Violence In The Wake Of Civil War: Investigating The Transformation Of Intergroup Relations In Nepal And Mozambique

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Violence In The Wake Of Civil War: Investigating The Transformation Of Intergroup Relations In Nepal And Mozambique

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Ph.D. Thesis in Development, Policy and Practice, Open University

(September 2016)
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Abstract

When a civil war ends there is a formal cessation of hostilities between the warring groups. Yet the termination of fighting does not necessarily end the violence, which can persist into post-war years. The study of post-civil war violence as a distinct phenomenon is dominated by explanations that see it as a legacy of the warring elite and an exercise in preventing them restarting war, or, as culturally embedded within interpersonal relations. This thesis draws on the group nature of civil war to offer a different perspective on this problem. It considers post-civil war violence as a product of continuing hostile relations between previous warring groups and examines the transformation of broader intergroup relations in post-war years. The rationale for the research rests on the idea that if violence is part of intergroup relations, then how might a more informed understanding of these relations facilitate effective peacebuilding interventions in countries emerging from civil war. Using qualitative methods, and a case study approach focusing on Nepal and Mozambique, I compare understandings and experiences of the transformation of intergroup relations from the perspective of political parties that claim to represent the previous warring groups, to that of people living in villages (three in each country). The study finds that violence can remain a central feature of how political parties relate to one another, even after decades of peace. To appreciate this violence requires a conceptual step away from dominant ways of thinking of violence as physical or structural. Conversely, while intergroup violence does not appear to have been a problem within the villages, the presence of violence within interparty relations is driving a pervasive and persistent fear that civil war may once again erupt. The thesis examines the impact of this violence on both the peace process and group relations to highlight the need to recognise and proactively address it.
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List of acronyms and abbreviations

CCM - Christian Council of Mozambique
COCAP - Collective Campaign for Peace
COMPOL - National Police Affairs Commission
CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Nepal)
CPN(M) - Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPN(UML) - Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist)
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID - Department for International Development (UK)
FADM - Mozambican Defense Force
FRELIMO - Mozambique Liberation Front
GPA - General Peace Agreement (Mozambique)
HLPC - High-Level Peace Committee
ICTJ - International Centre for Transitional Justice
INGO - International Non-governmental Organisation
LPC - Local Peace Committee
MANU - Mozambican African National Union
MDM - Democratic Movement of Mozambique
MoPR - Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
NC - Nepali Congress
NGO - Non-governmental Organisation
NPSP - Nepal Peace Support Project
NTTP - Nepal Transition to Peace
ONUMOZ - United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PDD - Party for Peace, Democracy and Development
RENAMO - Mozambique National Resistance
PLA - People’s Liberation Army (Nepal)
RNA - Royal Nepali Army
RPP(N) - Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal
SCAF - Strategic Conflict Assessment Framework
SPA - Seven Party Alliance
SSR - Security Sector Reform
TRC - Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCPN(M) - United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
UDENAMO - National Democratic Union of Mozambique
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
UNAMI - National African Union of Independent Mozambique
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO - United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNMIN - United Nations Mission in Nepal
US - United States
USIP - United States Institute for Peace
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO - World Health Organisation
YCL - Young Communist League
Chapter 1
The end of civil war and the need to transform intergroup conflict

Introduction
This research is an exploration into the nature of post-war violence after civil war in Nepal and Mozambique. Civil wars are a form of violent conflict fought within a country, between citizens of that country, and characteristically involve large groups battling one another. This intergroup nature means civil wars fracture a society. Indeed, the very notion of civil war implies a radical change to the existing order, whether a group is struggling for independence, control of government or a particular region, or to change government policies (Fearon, 2007:4). Socio-political cohesion breaks down and groups can become deeply divided as group relations degenerate into mass violence – in effect polarising society.

Civil wars are noted for the severity and brutality with which violence and atrocities are executed (Yanacopulos and Hanlon 2006a:7). The majority of fighting is close quarters, involving small arms and hand-to-hand combat. Another feature of civil war violence is the impact on the civilian population, with a great deal of violence taking place within communities and villages – the places and spaces where people live. When fighting stops, a peace settlement may end formal hostilities between group elites, but this does not always equate with the complete cessation of violence.

1 Civil wars can also be a particular group against the state, or a faction within the state itself (such as a military coup). However, in both cases, the state’s opponent will likely be representative of a larger group within the country.
2 A detailed definition of groups and how they are understood in the thesis is covered in Chapter 2 but the research draws on the idea of a number of individuals who are connected due to shared characteristics, beliefs or interests – a group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Where the term relations or group relations appears, it is taken to refer specifically to the ways in which groups interact during conflict.
The inspiration for this thesis started from a personal reflection on the power of civil war to fundamentally redefine societies. During previous academic study, I had looked at the complexities and difficulties of delivering aid and promoting development in contexts of war and post-war. Through this work I had examined a number of civil wars and was intrigued by how quickly intergroup relations can degenerate into violence; that in some cases, overnight, years and decades of non-violent and peaceful relations can be erased or rewritten so those who were friends, neighbours, colleagues or just strangers in the street suddenly become something that needs to be violently eradicated. What I was more interested in, though, is what happens afterwards. When large parts of society have been subjected to or committed acts of extreme violence against one another, what has to take place between the previous warring groups to allow them to go back to living non-violently and peacefully together?

There is substantial evidence showing that the end of civil war and the advent of peace does not automatically equate to a reduction in levels of violence (MacGinty, 2006; Kurtenbach, 2013). In fact, the reverse is possible, that post-war years can experience an increase (Suhrke and Berdal, 2012). For example, Kooning and Kruijft (2004) document rising levels of violence in many Latin American countries such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador as they emerged from civil war. Post-war violence is well studied. Explanations for its cause tend to gravitate around two main arguments. The first sees post-war violence as a problem of political elites reneging on the peace agreement and using violence to disrupt the peace process or even restart war. The second reason that post-war violence can continue is the result of wartime violence becoming embedded in socio-cultural practices and manifesting largely through criminal activity or interpersonal disputes (Suhrke, 2012:2). Yet, civil war by its very nature is fought between groups. This thesis draws on the intergroup character of civil war to offer a different perspective on the two leading views. It does this by exploring the role of violence in how the previous warring groups

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3 There is no unified definition of what timeframe post-war refers to although there is a range of qualitative and quantitative markers. In this research, post-war refers to countries where war has ended, but the peace process in terms of successful implementation of the peace agreement remains incomplete.
interact and deal with conflicts between them in the post-war period. Looking at intergroup conflict over an extended timeframe will allow the research to examine the transformation process groups go through to re-establish peaceful, non-violent relations. The rationale rests on the idea that a more informed understanding of if, and how, violence might be part of intergroup relations in post-civil war periods could inform better peacebuilding interventions in civil war stricken countries.

This chapter introduces the idea of post-civil war violence as a potential problem of intergroup relations enduring from the war. The aims and research question are set out and the thesis’ understanding of intergroup conflict, violence and civil war are explained. There is brief introduction to the methodology and how I propose to investigate the transformation of intergroup conflict to be able to answer the principal research question. The chapter ends with an account of the argument I present and a description of the coming chapters.

1.1 The problem of intergroup violence

The last century has seen a dramatic rise in the number of civil wars (intrastate) relative to interstate wars (Newman and DeRouen, 2014). The change has had significant implications for those working to build peace in war-affected countries as the two types of warfare display some very different characteristics. One of the features that distinguish civil from interstate wars is the role of violence in relation to a country’s citizenry - the forms that violence can take and ways in which it can impact on a civilian population.

Traditionally, interstate wars are defined as being fought between professional military forces. Civilians are affected - typically as collateral damage, but also as deliberate targets of violence and there is an extensive body of research that

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4 Interstate wars are fought between two or more states between their respective armed forces. Intrastate (civil wars) are typically fought within the borders of a state between state forces and non-state groups (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006).

5 It is important to note that as the nature and understanding of war has evolved over the past several decades, this historic definition has become increasingly subject to scrutiny due to conflicts involving non-state forces such as the fight against ISIS in the Middle East.
examines victimisation of civilian populations in interstate wars (Downes, 2008). Conversely, in civil war, because they are fought between groups within a country the violence is commonly intentionally directed against particular sections of that country’s population. The rise in the number of civil wars has meant that in both theory and practice, international peacebuilding has had to adapt the way in which it understands and deals with the legacy of violence in the aftermath of war to meet a very different set of challenges.

During civil wars, civilians are often seen as legitimate targets and disproportionately bear the effects of violence relative to armed forces. Ninety percent of casualties in civil war are civilian (Mason, 2004:17). Conventional thought views violence against the population as a strategy to terrorise (and thereby destabilise areas occupied by opponents) or to control (to gain the compliance of the population) (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002:461). Yet, civilians are far from just passive victims of violence. A common feature in many civil wars is the mobilisation of the civilian population, whether voluntary or forced, to become perpetrators of violence (Wood, 2008). One of the most extreme examples is the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 when huge numbers of the Hutu population were rallied to engage in a systematic extermination of the Tutsi people.6

Indiscriminate killing can be a feature of civil wars, but as the Rwanda case highlights, violence is predominantly intergroup in nature. As a consequence, during civil wars, violence pervades group relations. Lederach (2003:64) says that groups can become locked into cycles of conflict - that patterns of interaction are built up historically over extended periods. These patterns can be extremely resistant to change and hard to transform. If a civil war becomes protracted, taking place over prolonged time frames, violence becomes a fundamental part of how groups understand and relate to one another. The signing of a peace agreement may signal the formal cessation of hostilities, but using Lederach’s idea of patterns to conflict, violence could still be understood to

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6 In 100 days, conservative estimates put the death toll between 800,000 and 1 million, out of a total population at the time of 7 million in Rwanda (Verwimp, 2004:233).
be an issue that could persist into post-war years. It is this concept that provides the impetus for exploring post-civil war violence as an intergroup issue.

It is important to understand then, how violence could become such an endemic part of group relations that it could continue into the post-war years. Kalyvas (2003:475) discusses how the deep divisions between groups that are characteristic in many civil wars are often described as binaries – that society literally splits into opposing large identity groups. Under conditions of civil war, particular group identities (specifically the fighting groups) take on greater significance because affiliation and membership to these groups become an issue of survival – a determinant factor in whether an individual lives or dies. As a consequence, the population is polarised as identities are essentialised around the warring groups. Sen (2007) calls this the illusion of identity – the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality that comes to dominate understandings of intergroup relations to the exclusion of any other way of distinguishing between people. Beah (2008:37), writing on experiences of the Sierra Leone civil war explains, ‘people stopped trusting each other, and every stranger became an enemy’. Anyone not recognised as a member of the group is an ‘other’ that represents a potential threat and enemy. Kaldor (2013:11) writes that fostering group polarity can be instrumental in civil war as a way of mobilising support and inciting violence. Polarisation occurs through manipulation of identity, whether on the basis of ideology, religion or ethnicity, by presenting the belief (real or perceived) that a group faces an existential threat from another group. The strategy for victory, Kaldor claims, is based on playing to the politics of fear in which people can be mobilised to commit acts of extreme violence in defence of themselves and the group to which they belong (Kaldor 2013:6; Kalyvas, 2003:78).

Enmification is the process of turning an ‘other’ (non-member of the group) into an enemy to justify violence and killing (Rieber and Kelly, 1991). The

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7 Derived from Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) social identity theory, it is the notion that groups form to provide individuals with a sense of belonging. Developing group identity creates boundaries for inclusion – who is ‘in’ and by extension who is ‘out’ – thereby dividing the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorisations.

8 Othering is an integral part of group identity formation. An identity requires a ‘different and competing alter ego’ (Said, 1993:35). Defining what the self is requires identifying what it is not.
demonisation of Jews in Nazi Germany and Tutsi in Rwanda are two prominent examples. Through ‘enmification’ groups place non-members outside of their moral boundary to make them exempt from having to justify violent behaviour (Levine and Hogg, 2010:189). One of the reasons civil war violence is often so brutal is because a common strategy in the mobilisation of groups is to dehumanise the opposition and thereby give licence to commit murder without guilt (Volkan, 2006a).

Over the course of a civil war, the polarised political narratives can become ‘internalised through the process of engaging in or suffering from violence’ (Kaldor, 2013:6). The violence itself then becomes a negatively reinforcing factor in the internalisation of the polarised group identities. Additionally, violence can become part of the everyday; if not through exposure to direct physical violence, then as an omnipresent threat that physical violence could descend at any time. Pettigrew’s (2013) ethnographic research during the civil war in Nepal provides vivid accounts of the impact of violence on village life. The longer civil war carries on, the longer groups are exposed to the polarised narratives of intergroup conflict. The research, therefore, starts from the premise that post-war violence may be resulting from these violent intergroup relations from the civil war.

1.2 Research aim and questions

The aim is to look at the transformation of relations between the previously warring groups after the end of civil war. The research examines how understandings of groups and intergroup conflict are changing and the effect of this change on how groups deal with conflict between them in post-war years. The focus is specifically on the role of violence in these conflicts.

The question driving this research is:

- How, and why, are groups that were fighting during civil war transforming the way they approach conflict in post-civil war years?
Three sub-questions are posed to answer the research question in a way that meets the research aim:

1. How and why is conflict transforming among political parties?
2. How do understandings and experiences of intergroup conflict among people living in villages relate to those of the political parties?
3. What impact do political structures and processes designed to facilitate participation in peacebuilding decision-making have on how conflict transforms?

1.3 Investigating transformation of intergroup conflict

Civil wars are fought between large sections of a society, and as such, these groups can be comprised of large memberships. Given the scale this presents, here, I set out how I will investigate the transformation of intergroup relations so as to be able to answer the research question. Included is a brief introduction to the methodology that is expanded upon in Chapter 3.

There are many differing views and perspectives on what constitutes a group and how they are defined. For the purposes of this research, I draw on ideas from within the social sciences, and specifically, writers such as Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Brown (2001) who suggest that groups are how people categorise themselves around a common sense of identity through shared characteristics, belief or interests. Groups are therefore the result of individuals organising around particular mutual trait(s) that form the basis for a collective sense of self and unity. The notion of identity is frequently employed in reference to groups because the traits around which a group associates are a powerful expression of how the group see and define themselves. In essence, how they identify.

Theories of identity are used extensively in the study of civil wars and I employ them as the basis for my theoretical framework. I take a pluralist approach to
identity as the way to conceive of groups (Sen, 2007). The detail is discussed in the following chapter but centres around the notion that individuals have multiple identities. Pluralism introduces the idea that we can belong to a range of different groups simultaneously, and that identities change over time. This concept can be used to look at how people understand and relate to the previous warring groups as well as examining changes in group identity as a way to analyse transformations in intergroup conflict.9

The investigation into the transformation process uses a two-pronged approach. The first analyses intergroup relations from a national standpoint, focusing on how groups and intergroup conflict is portrayed during the ongoing development and implementation of the peace process. The intent is to look at a range of actors and organisations that can be seen as agents trying to influence the peace process on behalf of the warring groups. What I had not anticipated emerging from the cases, however, was the importance of political parties as a critical actor. Consequently, the empirical chapters concentrate on their role and behaviour as a key factor affecting the transformation process. This political party focus is the product of an inductive engagement with the data rather than something I planned prior to fieldwork. In addition, while I use a multiple identity approach, very early in the analysis it was apparent that political party identities in Nepal and Mozambique remain strongly attached to narratives from wartime. The weight of my argument centres on how political parties strategically construct and reify essentialised group identities grounded in civil war factionalism and the implications this has for the building a sustainable peace.

The second prong involves considering intergroup conflict within particular villages. The majority of both Nepal and Mozambique’s populations live in rural areas and, as such, villages are the predominant settlement type. The rationale for considering group relations in villages is that they are places where groups from both sides cohabit, and so present likely sites of intergroup conflict. I

9 Societies are comprised of many different identity groups, so unless expressly stated otherwise, where the term group(s) appears it should be understood to refer to the groups that were fighting during the civil war.
conducted site visits in six villages – three in each country. The intent is to compare the transformation process within villages to that of the national actors (political parties) and use the findings to see what insights can be inferred about the extent of broader group relation transformation.

The prominence parties’ play in this thesis requires some consideration of their role and how they are regarded in peacebuilding literature. A vital component in many civil war peace settlements is negotiating and reconfiguring the political landscape – determining the conditions under which the fighting groups will agree to move forward, replacing the violence of war with participation in non-violent politics as a way of dealing with conflict.\(^\text{10}\) Under the prevailing liberal peacebuilding paradigm, this political configuration is democracy (Pugh et al., 2011; Roberts, 2011), and so armed groups are required to transform into legitimate democratic political parties (Collier, 2010; Dudouet et al., 2016).\(^\text{11}\) Lyons (2006) talks about the importance of ‘demilitarising politics’ – the ability of previous belligerents to convert and integrate as peaceful political actors – being crucial to creating a sustainable peace. In addition, parties that were in power before and during the war will require significant adjustment to accommodate these new actors into political life.

Castillejo (2016:1) maintains that international peacebuilding, to date, has tended to be wary of engagement with political parties. She says there is a need to improve understanding of parties in conflict-affected contexts - ‘how such parties relate to conflict and peacebuilding’ and to ‘deepen engagement with them’. Part of Castillejo’s reasoning rests in parties playing a vital role in securing long-term peace because they are the primary vehicle through which groups find political expression of grievances. The discussion in the empirical

\(^\text{10}\) Although civil wars can end in military victory the vast majority conclude with a signing of a peace agreement (De Rouen et al., 2010:333).

\(^\text{11}\) Peacebuilding is dominated by a liberal conception of peace that favours ‘particular institutions in the building of peace, which have in the West (until recently) sustained the long-term betterment of human life. There is a general assumption that democratisation and statebuilding in the Global South will improve everyday life as it did in the West. Orthodox peacebuilding is expected to prime local democracy, stability and prosperity; the Liberal Peace is then reproduced globally. It is state-centric, metrocentric and demo-centric (Roberts, 2011a:xi).
chapters supports this assessment with my argument concentrating primarily on those parties that were signatory to the peace agreements. With the transition into legitimate political actors, these parties are responsible for trying to secure the interests of their group in ongoing negotiations around the peace process. As such, political identity of these parties is constructed around ideas of the previous warring groups. Exploring how these identities and interactions change over time is used as the means of assessing the transformation process from the national perspective. Subnational party dynamics (particularly within villages) are considered, but the national focus is intended to provide insight into those actors representing and shaping policy for the group at a country level.

At the same time as being builders of peace, Castillejo is mindful that political parties can be instigators of antagonism and conflict, resonating with Kaldor’s (2013) ideas around the political manipulation of group identities as a precursor to inciting violence and civil war. It is unexceptional to find wartime elites and leaders at the helm of post-war parties. Ideas of ‘spoilers’ of peace would see these party elites as potential risks for restarting war (Paris and Sisk, 2009; Stedman, 1997) and as such the parties representing the previous fighting groups can be seen as the actors most likely to be able to re-incite intergroup violence on the scale of civil war. A core component of the empirical chapters centres on arguing that political parties are key perpetrators of violence in post-war years.

The term peacebuilding is synonymous with ‘intervention’ (Barnet et al., 2007:37) and historically the involvement of external actors has been seen as a necessity for peacebuilding to be effective (Paffenholtz and Spurk, 2006:18). The underlying logic informing this understanding rests on two normative ideas. The first, that often resolving violent conflict requires a third party – an independent that can objectively mediate and help develop trust between warring groups. Second, war-ravaged countries are unlikely to have the capacity or capital to effectively manage reconstruction on their own. External actors provide these
much-needed resources. Over the past several decades the idea that external intervention as an inherently benevolent force has come under increasing scrutiny as research has shown how external actors can undermine the capacity of post-war countries to self-organize (De Coning, 2013:5).

These debates have prompted a shift in focus towards more in-country ownership based on claims that peace processes should have ‘resonance at the receiving end’ (Hughes et al., 2015:817). The argument fits into the wider critique of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm that stands accused of being a hegemonic regime imposed on countries by outside forces (Roberts, 2013:103). Caplan (2012:3) grounds the argument for giving greater participation and control of peace processes to the war-affected country by pointing to the reality that at some point external interveners must pull out and leave a war-torn country to govern itself. While I acknowledge that peacebuilding processes are inseparable from international actors involvement and influence, the focus on transformation from the perspective of political parties and group relations in villages, provides an opportunity to contribute to the emerging research around in-country ownership. I explore these ideas more in the following chapter.

