A Comparative Historical Categorization of Anti-Catholicism

The history of anti-Catholicism is a subject that readily lends itself to elephantine metaphors. Like large animals browsing in the African bush, anti-Catholic attitudes were prominent in a wide variety of societies, but could seem placid and unthreatening until roused into sudden fury, as for example in the Gordon Riots in London in 1780, in the Philadelphia Riots of 1844, and in the defiance of the signatories of the Ulster Covenant of 1912. Anti-Catholicism needs sometimes to be recognized as ‘the elephant in the room’ of other historical problems such as the motivations of revolutionaries in nineteenth-century Europe, the unfolding of British or American imperialism, responses to Nazi Germany, and changing attitudes to gender, sexual and family relations. Scholarly analysis of this ‘elephant’ moreover is prone sometimes to resemble the efforts of the proverbial Indian blind men to visualise a real elephant by each feeling differing parts of its anatomy. All perceive a part of the truth, but none can grasp the whole, and unrecognised and unexplored differences of approach and understanding lead to unresolved divergences of analysis and interpretation.

This article seeks to contribute to clarification of the consequent confusions by outlining in a broad comparative framework four different varieties of anti-Catholicism, all of which have rich and complex and in some respects distinct, histories of their own. These categories are not abstract theoretical ones, but are grounded in empirical historical research, which is used both to exemplify them and to illustrate their changing dynamics across time. Boundaries between them were fluid and might indeed be conceptualized in a variety of alternative ways. Nevertheless it is argued that these four categories are representative of perceptible differences of emphasis, personnel and organization and hence constitute a useful tool for developing nuanced historical analysis. The article will in turn consider first, constitutional-national; second, theological; third, socio-cultural, and finally, popular anti-
Catholicism and conclude with a consideration of cross-cutting issues and alternative formulations. Material for the article is drawn primarily from majority Protestant countries, especially Great Britain and the United States. Some of the attitudes discussed had affinities with the concerns of anti-clericals in predominantly Catholic states, although here antagonism was naturally specifically directed against the institutional church, rather than against Catholics as a whole. Indeed, as we shall see, in some strands of anti-Catholic discourse, a parallel distinction between Catholics as individuals and Roman Catholicism as an institution was also apparent.

**Constitutional-national anti-Catholicism**

Central to this form of anti-Catholicism was a perception of the Catholic Church as an extra-territorial power aiming to achieve worldwide *political* supremacy, both as an end in itself, and as a means to the achievement of its ultimate religious ends. Such ambitions were sometimes attributed more particularly to specific forces within the church, especially the papacy and the Jesuits. This form of anti-Catholicism can thus be seen as having continuities with the attitudes of medieval secular rulers who quarrelled with the papacy, and parallels with the endeavours of post-Reformation Catholic states to assert their political independence from Rome and to control or even prohibit the activities of the Jesuits and other religious orders. In Protestant states, however, it originally stemmed from the outworking of the principle of ‘cuius regio, eius religio’ (the religion of the ruler is to be the religion of the people), accepted by the German princes in the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, and in effect adopted much more widely across Europe. It followed that in a Protestant country, Catholics were at best treated as second-class citizens and at worst subject to persecution and enforced emigration. (The converse applied in Catholic countries, notably in France after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 forced the emigration of the majority of the
Protestant population.) The principle of cuius regio, eius religio, could cut both ways for rulers who did not share the religion of the majority of their people: in 1654 Queen Christina of Sweden felt obliged to abdicate before she could convert to Roman Catholicism; in Britain James II’s Catholicism was a major factor contributing to his deposition in 1688. Subsequently the Act of Settlement of 1701, by excluding Roman Catholics from the succession to the English throne, established the principle that the sovereign of a Protestant people must also always be a Protestant.

Anti-Catholicism of this kind appeared to recede during the eighteenth century in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden with the advance of more secular constructions of nationhood. Britain, however, was something of an exception to this pattern, as a consequence both of the continuing political challenge to the Hanoverian regime presented by the exiled Catholic Stuarts, and of the positive value of Protestantism in ‘forging the nation’ made up of the hitherto distinct kingdoms of England and Scotland brought together in the Union of 1707. Even here, however, moves to relax penal legislation began in the late 1770s, and reached their culmination when Emancipation in 1829 allowed Catholics to take seats in Parliament. On the continent, events such as the suppression of the Jesuits in 1773 and the humiliation of Pius VI, taken to captivity in France after Napoleon’s troops occupied Rome in 1798, ‘seemed to annihilate the possibility of popish ascendancy’ and hence for some constitutional-national anti-Catholicism began to seem an anachronism.

In the event, however, the nineteenth century saw substantial revival and resurgence of such attitudes, asserting anti-Catholic constructions of nationalism in the face of the reality of growing Catholic populations in most Protestant states. In the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’ as created in 1800, Catholics now made up around a third of the total population. The westward expansion of Prussia in the early nineteenth century similarly brought large Catholic populations under the rule of this hitherto predominantly Protestant
The United States not only experienced substantial Catholic immigration to the cities of the Atlantic seaboard, but also acquired additional territories with Catholic heritages, notably Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas and California. The very fact that exclusively Protestant constructions of national identity could no longer be uncontested engendered their vigorous reassertion: for example, in 1833, the Irish leader Daniel O’Connell remarked that the current British parliament, more overtly Protestant than its predecessor in 1829, would not have passed Catholic Emancipation. Similarly, in Scandinavia from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, as a Catholic presence became more noticeable and hitherto exclusively Protestant constitutions were relaxed, there were vigorous restatements of the perceived anti-Catholic basis of national identity.

