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I begin by contrasting Aristotle's 'world-centred' general epistemology, and his 'mind-centred' (more exactly, 'agathos-centredï¿½) moral epistemology. I argue that Aristotle takes this approach, not because he doubts the objectivity of ethics, nor because he is an 'ethical particularist' (whatever one of those is), but because of the reflexive nature of ethics as a study. I further argue that, by taking the notion that 'the good man is the measure of all things' as central to Aristotle's ethics, we can see how to unify coherently the rather embarrassingly diverse ethical resources that Aristotle offers us.
|Item Type:||Book Chapter|
|Extra Information:||The chapter in question is Chapter 11.|
|Keywords:||Aristotle; virtue ethics; epistemology; moral epistemology|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Politics, Philosophy, Economics, Development, Geography
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
|Depositing User:||Andrew Conway|
|Date Deposited:||01 Aug 2006|
|Last Modified:||05 Oct 2016 06:43|
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