To set some boundaries around the investigation of the transformation process, I concentrate on looking at how political parties participate and engage during the development of specific policies provisioned in the peace agreements. Peacebuilding has come to incorporate a wide array of activities and approaches. Policies generally fall into two categories: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR, which also includes SSR – security sector reforms13) and transitional justice. DDR involves a set of strategies designed to target combatants of armed forces or armed opposition groups ‘in order to disarm, demilitarise and reintegrate these persons into civilian life, the armed forces or the police’ (Carames and Sanz, 2009:8). Buckley-Zistel (2009:81) says that

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12 This notion has its roots in the Marshall Plan, the US aid programme designed to help Europe recover after World War 2 (Richmond, 2014:108).
13 SSR is the term used for the reform of state security more broadly, beyond just the military. It is increasingly recognised that the two cannot be considered as separate activities, but are intimately linked (UNDPKO, 2010).
transitional justice is ‘based on the assumption that in order to move on politically and socially some form of dealing with gross human rights abuses, crimes against humanity and war crimes is necessary’. Olsen et al., (2010:11) term it an ‘array of processes designed to address past human rights violations following periods of political turmoil, state repression, or armed conflict’. DDR and transitional justice have spawned a wide array of scholarly literature. The intent is not to debate the policy approaches, but to use understandings and experiences of participating in the policy-making process of these peacebuilding interventions as a way to investigate the transformation of conflict. The individual policies that were part of the Nepalese and Mozambican peace agreement are detailed in Chapter 4 but were chosen because they are designed to deal with the aftermath of violence. The rationale rests in the idea that these policies will provide a good window into how intergroup conflict is understood.

Policy-making takes place within a political system, which is taken in the thesis to refer to the ‘formal and informal political processes by which decisions are made concerning the use, production and distribution of resources in any given society. Formal political institutions can determine the process for electing leaders; the roles and responsibilities of the executive and legislature; the organisation of political representation (through political parties); and the accountability and oversight of the state. Informal and customary political systems, norms and rules can operate within or alongside these formal political institutions’ (Scott and Mcloughlin, 2014:2). Where political system or political process is used in this research, it is taken to refer specifically to the political system of processes, mechanisms, channels and institutions that are in place to allow actors to participate in policy-making.

The research employs a qualitative methodology. The rationale for using a solely qualitative approach rests with the research’s focus on exploring perceptions and understandings of intergroup conflict. Qualitative techniques provide effective means of obtaining rich and detailed data to examine why a particular phenomenon is happening, not just how it happens (Tewksbury, 2009). They are also better suited to the study of complex socio-political problems. A twin case
study approach is adopted, looking at the transformation of group relations after the civil wars in Nepal and Mozambique, using a combination of semi-structured interviewing with document analysis.

In Nepal, a bitter civil war raged for ten years between Maoist rebels and the Government/Monarchy between 1996 and 2006. Nepal is comprised of a very diverse ethnic and caste-based population and although the war was a fight against the state, it is also widely regarded as a conflict of historically repressed and discriminated groups against a minority elite of the upper castes (Lawoti, 2003:49). In Mozambique, civil war came on the back of a liberation war that ran from 1964 to 1974. The Portuguese colonial power was cast out and the rebel opposition FRELIMO became a one-party communist state. Anti-communist powers in the region created the rival pro-West group RENAMO, which crossed the border from Rhodesia into Mozambique in 1977, sparking a civil war that lasted until 1992. In both countries, the civil war ended in power-sharing arrangements with rebel forces being brought into the political system as legitimate political parties.

The main reason informing the choice of Nepal and Mozambique is that there needs to have been a significant peace period in order to be able to assess transformation in intergroup relations taking place over time. Fieldwork was conducted 9 years after the war in Nepal and 23 years in Mozambique. Collier et al., (2003:7) say that half of all civil wars restart within a decade. Chances significantly reduce past the ten-year mark. The research, therefore, works on the assumption that after a decade without war there should be significant transformation to be able to analyse.

1.4 Understanding intergroup conflict, violence and civil war

In order to explore the transformation of intergroup conflict, it is important to define some key terms and explain how intergroup violence and civil war happen. The research starts from the premise that conflict is ubiquitous to society (Boulding, 2000:89). This understanding differs from the two main
schools of thought on conflict – conflict management and conflict resolution – that view conflict as a negative and disruptive influence, an interruption to normal relations and, therefore, something to be mitigated or eradicated. This research takes the view that rather than conflict being seen as something that is confined to isolated and easily identifiable episodes or events, it is a natural part of human relations and society (Lederach 1997:34; Yanacopulos and Hanlon, 2006b:11). Conflict is not always undesirable as it can bring change by creating opportunities for new ways of doing things (Lederach, 1997). Conflict is inevitable but violence is not.

Mills (2000) sees conflict arising due to difference of interests and resources – whether political, social, economic or cultural (Galtung 2009:23; Tilly 2003:26). The pursuit of interests need not just stem from material concerns but also relates to beliefs, ideals and values. Incompatibilities arise because societies are not egalitarian utopias – not all people and groups are endowed with equal levels of capability and resources, or the means to advance their interests. As a result, contests may arise where access to pursue interests is restricted, or there are limited resources to satisfy needs. Also, differences of power within relations are an important determinant in conflict. Power can be used to ones advantage – using influence to favour distribution of resources to ones group, for example; or it can be used to disadvantage other groups – blocking access to means of pursuing interest through discriminative and marginalising behaviour. From this understanding emerges a view of conflict as a contested and transformative process – a mechanism through which to either redress incompatibility through redistribution or recognition of inequalities (if the subordinate party), or maintain the status quo (if the dominant party).

Where interests clash, a strong political system is required to provide an effective way to deal with conflict between groups in a way that is amenable to all of the parties involved (Hanlon, 2006:78; Dikshit, 2000:49). If the system

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14 Conflict Management ‘involves the control, but not resolution, of a long-term or deep-rooted conflict’ (Spangler, 2013 para.7). Conflict Resolution seeks an outcome that goes beyond just satisfying conflicting parties interests, but that finds a stable solution to the underlying cause of a conflict.
allows dialogue and debate in a way that groups feel their interests have been
given fair and equitable consideration, it should preclude the need for groups to
pursue said interests through other means, such as violence (Schwartzmantel,
2011). Groups may encounter a number of barriers when participating in these
political processes, which can result in disenfranchisement and political
marginalisation. When the doors of political participation are closed, and when
groups are prevented from having formal channels to publically express private
interests, groups may seek to pursue their interests in other ways (Tilly, 2003).
This is where physical violence and civil war can erupt.

Civil war is taken to refer to ‘collective killing for some collective purpose, mainly
within one country, and where the fighting is between people of that country’
(Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006a:12). Within civil war, violence can take many
forms. Its most literal understanding is the intentional use of physical force to
inflict harm on others. However, this is a very narrow and prescriptive
explanation, only acknowledging physical dimensions and understandings of
violence. One of the most commonly cited definitions of violence is by the World
Health Organization (WHO, 2002:4), expanding on the physical to include
‘psychological harm, maldevelopment and deprivation, all of which can result
from direct physical violence that significantly increases the scope of what can
be considered violent acts’. Aside from the physical manifestation of violence,
there is also the threat of physical violence. A threat is typically employed to
coerce others to get them to comply with demands. In terms of intergroup
relations at a societal level, Nieburg (1962:865) asserts that the possibility of the
outbreak of violence is not only a necessity for the functioning of large societies
but that it is even useful as a way of securing peace. The issuing of a threat can be
a powerful motivator for change as the threat of physical violence can provide
marginalised or discriminated groups with a means to try and gain more
egalitarian relations.

Others have sought to broaden understandings of violence still further. Johan
Galtung, the founder of modern peace and conflict studies developed the notion
of ‘structural violence’ (Galtung, 1969). Structural violence can be described as
any activity that would deprive or limit a group’s life chances when the potential for realisation of needs or interests is greater than the actual ability to realise them. It manifests through institutions limiting, constraining or depriving opportunities. Structural violence can be subtle, embedded in social structures and relations, and can be present but not outwardly acknowledged within a society. Structural violence helps illustrate how deep social divisions and inequality can permeate society and generate situations of actual, or perceived, unresolvable incompatibilities between group interests. It is an important conceptual tool for studying post-war contexts because marginalisation and exclusion of groups are common triggers for violence. Structural violence may be present in a society for years, decades or even centuries without it ever escalating into physical violence or civil war.

Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010:3) argue that peacebuilding suffers from a pervasive oversimplification when it comes to understanding violence. Often, peacebuilding literature talks in terms of a simplistic dichotomy of violence and non-violence. Little attention or qualification is paid to the fact that these are categorical terms that can encompass a wide range of strategies – both violence and non-violence take many forms. Rather than put a prescriptive boundary around the types and forms of violence that I use to examine post-war violence, instead, an exploratory approach is adopted to see what understandings of conflict and violence emerge from the data.

In both peacebuilding academia and practice, it is customary to refer to the period of transition after civil war (or after mass violence generally) as post-conflict. This understanding makes a conceptual link to conflict as something that is inherently violent, to be eradicated and moved beyond. This research views conflict as part of human nature and societies. Thus it seems counter-intuitive to presume a condition can exist where conflict can be considered as concluded, never to resurface. Therefore, the post-period is referred to as post-civil war, rather than post-conflict.
1.5 Argument and contributions

My argument is that based on observations of relations between political parties, violence has remained a key part of how some parties understand and deal with conflict long into post-war years, in particular those claiming to represent the previous warring groups. I describe three behaviours that I propose constitute forms of violence: threat of armed revolution, retaining armed forces and civil war-related claims-making. The empirical chapters show how this violence has affected interparty relations and impacted on the implementation of the peace processes in Nepal and Mozambique by impeding peace agreement policy-making. The different forms can be seen to share a connection to the civil war, and as such, I use the civil-war-contingent violence as a way to conceptually understand and analyse the violence. The prevalence and persistence of civil-war-contingent violence implies little transformation in intergroup conflict, as it shows how violence can play a pivotal role in how some political parties understand and react to conflict years after the ending of the war.

Conversely, I find that among those I interviewed who were working to build peace within the villages, violence between members of the previous warring groups is not seen as a cause for concern. Informants described a remarkably swift transformation away from the violence that characterised intergroup relations during war. Despite this lack of violence, there is a pervasive sense that further mass intergroup violence and civil war are a distinct possibility in the future. The relations between political parties, marked by the use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence, are seen as a key source for this anticipation. Transformation away from violence could be enhanced, I argue, if civil-war-contingent forms of violence were given more attention, and there were more active attempts to reduce their use as part of peacebuilding interventions.

This research offers three main contributions to new knowledge:

1. Proposing that violence can be present in post-civil war contexts beyond contemporary understands of physical and structural violence. To support my claim, I advance three forms of violence which evoke ideas of physical violence without it manifesting, but which are more direct acts of
agency than structural violence recognises. I use the term civil-war-contingent violence to conceptualise this violence to offer a way to understand and analyse its effects on a peace process.  

2. Recognising that there are cycles to this violence suggests that violence can be deeply embedded in interparty relations, years and decades after fighting stops. Addressing this violence requires more active and sustained work with political parties to help them break these patterns.  

3. Using a theoretical framework that examines political representation as a dynamic and reflective process of interaction taking place over time.

1.6 Thesis structure  
This chapter set out how the thesis understands and investigates post-war violence as an issue of intergroup relations. Chapter 2 moves to critically review the study of violence and civil war within the peacebuilding literature looking at how others have explained civil war-related violence, and in so doing, identifies a number of gaps in existing knowledge that the research will investigate. The chapter also outlines the framework used to theoretically analyse the transformation of intergroup conflict. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used to operationalise the research. Chapter 4 introduces the case studies of Nepal and Mozambique. Historical factors leading up to the outbreak of civil war are discussed with particular focus on political dynamics and intergroup relations. It looks at the impact of violence during the war, gives detail on the key peace agreement policies that are the focus for the analysis of the transformation process and provides background on the six villages where interviews were held. Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings. Chapter 5 focuses on the transformation of intergroup conflict from the perspective of political parties. Chapter 6 then compares the findings in Chapter 5 to understandings and experiences of intergroup conflict within six villages (three in Nepal and three in Mozambique). As part of the discussion, the chapter explores the perceptions of key actors involved in peacebuilding living in the villages – their views of intergroup conflict, the peace process and political parties. Chapter 7 reviews the findings and offers an answer to the principal research question. It outlines the main
contributions and implications of the research for the study of violence during peacebuilding and suggests a number of recommendations for further research.
Chapter 2
Understanding post-war violence and the transformation of intergroup conflict

Introduction
Although peacebuilding has developed into a complex multi-faceted enterprise involving different aspects of political, social and economic capacity building and reform, at its core it is about the prevention of a relapse into war through developing the capacity to deal with conflict non-violently. Accordingly, much of the academic research on the transition from war to peace and the issue of post-war violence falls within the peacebuilding literature. This chapter serves the dual purpose of critically reviewing current scholarly thought on post-war violence to identify gaps that the research will engage with whilst setting out the theoretical framework used to explain the transformation process.

The chapter has five sections. Section 2.1 reviews the literature examining post-war violence to identify the main gap that the thesis engages with. Section 2.2 introduces the concept of conflict transformation that provides the foundation for the theoretical framework. Conflict transformation does not prescribe to a particular way of interpreting, understanding or analysing a conflict so Section 2.3 draws together a number of different concepts to construct a theoretical framework to explain and analyse the transformation process. In section 2.4, I take a step back to critically reflect on the theoretical approach and consider some constraints and implications that the section holds for the empirical findings.

Section 2.5 then shifts away from the topic of violence and transformation of intergroup conflict. Comparing understandings and experiences of political

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15Barnett et al., (2007:35) note that peacebuilding has become more than just stopping armed conflict. It is now widely understood to involve addressing causes of conflict that may lead to the use of violence.
parties to people working on peace and reconciliation in villages presents an opportunity to explore two areas of peacebuilding where research is nascent. The first relates to the idea of levels of peacebuilding and a tendency to dichotomise peacebuilding actors and activities as either national or local. The second centres around the nature of political representation in countries emerging from civil war.

2.1 Explaining post-war violence
In *The logic of violence in civil war*, Kalyvas (2000:51) raises the point that research into civil wars has historically concentrated on root causes to the exclusion of studying violence itself. Theories explain why civil wars start and what needs to be addressed to develop sustainable peace, but Kalyvas contends that they give little consideration to the form(s) that violence takes, the way it is used and the reasons behind why violence is used in particular ways. There are a number of leading theories that dominate understandings of peacebuilding and civil war-related violence.

Social contract theory concerns ‘the set of rules, formal and informal, that guide the behaviour of citizens, entrepreneurs, and governments to allow conflict to be expressed and resolved peacefully rather than violently’, (Addison and Murshed, 2006:137). A social contract approach to peacebuilding promotes non-violence through effective and legitimate state institutions that respond to group needs, emphasising development of strong state–society relations. Another key explanation for civil war centres on theory of Statebuilding. As civil wars often result from, or involve, the collapse or failure of the State, a Statebuilding approach would focus on rebuilding the capacity and capability of state institutions and the state’s ability to perform core functions as a way of restoring peace, meaning peacebuilding is viewed as a largely technocratic process (Paris and Sisk, 2009; Roberts, 2011b). Building on from Statebuilding is the concept of Nationbuilding, which Lotz (2010:223) describes as the ‘creation and strengthening of a shared national identity’. The notion of identity is central to nationbuilding. Modern civil wars ‘are usually fought over the definition of the
political community’. The premise for creating peace is the idea that developing a collective and shared national identity can be a powerful force for mobilising and uniting a diverse population behind the statebuilding project.

Arguably the most controversial explanation for civil war is the greed vs. grievance debate. Greed proponents look to political-economy factors, and specifically, the private accumulation of wealth and resources as the primary driver of violent conflict (Collier and Hoefler, 1998). In contrast, advocates of grievance theory contend that civil war is the product of inequality: whether social, economic, political or cultural. Relative deprivation and exclusion (whether real or perceived) are seen to be the motivators of civil war, rather than purely material concerns. Stewart’s (2001:312) work on horizontal inequalities is the seminal thinking in grievance circles. While historically these theories have taken exclusive positions on the cause of civil war, theoretical and empirical advances in research are showing that the reality is far more complex than being able to explain civil war as due to either greed or grievance. Civil war is a complex combination of many factors and does not lend easily to exclusive explanation (Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006b, Collier et al., 2009).

While Kalyvas (2000) would deride these approaches for their lack of attention to dynamics of violence during civil war, his point translates to the subject of this thesis as the causes of civil war arguments are frequently used to frame much of the study and discussion of post-war violence. The way in which it is understood and explained is often simply as a continuation of the factors that led to civil war in the first place. Where there is thinking around post-war violence as a distinct phenomenon it can be seen to fall into two main camps (Suhrke, 2012:2). The first views post-war violence largely as a preventative exercise – avoiding a relapse back into civil war. Suhrke (2012:2) call this the ‘legacies of war’ approach, whereby violence is explained as a product of unresolved issues left over from the fighting. Boyle (2014) conducted an extensive cross-data analysis of wars within 52 different countries. Boyle’s research identifies, from a legacies perspective, two likely sources of further violence in civil war affected countries – new disputes that arise between the winners and losers over the terms of
peace, and competition among the victors over the spoils of war. Post-war violence then is seen as an extension of ongoing tensions and motivations from the civil war. Because of the focus on preventing civil war from restarting, an emphasis is placed on the leadership of the previous warring groups as the primary protagonists, and as a result, other actors are largely ignored. My research echoes this approach by looking at the political parties as the main representatives of the previously warring groups, but goes beyond the exclusive focus on these elites by examining intergroup violence within villages as a way to reflect on violence as an issue of wider group relations.

Under the legacies of war view, post-civil war violence is seen as a product of a breakdown in the peace agreement and a weak and ineffectual state unable to maintain peaceful relations. The logic of the argument and the nature of the peace it seeks to create echoes the dominant liberal peacebuilding paradigm. Efforts concentrate on appeasing leaders of the previously warring groups to ensure they do not restart war by developing strong state institutional capacity (Caplan, 2012:121; Herman and Gerard, 2009), particularly building transparent and accountable democracies, founded on the competent implementation of the rule of law (Newman et al., 2009:8; Richmond, 2011:45; Roberts, 2011a:1).

The second school of thought looks below the state level and national political dynamics between the warring parties. Suhrke (2012:2) terms this approach ‘cultures of violence’. It subscribes to a sociological view of post-war violence that concentrates predominantly on socio-cultural factors. Suhrke (2012:2) maintains – ‘wars create social disorganisation and a general legitimisation of violence stemming from wartime reversal of customary prohibitions of killing’. Steenkamp (2009:29) examines the issue of rising violence after the formal end of hostilities, arguing that the continued tolerance towards violence is reinforced because it becomes culturally embedded. Cruz (1998:92) defines this cultural violence as ‘the system of norms, values or attitudes which allow, make possible or even stimulate the use of violence to resolve any conflict or relation with another person’. Culture, here, is taken to be the product of learned and exchanged behaviour through socialisation, a process constructed in the
everyday. Proponents of the ‘culture of violence’ approach argue that through prolonged exposure to violence during war, violence becomes a socially sanctioned means of resolving conflicts. For example, Hamber (1999) talks about how in post-apartheid South Africa violence became an accepted way of life in many communities. In essence, the politically legitimised violence of war internalises and transforms into violence-supporting social behaviours.

Much of the literature points towards the abundance of small arms left over from war as a primary source of this violence, which typically manifests as an escalation in criminal activity – gang violence, drugs trafficking and extortion (Renner, 1997; Godnick et al., 2002; Steenkamp, 2009). Additionally, Suhrke (2012:2) points to other forms of violence that see an increase after the end of civil war – domestic violence, rape, kidnapping and revenge attacks. By looking at these different manifestations of post-war violence, the ‘cultures of violence’ approach differs from the ‘legacies of war’ view principally in terms of the level of focus. Much of the post-war violence it characterises and seeks to explain involves small-scale incidents that are often restricted to specific geographical locations and are predominantly interpersonal in nature.

Steenkamp (2005) contends that where ‘cultures of violence’ are referenced in post-war literature, there is a tendency to contextualise it in relation to the overarching political dynamics of the conflict; in essence, the legacies approach. The types of violence that a culture’s view examines are seen as the result of a weak state. Ineffective state security and judiciary mean that people have to take conflict resolution into their own hands. Consequently, the ‘cultures of violence’ approach has been poorly conceptualised and not treated as a distinct issue in its own right. Eriksson (2013:107) contends that the literature ‘is mainly exploratory and descriptive, focusing on the formation of cultures, not their persistence.’ Steenkamp (2005:254) makes the case that where cultural explanations of violence are acknowledged in mainstream peacebuilding literature it is done so cursorily with ‘very little consideration given to exactly how this culture of violence is likely to happen’.
These two explanations for post-war violence fundamentally differ in the types of actors they hold responsible for the violence, and the level at which the violent activities take place. The ‘legacies of war’ approach concentrates on the previously warring elite while for ‘cultures of violence’ advocates it is an issue of violence becoming embedded more in interpersonal relations.

Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010:4) say that studies of civil war tend to oversimplify violence. Often, situations are labelled dichotomously – as being either violent or non-violent. These terms are unsophisticated because violence and non-violence are complex categories that include a diverse array of different strategies and ways that actors can use violence when dealing with conflict (Tilly, 2003). The recognition that civil war violence can take very different forms to violence during interstate wars is one example. Unpacking the complexities of war-related violence are important because it has implications for how violence is dealt with – different forms of violence and the different strategies behind its use will demand differing methods and measures to overcome.