In Britain, Germany and the United States, however, constitutional-national anti-Catholicism gathered new momentum in the 1830s. 1835 saw the publication of Foreign Conspiracy Against the Liberties of the United States by the inventor and artist Samuel Morse, alleging that Catholic emigration to America was being deliberately encouraged by the papacy and by European absolutist Catholic powers with the intention of subverting republican freedoms. The same year saw a vigorous political campaign in Britain in support of the Church of Ireland as an essential bastion of national Protestantism in the face of Roman Catholicism. It led to the formation of the Protestant Association in 1836. In November 1837 the Prussian authorities arrested the Archbishop of Cologne, Clemens August von Droste Vischering, because of his allegedly treasonable insistence on requiring that the children of mixed marriages be raised as Catholics, in obedience to encyclicals from Gregory XVI but in defiance of government requirements that they should be raised as Protestants. The pope firmly supported the archbishop, and the consequent controversy not only polarized religious forces in Germany, but attracted wider European attention, as much as a manifestation of conflict between ecclesiastical and civil power as over the substantive issue of mixed
marriages. In 1838 Christian von Bunsen, the Prussian minister in Rome, resigned in the face of papal intransigence on the matter, and contributed his analysis of events to the *Quarterly Review*, a leading London conservative periodical, in an article co-authored with two leading evangelical Anglicans, Lord Ashley and Alexander MacCaul. The writers explicitly linked events in Germany to those in England, Ireland and British colonies, and believed that the pope had ‘thrown down the gauntlet’ in a conspiracy to extinguish Protestantism from the world. Meanwhile the affair was also attracting the attention of the Duke of Wellington, and his associate Henry Phillpotts, the Bishop of Exeter. Both perceived an alarming alliance in Ireland and in much of continental Europe between Catholicism and popular radicalism, in opposition to established state authority.

It would be tempting to dismiss the perception of these two arch-conservatives that, as Wellington put it, ‘Popery is popularized’ and ‘the very existence of Popery depends upon the success of democracy’ as absurd in the light of the exactly contemporary inverse perception of Morse and others in the United States that the Roman Catholic Church was the ally of absolutism in seeking to suppress American republican liberties. These polarized monolithic views are indeed revealing of a tendency to equate Catholicism with the political as well as national ‘other’ in a species of tunnel vision that discounted contrary evidence. However merely glibly to dismiss these conspiracy theories with the assertion that they could not all be correct would be to obscure the ways in which they were indicative of a more complex and interesting reality. Catholicism made very different political alliances in Boston or County Clare from those in Vienna or Italy. Similarly anti-Catholicism was something of a political chameleon. It could look intensely conservative in resisting constitutional concessions to Roman Catholics, or even seeking to reverse them, but it also had significant liberal potentialities insofar as it was an ideology of opposition to authoritarianism and asserted that the allegedly intolerant could not be tolerated. This argument has been fully and convincingly
developed by Michael Gross in relation to Germany, but is also very applicable to the United States and to Britain. In the US constitutional-national anti-Catholicism was closely linked to assertion of the separation of church and state against the supposed pretensions of the Catholic hierarchy. In the United Kingdom in 1845 Sir Robert Peel’s plan for the permanent endowment of the Catholic seminary at Maynooth in Ireland was opposed not only by Anglican conservatives who saw it as a disastrous compromise of the principle that the state should only support Protestantism, but also by Nonconformist liberals, reinforcing their conviction that the state should not be supporting any religion. The liberal political implications of British anti-Catholicism were further evident in the extent to which it became linked in the 1850s and 1860s to enthusiastic support for the Italian Risorgimento.

Indeed during the 1850s two cause célèbres of perceived Roman Catholic persecution in Italy stimulated a significant internationalisation of this kind of anti-Catholicism. In August 1852 in Florence Francesco and Rosa Madiai were sentenced to substantial terms of imprisonment for allegedly holding a Protestant religious meeting in their home. In June 1858 in Bologna (then in the Papal States), a Jewish boy, Edgar Mortara, was taken away from his parents to be brought up by the Church, on the grounds that as a baby he had been baptized by a servant. Both the Madiai and the Mortara cases provoked outrage across Europe – notably in Britain, France and Germany – as well as in the United States, and linked anti-Catholicism both to wider liberal campaigns for freedom of religion, and to international pressure for a new political order in Italy.

The dimensions of constitutional-national anti-Catholicism are further illustrated by brief illustrations of some of its manifestations from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. For example, in 1850, the liberal British prime minister, Lord John Russell, denounced the documents re-establishing a Catholic episcopal hierarchy as manifesting ‘a pretension to supremacy over the realm of England, and a claim to sole and undivided sway, which is
inconsistent … with the spiritual independence of the nation, as asserted even in Roman Catholic times.’18 Similarly, few years later, an anonymous supporter of the American or ‘Know Nothing’ party that was then at the height of its influence in the United States defined its two ‘great issues’ as ‘that Americans should govern America; and secondly, that the country should be governed independent of the Church of Rome, and with a jealous eye on the political designs of that church.’19 Although Know-Nothing influence was short-lived, similar perceptions that Catholicism was fundamentally antagonistic to American and republican values resurfaced prominently in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.20 Meanwhile in 1874, in Germany Bismarck, with liberal support, was pursuing the Kulturkampf against the Catholic Church, and in England, William Gladstone, whose recent first ministry had disestablished the (Anglican) Church of Ireland and passed other major reforms, published a celebrated denunciation of the decrees of the Vatican Council of 1870. Gladstone saw these as representing a revival of Rome’s historic claims to ‘universal monarchy’, and placing the ‘civil loyalty and duty’ of Catholics ‘at the mercy of another’.21

