of the reform programme was, however, justified on broader philosophical grounds: on the right of the Salvadorean child to nine years of basic education; it was not confined to cost reduction, manpower planning or even curriculum considerations.
4. ASIA-PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR BROADCASTING DEVELOPMENT

In 1966, a UNESCO meeting held in Bangkok, entitled 'Radio and Television in the Service of Development in Asia', put forward the idea of a regional institute for advanced broadcasting training to be based on a national training institution which would first of all meet the specific needs of an Asian country. It set regional training within a hierarchy of training needs, formulated as follows:

"National training is the fundamental requirement ... Regional training should preferably be built upon a national foundation ... (but) given this national basis, regional training has the advantage of financial saving through the centralisation of resources, justification for a better and larger staff, a stronger appeal to international aid sources, and the opportunity to develop regional exchanges of experiences and programmes". (UNESCO, 1967 p 26)

In this statement, the origins of the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development were implicit. In 1967, a UNESCO-sponsored survey of training needs in the Asian region revealed that, out of a total of 35,000 broadcasting personnel, 20,000 would be in need of training or re-training over a five-year period. Of these, 10% were estimated as potential recruits for a regional training programme.

Subsequently, a meeting of training experts held in Malaysia agreed upon Kuala Lumpur as the location for an eventual Institute (after hearing the rival claims of both Malaysia and Iran). An initial development programme was entrusted to UNESCO and financed by UNDP, and in 1970 a UNESCO Regional Broadcasting Planning Adviser (Alan Hancock) took up
post in Kuala Lumpur. His task was twofold: to assist in the development of the National Broadcasting Training Centre of Malaysia; and to make plans for the creation and financing of the regional institute.

A national centre was established in temporary premises in 1972, and four experts were seconded to a UNESCO project, again financed by UNDP, with equipment provided by the UK under its bilateral aid programme. Simultaneously, survey tours of Asian countries were made to examine the regional problem, and a questionnaire survey was mounted. In 1971 a lengthy report was published: 'Asian Broadcasting Training Institute' (Hancock 1971). This was discussed at the annual meeting of the Asian Broadcasting Union (from the outset an active supporter of the proposal), and a formal submission was made to UNDP for financing. However, this main submission was turned down as not having a sufficiently high development priority, and only an interim programme was financed, which covered a limited number of annual regional courses and the continued services of the Regional Broadcasting Planning Adviser, reinforced by an additional expert to be responsible for mounting basic, in-country courses. In 1972, a supplementary report was issued (Hancock 1972) and again discussed at the ABU; this report proposed a system of self-maintenance for the Institute through annual contributions from mixed sources, including the broadcasting organisations themselves. It was discussed at the ABU General Assembly, and a special Study Group was formed to look more closely at its recommendations. However, the cost-sharing formula was not accepted at this time.

In 1972, the national training programme began in Malaysia, and later in the same year a limited regional programme was started. This was operated very much on an ad hoc basis; individual courses were financed by separate sponsors and specialist consultants were secured for each training programme. The facilities of the National Broadcasting Training Centre
were made available to the regional programme by the Malaysian Government (which had remained loyal to the concept, in spite of financial and political setbacks), and the overall programme was coordinated by UNESCO.

In the meantime, plans were going ahead for the construction of a new training complex, on the site of the main radio and television facility of Malaysia, following designs prepared in 1971 with UNESCO assistance. A more permanent policy-making body was established, in 1973, as the Asian Broadcasting Training Group (later renamed Committee), which included representatives of the ABU, of the host institution, of UNESCO, and of other sponsors. This group was responsible for the preparation of an annual programme, though financing was still largely coordinated by UNESCO.

The two years from 1973-4 were a period both of consolidation and of attempts to put the project on a more secure, long-term footing. The importance of the project was underlined by a resolution passed at an Asian Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies convened by UNESCO in Jakarta; further endorsement came from the ABU and from the 1974 General Conference of Unesco. But UNDP rejected requests for further sponsorship, at least for the time being, and in 1974, the in-country programme had to be suspended for lack of funds. From 1973 onwards, the burden of coordination fell primarily upon UNESCO, which maintained its Regional Communication Adviser in Malaysia, financing his services from the Organisation's own regular programme.

Nevertheless, training opportunities continued, and the search for sponsors was reasonably successful. By 1975, 640 broadcasters had been trained at an advanced or intermediate level in Kuala Lumpur; 579 had
received basic training on in-country courses. The range of sponsors included multilateral, bilateral and private organisations - over ten agencies were involved at different times.

The philosophy of the project also changed considerably. In 1975, the Institute was renamed 'Asian Institute for Broadcasting Development', to symbolise the extension of its role beyond a simple training function: research, planning and development also figured theoretically in its repertoire. In the context of training, priorities shifted; whereas the original demand had been for basic skills (e.g. engineering and production), a survey conducted in 1975 showed a shift of interest towards training in more specialised areas, including an emphasis on management and instructional topics, in particular the training of trainers. The first materials were produced by the Institute, including a broadcasting glossary, and links were set up with other national and regional organisations, such as the communication faculty of the Universiti Sains Malaysia, CEPTA TV, and the Asian Mass Communication Information and Research Centre in Singapore. At the same time, the original emphasis on television training was also reduced, as more interest was shown within the region in a revival of radio.

In 1975, under pressure from the Malaysian Government, UNDP agreed to finance a further survey of the project, and subsequently a completely revised project document was prepared for circulation (hopefully to be financed, from 1976 onwards, by UNDP's Intercountry Programme for Asia and the Pacific). Unfortunately, the timing of this submission coincided with a massive liquidity problem for the agency, and all new projects were temporarily suspended. However, a Project Manager was appointed for further preparatory work (R. Balakrishnan, the earlier Director of the National Broadcasting Training Centre), including in particular the
convening of an inter-governmental meeting in 1977. With whatever resources could be mustered, the regional programme continued as before. At this time, UNESCO was still continuing its direct assistance through the Regional Communication Adviser, and a regional training coordinator was also financed by the New Zealand Government.

In 1976, the long-awaited training complex opened, now renamed the Tun Abdul Razak Broadcasting Training Institute (in honour of the recently deceased Prime Minister of Malaysia). A reduced project submission was made to UNDP, in the light of their changed financial circumstances, and while the search for additional sponsors continued (successful approaches were made, for example, to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation), a main effort was directed towards turning the Institute (soon to be renamed the Asio-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development) into a bona fide intergovernmental organisation. This move, which had been resisted for many years by the Asian Broadcasting Union, seeing it as a threat to the independence of broadcasters and to mixed public and private broadcasting systems, was now agreed to be necessary if long-term financial and material support were to be secured throughout the region.
5. **GROW (GROUP RESOURCES OF WOMEN) - TOBAGO**

The first outline of the GROW project appeared in the Regular Programme of UNESCO for 1973-4, as approved by UNESCO's 1972 General Conference. Entitled 'Communication and the Functional Education of Women', it embodied a programme proposal in the area of communications media and lifelong education; strong connections were foreseen with International Women's Year. Conceptually, the project was also part of a major initiative of UNESCO's Communication Sector in the Caribbean, which was most directly expressed through a regional project (financed by UNDP) on the use of communication in development.

The island of Tobago was chosen, in 1973, as an appropriate location for a pilot experiment: the island was compact and homogeneous, and relatively underdeveloped as compared with its sister island Trinidad. It had (in 1970) a population of 41,000, of whom half were women and under the age of 21. One of its major problems was migration (to Trinidad), and employment opportunities were limited.

The project was therefore planned mainly as an experiment in community development, with media acting as catalyst; the communication emphasis was to be on low-cost forms, including the community press, radio and simple video formats. However, in tracing its development, several influences have to be accounted for, as these were not always compatible and seriously affected the success of the programme. The first influence was the strong emphasis upon educational programmes for women, accentuated by the imminence of International Women's Year. There was, secondly, a growing interest by UNESCO in multi-media materials for education, and in particular low-cost and innovative technologies. Finally, there was the emergence of a new strand of activity concerned
with community media - media based upon community identity and growth, to be created and managed by the community itself, stressing principles of access and participation. Another part of the UNESCO Communication Sector's programme was, at the same time, concerned with community media in North America and Europe, where models of development in industrialised settings were being surveyed. The Tobago project was intended to furnish preliminary experience on the application of such principles in the developing world, as a prelude to a more structured exploration of this field at a later stage. For this reason, there was a particular stress upon allowing the Tobago experiment to evolve of its own accord, without pressure, so as not to prejudge its problems.

Initial discussions in Trinidad and Tobago, handled through the UNESCO National Commission for that country, seemed to indicate interest in the project, and subsequently a consultant, Kay Kinane (of the Australian Broadcasting Commission) visited Tobago for a few weeks in mid-1973. Her visit was welcomed by the Trinidad National Commission, whose Secretary General (Sheilah Solomon) considered Miss Kinane's personality and experience exactly what was needed (in fact, it was hoped that she might later act as a more permanent expert, though in the event she could not be released from her Australian functions). The report which she completed (Kinane 1973) laid particular stress upon community and self-help actions, including employment and tourist possibilities; however, it had little specific to say about communication's role. After much correspondence, a version of the project was put forward for consideration in Trinidad, which included both Miss Kinane's material and other material prepared by the UNESCO Secretariat; it was received in the country in October, and formed the basis of a Cabinet paper submitted in December.

The project as revised was not actually accepted until April 1974;
in the final framework the UNESCO commitment amounted to 67,840 dollars, and included the services of a senior media adviser and a variety of equipment. Because of UNESCO's budgetary procedures, much of this equipment had to be ordered in 1973: a constraint which led to difficulties at a later stage. In spite of the non-approval of the main document, a senior media adviser (a Canadian, Ernest Mutimer) was appointed in January 1974, for a period of two years. Mutimer's expertise was mostly in mass media (in radio, television and film); he had been working previously as part of a residential team in the Caribbean (attached to the UNDP/UNESCO regional communication project) and had actually been located in Trinidad. It was felt that his previous experience of the region should help him acclimatise quickly to the new project's demands, even though he was unfamiliar with community animation and development work.

On Mutimer's appointment, a local coordinator was also found, but she resigned almost immediately. Subsequently, a young sociologist, Joy Henry, was recruited in her place, though only after a seven-month interval. Two other local staff were also found, one of whom, Olive Sawyer, was a social worker and educationist of many years' experience, now in retirement.

Much of 1974 was taken up with receiving equipment, pressing for building works for the GROW centre (which were substantially delayed, though they were part of the Government commitment), and negotiating acceptance of the project document. Very little time, according to subsequent evaluations, was spent in devising infrastructures for the project's organisation, consolidating local development contacts, training personnel, or producing an operational work programme. In October 1974, the project was visited for one month by a Canadian consultant appointed by UNESCO, who had a strong background in community
video programmes; he reportedly brought to the project some fresh impetus, and gave some instruction in video production.

By 1975, there was still apparently no real work programme, and what had been achieved had been random. For example, a small group, encouraged by Olive Sawyer, had been making greeting cards out of banana leaves; some videotapes had been produced to demonstrate local handicrafts. A survey had been conducted on readership habits, to help prepare for the community newspaper, but the results of this survey were left unprocessed for a considerable period.

In April, 1975, a member of the UNESCO Secretariat (Alan Hancock) visited the project, together with Hugh Cholmondeley (the Caribbean regional adviser), and at this time helped draw up, together with Sheilah Solomon, the Secretary General of the Trinidad National Commission and the prime mover of the project, a more specific framework for project development. The Senior Media Adviser produced a work plan, which included newspaper work, radio programming and a series of travelling exhibitions. The newspaper actually began production in June 1975, assisted by an associate expert (Bernard Legrelle, who had arrived on the project in early 1975, sponsored by the Belgian Government), but the radio input was of very short duration, and the exhibitions did not finally take place. The local coordinator, Joy Henry, had to leave the project for medical reasons, and relationships between other local staff and experts deteriorated. Later in 1975, two further evaluations were made: one by Everold Hosein, a visiting lecturer from the University of the West Indies, and the second by Sheilah Solomon herself. Hosein attributed the failure of the project to take off the ground to two factors: conflicting objectives and incompatible views of its functions; and unsuitable expert personnel. Sheilah Solomon developed both of these themes in some detail, arguing that the failure of the project to assume a tangible shape lay in the fact
that, in its original conception, communication was seen as a 'neutral facility', attached to development objectives which were not clarified in the project plan, but left to emerge as a result of community involvement.

The Senior Media Adviser left Tobago in December 1975, though the associate expert stayed on for a further year. The community newspaper was the only real survivor of the many communication initiatives, although even this was criticised at first as basically a tourist promotion, with few roots in the local community. Subsequent development of the project was expected to lie in affiliating it more strongly with regional initiatives, and at the same time trying to involve it more strongly with local development programmes. During 1976, the UNESCO assistance was gradually phased out, much of it concerned with specialist assistance (e.g. for the newspaper, as the most viable point of operations) and with evaluation. The regional connections which had been hoped for did not finally materialise (as the UNDP regional communication project was discontinued at the end of 1976).
Although references to a 'University of the Air' can be traced as far back as the 1920s, the first official proposal for the present institution was made by Harold Wilson, in a speech in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1963. Preliminary steps towards planning were taken by the Ministerial Committee on Broadcasting, in 1965, after the Labour Party had come to power (mention of the Open University was made in its 1964 manifesto). Miss Jennie Lee, then Minister of State for the Arts, was asked to create an advisory group to study the educational functions and content of a 'University of the Air', and her group reported in 1965 (a White Paper was produced in 1966). Subsequently, an Official Committee was asked to consider further aspects of organisation and finance; its estimates were again checked, at the invitation of the Prime Minister, by Lord Goodman. In the event, though both estimates were close to each other, the institution proved to be much larger and more costly than had been envisaged.

Jennie Lee originally argued that the University of the Air could only be serviced by allocating a fourth television channel to educational broadcasting. However, this argument was not accepted, and a partnership arrangement with the BBC, using existing channel space, became the basis of media operations.

In 1967, the appointment of a Planning Committee, as proposed by the White Paper of the year before, was announced. By this time, the 'University of the Air' had become the 'Open University', and the task of the Planning Committee, under the Chairmanship of Sir Peter Venables, was to work out a comprehensive plan for the University's creation, and a draft Charter and Statutes. The resulting Charter, the work of a sub-
group, was similar in character to those of traditional universities, and it has since been criticised as over-restrictive.

The first report from the Planning Committee came in the form of a press release in March 1968, though its full report was not published until 1969. However, pressures of time were then considerable, if the University were to begin its first courses in 1970. In 1968, Walter Perry was appointed Vice-Chancellor, and Anastasios Christodoulou, Secretary; temporary offices were found in Belgrave Square, London.

The overall design of the University was clear by the time the Planning Committee had finished its deliberations, as a mix of correspondence courses, textual support, radio and television programming, residential schools, and local study centres. It was proposed that the University should operate at three levels: the undergraduate, the post-experience, and the post-graduate; it was also proposed that it should operate a 'credit' system, along similar lines to US universities, and that its academic year should run from January to December (both of these innovative proposals for a British university). What was not clear was the process by which this design would be implemented, and the period 1969-70 therefore represented a crisis period for planning, with 1970 as the first, compressed year of Foundation Course preparation. Academic and administrative staff were mostly recruited during 1969, and a site was chosen for the University in the new city of Milton Keynes, where building work began at an accelerated pace, ready for the arrival of incoming staff in September 1969.

The basic courses were evolved through a 'course team' approach, which was to reflect the corporate work, for each course, of a body of academics, educational technologists, and media producers. Production of
these courses had to be phased to begin in early 1970, for delivery to students by January 1971. The emphasis was upon an integrated delivery system, and the earlier stress upon mass media was soon played down. Problems associated with course production, however, had not been fully appreciated at the outset, except for the broadcasting component (where the BBC had a substantial reservoir of experience upon which to draw), and during 1969/70 the University had to create sustaining infrastructures as it went along, including an extensive publishing and distribution operation.

The Government of the University was in the hands of a Council and of a Senate (all academic staff and BBC senior producers being members of the latter), with specific development entrusted to a network of interlocking committees. In practice, however, the government structure evolved in a far more complex way than was originally envisaged, partly because of the magnitude of the institution (e.g. with more than 500 members of Senate in 1976), partly because of the attempt to introduce more democratic elements into its management, and partly because of its evolution along lines not originally foreseen by the Planning Committee. One component of the system which received little attention initially was the University's regional infrastructure, and the Regional Directors appointed in 1969 had to begin virtually from nothing. Apart from overcoming initial hostilities from local Government and traditional adult education movements, they had to set up a mechanism for establishing some 284 study centres in twelve regions, and shortly afterwards the residential summer schools (covering twenty-seven academic lines).

It had been envisaged that, from 1972/3, post-experience courses would be inaugurated, but a further complication arose through a series of confrontations with the new Conservative Government. As early as 1969,
Edward Heath had warned the University that there was no guarantee of its continuance with a new Government in power, although in the event this threat was not followed through, apart from a budgetary cut amounting to £1 million over three years. But a great deal of pressure was exerted upon the University to accept eighteen-year-old students among its numbers, a principle which the University resisted as being against the spirit of the University (as an institution for mature students seeking a 'second chance'); it was however an attractive political formula for those wishing to see an extension of higher educational opportunities at low cost. In the end, the University agreed to mount a pilot experiment involving 500 young people, and this began in 1974.

Another problem had been resistance from the academic community. This came in particular from the traditional adult education movement, which was sensitive to the fact that the University had been established by drawing on funds to which they might have some claim; the movement also resented the academic level at which the experiment had been pitched, feeling that a lower level of qualification would have been more appropriate. This feeling was gradually eroded following a long public relations campaign, and might be said to have been formally removed when, in 1973, Walter Perry was invited to attend meetings of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the UK.

The first years of the University were extremely hectic: there was little time to apply formative principles in the construction of courses, or in the development of University infrastructures. The institution was forced to learn through experience, and proved both sensitive and resilient in adapting to pressure. An early introduction was the creation of an Institute of Educational Technology, partly to monitor student performance and measure instructional efficiency, but also concerned, once
courses were better established, with elements of formative research.

Fortunately, the University soon proved itself capable and became well known throughout the world as a major innovative force in education. The Open University Consultancy Service (later to become the Centre for International Co-operation and Services) was established to advise on similar distance-learning projects overseas, and courses were marketed through an independent marketing service. The drop-out rate from courses proved much lower than anticipated, and in 1975, the cumulative percentage of graduating students had reached 42.4%, a figure which was much better than any other correspondence-based programme in the UK, and comparable with many US universities with a sizeable off-campus population. Having always been sensitive to the problem of academic equivalence, the University was scrupulous in its recruitment of academic staff, and the percentage of doctoral-level staff, for example, was above the national average for British universities.

It also lived up to earlier promises of cost-effectiveness, even though the limitations deliberately placed upon its student members restricted cost benefit. Although difficult to establish how much cheaper it was than conventional University education, one calculation in 1972 put the average annual recurrent cost per undergraduate at £251 for an OU student, compared with £940 for a conventional university undergraduate.

One problem which still remained unresolved was that of 'openness'. The University was created according to a principle of egalitarian opportunity, and in theory at least, the structure of its student-body was expected to bear a marked resemblance to the overall structure of the UK adult population. An early bias in enrollment against women was soon rectified, and once enrolled, women proved to be quite as capable as their
male peers. But working-class students, and those with a limited education, were still under-represented; moreover, their chances of surviving the degree programme were lower than those of other student groups.

