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Version: Accepted Manuscript

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A transformative presence?
Chinese migrants as agents of change in Ghana and Nigeria

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Introduction
China’s rapidly expanding engagement with Africa has been heralded as one of the most important developments in the continent’s post-colonial history, and has been ascribed the potential to radically transform Africa’s economic and political position in the world (Moyo 2009). There are many strands to China’s renewed involvement in Africa and while most attention has focused on high-level diplomacy, trade and investment, it is increasingly recognised that the growing presence of Chinese migrants on the continent is a key factor in determining how China-Africa relations unfold. As

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Chris Alden (2007: 128) has argued, ‘The behaviour of thousands of newly settled Chinese businessmen and the conduct of the African communities in which they live and work will matter as much as the diplomacy and concessions made at the government level’. Consequently, studies of Chinese migrants in various African countries are emerging and these have begun to deepen our understanding of the nature of this migration and how those involved organise their economic activities and operate transnationally (Haugen and Carling 2005; Ho 2008; Dobler 2009; Huynh et al 2010; Giese and Thiel 2012). Yet our knowledge of how the Chinese presence is impacting upon African development remains limited.

In attempting to better understand the impact of migration on development, we turn to the relationship between migration and social transformation. This has been conceptualised most coherently by the sociologist and migration scholar Stephen Castles (2009, 2010) and his work broadens and complexifies the often narrow, normative and over-simplified debates about the developmental role of migration that have re-emerged over the last 15 years. The notion of social transformation therefore offers a more sophisticated framework for exploring the dynamics and effects of migration and reminds us that migration is profoundly embedded in wider processes of social change, being both a driver and an outcome.

In seeking to draw-on and develop theorisations of migration and social transformation, we will explore how and to what extent the presence of Chinese migrants in Ghana and Nigeria contributes to wider social, economic and political dynamics in these countries. In doing this, we use ethnographic research with Chinese migrants in the two countries, as well as the accounts of Ghanaian and Nigerian respondents. The research was conducted between July 2010 and September 2011 and involved three main elements. The first was participant observation in workplaces and social spaces where Chinese migrants interact with each other and/or Ghanaians and Nigerians, such as offices, shops, restaurants and beaches. The second was a survey of local attitudes towards the Chinese presence, which was conducted among a semi-randomised sample of 1084 Ghanaians and 600 Nigerians using a standardised questionnaire,

1. The research on which this chapter is based was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (RES 062-23-1893).
and also involved 60 in-depth follow-up interviews. The final element was in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 102 Chinese migrants and 61 Ghanaians and Nigerians connected to or particularly affected by the Chinese presence, such as workers, partners, competitors, trade unionists, private sector representatives, and government officials. In making use of our data from these sources, all respondents and associated companies have been anonymised and where names have been used, these are pseudonyms.

Our sample of 102 Chinese interviewees was divided equally between those based in Ghana and those based in Nigeria. 80 were from ‘mainland’ China, 18 from Hong Kong, 3 from Taiwan, and 1 from Singapore. Respondents from Hong Kong tended to be connected to the long-standing Hong Kong Chinese manufacturing presence in Ghana and Nigeria, which emerged in the 1950s and ‘60s and was predominantly involved in establishing enamelware and textile industries (Mohan et al 2014). While some of these manufacturing enterprises have since closed down, a good number have remained and diversified into plastics and metal-processing industries as well as construction and hospitality, particularly hotels, Chinese restaurants and casinos. These enterprises also underpinned some of the earliest ‘mainland’ Chinese migration to Ghana and Nigeria, recruiting technicians from China, predominantly from Shanghai where most of the Hong Kong industrialists in West Africa had their family origins, when the equivalent Hong Kong expertise became too expensive in the 1980s. At the same time, a smaller cohort of Taiwanese entrepreneurs arrived and also established themselves in light manufacturing and recruited some workers from China. Alongside this, ‘mainland’ Chinese managers and workers began to arrive with the pioneering Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly in the construction sector. While these older cohorts of Chinese migrants are represented in our sample, most respondents arrived as part of the significantly expanded flow of ‘mainland’ Chinese migrants to Africa since the late 1990s, which is associated with the growing penetration of Chinese SOEs and private companies and an independent entrepreneurial migration enabled by Chinese liberalization. Small-scale traders are often seen to be emblematic of the latter although recently-arrived Chinese entrepreneurs have established a range of enterprises not only in retail but also in health services, hospitality, construction and
light industry. While Ghanaian and Nigerian respondents closely connected to the Chinese presence are aware of its diversity of origins and activities, many local actors tend to see ‘the Chinese’ as a largely homogenous group. Significantly, and partly in response to this, some prominent Chinese migrants in both Ghana and Nigeria have themselves sought to develop a unified Chinese identity and organize across the diversity of cohorts and regional origins to present and protect the image and interests of ‘the Chinese’ (Mohan et al 2014).