Similar sentiments manifested themselves in relation to British imperial claims. In 1901 in the face of demands for a revision of the offensively anti-Catholic language of the Protestant declaration required of a new monarch on their accession, the Imperial Protestant Federation took a full page advertisement in The Times to assert that ‘The maintenance of the Protestant throne and constitution is of vital interest and importance to our colonies and dependencies as well as to the mother country, and to them the Council of the Imperial Protestant Federation now earnestly appeals for immediate and vigorous assistance in maintaining and handing down intact to our children that national Protestantism which, under God’s blessing, has made the British nation the greatest nation in the world’.22 Then in 1912, following the signing of the Ulster Covenant, the influential novelist and poet Rudyard Kipling characterised the Roman Catholic Church as ‘England’s oldest foe’, and saw
the resistance of the northern Protestants to Irish Home Rule as rooted in their awareness of ‘the hells declared/for those who serve not Rome’.

In the twentieth century constitutional-national anti-Catholicism moved further from the political mainstream. Nevertheless such attitudes continued to have a noticeable influence in a wide variety of locations and contexts. For example, in the Swedish media in the 1920s Catholic priests and nuns were perceived in quasi-military terms as ‘occupation troops’ and were attacked both from the political left for undemocratic tendencies, and from the right as a threat to national identity and independence. In 1944, a preacher at the Flinders Street Baptist Church in Adelaide, attacked the papacy as ‘an excluding caste, an ecclesiastical clique, a clerical combine, an aggressive monopoly, concentrating its resources on the conquest of the British Empire – and succeeding passing well in Australia’. In the Cold War United States, Paul Blanshard published best-selling books attacking the allegedly unconstitutional and undemocratic influence of the Catholic Church, and drawing an explicit extended analogy between the baleful international influence of the Vatican and that of the Kremlin.

Significant echoes and resurgences were apparent even in the recent past. In 1997, a writer in a Belfast publication associated with Ian Paisley’s European Institute of Protestant Studies, claimed that ‘There is evidence that exposes the Europe envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty as a modern Romanist plot against Britain and other Protestant nations.’ Then in 2010 opponents of Benedict XVI set up a website to promote their conviction that ‘as a head of state, the Pope is an unsuitable guest of the UK and should not be accorded the honour and recognition of a state visit to our country.’

These examples collectively point to the extensive geographical scope of constitutional-national anti-Catholicism, and its capacity to draw support from a wide spectrum of political opinion. They also illustrate its long-term persistence: although the staunch Protestantism represented by Ian Paisley and his associates was of marginal influence
by the 1990s, it had not disappeared. Meanwhile secular versions were if anything gaining
ground, with the Roman Catholic Church a particular focus of attacks on religious influences
in general. These are represented in contemporary Britain by Richard Dawkins and his
associates in the ‘Protest the Pope’ movement of 2010, and in the United States by Americans
United for the Separation of Church and State, which significantly has long since dropped the
word ‘Protestant’ which featured in its original title in the 1950s.

**Theological Anti-Catholicism**

This form of polemic highlighted the perceived doctrinal errors of the Roman Catholic
Church and, after the rise of the Oxford Movement in the 1830s, the similar alleged defects of
Anglo-Catholicism. It could be found in a wide variety of specific theological and
denominational contexts, including traditional High Church Anglicanism and liberal
Protestantism, but from the 1820s onwards was particularly associated with evangelicalism. In
its more intense forms, it portrayed ‘Romanism’ and ‘Popery’ as soul-destroying counterfeits
of true Christianity. It stimulated antagonism to devotional manifestations of Catholic
theology, including the veneration of saints and ritualism in the later Victorian Church of
England. It also inspired missions to proselytise Roman Catholics, founded in the conviction
that they were deluded victims of the priesthood, whose eternal destiny depended on their
acceptance of true saving Protestant faith. A primary commitment to theological anti-
Catholicism could have significantly different implications from one to constitutional-national
anti-Catholicism. For example, a substantial proportion of British theological anti-Catholics
supported Catholic Emancipation in 1829 because they saw it as a matter of civil justice
rather than of religious identity and judged that if Catholics had their legitimate practical
grievances removed they might become more receptive to Protestant religious teaching. The
British Society for Promoting the Religious Principles of the Reformation [BSPRPR],
founded in 1827, explicitly excluded ‘political’ matters from its remit.\(^\text{29}\) In the mid-century United States, whereas the constitutional-national ‘Know-Nothing’ movement advocated measures to limit the influence of Catholics in public life because of their ‘unAmerican’ character, for theological anti-Catholics the emphasis was rather on seeking their conversion to Protestantism. There was little overlap between the membership of more religiously-orientated societies such as the American and Foreign Christian Union and the nativist political parties.\(^\text{30}\) In Germany in the later nineteenth century the Protestant League, founded in 1887 ‘to break the power of Rome on German soil’, immediately found itself internally divided between those who favoured political strategies to that end and those with spiritual and theological priorities who distrusted politics.\(^\text{31}\)