Over the course of its early history, the Open University learned to place the mass media in perspective, using them for specific illustrative and motivational tasks. However it was beginning (by 1975) to face great difficulties in respect of access to air time, being already compelled to make use of early morning and late-night hours. In its presentations to the Annan Committee on Broadcasting (GPO 1977), the University argued for a continuation of its partnership arrangement with the BBC, which it considered to have been valuable, but insisted that further progress would depend upon the allocation of a fourth television channel to educational broadcasting in the UK (a proposal which was not ultimately accepted). In the meantime, it conducted some local experiments with alternative forms of distribution (originally with film cassettes, subsequently with video-cassettes), and undertook theoretical studies on the relative cost and feasibility of physical distribution of media networks in certain course areas, as compared with broadcast transmission.

By the end of 1976, it was still, as an institution, evolutionary, with little consensus on the future of media use, but very conscious that this area was subject to technological and institutional developments in the field of broadcasting as a whole. At the same time, the University was vulnerable to economic pressures affecting all of higher education.
In 1962, the US Office of Education funded three demonstration projects in instructional television. Each of these was conceived of primarily as a library of instructional television programmes; two were regional (the Northeastern Regional Instructional Library and the Great Plains Regional Instructional Library), but the third - the National Instructional Television Library - had a wider mandate. NITL was physically located in New York and was affiliated with National Educational Television (NET). The broad goal of all three projects was the exchange of educational programmes.

In 1965, when the original NITL grant ended, the organisation moved from New York to Bloomington, Indiana, where, under the auspices of the Indiana University Foundation, it became the National Center for School and College Television (NCSCT). At that point, financial continuance until 1967 was guaranteed, and at the same time the IUF agreed to provide credit even beyond 1967, as a bridge from subsidy to a new financial formula.

After a series of internal assessments, in 1967 yet another agency was created, after the end of federal funding, when NCSCT became NIT (National Instructional Television Centre). The Centre was to operate on income from the sale and rental of telecourses, and on money borrowed from the Indiana University Foundation. In this way, interim financing was secured, but the long-range programme still remained uncertain.

The answer to this problem had to lie in some kind of programme development formula, but an early unilateral experiment by NIT (a physical education series called 'Ready Steady Go') was not a financial success. Gradually the Consortium idea evolved; the idea was promoted that state education agencies might be persuaded to invest in a project in return
for extensive user rights and the opportunity to participate in project design. A first consortium experiment, 'Ripples' (on early childhood education), was produced in 1969/70 and had encouraging results; a second series, 'Images and Things' (in the field of art education), was produced in 1970/71, for a consortium consisting of seventeen State agencies and six local and regional agencies within States. As the size of the consortium grew, the proportion of funding provided by NIT diminished, and the viability of the approach seemed to be demonstrable. Subsequently, a third project, 'Inside Out' (a health education series at the primary level), was produced with some finance from the Exxon Corporation but without NIT funds, and it was followed, in 1972, by a career development series entitled 'Bread and Butterflies'. By this time the consortium had grown to 32 State agencies and two local organisations. The approach, however, still needed regularisation and a sharper political edge. This was provided, in 1972, by a formal association of the project with the Council of Chief State School Officers (the professional association representing State-level educational administrators), largely through the assistance of C. Taylor Whittier, a member of the NIT Advisory Board and also a CCSSO member (in his capacity as Commissioner of Education for the State of Kansas). In July 1972, six Chiefs were invited to Bloomington to discuss NIT and the idea of interstate cooperation. Subsequently, a major meeting was held in Atlanta, in late October, which was attended by 105 educational and communication administrators, representing 54 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and four Canadian provinces. This meeting generally endorsed the consortium approach, and specifically the formation of a national organisation for the development of school television programming. Immediately after Atlanta, the same proposition was put before the CCSSO and was again supported, with a seventeen-member working committee (under the Chairmanship of Whittier) being mandated to pursue the matter. This committee reported in February 1973 and produced
a draft proposal for the creation of the Agency for Instructional Television (AIT). After this point, the work snowballed, and the AIT was actually incorporated in April 1973. It was headed by Ed Cohen, who had served as Executive Director of NIT (and indeed of the earlier projects).

One difficulty which remained was administrative: how to phase out NIT, without placing undue burdens on the new organisation. Finally, it was agreed that AIT would purchase NIT from the Indiana University Foundation for the amount of its outstanding indebtedness to the Foundation plus a reasonable interest return. This would, however, be achieved only gradually, terminating at some point between 1977 and 1980, after which time the two organisations could merge fiscally. By a piece of administrative sleight of hand, and through goodwill, what might have posed a considerable financial problem was averted. The AIT Agreement took effect in July, assisted also by a long-term loan from the Ford Foundation and from the Exxon Corporation. The mechanism for long-range financing continued to work, and by 1976, debt repayment was on schedule and the financial situation appeared promising.

At the time of the emergence of AIT in 1973, consortium production methods and priorities were also formalised through a series of regional meetings. The approach of the AIT project was to stress extensive consultation between members of the consortium and the pre-testing and formative evaluation of materials at all stages. First of all, priority areas were fixed through a needs determination process; ideas were crystallised at meetings and through conferences, and then circulated to prospective consortium members for comment. In order to produce a particular series, a consensus was required as to the series' importance - not necessarily total agreement, but at least a substantial majority. Planning teams were formed under the chairmanship of a chief consultant, and a preliminary
report produced, which was shared with education and broadcasting agencies for comment. Some four to eight months later, a prospectus was issued, as the end product of the conceptualisation process, and this became the formal commitment document for a new series.

Production was contracted out to selected educational production agencies, and materials were extensively pre-tested. The emphasis in the AIT is not so much upon the formulation of highly specific and detailed objectives (which are already shared by its members), as upon the validation of production at every stage through formative research. Summative evaluation has been generally slight; the product has to be right at the initial stage if the consortium is to succeed. The AIT staff itself is small, acting as a secretariat, with motivating and coordinating functions (although considerable expertise is still demanded of them in all production and utilisation areas). The agency is run on informal lines, with few staff meetings: yet all decisions are based upon consensus, however informally secured. The nature of the Agency is such that it has to be extremely sensitive to group feelings and preferences. It is governed by a sixteen-member Board of Directors, but the Board's main function is to set priorities for the overall programme, not to interfere with the production cycle once established.

The programmes of AIT have been widely used: 'Inside Out' for example has been broadcast by almost 85% of all public television stations, and at the time of developmental work on 'Self Inc.' all but five US States and Canadian provinces had participated in at least one collaborative project. In the absence of comprehensive survey data, however, it is impossible to estimate the numbers of children reached by the programmes. The concentration of the AIT is upon reaching the educational teacher/user, and its formula for priority setting and financing depends heavily
upon the involvement of educational administrators, a group which it considers a valid reflector of what is needed in the schools. This view has demonstrably brought about financial and organisational security, however much it might be challenged on other grounds.
8. CHILDREN'S TELEVISION WORKSHOP

The idea for the Children's Television Workshop reputedly stemmed from a dinner party in New York, given in 1966 by Joan Cooney (then a TV producer) and her husband, at which one of the guests was Lloyd Morrissett, a vice-president of the Carnegie Corporation. This anecdotal account of the project's origins is significant, in that the whole project subsequently hinged upon the activities of a small, elite and influential group of people, among whom Cooney and Morrissett were particularly important. At this dinner party the subject of children's television programming was raised, and as a result of what was argued on the topic, Joan Cooney was later commissioned by Carnegie to prepare a feasibility study on the possibility of mounting a new TV series at the pre-school level, which was ostensibly both to educate and entertain children.

The feasibility study was submitted in October and was favourably received; in May 1967, Joan Cooney joined Carnegie as a television consultant. She had originally conceived of the series as a project for WNDT (a New York Public Television Channel for which she was working), but it soon appeared to have much wider implications. Morrissett decided to try to interest other agencies, such as the US Office of Education, in the idea; he perceived it, from the very early stages, as a project in need of financing from a consortium of sponsors. Thus, in June 1967, a meeting took place in Washington, attended by Harold Howe and Louis Hausmann of the US Office of Education, Morrissett and Barbara Findberg from Carnegie, and Joan Cooney. At this meeting a consensus was reached on the viability of the proposal; it was then up to its sponsors to find the necessary financing.

Two further meetings also took place at Carnegie in 1967: one in
September, to discuss production and budgetary issues, and the second in October, to review plans for research and evaluation. A number of outside experts were brought into these meetings (and at the second, Edward Meade, Jr., of the Ford Foundation, also attended - important in view of Ford's later assistance to the project).

A final proposal was completed by the end of the year, synthesising the conclusions of all these meetings, and this was formally submitted to the Carnegie authorities in February 1968 (although a commitment to the project was made on the basis of an earlier, December 1967, draft). A tentative budget of eight million dollars was agreed for the Workshop, with the primary sponsors being Carnegie, the US Office of Education, and the Ford Foundation. (Ford's original commitment was 250,000 dollars, but this was seen only as a preliminary undertaking). Joan Cooney was appointed Executive Director, and Gerald Lesser (of Harvard) as Chairman of the Advisory Committee; both of these had been instrumental in steering the project through its first phases.

1968 was a year of intensive preparatory work for the Workshop and for its first production 'Sesame Street', which was scheduled to begin transmissions in 1969. It had been agreed by all concerned that the programme would have some eighteen months of unhurried preparation, including extensive developmental testing of materials, and this grace period was actually secured without undue pressure. Indeed, after a Press Conference announcing the project in March, 1968, publicity was allowed to drop until much closer to the transmission date, so that those involved could work without interference. Two major matters dominated 1968: one administrative, one creative. In March an Agreement was signed between the Workshop and National Educational Television, which spelled out in precise terms the relationship between the two. CTW was to make use of
the legal and administrative support facilities of NET, but the Workshop's Executive Director was to report directly to the President of NET, so avoiding some of the problems experienced in earlier projects (notably the Public Broadcasting Laboratory). It was recognised that the Workshop would make extensive use of the NET distribution network, covering the nation's public television stations, but that at the same time production independence must be guaranteed. The fact that this arrangement was reached without major incident showed a great sensitivity by all involved to the difficulties which might be faced, and a considerable commitment to the project's goals.

The second strand was more academic, but quite fundamental. In June, July and August, a series of five seminars were held in Cambridge, Massachusetts and in New York, during which the goals of the programme were carefully evolved. By this time senior production staff and research staff for the Workshop had been appointed (David Connell, from commercial broadcasting, as executive producer, and Edward Palmer as research director), and the seminars were therefore able to involve all of these in a dialogue with expert workers in the various child-centred fields. The seminars were directed by Gerald Lesser and came to grips, successively, with the series' goals in the areas of social, moral and affective development; language and reading; mathematical and numerical skills; reasoning and problem solving; and perception. Participants were asked to consider creative production proposals as well as goal statements, and out of these exchanges came a statement of the series' intentions which was synthesised as a producers' and researchers' manual. All those concerned considered them to be instrumental in the project's success.

In September 1969, the Workshop staff was enlarged, and the production process began in earnest, with transmissions starting in November 1969.
following an intensive period of pre-publicity (directed both to television stations in the public broadcasting network, and to parents and teachers). The production process itself was based upon principles of formative evaluation: programme concepts were developed through exchanges between producers and researchers, who were initially hired, not solely for their qualifications, but for their breadth of interest and apparent willingness to work together in team settings. Programmes and pilot programmes were developmentally tested, and revisions constantly made, as the series continued. But summative evaluations were also made by the Educational Testing Service of Princeton University, which published its first results in October 1970, after pre- and post-test investigations. This evaluation showed the impact of the series to be significant in most spheres: children who viewed the programme achieved many of the goals in letters, numbers and forms, and gained appreciably in skill in sorting and classifying. The cognitive skills of poor children were increased, in some cases, by as much as 62%, and the popularity of the series was such that it reached almost 7 million children, five days a week. The gains of frequent viewers surpassed those of less-frequent viewers (the frequency variable cutting across social class boundaries); teachers also welcomed the series, though not all considered it to be a useful classroom innovation.

The success of Sesame Street was greater than the Workshop had expected, and it promised well for the next venture, a basic reading series for 7-10 year olds, entitled 'The Electric Company'. The construction of this second series followed comparable principles to Sesame Street, and the first daily series began in October 1971. Again, results were highly encouraging. In a second survey, conducted by independent evaluators in 1972, 85% of teachers had very favourable overall opinions of the series, and similar enthusiasm was reported from students. Specific
gains in reading skills were also reported by more than 80% of teachers.

The success of the Children's Television Workshop has been attributed to a combination of factors: good, flexible planning; the energetic interest of an influential controlling group; the marriage of production and research talents; a rational attitude to financing. However, it was not without its problems. The first anxiety was for how long the formula could be perpetuated: a later production of the Workshop, in the area of health education, was far less successful than its predecessors. The second problem was that of transferability: following its initial success, 'Sesame Street' was sometimes adopted wholesale on many of the world's television screens, and a more cautious approach was urged (making a more judicious cultural adaptation for other countries, as in the version entitled 'Plaza Sesamo'). The third and most intransigent problem was that of finance. The Workshop could not be financed indefinitely from public and private funds, and the Ford Foundation, in 1972, made a terminal grant of 6 million dollars, while in 1974 Federal financing was reduced by some 50%. Additional funds were raised by establishing a products group (franchising articles, based on characters from the series), and some staff cuts were also made. The future of the Workshop was also substantially affected by trends in the public broadcasting system, which was moving away from national programme production towards local initiatives, though at the same time, new approaches to the distribution of public broadcasting were being considered, including satellite interconnection. It was in this context that long-range financing strategies had to be devised, if the Workshop was to continue in the same vein, and with the same security, as during earlier years.
Introduction

The purpose of this scenario is two-fold. Firstly, it is intended as a guide for the planning team, providing a breakdown and phasing for essential activities of the study. Secondly, it is conceived as a reference frame and norm for evaluation in order that the survey may be monitored throughout. Previous studies of communication planning have had to depend largely upon secondary data, as the progress and conduct of planning surveys have rarely been monitored in situ.

The scenario is based upon two main principles. It seeks, in the first place, to secure a compromise between careful pre-planning and scheduling, and flexibility: to profit from detailed creativity, leaving the planning team with genuine responsibility and decision-making capacity. At the same time, it tries to accommodate dimensions of policy and decision-making within its planning strategies, taking account of pragmatic as well as theoretical constraints.
Basic Figures

The key to this approach is seen in Figure I and Table A (to which the scenario is essentially a commentary).

Figure I is a simplified network of the planning process, set within a two-dimensional matrix. In this matrix, the vertical axis is one of time, covering a pre-planning period (basically of data collection and synthesis before the survey), and three main phases beyond. Phase One is a policy making period, during which communication policies are set and articulated, goals and targets evolved and objectives specified. Phase Two covers the strategic planning phase, during which alternative strategies are developed, preferred alternatives chosen, and an overall framework devised. Phase Three is the final period of preparing phased operational plans. The horizontal axis represents the environment of planning. It comprises firstly the communication planning setting (i.e. the planning team and counterparts): secondly, the development planning context (e.g. economic and central government planning); and thirdly, the policy-making and decision-making environment (i.e. government itself). Figure I, therefore, traces the course of the survey through its separate planning phases, in relation to both planning and decision-making forums.

Table A relates these activities more specifically to the phased introduction of planning consultants, and to the chronology of the study.

Constraints

Certain constraints have either been recognised or directly introduced into the survey. It has had to be accepted that the time available is short, and the numbers of specialists small, for a study of this magnitude.
### Figure 1: Planning Scenario for Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEK</th>
<th>POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT PLANNING</th>
<th>COMMUNICATION PLANNING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRE-SURVEY (1-2 months)</td>
<td><strong>PHASE I WEEKS 1-8</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Discuss with (7) Policy Body and Modify</td>
<td>(5) Discuss with Counter-part team and modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>(8) Expand policy statement to goals and targets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>(10) Derive and state objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>(12) Quantify Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>(14) Formulate alternative strategic approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PHASE 2 WEEKS 9-17</strong></td>
<td>(15) Review alternatives with full team and modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>Discuss and (16) Modify</td>
<td>(17) Prepare format for decision-makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Discuss with Policy Body and Select (18) Preferred Strategies</td>
<td>(19) Evolve Macro Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Discuss and (20) Modify</td>
<td>(21) Evolve Phased Strategic Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17</td>
<td>Review and Modify</td>
<td>(23) Research for Operational Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Plan (26)</td>
<td>(24) Evolve Evaluation System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(25) Prepare Plan Format for Decision-makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEEK</td>
<td>POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING</td>
<td>DEVELOPMENT PLANNING</td>
<td>COMMUNICATION PLANNING</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss and Modify</td>
<td>(29) Synthesise Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Review Report (30) and Modify</td>
<td>(31) Prepare Format for Decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(33) Finalise and Submit Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Scenario: TABLE A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description of Activity (Summary)</th>
<th>Team Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>Discuss draft policy statement with counterparts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning and Policy Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>Expand to include goals and targets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss and modify with Planning Body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Derive and State Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>Quantify Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Formulate alternative strategic approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Review alternatives with full team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>17-18</td>
<td>Prepare Format for Decision-Makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Policy Body and Select Preference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>19-20</td>
<td>Evolve macro framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Evolve phased strategic plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>Research for Operational Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Evolve evaluation framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare Plan for decision-makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Team Membership**

- **Team Leader**
- **Deputy Leader (Economist)**
- Systems Analyst
- Team Leader
- Deputy Leader – Economist
- Rural Com. Expert
- Telecom. Expert
- Radio-TV Progr. Expert
- Print & News Ag. Expert
- Film & A-V Expert
- Evaluation Expert
- Systems Analyst
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description of Activity (Summary)</th>
<th>Team Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Review strategic plan with policy body and modify</td>
<td>Team Leader&lt;br&gt;Deputy Leader - Economist&lt;br&gt;Rural Com. Expert&lt;br&gt;Telecom. Expert&lt;br&gt;Evaluation Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Prepare detailed Operational Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Synthesise Report</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Review Report with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td>Deputy Leader - Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Prepare Report Format for Decision-Makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Review with Policy Body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25+</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Finalise and Submit Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A more deliberate restriction derives from the nature of decision-making and decision-making organs. It has been accepted that the time of senior politicians and members of government is limited, and that the possibility of consulting actively with policy-making bodies (and involving these in decisions at various critical points of the survey) is correspondingly restricted. Consequently, the number of such consultations has been reduced to what is considered a practical minimum, less than which co-operative decision-making would have been more nominal than real. (On the other hand, far more dialogue has been assumed with central and sectoral development planning agencies, to whom access is easier. It has also been assumed that in communication planning itself, full-time counterpart specialists to the external team will be available throughout the survey - and this is considered a vital factor for the project's success).

Planning and Decision-Making

Something should also be said about the character and context of planning and decision-making. The purpose of the network shown in Figure I is to pinpoint key activities and decision points, as these occur within a phased planning process. It is not intended to be exhaustive, nor does it (nor can it) contain all the casual interactions between sectors upon which the sensitivity of the survey must depend. Similarly, it does not include other components of briefings, visits, etc. which will be necessary for external specialists (though these are included in the detailed commentary upon Figure I and Table A which follows). However, even within those activities highlighted in the network of Figure I, several kinds of consultation are envisaged. The discussions of the communication planning team, for example, are seen as regular, daily dialogues (and group, preferably open-plan, working is recommended for
the team and its counterparts). Discussions with the development planning agencies are of a different order. In Figure I, the term "planning body" is used as a convenient shorthand to include consultations with a number of planning agencies (some of which may be specially created or convened to assist with the survey). Firstly, it is urged that a representative of the Ministry of Planning should be appointed as a permanent link with the team, and if possible made available full-time to work as a regular team member. At a more formal level, meetings with the Ministry of Planning will be needed to consider particular sets of proposals and to modify these before they attain a wider circulation. It is also recommended that, for the most critical planning meetings, a Co-ordinating Committee should be formed, including representatives of the various ministries concerned (e.g. Information and Culture, Education, Agriculture, Communication etc.) as well as the Planning Ministry, to ensure that sectoral opinion is adequately voiced. The particular level of debate for each activity is indicated in the commentary which follows.