Our analysis begins by discussing in more detail the potential and limitations of migration and social transformation approaches. While these approaches offer a more nuanced and contextualised understanding of migration and its effects, their focus has been on South-North migration rather than South-South flows. Furthermore, we argue that these conceptualisations need to do more to incorporate the agency of local actors with whom migrants interact and how these relationships and their outcomes are shaped by the politics of class. In developing this argument, we draw on our data to chart some of the social changes and new social relations with which the expanded Chinese presence is involved. We argue that while many of the social, economic and political effects of the Chinese presence are significant, they are not necessarily transformative in and of themselves. However, we contend that the ways in which these effects are entwined in localised social, economic and political dynamics mean that they have the potential to contribute to broader processes of transformation, although not always in ways deemed positive or progressive. Here we aim to demonstrate that the impact of Chinese migrants is incorporated into wider processes of social change through the agency of local actors and the politics of class, factors that have been underplayed not only in social transformation perspectives on migration but also in the emerging body of work on resurgent China-Africa relations (Corkin 2013; Mohan and Lampert 2013).

Migration and social transformation

Over the last 15 years, there has been a resurgence of interest among academics, civil society activists and policy makers in the developmental role of migration (Faist and Fauser 2011). This
wave of interest has been much more positive in its conclusions than established debates about migration and development, attributing migrants with the potential to make significant contributions to their ‘host’ and ‘home’ countries through the international flows of money, ideas and influence they engender (DFID 2007; Brinkerhoff 2008; Newland 2010). However, this discourse of migration and development has been criticised for giving too much emphasis to particular, primarily economic factors such as migrant remittances (Page and Mercer 2012) and attributing excessive influence to international migration relative to other social and economic dynamics (Skeldon 2008; Lampert 2014). It is in this context that Castles and others have advanced a social transformation perspective on migration and its effects. This approach seeks to place the drivers and outcomes of migration in the context of broader and ongoing processes of social, economic and political change (Castles 2009, 2010; Glick Schiller and Faist 2009). It also stresses that social transformation is a less normative concept than that of development and is not defined only in terms of positive change, meaning that social transformations can be adjudged to be negative as well as positive (Castles 2001; Portes 2010).

While this approach allows for a more contextualised conception of migration and its often ambivalent outcomes, it is not always clear what exactly is meant by social transformation. Castles and other proponents tend to emphasise seismic social, economic and political shifts, often at the global level, such as Europe’s ‘great transformation’ as identified by Polanyi or the rise of globalisation and the ongoing rebalancing of international power (Castles 2001, 2010; Glick Schiller and Faist 2009). At the national-level, these global forces are seen to manifest themselves in profound ways, such as radically reconfiguring established social structures. In this way, social transformation comes to be defined as “a fundamental shift in the way society is organised that goes beyond the continual processes of incremental social change that are always at work” (Castles 2010, 1576). However, scholars in the field sometimes appear to use the ideas of social transformation and social change interchangeably (Portes 2010; Van Hear 2010), and the notion of social transformation is often applied to changes that are undoubtedly highly significant but nonetheless do not appear to be
as fundamental as the term implies (Binder and Tošić 2005; Schuerkens 2005).

There is clearly something of a tension around exactly how transformative social transformation is, and Portes’ (2010) attempt to explore this more explicitly is helpful in suggesting a way forward. He argues that there are “qualitatively different levels at which social change can take place” (p1539) and differentiates between ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ or ‘revolutionary’ social change, the key difference being whether or not fundamental social values or structures are transformed. As he explains, change “‘at the surface’ [...] yield[s] only marginal modifications to the social order” while ‘deep’ change “produces core systemic changes of the kind identified in everyday discourse as ‘revolutionary’” (ibid.). “[T]ruly revolutionary social change”, he contends, “requires the transformation of the value system or the remaking of the society’s class structure” (p1548).

There is an emerging consensus that changes linked directly to migration are rarely transformative in the sense of Portes’ ‘deep’ social change. As Schuerkens (2005: 544) argues, “transformation processes are subject to very complex determinants and not just to the mobility of people. In most cases, migration is a minor factor of development”. This coheres with Portes’ (2010) argument that unlike ‘telluric movements’ of the past, which involved large-scale displacements such as the European colonisation of Australia and North America, “the transformative potential of contemporary migration is limited” (p1550). He traces this not only to the relatively small number of international migrants in terms of the global population but also to the fact that “the transformational potential of migration is limited, at every level, by the existing web of institutions reflecting deep cultural and power arrangements” (p1548). Consequently, he contends, migrants tend to incorporate themselves into the existing social systems of their ‘host’ environment, meaning that their “role is most commonly to buttress the existing structures of power rather than challenge them” (p1549).