- This research engages with the gap in the literature around the need for more nuanced understandings of war-related violence by exploring perceptions and experiences of violence in the aftermath of civil war in Nepal and Mozambique. The thesis does this by considering continuing violence as an issue of wider group relations – as crystallised in political parties - to offer a different perspective to the prevailing ‘legacies’ and ‘cultures’ explanations.

### 2.2 Conflict transformation

The roots of conflict transformation lie in the conflict resolution school within International Relations but developed as a distinct branch of conflict studies under John Paul Lederach in the 1980s. It is used extensively in the examination of conflict and violence both within and between societies. Where conflict transformation appears in the thesis, unless otherwise stated, it is used with
specific reference to Lederach’s understanding of the term. Lederach (2003:14) talks about conflict transformation in terms of what he calls two ‘verifiable realities’, both of which resonate with the way conflict is understood in this thesis. Conflict is considered a motor for change, supporting this examination into how conflict between groups after civil war shapes the direction of peace, and that conflict is normal in human relationships and societies. While conflict, therefore, is inevitable, violence is not and a guiding objective of conflict transformation is to prevent conflicts from degenerating into violence, or to stop violence where it has already started.

Conflict transformation is more than just preventing or ending violence. For Lederach (1997:36), conflict is not exclusively negative. Conflict transformation is about altering destructive patterns of conflict and instead, tapping into and channelling the potential of conflict as a positive force for change. Whether conflicting parties use violent or non-violent means of resolving their issue(s) comes down to the nature of the relationship between them. Through conflict ‘we are negotiating the nature and quality of our relationships’ (2003:24) and the objective is to reframe and restructure the way we perceive and interact in order to form ‘healthy’ relationships. By healthy, Lederach (2003:26) means discovering opportunities to learn and find constructive solutions. Parties then, cannot transform relationships independently of each other and it is the importance of interaction that resonates with the research's focus on intergroup relations and use of a critical social constructivism as a guiding epistemology, discussed in the subsequent chapter. It is not enough to merely look at how parties interact. Insight is also needed into the way parties perceive and make sense of conflict because these understandings will influence how parties interact. For transformation to be lasting, change has to be meaningful to those involved. This approach supports the research’s objective of a deeper investigation into why particular transformations are happening.

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16 I use the term relationships in the discussion of conflict transformation as this is the language of the approach, but the term can also be taken to refer to intergroup relations.
Relationships form over time so an appreciation of the historical context of a relationship is crucial to effecting constructive change. How groups have interacted in the past can be a window into how they are behaving in the present. Lederach (2003:63) talks about cycles of conflict – that parties can become locked into repetitive patterns that can be highly resistant to change and hard to break. It is the idea of patterns of conflict built up over time that helped inform the research premise that intergroup violence that has taken place over extended years during a civil war may be affecting intergroup relations in the post-civil war period.

Conflict transformation views these relationships as inseparable from the broader socio-political and economic systems within which they are embedded. System refers to institutional arrangements and structures within a society (formal and informal), which Lederach (2003:46) refers to as the wider ‘context’. The context can be a window into understanding what drives conflict – its root causes - because conflict transformation sees interdependence between systems shaping and influencing the course of a conflict, but equally conflicts form, sustain and transform systems and institutions. The interplay between actors and structures aligns with my use of a critical social constructivist epistemology and consideration of the political system on the transformation process through research sub-question 3.

Conflict transformation recognises the complexity of social conflict, acknowledging it is practically impossible to know everything that is happening, particularly on the scale of civil wars. However, it advocates embracing complexity, operating on the principle of working to be better informed. Conflict transformation is principally a way of ‘looking and seeing a conflict’ (Lederach, 200:10). It does not prescribe to a particular way of interpreting, understanding or explaining a conflict and it is here that my research begins to build on conflict transformation as a conceptual device to analyse the transformation process. Lederach (2003:95) maintains that ‘issues of identity are at the root of most conflicts’ and that looking at how identity is expressed in relation to conflict can reveal how a relationship is being experienced and understood. It is to ideas of
identity that we now turn as the starting point for theorising the transformation process.

2.3 Explaining transformation of intergroup conflict
Several independent theories are brought together into a framework to conceptually understand the transformation process. The framework starts with theory of identity that is used as a way to conceive of large groups. Identity does not transform of its own accord, however, but changes due to groups interacting with the world around them. Therefore, a way is needed to explain how identities can transform. To do this, the research draws on the political claims-making model of Michael Saward (2010), looking to the content of claims made as political parties participate in the peace process. The interests and needs articulated in claims are taken as an expression of group identity; who the group is, what they want and how they understand intergroup conflict. Looking at how claims change over time provides a way to assess how identities transform. Saward’s model focuses on the actor making a claim, but conflict is relational, involving multiple parties. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the influence of interaction between groups to accurately reflect how transformation is taking place. Andrea Cornwall’s (2002) three categories of political space: closed, invited and claimed, are employed to do this. Political space is taken to refer to the physical and figurative opportunities that actors had to participate in the policy-making process – the channels, mechanisms and places (formal and informal) through which parties make claims and that bring the parties together during the development and implementation of the peace policies. In combination, these different theories allow me to address the research question.

2.3.1 Identity
Identity can be revealing in the understanding of conflict because it can be taken as an expression ‘of deeply felt demands and preferred outcomes’ (Lederach, 2003:96). Identity theory provides the starting point for theorising the transformation process – a way of understanding groups and intergroup conflict. Lederach’s use of the term ‘deeply felt’ reflects why identity theory is suited to answering the research question as it provides a way of going deeper into the
perceptions and meanings groups attach to conflict. Northrup (1989:55) terms identity as an, ‘abiding sense of self’, the way that actors conceptualise themselves, the roles that they play and the purpose that they serve in the world. However, the self does not operate in isolation but is continually interacting with the wider environment. As a result, identity is shaped by our understanding and experience of the world and those we interact with (Wendt, 1992:397; Zehfuss, 2001). Identity formation then is deeply relational.17

Groups form through the association of individuals who share a collective interest(s). Human beings tend to gravitate to those of like-mind, to people who share similar ways of thinking, characteristics and traits, or who have the same material aspirations. Common interests give rise to shared understandings and meanings of what it is to be part of, and belong to, a collective, which in turn finds expression as the group identity (Jenkins, 2004). Volkan (2006b:306) uses the visual metaphor of a ‘tent’ to illustrate – as individuals, our identity can be likened to a set of clothes with which we dress/see ourselves. Outside of our clothes is the tent under which we gather collectively for shelter and security with others, upon the canvas of which the group’s collective identity is cast. Volkan (2009b:4) uses this idea of the tent in the development of a notion of large-group identity – ‘whether it refers to nationality, ethnicity, religion, or political ideology: it is the subjective experience of thousands or millions of people who are linked by a persistent sense of sameness’. Volkan’s (2009a) conceptualisation of group identity provides an effective way through which to distinguish and differentiate between large social groups because it moves beyond spatially or geographically limited definitions. For Volkan, group identity can be shared even though people may never have met. The most evident example of this would be the idea of nationalism – millions of people sharing a similar sense of national identity across expansive geographical locales even though they may never physically met.

17 The relational nature of identity formation supports the use of a Conflict Transformation approach based on a critical social constructivist epistemology.
Ideas of identity are used extensively in the study of civil war. The opening chapter discussed a tendency for groups to be cast as clearly delineated and distinguishable entities. There are some theorists that ascribe to a view of group identities as largely fixed. Essentialists such as Geertz (1963) and Gurr (2001) are of the opinion that identity is innate – that some identities are natural and static. Jenkins (2004:5) says that much like Geertz and Gurr, a lot of the contemporary literature using identity to explain conflict treats identity ‘as something that simply is – not paying enough attention to how [identity] works’. There are theorists that take a less deterministic view, and indeed, even warn that unsophisticated analyses of identity like the essentialist view holds potential to exacerbate conflict (Sen, 2007:4).

A pluralist view, which Sen has, is one approach that embraces a more complex view of identity. It moves beyond singular and solitary notions of group association; that belonging to one group does not preclude identifying with other groups. Plurality is grounded in the argument that the individual is composed of many different ways in which it can conceive of itself: simultaneously, one can be Muslim, British and vegetarian (Sen, 2007:4). The implication is that identity is malleable and groups are fluid as members are at any one time affiliated with a variety of groups. The plural view introduces the idea of change to the conflict and identity debate in two ways. Firstly, the relative importance of group identities can shift and fluctuate with different identities asserting priority dependent on context (Parekh 2008; Kaplan 2009). Trying to understand why particular identities become more salient during violent conflict allows for a more nuanced investigation and prompts inquiry into how polarisations arise - what drives particular identities to assert dominance. Secondly, group identities take on new and different meanings because group interests and needs will change over time, which in turn alter how the group understands and identifies itself. Viewing group identity as a shifting and variable entity provides the means of exploring the transformation of intergroup conflict.

For identity to explain intergroup violence and civil war, understanding othering is critical. Othering is a social process used to define the self by identifying what
it is not. Creating a sense of ‘sameness’ generates a set of criteria for inclusion into the group. At the same time, it defines who is excluded. So, the creation of group identity, simultaneously, generates the ‘other(s)’ that the group ‘are not’ (Cohen, 2010; Sen, 2007; Volkan, 2009b). It is out of the process of defining the collective ‘self’ that differences emerge that can lead to conflict - oppositional categorisations of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Groups can build up biased understandings of those they are in conflict with, which can fuel antagonism. Moral and behavioural comparisons can quickly take on negative connotations: ‘they are people who behave like that’, ‘we would never do such things’. Allport (1954) argues that these generalisations can lead to stereotyping that can drive powerful social cleavages that can divide societies.

The extreme manifestation of othering is enmification. Enmification is the process of turning an ‘other’ into an enemy. By presenting the other as a threat to the very existence of the group, the other becomes a target to be destroyed. Rieber (1997:60) contends that ‘defining an image of the enemy on a mass scale is the psychological prerequisite for modern warfare’. Bromley (2011) stresses that constructing particular representations of the other as an enemy were instrumental in fanning the flames of violence in Rwanda, for example. Examining understandings of how groups see themselves in relation to intergroup conflict is essential to this study but of equal importance is the identity of the other. How groups understand those they are in conflict with can be a key determinant in the way that conflict is approached and whether violence is part of the strategy. The idea of othering therefore, is used to consider the impact of the competing identities on how groups interact during the policy-making process.

While a pluralist theory of identity is used as the basis for analysing the transformation in intergroup conflict, identities do not just transform on their own. They change as a result of interaction with the world. What is needed then, is a way to assess how the transformation in group identity takes place, and for this, the research turns to the theory of political claims-making.
2.3.2 Political claims-making

Political claims-making refers ‘to the process of performing or articulating claims that bear on someone else's interests’ (Lindekilde, 2013:1). Claims-making in this research refers specifically to the act that political parties undertake in order to bring the interests and needs of groups into the policy-making process. The claims-making model of Michael Saward (2010) is used as a way to capture group identity, intergroup conflict and how it transforms over time.

Michael Saward's work on 'The Representative Claim' is a treatise in which he argues for the need to shift focus from the agent of voice to the content of the demand itself and the process that happens during a claim (Saward, 2010). Saward (2010:6) is reproachful of traditional approaches to the act of claims-making within political theory – what he calls the 'presence' perspective. The presence view concentrates on representation as an institutional act that is seen as a direct result of elections (Schaap et al., 2012:112). Representation is given presence via effective structural and procedural arrangements allowing claims to be articulated. The presence view, Saward maintains, has a preoccupation with the claim, or the product, as it forms the primary object of study. If a claim is made, representation can be said to be taking place. By focusing exclusively on the claim itself, Saward argues that it treats claims as fixed, bounded and to some degree predictable proclamations. Representatives, constituent groups and their interests are assumed to be secure and essentially unchanging. It also precludes any consideration of what happens during the act of making a claim. In a critical review of Saward’s approach, Schaap et al., (2012:109) suggest ‘there is an unfortunate tendency to presume that the represented has a given, transparent and largely stable set of interests’.

Saward (2010) refutes the presence view and contends that representation and claims-making are far more dynamic and changeable and, instead, advocates interrogating representation as a process. For Saward, it is essential to look at the content of a claim (what is being said), but it is equally important to look at the process that goes into constructing and expressing a claim, and what
happens during the act of claiming itself: ‘the makers of claims actually constitute or create the objects of their claims in the process of representing them’ (Schaap, et al., 2012:111). Representation and claims-making are a process rather than an event.

Saward devised a model for conceptualising claiming as a process. The model looks at the act of claiming, the composition of a claim, who is representing, who they are claiming to represent, what they are claiming, and how and who the intended target of a claim is. Saward (2006:302) distinguishes five steps: a maker of representations (‘M’) puts forward a subject (‘S’) which stands for an object (‘O’) that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is offered to an audience (‘A’). Central to Saward’s thesis is the constitutive character of this process. Instead of claims being objective reality, they are constructed. An individual or collective agent creates (in this study politicians and political parties) a claim about an object (the group), ‘and the thing represented is an idea of it, not the thing itself, which is better called a ‘referent’. In this research, politicians and political parties are the ‘subject’ who stand for an ‘object’. The object is their idea of their constituency (the group they claim to represent) and what they think are their interests and needs. Saward’s model provides a means to analyse group identity and intergroup conflict: looking to the content of claims for group interests, which are taken as an expression of group identity.

Saward’s model is linear in that the claiming process ends once a claim is offered to the audience. The purpose of this research is to explore transformation over extended timeframes. Therefore, a way is needed to be able to look at claims-making as a process that allows the research to examine transformation in understandings unfolding over time. To do this, Saward’s model is used iteratively, in a recurrent manner so that the claims-making process becomes a cycle: considering how the impact of a particular claim, and decision-making taken around a claim, influences future claiming. This creates a recurrent loop to the model.
While Saward's claims-making model provides a suitable means to examine how and why transformation is taking place, the model only considers the claiming process from the point of view of the representative making a claim. Conflict, however, is relational – a result of interaction between two or more parties. In addition, referring back to the emphasis conflict transformation places on appreciating the wider ‘context’ of a conflict, it is necessary to consider the influence of the political system for a more realistic and holistic view of the transformation process. This is where the notion of political space is brought into the approach – providing the final component to the theoretical framework to look at where and how political parties interact during the peace process and consider the influence of the political system on transformation.

2.3.3 Political space

There are a range of theoretical approaches that could be used to explain the influence of the political system of structures and procedures governing policy-making on the transformation process. Statebuilding theory, for example, focuses on the importance of institutional arrangements for building sustainable peace (Paris and Sisk, 2009:2). The state-centric nature of the statebuilding approach, however, lacks sensitivity to sub-national dynamics that are a primary focus of this research. Rational choice theory contends that actors engage with political institutions and processes to try and maximise their utility (Shepsle, 2006). Rational choice presumes actors make educated and calculated decisions based on all available information and is not suited to research exploring subjective experience and interpretations of intergroup conflict.

That conflict is relational carries an inference that there is a spatial dimension – somewhere for interaction to take place. It is for this reason that political space is used to analyse the impact of interaction within the policy-making process on the transformation of intergroup conflict. Drawing on Gaventa’s (2006a:26) idea of space as ‘structures, moments and channels to affect political discourse and policies’, the term political space is taken to refer to both the physical and figurative opportunities that actors have to participate in discourse and decision-
making around the peace policies. The intent is to look at how political parties interact with each other, and how the political parties interact with their constituents within villages, through different forms of formal and informal political spaces.

Pugh (2009:1) talks about a 'spatial turn' in academia in the past several decades, taking theories of space far beyond their geographical roots. Pugh says that ideas of space are widely used in political theory around issues of governance, power and participation. Discussions of political competition and policy-making are inherently linked to the language and notion of space. For example, actors can be spoken about as having different 'positions' and 'approaches' (Benoit and Laver, 2012:195). Also, spatial theory is being applied to peacebuilding. Mitchell and Kelly (2011:307) discuss how interveners can look to create 'peaceful spaces', places that are secure and safe for sensitive peacebuilding activities. There are a variety of different approaches to political space, all using different terminology. Cornwall and Coelho (2007) talk about 'democratic space' as the arenas in which people claim citizenry and participate in governance. Others such as McGee (2004) use the phrase 'policy space' to refer to opportunities for people to engage with policy-makers. Despite divergence in terminology, a common thread that is seen to bond these different conceptions of political space is that they involve a concern with the ways and means of interaction between policy-makers, and between policy-makers and the wider population who are the intended beneficiaries.

Cornwall’s (2002) conceptualisation of political space is used to build into the theoretical framework a way to consider the effect of the political system on the transformation process. There are a number of reasons for using Cornwall's work over others. She sees space in terms of opportunities for positive transformative change, which aligns with ideas of conflict transformation. Also, rather than political space being understood as bounded or fixed points and processes, Cornwall advocates space as a fluid entity that can be created, shaped and transformed. Cornwall considers space as the formal practices actors are able to participate in, but also supports analysing informal spaces as well: these
are the spaces that actors who may be excluded from formal processes can create in order to access policy-making. The notion of groups being able to create space to express their interests is particularly pertinent to a study of violent intergroup conflict as many civil wars arise due to marginalisation and exclusion of particular groups from political processes. It also supports the focus on political parties as the voice of the previous warring groups.

Cornwall (2002) worked collaboratively with Gaventa (2006a) to develop three forms of political space:

- **Closed Spaces** - offer limited access to participate in political processes. They typically involve exclusive and restricted numbers of actors. Closed spaces can be considered decision-making taking place behind closed doors, policy-making that is not widely consultative or open.

- **Invited Spaces** - ‘those into which people (as users, citizens or beneficiaries) are invited to participate in various kinds of authorities, be they government, supranational agencies or non-governmental organisations’ (Cornwall, 2002:17). Invited spaces can be regular and institutionalised or more transient and opportunistic.

- **Claimed/Created Spaces** - space taken by less powerful actors from those who dominate or control a space. Cornwall talks about these spaces being organic. They ‘may come into being as a result of popular mobilisation, such as around identity or issue-based concerns, or may consist of spaces in which like-minded people join together in common pursuits’ (Cornwall 2002:17).

Beyond the different forms of space, Cornwall (2002) highlights the importance of recognising that these spaces are not neutral. Because spaces are socially constructed, Cornwall says that space is pervaded by relations of power and she talks in terms of power surrounding and entering political space. That Cornwall’s theory of political space incorporates ideas of power provides the research a means of looking at how spaces are created, who has access to space and who is excluded as a factor affecting the transformation process.
This theoretical framework has been developed so that, starting with the conflict transformation approach, each additional theory builds on from the previous, adding a new dimension to the analysis. In combination, the theories work together to allow me to answer the research question.

2.4 Critical reflection on the theory

Having set out the theoretical approach, here, I take a step back to critically reflect on several aspects of the framework to discuss the implications their use holds for my findings. They are conflict transformation and the type of relations it seeks to produce, and the utility of identity for examining the transformation of intergroup conflict.

Conflict transformation sees conflict as inevitable. What is not is violence, and by extension, civil war. An inference that could be seen to run from this line of thought is that if violence and war are not ‘natural’, then they are aberrations, conditions to be eradicated. There are arguments that propose war as natural to the human condition and societies. Luttwak’s (1999:36) controversial ‘Give War a Chance’ argues that war has a functional purpose of resolving political conflicts to allow societies to transition into a new stage of development. Clausewitz’s renowned statement ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’ (Howard and Paret, 1984:87), understands that war is one tool in the gamut of political instruments available to political actors in the pursuit of their goals. War is not the cessation of political relations but one condition along a spectrum. Part of the reason for using conflict transformation is that it recognises the importance of understanding history to affect positive change. Civil war, therefore, is not seen to represent a break in the continuity of a society’s history, or even an anomalous break from politics, but is an integral part of intergroup dynamics. The subsequent chapter considers factors and events in the lead up to the civil wars, as well as during, that gives important context and support to the empirical findings.

What these arguments draw attention to is that particular understandings of the nature and role of civil war will influence the vision of what post-war society will
be; setting expectations for the type of transformation that is projected to happen. This research is not based on an idealised notion where ‘peace is seen as the ‘natural’ condition and war the ‘aberration’ (Aggestam et al., 2015:1740). The aspired outcome in the transformation process is not an end state that is harmonious, building a unified utopian society where dissent and difference are eliminated. Indeed, the main argument I propose makes the case that post-war interparty relations have continued to be overshadowed by violence, years into peace, despite there being limited physical violence.

Beyond these more esoteric discussions on the nature of post-civil war society, conflict transformation places importance on understanding the change in relations as a process – focusing on means, not just the end state. Lederach (2003:26) considers the transition as one of destructive into constructive relations. Civil wars, however, are often referred to as ‘intractable conflicts’ (Azar, 1990), where those involved see a conflict as irreconcilable, unable to see the situation as anything other than zero-sum (Vallacher et al., 2010). Two civil wars that could be thought to embody intractability are Northern Ireland and the Palestine/Israel conflict. Mindful that both have been through cycles of peace and war, these two conflicts have been waged for decades and received extensive peacebuilding efforts yet, after all this time, neither could be said to exhibit relations that are ‘constructive’ or ‘healthy’. The idea of intractability then, raises questions around what transformations can be realistically achieved in post-war contexts. It suggests some parties do not, and will not, concede to compromise or cooperate. If those involved do not want to reconcile then the best that can be hoped for is tolerance and cohabitation without violence. There is a risk, therefore, that the use of conflict transformation and its attendant notion of constructive, healthy relations could be seen to set unrealistic expectations and so predestine the parties in Nepal and Mozambique to failure before analysis even begins.