The term "policy body" is used in a similarly generic fashion, to denote a high level of political consultation, appropriate to the options being discussed. Only four occasions are proposed in this scenario at which such a high level of policy discussion is considered essential (as opposed to nine occasions for more formal meetings of the "planning body"). It is hoped that, if the importance of these policy meetings is adequately stressed from the outset, satisfactory arrangements can be made for them to be maintained. In all probability, no single existing body will be suitable for such discussions, and a special Cabinet-level committee may have to be created ad hoc under the Office of the Presidency, to consider the alternatives being proposed and decide orientations. Again, it is the level of representations which is primarily being urged here.
In summary, what is being proposed is as follows:

(1) Communication Planning:

A team made up of external specialists and full time counterparts, drawn (at a middle professional level) from the various Ministries concerned with communication issues.

(2) Development Planning:

(i) A permanent officer placed with the communication planning team;

(ii) A small ad hoc committee formed within the Planning Ministry, to review particular drafts produced by the team, and to relate these to central planning issues;

(iii) A Co-ordinating Committee, formed (at a senior professional level) from the various ministries (and private agencies, if appropriate), concerned with communication issues. This committee, convened by the Planning Ministry, but with nominees from each participating Ministry, would meet on about nine occasions (cf. the scenario and Figure 1) to review critical drafts produced by the communication planning team, after informal negotiations and discussions were complete.

Policy and Decision-Making

A high-level body, under the Office of the Presidency, should be convened to discuss major policy issues arising during, or as a result,
of the survey. This committee would meet on only four occasions; its composition would be subject to advice received from the Afghan Government, through the intermediary agency of the Planning Ministry.

In this proposal, there are evident departures from the Project Document produced for the study. In the project document there was:

- no specific insistence upon full time professional counterparts for the external team;

- no distinction was made between planning and policy-making bodies, especially in the discussion of a Co-ordinating Committee.

Rather it was proposed that liaison officers from the various Ministries would be appointed, who would constitute a Working Group to assist the team during its time in Afghanistan, and who might subsequently form the nucleus of a permanent Co-ordinating Committee. What is suggested here is an amplification of the earlier proposal, which is not in contradiction, but which clearly separates out planning and co-ordination from policy-making functions, and which also provides for permanent counterparts (at a lower level) for the external team. It is believed that these additions are necessary in order to ensure a genuine pattern of participatory decision-making and to equate the concerns of planning and policy more closely.

The scenario which follows consists, therefore, of an expanded commentary upon Figure I and Table A, to which reference should be made in order to retain a perspective of the whole survey. The commentary is weekly based; general introductory remarks are followed by a con-
sideration of specific activities or tasks.

**PREPARATORY PERIOD**

The activities in this period (Tasks 1-4) are not specifically described here; they belong to a preparatory phase, prior to the commencement of the survey. For completeness, they are included in Figure I, but not in Table A; taken together, they cover the processes of data collection, its sifting and analysis to formulate a draft statement of communication policies, the collection of supplementary data, and the synthesis of the whole as:

(i) a statement for initiating debate with the country's planning and decision-making authorities;

(ii) a means of briefing specialists attached to the planning team;

(iii) a basic reference source.

The outcome of this preliminary work (involving both Secretariat and research assistant time) should be a general statement of communication policies, both explicit and implicit, as these are revealed in existing documentation on communication processes and institutions in Afghanistan. This statement should include and highlight apparent anomalies in practice, particularly as these occur between sectors. In discussion with both planning and policy-making bodies, it is through the appraisal of contradictions and the removal of gross anomalies that a more coherent statement of policies will be arrived at. This is needed as a basis for the survey work which follows.
THE MAIN SURVEY

Phase One

Week 1

In this week, the Team Leader, the Economist and the Systems Analyst arrive, meet with counterparts, and begin a round of courtesy calls. (For an initial four-week period, these are the only external specialists present). During this orientation, it is important that they should:

(i) ascertain that all counterpart commitments are being, or will be, met;

(ii) explain to counterparts the organisation of the survey, and its emphasis upon corporate decision-making;

(iii) discuss the draft policy statement, and review the authenticity of the data base;

(iv) set up major meeting dates for the future (in particular, meetings to be arranged with the policy-body);

(v) determine the exact form and context of planning and policy-making bodies;

(vi) evaluate working arrangements and administrative support;

(vii) identify contact points and key figures in the various sectors participating in the study.
Task 5: Discuss Draft Policy Statement with Counterpart Team

The draft policy statement should have been distributed to counterparts only, prior to the team's arrival. The first meeting with the counterpart team should, therefore, serve as orientation to the whole survey, introducing the draft, examining the anomalies which it contains (and which will have to be reconciled) and explaining its relationship to the survey's organisation.

After the first meeting, an interval should be allowed (while briefing visits proceed), to allow counterparts to digest and validate information in the policy statement. Meetings later in the week will lead to some modification of the document.

A preliminary meeting with the Planning Ministry should set in motion other consultative arrangements, especially for:

(i) the appointment of a Planning Ministry counterpart;

(ii) the form and composition of the planning Co-ordinating Committee;

(iii) the creation of an appropriate policy making body.

Tentative time scales and dates should also be discussed.

Task 6: Discuss Policy Draft with Planning Body and Modify

Towards the end of the same week, a second meeting should be arranged with the Planning Body to review the policy document, and consider possible
strategies for its modification. A suitable format for presentation to the policy-making body should also be reviewed.

Week 2

During this week, a routine of team/counterpart working and consultation should be established, further briefing visits undertaken and a programme for other visits (including distant visits) evolved. (Some of these may best be reserved for the arrival of the main team, to reduce time and expense. However, it should be stressed that, for this particular survey, the time constraints are such that extensive visits must be avoided, and reliance placed upon counterpart knowledge; a basic briefing for experts is needed, but detailed enquiries will be impossible.

Task 7: Discuss Policy Statement further with Planning Body and with Policy Body and Modify

Two significant meetings are scheduled for this second week: with formal planning and policy making bodies respectively. The first is a meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee (made up of senior representatives of various interested Ministries). It is at this meeting that, apart from a general airing of the study's scope and purpose, the matter of sectoral co-ordination will be initially raised; discussion will be based upon the draft policy document (revised partially after the discussions of Week I, and circulated in advance to participants). No consensus can be expected at this time, and it should be emphasised that the issues are also being presented, in the same few days, to the policy body for review.

The meeting with the policy body (constituted according to the
Planning Ministry's advice) should, therefore, come relatively late in this second week. The format agreed upon as a basis for discussion should again be circulated in advance of the meeting to allow time for review, and the meeting should begin with an orientation conducted by the team leader and counterpart officers, explaining the organisation of the study, and in particular the pattern of co-operative decision-making. The main function of the first policy meeting (apart from promotion) will be to establish ground-rules for the study, agree survey design, and in particular to approach issues of sectoral priority and disagreement. It is unlikely that these issues will be resolved in a single session; they will have to be pursued through correspondence and informal meetings. A means of arbitration may finally be required, and should be discussed in advance.

**Week 3**

In this week a more routine dialogue with the Planning Ministry needs to be established and a calendar of meetings over the six-month period should be fixed. Links should be set up with other projects touching upon the communication field (cf. project document listing) and specialist consultants and advisers within the country identified (as reference points for later team members). Further informational and statistical searches are begun on matters arising out of the policy meeting. A revised policy statement is produced for circulation incorporating, tentatively, any changes proposed to restrict sectoral independence in the interests of cohesion. As argued above, this last activity will be time consuming and will run parallel to other tasks listed below, but it must be complete, and agreement reached generally (after arbitration if necessary), by Week 11 at the latest. An earlier resolution would be preferable, but if necessary outstanding issues can be finally resolved at the time of (and in the con-
text of) alternative strategic approaches.

**Task 8: Expand Policy Statement to Include Goals and Targets**

This is part of a gradual programme of concretisation of policies, leading towards the formulation and quantification of objectives. The first step is the determination of goals (as a preliminary expression of desired societal outcomes and of communication philosophy), and targets (preliminary versions of phasing and quantification).

**Task 9: Discuss and Modify with Planning Body**

Task 9 continues with the matching of communication goals and targets to overall development goals. Here (and in immediately subsequent tasks) the main dialogue is with the Planning Ministry, but at each stage there must also be informal involvement of other sectoral representatives. Finally (after negotiation) the formal approval of the Co-ordinating Committee is required. The pattern is, therefore, one of gradual refinement, followed (once issues are understood, and sectoral points of view exposed and accommodated as far as possible) by a confirmatory session. As far as possible, conflict issues should be resolved in advance of the major Co-ordinating Committee meeting.

Some flexibility in phasing must be accepted during these early stages of discussion, provided that the final deadline (of Week 11) is respected. Many of the activities leading up to this deadline may be run concurrently, given a clear distribution of functions as between members of the counterpart team, the team leader and the deputy team leader/economist.
Week 4

By this time initial briefings, visits etc. should be completed and the process of formulating objectives continuously under way.

Task 10: Derive and State Objectives

The intention in this task is to make the articulation of objectives as clear, as full, as coherent and as detailed as possible (and wherever possible expressed in outcomes which can be measured and evaluated). This goal is not easy to fulfill and, initially at least, a more general presentation may have to be accepted, to be modified, expanded and strengthened as the study proceeds. It should be remembered that, in many cases, objectives are implicit, only becoming apparent as concrete discussions of the planning design (and especially the selection between alternatives) continue. At the macro level of a communication system, not all objectives can be expressed in behavioural terms, but clearly the more frequently that this is done, the better for the evaluator.

Week 5

Task 11: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify

Here, as for most of the interactions represented in the network, more than one exchange is envisaged. The assumption is not that the communication planning group will agree, unilaterally, a draft statement, which can then be passed over to the Planning Ministry for comment; rather, a more regular, multi-way dialogue is envisaged. The symbolisation of this activity (and comparable activities) in Figure I as a single exchange is only a convenience in graphic coding.
Week 6

Task 12: Quantify Objectives

Task 13: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify

The first draft of objectives, after discussion, is put to the test of quantification. The purpose of this activity is not primarily to specify definite numerical quantities, but more to assist in the precision of objectives in general, and to force a greater coincidence between communication objectives and those of general development planning (which are already, to a greater or lesser extent, quantified). A coincidence of phasing, in particular, between these two planning sets is crucial.

Weeks 7 and 8

Task 14: Formulate alternative strategic approaches

The following month is taken up with the preparation of alternative strategies which might be contemplated in meeting the objectives derived for the communication system. Their basic formulation is undertaken by the team leader, deputy team leader and counterpart team, prior to the arrival of the main team. Clearly, the precision with which these alternative strategies are formulated will depend upon the clarity with which goals, targets and objectives have been framed earlier, but however precise these are, there will be more than one possible way of meeting them.

The preparation of alternative plans has a number of benefits. In the first place, it provides planning and policy-making bodies with a concrete set of options, and a range of choice which is not confined to the
those planners and decision-makers who are not completely familiar with communication methods and processes will be in a much better position, if they are able to base their selection upon practical options. Secondly, the preparation of alternative strategies will, in many cases, bring to light elements of communication policy which have previously been neglected, or simply not realised. Thirdly, while there will have been some attempt, in the articulation of objectives, to rank these in an order of priority, it is through their incorporation into specific proposals for a communication system that the real order of priorities becomes explicit. And fourthly, assuming that there are still areas of sectoral dissent and competition, these can best be highlighted (and compromises evolved) within the context of coherent communication plans, which will then point up, in discussion, the consequences of unilateral sectoral action, or of attempting to divert scarce resources to a variety of incompatible ends.

The basic formulation of strategies is probably best done (judging from experience in other planning contexts) by a relatively small number of people: in any case, the financial and manpower constraints attached to this study make it impossible for the process to be worked through with the contribution of a full external team.

It is further proposed that, at this particular stage, the Planning Ministry should not be as regularly involved as heretofore (apart from their permanent representative for the study). The preparation of specific strategies is a technical exercise best undertaken by communication specialists.
Phase Two

Week 9

With Phase Two, other members of the external team arrive, and a proportion of the first two weeks must be devoted to briefing them on the current position, allowing for orientation visits, and providing time for documentation to be digested. It is assumed that all team members will have been given in advance of their arrival a full set of briefing documents, including the original draft policy statement, and its accompanying data bank. The new documentation should include the agreed formulation of policies, the statement of goals, targets and objectives, and what has so far been prepared in the way of alternative strategies. An early part of the briefing must be devoted to explanations and discussions, between the team leader, deputy team leader and all team members, of the organisation of the study, the results which have so far been achieved and (most particularly), the constraints which are placed upon the weeks which follow.

It must be understood, and accepted by the team, that the time available for the survey and the phasing of the team's composition does not allow for any radical changes of direction. The formulation of policies, and their translation into goals, targets and objectives, must be taken as a sine qua non. Equally, there will be little time for extensive briefing in situ for team members, or an elaborate programme of visits. It is the specialised knowledge of team members which is being solicited; local data will have to be accepted largely upon the valuation of the counterpart team. This is not to say that additional briefings will not be possible, or necessary, but they must be made in pursuit of specific enquiries, directly associated with the consideration of alternative strategies, or with ensuing
strategic and operational plans.

**Task 15: Review Alternatives with Main Team**

During Week 9 and over the first days of the following week, the preparation of alternatives must be completed, finalised through regular team meetings, and the implications of particular strategies must be thoroughly thought through and committed to paper. This will place a burden upon specialists newly arrived in the country, but it seems inevitable given time constraints. A departure from the critical path at this stage will have a disastrous effect upon later activities, and could, if allowed to continue unchecked, mean the wastage of specialist talents and knowledge (since it would defer the stage of strategic and operational planning to a point at which the specialists had departed). It is likely that, over this particular period, some abnormal strains will occur, and considerable delicacy and firmness will be required of the team leader and deputy team leader.

**Week 10**

**Task 16: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify**

By the end of the week, the devising of alternative strategies should have reached a point where it can be presented to, and discussed with, the Planning Ministry. Preliminary informal discussions with the Planning Ministry and with sectoral representatives should be followed by a Co-ordinating Committee meeting. (The first informal meetings will help track down inconsistencies in the various strategies as compared with overall development plans; meetings with sectoral representatives will also highlight individual reactions, since each option is likely to prove advantageous, or disadvantageous, when seen from a sectoral viewpoint.
Some negotiations and modifications may, therefore, be necessary before the full Co-ordinating Committee meeting is held. The formal Co-ordinating Committee meeting will inevitably air options and preferences, but it should be emphasised that it is not a decision-making occasion).

**Week 11**

From the decision-making viewpoint, this is also a critical week, as it is during this period that a preferred mix - as between various options proposed - will be chosen, and the outlines of the main strategic plan clarified.

**Task 17: Prepare Format for Decision-Makers**

The first part of the week should be devoted to the presentation of alternatives. A policy-making body cannot be expected to consider the detail of available options with the same degree of attention, or the same specialist knowledge, as a planning body; therefore, main outlines must be summarised, major implications made clear and pursued, and the format of the whole presented as attractively and intelligibly as possible. There will be little time available for this work, and some consideration of the tasks involved should have been given by the team leader and deputy in earlier weeks. Moreover, there will be a burden on secretarial and supporting facilities, which should also be anticipated in advance.

**Task 18: Discuss with Policy-Making Body and Select Options**

It is unlikely that, from the range of options presented to the policy making body, any one particular option will be preferred: a mixture which accommodates political forces is far more likely. Documents should be made
available to the policy making body at least a day in advance, and a full
and formal meeting should be prefaced by an explanation, from the team
leader and counterpart leader, of how the options were arrived at (i.e. in
relation to the policy statement), the significance of each alternative and
the implications which are foreseen. After this initial presentation, the
team (if all are present - this is debatable and can be decided in situ)
should play a subordinate role, advising and intervening only as required.
Again, tact and delicacy are required, to advance discussions without any
hint of dominance. At the end of the meeting, the team leader (directed by
the meeting's chairman) should be prepared to summarise conclusions, in
such a way that a mandate for continued work is given, without necessarily
waiting for approved minutes. It is of course likely that second thoughts
will occur, and after the conclusion of the meeting, some modifications
will probably be necessary to the overall strategy proposed, as a result of
further consultations and some lobbying. But broad outlines of agreement,
at least, are needed.

Week 12

This week offers a breath pause, and a time for assimilation. A "macro
framework" is proposed; what this amounts to is a clear statement of the
choices made at the policy meeting, in a format which commands general
acceptance and credibility. In technical rather than political matters,
some further contributions from the Planning Ministry may be expected.

Task 19: Evolve Macro Framework

Task 20: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify

The format of the macro framework, therefore, is a short descriptive
account, with illustrative diagrams, of the mix of strategies and options chosen, and its relationship with earlier statements of policy, goals, targets, objectives etc. This document can serve as an explicit record of discussions to date; after corroboration from the Planning Ministry it can be fairly widely circulated, and it will act as a blueprint for the team in their preparation of more specified plans (and of course for the final report). Some care is therefore needed in its presentation, and its format (for circulation) should have an authoritative character. With this document the period of focusing down, of trial and of selection, is concluded, and the remaining tasks of the team, though considerable, are at the same time more technical, more dependent upon specialised knowledge and enquiry, and less open to political speculation. It should be noted, too, that by this time, the halfway point of the study has been reached.

Week 13

In this and the following week, briefings have to be arranged for the newly arrived evaluation, film and audio-visual specialists (arranged ad hoc and scheduled between other team activities which must take precedence).

The main events which follow over subsequent weeks follow a more traditional pattern for work of this kind - the preparation and in-fill of strategic plans, their translation into operational sequences, and the incorporation of an evaluation framework, leading to a final complete report.

Task 21: Evolve Phased Strategic Plan

From the overall framework, it will be the function of the team,
working as a whole (in group discussion) to develop the **phased outline** of a strategic plan for the system. This phased outline has two functions: to develop the first, skeletal framework of an operational plan; and to indicate the extent of the planning activities which have still to be undertaken, in such a way that some division of labour is possible between team personnel. One of the main disadvantages of the time constraints is that they limit the team members to an overall span of two months: their particular expertise will, therefore, not be available when the detailed operational plan is produced and the final report drafted. The only means of mitigating this position is to estimate in advance what individual, specialised inputs will be required (particularly in technical areas, costing and scheduling), so that the necessary research can be done early. The phased outline consequently differs from the macro framework mostly in the degree to which activities are pinpointed in time, over an appropriate planning period, and their elemental strands networked. At the same time, the needs for quantification (in such matters as institution building, training, programming, materials production and distribution etc.) should be foreseen and extrapolated for each specialist. Charts, networks, tables etc. are essential at this stage.

**Week 14**

**Task 22: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify**

The strategic plan, in its tentative form, can be discussed immediately with the Planning Ministry; since it is similar in form to other development programmes, it will cause the professional planner little difficulty in assimilation, and his critique is likely to be directly relevant and useful. Furthermore, the more difficulties which can be eliminated at this relatively early stage (and areas of potential disagreement), the less the more detailed stages of preparation are likely to suffer.
Weeks 15 and 16

These weeks mark the final period during which the whole team is available; for optimisation of effort, therefore, a number of tasks are scheduled concurrently. The task of co-ordination and liaison will fall upon the team leader. Some group meetings will be necessary to ensure that a degree of cross-fertilisation is taking place, but they should be kept to a minimum. It is at this particular period that individual work by specialists will pay off most (and for this reason, the dialogue with planning and policy-making bodies is interrupted, to capitalise upon individual effort).