However, as even Schuerkens (2005) acknowledges, while contemporary migration may not itself drive social transformation, it does have the potential to influence it. This is where the central contention of social transformation approaches to migration becomes key; it is essential to recognise how migration is deeply
bound-up in broader processes of social change. As such, it becomes necessary to understand how migration is embedded in wider social, economic and political contexts, at local, national and global levels (Castles 2009, 2010; Glick Schiller and Faist 2009). This resonates with research in the field of migration and development which increasingly demonstrates the importance of social, economic, and political contexts in shaping the extent to which migrants can contribute to processes of development (Skeldon 2008; de Haas 2010).

Adopting such perspectives, the growing presence of Chinese migrants in Ghana and Nigeria can be seen as part of a wider dynamic that could be regarded as constituting a ‘revolutionary’ form of social transformation; that of the rapid expansion of Chinese interests and activities in Africa which is itself related to the increasing multi-polarity of global economic and political power. Yet taking a social transformation perspective also demands that we understand how the activities and impacts of Chinese migrants in Ghana and Nigeria intersect with ongoing processes of social change within these countries. Only then can we begin to assess the extent to which these intersections might go beyond contributing to ‘surface’ changes to underpin ‘deep’ social transformation. In an attempt to do this, we first explore some of the social and economic effects of the increased Chinese presence in Ghana and Nigeria and then go on to consider how these have been shaped by African agency and become entwined in the ongoing politics of class in these countries.

**Towards social transformation? Social and economic effects of the expanded Chinese presence in Ghana and Nigeria**

While data are far from reliable, there has been a significant expansion of the Chinese population in Africa over the last 15 years with claims that it is now over 1 million. Between 1995 and 2010, estimates suggest that the Chinese population has increased from 700 to around 20,000 in Ghana and from 5,100 to as high as 150,000 in Nigeria (Mohan et al 2014). Certainly, Ghanaian and Nigerian interviewees often note that people they believe to be Chinese are now a much more common sight on the streets of cities in which they reside. Indeed, **75%** of African respondents in our attitude
survey noted an increase in the number of Chinese people over the past five years. The rise of the expression ‘Chinko’ in Ghana and Nigeria may well be indicative of this. Emerging initially as a disparaging reference to cheap, Chinese-made goods, the term has also come to be used by some to refer to people believed to be of Chinese origin. One of the authors, a White British male, first discovered this when walking down a Lagos street in 2010 and the common salutary call of ‘Oyibo’ (white person) was replaced by ‘Chinko’. Clearly, Chinese migrants have to some extent entered the popular imagination as a prominent feature of the local expatriate population.

One of the most distinct ways in which the expanded Chinese presence is visible is in the urban fabric. Since the late 1990s, many of the major cities of Ghana and Nigeria have witnessed the appearance of new Chinese restaurants, corporate offices, construction companies, factories, traditional medicine clinics, hotels and shops. In the latter case, Accra and Lagos, like other African cities (Dittgen 2013), have seen the development of striking ‘China Town’ shopping complexes. In Lagos, the imposingly red-walled ‘China Town’ is particularly prominent with its two-storeys providing space for up to 400 shops and stalls, a casino and restaurant, and living quarters for some of the Chinese traders operating there.

While Chinese migrants and their enterprises have clearly become a more prominent feature of everyday life in Ghana and Nigeria in recent years, Portes (2010: 1548) is dismissive of the idea that such developments can be seen to constitute ‘deep’ social transformation, contending, “[...]migration can transform the ‘sight and smells’ of a city or the ethnic composition of the masses riding public transport (Kasinitz et al. 2008), but these are ‘street-level’ changes”. For Portes (2010), migration’s role in “creating diversity in the streets” (p1550) is not ‘revolutionary’ in and of itself as it does not necessarily transform the “fundamental pillars” (p1548) of the ‘host’ society, such as social values, the distribution of power and the class structure.

