Wessel, Stephan; Decker, Carolin; Lange, Knut S.G. and Hack, Andreas
(2014).
| DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2013.08.003 |
|---|---|
| Google Scholar: | Look up in Google Scholar |
Abstract
Family offices are organisations dedicated to the management of entrepreneurial families’ private wealth. Based on agency theory, we analyse types of family offices with regard to the families’ goals and the control mechanisms used to ensure goal achievement. Family-dominant management and private client structures involve stronger emphasis on non-financial goals in single and multi-family offices than in non-family-dominant management and open client structures. Variations in family involvement, ranging from family dominance to the complete absence of family ownership and/or management, and diverse client structures justify the differential reliance on formal and informal control mechanisms.
| Item Type: | Journal Item |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 0263-2373 |
| Keywords: | family offices, wealth management, agency theory, goals, control mechanisms, ownership, management |
| Academic Unit/School: | Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business > Department for Public Leadership and Social Enterprise Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) |
| Item ID: | 54461 |
| Depositing User: | Carolin Decker-Lange |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Apr 2018 10:20 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2018 02:06 |
| URI: | http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/54461 |
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