It is possible to find examples of theological anti-Catholicism in any post-Reformation decade, hardwired as it was into the very substance of Protestant identity. However, some such writers, especially in the aftermath of the explosive popular anti-Catholicism manifested in the Gordon Riots of 1780, were sometimes careful to distinguish theological polemic from personal hostility. For example in 1781 Beilby Porteus, then bishop of Chester, published *A Brief Confutation of the Errors of the Church of Rome* for the use of his clergy ‘more especially of those parts where the papists are most numerous’, drawing on sermons by Archbishop Thomas Secker (1693-1768). However, ‘bad doctrines’, Secker argued, should not engender ‘any incivility or secret ill-will towards’ Roman Catholics.\(^\text{32}\) Across the Atlantic in 1793 John Lathrop, a prominent Boston Congregational minister, delivered one of the quadrennial lectures on the ‘errors of Popery’ in the chapel of Harvard University, which had been endowed by Paul Dudley in 1750. Lathrop, however, appeared somewhat embarrassed by his required theme and, like Secker and Porteus, hastened to present it in a charitable and even-handed light:
Our Catholic brethren, some of whom we highly esteem for their learning and piety, will not be offended, that we point out such things in the doctrine, or in the practice of their church, as we think inconsistent with the doctrine of Christ, and the practice of the apostles. They have the same liberty. Protestant churches still retain errors, which many in their communion wish to see reformed. And would thank the members of any church whatever, for assistance in so good a work.\textsuperscript{33}

Lathrop’s moderation is illustrative of a wider recession in theological anti-Catholicism, like constitutional-national anti-Catholicism, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries but it then revived strongly in the 1820s and 1830s. There were two key stimuli. First, there was a renewed consciousness of rivalry on the ground with the Roman Catholic Church. On the Continent its recovery after 1815 showed that the humiliations suffered at the hands of the French revolutionaries were temporary setbacks rather than a trigger for continuing decline. In Ireland Protestant educational and missionary efforts began to provoke a backlash from the priesthood; the growth of Catholic populations in Britain and America seemed to challenge Protestants on their own doorsteps. Competition intensified around mid-century, with the triumphalist pronouncements of Catholic prelates such as Cardinal Wiseman in England and Archbishop Hughes in America, and the contest for the souls of the post-Famine Irish peasantry between a revived ultramontane Catholic Church, and the evangelical Irish Church Missions to Roman Catholics.\textsuperscript{34} Second, especially in Britain, an upsurge of interest in the contemporary application of biblical prophecy fuelled theological anti-Catholicism because influential interpreters such as George Stanley Faber (1773-1854), James Hatley Frere (1779-1866) and Edward Bishop Elliott (1793-1875) readily identified the Roman Catholic Church and the papacy with the forces of evil and apostasy foretold in Scripture.\textsuperscript{35} Such views were popularized by preachers such as Edward Irving in the 1820s and John Cumming in the 1840s and 1850s.\textsuperscript{36} These two factors preconditioned
those of Protestant sensibilities to respond with suspicion and hostility to the rise of Anglo-Catholicism, readily perceived as a ‘fifth column’ for Roman Catholic resurgence, and as a further manifestation of the ‘mystery of iniquity’ (II Thessalonians 2:7).

Nineteenth-century theological anti-Catholicism was premised on an assumption of the essential unchangeability of the controversy with Rome. Hence there was frequent reference back to the Reformation, in the names of organizations such as the BSPRPR, the American Society to Promote the Principles of the Protestant Reformation (1835) and the Scottish Reformation Society (1851); in the widely commemorated tercentenary of the English Reformation celebrated in 1835; and in the extensive programme of republication of classic Reformation texts undertaken by the Parker Society between the early 1840s and the mid-1850s. Historical understanding of the context of Reformation theology was, however, often limited, with the consequence that it could be selectively employed in the service of crude polemics. Such an approach was especially apparent in the series of public theological debates between Protestant clergy and Catholic priests in both Ireland and England between the late 1820s and the late 1830s.37

On the other hand, theological anti-Catholicism could prompt more positive expressions of Protestant spirituality and vision. In 1836 a leading Anglican evangelical, Edward Bickersteth affirmed the priority of faith over works, reflecting on what he called ‘Protestant Popery’, of which he believed there to be a ‘great abundance’

… first in every carnal heart, and therefore in our own, and then, in all religious writings. Popery is, to be looking to ourselves and our own doings for salvation. Real Protestantism is, to be looking simply to Jesus for every thing … Now you will see … how you and I, though we hate the Pope, may have plenty of self-popyery.38

Theological anti-Catholicism was also a stimulus to develop Protestant ‘unity in diversity’ as a counterweight to the perceived hierarchical uniformity of Roman Catholicism, a vision that
was most ambitiously reflected in the formation of the Evangelical Alliance in 1846. The founding conference in London attracted over eighty participants from North America, thirty-eight from continental Europe, and expressions of support from as far away as Agra, Cape Town and Hobart. ‘Unity in diversity’ proved difficult to implement in practice: from the start the movement was fractured by theological and ecclesiological tensions, notably over the doctrine of eternal punishment and the legitimacy of state churches, and by the problem of slavery in the United States.\(^\text{39}\) However, aspirations for international Protestant unity revived after the American civil war, particularly through the work of a German Swiss emigrant to the United States, Philip Schaff. This bore fruit in a major Evangelical Alliance conference held in New York in 1873, contemporary with the height of the *Kulturkampf* in Germany, which was a significant Protestant counterpart to the First Vatican Council. A full day was committed to discussion of ‘Romanism and Protestantism’.\(^\text{40}\) In the meantime Protestant convictions of the essential importance of private judgement and personal response to God prompted campaigns for religious liberty in Protestant as well as Catholic states.\(^\text{41}\)