Yet Portes does not give sufficient attention to how migrants do more than simply add to the visible diversity of the street and bring into being new, inter-ethnic social relations and economic linkages (Pécoud 2004, Beuving 2006). Chinese migrants in Ghana and Nigeria have entered into a diverse array of relations with Ghanaians
and Nigerians, including as buyers and sellers, bosses and workers, business partners and competitors, colleagues and friends, and lovers and spouses. As work on the Chinese presence in Africa has tended to emphasise, many such relations are marked by tension and conflict because of the negative social and economic effects they are sometimes seen to produce. This is particularly apparent around employment relations and perceived economic competition. In the latter case, the most contentious issue in a number of African countries is the arrival since the early 2000s of significant numbers of Chinese traders and their importation of large quantities of ‘cheap’ Chinese consumer goods. This is often seen to present a direct challenge to locals operating in the informal retail sector and to undermine local manufacturing (see for example, Dittgen, 2010; Dobler, 2008; McNamee et al, 2012; Scheld, 2010). In Ghana, the Ghana Union of Traders Associations (GUTA) has led the agitation against the Chinese trading presence with its vociferous complaints and well-publicised protest marches calling on the government to enforce legislation reserving small-scale retail trading for Ghanaians (Takyi-Boadu 2005; GNA 2007a, b; Klutse and Ennin 2007). In Nigeria, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) has been in the vanguard, blaming Chinese traders, particularly in the Lagos ‘China Town’, for the importation of low-cost, often counterfeit China-made consumer goods, especially textiles, which they see as undermining local industry (Ogidan 2004; Akinrinade and Ogen 2008; Lampert and Mohan 2012).

While such responses suggest that Chinese traders are a new economic challenge to local traders and manufacturers in Ghana and Nigeria, it is recognised, even by those who led the agitation, that the underlying ‘problem’ is neither novel nor driven principally by Chinese migration. In both countries it is noted that there have long been tensions around the presence of foreign traders (see also, Falola 1990; Akyeampong 2006) and that the Chinese are only among the most recent nationalities to have entered on a significant scale. Indeed, GUTA’s agitation against Chinese traders has been part of a campaign against foreign traders in general (GNA 2007a). This has also targeted those from India, Turkey and Nigeria, with the latter often seen to be the largest and most troubling threat. Furthermore, in terms of the large-scale importation of Chinese products in recent years, there is widespread recognition
that it is African rather than Chinese traders who are primarily responsible (see also Axelsson 2012, Axelsson and Sylvanus 2010; Haugen 2011; Marfaing and Thiel 2011). For example, the CEO of a prominent Ghanaian manufacturing company, who has himself “been making a lot of noise” about cheap, low-quality imports from China undermining his business, asserts, “China is actually not exporting into Ghana per se. Yeah, they make it available, [but] it’s Ghanaians and Nigerians that go to China to order what they want to buy. [...] it’s not the Chinese fault”. Indeed, recognising this, MAN has re-orientated its campaign against the importation of low-cost Chinese consumer goods away from a focus on Chinese traders and the Lagos ‘China Town’ to target Nigerian traders and importers, joining with the government in “campaigning to change the orientation of Nigerians who go [to China] to make specification for lower quality products”.

What is seen to be at the heart of this is a wider process of globalisation in which African governments are reluctant and/or unable to regulate increasing international flows of people and goods. As the Ghanaian CEO quoted above notes, “the WTO [World Trade Organisation] rules, you know, it’s a open world now, it’s almost a free economy around everywhere in the world”. Similarly, a senior official in Ghana’s Ministry of Trade and Industry contends, “we live in a global world and there are no borders anymore”. Where the Ghanaian and Nigerian governments have made attempts to regulate international flows, these are routinely seen to be undermined by problems of state capacity and corruption. Reflecting on why import bans the Nigerian government placed on textiles and other consumer goods had failed to reduce the importation of these products, a senior official at the Lagos Chamber of Commerce reflects a widespread sentiment by asserting, “[...T]he Customs are making good money from it because it creates room for corruption” (see Axelsson 2012 for the Ghanaian case). As respondents such as this contend, the wider challenge of globalisation is com-

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2. Interview with Tema, on 08/30/2011, in Ghana.
5. Interview with senior official of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce, on 02/22/2011, in Lagos, Nigeria.
pounded by a problem of governance. In this way, what are perceived by some as the negative effects of increased inflows of Chinese traders and goods appear less like a detrimental form of ‘deep’ social transformation in their own right. Instead they appear merely as symptoms of broader and more far-reaching social transformations such as the global rise of neo-liberalism and an ongoing crisis of governance.

Tensions and conflicts that have emerged in Ghana and Nigeria around Sino-African employment relations tend to be seen in a similar way. As highlighted elsewhere in Africa (see for example, Baah and Jauch 2009; Lee 2009; Brooks 2010; Human Rights Watch 2011), there are widespread complaints that African workers in Chinese companies endure low pay and poor conditions, producing a growing sense that ‘the Chinese’ are particularly bad employers. This is especially apparent in Nigeria’s manufacturing sector where Chinese-owned factories have come to be associated not only with poor pay and casualisation but also high profile industrial disputes and accidents, most notably a 2002 fire at a Hong Kong Chinese-owned factory in Lagos State in which around 29 Nigerian workers died having reportedly been locked-in (WSWS 2002). While there are undoubtedly serious problems around the treatment of African workers in Chinese factories, it is widely recognised that these are far from unique and are also to be found in other foreign- and African-owned enterprises (see Hairong and Sautman 2013 for a similar argument in the case of Zambia’s mining sector). As a senior Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) official in Lagos argues, “Basically whether you talk about the Chinese, the Lebanese and the Indians, they have the same kind of business attitude. [...] They try to cut cost, that’s labour cost”. In such ways the problem of low pay and poor conditions is framed as a general issue rather than one that has been created by the increased entry of Chinese enterprises. Again, the genesis of this situation is traced to poor governance, particularly in terms of the state’s failure to effectively regulate employment conditions, coupled to a set of structural circumstances in which underdevelopment renders local workers vulnerable to exploitation by global capital. As a union official in Kano

