'The good man is the measure of all things': objectivity without world-centredness in Aristotle's moral epistemology

Chappell, Timothy (2005). 'The good man is the measure of all things': objectivity without world-centredness in Aristotle's moral epistemology. In: Gill, Christopher ed. Virtue, norms, and objectivity: issues in ancient and modern ethics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 233–255.

URL: http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780199264384

Abstract

I begin by contrasting Aristotle's 'world-centred' general epistemology, and his 'mind-centred' (more exactly, 'agathos-centred�) moral epistemology. I argue that Aristotle takes this approach, not because he doubts the objectivity of ethics, nor because he is an 'ethical particularist' (whatever one of those is), but because of the reflexive nature of ethics as a study. I further argue that, by taking the notion that 'the good man is the measure of all things' as central to Aristotle's ethics, we can see how to unify coherently the rather embarrassingly diverse ethical resources that Aristotle offers us.

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