From the later nineteenth century onwards, whereas constitutional-national anti-Catholicism was increasingly secularized, theological anti-Catholicism tended to retreat into sectarian and fundamentalist *milieux*. In England in the 1830s and 1840s there were still significant numbers of strongly anti-Catholic conservative High Church Anglicans, such as Christopher Wordsworth (1774-1846, brother of William) and George Townsend (1788-1857), but thereafter a younger generation of High-churchmen predominantly identified themselves with Anglo-Catholicism. A Broad Church, theologically as well as politically liberal, anti-Catholicism was prominently represented by Charles Kingsley (1819-75), but by the first half of the twentieth century the most conspicuous representative of this tradition, Herbert Hensley Henson (1863-1947), appeared a rather isolated figure.\(^\text{42}\) Meanwhile from the later nineteenth century the Church Association’s crusade against Anglican ritualism
associated theological anti-Catholicism with a narrow and combative evangelicalism. A parallel trend was apparent in Scotland where the theological anti-Catholicism that, led by men such as James Begg, John Hope and James Wylie, had seemed very much in the ecclesiastical mainstream in the 1850s, found its twentieth-century heirs not in the majority Presbyterian churches, but in the small post-1900 Free Church of Scotland and Free Presbyterian Church. In the United States, as Margaret Bendroth has shown, a resurgence of theological anti-Catholicism in late nineteenth century Boston was associated with proto-fundamentalism, a trend confirmed as the fundamentalist movement acquired a more distinct identity and international influence in the interwar period. In this context the connections between anti-Catholicism and a premillennial historicist eschatology became more explicit. For example in 1933 an Australian pamphlet warned of the ‘coming world struggle’ in which the British Empire, the United States and Japan would find themselves fighting the battle of Armageddon against the rest of the world, including Stalin’s Soviet Union, controlled and corrupted by the pope and the Jesuits in alliance with the forces and Islam and ‘heathenism’. Such readings of events were too implausible to gain credence from more than small groups of committed enthusiasts. It was true that, as John Maiden has recently argued, the more latent anti-Catholicism of a wider evangelical constituency could still be mobilised on occasions such as the successful 1927-8 campaign against Prayer Book revision in the Church of England, but a more consistent and fully-developed theological anti-Catholicism appeared increasingly marginal as the twentieth century wore on. Its credibility was further undermined by the transformation of the Catholic Church brought about by the Second Vatican Council from the 1960s onwards, and by the consequent willingness of more moderate evangelicals to contemplate ecumenical dialogue with Rome. Its marginalization was represented by the small group of aging Protestant protestors who confronted Benedict XVI in Edinburgh in 2010, in contrast to the much larger and more youthful secular anti-pope demonstration in London.
Socio-cultural Anti-Catholicism

This category might be specifically explored in relation to a variety of issues, including controversies over Catholic schooling, although these were also fuelled by theological concerns over the dissemination of allegedly false teaching, and constitutional-national ones about their tendency to isolate Catholics from mainstream society. The focus here is rather on a core social-cultural perception of the Roman Catholic Church as fostering immorality, especially in sexual matters. Incidents such as the case of Mary Catharine Cadière, who accused her Jesuit confessor of seduction leading to a high profile court case in southern France in 1731, fostered an image of priests and nuns as hypocrites whose professions of celibacy concealed a sordid reality of secret liaisons.\(^{48}\) Indeed, as Tim Verhoeven shows, this kind of polemic was linked to contemporary medical views that long-term male celibacy was unrealistic, and liable to lead either to adverse physiological consequences or to a sex drive that became uncontrollable resulting in predatory behaviour.\(^{49}\) The confessional was a particular focus of antagonism as it was seen both as a means for priests to exercise control over intimate details of the lives of their parishioners, and also for them actually to seduce suggestible women. The writer of an anonymous polemic, published in 1833, listed the ‘evils which society suffers from Popery’, including such suggestive subheadings as ‘Ignorance’, ‘Hostility of Popery to Modern Science’, ‘Institution of Nunneries for the gratification of Priestly Love’ and ‘Adulterous system of the Priesthood, by means of Confession’.\(^{50}\) A campaign of large-scale anti-Catholic meetings in Britain and Ireland in 1835 and 1836 focused particularly on the *Theologia Moralis et Dogmatica* by Peter Dens, written in Belgium in the mid-eighteenth century but republished in Dublin in 1832. Dens’s endeavours to define the boundaries of legitimate Catholic sexual practice had led him into a degree of explicit detail that seemed highly shocking to Protestant readers who assumed (or chose to
assume) that this work of academic moral theology was representative of the day-to-day practice of priests in the confessional. Extracts from Dens were extensively reprinted in polemical pamphlets such as *The Confessional Unmasked* (1851).\(^5^1\) Meanwhile the publication in New York in 1836 of the best-known example of the genre, *The Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk* (1836) gave currency to allegations that nuns at the Hotel-Dieu in Montreal regularly had sexual relations with priests at the nearby seminary and that any resulting infants were murdered at birth. The exposure of Maria Monk as a fantasist did little to check the extensive circulation of her claims, particularly in the United States, but also in Britain and Australia. A Dutch translation was published in 1852 and an Afrikaans one in 1952.\(^5^2\)

A British Catholic pamphleteer, Charles Larkin, shrewdly identified the secret of Maria Monk’s success. He had discussed the book with a Protestant acquaintance, who had ‘relished [it] exceedingly’, but only as a work of fiction. ‘No man of sense and candour believes it’, Larkin wrote, ‘but every man, and every woman too, who is fond of obscene narration, reads it.’\(^5^3\) It is therefore no surprise that anti-Catholic publications of this kind featured prominently in the bibliography of pornographic works compiled by Pisanus Fraxi [Henry Spencer Ashbee]. He prefaced his listing with a denunciation, supported by copious footnotes, of