asserts, “[...] they are being infringed to the level that they just have to bear it because one needs to keep life going. [...] The whole thing is rested on the economic situation of the country. If you don’t have an alternative, you will rather die or work?”

However, what is little recognised in the growing literature on the Chinese presence in Africa is that more convivial and cooperative Sino-African relations also emerge and that these can produce mutually beneficial outcomes which might underpin more positive and deeper forms of social transformation. For example, we found Chinese bosses forging close and enduring relationships with some of their African employees, Chinese and African colleagues in Chinese companies developing friendships and socialising together, and Chinese and African entrepreneurs initiating successful business partnerships. In such cases, convivial and cooperative relations often involve exchanges of financial, human and/or social capital that have allowed African actors to augment their knowledge and skills, identify and pursue new professional and business opportunities, and expand their economic networks, especially to China. Exemplifying this, a Nigerian engineering graduate has become one of the most successful entrepreneurs in the Lagos ‘China Town’ by building on the Chinese business contacts he was introduced to by Chinese “friends” he made while working at a large, Hong Kong Chinese manufacturing company. These contacts enabled him to gain business experience by working with a Chinese entrepreneur in ‘China Town’ from whom he was able to make more Chinese contacts and establish his own trading business while also pursuing mining opportunities with Chinese partners.

Similarly, restaurateurs we interviewed in Accra and Lagos contend that African chefs and waiters trained in Chinese-owned restaurants are highly prized and often go on to better paid jobs in the cities’ expanding hospitality sectors while a Chinese entrepreneur who established a small door factory in Lagos reported that several Nigerian workers he recruited and trained with the assistance of two experienced Chinese technicians went on to establish a door repair and manufacturing business of their own. Most notably, current and former staff of one of the major Chinese telecommunica-

7. Interview with union official, on 02/18/2011, in Kano Nigeria.
8. Interview with Nigerian entrepreneur, on 09/20/2010, in Lagos, Nigeria.
tions companies operating in Nigeria assert that local staff benefit from the company’s intensive hands-on training and rapid promotion system and often move on to lucrative jobs with ‘Western’ multi-nationals or to establish companies of their own in the booming telecommunications sector. Exemplifying this, two Nigerian respondents who held senior positions at this company argue that the knowledge and experience they gained there underpinned their subsequent career progression. One became the Chief Operating Officer of a successful Nigerian technology and engineering company while the other went on to establish a dynamic telecoms engineering services firm which now employs over 100 staff, many of whom he trained directly by drawing on the expertise he acquired at the Chinese company.

As Bräutigam (2003) argued in the case of auto-parts manufacturers in southeast Nigeria, contact with Chinese migrants and their enterprises enables some African actors to develop their capabilities and carve-out new career and business opportunities. Clearly, this can be seen as transformative for these African actors in terms of advancing their social and economic mobility, and it could be argued that similarly positive effects spread to Africans who they might go on to employ, train or form business relationships with. In this way, the expanded Chinese presence has the potential to spur the development of particular economic sectors or clusters, and possibly have a wider effect at the level of the national economy. However, our data suggest that the positive aggregate effects of contact with Chinese migrant enterprise are currently limited at the national level, partly because the numbers of Ghanaians and Nigerians involved are relatively small in terms of the wider economically-active population. Furthermore, as Bräutigam (2003) and work on migration and development have shown (Skeldon 2008; de Haas 2010), the positive impact of migrant enterprise tends to be limited by the kinds of contextual and structural constraints that are present to varying degrees in Ghana and Nigeria, such as poor and unstable governance, infrastructural deficits, retrenched health and education systems, and inadequate credit markets. Moreover, while individual, localised and sectoral social and economic benefits deriving from the Chinese presence may be evident, it is hard to imagine how, at this stage, they could drive ‘deep’ or ‘revolutionary’ social transformations such as displacing the dominance of eco-
economic and political elites or the position of Ghana or Nigeria in the global economic order. Nonetheless, while the Chinese presence might not drive ‘deep’ social transformation, it could come to be one of many factors that are contributing to what some see as a new and potentially transformative economic dynamism in many African countries, including Ghana and Nigeria (The Economist 2011).