Aggestam et al., (2015:1736) argue that idealistic thinking around the extent of relation transformation after civil wars is an issue built-in to contemporary peacebuilding. They describe a liberal construction of peace based on an
understanding that strives for consensus among warring parties, ‘advancing the resolution of conflict through the eradication of dissensus’, and contend that the failure to recognise and give voice to difference and disagreement can destabilise the peace project and even fuel violence. Aggestam et al., (2015) are among a number of academics (Hirsch, 2013; Maddison, 2015; Schapp, 2006; Yuksek, 2014) challenging the prevailing logic that undiscerningly seeks consensus in post-war societies. The call is to critically reconsider the nature of relations after the end of civil wars through a more analytical engagement with the political and contested nature of peacebuilding. To do this, ideas of agonistic politics, taken from the works of political theorists such as Mouffe, (2000, 2013) and Connolly (2005), are being applied to the development of peace.

Mouffe’s (2000) idea of democracy as agonistic pluralism is based on the notion that the political nature of society and human relations is not just inherently conflictual but antagonistically so. The aspiration of politics should be to defuse and reduce antagonism, but conflict is irreducible so the notion that politics can be an act of consensus building is a fallacy that denies the very nature of the political – a constant state of conflict. Where ideas of agonism are particularly pertinent to this research is attention to perceptions of conflicting parties and a focus on their relations. Mouffe (2000:15) uses identity to illustrate the antagonism/agonism nexus - equating antagonism with the perception of the other as an ‘enemy’, whereas agonism views an ‘adversary’. The objective is to ‘construct “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but an “adversary”, i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question’. Aggestam et al., (2015:1738) appraise the intent of agonistic pluralism in post-war contexts succinctly in the statement - ‘agonistic peacebuilding is about creating political space in which a friend/enemy relationship can be reframed and transformed into one of legitimate adversaries’.

The use of identity and enemy/friend perceptions resonates strongly with the way I investigate the transformation of intergroup relations, particularly with its attendant focus on participation in democratic political processes. Several
authors, though, are cautious of the optimism placed in agonism without more critical reflection; warning that agonistic spaces could, in theory, increase distrust and risk reifying polarised identities and perceptions of the enemy rather than transforming them (Ramsbotham, 2010; Yuksek, 2014). The antagonism/agonism argument potentially offers a more nuanced conceptualisation of relations between conflicting parties but much of it comes from international relations theory that places prominence on the role of democratic institutions as the vehicle through which transformation happens (Aggestam, et al., 2015; Dryzek, 2005; Schapp, 2006). While my thesis recognises the importance of institutions, focus is on the less researched relations between previous warring groups as a factor in the transition to peace. The agonism literature recognises the importance of relational dynamics but change is facilitated through trusted and respected institutions creating political space in which the parties can start to engage agonistically. Little deliberation is given to how trust in institutions is built among the parties to allow them to enter political space to begin a dialogue. The emerging literature around agonism and peacebuilding does, however, offer insight for some of the findings and so I do bring it into a critical reflection of my argument in chapter 5 that looks at the transformation process from the perspective of the political parties.

The second dimension of the theoretical framework that needs consideration is identity. Although widely used in the study of civil war, identity-based theories are not without critique. One of the leading accusation is that identity approaches lead to simplistic understandings; diluting the explanation of civil wars down to differences between just a handful of particular identity types: ideological, ethnic or religious differences (Collier, 2010; Sen, 2007). A lack of depth and unsophisticated analysis risks identities being treated as free-floating entities that are autonomous and isolated, and so effectively ignorant of any other factors that may be contributing to the outbreak of civil war.

Civil war out of a sense of injustice or ill-treatment means that much of the identity-based explanations fall firmly within the grievance camp. Stewart’s (2001) work on horizontal inequality and Fraser’s (2009) politics of recognition
are based on grievance as a cause of political conflict and violence and they draw extensively on ideas of group identity in their arguments. In *Wars, Guns and Votes*, development economist Paul Collier (2010:132) maintains that ‘many people quite reasonably assume that violent internal conflict is the consequence of political repression, but we simply do not find the evidence for this’. What plays a more dominant role, Collier argues, is political economy. Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005:2) maintain that economic factors have played a central role in warfare throughout history, and as such, they say that giving consideration to socio-cultural dimensions alone is insufficient for an accurate account of the dynamics of war. The political economy of civil war is often used to critique and contest identity and grievance-based explanations. A political economy examination looks to a very different set of issues and dynamics shaping civil wars and post-civil war situations to an identity approach; one grounded much more in factors influenced by private and personal accumulation of power and wealth – as opposed to more collective group interests and greater participation in political decision-making.

Political economists study peacebuilding in a range of ways. The terms of power-sharing arrangements and how they play out, for example, can be a determining factor affecting the prospects for lasting peace. Institutional political economists, Di John and Putzel (2009) say that the power dynamics between the previous warring elites is a crucial factor in peacebuilding because it is the brokering that will determine the new order of who has distributional rights to resources and the state. The relative level of access to, and accumulation of, wealth as well as control of state resources is another important factor that can affect the development of peace. The natural resource debate, for example, contends that states that are dependent on natural resources are more prone to civil wars due to monopolistic tendency behaviours (Collier, 2010:126; Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007). Control of natural resources can be key source of conflict after the ending of a civil war as individuals that have enjoyed exclusive access to resources before or during a war may be reluctant to relinquish them, and new political and economic actors can see them as an attractive source of quick revenue that is easily monopolised.
Several independent but interconnected aspects of the political economy of post-war countries include problems of corruption, nepotism and patronage networks. Many of these practices and networks that may have been prominent in the lead up to civil wars and during will still be active in the post-war period (Scharbatke-Church and Reiling, 2009:5). They can work to undermine the peace process as different actors try to exploit peacebuilding efforts. For example, through the expansion of criminal and black market activities, illicit economic activities and bribery as a way of securing private and state contracts (Cheng and Zaum, 2011; Eriksson and Kostic, 2013). Clientelist practices or the diversion of resources committed for public goods and services to private individuals or favoured sub-sections and groups by elites is a well-studied area within peacebuilding (Barma, 2016; Donais, 2012; Le Billon, 2008). Beyond these rent-seeking strategies, there is the already mentioned ‘spoilers’ argument that says that there will be elements within society benefiting from the war economy and so may actively be trying to thwart attempts to create a peace that they cannot profit from (Stedman, 1997).

As interaction between political parties is used to assess the transformation process, it is reasonable to presume that issues such as those described in the past several paragraphs will be influencing the way group identities are constructed and represented. My investigation, therefore, is sensitive to the fact that identity, intergroup relations and the transformation process are not inseparable from the various dynamics of political economy. At several points throughout the empirical chapters I discuss how aspects of political economy affect the argument and impact on the transformation process but this is limited because the intent of this research was to explore post-war violence as a potential issue of group relations, which identity lends better to analysing than political economy. Therefore, the data I collected does not support an in-depth political economy examination.
2.5 Beyond the transformation process

The primary focus of the research is looking at the transformation of intergroup relations. The comparison of understandings and experiences of intergroup conflict between the political parties and people working to build peace within villages also presents an opportunity to use the empirical data to reflect on two areas of peacebuilding where knowledge is newly emerging. Here, I review the existing literature on these two topics, identifying ways this study can contribute to these debates and introduce the theory that will support an analysis of these issues.

2.5.1 Levels of peacebuilding

Paffenholz (2015:857) maintains that the field of peacebuilding is plagued by a binary way of thinking about how levels are understood in both theory and practice – the international at one end and local at the other. The problem with this essentialist conceptualization, she says, is that these two levels are ‘presented as the only relevant locations of power and resistance’. Arguably, the same case can be made for the way that national and local levels are juxtaposed when talking about in-country peacebuilding.

The dichotomisation of level carries strong connotations about the kinds of actors that operate at particular levels and the types of activities that take place.18 To illustrate, Lederach (1997:67) uses a pyramid to model the layers of peacebuilding (see Appendix E). Levels in the pyramid relate to the degree of impact that activities have on the overall population. National level is peacebuilding that affects the entire country while local level will be very specific efforts restricted to small geographical/population size locales such as villages. Lederach says that higher levels on the pyramid equate to greater access to information and decision-making while simultaneously being less affected by those decisions. Conversely, lower levels have less decision-making power but have increased exposure to the consequences of any decision-making.

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18Where national and local are referred to in the thesis, they refer specifically to the understandings of the types of actors and activities attached to these labels.
Hughes et al., (2015:817) contend the local is currently enjoying a moment when it is being favoured by theorists and practitioners alike, replacing the conventional focus on international and national actors. MacGinty (2015:840) talks about the word ‘local’ being everywhere in peacebuilding with local partnership and ownership lauded as essential to the legitimacy of peacebuilding efforts. The dogmatic nature with which the benefits of local involvement are unquestioningly promoted has prompted critique. What constitutes the ‘local’ is often unclear and subject to contestation both conceptually and empirically with very little meaningful clarity given to who, how, when, where and even the why of involving the ‘local’. Pugh (2013:14) cautions that the local is too often oversimplified and praised as ‘a fast track to success’. The local is portrayed as a holistic and benevolent entity when the realities of local dynamics are far more complex as regional and local levels are rife with tensions and asymmetrical power struggles (Donais, 2012:112). A key concern with thinking around local ownership in terms of how it can contribute to peace centres on the status of available research.

There is a lack of empirical evidence capturing the complexity of peacebuilding dynamics at sub-national levels (Roberts, 2011b:411; de Coning 2013). Research is advancing though, as more theorising and empirical work is focusing on the meaning and role that local actors can play. Paffenholz (2015:868) argues not enough is being done though. She identifies a number of areas that need further research, one of which is unpacking the dichotomy of levels that started this section that led into the discussion on participation and the shift in attention from national actors to the role of local actors and activities within peacebuilding.

Rarely are national and local levels linked in any relational sense (Paffenholz, 2015). Differentiation is made between national and local, and that they interact, but there is no qualification of the relationship or about any intervening levels of hierarchy. A United Nations (UN) report, for example, talks about the benefits of local involvement: ‘national and local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also help
to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn’ (UNDPKO, 2008:36). Hughes et al., (2015:818) point out that the local is inherently relational in that it is defined by its relationship to other political levels. Yet, for all the acknowledgement of the need for more research looking at the connection between national and local peacebuilding, there is a distinct lack of supportive theoretical or empirical knowledge on how this is to be done (Paffenholz, 2015).

- Using Lederach's (1997) pyramid of levels of peacebuilding (Appendix E), political party members can be understood as examples of national level actors, while interviewees in villages, local actors. Looking at how these two types of actors perceive their roles and participation in the peace process in relation to ideas of level, and examining ways in which the two interact, the research will contribute new empirical data that takes a more nuanced look at relations between national/local peacebuilding actors and activities.

A primary reason that ideas of level tend to be oversimplified and dichotomised is due to conceptualising level as a geographical issue. MacGinty (2015:841), in asking the question ‘where is the local?’, contends that it is not to be found in territorial terms alone. Instead, MacGinty proposes the need to look to the systems of thinking that are being employed when identities are being applied to specific levels. MacGinty’s idea is based on a constructivist view of level: that levels cannot be predefined but are created and shaped dependent upon the political and socio-cultural context at any given point. A constructed interpretation expands the understanding of level to introduce potential for change and the need to shift thinking to see levels as more fluid and malleable. Additionally, as MacGinty (2015:819) asserts, it opens up new ways of seeing levels: ‘as activity, networks and relationships’.

Marston (2000:220) applies constructivism to understandings of scale, stating that scale is typically equated with ideas of ‘size (census tract, province, continent)’ and ‘level (local, regional, national)’. There is another often forgotten
factor, Marston argues, which is the relational dimension. Marston says that placing emphasis on relational dynamics draws out the relationship between level and size to give a more functional, nuanced perspective of how scales are understood and experienced. While Marston is focusing on scale, what Marston’s work raises is the importance of the relational dimension to the social construction of levels as well. Understandings of level exist by virtue of their relations to other levels. What develops from the social construction perspective is that there is little benefit in trying to neatly define what constitutes level in terms of national to local because they do not exist as objective fact but are intersubjective: ‘a contingent outcome of the tensions that exist between structural forces and the practices of human agents’ (Marston, 2000:220). Here, level is seen as fluid and what constitutes the national or local shifts over time dependent on the prevailing political discourse and historical-social realities.

Hughes et al., (2015:821) contend that if levels are constructed then they are also political. Cox (1998) is a proponent of considering political influence in the construction of level and says that it is essential to look beyond how level is constructed to who is constructing a particular understanding and the relations of power involved in shaping those understandings: what is the dominant discourse, who is informing this and how different actors are interacting around discussions of level. Marston (2000) and Cox’s (1998) ideas of level as constructs, influenced by politics, is used to explore how actors understand their participation in the peacebuilding project.

### 2.5.2 Political representation after civil war

Cornwall and Gaventa (2001:32) contend that the nature and form of political participation and representation are being contested around the world. They highlight a crisis of legitimacy in the relations between states, state institutions and their citizens, as well as widespread disillusionment of peoples’ with their governments. Their argument centres around the idea of ‘deepening democracy’; a need to increase and enhance wider public participation in political processes
and policy-making, to give people more direct access to be involved in decision-making and to hold those who govern them to account (Cornwall, 2002).

Despite the developing discourse around increasing public participation within international circles, when applied to post-war contexts, both theory and practice in peacebuilding approach political representation predominantly as an issue of institutionalised national elections (Donais, 2012:10; Call, 2012:32). Nooruddin and Flores (2009:1) write that the holding of elections as early after the end of a civil war as possible has traditionally been seen as the best way to mark the transition to a sustainable peace. The logic runs that the installation of a popular government mandated by the people through the holding of national elections is the best way to establish a stable political environment. Nooruddin and Flores go on to argue that research is increasingly challenging this assumption. Collier (2010:5) talks about a ‘comforting belief in the illusion’ pervading thinking among the international and peacebuilding communities, that competitive elections reduce political violence in newly emerging democracies. In Wars, Guns and Votes (2010) Collier shows how national electoral processes can be manipulated for political gain and even to create conflict and violence. A consequence of equating representation with national elections has resulted in the measure of success for judging the representativeness of peace being analysed largely through voting patterns.

A concern with political representation and participation framed solely through institutionalised national elections is that it portrays a very reductionist view of relations between representatives and the represented. It is founded on the idea that a population can only exercise agency on their representatives, to judge them and hold them to account, every four or five years. Academics such as de Wilde (2013) and Paffenholz (2014) argue that viewing political representation solely in terms of developing an institutionalised set of formal systems and practices that revolve around elections as the primary gauge of legitimacy denies what is a far more dynamic set of relations between the state, government and the citizenry. By treating the act of representation as a process Saward’s claims-making model offers a more sophisticated way of analysing the dynamics
involved when representatives are representing that can be used outside of election times but it does not explicitly look at the relations between a representative and those they claim to represent.

A series of UN workshops entitled ‘Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Societies’ (2010) looking at the role of the ‘local’ in peacebuilding concluded that though governments are historically representative of local populations, the majority of participants thought that there was a lack of legitimacy of new governments and institutions. A report issued by the Overseas Development Agency (2010), argues that the problem with understanding representation exclusively with national institutionalised elections is that it can disincentivise political agents from developing strong links with their supporters.

- The thesis engages with this call for more nuanced consideration of the nature of political representation in countries emerging from civil war. It does this by looking at relations between political parties and the groups on whose behalf they claim to stand using ideas of political representation as a dynamic, interactive and ongoing process.

Explanations of representation are contested but Pitkin’s (1967), The Concept of Representation, is widely held as the seminal work among contemporary thinkers. Pitkin identifies four distinct forms of representation, but it is the fourth in her typology which holds particular weight for this research – ‘representation as acting for’. In this study, representation is taken as the act of speaking or standing on behalf of someone or something (Petit, 2009:62). The subject of representation can be diverse: ideas, objects, value systems, but the concern here is with groups and their interests so when representation is used it is in explicit reference to human beings representing other human beings and their interests. Representation as ‘acting for’ must be deliberative in that the act must be undertaken with the intentional cognisance of furthering the interests of the constituents for whom the representative stands (Pitkin, 1967).

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19Pitkin’s (1967) other three forms of representation include formalistic, symbolic and descriptive.
Representation - acting on behalf of others implies a relationship between the representative and the represented. An issue Pitkin (1967) identifies is specifying what form this connection should take. Two issues are key to the relationship. The first is legitimacy, which is concerned with where a representative derives their authority to claim to speak on behalf of a group (Rehfeld, 2005:13). The second is accountability, which looks to the means by which groups have to judge their representatives and hold them responsible for their actions (Przeworski et al., 1999).

To talk of political representation infers representative democracy, due to the prevailing western liberal paradigm in international affairs (Shapiro et al., 2009). This is because modern states and societies are so large and complex in terms of geographic, demographic, socio-political and economic make-up as to make the idea of direct, self-representation impractical and unrealistic. Virtually all countries emerging from civil war adopt a democratic political system. Both post-civil war Nepal and Mozambique are categorised as representative democracies. The problem with current understandings, and this relates to Cornwall and Gaventa’s (2001) call for deepening democracy, is that it prescribes to a normative view of representative/represented relations as ‘a formalised relationship between a representative and his/her constituency’ (Castiglione and Warren, 2005:7), in essence, through the lens of institutionalised electoral process. Emphasis is placed on elections because they are considered the most effective way to provide members of society a fair and equal opportunity to influence the selection of their representatives (Castiglione and Warren, 2005:5). It is also seen as the most efficient way to be able to coordinate large bodies of people in a selection process.

Castiglione and Warren (2005:1) argue, however, that this simplistic view masks the complexity that belies interactions between representatives and the represented. What is lacking is a more intelligent and nuanced consideration of the nature of their relations. For example, Rehfeld (2006:5) calls into question conventional thought by arguing that the ability to influence through the act of
representation rests not on whether there are formal structures with reputable mechanisms through which to articulate interests, but more on whether the act of representation is considered legitimate in the eyes of the intended recipient. Talking in regard to post-war contexts and some of the discussions in this chapter, it is also limitative in that it carries a number of assumptions. The first is that political parties act benevolently and so ignores power dynamics of deal-making and decision-making around the peace agreement. Second, it forgoes the complexities that can affect wider voter behaviour such as ethnic or kinship ties and ignores many of the political economy factors and informal practices that Collier (2010) talks about acting on the national election process: corruption, patronage networks and rent-seeking practices.

De Wilde (2013:278) says that recent developments in political theory show a movement in the frame of reference around representation as more academics are recognising that ‘representation ought to be understood as a dynamic continuous process between represented and representatives, rather than as the static product of elections’. Legitimacy and accountability should not be considered solely in terms of particular moments in a political process, but need to be seen more as stemming from continuous interaction between representatives and the represented (Young, 2000). Dalton et al., (2011:2), for example, state that elections and democracy are an ongoing process. The research adopts these ideas as a way to examine relations between representative (political parties) and represented (constituents in villages) to explore the nature of political representation outside of the national election process.

**2.6 Summary**

This chapter has critically reviewed existing peacebuilding literature to identify three areas that are currently under-researched and where an answering of the research question will allow the thesis to contribute new knowledge. The first relates to a need for more subtle thinking around war-related violence, which the research does through an exploratory look into perceptions and experiences of post-war violence, with specific consideration to the persistence of violence as
an issue of intergroup relations. The second and third come through the comparative look across political parties and villages as a way to explore ideas of level in peacebuilding and the nature of political representation in post-war countries outside of institutionalised election processes.

The chapter also presented the theoretical framework. Conflict transformation provides the foundation for the way I view and approach intergroup relations. To analyse the transformation process, pluralist identity theory is used to conceptualise groups and the claims-making model of Saward (2010) to assess how group identity is transforming. Cornwall’s (2002) notion of political space accounts for the impact of group interaction and the wider political system. Finally, ideas of level as a social construct and political representation as a dynamic iterative process are used to theoretically engage with the additional gaps. The next chapter turns to the methodology to explain how the theoretical approach is operationalised.
Chapter 3
Methodology

Introduction
This chapter sets out the methodology that I used to gather and analyse the data. It is based exclusively on a qualitative approach with the rationale resting on the idea that qualitative methods provide effective tools to explore complex socio-political problems like peacebuilding in the aftermath of civil war. Qualitative methods are also suited to probing below the surface to understand why the transformation process is happening, which is a primary aim of the research. Section 3.1 presents the motivation for the research outcomes that is grounded in informed problem solving. Section 3.2 explains the epistemological foundation of critical social constructivism. Section 3.3 rationalises a qualitative methodology and details the research techniques used to gather data. Section 3.4 discusses the use of a twin case-study approach. Section 3.5 describes data sources, collection and organisation as well as the ethical considerations of the research. Section 3.6 details the data analysis process and Section 3.7 concludes with a reflection on some limits to the research.