the irregularities and licentiousness which have at all times distinguished monastic institutions both male and female; the useless asceticism, puerile macerations, and their flagellations, at once absurd, cruel and indecent; …the terrible system of auricular confession, and the abuse which has been made of it; the coarse, scurrilous and licentious discourses of the old preachers; the immorality caused by the unnatural law of clerical celibacy … \(^5^4\)
However during the nineteenth century the range of socio-cultural anti-Catholicism expanded. Even Ashbee, with his particular interest in pornography, did not limit his polemic to sexual issues, and also attacked Catholic credulity, hypocrisy and criminality. A subsequent chapter in the anonymous 1833 volume argued that ‘Popery’ was a cause of poverty, primarily because of the heavy financial burdens imposed on adherents by a grasping hierarchy, which it alleged, allowed people to commit crimes in return for payment. A similar argument was advanced in 1836 by a formerly radical British MP, John Campbell Colquhoun, who had recently transferred his loyalties to the Conservative Party because of his support for the Church of Ireland. Colquhoun interpreted the available evidence to support his argument that Protestant areas of Ireland were uniformly more prosperous and less crime-ridden than Catholic ones. Hence he concluded, ‘if we desire the progress of civilization in Ireland, we must seek for the spread of Protestantism.’ Richard Blakeney in his Popery in Its Social Aspect cited extensive statistics showing much higher levels of crime and illegitimacy in Catholic than in Protestant countries. Like Colquhoun he implicitly discounted the role of wider economic, political and social factors in explaining such differences, and presented them as conclusive ‘evidence’ of the baleful moral consequences of Catholicism. Blakeney also gave particular attention to historic examples of persecution and deceit by the Roman Catholic Church, which in view of his premise that ‘It boasts, both as to time and place, that it is “semper eadem,” always the same’, were deemed to be indicative of its present and future behaviour wherever it could exercise unrestricted power.

As these examples illustrate, nineteenth-century socio-cultural anti-Catholicism was promoted by individuals of widely varied outlooks from a staunch evangelical clergy such as Blakeney to confidence tricksters such as Maria Monk and pornographers such as Ashbee. More pious polemicists of this kind usually avoided explicitly sexual allegations and did not promote the more lurid publications of others, but their very reticence and allusive hints are
likely to have stirred their readers to imagine what remained unspoken. Ashbee, for his part, viewed alleged sexual perversions with a fascinated disgust, provoking a diatribe focused on Catholicism as the easiest target for his hostility to the hypocrisy he apparently perceived in all religions.

The non-religious dimensions of socio-cultural anti-Catholicism ensured its persistence throughout the twentieth century, with rather greater vigour than constitutional-national anti-Catholicism. The publications of Paul Blanshard (1892-1980) in the two decades after the Second World War were of particular importance in this respect. Although their impact was greatest in his native United States they had an international scope and circulation, with *American Freedom and Catholic Power* (1949) followed by *Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power* (1951), *The Irish and Catholic Power* (1954), and *Freedom and Catholic Power in Spain and Portugal* (1962). Blanshard was an avowed atheist and socialist, and his independence of Protestant doctrinal claims, and his extensive if slanted research on pre-Vatican II Catholicism gave his work widespread credibility. Although he was concerned about constitutional issues and the political influence of the Vatican, the main emphases of Blanshard’s critique related to the cultural and social power of the Catholic Church. He avoided lurid speculation about illicit sexual activity, but even though he took professions of celibacy at face value he still found them problematic. He wrote of the ‘cultural sequestration’ of nuns and questioned the capacity of celibate priests to advise on sexual matters. Moreover, he drily remarked, ‘one can imagine the astonishment and bewilderment of Jesus if He returned to this mortal sphere and heard members of the Catholic hierarchy expounding these tortuous and detailed sexual regulations as a necessary part of His teaching.’ His overriding concerns, however, were with the medical and social consequences of Catholic teaching on marriage, contraception and abortion, especially the divisive effects of insisting that the children of mixed marriages be brought up as Catholics, the physical and social implications
for women denied any form of birth control other than the unreliable rhythm method, and the absolute ban on abortion in Catholic hospitals, even when the foetus was non-viable and there was an imminent danger to the mother’s life. The other main emphasis of American Freedom and Catholic Power, further developed in his later books, was the obscurantist nature of the Catholic sub-culture, perpetuated by segregated education, censorship and hostility to scientific and scholarly advances.

In his heyday Blanshard was an influential figure, well networked through his close links to the leading American radical weekly, The Nation and with key figures on the British political and philosophical ‘left’ including Nye Bevan, Jennie Lee, Julian Huxley and Bertrand Russell. While some aspects of his critique were rendered redundant, or at least less plausible, by the reforms of Vatican II, others had more enduring credibility, especially his attack on the Catholic stance on artificial methods of birth control, after this was reaffirmed by Paul VI in the encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968). Hence, although his books were probably little read after the 1960s, he had an enduring impact in giving sustained articulation to a form of anti-Catholicism that appeared progressive and secular rather than reactionary and contingent on anachronistic constructions of ‘Protestant’ identity. His legacy is apparent in the ‘new anti-Catholicism’ of contemporary America analysed by Philip Jenkins. The persistence of earlier patterns of socio-cultural anti-Catholicism is also apparent in responses to recent revelations of sex abuse by Catholic priests, insofar as these emphasize systemic failings rather than the fallibility of the specific individuals concerned.