In order to better understand the potential for this and how it might unfold, we will now explore the importance of doing more to consider class politics and agency beyond migrant actors in developing a social transformation perspective on migration and its effects.

**Shaping the transformative potential of Chinese migrants in Ghana and Nigeria: The importance of African agency and the politics of class**

We have argued that the social and economic impacts of Chinese migrants tend to be seen in the context of wider social and economic dynamics and are not generally identified as major drivers of ‘deep’ change in their own right. This accords with social transformation perspectives on migration, as well as work on migration and development, which stress the importance of structural and contextual factors in influencing the change potential of migration. However, what also emerges in the preceding analysis is that the social and economic impacts of Chinese migrants are mediated by the agency of Ghanaians and Nigerians, whether manifested in forms of resistance or creative accommodation. Yet in emphasising migrant agency, migration and social transformation theorists tend to overlook the role of the local actors with whom migrants interact and through which migration’s change potential is shaped. As we demonstrate below, incorporating local agency into our understanding of migration and social transformation also requires attending to class dynamics, both in terms of how they influence relations between migrants and local actors and shape wider social and economic outcomes. While class is often acknowledged in theories of migration and social transformation, its precise role and importance are rarely articulated. Portes (2010) does more than most in this direction, but his focus is on how migrants incorporate themselves into existing class structures in the ‘host’ society. We argue that it is necessary to go beyond this and consider how migrants intersect
with local class dynamics in ways that shape the nature and social distribution of migration’s impacts, with important implications for their potential to contribute to deeper forms of social change such as transforming established power structures.

In understanding this, a first step is recognising that the social and economic effects of migration are experienced differently by different local actors, exciting a variety of local responses. In the case of Chinese traders in Ghana and Nigeria, the reaction of African actors has not simply been negative and defined by resistance. In addition to seeing the increased presence of Chinese traders and goods in the context of globalisation and limited state capacity, some local actors also identify positive impacts and are even prepared to defend Chinese trading activities. Underpinning such responses is an acknowledgement that the entry of Chinese traders has lowered the price local consumers pay for Chinese goods, and that this has a wider social benefit (see also, Carling and Haugen, 2008). For example, a member of staff at the Kano Chamber of Commerce contends: “[...E]ven in the textile importation of clothes, I don’t see much wrong because they have been able to clothe almost everybody, anybody can afford to get to them according to his capacity. We’ve had Vlisco brand from pre-independence up to now, not everyone can afford it. But the Chinese have come in and within a few years they’ve managed to clothe everybody”.

A Ghanaian member of the Ghana-China Friendship Association, whose main individual concern is promoting Ghanaian products in China, agrees that Chinese traders have benefitted local consumers by reducing the cost of Chinese goods. He argues that those making “big noise about the Chinese taking over the economy” are Ghanaian importers who previously enjoyed excessive profits on Chinese goods. Notably, the Ghana Central Shopkeepers Association, which is allied with GUTA, complains that local distributors, what are popularly known as ‘market women’, prefer to buy from Chinese traders and have even challenged GUTA’s campaign against the Chinese presence in the market. Similarly, a Nigerian who has been closely involved with the management of the Lagos ‘China Town’ contends that when MAN’s complaints

9. Interview, member of staff of Kano Chamber of Commerce, on 02/16/2011, in Kano, Nigeria.
prompted the Nigeria Customs Service to close down the complex in late 2005, the city’s influential market women’s association, whose members came to rely on the complex as a source of affordable goods, were part of the lobbying effort that saw it reopened some three months later.

This highlights how local responses to the Chinese presence do not simply pit African and Chinese actors against each other but rather expose competing African class and gender interests. What becomes key in terms of the potential for social transformation is how the intersection of these local interests shapes the distribution of the perceived costs and benefits of the Chinese presence. Significantly, the ability to contest or derive benefits from the Chinese presence is far from evenly distributed and it is often established elites who are most able to exercise such agency and further their interests. At the level of the state, government officials in Ghana and Nigeria often seem more concerned with deepening diplomatic and trade relations with China, and attracting Chinese investment, than with responding to citizens’ concerns about the growing Chinese presence. For example, a senior official in Ghana’s Ministry of Trade and Industry, who has been particularly proactive in developing relations with China, was rather dismissive of complaints about the Chinese trading presence, arguing, “we can shape the cooperation and remove some of the trivial problems that have come to be associated with the Chinese, like people saying they are doing retail trade”\(^{10}\).