The tasks involved are as follows:

Task 23: Research for Operational Plan

Under the guidance of the team leader and deputy team leader, basic data (costs, technical detail, projects etc.) for the construction of the operational plan are researched, and other enquiries progressed. This will in all likelihood involve correspondence with Headquarters, or with other external agencies, for which adequate time has to be provided.

Task 24: Evolve Evaluation Framework

One of the drawbacks of the team's composition and phasing is that an evaluation specialist cannot be made available throughout the study. He has, however, been brought into the team at the best point available: early enough for him to consider evaluation strategies before planning detail has been finalised, but late enough for him to contribute to actual plan construction. His task will be to devise an evaluation strategy for the communication
system proposed and of its components, so that these can be incorporated into the plan as a whole. If this is not done, evaluation is likely to become an appendage to the system (and hence a dispensable component, vulnerable to financial astringencies). It should be emphasised that the greater needs are for formative and process evaluation. Summative forms can be added more easily later, and are in any case traditionally more acceptable.

Task 25: Prepare Plan for Decision-Makers

This is primarily a task for the leader and deputy team leader. It is important, before the main team disperses, that a coherent presentation of the strategic plan (as far as it has been developed) should be made to decision-makers. This presentation will serve two purposes. In the first place, it will act as a final check with policy-makers that intentions have been properly construed, before an elaborate report is begun. Secondly, it will help promote the importance of the final plan, and orient those responsible for the policy towards practical implementation, in a way that a report alone could never do. Again, some attention must be given to format and the presentation made as thorough, yet as clear and attractive, as possible. If time permits, some appropriate use of audio-visual resources can be made.

Week 17

Task 26: Review and Modify Strategic Plan

In this final week before the departure of the majority of the specialists, the presentation planned in Task 25 above is made, and suggestions and reactions noted. The presentation should come early
enough in the week to allow for final additions from consultants, if these are found necessary. In some cases, further correspondence may be required during the report-writing stage.

Phase Three

Weeks 18 and 19

Task 27: Prepare Detailed Operational Plan

The two weeks which begin Phase Three are a time of intensive activity for those members of the external team who remain (the leader, the deputy team leader, the rural development specialist, and the evaluator) and for the counterpart team. Upon them falls the principal burden of expanding the strategic plan and synthesising the individual contributions of other specialists, into a detailed and phased operational plan. The shape of operational plans is well known; it includes components of technical design and specification, organisation and administration, finance, personnel (including training), materials design, production and distribution and co-ordination; all of these have also to be interrelated, phased and networked.

Week 20

Task 28: Discuss with Planning Body and Modify

The consultations with the Planning Ministry at this stage are mainly upon presentation and technical detail; it is probably better for drafts of the plan to be circulated, and comments solicited, than to hold a full Co-ordinating Committee meeting. (If the latter is held, then it should come after sectoral reactions have been obtained - a formal meeting is not
the best forum for discussing a specific report). The work of the evaluator is of special importance at this time, as he will shortly be leaving the team; any critique of the strategy which he is proposing should be obtained early.

Week 21

Task 29: Synthesis Report

For the remainder of the time available, the focus of attention is upon two tasks: the preparation of the final, consolidated report, and its presentation and submission to the decision-making body in such a way that real outcomes are likely.

It must be accepted that time and logistics (including publication problems) will almost certainly prohibit the report from being issued in Afghanistan (hence the labelling of the final week as 25+). However, its overall shape must be clear enough for a terminal presentation to be made to the highest policy level (by the team leader, the counterpart leader and their deputies). In preparing for the report synthesis, both needs should be kept in mind: the collation and editing of materials; and the preparation of a summary version in advance, to facilitate the closing stages of the team's work. The actual form of the report should be kept flexible, sensitive to events as they occur. It should at one and the same time be a truthful record of the team's experiences and a coherent treatment of its conclusions. It should also be reasonably brief.

In all probability the report will contain:

1. A summary of findings and of the system proposed.
2. A summary of policies, goals, targets and objectives (and of the processes by which these were derived).

3. The overall framework and strategic plan proposal.

4. The detailed operational plan (with financial and quantitative projections).

5. Annexes (giving technical and supporting information - including statistics), sources and references consulted, and other ancillary materials produced (e.g. the evaluation framework proposed).

Whatever the actual format adopted, it will be imperative for a summary volume to be available, which draws together basic information for decision-makers and review missions, since these are unlikely to master the fuller version. This should be presented in an attractive format with some graphic illustration.

Week 22

Task 30: Review Report with Planning Body and Modify

At this stage, as argued above, it will be logistically impossible to review a full report - but an explanation of format and of context, and possibly a draft summary, can be undertaken with the Planning Ministry. This is not an occasion for a formal meeting, and there will be little advantage at this stage (and some disadvantage) in exposing the drafting to sectoral review. What is basically required is an informal dialogue with the Planning Ministry, with particular emphasis laid upon the form
Week 23

Task 31: Prepare Report Format for Decision-Makers

The main focus of attention at this time is upon the concluding main presentation by the team to decision-makers; any audio-visual support should be solicited early. A time-table should also be agreed for report printing and publication, and for channels of communication.

Week 24

Task 32: Review with Policy Body

The presentation should be prefaced by a full review of the study's history, the co-operative means by which decisions have been reached, and in particular, the ways and means by which follow-up can be achieved. The initial presentation will be the responsibility of the team leader and counterpart, but as before, following their detailed introduction, they should play a subordinate role in the discussion which follows.

Week 25+

Task 33: Finalise and Submit Report

It is assumed that the publication and submission of the report will be completed outside Afghanistan, and their form dictated by the resources available. However, this should be only a mechanistic process; the contents of the report should all be agreed before the remnants of the team leave
and the period of publication should not be used for major editorial revisions. However, editing for the sake of conciseness and brevity can profitably be undertaken at this time.

Final Note

Nothing in this scenario should be construed to mean that its time-scales and activities are inviolate, or that flexibility is eliminated. On the contrary, it will be most important for the team, when on the ground, to respond to unforeseen pressures and to add, delete or re-shape tasks in the light of new and specific knowledge.

For the sake of evaluation, however, all departures from the original plan should be carefully noted, and a record kept by the team leader and his deputy of the reasons for divergence, and the consequences of all changes of plan. (At a later stage, a more precise evaluation framework for the survey itself will be prepared). Even more important, when alterations of plan are envisaged, their impact upon other activities which follow must be carefully judged, and both the scenario and Figure I re-phased to accommodate change; flexibility does not imply improvisation. In their present form, Figure I and Table A are still over-simplified and tentative, and may usefully be expanded immediately prior to the survey.
INTRODUCTION

The Project

The Communication System Planning Survey (CSPS), carried out jointly by UNESCO and the Government of Afghanistan, aimed basically at preparing a long-term (10-12 years) plan for the communications sector of Afghanistan. The plan was to include broad outlines for specific courses of action in regard to the development of infrastructure, production, distribution, utilisation, manpower, training, research and evaluation, etc, within the overall communication sector. This was to be based upon an assessment of the overall needs with respect to the utilisation and production of communication media and associated services (e.g., telecommunication infrastructure, printing facilities, field and extension services, manpower training, etc).

The CSPS is unique in many ways:

- it was the first ever exercise attempting to prepare a complete, long-term plan for all the communication media of a whole country.
it was the first attempt at considering the communication sector as a total system and applying concepts of systems analysis to it.

for the first time systematic planning procedures were sought to be used on a communication planning exercise of this magnitude.

The Process

A detailed description of the survey, and the specific responsibilities of UNESCO and the Government of Afghanistan, have been spelt out in a Plan of Operation which forms the basis for the survey. This calls for a joint team, with UNESCO-hired consultants and national counterparts working together on the project.

The planning procedure and tasks were documented in a Scenario, whose purpose was to serve as a guideline in the process of evolving a plan.

This Study

One of the implicit aims of the project was, therefore, to study the applicability and usefulness of the Scenario. Specifically, to use this project as a field trial of the suggested planning framework, as a learning experience regarding how best to use such planning techniques, what modifications are required and what elements are missing, etc. This necessitates a comparison of the plan with what was actually done and an analysis of the reasons for deviations. It is important to know whether the deviations from the original plan were due to conceptual reasons, or factors in the local situation, or pragmatic operational constraints.
This study aims at examining the application of the Scenario: analysing and commenting on deviations from it, and trying to draw lessons for future communication planning exercises. The presentation - in the best tradition of systems analysis - relies considerably on charts, tables and figures which are largely self-explanatory, rather than on detailed descriptions.

THE PLANNING SCENARIO

As mentioned earlier, the planning exercise was to be based on a Scenario prepared specially for this project. The Scenario attempts to take a systems view of the planning process. It had two purposes: to serve as a guide for the planning team, and to be used as a reference frame and norm for evaluation. It is based on securing a compromise between careful pre-planning and scheduling, and flexibility. It also tries to accommodate dimensions of policy and decision-making within its planning strategies, taking account of pragmatic as well as theoretical constraints.

It contains a detailed break-down and description of each task, and is scheduled on a week-by-week basis. Three main stages of work are identified: policy-making, strategic planning and phased operational planning. This work is seen to flow through three different levels, which are identified as: the communication planning team, development agencies, and policy-making bodies.

The Scenario also contains a clear note that its time-scales and activities are not inviolate. The need and desirability of responding to unforeseen pressures and making changes in the light of new knowledge
are explicitly recognised

Planning Network

The summarised network of the planning process as envisaged in the Scenario is presented in Figure 1. It is seen from this that the Scenario aimed basically at a step-by-step process, by and large proceeding to a new activity only when all the previous ones had been completed. Thus, little parallel effort and no iterative processes have been envisaged.

Conceptual Base

The conceptual base of the Scenario can be summarised as follows:

1. It is based mainly on a "linear-sequential" flow of activities. Thus, a logical step-by-step process is assumed.

2. A static model is implied: specific thought does not seem to be given to the possibility of changing policies or objectives during the 10 to 12 years time-frame considered for the project.

3. Continuous consultation and discussion with the government, and participative/interactive decision-making are essential parts of the overall scheme.

4. The planning process is built around communication policies and objectives, which are assumed to be already in existence.

5. Active interest and involvement of the government is assumed as a basis for all the work.
A later section examines this conceptual base, and the assumptions implicit behind it, in relation to reality.

Strategy

The Scenario assumed that the starting point of the project would be a draft policy statement, prepared before the arrival of the project team in Afghanistan. This would be ratified formally at the policy level within two weeks, so that the team could then go on to targets, goals and objectives. The strategy was to proceed systematically, step-by-step from these to a final plan.

It was envisaged that at a number of major points in the planning process there would be consultations and discussions with appropriate government authorities, especially through the meetings of a formal Coordination Committee. This would be in addition to the close involvement and collaboration of the counterpart team working on a full-time basis. At a few specific points, discussions with a policy body were also envisaged. The strategy was to get guidance on only crucial issues from the policy makers and to settle all other operational and planning issues at lower levels, where more frequent consultations would be possible. While directions and choices would have to be made all the time, a specific policy decision from the government would be required only at one point: choosing the preferred strategic option.

The mode of operation of the project would be that the team leader and deputy team leader would more or less stay throughout the project, while other international consultants would come in for brief periods.
In order to understand the constraints on the planning process and the deviations from the original plan, it is crucial to have some appreciation of the environment within which the planning exercise was carried out. Planning is affected by three kinds of variables: conceptual, operational and situational. The first two of these are dealt with in other sections of this paper; here, the situational factors that influenced the planning process are listed. A discussion of their effect in terms of changes from the original plan are discussed separately in a later section.

The situational problems (and only problems are mentioned here) can be broadly classified into three categories: data/demography problems, cultural problems, and socio-economic/political problems. It should be clarified that these were problems for this project and most of these are common to almost all developing countries. It is clearly recognised that these arise from historic circumstances and are inevitable concomitants to under-development: no criticism is implied or intended. The main problems are summarised below:

Data/Demography Problems

1. Lack of data; Little data exists on several crucial factors such as number and spread of radio receivers, radio listening habits, literacy figures for each area, detailed demographic data (estimates exist, but are disputed; the first national census is due only in 1978), etc. Even where data does exist, its reliability is often in doubt.
Cultural Problems

2. Alienation problems: As in most developing countries, the foreign-educated and/or "western"-culture-oriented administrators and technocrats in Kabul probably have little empathy or understanding of their own rural residents. Thus, depending on their subjective insights is not necessarily a good replacement for the non-existent data.

3. Language difficulties: The fact that none of the international consultants knew the local language did not prove to be a major problem. However, it certainly impeded free and easy communication with counterparts. Also, it increased the "adjustment period" of the consultants and hindered the early establishment of rapport with counterparts and with environment. Most importantly, it caused operational delays since documents had often to be translated from English into Dari and vice-versa.

4. A traditional bureaucratic administrative system:

As in most developing countries, Afghanistan too is saddled with the typical problems of a traditional and inflexible bureaucratic system of administration. It is characterised by:

(i) strong "territorial" boundaries between Ministries/departments - reflected especially in an unwillingness to discuss problems of other departments
(ii) lack of horizontal coordination between Ministries

(iii) little delegation of power or authority

(iv) a "dependence syndrome", caused possibly by massive aid programmes and foreign inputs (two thirds of the present Seven Year Plan is foreign-financed), resulting in an unwillingness to take the initiative or to make decisions.

(v) a bureaucratic reward and punishment system, which punishes wrong decisions or actions, but overlooks sins of omission. This reduced initiative and risk-taking.

(vi) poor information flow between and within Ministries.

Socio-economic/Political Problems

5. Priority to physical inputs: An understandable, though exaggerated, importance seemed to be placed on all physical inputs as opposed to planning. The result for this project was a seeming lack of priority - and even interest - at higher levels in communication planning. This was in marked contrast to the priority and importance given to the setting up of physical facilities - the TV station, for example.

6. Overwhelming importance of immediate problems: In any developing country, where mere existence itself is a day-to-day problem for a majority of the population, the need to focus effort on present
problems is obvious. However, from the point of view of a long-term planning project, this can be a problem.

THE ACTUAL PROCESS

Network

Since the draft policy document was not ready when the project started, the original plan contained in the Scenario had obviously to be modified. A new PERT/CPM chart was therefore prepared by the team. As work progressed, changes had to be made even in this modified network. A simplified version of the network representing the actual planning process is shown in Figure 2, and this best summarises the actual experience in the execution of this project. This simplified network does not show the meetings and discussions held with various levels of the government at a number of times during the project. These are indicated in Figure 3 (in next section).

Description

The first few weeks were taken up by the process of trying to determine the overall communication policy of the country. Since no clearly defined and articulated communication policy seemed to exist, this task had to begin with data collection. Based on various policy documents of the government (the Constitution, Seven Year Plan, speeches by important national leaders, etc) and interviews with important officials, a draft paper on communication policy was prepared. This raised certain specific policy questions and the intention was to get answers to these from a Minister-level policy body. In the absence of such a body for this project, and delays in meeting individual Ministers, definite answers could not be got immediately. In view of the time constraints,
the team decided to go ahead on other fronts without awaiting high-level policy guidance. This mode of working simultaneously on different tasks had to be followed throughout the project.

Since the tasks of getting the overall communication policy and objectives seemed to be rather difficult and time consuming, it was decided to try and determine these on a sectoral basis. This decision was also based on information that, by and large, different sectors were free to make their own communication policies and objectives within the broad general framework of overall government policy. Accordingly, efforts were initiated to determine the communication policies and objectives of each relevant sector. Based on these sectoral inputs, an attempt was made to put together an overall picture in terms of communication policy. However, it became clear that a sectoral - as opposed to global - approach would have to be used. Accordingly, goals and target audiences were determined on a sectoral basis. None of these existed: they had to be "created". Existing sectoral strategies too had to be determined, and goals and targets revised in the light of these. This was an iterative process involving policies, objectives, goals and targets. Based on these, preliminary future sectoral strategies and operational plans were formulated.

Some areas of overlap and duplication between sectors was noticed and this issue (with possible options) was referred to the policy level. In the absence of immediate decisions on all these issues, the team went ahead by assuming the choice of a particular option.

After choosing from the various possibilities a preferred strategy for each sector in consultation with representatives of that sector, detailed sectoral operational plans were prepared along with a preliminary
macro-framework. The finalisation of an evaluation framework preceded these tasks. Sectoral plans were then integrated into a final overall macro-framework. In some cases this required some modification of the sectoral plans and thus this was basically an iterative exercise. Simultaneously, a preliminary overall phased plan was evolved and the main recommendations were discussed with the government. Based on these, a preliminary report and final overall phased plan were prepared. After this, the writing of the final report was taken up.

Counterparts

Full time counterparts were not available at any point in the project. Consultations and discussions had, therefore, to be carried out on an ad-hoc basis and through two formal committees which were set up: a Communication Planning Council (CPC) and a Presidents' Communication Council (PCC).

Both had representatives from all the concerned Ministries and agencies; the CPC representatives being operating-level personnel, and the PCC consisting of departmental heads (Presidents). During the six-month project, the CPC met five times and the PCC four times. Efforts to form a policy-level group at Ministerial or sub-Ministerial level did not succeed and policy discussions were limited to meetings with individual Ministers (three such meetings were held throughout the project duration).

In spite of efforts to get guidance or approval of the general thrust of the plans from the policy level, Minister-level meetings could be held only once mid-way through the project and then only at the stage when the report was already finalised.
Decision-making

The lack of full-time counterparts meant that the work was carried out not by a joint team, but basically by foreign consultants - though, of course, with frequent consultations and discussions with government officials. As a result, the foreign consultants implicitly had to make a number of decisions, in spite of the original plan to involve counterparts at all stages of the planning and decision-making processes.

To determine policy choices, the team adopted the method of preparing a paper outlining the issues and giving possible options. This worked, but only to a limited extent. The main problems were:

(i) Many of the issues transcended the Ministerial boundaries and thus required inter-Ministerial discussions, which did not take place.

(ii) Since no formal policy-level body was formed for the project, the process of getting views and guidelines even from individual Ministers proved to be a time-consuming one. Rather than allow these problems to bring work to a standstill, further tasks were undertaken by assuming the choice of a particular option.

ANALYSIS OF DEVIATIONS FROM THE SCENARIO

This section presents the deviations made from the original scenario in the actual process of planning. These deviations were due to a number of reasons: some pragmatic, others situational and a few conceptual. A comparison of the networks for the plan and for the actual process (Figures
1 and 2) indicate the differences. For ease of reference and understanding, Figure 3 presents a summarised form of the planning process as originally envisaged and as actually carried out. In this, exactness has been traded off for simplicity, but the basic process in each case has been faithfully adhered to.

Conceptual Deviations:

Policy: The Figures highlight the step-by-step, linear-sequential mode of the original plan, in contrast to the approach of tasks-in-parallel adopted in reality. It also shows the considerable time which had to be devoted to the task of determining communication policies. In terms of both time and effort, this was a major deviation from the Scenario which had assumed that a draft policy statement would be ready even before the project started, so that it would only need to be discussed, modified and formally ratified. The project team did draft a policy document in the first few weeks, but unfortunately this could not be discussed at the policy level for a long time. It was this delay that necessitated the strategy of working simultaneously on several fronts rather than on a task-by-task basis.

However, while the initial reason for working simultaneously on policy, objectives, goals and targets was merely the result of operational exigencies (the time constraint), later it was found to be a conceptual necessity. This was because a definite "communication policy" did not exist when the project started: it had to be created.