3.1 Motivation for research design
The research aims to contribute new knowledge to both theoretical debates and practices in peacebuilding. I recognise and am sensitive to the context-specific nature of civil wars (Goetze and Cuzina, 2008:178). Each civil war is the product of distinct and complex historical forces. Also, the typically unstable and highly
changeable dynamics of post-civil war environments make any direct comparison extremely problematic. Consequently, this is not a comparative analysis and outcomes are not intended to produce directly replicable results. The idea is for observations and findings from Nepal and Mozambique to be used for innovation in other situations. To look for patterns and commonalities across the two cases: what worked well, what didn't and through the analysis extrapolate conclusions that are intended to expand academic understanding and thinking around the role of violence after the end of civil wars. In essence, to provide ideas to inspire and inform more effective decision-making or problem-solving in other post-war contexts (Benson 2009:302).

### 3.2 Critical social constructivism

Shope (2002:56) argues that an awareness of how research questions are formed, and how knowledge is created can help strengthen validity and reliability, generate mindfulness to limitations and thereby help mitigate their impact. Critical social constructivism is used to epistemologically ground the study and, here, I discuss how it aligns with a conflict transformation approach and the other key theories within the theoretical framework. The rationale for using critical social constructivism rests on the premise within Lederach’s conflict transformation approach that if a transformation in intergroup relations is to be lasting and meaningful, it is crucial to understand reasons behind the change. Social constructivism seeks to understand the meanings that an actor ascribes to a particular subject (Wendt, 1995). Critical social constructivism, however, goes deeper to examine how particular understandings form (Hopf, 1998:124). Critical social constructivism, therefore, aligns with the aims of the research: to probe into why transformation is taking place. Social constructivism is discussed before explaining more fully why the ‘critical’ element is a necessary addition.

Social constructivism is used extensively in qualitative research. It is predicated on an approach to knowledge centred on social interaction and the notion that reality is socially created: the meanings and understandings that we hold are generated through our interaction with the world around us and our
relationships with others (Mertens, 2005:14). At its heart it is subjective, based on interpretation and particularly suited to investigating problems that involve complex human behaviours and social structures. An epistemology that advances the importance of subjective interpretation as a way of giving shape to understandings supports the aim of looking at why transformation is happening.

Wendt (1992) contends that a fundamental principle of social constructivism is the notion that actors act toward objects (including other actors) on the basis of the meanings that the object has for them. However, meaning is not just developed internally but through interaction with other actors and the social systems within which they are embedded. How and why actors behave the way they do is a result of these 'social transactions that actors have with each other' (Jackson and Jones 2012:105). Through interacting with others, actors develop shared meanings and understandings of the world, which can form the basis of collective identities, shared cultures and knowledge – out of which, emerge groups. The idea of identity is central to social constructivism as a group's understanding of its identity will be a key determinant in how that group behaves. That shared interests are the basis for group identity formation resonates with the explanation of intergroup conflict that informs the study: conflict is the result of clashes of interest. The prominence identity plays in social constructivism supports the use of a multiple identity approach.

Interaction also creates difference as subjective interpretation means that multiple actors or groups faced with the same situation may understand it in very different ways, which can provoke conflict as well as cooperation. To illustrate the point Wendt (1992:395) uses the example of meanings attached to missiles during the Cold War. Objectively, the US, British and the Soviet Union all had nuclear capability. From the US perspective, the Soviet Union was the enemy, and as such, their missiles represented a threat. Conversely, the British were allies, so their missiles were viewed as an asset. This difference in US understanding of British to Soviet missiles led the US to have very different relations with the two countries.
Additionally, social constructivism is not concerned purely with actors. Structures, in effect the system within which actors interact, are equally important. Of significance within social constructivism is the nature of the relationship between structures and actors as a determinant of behaviour. Wendt (1987) talks of the structure–agent problem: to what extent do actors through social interaction shape the system, and vice versa, structures shape actor behaviour. Speaking of a structure and actor dichotomy is for simple heuristics to help conceptually clarify what can, in reality, be very complex processes of interaction between the two. Within a system, individual components and actors are not static but are constantly interacting; communicating, interpreting and responding.

Wendt (1995:74) refers to actor-structure interaction as ‘practice’: ‘social structures exist, not in actor's heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices’. The emphasis Wendt places on process through practice is indicative of the importance that social constructivism places on change, which is crucial in an investigation that aims to explore how understandings are transforming over time. The social constructivist focus on structure–actor interaction aligns with the recognition in this research that transformation of intergroup conflict cannot be considered as isolated and happening solely between the conflicting parties. It takes place within systems that will influence the transformation process. For this reason, I incorporated this dynamic into the research through sub-question 3 and the use of Cornwall and Gaventa's (2001) theory of ‘political space’ to analyse the political institutions and processes facilitating the development of peace policies.

However, Wendtian notions of social constructivism are criticised for generating superficial understandings of behaviour. Zehfuss (2001:98) argues that social constructivism seeks to understand the meanings that an actor ascribes to a particular subject, but fails to consider the critical issue of how meanings are formed or shaped in the first place. Hopf (1998:124) advances the idea of critical

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20 Within social constructivism, ‘structures’ are taken to refer to the rules, conditions and systems that guide social interaction (Giddens, 1984).
social constructivism that seeks to address Zehfuss’ critique by creating deeper analysis to explore how understandings form by looking at the processes of interaction that shape how people comprehend and attribute meaning to the groups they associate with. Conflict transformation says change must be meaningful for it to last. People need to understand the reasons for change. Hopf’s expanded notion of critical social constructivism, with its prominence on how and why particular behaviours are developed, supports this idea.

Critical social constructivism, however, is derided for its subjectivity and multitudinous interpretation of reality (Craib, 1997). Critics argue it does not account for any objective reality, such as biological determinants of behaviour. For example, there is a theory of conflict that contends that males have a biological predisposition to aggression and violence (Konrad and Morath, 2014; Malesevic, 2011). I deliberately adopt critical social constructivism because the intent is not to contemplate the nature of war and peace but to explore how violence could continue to affect how groups deal with conflict after civil wars end. The research takes a relational view of the transformation process, understanding that how conflict is approached and shaped through changing understandings of relations and through groups ongoing interaction with one another. This view precludes the notion that violent conflict could be predetermined by factors such as biology.

The second criticism of social constructivism stems from the premise that if reality is interpreted, then research is influenced by the researcher. This relates to the issue of bias, which is addressed in the limitations section. Building on from this point, critics argue from a relativist position that ‘the conclusions of research constitute just another account and as such cannot claim to have precedence over any other account’, (Andrews, 2012:42). The point Andrews raises, however, could, in theory, be applied to any research and comes down to an issue of validity, which is considered in the following sections that look to justify the methods, outline steps taken to mitigate researcher bias and acknowledge the limitations of the study.
3.3 Qualitative methods

Qualitative methods are more suited to the study of multifaceted socio-political problems than quantitative methods (Castellani, 2014). The techniques that a qualitative approach can employ provide a richness and depth to data that quantitative methods can lack. Qualitative methods are better able to appreciate social diversity and social interaction to explore complexity and multiple realities. The primary reason for using purely qualitative methods was because they allow me to answer the research question in the most effective way, which is driven by a need to understand why transformation is happening, not just what is transforming.

Qualitative methods lend more effectively to capturing and dealing with subjective experience (Morgan and Drury, 2003), which is required to explore how groups and intergroup conflict is understood. Quantitative methods can examine general trends and patterns to establish why an event or process is happening, but they are less suited to investigating causes and motivations behind change. Johnson and Christensen (2010:430) maintain that qualitative methods allow a researcher to respond to changes during a study (particularly during fieldwork) more effectively than quantitative methods. Qualitative methods also provide flexibility and allow adaptation, to react to changing contexts. For example, the difference in situation between Nepal and Mozambique required varying some of the interview questions slightly to reflect the different dynamics, such as questioning into the reasons behind the renewed fighting in Mozambique.

Another advantage of qualitative methods is that they provide a richness of data that can be used to ‘vividly demonstrate a phenomenon to readers’ (Johnson and Christensen, 2010:430). One of the objectives of the research is to inform more effective problem solving in other contexts. Qualitative methods allow for the gathering of detailed data to use as examples to help illustrate findings in the subsequent data chapters, adding depth to the argument. Additionally, Johnson and Christensen (2010:430) highlight that qualitative methods are more apt to
explore dynamic processes, such as this study, looking at transformation in intergroup conflict over time.

A mixed methods approach would have been feasible. A quantitative questionnaire, for example, could have listed a number of variables that respondents chose and rated as factors influencing transformation in relations. Or, score how positively or negatively group conflict is viewed in terms of violence or non-violence. This would allow for a much larger sampling than was possible using qualitative methods alone. There were two principal reasons for not employing a quantitative approach, though, using techniques like questionnaires. The first was an issue of access. In both countries infrastructure outside of urban areas is not well developed and much of the population live in remote rural communities. This would have made large-scale data collection very difficult. I also lacked in-country knowledge and contacts, which raised concerns around how effectively I would be able to organise, distribute and gather large amounts of questionnaires. Secondly, it was a decision made based around the type of data that I wanted to collect. Quantitative methods can provide detail of what transformation is happening, but I wanted to probe deeper into why transformation is taking place and qualitative techniques are much more suited to accessing this type of information.

3.3.1 Research techniques

A dual approach was employed to identify and obtain data. The two methods used are document analysis with semi-structured interviews. Data sources were collected and organised around a case study approach, based on the peace processes in Nepal and Mozambique. Additionally, I conducted a pilot study to test the research design. The reason for adopting multiple research techniques was driven by two factors. First, that qualitative data reliant on one research technique is more vulnerable to claims that inferences may be questionable or incorrect (Bryman, 2008:112). Employing multiple techniques to investigate the same phenomena allows for what Kopinak (1999:170) calls convergence: cross-referencing different data types to improve reliability and validity. Research is
strengthened through the use of complimentarity, providing multi-layered information.

Second, the research requires an analysis of how understandings of conflict change over time. Interviewees can be asked about the past, but responses come with the caveat that they will be coloured by time. Responses given today may be different to those the same respondent would have given during the civil war, immediately after its ending, five, ten years after and so on. I had to find a way to develop an understanding of the transformation process that was more reflective of different timeframes. To do this, I used a variety of documented sources, sampled from across the post-civil war years. The number of documents and interviews collected, along with sampling techniques and analysis methods, are described in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. Here, I consider the reasons for using document analysis and semi-structured interviews: their advantages and limitations.

**3.3.2 Document analysis**

A document analysis is a ‘systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic’ (Bowen, 2009:27). Documented sources are widely used in qualitative research and can serve a variety of different functions to help develop a researcher’s appreciation of a problem topic (Barrientos, 2007:113). Documented sources were used in two ways.

First, a wide variety of secondary documented sources were used to develop an understanding of the context of the civil wars and peace processes in Nepal and Mozambique. Conflict transformation requires appreciating the history of the relationship between conflicting parties as well as the conflict itself. Documented data on the civil wars and peace processes allowed me to develop an historical appreciation of both contexts to help inform a better analysis of post-war dynamics and factors influencing the transformation process. The types of documents I reviewed were journal articles, newspaper articles, academic books and reports produced by a range of organisations working on peacebuilding, as well as historic factual books. These document sources are instrumental in the
case study descriptions found in the following chapter. Secondary documents mainly took the form of academic materials, using the writings of other researchers to gain insight into the appropriateness of the research question to the case studies. Some of these secondary sources are also used to support findings in the empirical chapters.

Second, primary documents are employed as a key source of data for the analysis. The data contained within documents can be ‘examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge’ (Bowen, 2009:27). I sampled documents that gave a representative range covering the post-civil war years. As far as practically possible, I tried to match documented sources to the individuals or organisations that I interviewed. For example, if I interviewed a particular political party member, I searched for documents where the same individual was expressing views on peace policies and intergroup conflict at different points over the post-war years. Matching sources this way was intended to provide consistency and accuracy in whose understandings were being analysed over the post-war years.

There are a number of reasons why a document analysis is appropriate for this research, aside from the practical reason of needing a way to look at the transformation process over extended periods. Denzin (1970) talks about the merits of document analysis as a complement to other research techniques. They can be used to compare and corroborate other data sources, as in this research with semi-structured interviews. Document analysis is also suited to qualitative case study based research, as it provides a way to gather a wide range of different forms of data on a specific case which can produce a rich picture of what is going on (Yin, 1994). Additionally, as the focus of the research is not just to analyse what transformation is taking place in intergroup conflict, but why, Merriam (1988:118) says that ‘documents of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem’. The types of documents and sampling techniques are described in detail in Section 3.5, but include newspaper articles, press statements, published reports, speeches and recorded interviews.
There are a number of risks attached to document analysis (Denzin, 1970). They can produce large volumes of data that can make research unwieldy and time-consuming. Sources can be representative of particular views and interests so there is need to be careful of sampling to avoid bias. Researchers are restricted to what data already exists and documents may not contain personal thinking or reflections making them unhelpful in research seeking to investigate how people understand a particular subject or issue. Each of these concerns is addressed in the way that I have approached the data gathering and analysis, which has operated on the principle of trying to be as open in scope as possible while being efficient in the management of the data.

3.3.3 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviewing is widely practised in the social sciences and is noted for its suitability in obtaining qualitative data (Yin, 1994; Woodhouse, 2007). Because of the research's concern with understandings and experiences of conflict, semi-structured interviewing presents an appropriate vehicle for exploring the nuances and subjectivities this type of research entails because it provides for structured dialogue while leaving scope to explore informant’s views, unfolding in a conversational manner (Longhurst, 2010:172). Interviews were conducted to a standardised set of questions (see Appendix A). These questions kept informants focused on the central themes (Yin, 1994), while the openness of the technique allowed room for individual respondents to be explorative in their answers. Semi-structured interviewing also affords flexibility to individualise the interviews by picking up on interesting points and observations to be able to probe more deeply through impromptu follow-up questions. In Mozambique, for example, several questions were asked beyond those in Nepal to reflect the differing contexts and allow greater appreciation of the nuances of each case. Where possible, background research was conducted on interviewees beforehand to aid the interview process, and to tailor questions, but also to allow more effective use of impromptu questioning.
Semi-structured interviewing as a method has some limitations. Rubin and Rubin (2005:170) identify two main issues. Interviews can produce large volumes of data that can be unwieldy and difficult to interpret meaningfully. How I effectively managed the large volumes of data is addressed in the data analysis section. Also, there can be issues around interviewer bias and interviewee reliability. Researcher positionality and bias is addressed in Section 3.7.

In terms of reliability of data, there is always risk that interviewees are not honest in their responses, misinterpret the research objectives, do not understand questions as intended or tailor responses to the interests of the researcher, telling them what they want to hear (Norenzayan and Schwarz, 1999:1011; Diefenbach, 2009:875). This can lead to miscommunication and irrelevant or misleading data. This issue is particularly pertinent to studies where research is being conducted in countries unfamiliar to the researcher: people are being interviewed in a second language, or translators are used. These risks are covered in a later section that discusses the use of in-country support. The types of interviewee, how they were selected and where interviews took place are discussed in Section 3.5.1.

Many of the interviews were conducted in English. Research assistants acted as translators where interviewees spoke little, or no English, which was predominantly in the villages. Issues and barriers that arose due to working with translators and how they were mitigated against are discussed in Section 3.5.2. Sechrest et al., (1972) talk about a range of problems that can arise when interviewing and translating in cross-cultural contexts, particularly where the language spoken during the interview is not the first language for the interviewer or the interviewee. In both Kathmandu and Maputo, the majority of interviewees were competent in English so that I did not have to use translators. Levels, however, varied between respondents, which raised some difficulties that I had to guard against in order to ensure data was as accurate as possible.
The two common problems that I was faced with were interviewees who were unable to convey accurately in English what they wanted to say, and misinterpretation due to accents.

There were several techniques I used to mitigate against these risks. Only a small number of interviews (six) were unaccompanied. If an interviewee struggled to find the relevant English, the research assistant (who spoke excellent English) was on hand to translate. If a response was unclear, or I unsure as to what an interviewee was trying to say, I would ask them to repeat, or relay my understanding back to them and ask them to confirm if my interpretation was correct. Finally, all interviews were recorded. This means I could listen back to interviews and on a couple of occasions, where I was unsure of the language or meaning behind what was being said, I returned to the interviewee to clarify those points.

3.3.4 Pilot study

A pilot study of two-weeks was undertaken in Nepal. I had a month to deliberate and reflect on the observations and findings to make any necessary amendments before the main fieldwork began. The pilot was functional in that it was designed to test specific premises and components to ensure they were practicably operational (van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2002). Maxwell (2005:58) says pilots give researchers insight into an understanding of the problem by those situated within the context, ‘if you don’t understand (the views and perspectives of the subjects), your theories about what is going on will often be incomplete or mistaken’. The pilot, therefore, was intended to test my ideas around the research question, the gaps in the literature, theoretical framework and methodology. I consulted a range of academics, policy officials and practitioners working on a variety of aspects of the Nepali peace process.\(^{21}\) The general consensus that emerged from the pilot confirmed that there was a need for the research and that the conceptual framing and proposed methodology would

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\(^{21}\) Ten interviews were conducted in total. They consisted of three domestic peacebuilding NGOs, one foreign government aid official, two civil society leaders, two politicians, two academics specialising in the peace process and one military advisor.
provide a suitable means of exploring the research question. As a result, no significant changes were made.

Conducting the pilot also provided a number of practical benefits. It offered an opportunity to have ten test interviews to trial questions and practice interview technique. The pilot also helped with optimising fieldwork in unfamiliar environments by developing a network of in-country contacts to aid data collection, identify suitable interviewees, improve recruitment, build relationships and rapport with potential respondents and source reliable locations for possible site visits (van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2002). A crucial issue in research that uses extended in-depth interviews is developing trust quickly between researcher and participants. Creating a rapport can greatly aid reliability of information, making respondents more likely to be open and honest in their answers (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006:316). This is particularly important where the topic of an interview may be sensitive and involve personal reflection, such as experiences of conflict. Establishing good relationships with trusted gatekeepers who could provide access to interviewees was a primary activity of the pilot study.

A pilot was conducted in Nepal only due to timing and financial constraints. However, I sought out a number of associates within the UK who had extensive experience of working in Mozambique and knowledge of the peace process as a way to test the appropriateness of the research before doing the fieldwork.

3.4 Case studies
The research is based on a multiple case study method examining the peace processes in Mozambique and Nepal. Yin (1994:23) defines the case study method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. A case study uses systematic collection of data in

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22 This was my first time conducting interviews using translators.
23 Five individuals were consulted. Three academics who have extensive knowledge of Mozambique. For two of these, the peace process is an area of particular interest. The other two were a Mozambican civil servant and a Mozambican academic, both working in the UK.
order to effectively understand how a subject operates or functions (Berg, 2001:251). Through a particular case, a researcher can examine a problem through many different interpretations, perspectives and worldviews. The emphasis on gathering multiple standpoints makes case studies particularly suitable to research investigating a diverse range of understandings in order to develop a rich, nuanced picture of the transformation of intergroup conflict.

Case studies provide researchers with evidence of a practicable and illustrative nature with which to construct arguments (Thomas, 2007:307). A case study approach, therefore, supports the objective of producing outcomes focused towards policy and practice as well as theory. Additionally, case studies offer a platform for employing multiple exploratory techniques. Meyer (2001:329) says that a case study method does not subscribe to specific theoretical or conceptual paradigms making it a flexible tool. It can be used in combination with, or as a compliment to, hybrid methodologies to introduce variety into the data. The case studies, therefore, provide a suitable means through which to channel the document analysis and semi-structured interviews.

Case-study research is not without criticism or limitation. One critique relates to their context-specific nature and argues that immersion in singular or limited numbers of cases works as a disadvantage to ‘generalisability’: the capacity to apply conclusions to other contexts can be limited (Yin, 1994:176; Tellis, 1997:26). I have alluded to this issue already by emphasising the intent of this research is informed problem-solving, not to replicate or generalise findings to other contexts. Second, Zainal (2007) contends that the scientific merit of case studies is questionable stemming from a lack of attention to methodological rigour, that often cases can be ill-defined, deficient in detail and generate too much information making them an ineffective way to analyse data. These concerns are guarded against through the use of well-defined and targeted research questions that are explored using multiple research techniques and focused data collection. Gagnon (2010:61) presents a further disadvantage of the case-study approach in that they pose issues with data validity because they are difficult for other researchers to replicate. As far as possible, given the sensitivity
of the topic and the need to be mindful of the safety of informants, I conducted the research so that other researchers would be able to undertake a similar study.

3.4.1 Case study selection

Two factors influenced the choice of Nepal and Mozambique. The first relates to the gap in the literature around needing a more nuanced understanding of how actors and activities relate to levels: beyond simple international-national-local conceptions. In both countries the peace processes adopted a multi-level approach. By this I mean that they did not only include national level initiatives designed as countrywide approaches, but also incorporated provision for local peacebuilding mechanisms that were intended to be adapted to support reconciliation that was sensitive to specific contexts and needs within different communities and villages. This allows me to look at how political parties and interviewees in villages understand, experience and engage across the different initiatives. The individual policies that formed the focus for studying the transformation process are detailed in the next chapter.