**Popular Anti-Catholicism**

This final category was a diverse one, which as we shall see, can be further subdivided. Nevertheless it serves as a helpful overall descriptor for forms of anti-Catholicism that, in contrast to the three other categories, have been shaped and expressed primarily by oral rather
than by print culture, and have produced organizational structures largely independent of control by political, religious or social élites. Anti-Catholicism of this kind was entangled with ethnic antagonisms, above all to the Irish, but also, for example, to the French in New England and British North America. It was also often, but not necessarily, associated with outbreaks of riot and physical violence. In the words of a broadsheet comment on the atmosphere in Stockport shortly before the riots of 1852, ‘the feeling that prompts the educated man to the use of injurious words, will urge the ignorant man to resort to blows’. This observation highlights the complex and ambivalent relationships involved: in general exponents of constitutional-national, theological or socio-cultural anti-Catholicism had no wish to incite violence. Itinerant Protestant agitators, such as those described by Donald MacRaild, were something of an exception in that they sought publicity and excitement to further their cause, but local clergy and lay leaders, with a stake in the stability of the communities where they lived and worked, were usually more cautious. However their arguments, especially if presented orally in public space through open-air preaching, political gatherings or an advertised lecture, could be the triggers that inflamed relations in previously religiously-divided but largely peaceful communities, as for example in Philadelphia in 1844 or Belfast in 1857. They could both provoke attacks from Catholics themselves and give Protestants a sense of ideological legitimacy for their more visceral sectarian antagonisms. Nevertheless, as Mark Doyle has observed, with specific reference to mid-nineteenth-century Belfast, but with a much wider application:

‘Sectarianism’ was not a nebulous force that simply lay dormant until some evangelical minister came along it activate it; it was a way of thinking and acting that was rooted in each group’s social relationships and shaped by the city itself. 66

Although it is possible to cite examples of sectarian violence that occurred in rural settings, as at Belfast, Prince Edward Island, in 1847 and at Dolly’s Brae, County Down, in 1849, 67 Doyle
rightly highlights the primarily urban nature of this kind of socially-embedded anti-Catholicism. It is therefore no coincidence that its most notorious early manifestation, in London in the Gordon Riots of 1780, took place in largest city of the day. Its subsequent more general upsurge was associated not only with the Irish diaspora, but also with rapid urbanization, in other British and North American cities in the mid-nineteenth century and in Sydney and Melbourne at the turn of the twentieth century.

The popular culture of anti-Catholicism was also shaped by two calendar traditions, the celebration of Guy Fawkes Day on November 5 and of the Irish victories of William of Orange on July 12. November 5 was also linked to William, as it was the anniversary of his landing at Torbay to depose James II in 1688. In its origins the commemoration of the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot on 5 November 1605 was an official national occasion enshrined in the Anglican liturgical calendar, but its characteristic expression was rather popular celebrations, especially processions and the burning of effigies of Guy Fawkes. These occurred not only in England but also in colonial America, where they also reflected fears of the Catholic French presence to the north. The royalist associations of the event naturally led to its disappearance in the United States after independence and even in England observance appears to have declined somewhat in the early nineteenth century. It revived strongly there in the 1850s, in response to the further calendrical coincidence of the provocative news of the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in England and Wales arriving in late October 1850, thus rendering Guy Fawkes Day an obvious focus for protests. In response local élites became anxious to control the celebrations, in the hope of preventing them degenerating into rowdyism and violence.

November 5 celebrations persisted in England throughout the twentieth century, maintained most tenaciously by bonfire societies in East Sussex, especially in the county town of Lewes, where they were also commemorated the burning of seventeen local Protestants in
the persecutions of Mary I’s reign. They were also exported to regions of strong English cultural influence, including Newfoundland, New Zealand and Cape Town. Gradually, however, they usually lost their explicitly anti-Catholic character and became merely ‘a great excuse for a great night out’ at a period of the year when earlier nightfall and colder weather in the northern hemisphere gave bonfires a particular appeal. Where traditions were most tenaciously and distinctively maintained they were also a focus for local identity and civic pride, as in the boast of Ottery St Mary in Devon to be ‘the only Town in the country carrying full sizes lighted tar barrels through the streets’ on November 5. At Lewes the continuance and even revival in the early twenty-first century of no less than seven local bonfire societies centred on different areas of the town and vying with each to organize the most spectacular celebrations is expressive of a fierce local patriotism analogous in some respects to that centred on the Palio races between the different contrade in the Italian city of Siena. Nevertheless by 1933, all but one of the Lewes societies had already ceased to burn the pope in effigy.

November 5 and July 12 celebrations were not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they were concentrated in different geographical areas and reflected different cultural networks. Whereas the heartland of Guy Fawkes Day was the south, especially the south-east, of England, the Twelfth originated in the north of Ireland, and was exported from there to the north of England, Scotland and to other regions of Irish Protestant settlement across the British empire, especially Australia and Canada. Although the Orange Order, with its roots in County Armagh at the end of the eighteenth century, was not formed until a century after the Williamite battles commemorated on the Twelfth, its processions became the primary focus of the celebrations. The wider community functions of Orange lodges rendered them a distinctive and – in their later nineteenth century heyday – very widespread form of anti-Catholicism. The royalist associations of Orangeism, however, like those of November 5,
meant that it was not readily exportable outside the British empire, although the Order nevertheless managed to establish a foothold in the United States. During the upsurge of anti-Catholicism in the 1890s led by the American Protective Association, it presented itself as a thoroughly American society, [which] ranks with all the genuine American societies having for their object the conservation of peace, law and order. It pledges loyalty to the principles of American government and conformity to the support and character of American free institutions.  

The more diffuse influence of Orangeism in the United States was also apparent in the adoption of a lodge structure by the Know Nothing movement of the 1850s. However during the twentieth century outside Ireland, Orangeism declined, especially in Canada where it was particular strong in the Victorian era: after the early generations of settlement the sense of identity and of continuing linkage with Ireland that the movement provided became less important to people. In post-partition Northern Ireland on the other hand, the Orange Order remained a substantial pivot of Protestant identity, with the 12 July marches the focus for potentially violent territorial disputes with the Catholic population, notably at Drumcree near Portadown at the turn of the twenty-first century.