The same was true of objectives and goals. In this process, the team found that the relationship between these was not a undirectional,
linear-sequential one of the type shown below and assumed in the Scenario.

\[
\text{POLICY} \rightarrow \text{GOALS & TARGETS} \rightarrow \text{OBJECTIVES}
\]

Rather, it was a complex interacting relationship, and each of the factors could be arrived at only on an iterative basis. Thus, the relationship can be symbolised as below:

\[
\text{POLICY}
\]

\[
\text{GOALS & TARGETS} \leftrightarrow \text{OBJECTIVES}
\]

It is debatable as to whether policy should (or even can) be influenced by objectives or by goals and targets; however, the fact is that in the real-world situation, "policy" is necessarily an amalgam of the desirable and possible, of philosophy and pragmatism, of achievable targets and populist goals. In such a situation, the interplay between the three (as shown above) is not only inevitable, but even necessary. In fact, the three can be considered as part of a single package and not as easily separable, distinct units. This was the approach that the team was finally forced to adopt.

In situations where a pre-defined, clearly articulated communication policy does exist, the linear, unidirectional flow model may be valid. However, one should note that there are few countries in the world fulfilling this pre-requisite. In all other situations, varying amounts of iterations with other factors will be necessary before "policy" can be "created".

In this context, it is also necessary to note that there are possible semantic problems with words like goals, objectives and strategies: these convey different concepts to different people. In many disciplines, strategy - for example - follows from policy, while goals and objectives
could be tactical, and therefore changing with time or with the situation.

**Temporal validity:** A larger problem that arises for a long-term planning project is the degree of immutability of policies and objectives. In the rapidly changing world environment, with exponential rates of change in technologies, can fixed policies and objectives be laid down at all? Especially in developing countries, the rate of change is extremely rapid, both in the technological and socio-economic spheres. Change can be even more rapid and drastic in the field of politics. In such cases, what is the temporal validity of a policy or of objectives? The Scenario is based on a static model, and so was the actual planning process. However, whether these models stand the test of time is yet to be seen.

**Planning philosophy:** Another major deviation from the Scenario was in the very philosophy of planning. The scenario was based primarily on an "up-to-down" planning process. This "planning from above" was implicit in the logical flow from communication policies (overall) to objectives, goals, targets and alternative strategies. Though not explicitly stated, these seem to be at the global or total-system (as opposed to sectoral) level. In actual practice, the team was forced to follow a contrary course and resort to "bottom-up" planning: policies and objectives had to be determined at sectoral levels, since no overall communication policy existed. Having begun in this mode, it was carried further and even strategies were worked out only at the sectoral level. It was only after a preferred sectoral strategy had been selected, and operational plans prepared for each sector, that an overall macro-framework was put together. Thus, though the process was not strictly a "bottom-up" one, it did involve a sectoral-to-global approach and not vice-versa.

This is highlighted in Table 1 which compares the actual process and
### TABLE 1

**DEGREE OF AGGREGATION: PLANNED AND ACTUAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Mainly sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative strategies</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred strategies</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro framework</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation framework</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phased plan</td>
<td>Global, then sectoral</td>
<td>Global, then sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational plan</td>
<td>Global, then sectoral</td>
<td>Sectoral, then global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Global and sectoral</td>
<td>Global and sectoral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the planned one in terms of the degree of aggregation for each of the major steps.

This approach of working mainly at the sectoral level was necessitated - as mentioned earlier - by the fact that communication policy, objectives, etc did not exist: they had to be "created". This process was a time-consuming one and it left less time than was originally envisaged for working out alternatives, choosing a preferred strategy and devising operational plans. The difference is illustrated in Table 2 which compares the type of effort assumed in the Scenario with the actual one for each of the major steps.

**Situational Deviations**

**Existence of a communication policy:** The Scenario had implicitly assumed the existence of a communication policy and objectives. All that needed to be done, therefore, was to prepare a policy draft - based on existing documents - and to get it ratified. As mentioned in the previous section, this was not so in reality. It is debatable as to whether it is - in fact - a common feature in most countries (in which case it is really a conceptual problem). As noted earlier, this seems to be a common feature rather than an exception, and therefore this author would rather classify this as a conceptual deviation.

**Counterparts:** The fact that full-time counterparts could not be found has been mentioned in an earlier section. It is, however, important to note that the Scenario laid great stress on the international consultants working with counterparts as a joint team and having continuous consultations with them. In actual practice, counterparts were available only
### TABLE 2

**TYPE OF EFFORT ENVISAGED AND ACTUALLY REQUIRED FOR MAJOR ACTIVITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Assume as existing</th>
<th>Derive</th>
<th>Create</th>
<th>Decide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative strategies</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred strategies</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro framework</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phased strategic plan</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation framework</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational plan</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( P \) : as originally planned (Scenario)

\( A \) : as actually done
on a part-time basis and the basic plans were drawn up by the international consultants with only a little discussion and input from their counterparts.

**Decision-making:** While the Scenario assumed basically only one crucial policy-level decision (on preferred strategies - see Table 2), it assumed frequent consultation with a Planning Body and a Coordination Committee. This was in addition to the four meetings proposed with the Policy Body and the continuous interaction with the counterparts. These meetings would, in each case, provide the necessary inputs and guidance to change or modify plans and documents. In reality, the Policy Body never came into existence and the two committees set up at lower levels rarely provided definite guidance or directions. Much of the decision-making was, therefore, done - implicitly or explicitly - by the international consultants.

The Scenario implicitly assumed that decision-making is a logical, rational process which takes account of costs and benefits. However, as almost everywhere in the world, important decisions were based not on economic analyses, but on political or arbitrary factors. A specific example is the decision to invest in a colour TV system for the Kabul area. Since important decisions on such matters are inevitably made on extraneous considerations all over the world, this should really be considered a conceptual, and not a situational, variable.

**Interest in the project:** Contrary to the assumption implied in the Scenario, the government did not seem to have a great deal of interest in the project. While full cooperation was always forthcoming whenever asked for, the degree of importance given to the project seemed to be rather low. The symptoms of this - which concretely affected the project - included the great
difficulty experienced in getting to meet policy-level personnel. This
could also be the reason for the lack of full-time counterparts and the
non-involvement in decision making, though - clearly - other factors
were probably more important in these instances.

Operational Deviations

Non-availability of a draft policy document: The Scenario presupposed
the availability of a draft document on communication policy
before the start of the project. In fact, this was not available and
the project had to begin with data/document collection for the prepara-
tion of such document. The ensuing loss of time certainly had its own
effect on overall project functioning and mode of operation. One immedi-
ate impact was the need to work in parallel on various tasks; the fact
that this was later found to be desirable is another story.

Focal point: The plan was drawn up on the basis of the Planning
Ministry being the focal point of the project; it was also assumed that
the counterpart Coordinator would be from the Ministry of Planning.
As it turned out, the Ministry of Information and Culture - and Radio
Afghanistan (RA) in particular - was the focal point. The team was
physically located in RA premises, and the counterpart Coordinator was
the Technical President of RA. To what extent this change affected the
project is not immediately clear; however, it does seem clear that the
Planning Ministry may have been a more preferable base because of its
inter-Ministerial and co-ordinating role. It may have also added to the
prestige and importance of the project, since the Planning Ministry is
responsible for deciding on fund allocations for all developmental
activities.
Present problems and future plans: In some areas, this project faced the inevitable problem of focusing on the future as against solving (or helping to solve) immediate problems. Within the time constraints of the overall project, and especially the limited time of most of the experts (as opposed to the "generalists" who stayed throughout the duration of the project), it was clear that only one or the other could be thoroughly done. In spite of efforts to keep the focus on the basic task (the long term plan), there were some deviations into the field of immediate problems. To that extent, less time and effort were devoted to the primary planning task. Whether this is inevitable is a moot point: if it is, the conceptual design of the planning process will need to be modified.

Assumptions and Reality:

The Scenario was based on various assumptions - some conceptual, others situational and operational. This section has analysed how and why the actual process differed from the one envisaged in the Scenario. Table 3 summarises these and other factors in the form of a comparison between the important assumptions of the Scenario and reality.
### TABLE - 3

**ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SCENARIO AND REALITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS OF SCENARIO</th>
<th>REALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conceptual</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. It is possible to draw up a long-term (10-15 years) communication plan.</td>
<td>The possibility has been proven; there is, however, the problem of getting bogged down in the present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Communication planning is a systematic process that can be carried out in a &quot;linear-sequential&quot; mode.</td>
<td>Communication planning can be done in a systematic, planned manner, but the steps are often iterative and not sequential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No mutual interaction exists between the main elements (policy, objectives, strategy): a one-way only relationship is assumed.</td>
<td>There is interaction between these, especially when an explicit, coherent communication policy does not already exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. International experts coming in only for brief periods and with no prior knowledge of the local situation can prepare a relevant long-term communication plan.</td>
<td>A plan has been prepared and hence the feasibility of this is proven. Its quality and relevance cannot be assessed at this stage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Decision-making is based on rational, logical analysis: on cost-benefit studies, for example.</td>
<td>Decisions on important and basic matters are made on arbitrary or political considerations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situational</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. A coherent communication policy exists, and can be culled from official documents.</td>
<td>An explicitly, coherent communication policy did not seem to exist: the task of trying to cull it directly from documents was an impossible one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The host country has a high level of interest in the communication planning exercise, and attaches importance to it.</td>
<td>This, unfortunately, did not seem to be the case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continued ......
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The host country has a desire to participate actively in the decision-making and alternative-choosing processes involved in communication planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Full-time counterparts will be available, and the whole planning process will be carried out by a joint national-international team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>A high-level policy group can be convened to meet a few times (3-4 times) during the project to provide guidance and make decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>A 6 months-long study can produce a good, long-term communication plan for the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>The media experts are required for a shorter time and can leave before the &quot;user&quot; sector experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>It is possible and desirable to have all &quot;sector experts&quot; (i.e. excluding the generalists) arrive at the same time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was not evident - possibly because this was not considered an especially important project.

No full-time counterparts were available, and much of the basic planning was done by the international consultants.

This was found to be impossible. The only Minister-level group that was convened met days before the end of the project.

While 6 months is a very short period for producing such a plan and more time is certainly desirable, the project has shown that it is possible to prepare a plan in 6 months.

In retrospect it would have been better for the "user" sector experts to come before the media experts and finish most of their work (in terms of finally assessing media needs) before the media experts arrive - or at least before they leave.

It is not possible, nor desirable (see 12 above).
COMMENTS ON THE PLANNING PROCESS

Utility of the Scenario

The extensive notes on deviations from the Scenario may lead to the impression that it was not very useful. This would be totally erroneous. Since the main purpose of this study is to provide a critique of the Scenario, it is but natural that problems in applying its planning framework have been highlighted. However, on the whole, the Scenario was immensely useful.

Firstly, it provided a clear plan and direction at the inception of the project itself: a critical time when various pressures and the effects of "culture shock" can lead to frenzied but chaotic working, in the absence of a definite plan.

Secondly, it provided a base to deviate from. For the essence of successful planning lies not in having a fixed, immutable plan, but in having a basic plan from which one deviates in a conscious and intentional manner as dictated by circumstances. In this case, for instance, a new plan and network was drawn up within the first few weeks of the project itself, but this new plan was based on the original scenario.

Thirdly, it provided a detailed "work break-down structure" in the form of the tasks required to be carried out. Even as the original plan underwent various modifications and changes, this listing of tasks proved invaluable - both as inputs for new plans and as a check-list of work to be performed.

Finally, except for the policy - objectives stage, the planning
framework could be applied - by and large - almost as designed.

Thus, even though there were deviations - some of them important ones - from the Scenario, it proved to be very useful in guiding and planning the whole project. It has established the feasibility, utility and even necessity of having such planning frameworks for communication planning exercises.

Policy formulation

As mentioned earlier, communication policy cannot be assumed to exist; if anything, the contrary assumption would be truer. Projects of this nature therefore have to begin with the painstaking and time consuming task of formulating or creating a coherent communication policy. Also, policy cannot easily be separated from objectives, goals and targets. In view of the interacting nature of these variables, and the difficulties inherent in trying to clearly separate one from the other, it may be necessary to consider them all together, as part of a single package, rather than as distinct, separate entities. This also implies a recognition that the relationship between them is not linear and sequential, but interdependent and iterative.

Counterparts

The absence of full-time counterparts undoubtedly affected the project. First, it decreased the extent of national involvement in the project and its decision-making. Second, it made difficult the acquisition of data, and thereby led to some delays in the overall schedule. Third, a considerable amount of the time of the experts was spent in trying to find the right person in each of the sectors:
availability of full-time counterparts would have reduced substantially this waste of time.

This is not a new problem and is one that has beset most international projects all over the world. For example, an assessment of the Pre-Investment Study of Educational Mass Media carried out by UNESCO in Thailand (in 1973-74) indicated the problem of getting full-time counterparts as a major one.

**Perceived Importance of the Project**

As noted earlier, the project did not seem to enjoy very great priority with the government. This affected the project in a number of ways, and this has been detailed elsewhere. Two tactical factors probably made the situation more difficult.

The first was the fact that the project was located in and was being coordinated by Radio Afghanistan in the Ministry of Information & Culture, rather than the Ministry of Planning.

The second was in relation to the start of the project. It may have been preferable for the first meeting - to "kick-off" the project - to have been chaired by a Minister. This could have had the subtle effect of demonstrating top-level support for the project and would have "opened all doors" for the project personnel.

**Phasing of Experts**

The change in approach - caused by the lack of a policy document to start with - resulted in a problem in terms of the phasing and work of
the experts. Since the task of policy determination was intricately linked with goals, objectives and targets, the "generalists" from the international team (basically those who stayed through the whole project) had to work on all these issues. However, since policy, objectives, etc had to be determined on a sectoral basis (see Table 1), the "generalists" had to work on these with persons from each of the sectors. When this task was about three-quarters done, the "sectoral" experts arrived. As experts on specific sectors, they took over this task for their respective sectors. Inevitably, they had to repeat some of the work and many of the questions of the "generalists", and some resentment on the part of the contacts in each sector resulted. Also, the sectoral consultants were therefore not quite received with open arms and this led to some frustration on their part.

Another problem related to the duration and phasing of the media consultants (experts on TV, films, etc) and user-sector consultants (health, rural development, agriculture, education, etc). There was only one user-sector consultant (though one other consultant did double up for a user sector too) and this was found to be a major shortcoming, especially in view of the lack of full-time counterparts from these (or any other) sectors. This one consultant came at the same time as the media consultants, who stayed for shorter durations and left earlier. As a result, the complete input of user sector media requirements could not be given to the media experts before they left. A better use of the consultants would have been possible if the user sector consultant had come before the media consultants, done some work on media requirements - on his own, and in consultation with the media experts when they came - and then provided these as inputs to the media experts for their planning. Some iteration in such cases - between the desirable and the possible - is obviously essential, and this can be done only
if the user sector requirement of media support is fed into the media experts planning.

**Background of International Consultants**

In the analysis of deviations from the Scenario and elsewhere, the main variables have been grouped into three main categories: conceptual, situational and operational. However, there is little doubt that personnel factors - in terms of the background, experience and personality of the consultants - play an equally important role in planning processes. In some ways this can be considered an operational variable, but it is of such a different kind that it merits separate attention.

This project was lucky to have an excellent group of consultants, most of whom had previous experiences of working in developing countries. However, one drawback was that few of the consultants had first-hand knowledge of how governments and administrators in developing countries work. Also, few of the consultants had any experience in actually implementing large-scale plans.

**Communication Policy and Strategy**

In spite of the time and effort spent by the team in the policy area, some basic issues were left untouched. For example, though feedback from the people to decision-makers was mentioned in the policy document prepared by the project team, it was implicitly assumed that the main purpose of communication was basically development-support. In view of the fact that the government accepted this approach, it may have been a valid assumption for Afghanistan. However, alternative purposes of communication - e.g., increasing participation, politici-
isation or conscientisation, etc - were not presented or discussed.

Communication Research

The final report laid considerable stress on research, including feedback, in the communications area. At present little data exists on effects and impact of different media and different programmes in Afghanistan. In the absence of such data, choice of media or media-mixes for particular uses has to be either arbitrary or based on experience elsewhere. Given the very different and unique culture of Afghanistan, the applicability of foreign findings is doubtful. In spite of this, the team had little choice and recommendations on media use had to be made on the basis of experiences in other countries.

CONCLUSION

The Communication System Planning Survey was a unique effort in the fields of communication planning and applied systems analysis. Systems analysis, though of comparatively recent origin, is a powerful tool and has been successfully applied in a large number of fields. However, it has so far been rarely - if ever - used for communication planning: mainly because large-scale communication planning is itself a new phenomenon. This project has definitely proven the practical applicability and usefulness of systems analysis for communication planning. It has also brought out the problems involved in terms of conceptual and methodological difficulties. The learning experiences from this may be useful as lessons for future projects, and that is the reason and hope of this study. This section therefore summarises some of the learning experiences and raises a few issues.
Learning Experiences

1. Systematic planning procedures are feasible and useful in communication planning. The planning framework must, however, be used as a base to deviate from and not as a given prescription; its direction and spirit are more important than its letter.

2. The specific framework developed for this planning exercise was extremely useful, but it has some conceptual problems, and needs to be modified.

3. Hardly anywhere does communication policy exist, in terms of a definite, coherent policy. Not only does it have to be "created", but also it is intricately linked with objectives, goals, targets, etc.

4. Mainly (but not only) because of the above, communication planning cannot be considered as a "linear-sequential" process. Activities are often dependent on each other, and an iterative, tasks-in-parallel process is necessary.

5. "Full-time counterparts" seem to exist only in theory. In reality, getting even part-time counterparts is a difficult task.

6. It is desirable that the national focal point for such projects be a Ministry that already has certain inter-Ministerial coordinating functions - e.g., the Ministry of Planning. However, to promote close and regular interaction, it is desirable that the international "sector-experts" be physically located in the Ministry/agency that they are concerned with.
7. Involving local nationals in is good and necessary, but extremely difficult: they are just not interested enough.

8. In a communication planning project, the "user sectors" (health, agriculture, etc) are of crucial importance; the composition of the international team should reflect this importance.

9. While knowledge and experience of working in developing countries are important considerations in recruiting consultants, knowledge of government systems and experience in implementation of large projects are also very desirable factors.

10. Policy-level meetings are difficult to arrange if the project is not perceived as being especially important. Since this is often the fate of planning exercises (in which no hardware is delivered), in such cases it may be better to formalise some of these aspects in an appropriate document before the project even begins. Possibly, this could form a part of the Plan of Operation.

Some Issues

1. In a long-term planning framework, is it right to treat policies and objectives as immutable? In the rapidly changing socio-economic, cultural and - often - political environment of developing countries, should not the plan itself provide for possibilities of changing policy and objectives?

2. To take account of the above, is it possible to evolve a dynamic (as opposed to static) model for planning?
3. How to get full-time counterparts? Is it possible to conceive of a scheme in which UNDP/UNESCO pay an incentive, a salary supplement, to counterparts? This may "commit" the individual and create some pressure on the government to ensure that counterparts are really available on a full-time basis.

4. How to get national involvement in decision-making? This is related to the perceived importance of the project, and the question therefore is: how to create a climate of importance for the project? One possibility is to take up only those projects in which the government is really and considerably interested.

5. In a long-term planning exercise, how much time and attention should be devoted by the international consultants to the solution of immediate problems? While working on immediate problems helps the concerned Department and thereby helps develop good rapport with the international consultant, it does take attention away from the long-term perspective. Is there a generalised solution to this dilemma, or does it depend on personal and situational factors?