The second-factor influencing case selection relates to the idea that successful peacebuilding is a long-term endeavor. To be able to investigate transformation in intergroup conflict as a process unfolding over time required countries that had a considerable period of years after the civil war had ended to be able to analyse. Collier et al., (2003:7) contend that statistically there is a 50% chance of war renewing within the first ten years of peace. The figure drops significantly to around 10% after this. I decided to select the cases based on using this ten-year mark as the upper range or beyond, the inference being that by the end of the first decade countries should be well on a path to long-term sustainable peace and so provide a rich process of transformation to examine. At the time of fieldwork, Nepal was 9 years into peace and Mozambique 23 years.

Mozambique was not the first choice of case study. Originally, I selected Nepal and Rwanda. I was forced to seek an alternative, however, when I was unable to find an institution in Rwanda that was willing to support an application for a
research visa. Sierra Leone was chosen instead, however, during preparation I had to abandon the trip because the Ebola outbreak was escalating, which made the fieldwork unfeasible and impractical. I then turned attention to Mozambique.

### 3.4.2 Conflict analysis

A conflict analysis is usually undertaken in the early stages of planning interventions to gather, filter and evaluate the context of a conflict.\(^{24}\) Conflict analysis developed as a means of trying to comprehend the convoluted mix of dynamics involved in violent conflict and war.\(^{25}\) As part of the research, I conducted conflict analyses on both Nepal and Mozambique.

The purpose was threefold. First, they were crucial in helping to build up an understanding of the dynamics of the civil wars, supporting the conflict transformation principle of being better informed. A better appreciation of the wars helped reinforce the suitability of the cases for the research. Second, developing a greater knowledge of the history and broader dynamics of the wars and the post-civil war period aided the data analysis by giving more contextual awareness of the transformation process, supporting the conflict transformation principle of understanding the historic context of a conflict. The third relates to fieldwork, doing conflict analyses helped to identify key groups and actors to interview, map the peace process and learn about the specific policies that were part of the peace agreements.

Over the last several decades there has been an explosion in the number and range of conflict analysis tools leading to a high degree of diversity. It is arguable that there are as many approaches as there are organisations using them. The variety is a product of organisations tending to develop their own tools and methods to fit the ethos and practice of their particular organisation.

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\(^{24}\) Within the literature there is a divide. Some use the term ‘conflict analysis’ while others use ‘conflict assessment’. They essentially refer to the same basic approach - developing a greater appreciation of conflict situations – and it is just a matter of personal preference. I use ‘analysis’ because the word implies a more open-ended activity, reflecting that conflicts are continually changing, whereas an ‘assessment’ infers a finite evaluation of a situation.

\(^{25}\) Conflict analysis methods and tools have since been applied to many other types of conflict beyond war contexts. For example, they have been adapted for use in studying inter-organisational conflicts and interpersonal conflict.
For the basis, I used the Strategic Conflict Assessment Framework (SCAF) developed by the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID, 2002). The framework gravitates around three central components, examining actors, structures and dynamics. The dynamics dimension refers to trends and patterns in the conflict as a result of the interaction between the actors and structures. The main rationale for using the framework was because the structure resonated with the research’s critical social constructivist epistemology and relational approach.

DfID advocates using the framework with flexibility, in recognition that every conflict is unique, and suggest that the framework is adapted to suit the needs of the research and researcher. There were two aspects of the research that were crucial to answering the research question that the SCAF in its original form did not capture. They were to differentiate between actors and structures operating at different levels, and a temporal dimension of being able to look at how the peace process unfolded over time. I adjusted the framework to account for these factors and using this modified framework I was able to develop a more informed and nuanced understanding of both case studies.

3.5 Data sourcing and management

Here I detail the types of sources, collection techniques, storage and ethical dimensions of the research. Interviews constitute primary evidence and literary data a combination of primary, secondary and grey sources.

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26 There are three key stages in DfID’s SCAF framework methodology. Stage A: conflict analysis. Stage B: analysing existing responses to conflict. Stage C: strategies/options for ways forward. In this research, I only used Stage A to help build up an understanding of the civil wars. For the analysis of data and development of findings, the research uses specific qualitative data analysis methods that are described in Section 4.6.

27 During this research, I was an author on a course team within the Open University rewriting a module on Conflict and Development. As part of this work, I created teaching materials on conflict analysis, which included developing an innovative conflict analysis framework. I used the adapted DFID SCAF method from this research as the basis for that approach.
3.5.1 Sources, sampling and collection

The research utilises primary, secondary and grey sources, which it does in different ways through the three data collection techniques that I use: semi-structured interviews, document analysis and case studies.

Semi-structured interviewing provides primary data sources. Interviewees were ‘purposively’ sampled in the sense that they were selected intentionally to be a representative group that could provide appropriate data to meet the aims of the research and answer the research question (Palys, 2008:697). All participants were selected as individuals and members of organisations embedded in the peace process – involved in some capacity in peacebuilding and reconciliation activities - to ensure that data was relevant to the research questions (Woodhouse, 2007:160). Interviewees fell into two broad categories.

The first category I call ‘representatives’. These are individuals and people working for organisations involved in, or trying to influence, the decision-making and implementation of the peace agreements and the policies that were part of the peace process. They included: political party members, officials in government departments, journalists, academics, political activists, domestic and international NGO workers and people representing different elements of civil society. In essence, they can all be seen as representatives who are making claims on the peace process on behalf of particular groups or sections of society.

These interviews, in combination with the document analysis, provide the data that is used as the primary means of assessing the transformation of intergroup conflict over time. It was essential to secure interviews with the political parties and also government officials working on the different policies as these actors were key to analysing the transformation of relations between the previous warring groups. However, as I use pluralistic ideas of identity, the identities associated with the warring groups will be composed of many sub-groups, and as such, I sought a wider range of interviews with people representing youth, women, conflict-affected victims, ex-combatants, ethnic and minority indigenous groups. The idea was to see if, and how, these identities might relate and interact.
with the identities of the previous warring groups but also how political party portrayals of groups and intergroup conflict are viewed by these representatives. The objective was to provide a more sophisticated data set to explore how the group identities are constructed, overlap and change in the post-war environment.

The potential for possible participants was vast. Therefore, I took a selective approach, working to identify key individuals using several techniques. In Nepal, I worked with research assistants to identify and approach members of each of the main political parties. In Mozambique, I was directly approaching the parties myself. The criteria I worked from were; party members who were prominent in the leadership and so influential in shaping party identity and political strategy; active on issues related to the peace processes and; who had membership of the party/group since the time of the civil war so they could give a historical account of the evolution of their party. A representative government official was sought from the departments responsible for developing the various policy strands of the peace process related to dealing with violence.

I selected other interviewees based on involvement in peacebuilding and the peace process generally, lobbying or advocating on behalf of particular group interests, working on the specific policies, or experience of engaging with political parties during the peace process. To identify these sources, I relied on the knowledge of research assistants, personal desk-based research and snowballing from interviews – interviewees making suggestions for further useful informants. All of the ‘representative’ interviews were conducted in the capital cities, Kathmandu and Maputo, reflecting that these are the main places where decision-making on the overarching peace processes takes place. In Nepal, I conducted 10 pilot interviews and a further 22 during fieldwork. In Mozambique, there were 19 interviews.

The second category of interviews was designed to capture the understandings and experiences of the transformation process from the perspective of those working to build peace between groups within villages. Interviewees came from
a diverse range of backgrounds, covering an array of issues and activities: helping ex-combatants, working with conflict-victims, providing psycho-social support, training and skills development for sustainable livelihoods, advocacy or reconciliation-based projects, political activism, civil society groups, and district-level politicians and village leaders. There were all selected, though, because they can all be considered as being embedded in village-based peacebuilding, and as such, have extensive experience of observing and working with groups in the villages over extended periods so that they had good knowledge of how the previous warring groups were dealing with conflict and interacting with each other, rather than gathering individuals experiences of the peace process. These types of informants, I reasoned, would be aware of the issues, needs and concerns facing different groups within the villages and, therefore, be able to give a group perspective. The next section gives details on each of the villages and why they were selected.

Aside from interviews, the other main data that I gathered was documentation. These sources took the form of primary, secondary and grey literature and were used in a number of different ways. Interviews could provide an understanding of intergroup conflict at the time of fieldwork, but these perceptions are inevitably coloured by experience, and so I needed a way to capture understandings at different points in time. To do this, I drew on primary documentation that would span the course of post-civil war years. The types of documents that I gathered included: transcripts of interviews, letters, speeches, press statements, a wide range of party manuscripts, reports and a number of videos. To ensure that the data was representative of the passage of time, as far as possible, I selected sources so that I had coverage by month and year from the signing of the peace agreement to the time of fieldwork. Nepal – November 2006 to June 2014. Mozambique – October 1992 to April 2015. There were, however, gaps. This is due to issues with access – sometimes documents were unavailable or not in English and I had to prioritise what were most relevant to the study. Similarly, there are periods where I have more sources, such as during key events in the peace process. Also, there are periods where there was no relevant data to collect. Ensuring a concise coverage of the entire peace process timeline
was not a priority. Focus on ensuring I had the most relevant documents capturing key events and perspectives on group conflict. As was mentioned several paragraphs earlier, I also selected sources to try and match with the ‘representative’ interviewees to ensure consistency across the data.

I gathered documents from a range of individuals and organisations: political parties, government departments, peacebuilding organisations and civil-society groups. Individual documents were chosen based on content: referencing to the civil war, group identities and intergroup conflict, violence, the peace process and its specific policies. For Nepal, I gathered 378 individual documents and Mozambique, 205.

There was a lack of documentation capturing views and perspectives of the peace process at the village-level that could give a representative sample to analyse change over time. As a result, I had to rely exclusively on the interviews from the six village sites to analyse how intergroup relations had transformed. There is a caveat built into the village-level analysis, therefore, stipulating that understandings are grounded in the time that fieldwork was conducted. Additionally, while interviews in the villages could provide perspectives on group relations, an aim of the research is to see how understandings of the groups transform. Restricting interviews to people proactively undertaking peacebuilding activities only, risked not capturing views of the groups themselves. Therefore, in each village, I tried to speak with people who identified as members of the previous warring groups to ensure I gathered data that was reflective of understandings of intergroup conflict from the perspective of the groups themselves.

Aside from these primary sources, I also used secondary and grey sources. They served a dual purpose. First, they were used to help develop my understanding of the two case study contexts. I drew on a wide range of academic literature (books, journal articles and reports) and sources from organisations working in Nepal and Mozambique (reports) to build up an appreciation of the history of each country, before the civil wars, during and after. This information was used
to inform the conflict analyses, which in turn shaped the methodological approach to fieldwork: building up an understanding of intergroup dynamics, helping with selection of the peace policies and identifying suitable organisations and individuals to interview.

Second, some of the academic materials were used to critically engage with emergent findings, cross-referencing conclusions against existing debates and arguments. These secondary sources included academic materials and reports produced by a range of different organisations that were selected along the same lines as the primary document materials, relevant references to: intergroup conflict and violence, group identities and decision-making on the peace process. The types of documents collected included: books, reports, journal articles and several documentaries. Due to their focus on different aspects of peacebuilding these sources cover the post-war timeframe – 9 years in Nepal and 23 in Mozambique. There was no specific selection process involved, such as a representative range across post-war years. The main criteria were content that was relevant to the research questions and key themes of the research. For Nepal, I consulted 93 individual sources of information and Mozambique 58. To identify these sources, I used the Internet and archival searches and access hard-copied materials directly through libraries and in-country contacts.

3.5.2 Selecting village field-sites

I worked with research assistants to select interviewees in villages, using their knowledge to identify the most relevant individuals and sites. Locations differed in size of village and levels of peacebuilding activity, which influenced the amount of available interviewees, their background and the scope of their work. Consistency across sites was not of primary importance as the main objective was to gather a range of views from each site that would provide rich and in-depth accounts of intergroup conflict within the villages. In Nepal, I conducted 19 village-based interviews and 14 in Mozambique.

In both countries, I opted for three site visits. This number was feasible given time constraints on fieldwork, while giving variety to the data. Between three
and five days were spent in each village. In Nepal, three sites were chosen that were representative of villages that had very different experiences of the civil war and intergroup conflict in post-civil war years. One in the west of the country, in a district that was the heartland of the Maoists and so had seen extensive fighting during the civil war; a village in the far East which, although touched by the civil war, was relatively unaffected compared to other parts of the country; and a village in the Terai, a southern region which had experienced violent movements since the ending of the civil war.

Mozambique was much more constrained. Given ongoing peace talks during fieldwork, it was inadvisable to travel north of Maputo and conduct this type of research at such a sensitive time. As a result, I was confined to visits in the south of Mozambique. Given the more restrictive selection process in Mozambique, I am conscious that this has implications for the research and it’s findings. This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.7. The Mozambique villages were selected based on having large communities of groups that identified with both sides from the civil war. In particular, the three villages were known for having significant numbers of ex-combatants and conflict-affected people.

The following case study chapter gives more detailed background on the six villages but here I provide the main rationale for their selection. The villages and interviewees are all coded to ensure anonymity, which was a condition of the Open University’s Research Ethics Committee giving clearance for this research. The codes relate to districts to help give a general sense of location but are not more geographically specific to protect participants’ identities.

Nepal villages:
I. Village C (Chitwan) - has a population composed of a diverse range of ethnic groups. It was chosen as a site through which to explore how these many different groups were cohabiting after the war. In addition, the village also experienced violence during the two Madhesi movements of the early post-civil war years.
II. Village I (Ilam) – was chosen as a village that had a very contrasting experience of the civil war relative to the other two villages, and many other areas of the country. The people of the village experienced very little fighting or violence. In addition, a number of Maoist ex-combatants moved to the village after the end of the war presenting an opportunity to explore how they were viewed and had affected village group relations.

III. Village R (Rolpa) - has historic roots to the ‘People’s War’ and to the Maoist cause long before the onset of the civil war. The village, therefore, presented an opportunity to explore transformation from the perspective of a group with a strong connection to the Maoist identity. The people of the village had also experienced extensive exposure to violence during the civil war.

Mozambique villages:

I. Village Ma (Maputo Province) - experienced little direct fighting and violence during the civil war. Despite this, many people left the village seeking refuge in nearby South Africa. Many have never returned, and the visit focused on exploring reasons behind this.

II. Village Mb (Maputo Province) - has a large population of both FRELIMO and RENAMO ex-combatants and conflict-affected people from across many different regions and provinces in the country who came to settle in the village after the end of the civil war. The village also has a very proactive peacebuilding community, setting up its own organisation early into the peace years to help facilitate the different groups coming together.

III. Village Mc (Gaza Province) - was a site of contestation during the civil war due to its proximity to a FRELIMO garrison, which meant that the villagers were intermittently exposed to violence over the course of the civil war years. A number of RENAMO ex-combatants also came to settle there after the end of the civil war making it a good site through which to explore intergroup relations.
3.5.3 Challenges of multi-sited research

Multi-sited research can present researchers with a number of challenges. A common critique is that the use of multiple sites can limit a researcher getting to know any one site in-depth, potentially affecting the quality of data (Falzon, 2009). While commonly a critique in ethnographic work, it is applicable to any qualitative study. In addition, questions can be raised about data quality and comparability if different timespans are spent in each locale (Falzon, 2009).

The intent behind my visits to the villages was to conduct a select number of in-depth interviews with key individuals who had extensive experience working on peacebuilding-related activities, and as such, who be well placed to give perspectives on the nature and dynamics of intergroup relations in the villages. The three to five days I spent in each village allowed me to gather the data that I wanted.

Another problem researchers can face when using different sites concerns levels of access to participants. Nadai and Maeder (2005) note how some groups or individuals may be unwilling to participate at particular sites, raising issues around comparability. To my knowledge, this was not an issue I encountered. I worked closely with research assistants to identify appropriate interviewees and was unaware of anyone declining to speak with me. However, I am conscious that the reliance on research assistants meant I cannot be certain that there were not people who may have been suitable interviewees that I, or the assistants, were unaware of, or whom assistants did not raise or approach if they knew they would be unwilling to participate. I had discussed socio-political dynamics of each village with assistants and queried if there were elements or sections within the villages who may be resistant to taking part but recognise it is difficult to be certain. I was, however, able to gather a good range of interviews from each village site.

With multi-sited research, often the ability to compare data can be called into question when drawing from very different populations and cultures (Falzon, 2009). I acknowledge that every civil war is unique and the research was not
designed to be directly comparative across cases. I did, however, compare the data across sites within each country. Experiences were compared between the three villages because using multiple sites provided richer data from which to analyse the transformation of intergroup relations. In addition, the interviews from villages were compared to the interviews in capitals to be able to compare experiences across the different levels. I make this statement mindful of the limitations and claims that can be made from data gathered at a limited number of sites.

3.5.4 Using in-country support

Research assistants were used in both countries to help deal with the challenges of conducting fieldwork in unfamiliar environments: in countries where I did not speak the language and not all interviewees spoke or were fluent in English. Research assistants served in a dual capacity. First, with what McLennan et al., (2014:152) call the 'nuts and bolts' of practical and logistical arrangements for data collection. They accompanied me on interviews, aided selection of appropriate site visits to villages and helped organise interviews. As a result, research assistants were an aid in guiding the research and researcher so that I could optimise time in the field (Devereux and Hoddinott, 1993:27).

Research assistants were recruited based on a combination of personal research and recommendations through networking. They were selected for their experience of working on the peace processes: as professionals embedded in the peacebuilding communities in Nepal and Mozambique. As specialists in the field, they could assist in the second capacity, namely helping create a network of contacts and informants and building rapport with interviewees. The research assistants were instrumental as gatekeepers into the six villages.

Having this prior background in peacebuilding helped to familiarise and orient the research assistants with my study and it’s aims. Where interviews were not conducted in English, I also used translators who had experience of working in the peacebuilding sector to transcribe interviews for the same reason. Being versed in the subject helped reduce the risk of inaccuracy or misinterpretation
during translation. There are, however, risks to using intermediaries in interviews. It creates a layer between interviewer and interviewee with potential for the intermediary to interpret questions and answers in their own way that can lead to unreliable and unsuitable data. I spent significant time familiarising research assistants with the aims and objectives, going through the questions so that whether interpreting or note taking, the research assistants were well versed to help avoid miscommunication and misinterpretation.

Aside from data collection, the research assistants also indirectly assisted with data accuracy and analysis. Almost all of my interviews were accompanied. Where interviews were in English, the research assistant took notes. Where interviews were conducted in the local language, I took notes (as answers were relayed in English to me between questions). After interviews, I consulted with the research assistant, comparing notes and key points from the interview. This dialogue provided an additional level of rigour to the data because it meant the data was being cross-checked for reliability and accuracy. From an ethical perspective, while familiarising research assistants with the research, I also briefed them on the values and principles of the study and the Open University, discussing the importance of anonymity. As professionals in the peacebuilding sector, the research assistants were sensitive to many of these issues already.

3.5.5 Data storage
To ensure compliance with the 1998 Data Protection Act, several steps were taken to safeguard data. Electronic data in the form of recorded interviews and transcription documents of interviews were stored in a filing system with password protection as well as in an NVIVO program, both of which are on a secure university server. Hardcopy consent forms are stored in locked files on a secure campus site.

3.5.6 Ethical considerations
Consideration of ethical and moral implications are important in all research but especially so when human subjects are involved (Oates, 2006:125), and particularly when investigating a sensitive issue such as conflict. Goodhand
writes on the issue of ethics in conflict research arguing that researchers operating in war zones and post-conflict situations bear particular responsibilities. First and foremost is observing Mary Anderson’s principle of ‘do no harm’. I adopted several precautionary measures to ensure the research was mindful of the sensitivities of working on conflict issues and to safeguard the security of participants.

The research was put before the Open University’s Ethics Committee for consideration and authorisation. As part of the procedure, the methodology had to be compliant with the institution’s Ethics Principles for Research Involving Human Participants. Approval was granted with the stipulation that all interviews should be anonymised to protect participants (particularly important given the sensitivity of the research topic), and as such, all villages and interviewees are coded to prevent people being identified. Appendix C lists all interviewees. I have provided some information that alludes to the type of organisation and work interviewees are involved to provide some context to comments and quotes appearing in the empirical chapters, but this is generalised so as not to compromise the participants.

A central concern with doing research in contexts of conflict that Goodhand (2000:13) highlights is the importance of the politicisation of information. He warns of the need to be acutely aware of economies of information. Talking about conflict opens up risks for participants and the data. Rarely will researchers be viewed as neutral or holding purely altruistic motives. This raises questions about the truthfulness of responses, and by extension, the validity of the data. A culture of silence may surround the topic making reliable data hard to obtain. Also talking about conflict could potentially expose participants to harm, for example, bringing up painful memories. Some practices were adopted to reduce these risks.

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Anderson’s (1999) principle of ‘do no harm’ challenges humanitarian and development workers to reflect on the implications of intervening in conflict situations. It says that, as a minimum, interveners should always aim to not make a situation worse.