Attitudes like this may well explain why GUTA’s agitation against Chinese traders, which began in 2005, has drawn a limited government response. While a multi-agency task-force to regulate the activities of foreign traders in Ghanaian markets was eventually established in 2009 under the leadership of the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC), it has produced only sporadic clampdowns. Although these are seen to have been a factor in driving most Chinese traders out of the ‘China Town’ complex in central Accra, many simply relocated to nearby streets where, dispersed among African businesses, they felt less prone to targeting by the authorities. By 2011, some of the side roads and smaller complexes

\(^{10}\) Interview with senior official in Ghana’s Ministry of Trade and Industry, on 08/02/2011, in Accra, Ghana.
near ‘China Town’ were almost completely dominated by Chinese shops, many selling shoes with others specialising in luggage, household furnishings, electrical fittings, plumbing equipment, and fishing nets. For a prominent Ghanaian executive, the limited response of the government task-force derives from a significant conflict of interest brought about by its leadership by the GIPC. “GIPC, unfortunately their remit is to increase investment”, he argues, “[…] they always have to recognize, ‘if I stop these people my statistics will go down’, and it is not their job really to police these guys”11. As far as a senior GUTA official is concerned, the task-force has been an abject failure, symptomatic of what he implies is the government’s reluctance to take “genuine steps”12.

Similarly, trade union officials in Nigeria regularly complain that the government takes little interest in its objections to the poor conditions endured by local workers in some Chinese companies (see also, Baah et al 2009). As a union official in Kano contends, “[..]sometimes I will send back to the government because they don’t go out to see what we are seeing. Once you have entered the government house, anything you are telling them they will not believe what you are talking and they will not have time to go and find out and even if they send the people to go and find out they may not even go, they will just stop somewhere and come back but we are here shouting everyday.[…] The government is supposed to say something when we make our complaint but sometimes their belief is that the [investors] are providing employment. They will say ‘why are you people making noise, talking this and talking that, our children are working under them’”13.

In seeking to explain why government officials often appear uninterested in regulating Chinese activities in response to popular concerns, some respondents point not only to high-level diplomatic imperatives and a desire to attract Chinese investment but also to more direct self-interest. Beyond the widespread suggestions from both African and Chinese respondents that lower-level officials are often willing to relax their regulation of Chinese activities in return for unofficial payments, there is a strong sense that more elite Afri-
can actors also facilitate the Chinese presence in order to create and/or take advantage of opportunities to advance their own business and political interests. Exemplifying this, a Lagos-based union official contends that when attempts are made to investigate poor pay and conditions at Chinese and other foreign owned companies, it is often found that “they have a face, that’s a Nigerian who’s probably in government or whatever, and at the end of the day they use that person as an interface between the people and the company.”14 Indeed, the largest Hong Kong Chinese manufacturing groups in Nigeria have prominent local figures on their boards and Michel et al (2009) showed how the connections of some of the most successful Chinese entrepreneurs in the country can go as high as the presidency. Similarly, Haglund (2008) highlights the role of local political appointees being placed on the boards of Zambian-Chinese joint-ventures and Dobler (2009) details how forging connections and controlling access to local officials has enabled Chinese business elites to emerge in Namibia.

This collusion with local officials is indicative of how Chinese entrepreneurs and companies often depend on having influential local partners and patrons in order to survive and prosper, just as Nyíri (2011) has suggested is the case across the less developed world. Highlighting the mutually beneficial role that such elite local intermediaries can play in the success of Chinese business is the case of Mrs Lu, a Hong Kong Chinese entrepreneur based in Kano. After her fashion goods import business failed, she wanted to secure her new business selling beverages produced by a Lagos-based Chinese company by winning the exclusive distribution rights for northern Nigeria. However, she was only able to pay the fee for this when substantial contributions were made by two of her wealthy Nigerian associates, one a long-standing customer of her fashion business and the other a man she had known for 5 years from a casino they both frequented. In return for their investments, she made them partners in the business and has paid them handsome returns, remaining deeply grateful for what she terms their “generosity.”15 For Ms Lu, an added benefit of this arrangement is that a close relative of one partner is a senior police officer. He not

15. Interview with Mrs Lu, on 02/10/2011, in Kano, Nigeria.
only helped her when a local landlord attempted to defraud her but has also enabled her to take business risks she might not have done without his support. “I feel very secured”, she reveals, “even I give credit in the market because all the people know in the back is the [police officer]”.

Similarly, respondents who have been closely associated with the Lagos ‘China Town’ argue that while the complex has enjoyed popular support from some local traders and consumers in the face of MAN’s protests and sporadic clampdowns by the authorities, it has only remained open thanks to the backing of an influential Nigerian politician who had first brought over the Chinese founder as a business partner and supported him when he went on to establish ‘China Town’. As one of these respondents contends, “[…Y]ou know the business community in Africa, before you thrive you need somebody who is well established, a citizen who has the wherewithal to guide you, protect you in terms of the law and [has] connections”16. An ally of the politician argued that his intention in supporting the ‘China Town’ project was to attract Chinese entrepreneurs who would go on to establish factories in Lagos, thereby generating local employment and supporting economic development. However, another respondent involved with the complex points out that it became a useful outlet for close relatives of the politician involved in the textile business, particularly for retailing the substantial volumes of affordable material they import from China. As Dobler (2008) found in the case of Namibia, this could be indicative of a discourse of ‘local development’ being used by local elites to justify mutually beneficial interpersonal ties to Chinese entrepreneurs.