6. Should the planning team seek to re-open issues on which decisions have apparently been already made by the government?

7. In finalising the plan, how much should the team worry about the possibilities of implementation? Should the plan limit its recommendations only to ones that are/will be favoured by the government? How does the team determine - or should it at all - what is
politically feasible and what suggestions stand a better chance of being implemented?

Further Work

The Communication System Planning Survey in Afghanistan and other work undertaken by UNESCO (and others) elsewhere has led to a great deal of learning with regard to communication planning. However, this Survey itself has indicated the need for further work - both conceptual and empirical - in this area. Some of the issues that need to be studied further have been mentioned above, and more will surface in the process of further study itself. The increasing realisation of the importance of communication planning will, one hopes, lead to further work in this field and lead to both - improved techniques and better results.
SUMMARY NETWORK OF ORIGINAL PLAN (SCENARIO)

RATIFICATION OF POLICY STATEMENT
DETERMINE GOALS AND TARGETS
DERIVE, STATE & QUANTIFY OBJECTIVES
FORMULATE ALT STRAT. AND SELECT PREFERRED STRAT
EVOLVE MACRO FRAME WORK
EVOLVE PHASED STRATEGIC PLAN
PREPARE OPERATIONAL PLAN
SYNTHESISE AND FINALISE REPORT
### SCHEDULE OF MAJOR ACTIVITIES: PLANNED AND ACTUAL

| Weeks from Start of Project | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  | 9  | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 |
|-----------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| **Policy Ratification**     | ○  | ○  | ●  | ○  | ○  | ●  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  |
| **Goals & Targets**         | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  |
| **Objectives**              | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  |
| **Strategy**                | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  |
| **Macro Frame Work**        | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  |
| **Phased Strategic Plan**   | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  |
| **Report**                  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  | ○  |

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**Planned (original scenario)**

- Arrival of all sectoral experts
- Data collection
- Objectives
- Existing sectoral strategies
- Possible future sectoral strategies & operational plans
- Report
- Policy determination

---

**Actual Process**

- Goals & Targets (sectoral)
- Goals & Targets (sectoral)
- Macro Frame Work
- Arrival of most sectoral experts
- Meeting of Communication Planning Committee
- Meeting of Presidents Council
- Policy (Minister) level meeting

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**Notes**

- ○ Discussions with planning body
- ● Coordinating Committee meeting
- ■ Policy body meeting
COMMUNICATION PLANNING
FOR AFGHANISTAN

AN EVALUATION OF
A COMMUNICATION PLANNING FRAMEWORK

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Institute of Educational Technology
Open University,
United Kingdom
COMMUNICATION PLANNING AND EVALUATION

Process Evaluation
A Communication Plan for Afghanistan
The Nature of the Planning Framework
The Task of Evaluation
Methodology
The Scenario

THE FIELD EXPERIENCE

The Communication System Planning Survey
Recruitment of foreign Specialists and Counterparts
Establishment of Means for the Development and Agreement of Communication Planning Policies and Strategies
The Scenario Network

SOME JUDGEMENTS

Cultural Factors
The Nature of Planning and Decision-Making
The Success of the Framework
Process Evaluation

Evaluating the process of planning, as distinct from the outcome of planning and action, is, if not original, at least very rare in practice. There are numerous studies in both developed and developing countries of summative evaluation of communication projects (1); formative evaluation - i.e. the evaluation of products of projects, such as broadcasts, printed material, etc., in a formative stage, before final decisions on content and style have been made - is less common, but nevertheless has been carried out enough for some experience and ground-rules to be established (2); but the evaluation of the process of planning and setting up a system of communications for development purposes is so rare that there are no models or guidelines on which to base such a practice. Indeed, there are very few authoritative, personal, or straightforward descriptive accounts of the planning of such projects, never mind systematic and objective evaluation.

Yet the need for systematic evaluation of the planning process is very great. Each year, large sums of money are channelled through international agencies, national government aid programmes and private foundations for providing technical assistance for the planning of various development projects. At considerable expense, teams of foreign experts are recruited, sent out to developing countries for several months, a report is prepared for the national government, and then - what? Often, the report is put away, forgotten or deliberately ignored. Sometimes, the report is accepted by the national government, and funds may be sought from external agencies. In a comparatively few cases, the reports actually get implemented, although they may have been modified beyond
recognition from the original proposals. Even then, there is no guarantee that the project will be successful in achieving its aims, once implemented.

It is therefore essential to understand better the process of planning for development projects, so that as far as possible procedures which put projects at risk are avoided, and principles and procedures which increase the chances of needed and worthwhile projects being successfully implemented are identified. One possible way of doing this is to try to evaluate the process of planning on one such project, to provide a basis of experience for future projects which can actually be transferred.

A Communication Plan for Afghanistan

In 1977, UNESCO was invited by the Afghanistan government to draw up a communication plan for development in Afghanistan for the next 12 years, a period which would cover the next five-year development plan, plus the period covered by the existing national development plan. Responsibility for the provision of technical expertise for the drawing up of the communication plan was delegated to UNESCO's Division of Development of Communication Systems. The Chief of the Section of Communication Planning and Studies in the Division, Alan Hancock, was at the time developing a theoretical framework for planning for communication development. Since the Afghan communication plan itself would require careful preparation, it was seen as a good opportunity to test the theoretical planning framework in the field. This was agreed with the field project leader, Lesley Sargent.
The planning framework is described in full by Hancock (3), but it is necessary to summarise the basis of the framework and to analyse it for the purpose of evaluation. Basically, the hypothesised planning framework had four separate but related elements. The first was an identification of basic principles which appear to have been associated with the successful planning of previous communication projects. These principles were set against an analysis of eight major educational communication projects, which either had good documentary evidence about the planning process, or with which Hancock had been closely associated during the planning stages. These projects were:

- Open University (United Kingdom)
- Agency for Instructional Television (USA)
- Children's Television Workshop (USA)
- Educational Media Service (Singapore)
- Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (Malaysia)
- Group Resources of Women (Tobago)
- Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (India)
- Educational Television Service (El Salvador)

These were chosen to provide a range of institutional forms, from local to national levels, a variety of geographical locations, and differing levels of success in planning and implementation. The basic principles were also compared with an analysis of the planning process for a UNESCO pre-investment study on educational media provision in Thailand.
The second element in the framework was the drawing up of a theoretical and logical sequence of planning events and activities, necessary for the development of a satisfactory communication plan. The planning sequence, at this stage, was largely linear, in that one step logically followed another. In practical terms, though, this does not take account of the realities of planning, which involve discussion, changing of earlier decisions, and post-hoc analysis or identification of aims, etc. In order then to take into account the need for a flexible approach to planning, a third element modified the framework to build in concepts of horizontal and vertical integration of planning (horizontal, to ensure that all relevant departments, sections and Ministries affected by the plan were involved in the planning process; vertical, to ensure that all relevant levels within a Ministry or sector were also involved).

The fourth and final element - one commonly found in development planning projects, but not usually based on such a thorough prior theoretical approach - was the production of an operational plan - a scenario - of how the planning project should develop in the field. This scenario resulted in a timetabled sequence of 33 activities to be carried out in the 25 weeks allocated to the field planning activities.

The Task of Evaluation

The fact that the planning framework has at least four separate elements raised a number of problems from the point of view of evaluation. It would be tempting, for instance, to base the evaluation on the extent to which the reality of the planning exercise matched the projected scenario. However, the final scenario which the team of foreign experts recruited by UNESCO were to use as a guide to its activities was not in practice a "pure" derivation of the planning
framework, by any means. Quite apart from it being modified and restricted to take account of practical matters like the need to compress, for financial reasons, the planning process into as short a time as possible, the scenario was a result of constantly changing relationships and plans between UNESCO, UNDP, the Afghan government, and agencies willing to fund the planning project.

Perhaps more importantly, the rejection of the whole planning framework, if the reality did not fit the scenario, would be too crude a method of evaluation. There might well be important elements of the framework which would stand up well to the field experience, even if the scenario itself should turn out to be unsatisfactory.

On the other hand, the scenario must be a starting point for the evaluation. A comparison between the scenario and what actually happened should indicate points of incongruence, identify assumptions which turned out to be incorrect, and planning strategies which appeared to be impractical in the Afghan situation. It is an empirical starting-point for the evaluation of the framework.

Thus, the evaluation, as well as relating the scenario to what actually happened, and identifying reasons for events turning out the way they did, must also seek to relate these events to the other three elements of the framework. The evaluation must also attempt to explain the extent to which events which do not fit what the framework would predict are due to the unique circumstances of Afghanistan, or are likely to be general to developing countries. Perhaps most important of all, the evaluation must examine the internal logic of the framework, and the relationship between the four elements of the framework for possible sources of incongruence between predicted and actual events.
Therefore, there are several tasks which have to be accomplished in the process evaluation. The first is to obtain as accurate an account as possible of what actually happened during the planning survey. The second is to obtain as far as possible explanations or hypotheses for divergences between the scenario, the predictions from the framework, and what actually happened. The third is to identify how much such divergences are likely to be due to the particular situation in Afghanistan at the time, or how much such divergences are likely to be general problems. Lastly, the evaluation must analyse to what extent these explanations or deductions will influence or demand changes to the various elements of the framework. Finally, it should be noted that the evaluation is concerned primarily with the extent to which the theoretical framework stands up in the field, rather than with evaluation of the whole process of the planning exercise for communications development in Afghanistan, although the two are obviously closely linked.

**Methodology**

As mentioned before, there are few precedents to follow. Basically, the method used has been a form of participant observation, as controlled and systematic as possible, supported by semi-structured interviews with project personnel, and the careful collection and filing of records.

The evaluation was carried out by myself, as one of the specialists recruited by UNESCO to work on the planning survey team. As well as being responsible for planning proposals in the education sector, I also had, as part of my contract, responsibility for evaluation of the planning framework. Before the field-work began, I was already familiar with the planning framework which had been proposed. I had also worked before on a similar communication planning project, in Thailand, so I was to some
extent aware of some of the problems likely to be faced, and had some base for comparing the Afghan situation with that for another developing country. Also, being a full member of the team, with my own sectoral area of responsibility, I was directly aware of the real constraints of the field-work on the framework, and the extent to which the framework assisted or otherwise my own area of work. Also, as a full member of the team, I had direct and easy access, on an informal and friendly basis, both to other foreign specialists on the team and in other agencies, and to Afghan nationals in the education sector with whom I was working (for a period of three months). In this way, it was possible to obtain, at least indirectly, reactions of various people concerned to the way in which the planning survey was being carried out, and also to obtain a good knowledge of the way decision-making was carried out in the Afghan government sector.

As well as this informal observation, formal, semi-structured interviews were held with six of the seven foreign specialists on the team whose field-work extended for more than two weeks, at the end of their mission, before leaving Afghanistan. The team leader was interviewed in England after all the field-work had been completed, and the final report had been drafted.

The team leader kept a daily diary. Although the diary was personal and its confidentiality was maintained, the team leader was able to draw on this to verify points of detail and to support some of the more general conclusions he made during his interview.

Records of all committee meetings, including minutes, notes of meetings with Ministers and senior government officials, briefing or "action" papers prepared by members of the project team, notes of the
project team's staff meetings, and other papers relevant to the planning survey, were carefully maintained and made available for the evaluation.

Mid-way through the project, when six members of the team had spent at least one month each on the project, a staff meeting was held specifically to discuss the evaluation of the planning survey so far.

Members of the team were told at the beginning of their mission that there would be an attempt made to evaluate the planning process as it happened, but it was also made clear that the evaluation was not concerned with the individual performance of members of the team, but with the structuring of the planning exercise. All the foreign specialists approved of the idea of such an evaluation, although some were rather sceptical about whether it was possible to carry out, or whether it would make much difference to future projects. Members of the team had been sent the scenario in advance of their mission, but, with the exception of the team leader, they were not given the planning framework in full, partly because of bulk, and partly because it was not thought necessary for the foreign specialists to be aware of the theoretical basis of the framework. Indeed, it was thought that a more independent evaluation of the planning process would be achieved if they were unaware of some of the assumptions behind the framework.

The Scenario

For reasons already outlined, we have to start with the scenario. The scenario provided the team leader with operational guidelines as to what had to be done, the order in which things were to be done, and the time when they had to be done. To quote:
"The scenario is based on two main principles. It seeks, in the first place, to secure a compromise between careful pre-planning and scheduling, and flexibility: to profit from detailed creativity, leaving the planning team with genuine responsibility and decision-making capacity. At the same time, it tries to accommodate dimensions of policy and decision-making within its planning strategies, taking account of pragmatic as well as theoretical constraints ... Figure 1 therefore traces the course of the survey through its separate planning phases, in relation to both planning and decision-making forums. Table A relates these activities more specifically to the phased introduction of planning consultants, and to the chronology of the study." (4)

Figure 1 and Table A are both here reproduced.

In addition to the network, the scenario also makes a number of important proposals for providing the necessary organisational structure to enable discussion and decision-making to take place. First of all, Hancock makes a basic distinction in his theoretical framework between planning and decision-making or policy-making. Policy and decision-making is concerned primarily with the setting of objectives, determination of priorities, and decisions to implement. Planning is concerned with the preparation of plans, strategies for the efficient and equitable use of communications, and for the realisation of communications policies. He makes the following observation:

"... (i) planning, especially systems planning, is dependent upon the clear formulation of objectives, and objectives cannot be articulated with any precision unless
## FIGURE I
PLANNING SCENARIO FOR AFGHANISTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEK</th>
<th>POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT PLANNING</th>
<th>COMMUNICATION PLANNING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRE-SURVEY (1-2 months)</td>
<td>(1) Collect Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Analyse Policies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(3) Supplement Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Formulate Draft Policy Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Discuss with Policy Body and Modify</td>
<td>Discuss with (6) Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td>(5) Discuss with Counterpart team and modify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss and (9) Modify</td>
<td>(6) Expand policy statement to goals and targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss and (11) Modify</td>
<td>(10) Derive and state objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss and (13) Modify</td>
<td>(12) Quantify Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(14) Formulate alternative strategic approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PHASE 2 WEEKS 9-17</td>
<td>(15) Review alternatives with full team and modify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>(16) Modify</td>
<td>(17) Prepare format for decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Discuss with Policy Body and Select Preferred Strategy</td>
<td>(19) Evolve Macro Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>(20) Modify</td>
<td>(21) Evolve Phased Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(22) Modify</td>
<td>(23) Research for Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17</td>
<td>Review and Modify Strategic Plan (26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(24) Evolve Evaluation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(25) Prepare Plan Format for Decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEEK</td>
<td>POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING</td>
<td>DEVELOPMENT PLANNING</td>
<td>COMMUNICATION PLANNING</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-20</td>
<td></td>
<td>WEEKS 18-25</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss and Modify</td>
<td>(27) Prepare Detailed Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(33) Finalise and Submit Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Description of Activity (Summary)</td>
<td>Team Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>Discuss draft policy statement with counterparts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning and Policy Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>Expand to include goals and targets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss and modify with Planning Body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Derive and State Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>Quantify Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Formulate alternative strategic approaches</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Review alternatives with full team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>17-18</td>
<td>Prepare Format for Decision-Makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Policy Body and Select Preference</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Leader - Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>19-20</td>
<td>Evolve macro framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td>Rural Com. Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Evolve phased strategic plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>Research for Operational Plan Evolve evaluation framework Prepare Plan for decision-makers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Systems Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Description of Activity (Summary)</td>
<td>Team Membership</td>
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<tr>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Review strategic plan with policy body and modify</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Leader - Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Prepare detailed Operational Plan</td>
<td>Rural Com. Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Telecom. Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Discuss with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Synthesise Report</td>
<td>Deputy Leader - Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Review Report with Planning Body and Modify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Prepare Report Format for Decision-Makers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Review with Policy Body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25+</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Finalise and Submit Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
overall goals and policies are clearly understood. While policies may exist, and be discussed, therefore, without planning, planning cannot be expected to take place without policies."

Hancock also makes the distinction between communication planning and development planning, the latter being defined as planning for a reduction in inequalities. He sees communication planning for development as implying the use of communication resources and technologies as part of this process. In practical terms, as far as the scenario is concerned, the distinction between communication policy, development planning and communication planning reflects the different groups or sectors to be covered by or involved in any communication planning survey.

Therefore, in order to provide an organisational structure which will bring together the various groups and sectors necessary for the development of a national communications plan for development, Hancock proposed in the Afghan scenario a number of arrangements. These were:

1. A team made up of external (foreign) specialists and full-time counterparts (at a middle professional level) from the various ministries concerned with communication issues (to cover communication planning).

2. A permanent officer or representative of the Ministry of Planning should be appointed, if possible on a full-time basis, as a member of the communication planning team.

3. A small ad hoc committee formed within the Ministry of
Planning, to review particular drafts produced by the team, and to relate these to central planning issues.

4. An inter-ministerial Co-ordinating Committee should be formed, to ensure that sectoral opinion is adequately voiced. (This arrangement, and points 2 and 3 above, would cover development planning).

5 A high-level body, under the Office of the Presidency, convened to discuss major policy issues arising during, or as a result of the survey, at a Cabinet level.

It should be noted that these proposals differ in some respects from the official project document agreed between UNESCO and the Afghan government. In the project document there was:

- no specific insistence upon full-time professional counterparts for the external team;

- no distinction was made between planning and policy-making bodies, especially in the discussion of a Co-ordinating Committee.

In addition to these suggestions, the scenario included a brief description of each of the tasks to be carried out each week.

This then was the ground-plan for the planning exercise. What actually happened?
First of all, it is important to establish that the formal requirements of the project, as agreed between UNESCO and the Afghan government, were clearly met. Apart from reducing the period of planning from 12 to 8 years, all the goals were met. A substantial three-volume report, containing analyses of the present situation, suggestions for development of communication policies in user sectors and media agencies, costed proposals for external assistance, and proposals for inter-sectoral co-ordination of communication planning, were all submitted after extensive discussion and participation with the relevant national working groups. Although the report was apparently well-received by the Afghan government and the various agencies and Ministries concerned, the full impact of the study, which was distributed in March, 1978, will not be known for a number of years.

However, what is of immediate concern in this evaluation is the extent to which the planning framework helped or otherwise the development of an acceptable and practicable communication plan for Afghanistan. First of all, a brief description of the main events that occurred, of relevance to the framework, will be given. Secondly, an account will be given of the way the various arrangements and tasks set out in the scenario worked out in practice. Finally, this will be used to identify those parts of the framework which require revision, and some suggestions for revision, where appropriate.
(a) Recruitment of foreign specialists and national counterparts

UNESCO recruited three broad categories of foreign specialists for the survey: three "generalists" - the team leader, the deputy team leader, and the systems analyst, who arrived a month ahead of the rest of the foreign specialists, to carry out Phase 1 of the scenario, Policy Making; four media sector specialists - broadcasting, films and audio-visual, telecommunications, news and press; and two development sector specialists - rural development, education. All these specialists were to be concerned with Phase Two - Strategic Planning - and the team leader, deputy team leader, and the two development sector specialists would be concerned with Phase Three - Preparation of Operational Plans. With the exception of the News and Press specialist, who was delayed due to sickness, all foreign specialists were recruited and took up post on time. None left early.

At the same time, national counterparts were appointed to work with the foreign specialists. Table B summarises the appointments of specialists and counterparts. The foreign specialists were located in Radio Afghanistan, which provided office accommodation, translation and liaison, and transport facilities. Overall liaison for the project was supplied by Radio Afghanistan's President for Technical Affairs.