Key principles include compliance with protocol, informed consent, openness and integrity, protection from harm and confidentiality.
Research assistants acted as trusted intermediaries, gatekeepers to interviewees in many of the villages I visited, and some of the interviews in the Capitals, helping alleviate a danger that research can fuel misguided expectations of how beneficial outcomes will be to participants. This point is particularly relevant in post-war contexts where people are vulnerable and in need of support (Goodhand, 2000:14). The research assistants were used to communicate to interviewees clearly the aims and potential outcomes of the research to manage their expectations before the interviews began. The research assistants also helped build a rapport between interviewee and interviewer. Coming into an interview, particularly on a sensitive subject, with little or no prior contact does not necessarily facilitate the development of trust easily. Interviewees may be less likely to open up and divulge delicate information, or even provide truthful accounts. The use of gatekeepers who have a prior relationship of trust with informants helped mitigate this problem. Each interviewee was offered the opportunity to receive the research once completed.

Additionally, Goodhand (2000:14) states that ‘researchers need to show restraint and to know when to stop’ because even decades later reliving old traumas can reopen wounds. To minimise risk to participants it was explicitly stated that there were no expectations to answer questions and that the interview could be terminated at any point.

In line with principles of openness and transparency in research, interviews were not conducted without express permission from participants. Before each meeting participants were asked to read and sign a consent form that provided an overview of the research along with key objectives, which also informed of the right to withdraw at any time. Contact details were provided so that communication was possible past fieldwork.

3.6 Data analysis
Analysis centres on ‘plausible association’. Transformations in intergroup conflict may be causally attributable to participation and interaction through the
political process but the study recognises that the environment is highly complex, with many interacting factors. However, this is an unavoidable reality when examining the complexities of social reality (Abbott, 2007:381).

The research adopts a multi-method approach to data analysis working on the rationale that through complimentarity, individual shortcomings can be reduced while strengths maximised. The combination of methods has been selected for their appropriateness in fitting into the overall research design. The approach to analysis is primarily deductive in nature but does contain elements of inductive reasoning for inspiration. For the analysis, I use directed content and latent thematic techniques.

### 3.6.1 The logic of inquiry

The research uses a deductive logic of inquiry but also employs some inductive sensibilities. Babbie (2013:52) states that 'deduction begins with an expected pattern that is tested against observations, whereas induction begins with observations and seeks to find a pattern within them'. The approach I use in the analysis of the data draws heavily on deductive reasoning but does have an element of inductive logic too.

Deductive reasoning 'starts with a theory and leads to a new hypothesis. This hypothesis is put to the test by confronting it with observations that either lead to a confirmation or a rejection of the hypothesis' (Sneider and Larner, 2009:16). The research uses a set of theories to frame the research question in order to understand and investigate the transformation process in a specific way. The theories are also used in the empirical chapters to help structure the discussions around the findings. However, the aims of the research are not classically deductive in terms of determining a hypothesis or setting out to intentionally prove or disprove a particular theory (Stainton-Rogers, 2007:83). There is a strong element of exploration within the research, to look at post-civil war

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violence in a different way, as an issue of intergroup conflict and as such be open
to new and emergent themes and findings outside of the theoretical boundaries.

Blaikie (2000:51) says that deductive process starts with a premise, or premises, against which to test the data. Deduction forms the basis for the analysis and the following section demonstrates how the conceptual framework provides the starting point for the coding structure. Thomas (2006:238) says 'the primary purpose of the inductive approach is to allow research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed by structured methodologies'. Thomas argues it has the advantage of being less constrictive than deductive hypothesising that can lead researchers to overlook key dynamics and themes they are not looking for and will not consider. The research draws on ideas of induction in the sense that I explored themes and topics emerging from the data that were outside the understandings of the theories that were part of the theoretical framework.

For example, the inductive exploratory approach allowed me to observe and examine forms of violence that are outside of current thinking.

3.6.2 Data analysis: thematic content

I chose two different techniques to conduct the analysis: content and thematic. The reasoning for this choice was that thematic analysis can be used in combination with content analysis as a way of channelling the latter to give a more focused examination of the data.

At its core, content analysis can be considered 'any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings’ (Patton, 2015:453). Content analysis involves reducing large volumes of verbal or textual data through systematic organisation around coded key issues related to the subject being researched. Raw data is filtered categorically around key topics from which inferences and interpretations can be extrapolated for results. Essentially 'it allows researchers to understand social reality in a subjective but scientific manner' (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2005:67).
Harry Lasswell (1948:169), one of the foremost proponents of content analysis, articulates the justification for my use of content analysis through his model of communication when he says the merit of studying the substance of text lies in asking ‘Who (says) What (to) Whom (in) What Channel (with) What Effect’.

There are evident comparisons in Lasswell’s articulation with Saward’s claims-making model in terms of a focus on relationships of interaction and process. However, Hsieh and Shannon (2005:1277) differentiate between three distinct forms of content analysis. Although organisationally similar, they differ principally in where the origin of coding stems and how coding is structured. For this research, directed content analysis is used. The purpose of directed analysis is to employ the conceptual framework as a basis to guide the investigation. Directed analysis is the building block from which to analyse a very complex and subjective problem, with the conceptual framework providing the platform for initial coding.

Content analysis can be used to analyse both qualitative and quantitative data. However, thematic analysis can be used in conjunction with content analysis because it provides a way of drawing out the strengths of content analysis when looking solely at qualitative data (Joffe and Yardley, 2003). There is a debate about the relationship between the two methods. Often, thematic analysis is classified as a sub-technique within the content analysis repertoire. However, there are researchers who would argue against this, advocating it as a unique independent methodology (Braun and Clarke, 2006). For the purposes of this research, thematic analysis is taken as a complement to directed content analysis, which it does in three ways.

First, as the name suggests, it promotes the targeting of themes within the data. Themes are taken to be patterns that correlate with specific events and phenomena related to research objectives. This makes it conducive to a study

31 Conventional: coded categories are derived directly from the text data. Directed: analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes. Summative: is the counting and comparison, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context.
like this, which involves large amounts of data that need to be organised, reduced and channelled to make them manageable and focused.

Second, thematic analysis allows for a flexible and adaptive approach to analysis of data. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest it is a malleable method that can be moulded to the needs of the researcher. It is free of theoretical and epistemological constraints that are common to discourse or narrative analysis that prescribe a more regimented approach. Braun and Clarke go on to say that ‘through its theoretical freedom, thematic analysis provides a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex account of data’ (2006:81).

Third, building on from the last point, the focus of thematic analysis method is on developing rich pictures from the data. It embraces the subjective nature of qualitative data and encourages exploration of meanings and interpretations. However, Boyatzis (1998:70) argues that there are variations within thematic analysis related to the depth at which these meanings are explored. Boyatzis differentiates between ‘semantic’ and ‘latent’ levels of analysis. The former is concerned with solely what is written or said and the researcher does not probe beyond the explicit content, whereas the latter aims to penetrate deeper to look for hidden meanings behind the material. A thematic approach, with a ‘latent’ focus, allowed for exploration of the meanings attached to how and why groups perceive and understand intergroup conflict as they do, which gave more depth and qualification to the research. So in summary, I adopted a directed content approach to data analysis informed by the latent thematic method.

3.6.3 Analysis process
The analysis of the data involved a number of steps. First, categorising and filing the numerous documented sources to help organise and structure the analysis. To do this, I created a filing system that grouped documents around a series of key themes. These themes were based on time frames (pre-war, during war), document sources organised according to representative type (political parties, NGOs), formal peace process documentation and policy materials referencing the
approaches (DDR, Amnesty, TRC etc.). The individual documents in each file were arranged in order of date to help analyse how understandings were transforming over the post-war period.

The way that I employed the theoretical framework was through the use of thematic content analysis. Content and thematic analysis rely on developing categories that group words with similar meaning or connotations to be able to look for patterns and make sense of large quantities of qualitative data (Weber, 1990:37). In the social sciences, this is called ‘coding’. The second step after organising the data was to identify key topics as the starting point for coding the data. These were core themes that would be critical in an assessment of the transformation process and in answering the research question. Four out of five of these codes were informed by the different theories used within the conceptual framework, and as such the theories provided the building blocks for coding and analysing the data. These were: identity transformation, violence, space and levels. The fifth theme centred on coding the data according to references to the different peace policies.

I used NVIVO for the data analysis and the five themes formed the basis of the coding structure. Rather than code, NVIVO uses the term ‘node’. These five themes formed the parent nodes, from which child nodes (sub-codes) branching out from the parent nodes were developed. Using this system of parent and child nodes allowed for a more in-depth and nuanced investigation into the various themes in an organised way. Using violence as a parent node, for example, I then had a series of child nodes under it: physical violence, structural violence and non-violence. For identity transformation, Saward’s model of The Representative Claim and its individual components were used as child nodes to capture the expression of group identity through the process of claiming.

The theory provided the foundation for noding, but as I read into the data and analysed, I expanded the child-noding system to be able to account for new and unanticipated themes that emerged. By way of illustration, the emergence of the importance of ‘threat’ was one such child-node that I added very early into
analysis into the violence parent node. The other forms of civil-war-contingent violence were also added. Appendix B shows the thematic noding.

Due to the sensitive nature of the research, all interviews are anonymised. As a result, I developed a system that codes interviewees in order to be able to refer to a specific individual’s comments in the empirical chapters. Interviewees are identified by letters and numbers that indicate where interviews took place and a broad description of the type of informant to give some context to the data. Appendix C provides the coding of interviewees.

Welsh (2002:1) notes that ‘computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) has been seen as aiding the researcher in her or his search for an accurate and transparent picture of the data whilst also providing an audit of the data analysis process as a whole’. I used the qualitative NVIVO software package primarily because of the quantity of data sources and material collected. I could import the filing system of sources and the coding structure. The data could then be easily cross-referenced by running reports in a multitude of combinations to provide a deep and thorough analysis of a large volume of data.

In line with good research practice, iteration was embedded in the analysis. Emergent themes were subjected to thorough scrutiny, using multiple rounds of interrogation, checking and cross-checking results. Repetition helped to guard against any assumptions and bias, subjecting emergent findings to challenge through repeated testing of the data.

3.7 Methodological limitations and assumptions

Many of the assumptions and limitations about individual components of the methodology have been addressed during the discussion and justification for use. There are, though, several broader methodological questions that need addressing. A key dynamic relates to the nature of PhD research. Ph.D.’s come with some practical limitations that constrain the scope of a study, namely: time, resources and research being undertaken by a single researcher. Despite these restrictions, this research was a thorough, rich and in-depth investigation into
the transformation of intergroup relations and the role violence plays in this process. It included two substantial periods of fieldwork and led to a number of new insights with implications for the field of peacebuilding.

3.7.1 Researcher positionality and bias

Bias and assumptions about the researcher’s identity, from the researcher themself and their participants, can affect the research process (England, 1994; Holmes, 2014). Here, I take a reflexive look at my identity as a white, British, male, secular PhD student for whom it was the first time to Mozambique and Nepal, and first time conducting research in post-war contexts.

Having no prior connections to either country carried both advantages and disadvantages. Lack of association can be of benefit by increasing objectivity when analysing the data, but as an outsider not in my native culture, I was unaware of the subtleties of socio-political dynamics that may have been affecting the data (Buil, 2012). For example, a lack of localised knowledge may have impacted on participant selection. Research assistants were instrumental in accessing and helping choose interviewees in the villages. Consciously, or subconsciously, I could have unknowingly been steered toward individuals who represented particular views or vested interests, for example, only interviewing local elites. It is difficult to accurately access the impact of this risk other than to highlight I was conscious of it and took steps to try and guard against bias by working with trusted individuals who understood the aims of the research, and whom I instructed to get a balanced view from within the villages.

A prominent aspect of my identity that could have affected the research was my position as a white westerner. It is reasonable to assume that in both Nepal and Mozambique I was in the position of ‘outsider’. This carries a risk of not being able to elicit reliable and truthful data from subjects who view the researcher as a stranger (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009:54). There were several instances where I was very aware of my ‘otherness’. One example was working through interpreters, generating an inescapable sense of separation from the participant. Also, there were two instances that stand out where I was interviewing ex-
combatants, both in Mozambique, where I felt suspicion from the participants towards me. In the majority of cases, though, I found myself being welcomed, both from interviewees in the capitals and the villages. In the latter, in particular, most of my stays were with families rather than hotels and I was asked to participate in village gatherings (even a wedding ceremony), generally being treated as a guest. I was, however, challenged once in Maputo and another time in Kathmandu by informants testing my level of understanding of the countries history and civil war. This was counterbalanced, though, by other participants who would compliment me on my knowledge of post-war dynamics.

My identity as a lone PhD researcher may have aided access to, and openness from, interviewees. Not one participant ever refused to give an answer to a specific question, and often I received candid and sometimes (particularly in Mozambique) contentious views given the sensitive peace talks that were underway at the time. These were times when ‘otherness’ appeared to be an advantage. People were willing to talk, and several times research assistants explained this was in part because I was believed to be a neutral party: not representing a particular group, view or institution linked to the peace process. Indeed, in Mozambique, a number of people actively sought me out offering to be interviewed. As a general observation, I was never actively questioned or challenged on my religious beliefs, political persuasion or nationality.

These deliberations are my own interpretation of the ways different aspects of my identity may have influenced the research process. To be fully aware of the impact is incredibly problematic because positionality can change with every new person and interaction. In addition, Holmes (2014:7) says that individuals may be unaware of how they and others have constructed their identities. The hope is that by being cognisant, reflective and highlighting these aspects of my position in the research the reader will gain better insight into where I am coming from and how this may potentially shape the research process and its outcomes.
In regard to bias in outcomes, inevitably, findings are shaped by the assumptions and experiences of the researcher. They will influence decisions about what observations and conclusions are used and how. The empirical chapters and argument are constructed around the findings that bore the most relevance to knowledge gaps and that worked in a complementary way to be able to answer the overarching research question. Due to constraints on space, some results could not be included. I consulted supervisors closely, so, through multiple discussions and iterations of the analysis, any assumptions around the choice of findings and their interpretations have been subjected to academic scrutiny and challenge. Where interesting observations and findings emerged but could not be included in the empirical discussions, the key points are picked up in the concluding chapter under recommendations for further research.

3.7.2 Data difference and outcome generalisability

The threats of renewed fighting, political tensions and peace talks that were ongoing in Mozambique during fieldwork limited sites I could safely access for the village interviews. This issue has implications for the use of data in the empirical chapters. I wanted to travel to villages outside of the south of Mozambique. Maputo and the southern provinces are historically regarded as a FRELIMO dominated region (Hall and Young, 1997; Manning, 2002; Reis, 2012). In central and northern Mozambique there are many areas where there is greater allegiance to RENAMO, and increasingly the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) in cities such as Beira. Gorongosa in central Mozambique, for example, is where RENAMO headquarters are outside of Maputo and where RENAMO station the majority of their active forces. Ethnic and linguistic diversity also mean that socio-political and cultural dynamics are different across the country.

Being unable to travel more widely meant that I could not get a picture of intergroup relations in villages where the balance and dynamics between

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32 Interviews in the capital Maputo, and in particular, with the various political parties were not restrained and so do not raise similar concerns around the picture of the transformation process at the national political level.
members of the previous wartime identity groups would have been very different. A local NGO did offer to take me to the Gorongosa Province to interview in some villages there but the British Government were advising against all travel to this area. Many in-country contacts supported this assessment, pointing out I was a stranger who did not speak the local languages, or Portuguese, asking emotive and potentially dangerous questions at a very volatile time. For these reasons, it was not feasible to try and access villages in central of northern parts of the country.

Despite visiting three villages in each country, the lack of socio-political diversity in the Mozambican villages, relative to the Nepalese, could raise concerns around representativeness and claims that can be made from the village data. I am mindful that this issue does introduce limitations but it is important to reiterate that direct comparison across cases is not an objective of this research. I took some steps to limit the impact of the difference though, working with research assistants to select villages in the south of Mozambique where there are sizable populations of RENAMO supporters and ex-combatants living alongside FRELIMO members. Also, questioning those interviewees who have lived, worked or travelled in other parts of the country to gain their experience of intergroup relations outside of the south.

How the differences in access to villages impacts the research also comes down to a question of how I use the data. The empirical chapters are not built on a direct compare and contrast structure but on using the data from across the two cases to support my observations and findings illustratively. I have more diverse and rich data to draw upon for Nepal and as a result, therefore, data from my Nepalese interviews features more prominently. I am mindful that this is not ideal and acknowledge the limitations of the Mozambique data but this is, unfortunately, unavoidable given the situation at the time of fieldwork.

Discussion around case data also raises the issue around the generalisability of outcomes. Maxwell and Mittapalli (2008) maintain that generalisability is a synonym for external validity. External validity is the degree to which limited or
contextually specific examples can be convincingly extrapolated out to broader conclusions (Silverman, 2006:47). At several points in this chapter I have acknowledged how the methodology has been mindful of the limitations of site visits and interview sampling. The study aims to look at post-war violence as an issue of how the groups that were fighting transform away from the violence that characterised their relations during the civil war. It is unrealistic to make claims that findings from a sampling of three villages in Nepal and three villages in Mozambique are representative of a wider national picture of the transformation process. The findings are, however, a good representation of intergroup relationships within the villages that I interviewed and the findings can be used to reflect on some of the larger debates within the peacebuilding literature.Claims are made with the caveat and awareness of the limits of the data that I was able to gather.

3.8 Summary

In this chapter, I have outlined the methodology used to address the research question. It has detailed data collection, analysis and how the theories were applied to this process. The following two chapters offer the outcomes of this analysis. There are two empirical chapters because, rather than organising the findings around individual themes or concepts, the argument that I make over the course of these chapters builds to answer the research question in a way that was better presented and structured around the sub-research questions. Chapter 5 centres on sub-question one, considering the transformation process unfolding between political parties as they inform, develop and implement the peace process. Chapter 6 turns to sub-question two, focusing on understandings and experience of intergroup conflict among the village interviewees and compares these findings to the political party transformation process in Chapter 5. Sub-question 3 that considers the influence of the political system on the transformation process is woven through the discussion in both chapters.
Chapter 4
Intergroup conflict in context: the cases of Nepal and Mozambique

Introduction
A conflict transformation approach places importance on understanding the history between conflicting parties in order for constructive change to take place. Relationships are built up over time and how groups have interacted in the past can be a window into how they are behaving in the present (Lederach 2003:63). This chapter provides background to the civil wars in Nepal and Mozambique. The intent is to provide important detail that has bearing on the findings to allow for a deeper contextualised understanding of the examples that are woven through subsequent chapters in support of my argument. Each case considers factors and forces both leading up to the outbreak of civil war, as well as during, with a particular focus on intergroup dynamics and the impact of wartime violence on the population. The changing nature of the political landscape is considered along with the evolution of political parties and their relations. Due to the centrality of political parties to my argument, I consider how politics has influenced different group identities and the implications this has had for intergroup conflict. The narrative also considers how the socio-political and economic context and dynamics relate to other aspects of theory discussed in Chapter 2. There is a brief account of the key peace agreement policies that provide the focus for the analysis of the transformation process, and the case studies finish with background to the six villages where interviews took place.
4.1 Nepal

On 4 February 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) issued a 40-point list of demands to the Nepalese Government. Nine days later on 13 February, after the government failed to respond to these demands, the Maoists launched the ‘People’s War’, sparking ten years of civil war that ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 21st November 2006. The war was a culmination of a complex series of events, but at its core centred on Maoist disillusionment with what they perceived as an ineffective system of governance characterised by patronage, corruption and subjugation. Caddell (2005:120) highlights how Maoist demands were not dissimilar to many other leftist parties at the time. What set the Maoists apart was their commitment to violence as a means of achieving their aims, adopting Mao Zedong’s philosophy of achieving political power for the people through the barrel of the gun.

Nepal is a country of great diversity.33 How successive regimes have governed ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural differences has had far-reaching implications for group relations and conflict (Bhattarai, 2004). Indeed, issues over the way in which the ruling elite had historically treated particular groups within Nepalese society were fundamental to the Maoist’s reasoning for starting the civil war. While Nepal is widely credited as having high levels of tolerance between different groups, studies suggest that peaceful cohabitation has been the result of authoritarian, repressive rule at the hands of an elite minority rather than out of any sense of consociationalism.34 Nepal became a unified state under Gorkha King Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1768 (Whelpton, 2005). Prior to this, the territory was a disparate assortment of small Kingdoms and principalities. The King extended the Hindu system of Varnas to the thirty-six ‘jat’ (regional tribes) as a way to maintain order.35

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33 125 distinct ethnic groups, 123 official languages and over 10 major religions (National Census, 2011).
34 Gobyn, 2009; Jha, 2014; Manandhar & Seddon, 2010; Pradhan & Shrestha, 2005.
35 A system of social classification based on four categories that determine an individual’s position, role and duties in society.
Under Monarchy rule, the social order was rigorously hierarchical and stratified. All aspects of life were strictly regulated. While the majority of the population were excluded from access to politics and governance, along with many other aspects of life also being extensively controlled, the lower castes such as Dalit (untouchables) and Janajati were subject to particularly harsh discrimination and marginalisation. They were banned from certain public and private places, for example. Some of my interviewees talked fervently about the historic division between the Pahadi, the upper caste hill people from around the Kathmandu area, and the people of Terai: Madhesi and Tharu people of the southern plains (K9, I1, C2). The centuries of repression of these indigenous peoples at the hands of the ‘Pahadi elite’ was explained to be a prime motivator for people from these discriminated groups joining the Maoists during the civil war.