**Conclusion**

Like any taxonomy, this one is open to further refinement and alternative formulations. For example, it would be plausible to identify an anti-Catholicism of economic competition, linking grass-roots antagonism to Irish migrants as allegedly flooding and depressing the labour market to more élite advocacy of the ‘Protestant work ethic’. A further dimension, explored particularly by literary scholars was an anti-Catholicism of the imagination fuelled
variously by the conscious inventions of novelists, the paranoia of polemicists, and the more subtle cultural assumptions of other writers. According to Jenny Franchot

anti-Catholicism operated as an imaginative category of discourse through which antebellum American writers of popular and elite fictional and historical texts indirectly voiced the tensions and limitations of mainstream Protestant culture.\(^{81}\)

Novelists who lacked conscious malicious or polemical intent, could nevertheless find a scheming Jesuit, sinister convent or corrupt priest a useful character in constructing a compelling narrative.\(^{82}\)

Analysis might also draw useful distinctions between different media, the spoken and written word, the visual image, and oral traditions transmitted across the generation. A further useful distinction would be between anti-Catholicism that lacked obvious structure, but that which was organized and institutionalised, not only by the Orange Order, but also by the numerous Protestant other societies that were formed in Britain and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, and in other countries, including Germany and Australia, at later periods. These and other possible approaches would cut across the categories outlined above, which were, of course, often closely related to each other. The underlying purpose of this article, however, is not to propose a particular categorization as definitive, although it is hoped that the one offered will provide a useful point of departure. Rather the intention is that the pointing up of the sheer diversity of manifestations of anti-Catholicism will serve to check simplistic understandings of a highly complex phenomenon. Indeed, as other articles in this special issue well illustrate, its ramifications and mutations can be explored in a wide variety of contexts, such as the development of freethought, or the assumptions underlying the conduct of international relations.\(^{83}\) Such analysis highlights the profound and widespread historical significance of anti-Catholicism, but it also points to the importance of some definitional precision if the concept is not to become too diffuse to be useful.
The four categories presented above are also useful tools for understanding and interpreting ebbs and flows in anti-Catholicism over the last few centuries. The high tide of anti-Catholicism in the North Atlantic world occurred in the 1850s, when all four strands were strongly resurgent. Twentieth century decline, however, did not impact on all four strands evenly. While the theological became marginalized, and the popular strand weakened substantially, except in places were it was kept alive by specific local circumstances, the constitutional-national and the social-cultural proved more resilient, primarily because they were the most adaptable to a secular rather than Protestant discourse. Recognition of the inherent diversity of anti-Catholicism and the factors giving rise to it thus does much to explain its pervasiveness and persistence.

1 This article is an outcome from a Research Councils UK Global Uncertainties Ideas and Beliefs Fellowship, jointly funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council whose support is gratefully acknowledged.


7 J. Harvard and Y-M. Werner, eds, European Anti-Catholicism in a Comparative and Transnational Perspective (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013). See particularly the chapters by Werner (Sweden), Norseth (Norway) and Møller and Østergård (Denmark).


9 Walser Smith, 89.

10 Ashley, Bunsen and MacCaul, 117 and passim.

11 University of Southampton Archives, Wellington Papers, 55/40-44, Phillpotts to Wellington, 10 Dec. 1838, Wellington to Phillpotts, 12 Dec. 1838.

12 Wellington Papers, 55/43.


18 The Times, 7 Nov. 1850, 5.

19 ‘Franklin’, Know Nothingism; or the American Party (Boston, 1855), 8.


22 The Times, 27 June 1901, 12.


40 Philip Schaff and Irenaeus Prime, eds, *History, Essays, Orations and Other Documents of the Sixth General Conference of the Evangelical Alliance* (London, 1874), 427-520. Guiseppe Ricciardi’s gathering of freethinkers in Naples in December 1869, as discussed on Lisa Dittrich’s contribution to this special issue, might be characterised as a further, secular, counterpart.


42 Henson wrote in 1915 that ‘unquestionably many … Bishops and Clergy’ wanted the Church of England to repudiate the Reformation, whereas he considered such as step would be an ‘absurdity’ (H.H. Henson, *Retrospect of an Unimportant Life* (2 vols, London: Oxford University Press, 1943), ii. 135).


45 *The Coming World Struggle, or Romanism versus Christianity* (Adelaide: Australian Protestant Truth Centre, 1933).


49 Cross reference to Verhoeven article.

50 Popery, as opposed to the Knowledge, the Morals, the Wealth and the Liberty of Mankind (London, 1833), 409-546.

51 Wolfe, Protestant Crusade, 123-4. The 1851 version closely resembled an earlier pamphlet of 1836 with a different title, and was itself extensively reprinted in the 1850s and 1860s.


53 C. Larkin, A Refutation and Exposure of the Atrocious Forgery Entitled “Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1836), 14.


55 Ibid., pp. xxxii, xlv-xlxi.

56 Popery, as opposed to the Knowledge, the Morals, the Wealth and the Liberty of Mankind (London, 1833), 409-546.


59 Blakeney, 296.


62 As evidenced in his extensive manuscript correspondence in the Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.


64 *Stockport Letter Bag*, 30 April 1852 (Stockport Public Library).

65 Cross reference to MacRaild article.


69 There is no space here to develop this point further, but reflection on it might usefully be informed by recent social-scientific literature, including that on cities in the contemporary

70 For a survey see J. Sharpe, Remember, Remember the Fifth of November: Guy Fawkes and the Gunpowder Plot (London: Profile, 2005);


76 www.otterytarbarrels.co.uk/history.html, accessed 24 July 2013.


Cross references to articles by Dittrich and Weir.