The three generalists arrived six weeks ahead of the other specialists, and in addition to working on Phase 1 of the project, also dealt with practical arrangements, such as locating and getting counterparts nominated, making contact with the relevant Ministry departments and other development agencies and projects, and securing office accommodation and secretarial services.
## TABLE B: RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN SPECIALISTS AND NATIONAL COUNTERPARTS - ORIGINAL ARRANGEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARRIVAL</th>
<th>DEPARTURE</th>
<th>FOREIGN SPECIALIST</th>
<th>COUNTERPARTS (S) BY DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Deputy team leader/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>economist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Systems analyst</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Broadcasting</td>
<td>Radio Afghanistan - production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Educational broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Film and Audio-Visual</td>
<td>Rural development (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghan Films</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Afghanistan-transmission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>News Agency and Press</td>
<td>Bakhtar News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Rural development</td>
<td>Rural development (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public health (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Women's organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adult education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Education and evaluation</td>
<td>Educational broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adult education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Afghanistan-audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The three Phase 1 members of the team were able to ensure that each of the relevant Ministries had appointed at least one counterpart before the arrival of the second phase specialists. However, no doubt because of uncertainty as to the exact scope of the project and of the exact role expected of counterparts, several Ministries or departments suggested more than one counterpart. Also, as the Phase 2 specialists got into their work, they found it necessary to split up the work between themselves rather differently.

Consequently, the following specialist/counterpart relationship developed, with each specialist working with one or two main counterparts, although even then practice varied considerably from sector to sector:

TABLE C: FOREIGN SPECIALISTS AND NATIONAL COUNTERPARTS - FINAL ARRANGEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOREIGN SPECIALIST</th>
<th>COUNTERPART(S) - BY DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting</td>
<td>Radio Afghanistan - production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Film and Audio-Visual</td>
<td>Afghan Films</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Afghanistan - transmission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Agency and Press</td>
<td>Bakhtar News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural development</td>
<td>Rural development (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public health (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women's organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and evaluation</td>
<td>Educational broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adult education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The device of using counterparts, together with foreign specialists, on a partnership basis, is an important part of the framework. Counter-
parts are seen as the means by which planning discussions, knowledge of planning procedures, and most important of all, national involvement in the planning exercise, are permeated through the system at all levels. The counterparts will remain after the foreign experts have gone, and therefore should be able both to understand the background to the planning issues, and also to carry through the operationalisation of the plans for communications development.

Unfortunately, however, this aspect of the framework did not work out as planned. This was in no way due to lack of co-operation on the part of individual counterparts. Although of course there were variations, most counterparts were extremely helpful, courteous, and indeed willing to provide assistance as best they could. There were however a number of practical and structural constraints that prevented the specialist/counterpart relationship from working as planned.

First of all, the counterparts could not work full-time with specialists. They all had their own work to do, often in departments with a heavy load of work which could, for various reasons, only be done by the counterpart. For instance, in Adult Education, the main counterpart was responsible for the development of adult literacy materials for a large project scheduled to begin in 1978. This work had to be her main priority, rather than the development of plans for the next 12 years. In any case, because some foreign specialists had to cover several departments or Ministries, it was necessary for them to have more than one counterpart. This was a particular problem for the development sector people, above all the rural development specialist, who had to cover in the original plan five different ministries.

Perhaps more importantly, in the Afghan context, the counterparts were
not at the right level. It is necessary here to digress a little to discuss a crucial aspect of Afghan culture (at least at the time of the study), because this has implications for many different aspects of the framework. Decision-making in Afghan ministries operates on an extremely hierarchical basis. Decisions are only made at the top. Almost no decisions of any importance are made below the level of a departmental head in an Afghan ministry (called a President). Even then, many decisions which to a Western observer may appear to be trivial are likely to be referred to the Minister or Deputy Minister, particularly if it involves departure from normal practice, or a new development. As the team leader pointed out in the final report, the ideal level for the counterpart would have been the sectoral president. However, given the Afghan system, this was clearly impossible. Presidents of sectors already have impossible work-loads, and a regular day-to-day involvement with foreign specialists was clearly out of the question.

Another unfortunate consequence of this situation was that, in general, the counterparts did not adequately liaise between the team of foreign specialists and their presidents. Often, they were unaware themselves of policy within their own department, and if they were able to get in to see their president, their own operational difficulties and requirements were likely to take precedence over reporting on the team's work.

Partly as a consequence of the hierarchical nature of decision-making, and partly because the information did not usually exist, counterparts were often unable to carry out one of the main functions laid down for them in the framework, which was to provide data for the foreign specialists on facilities and policies, particularly if the information
required going outside the narrow sector for which they themselves were responsible. Where policy did not exist, not only were counterparts unable to take such a decision themselves, but most were reluctant even to indicate what it might be. As already mentioned, they were sometimes unaware of the existence of facilities, information or policy, even when they did exist.

Lastly, with two exceptions, most counterparts were not fully involved with or committed to the planning exercise. Particularly since most counterparts were working at the operational level, immediate problems naturally took precedence over long-term planning. Furthermore, in most cases, their Ministry or department, while perhaps approving of the idea of such planning in principle, had not requested or sought such an exercise. In one or two cases (Afghan Films and Adult Education, for instance) foreign specialists felt they had to do something practical to help, in order to get into the relevant department and win their co-operation. The two exceptions were Radio Afghanistan and the Educational Broadcasting Department of the Ministry of Education. In these two sectors, counterparts were always available and keen to work with the foreign specialists. In both cases, though, these departments had pressing short-term problems which the planning exercise would obviously help resolve - both were due to open a new service in six months time, and both were desperately short of trained personnel and resources.

Finally, there was one crucial gap on the counterpart side. There was no regular official counterpart from the Ministry of Planning. This led to a number of problems. It was extremely difficult for the team to get into the Ministry to see high-level officials. The team leader tried for six weeks to arrange a meeting with the Deputy Minister, who then complained that he was not being consulted enough about the exercise.
This does however indicate that even though counterparts were not able to play as full a role in the planning exercise as intended, it is nevertheless still vital for such people to be appointed from the key ministries and departments.

Indeed, there is a need for much more consideration to be given by both international agencies and host countries to the role of counterparts for planning projects. It took the team leader and his colleagues several weeks to arrange for counterparts and it was clear that, even then, counterparts were unsure of their role. Some team members felt that the local United Nations Development Programme office, with its understanding of the Afghan government and cultural system, could play a more direct role in advising on the choice of counterparts, and in briefing Ministries about what is expected from counterparts.

(b) Establishment of means for the development and agreement of communication planning strategies and policies. There were three levels at which it was attempted to create structures for deciding on planning strategies and policies: Ministerial, Departmental (i.e. presidents), and operational.

The project was formally attached to the Ministry of Information (of which Radio Afghanistan was a department). However, there were only two formal meetings arranged between the team leader and the Minister. The first was held in September, and was attended by five presidents from the Ministry, two U.N.D.P. officials, and the team leader and deputy team leader. The main purpose of the visit was to obtain advice on government communication policy, (a set of questions having been sent to the Minister by the team in advance of the meeting). At this meeting, the team requested the Minister to arrange an inter-ministerial meeting of Ministers in
November to discuss the team's major proposals. This the Minister promised to do.

The second meeting was held in November. This was short, and lasted just 20 minutes, before a cabinet meeting. In fact, several attempts to hold this second meeting were frustrated. The team leader was trying to get arrangements for an inter-ministerial meeting agreed and finalised. In the end, the inter-ministerial meeting never occurred, at least during the period of the project.

Mention has already been made of the meeting with the Deputy Minister of Planning (the Minister had been assassinated while the project was being carried out). Several meetings were also held with Ministers in the Ministry of Education. The Minister was ill during the length of the project, but two meetings were held with each of the two Deputy Ministers respectively. Access was easier to this level in the Ministry of Education, because of the need for the Ministry to provide two hours a day of educational television from March, 1978, and inevitably the team was drawn into preparing short-term advice, and negotiations for technical assistance. However, the main requirement from the team was for the Ministry to set up an advisory committee of presidents from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, and Radio Afghanistan, to discuss priorities for educational programming. This meeting was arranged, between presidents within just the Ministry of Education, in September. (In the event, it met only once, devolving all responsibility for educational broadcasting to the president of educational broadcasting). Nevertheless, it was possible for the team leader, the deputy team leader, and the education sector specialist to meet the Deputy Minister at the end of the project, to discuss the main proposals, and also to discuss in September the overall priorities for educational broadcasting with the Deputy Minister.
Apart from these meetings, it was not possible for any other meetings to be arranged at a Ministerial level with members of the planning team.

At the president of department level, a Presidents' Communication Council was established, to assist with the project. Presidents from 14 different departments, plus three representatives from three other departments, were members. It was hoped that the Council would meet once a month, but in fact it met three times during the project. Table D sets out attendance at the meetings.

**TABLE D: MEETINGS OF PRESIDENTS' COMMUNICATION COUNCIL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AGENDA ITEMS</th>
<th>Presidents</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1st</td>
<td>Discussion of sector objectives and communication policies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 26th</td>
<td>Likely demand for media from each sector</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 24th</td>
<td>Five inter-sectoral proposals from team</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The stated aim of the Presidents' Communication Council was to confirm the accuracy and authenticity of the information collected through the Communication Co-ordination Council, and to guide the direction of
the study. In practice, though, the team came to expect the President's Communication Council to resolve or agree to communication policies identified or proposed by the team. Unfortunately, however, this did not in general occur.

At the first meeting, each of the sectors gave useful additional information about policies and clarified where possible points on which the team were not sure. The meeting also provided an opportunity for sectoral presidents to find out about the policies of other departments or sectors, if they did not know these already. It was also used by the team to request further information about counterparts and strategic planning.

At the second meeting, the Presidents were asked to specify their likely demand for different media. However, although a form setting out the information required had been circulated prior to the meeting, it was received by most presidents only a day or two before the meeting. In spite of this, a number of sectors were able to respond in general terms, but it was clear that, for most sectors, it was going to be difficult to provide this information, because a number of broader policy issues, involving several sectors, needed to be resolved first. For instance, educational radio broadcasts would depend to a large extent on the provision of sets being increased.

At the third meeting, the Presidents' Communication Council was asked to consider five major proposals formulated by the planning team, that cut across or required agreement from a number of sectors. This was a particularly important meeting for the planning team, since these proposals were seen by the team as essential foundations for the development of an integrated communications planning strategy for Afghanistan. The five proposals
were as follows:

- the issue and shared use of community radio sets
- the establishment of a permanent Communication Co-ordinating Council
- the establishment of a communication and audience research service
- the establishment of an inter-agency system of training centres for village level workers
- the establishment of a "wall newspaper" containing development information from all agencies

It was clear from the discussion which took place after the brief introduction of each proposal that in Afghanistan, it was going to be very difficult to get different Ministries or agencies to share facilities, if it meant loss of autonomy. However, the proposals were discussed, and the planning team did get an accurate reflection of how the proposals were likely to be received, even if the probable reactions were not to the liking of the planning team.

The team leader was very upset about the outcome of the third meeting, in particular. It can be seen from Table D that although overall attendance had dropped only slightly from the first meeting (from 12 to 9), the level of representation had declined considerably, only three presidents attending the October meeting (and one of these left after half an hour). Given the difficulty being felt at this stage of getting contacts at a Ministerial level, it was considered all the more disappointing that clear-cut decisions, especially regarding cooperation between sectors, could not be reached through the Presidents' Communication Council.

However, if attendance of presidents to the Council meetings was
disappointing, generally presidents were accessible to individual members of the planning team who wished to see them. On several occasions, in fact, presidents themselves requested meetings with members of the team, either to keep themselves personally informed, or to seek advice or assistance on particular issues.

Finally, the last structure devised to obtain wide involvement of nationals in the project was the establishment of a Communication Planning Council. In all, 15 different agencies were represented on this Council. Members of this Council were used as information sources for the development of a communication policy and objectives statement. Members were operational personnel at the "director" level - persons involved in the daily execution of communication activities for their respective ministries. The Council met six times between June and September (roughly every two to three weeks). Table E summarises attendance at meetings, and Table F indicates the extent of involvement of various departments and individuals.

It can be seen from Table E that, although there was a slight drop (from 19 attending the first meeting, which was slightly unusual, being the first, and therefore attracting several presidents as well, to 13 for the last), the numbers of individuals attending held up well. The number of departments represented decreased from 11 for the first meeting, to 8 for the last. However, some which were not represented at the first meeting were represented at later meetings, and vice-versa, 15 departments in all being represented in at least one meeting.

However, more than just token participation was required. As one of the Afghan members pointed out in the second meeting, "irregular attendance by a section could cripple the project's effectiveness", and
# TABLE E: MEETINGS OF COMMUNICATION PLANNING COUNCIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>INDIVIDUALS</th>
<th>DEPTS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 21</td>
<td>Introduction to project-request for information on current comm. policy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11</td>
<td>Links between CPC and Presidents explained-request for specific sectoral objectives</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25</td>
<td>Depts. reported on their general objectives, target audiences, main obstacles to communication</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 13</td>
<td>Request for sectional budget data-2 groups discussed overlap between sectors and problems of facilities</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22</td>
<td>Continuation of earlier discussion, around specific questions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 19</td>
<td>Four problem areas raised for discussion</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Attendance refers to Afghan nationals only - UNESCO team members were also present at each meeting)
it was agreed by the Communication Planning Council members that the Chairman (a President from Radio Afghanistan) should get in touch with any missing members, and that UNESCO team members should also try and ensure that sectors were represented. Table F indicates the extent to which continuity of Afghan membership of the Communication Planning Council was achieved:

TABLE F: CONTINUITY OF ATTENDANCE AT CPC MEETINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT/MINISTRY</th>
<th>NO. OF TIMES REPRESENTED</th>
<th>NO. OF INDIVIDUALS ATTENDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Afghanistan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakhtar News Agency</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Broadcasting</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Women's Association</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Communications</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Agriculture</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Film</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Journalism, Kabul University</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min of Health</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Statistics Office</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Information - Publications</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. of Planning</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all, 35 different individuals from Afghan government agencies attended CPC meetings. Of these, 15, from 10 different agencies, attended at least half the CPC meetings. Virtually all the relevant Ministries and Departments were represented at half the meetings, and ten were represented at two-thirds of the meetings. Although the team leader was disappointed that attendance was not greater, it does seem that attendance was at least as good as could be expected, given the day-to-day pressures on the operational people who were members of CPC, and the rather unfamiliar
and sometimes threatening concept - in Afghan culture - of a large inter-
ministerial committee at this level of representation. Certainly, the
CPC did ensure that at least someone in each sector was aware of what the
UNESCO team were proposing and thinking, and had the opportunity to put
forward their own sector's views and information, if he wished.

It is more difficult to judge the more qualitative aspect of the extent
to which the CPC led to avoidance of overlap, and co-operation between dif-
ferent departments. It was a constant frustration for the UNESCO team, or at
least the team leadership, that during both the CPC and the Presidents' 
Communication Council meetings, there was so little apparent willingness to
coopoperate between the different sectors. This is an important cultural con-
cept to which we shall return again, but it has to be taken into considera-
tion that for CPC members, a decision to co-operate or share facilities with
other sectors was not only a very unusual phenomenon which, where it had been
tried, had usually resulted in an eventual loss of control over facilities
and their non-use, but was also a policy decision which could only be taken
at a much higher level. In any case, it would be unrealistic to think that
as a result of five or six such meetings, such a radical cultural change
would occur. On the other hand, frank and sometimes heated discussions on
the need for, and possibility of, co-operation and the use of shared facil-
ities did occur, sector objectives, and obstacles to the effective use of
communications in each sector, were discussed, and it would be surprising
if those 15 members who regularly attended went away without a much better
understanding of the communication planning process, the possible roles of
communication in development, and the likely advantages and disadvantages
of co-operation and shared use of facilities.

There is one final aspect of structuring for the planning exercise
which turned out, in the opinion of most of the foreign specialists, to
have been an important part of the planning exercise. This was the
management of the foreign specialists in the field. To some extent, of
course, this depends on the qualities of the team leader, but there were several steps taken which greatly enhanced the coherence of the team of foreign specialists, and facilitated the development of proposals which cut across sectoral interests. First of all, office accommodation was secured at Radio Afghanistan, which provided desk space for all the consultants in two rooms, close to each other. Therefore most specialists were able to meet each other on a daily, working basis. Secondly, during Phase 2 and 3, when there were usually at least six foreign consultants working on the project at any one time, regular weekly staff meetings were held, usually with an agenda and an opportunity for each specialist to report to the others on his or her progress, problems and discoveries. These meetings were held by most of the specialists to be extremely valuable. It enabled frustrations to be talked through and shared, but most of all it allowed for an interchange of experiences of how Afghan culture worked, and of the development of a common approach and understanding of communication planning.

This last point is important. One definition of a foreign specialist is an ordinary person a long way from home. One or two of the team had not worked before for any extensive period of time in a developing country. Most, while specialists in their own field - broadcasting, education, etc. - were not necessarily communications planners. Most of the specialists had difficulty in understanding the scenario and the philosophy behind it, and found it difficult to come to grips with the development of a total system. It would not be too exaggerated to say that communication planning is a strange idea even to experts. None of the foreign specialists was an expert in Afghan culture. Therefore regular staff meetings, and the occasional field trip that was arranged, were essential components of the planning exercise, to share and develop experience, and to help each other grope towards a common approach.
(c) The scenario network. Before describing what actually happened, it is necessary at this stage to probe into the proposed scenario a little more, so that both the predicted events and the nature of the scenario are clearly understood. First of all, the listing of tasks, and their sequencing, are of course only guidelines. Departures from the network were expected. Secondly, to allow for a simplified summary, the crucial liaison with Afghan ministries, etc., (through the various organisational structures discussed above) have been omitted, to allow a clear identification of the actual planning tasks proposed in the network.

(i) preparatory period. Before the fieldwork began, there were four listed tasks, involving UNESCO secretariat and research assistance time. Basically, this was the collection of basic background data on Afghanistan, and, more crucially, a draft communication policy statement, derived from an analysis of existing policies, statements, the constitution, etc.

(ii) phase 1. This would cover the first eight weeks of the project (from June 20th to August 14th, in practice). The main tasks in this phase were to be:

- discussion and modification of the draft policy statement with the Planning Body

- expansion of policy statements to goals and targets

- detailed statement of communication objectives for each sector, in quantified terms
- the formulation of alternative strategic approaches

This phase would be carried out primarily by the team leader, the deputy team leader, and the counterpart team. These, after consultation and discussion of course with the various Afghan decision-making bodies, would therefore be more or less solely responsible for identifying and specifying precisely communication policy.

(iii) **phase 2.** This would cover the next nine weeks of the project (from August 15th to October 16th). The rest of the team were scheduled to commence on August 15th, leaving at the end of this phase, except for the rural development and education specialist. The main tasks in this phase were to be:

- prepare format or document for the presentation of alternative strategic approaches for the government
- select the preferred strategies
- evolve a phased strategic plan in outline for the chosen option or mix of options
- research basic data required for operational plan
- prepare format or document for the presentation of the strategic plan for the chosen option for the government
(iv) **Phase 3.** This would stretch over the last eight weeks of the project (from October 17th to December 18th). The main tasks for this stage were:

- prepare a detailed operation plan for the chosen options, including costings, manpower, financing, phasing networks, etc.

- writing of the report

The rural development and education specialist were to remain for the first four weeks to finalise the operational plans in their sectors, and the team leader and deputy team leader would remain to write the report.

