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A Revenge Problem Without the Concept of Truth

Pinder, Mark (2015). A Revenge Problem Without the Concept of Truth. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4(3) pp. 151–161.

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The vast majority of putative solutions to the liar paradox face the infamous revenge problem. In recent work, however, Kevin Scharp has extensively developed an exciting and highly novel “inconsistency approach” to the paradox that, he claims, does not face revenge. If Scharp is right, then this represents a significant step forward in our attempts to solve the liar paradox. However, in this paper, I raise a revenge problem that faces Scharp's inconsistency approach.

Item Type: Journal Item
Copyright Holders: 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy
ISSN: 2161-2234
Keywords: liar paradox; revenge; truth; Scharp; inconsistency approach; replacement
Academic Unit/School: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
Item ID: 56634
Depositing User: Mark Pinder
Date Deposited: 25 Sep 2018 10:16
Last Modified: 09 Aug 2019 09:41
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