Indeed, it would appear that it is often local elites who are most able to shape the Chinese presence in ways that advance their interests, whether in advancing diplomatic relations with China, attracting Chinese investment, or forging mutually beneficial relationships with Chinese entrepreneurs. These elites have at times pursued such interests in ways that appear to bypass or undermine the conflicting interests of other local, generally less elite actors such as transnationally-connected traders and factory workers. With

economic and political elites benefitting most, and often at the expense of relatively marginalised local actors, the expanded Chinese presence does more to reinforce rather than transform existing local power hierarchies and class structures. In particular, Chinese actors can become enmeshed in, and thereby contribute to the perpetuation of, local systems of corruption and clientelism which are often cited as a major barrier to progressive social transformation in both Ghana and Nigeria. As Portes (2010, 1548) argues, migration’s tendency to “buttress the dominant political and economic structures” in ‘host’ societies is undoubtedly of great ‘structural importance’, but it clearly limits the ‘change potential’ of migration flows, undermining the ability of migrants to trigger any form of ‘deep’ social transformation. However, there is some evidence of an emerging challenge to the ways in which local elites facilitate and shape the Chinese presence to suit their ends, as exemplified by the local labour protests that were initiated in Nigeria in 2010 against the employment of Chinese workers by prominent Nigerian entrepreneurs (Mohan et al. 2014). The expanded Chinese presence could therefore emerge as an important issue around which class politics are contested in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, feeding into wider debates around corruption, democracy and human rights and augmenting growing ‘grassroots’ mobilization such as that around the recent fuel subsidy protests in Nigeria (Andrae and Beckman 2013). In this way, the Chinese presence could contribute to a potentially ‘revolutionary’ transformation of the social structure and class system, although this appears far from imminent and would of course depend on the agency of African actors rather than Chinese migrants themselves.

Conclusion

The significant increase in Chinese migration to Ghana and Nigeria over the last 15 years has, as elsewhere in Africa, been seen as one of the most tangible and potentially significant outcomes of China’s renewed engagement with the continent. It has undoubtedly produced some important social and economic effects not least by engendering a new set of inter-ethnic relations between Chinese and African actors. There has rightly been much emphasis on how these interactions can be detrimental to some African groups, such
as transnational traders threatened by their Chinese competitors and workers who have endured poor pay and conditions in Chinese companies. As the social transformation perspective suggests, it is clear that these effects which might at first appear to be driven by a particular migrant group are intimately tied-up with broader and much more significant social and economic processes, notably the global rise of neoliberalism and the ongoing crisis of the state in much of Africa.

Alongside this, we have also seen that some African actors have been able to derive significant benefits from the Chinese presence. This has produced noteworthy instances of social and economic mobility, especially where emerging African entrepreneurs and African workers in Chinese companies have been able to use their contacts with Chinese actors to advance their professional careers or develop their own business ventures. Such cases clearly represent a significant transformation for those involved but at this stage the relatively small numbers affected mean that the aggregate social and economic effects at the national level are likely to be limited. This is especially so when the wider contextual and structural conditions constrain the positive multiplier effects of migrant investment. Yet the possibility remains that the creative ways in which some African actors are shaping and taking advantage of the expanded Chinese presence could coalesce with other, ongoing processes of change. Together with developments such as economic and governance reforms, commodity booms, and new waves of domestic and international investment, African engagement with the Chinese presence could become a factor underpinning ‘deeper’ forms of social transformation such as more African countries transitioning to middle-income status and potentially changing their standing in the global economic order.

However, we have argued that if social transformation perspectives are to fully comprehend how migration can contribute to such ‘revolutionary’ change, greater attention must be paid to the role of local agency and the politics of class in shaping the social and economic effects produced by migrant groups. As we have seen, local agency plays a key role in determining the nature of these effects and how the costs and benefits are distributed through society. Clearly, some local actors are more able than others to exercise this agency, and it is often local economic and political elites who bene-
fit most, sometimes to the detriment of other local interests. But we have also seen that the issue of who shapes and benefits from the effects of migration can emerge as a point of local contestation, potentially contributing to deeper forms of social change such as transforming existing structures of power and domination. In this way, local agency and class dynamics become central to any exploration of the transformative role of migration.

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