The planned scenario, however, never really got beyond the first of the 33 planned tasks. The first stumbling block was the formulation of a draft communications policy statement for Afghanistan. This should have been available before Phase 1 began, and, according to the scenario, "it must be complete, and agreement reached generally, by Week 11 (September 4th) at the latest". The statement was not available at the start of the project, nor was there one already in existence in Afghanistan, at least in an explicit form. Thus, one of the main tasks of the team leader was first of all to try, from an analysis of the constitution, speeches of the President, and discussion with various Afghan ministries, to derive a policy statement, then secondly to get it endorsed. A six-page, typed memorandum was prepared by the team explaining the steps taken in this regard.

Arising from the first meeting between the UNESCO team and department...
heads on June 21st, a questionnaire was sent to each sector requesting a listing of sectoral communication policies. The response was very poor; even the few questionnaires that were returned had little information of use or relevance. After several attempts, the team leader managed to get a meeting with one of the Presidents from the Ministry of Planning on July 13th. Although he was unable to give any specific policy guidance, he did clarify that, basically, each Department was free to make its own policies, so long as they were within the broad policies enunciated in the Constitution, etc.

Fortunately, two days earlier, at the first "business" meeting of the Communication Planning Council, the team had already decided that because of the time constraints, each department should be asked clearly to state its specific sectoral (as distinct from communication) objectives and target audiences. Thus, without waiting for finalisation of the communication policy statement, the team had decided to move on to the "objectives" phase.

In this way, derived from the information provided by each sector and discussions with Afghan officials, on August 10th the team produced a draft paper on Communication Policies and Objectives. However, it indicated a number of areas of duplication and overlap, and a number of overall policy issues were clearly still to be resolved. Since at this time a high-level policy body had not been established (nor, in fact, at any time during the project), on the advice of the PCC it was decided to approach the Minister of Information. To force through decisions more quickly, the team prepared a document assuming certain policy decisions, unless informed otherwise. A meeting eventually took place with the Minister on September 3rd. Two of the policy issues were resolved on the spot. The third, concerning the duplication of effort at the village
level, could only be resolved through a meeting of several ministers, which the Minister promised to arrange. This however did not take place during the life of the project. However, a Communications Policies and Objectives in Afghanistan statement, in a revised form as a result of this meeting, was drawn up and included in an annex to the team's report. This statement was, however, never formally endorsed by the Afghan government (except by default). Furthermore, being couched in very general terms, and being finalised as late as it was, it proved to be of little use to the sectoral specialists who arrived in August.

The second, and not unrelated, departure from the scenario was the failure of the Phase 1 team to have determined and quantified the sectoral objectives by the time the Phase 2 members arrived. The scenario states:

"It is assumed that all team members will have been given in advance of their arrival a full set of briefing documents ... The new documentation should include the agreed formulation of policies, the statement goals, targets and objectives, and what has so far been prepared in the way of alternative strategies ... it must be understood, and accepted by the team, that the time available does not allow for any radical changes of direction. The formulation of policies and their translation into goals, targets and objectives, must be taken as a sine qua non ... local data will have to be accepted largely on the evaluation of the counterpart team".

The only documentation received on arrival, therefore, was the scenario, the background data, and the returned questionnaires from
each department on its goals and target groups. The problem was that most departments did not have a communications policy. Some had limited communications facilities, but these had been provided to meet short-term requirements for specific projects, and nearly all facilities had been bought from funds from overseas aid for such projects. What the sectors did have (though even then often only in the most general terms) was a sectoral policy, or set of priorities, for development tasks and target audiences. The media sectors also, of course, had general policies, but these were related primarily to their own survival or expansion, and not to development goals, except in the vaguest of terms.

The first task therefore of the Phase 2 development specialists was to derive a set of sectoral communication policies - in other words, to suggest how the use of communications media could assist in the achievement of the development priorities of the different departments. The media specialists on the other hand concentrated on technical and management aspects - how to improve the technical efficiency of Afghan Films, training and organisational structures for Radio Afghanistan for the introduction of television, development of telecommunications and news agency transmission system.

The team leader provided a suggested format for the development of strategy options in each sector at a staff meeting on September 11th. Although way behind the schedule of the scenario, this date was still too early for the two development sector specialists, who were still trying to sort out the overall development objectives, in specific, quantified terms. Nevertheless, by the end of September, most of the specialists had put forward a set of alternative proposals for communication projects, if not policies, within their respective areas. It is important to note here that the three Phase 1 members of the team were all unanimous in
their opinion that this was a task that could only have been done by sector specialists, since it involved analysis first of overall sectoral objectives, combined with a knowledge of the potential of communications media for development.

The next problem was to get the proposals discussed and options chosen. The proposals were circulated to Presidents of the various departments at the end of September. It was in practice difficult to get a detailed discussion of the various proposals with individual presidents, although this did vary from department to department. Reactions varied from complete acceptance without any discussion to total avoidance of any discussion or even consideration of the proposals. Language was obviously a problem. Some of the proposals were lengthy and detailed. Foreign specialists had to rely largely on interpreting or guessing the real reaction to proposals.

It was however possible as a result of the stages worked through so far to begin to draw out from the discussions and various sectoral proposals a number of general, strategic proposals, which cut across sectors. Thus, at the Presidents' Council Meeting of October 24th, it was possible to put forward for discussion five major inter-departmental proposals. These would, however, in most cases, such as the establishment of regional training centres for village-level workers, facilitate many of the individual sectoral proposals. As already mentioned, reactions of both the CPC and the PCC to the sharing of resources and the development of co-operative inter-departmental projects were not encouraging.

The problem with both the individual sectoral proposals and the more general, inter-departmental proposals was one of official endorsement. Because of the failure to set up a high-level policy body with
powers to choose, endorse, or reject projects, it was impossible to develop one strategic plan. What resulted was a whole set of proposals, both sectoral and general, but without any determined attempt to set priorities, or a total systems plan for communications, as envisaged by the scenario. However, it was possible to develop operational plans for the projects proposed, including costs, manpower and training, and phasing networks. In the education sector, it was also possible to draw up a detailed operational plan for the introduction of an educational television service.

SOME JUDGEMENTS

Weaknesses and Strengths of the Framework

This section will be even more interpretative than earlier parts of the evaluation, and therefore particularly open to discussion and more tentative.

1. Cultural factors. It is necessary to examine a little more closely the extent to which aspects peculiar to Afghanistan affected the framework. The hierarchical nature of decision-making in the government had several consequences. Firstly, decisions were always referred upwards. Secondly, below Ministerial level, there were likely in any one Ministry to be up to 15 or 20 presidents, all attempting to get the Minister's attention or decisions. Inevitably, then, it took time to get even meetings arranged. Thirdly, there was a reluctance to make decisions which created precedents or suggested initiative. While this may be true of most governments, it was exceptionally pronounced in Afghanistan. The team leader was moved to write in the report:

"... members of the team improved in their ability to
understand the seeming reluctance of the individuals to provide information or to comment on proposed plans. This self-protectiveness in a society coping with many difficult problems is understandable. The individual's fear of reprisal appears to be stronger motivation than hope that he will be rewarded by a system which can afford few monetary inducements. A salary scale which pays a department president the equivalent of perhaps $80 a month does not leave much scope between this and a bare subsistence level to offer incentives for enterprise. Job security is more important than innovation." (5)

Fourthly, sectoral autonomy was particularly strong, making arrangements or plans requiring co-operation or the sharing of facilities between departments particularly difficult. Again, the team leader commented:

"The sectoral 'chief' exacts almost feudal loyalty of his people and, in the bureaucratic sense at least, he is likely to punish undue consorting with other sectors or sharing with them proprietory information or facilities ... It would appear that the 'committee' structure so beloved by Western politicians and educators is not a viable decision-making machine in Afghanistan. In the first place, the member of the conference is speaking not for himself but as a representative of his agency. He is thus reluctant to express any view unless specially so commissioned by his superior. For a subordinate to attempt to guess what such a decision may be is not considered a wholesome exercise ... And this is not the way to make plans anyway (say the social mores): plans are made by the leader and carried out by his subordinates; strong leaders do not parley - they act." (6)
This has been spelled out at some length because the framework does depend very largely on co-operation between sectors, on people having the authority to make - and being willing to make - decisions, on the willingness of individuals to subordinate narrower sectoral interests to a broader, common good. It is dangerous to assume that Afghanistan is massively an exception amongst developing countries. While it may be more extreme, some of the tendencies can be found in many organisations, both in developed and developing countries. Hierarchical planning and sectoral, autonomous empires are not unique to Afghanistan. At the same time, any planning framework must take account of "local" decision-making practice. The question of course is how much a planning exercise should seek to change this. This is a fundamental question about the aims behind development, but if a country does want technological innovation, and particularly the large scale application of communications technology to development problems, then it seems probable that changes in the process by which decisions are made will also be necessary.

Planning is more a process than a product, and maybe the introduction or pressure to change to more appropriate decision-making processes for communications application is itself one of the most important objectives of a communications planning exercise. However, it must take as a starting point the way that decision-making occurs in the country, and work from this towards new structures. The planning framework was valuable in that it suggested and led to at least some examples of appropriate decision-making processes, but the failure to work from the top (i.e. the Ministers) down in the initial stages was no doubt a major handicap to getting the decisions required by the scenario.

2. The Nature of Planning and Decision-Making. Irrespective of the unique Afghan factors, the field test raises some serious questions
of some of the assumptions about planning and decision-making in the scenario. First of all, it was clear that communications policies did not exist, either implicitly or explicitly, in Afghanistan when the project began. Indeed, the main result of the exercise, and perhaps its most important outcome, was that it forced through consideration of communications policies in various sectors, and related these to development goals. Indeed, in most of the development sectors, people were unaware of the role that communication media could play in achieving their development goals. It was unrealistic then to assume that communication policies were there already, to be handed down and given to the team when it arrived. One of the major functions of the team was to assist the various sectors in the development of communication policies.

Indeed, on reflection, it should appear self-evident that such a project would not have had such a strong justification if Afghanistan did have clear communication policies. Knowing what you want to do is always much harder than doing it. This of course does not mean that there were no communication policies at all. Radio Afghanistan and Bakhtar News Agencies had their own policies, but these had not been related to specific development goals and objectives, except for increasing national cohesion and identity. Until communication policies are related to specific developments, there will obviously be difficulties in getting such development departments as agriculture, health, education, etc., to take a communication planning exercise seriously.

However, relating communication policies to development goals (or perhaps better, the other way round) turned out to be more difficult and technical than anticipated. According to the scenario, this was to have been done during Phase 1 by the team leader, the deputy team leader, and the counterparts. This they could not do, though, and had to await the arrival of the two development sector specialists. Most
of the specialists were required earlier than suggested by the framework. To some extent, the broadcasting, film and audio-visual, news agency and telecommunications specialists would all have benefited had development sector goals and target audiences been more clearly defined earlier. At the same time, the potential for media enabling various development goals to be met more quickly or at less cost needed to be explained by development sector specialists, and could not be done by the counterparts. The development sector specialists and the media specialists also had to check out for themselves much of the data and information provided by counterparts, particularly in terms of quantifying objectives, getting a comprehensive picture of existing media facilities, and identifying priorities.

Perhaps one of the major disappointments was the failure to get counterparts to work in the way intended.

The idea of placing responsibility on to national counterparts for the collection of information, identification of existing policies, and feeding back between the foreign specialists and more senior government officials and Ministers the thinking and development of, and reactions to, the project, is desirable for two reasons. It ensures involvement and continuity after the foreign specialists have left, and it is desirable that counterparts should themselves be part of the decision-making process, taking what they believe to be valuable from the project, and rejecting what they believe to be unsuitable.

Unfortunately, it did not work out like that. Partly the reason was cultural, but also partly technical. Very few counterparts, even in the media sectors, had the necessary information, training or background to develop a policy within their sector for the application of
communications technology to development goals, without substantial foreign specialist assistance. (If they had possessed such a background, one wonders why foreign specialist assistance would have been needed in the first place). For these reasons, it was a serious mistake within the framework to assume that policies and data could be ready for when the development sector specialists arrived. Their assistance was needed to do this.

Indeed, the most serious weakness of the framework is the sequencing and nature of the network (Figure A). Although it was accompanied by qualifying statements about it being only a guide, and the need for it to be used flexibly, it did turn out to be much too linear and too simplified in practice in its assumptions about the planning process. It certainly did not reflect a cyclical approach to planning. One must question seriously the "normal sequence of planning by objectives, moving from policy to goal statement, strategic and operational planning, prototyping and implementation." This is an ideal, a post-hoc rationalisation of a much more involved and complex process which, if charted out in detail in advance, will almost certainly be impossible to follow, if an acceptable project document is to be achieved. Of course, it is valuable for a team to have a model of what they should be aiming for, but this particular network did not reflect the reality of planning. In particular, the search for a statement of national communications policy held up the progress of the project, and at such a global level, it is doubtful whether it would have been very meaningful or helpful in any case towards the development of a national communications system. It could be argued that such a policy should be built from the ground up, in response to sectoral needs, but aiming to avoid overlap and duplication. The network proposed, however, assumed an overall communications policy which would be interpreted and applied downwards. Even in as hierarchically organised a system
as the Afghan government, such an approach was just not practical, especially when no such policy existed in any case.

Lastly, the network does not allow sufficiently for planning being an on-going process. Obviously, in a project limited to a specific period of time, specific projects and proposals for the use of communications media must be put forward, and decisions are required from government officials during the lifetime of the project to enable such proposals to be made within the overall context of existing government policy. However, government is an on-going process, with an ever-shifting frame of policy, priorities, and political philosophy. The network relied too much on quick, one might say hasty, "once-off' decisions from government about a range of policies which needed careful consideration and discussion, particularly since they were usually put forward in a foreign language. The network emphasises too much products, in the way of projects, ending with a single "preferred" communication strategy, and not enough on process, i.e. establishing permanent structures within government which would facilitate the planning process to accommodate changes in policy (although it must be said that the team did end up by proposing a number of such structures.)

In some ways, then, it may have been better to have reversed the sequence of Phases 1 and 2, but even that would suggest perhaps a too linear approach. Certainly, it would have been better to reduce the eight-week phase 1 period, just bringing in the team leader four to six weeks in advance to make practical arrangements and find and brief appropriate counterparts. The development sector specialists should then arrive, followed two to four weeks later by the media sector specialists. As well as aiming to suggest specific projects and goals for communications media, the team should aim at suggesting structures to improve the planning and utilisation of communications media for
development. Perhaps at the end of the project, the government may wish to synthesise an overall communications policy statement, as a result of the discussions and proposals that have taken place, unless, of course, a clear communications policy had already been decided before the project.

3. The Failure to Involve High-Level Decision-Makers. This is a much more intractable problem than the sequencing and steps in the network. Again, the failure was partly due to the structure of government in Afghanistan, but also, if not due to the framework, the failure to involve high-level decision-makers was at least partly due to some of the basic principles not being observed (through no fault of the team or the UNESCO secretariat). The failure to get close involvement with the Ministry of Planning was crucial. The Ministry of Planning heavily influences the allocation of resources for development projects. Several of the foreign specialists believed that the reason for the difficulty in getting in to see Ministers was because the project was not offering tangible resources, in the sense of immediate development projects. It had no carrots to offer. As one foreign specialist put it:

"We've been trying to get to see Ministers for weeks, but the Japanese were here for four days, saw five Ministers, and sold them a complete TV system."

The involvement of the Ministry of Planning on a closer basis would at least have ensured that the team's work was seen in the context of allocation of resources and priorities between sectors. However, the project was attached to the Ministry of Information, and located within Radio Afghanistan. It is not clear from where the political push for a communication planning survey originated, either within or outside the Afghan government. Certainly, the Ministry of Information - and also the
Educational Broadcasting department of the Ministry of Education — were most interested, but the project clearly did not have a higher level of political support or status; there was no senior Minister rooting for it. It was therefore all the more important for it to have been located in the Ministry of Planning, to ensure that it was not seen as a sectoral project, mainly concerned with the Ministry of Information's interests.

However, even if the project had started with the full support of the Ministry of Planning, there would have been problems in getting high-level involvement. One reason why it was difficult to get Ministers together, it was suggested by one member of the team, was due to the tense political situation in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, there are serious practical problems in getting high-level involvement. Long-term planning exercises do not have the urgency of day-to-day problems that Ministers have to tackle, nor do they offer immediate prospects of grandiose schemes which bring political rewards. How much time can such a project really expect of Ministers? It was suggested that Ministerial involvement is needed only twice: at the beginning and at the end, the first time to give the project a political push, the last time for endorsement of or clarification of policy. It would seem though that where there is little devolution of responsibility for decision-making, a mid-term meeting of Ministers would also be needed. Whatever detailed proposals though that are made for Ministerial involvement, this should be written into the official project agreement between UNESCO and the national government.

In the end, the project was also helped by the attitude of most of the other international or external development agencies in Afghanistan. The World Bank, UNICEF, and some other agencies made it clear that they
would wait for the outcome of the planning survey before committing themselves to a number of development projects, and in the later stages of the project, as proposals were coming forward, the support of these other agencies did increase Afghan interest in the project. Co-operation and co-ordination between planning surveys and the development agencies is crucial, and should be planned for from the beginning.

3. The Success of the Framework. Although there is substantial criticism of the detail of the network, particularly the sequencing and the assumptions about the way policy gets decided, the overall approach of the proposed framework was clearly right, within the context of an external, technical aid project. The emphasis on precision in policies, quantification of objectives, participation in planning, validation of proposals by the government, and practical operational plans, proved invaluable as goals to which the team should strive. It made clear, particularly to the team leader, what the team should try and do, even if the route suggested was not usually appropriate. The approach suggested by or underlying the framework led to a number of outcomes, which many would consider to be desirable in a development project:

(a) The project proved to be an invaluable educative process - it made Afghans at all levels of government think more clearly about what they wanted, needed and expected from communications in assisting development

(b) The project did involve people at an operational level, and a number of people at the president level (i.e. heads of government departments). Influence on this level of government, in a country as politically unstable as Afghanistan was at the time, is important. While Ministers may come and
go, the operational people are more permanent, and may themselves become heads of departments later.

(c) The project did succeed in eliciting goals, difficulties in existing communications, and an understanding of the way decision-making operated in Afghanistan. It did enable the team to obtain an accurate idea of Afghan priorities, and to react to and plan for these priorities. In the end, the plan did take account of what the Afghans wanted - e.g. an educational television service - even if the team did not agree with the priorities. The CPC, and to a lesser extent, the PCC, and also the counterpart arrangements, did work to the extent that they did in the end provide the team with the information it needed, even though these arrangements were less successful in eliciting policy decisions and endorsement of proposals and policies suggested by the team.

(d) Although there was less involvement of Ministers than was necessary, the project was clearly right to push for their involvement. Without it, no communication plan would stand a chance of being implemented.

(e) The scenario was very useful to the team leader for setting out steps that could be taken to force the team to push for the identification of clear sectoral objectives, consultation with Ministries, counterpart involvement. Although the team was strong enough to ignore the scenario when it did not fit the circumstances, it did provide clear goals to aim for. It cannot be assumed that foreign specialists are clear in what is required in the development
of a communication planning survey, and such guidance is necessary. On the other hand, there were times when members of the foreign team were close to frustration and despair from their inability to get near to what the scenario suggested, so changes are necessary.

(f) The scenario did help the team to come forward with pragmatic, practical proposals, both for projects, and for planning processes and procedures. Some of these might have happened in any case, but there seems little doubt that the scenario did help to produce a coherent and comprehensive planning survey. It is also important to note that, despite their doubts and criticisms about many aspects of the scenario, all the foreign experts were convinced of the need and value of the planning exercise for Afghanistan. That is not always a feeling found amongst foreign specialists working on development projects, and even less so on planning projects.
References


6. UNESCO, op. cit.