Social stratification was intensified under the Rana regime that came to power in 1854, introducing the Muluki Ain. The Rana dynasty is particularly notorious for the exploitation and despotic rule over the people (Bhattarai, 2010; Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009; Pettigrew, 2013). The inequality and systemic marginalisation many different groups experienced shows that structural violence was endemic in Nepalese society (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1999). Many of the points in the list of 40 demands the Maoists put to the government called for the eradication of societal structures that had, for centuries, discriminated against many sections and groups: preventing caste exploitation, ending untouchability and giving equal status to all languages and ethnic groups (Gobyn, 2009). The intent of the war was to dismantle the feudal landlord system, declare Nepal a secular republican state and establish democracy and popular rule by the people. The Maoists, in their propaganda, appealed extensively to the injustices suffered by many of these groups at the hands of the minority elite. As a result, many different marginalised and discriminated groups flocked to the Maoist banner.

While issues with domestic governance and repressive socio-political structures were key Maoist concerns, another core aspect of their demands was geo-

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36 Muluki Ain - a civil code that enshrined rights and duties along a strict Hindu caste hierarchy.
political in nature. Although Nepal was never colonised, the Maoists were seeking to cast off what they saw as centuries of interference and manipulation by foreign governments. Issues with these external forces took two main forms. The first was a need to combat an historic expansionist Indian agenda seeking economic and political dominance over Nepal (Anderson, 2014; Manandhar & Seddon, 2010). Nepal is sandwiched between India to the south and China to the north. Relations have been stronger with India out of necessity: the Himalayas bridging Nepal to China has made trade difficult, leaving India as the country’s main gateway to the outside world. Formal relations between the two countries began with the 1816 Sugauli Treaty that established the boundary between Nepal and British-India. Among the Maoists claims, were accusations that since this time, India had used its position geographically and its greater economic and political power to try and control and stranglehold Nepal (Jha, 2014). Second, since the opening up of Nepal to the world in the 1950s, the country had been dependent upon aid (Tamang and Malena, 2011:16). Dixit (1997:173) talks about the Balkanisation of Nepal, with various foreign governments carving the country into their own private development zones with the Government exerting little control over the whole development project. Chief amongst the Maoist demands was to rid the country of, what they saw as, imperialist influence.

The ‘People’s War’ was cast as a fight to free the Nepalese masses from centuries of authoritarian rule at the hands of a minority. The history of the ruling elites themselves, however, is not one that was characterised by consensus and conflict-free. Indeed, the dynamics among the political leaders was acrimonious, reading as a narrative of nepotism, patronage and ambitious power seeking that saw a series of different regimes in power. Since the time of the Gorkha King, instability, factionalism and infighting were a routine feature of the political environment (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009; Jha, 2014). Caddell (2005:68) writes that over time, during the Shah rule (the Gorkha King’s hereditary line), ‘the state became increasingly unwieldy to control due to the diversity of the population’. An entrenched rent-seeking mentality among the Monarchy and elite bureaucracy led to a coup that saw the Rana dynasty rise to power (Shakya, 2010:16). A powerful family from the Chhetri caste, the Rana imprisoned the
Monarchy in the palace, stripped the King of power and reduced the royal family to a figurehead role while the Prime Minister and many other government roles were made hereditary to ensure Rana control (Whitfield, 2008).

The Rana were ousted in 1951 under the negotiated Delhi Compromise that restored the Monarchy’s power and ushered in multi-party democracy. The concession by the Rana to power-share was driven by a number of factors, such as growing political activism among an exiled Nepalese elite in India and the wave of anti-imperialism and pro-democracy after the end of World War 2. Nepalese returning from the war were increasingly challenging the isolationist policy and discriminatory caste system (Caddell, 2005). The deposition of the Rana created a quasi-constitutional rule where King Tribhuvan was reinstated and governed along with newly formed political parties (namely, the Nepali Congress that led the move for democracy). Up until this point, formal political space had been closed, being the exclusive domain of the Monarchy and Rana. The Delhi Compromise signalled a turning point as more political space was opened up the emerging parties such as the Nepali Congress. The transition to democracy and a politics that was accessible and inclusive to the plurality of groups in Nepalese society, however, was far from smooth.

There are a number of features that defined the political environment over the following decade. Rather than power-sharing, the Rana, Monarchy and Nepali Congress relationship was more of a power struggle (Sah, 2015; Upreti, 2012). The Rana were side lined from politics after several years but the continuing relationship between the various political parties and the Monarchy was volatile and contentious. The power-sharing arrangement was not equitable. In fact, the Monarchy was actively hostile, contesting party authority and resistant to democratic ideals (Jha, 2014). Differences became irreconcilable and in 1962 King Mahendra used executive emergency power to ‘declare democracy a failure’, banning political parties and leaving many leaders imprisoned or exiled in India. Parliament was dissolved and the Panchayat system of governance was introduced: a traditional centralised structure of rule under the direct authority of the King. The Monarchy’s resistance to democracy, and attempts to retain
politics as a closed space to all but itself, has been a feature of the political environment in Nepal over the successive decades. For example, between 2002 and 2005, King Gyanendra dismissed three prime ministers before taking absolute power himself under the pretext of bringing peace and stability (Manandhar & Seddon, 2010:25).

The Panchayat system was abolished in 1990 and multi-party democracy restored after a popular non-violent democratic movement (Jana Andolan I) spearheaded by the exiled political parties forced the King to concede to popular demand. From 1990, though, the development of party politics was equally as contentious as party-Monarchy relations: best described as a myriad of continually shifting alliances and interparty splits. Indeed, between 1991 and 2003 there were fourteen different administrations due to these shifting alliances and power struggles (Caddell, 2005:72). The political environment was akin to Aggestam et al’s., (2015) idea of antagonistic politics: although there was no physical violence, relations between the parties was hostile, highly unstable and obstructive. Parliament was effectively immobilised. This interparty behaviour was part of King Gyanendra's rationale for abolishing parties in 2002 – declaring democracy a failure.

This type of antagonistic party conflict was not restricted to relations between parties but also within them. By way of example, Nepali Congress (NC) was the historically dominant party: enjoying the majority in Government from 1951 until party dissolution in 1960. They were a centre-right party that believed in popular rule and democracy and are often described as being more organised than the disparate collection of leftist parties. NC was instrumental in leading the democratic movement in the 1950s against the Rana. Then, over the next several decades from 1960, while in exile India, they galvanised the Nepalese people to pressurise King Mahendra to reinstate democracy, Parliament, the political parties and abolish the Panchayat system. Success came in 1990 when their actions culminated in Jana Andolan I: the Nepalese peoples popular democratic movement. However, Adhikari (2015) notes that, despite an outward projection of a unified party, failure by the leadership to consolidate internal differences led
to pervasive defection and factionalism, which severely hampered the parties’ ability to manage Government and the Monarchy during these periods.

The history of the Maoists is also a complex web of political splintering among a variety of left-wing parties. They have their roots in the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) formed in India in 1978. Committed to armed revolution, the party operated underground trying to, unsuccessfully, start a mass movement for democracy. In the late 1980s internal ideological differences caused CPN(ML) to split into a number of new parties, who, having renounced armed struggle joined a coalition of moderate leftist groups, under the name United Left Front (UFL). UFL joined with Nepali Congress against the Monarchy and Panchayat system as part of Jana Andolan I. After internal disputes led to UFL splintering, three of the more radical left parties joined together to form the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity-Centre). Led by Comrade Prachanda, who later led the Maoists during the civil war and UCPN(M) into post-war years, CPN(UC) adopted a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. Their path provisioned for a protracted ‘People’s War’ but this was to be a last resort and CPN(UC) entered the 1991 national elections. The party were unsuccessful in securing any seats in Parliament and disillusioned with the political process they withdrew from formal politics, going underground to formulate a new strategy. At this time, difference of views over when and how to start an armed revolution caused them to split. In an attempt to re-enter politics, both parties filed for formal party status as the United People’s Front but the group led by Prachanda was rejected and went on to form CPN(M). Thapa (2003) describes that the repeated rejection of CPN(M) to participate in mainstream politics was a key factor in their marginalisation, cementing their pledge to armed revolution. It is important to note that the Maoist ‘People’s War’ was not a disorganised rebellion but was based on a highly ordered strategy that involved establishing parallel governance structures in the areas that they occupied (Basnett, 2009): structures that continued to operate well into the post-war period in areas where it took time for the state to re-establish a presence.
What has been shown so far is that volatile political conflict was a facet of Nepalese history for centuries. Violence played an instrumental role in these political dynamics, often being linked to social control and political change. Caddell (2005:67) says that initial unification of the country came at the hands of an aggressive military expansion. The Rana coup over the Shah in 1846 erupted in a bloody slaughter (the Kot Massacre) in which many of the Royal family were killed. A similar event recurred in June 2001 when Crown Prince Dipendra went on a rampage killing most of the royal family before himself. There is a common conspiracy theory that believes the massacre was a plot staged by the King’s brother Gyanendra, who subsequently ascended to the throne (Adhikari, 2014; Hutt, 2004; Jha, 2014). The Royal massacre and Gyanendra’s subsequent disbanding of Government in February 2005 was a major prompt for the mainstream political parties to join together in a seven-party alliance (SPA) (Manandhar and Seddon, 2010).

In response to the dissolution of parties in 2005, the SPA mobilised a pro-democracy movement, calling for the Monarchy to re-establish Parliament and multi-party democracy. Named Jana Andolan II, the movement to reinstate parties and democracy ran concurrently with the civil war. For nineteen days during the movement there were mass protests on the streets of Kathmandu. There were many violent clashes between protesters and state security forces with the King imposing a strict curfew (Routledge, 2010; COCAP, 2012). The SPA formed an alliance at this time with the Maoists. However, when Gyandendra announced on the 24th April that he would concede and reinstate Parliament, the Maoists rejected the proposal and continued with the war. It wasn’t for several months after that a ceasefire was brokered between the Monarchy, SPA and Maoists that peace talks could begin in earnest.

Violence has also been wielded as a means of social control. Historically, the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), and other state security forces, have been agents of violent oppression, against both political opponents and the people, and as not only a way to maintain order but also for the Monarchy and Rana to retain power. The Rana period, in particular, is renowned for the use of the RNA as a
blunt instrument through which to terrorise the Nepalese people (Bhattarai, 2012). Similarly, during the Jana Andolan II movement, state violence was prevalent. *Volunteers Under Fire* (COCAP, 2010) is a Nepalese NGO report that depicts the stories of many human rights defenders caught in violent clashes between protesters and state forces when Kathmandu was under curfew. It details harsh and often indiscriminate violence unleashed on the public. One of the main demands from both Maoists and the wider democratic movement during peace talks was to put the Royal Nepali Army (RNA) under popular control.

The construction of particular identities for political ends can be seen woven through the history of Nepal influencing the trajectory of conflict and violence. There have been multiple re-imaginings of the polity, swinging between recognising diversity, to advancing a unifying idea of Nepalese nationalism. The most obvious is the caste system that was extended to the multitude of different groups. The imposition of these clearly delineated categories created a rigidly bounded social order, determining people’s position and role from birth to death. Emancipation from this elitist system of a hierarchical identity-structure was a core cause behind the initiation of the civil war. The Panchayat system, which was governance based on traditionally elected councils, included a policy of promoting a single vision of Nepalese identity to try and unify the nation – one language, one culture, one nation (de Chene, 1996; Caddell, 2005). There was widespread resistance from among minority groups because the one nation policy was grounded in the identity of the Brahmin hill elite and so was viewed not only as an attempt to eradicate distinctiveness but also to consolidate Rana control (Whelpton, 2005). A member of a Madhesi rights-based NGO (K9) told me that the Madhesi movements of the post-war years have their roots in the resentment that was cultivated during this period.

The Maoist identity during the war was an amalgamation of many different disenfranchised groups joining together as one in a common cause. How these different group identities interacted with the Maoist identity during the war was complex. For example, it was commonly held that the Maoist label was
synonymous with the Dalit caste (K8, I1). The relationship of Dalits to the ‘People's War’ and the Maoists, though, is not so simple. While the Maoist ranks may have been made up of many Dalits, there were also those that did not identify with the Maoist cause. To illustrate, there was a Dalit political activist group who, during the civil war, actively tried to publically refute and distance themselves from the perception that all Dalits sympathised with Maoists (COCAP, 2012).

The civil war lasted for ten years. Figures vary, but conservative estimates put the death toll at around 16,000 with 1,300 people still officially missing (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Aside from the loss of life, economic impacts were severe as the Maoist strategy involved targeting government infrastructure. Many officials and law enforcement in rural and remote areas fled to larger urban centres for safety, leaving many parts of the country without a state presence. A major feature of the war, though, was the way the fighting profoundly affected relations within villages and wider society. The Nepalese people were caught in the crossfire between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and State security forces. Villages became contested places where physical violence, or the threat of physical violence, was for many Nepalese an everyday occurrence (Onesto, 2005).

During the first five years of the war, fighting was sporadic and of low intensity. The government at this time dismissed the ‘People’s War’ as a law and order issue leaving the combating of the PLA to local police forces (Caddell, 2005). There were, though, elements within the government pushing for a harder response. Nepali Congress leader Koirala, for example, initiated Operation Romeo in 1995, intended to round up leftist agitators under the guise of acts of terrorism, and Kilo Sierra 2 in 1998 planned to purge the Maoists from 18 districts in which 500 people were killed. Norris (2004:2) says that it was during Operation Romeo that the Maoists publically declared violence as their modus operandi. When peace talks broke down in late 2001 the Maoists launched a

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37 Average GDP of 3.5 per cent over the ten years, declining foreign direct investment and loss of state taxes and levies from Maoist occupied areas (Gyawali, 2009).
series of coordinated attacks on army and police posts that left over 100 dead. In response, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and mobilised the RNA. From this point on, with the army becoming the main state protagonists, there was a dramatic increase in the intensity of violence.

Due to unfolding global events, this escalation was accompanied by increased international attention. Against the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, the Government and Monarchy officially labelled the Maoists terrorists of the state, giving recourse to appeal for international support, which they received extensively: primarily from the US, they obtained help in the form of military, intelligence and economic support (Bhattarai, 2004; Upreti and Vanoutte, 2009). India, at this time, also declared the Maoists a terrorist organisation. The Maoists have a complex history with India as many of the exiled Maoist elite were in hiding there in the early decades of the democratic movement (the 1960s, 70s and 80s), and India has often been accused of aiding the Maoists in their attempts to overthrow the anti-Indian elite (Upreti and Vanhoutte, 2009). The aid served to sour Maoist perceptions of western governments. In particular, fostering anti-American sentiment. This negatively impacting on Nepal’s foreign relations in the early years after the end of the civil war once the Maoists were elected to government. It was only in 2012, six years after the end of the war, that the US Government took the Maoists off their list of global terrorist organisations, despite UCPN(M)s position as the ruling party (Pokharel, 2012). In spite of external assistance, the Maoists came to control much of the rural countryside, surrounding urban centres. Violence even reached Kathmandu in the latter years with numerous bombings and Maoist-led bandahs (strikes), which often erupted into violence (COCAP, 2012; Jha, 2014).

Both the PLA and State forces have received heavy criticism for the brutality with which they engaged both each other and the general population. Accusations of human rights violations abounded: extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances and violent intimidation (Graham, 2007; Lawoti and Pahari, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2014). Pettigrew’s (2013) research during the war attests to the invasiveness of violence into daily life and village relations.
The nature of guerrilla warfare created a fluidity to the fighting, as both sides would ebb and flow through villages, leaving many living in a constant state of anxiety that either side could descend at any moment: the Maoists demanding food and shelter, the state security forces conducting aggressive searches and inspections.

Onesto (2005) describes a common tactic employed by both forces was to enter villages masquerading as the other side, seeking information, trying to root out enemy forces and test villagers’ loyalty. Pettigrew (2013) describes a number of coping strategies employed by villagers to deal with, and normalise, the violence. One related to both sides tactic of impersonating the other. Pettigrew explains how ‘Nepali’s had to learn to read the smallest sign in order to work out who was a Maoist and who the army. In the village too it was necessary to train children not to speak carelessly’ (2013:45). One slip of the tongue could reveal a recent Maoist or RNA presence that could bring revenge by the other side. Over the course of the civil war the possibility of violence became an ever-present danger in many villages, but what Pettigrew’s example coping strategy illustrates is that even though identities were polarized and essentialised around the fighting groups, for people living in these villages, their own identity was subject to a state of almost constant contestation over which there was little opportunity to exercise personal agency or control, meaning these villagers were exposed to the risk of violence from both sides.

**4.1.1 Comprehensive Peace Agreement policies**

After a series of fraught negotiations, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 21 November 2006, ending the civil war and bringing the Maoists into government as a mainstream political party in the form of UCPN(M). The CPA contained the blueprint for peace within which there were three specific elements intended to deal with violence.
**Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)**

One of most contentious components in the peace agreement was the future of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The CPA stipulated that all Maoist forces would be placed into one of the 27 specially created demobilisation camps to undergo the full DDR process.\(^{38}\) The army was to be democratised, making it accountable to Government and placing it under civilian control. A proportion of the PLA were to be incorporated into the military (although no exact numbers were written into the CPA) and the entire process of discharge, integration and rehabilitation of the remaining combatants was set with a six-month deadline.

Shortly after the signing of the CPA, the newly-formed interim government petitioned the UN for assistance. UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) was quickly established with three main functions: (1) oversee compliance with the conditions of the CPA, (2) monitor disarmament of the Maoist forces, and (3) provide monitoring and technical aid in working towards democratic elections. UNMIN oversaw the process until it formally closed operations in January 2011. A Nepalese Army general I interviewed (K6), who was heavily involved in the DDR process, said that the Nepalese government, disillusioned with the progress UNMIN were making, formally requested the mission end so that the parties themselves could see DDR through to completion, a feat they completed by the end of the following year.

**Truth and reconciliation commission (TRC)**

Since the 1980s when their use first emerged, Truth Commissions have become a standard component in many transitional justice processes where countries are emerging from war and violent conflict (Shaw, 2005:2). Under Section 5.2, headed ‘measures for the normalization of situation’ in the cease-fire section of the CPA (USIP, 2006:8), the signatory parties set out a commitment to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The purpose of this was to ‘probe into

\(^{38}\) In the Nepalese peace process, demobilisation camps were referred to as cantonments. Cantonment generally refers to temporary military or police encampments but can also mean permanent quarters. While some interviewees and documents use the term cantonment, I use the standard peacebuilding term ‘demobilisation camps’ for continuity across cases.
those involved in the serious violation of human rights and crimes against humanity in the course of the armed conflict for creating an atmosphere for reconciliation in the society [sic].

As in many other instances where TRCs have been used, the intent was to establish a common account or ‘truth’ of the civil war, and to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of gross human rights violations and war crimes. The TRC was charged with uncovering details of the atrocities committed by both sides, including identifying 3,500 people who were force disappeared during the course of the war (World Bank, 2006). Although the Commission was not to be endowed with legal power, the intent was for it to make recommendations on its findings to the judiciary.

**Local peace committees (LPCs)**

LPCs are a generic term given to ‘committees or other structures formed at the level of a district, municipality, town or village with the aim to encourage and facilitate joint, inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding processes within its own context’ (Odendaal and Olivier, 2010:2). The Peace Secretary had suggested in July 2006, four months before the CPA was signed, that the peace process might contain some element of local peacebuilding. Prasain et al., (2008:6) state that this came from ‘an awareness among the political leadership of the major parties that the national peace process needs to be supported and sustained locally’. Although there was no explicit reference to LPCs, Section 10.7 makes the direct petition ‘we sincerely appeal to the entire Nepali population to actively participate and make successful the historic campaign of building a new democratic Nepal and establishing lasting peace’ (USIP, 2006:15). In interview, a prominent civil-servant (K5) working on the Government peacebuilding strategy since its inception, stated that all political party representatives sitting on the High-Level Peace Committee (HLPC) recognised the need for some form of localised peacebuilding, as well as soliciting public contributions to the TRC process.

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39 A Committee composed of the key political parties negotiating the peace process - NC, UML, NC (D), NSP (A) and CPN(M) - that was designed to oversee implementation of the peace process.
Local Peace Committees were to be the government’s answer to countrywide conflict transformation. The task of developing and implementing LPCs fell to the National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission (later the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction – MoPR). Their mandate was to ‘build a presence within the local communities to promote the process of peace [to] get local communities stimulated and engaged in order for the peace process to succeed’ (Asia Foundation, 2010:6): in essence, to bring the peace to the people. To this end, LPCs were to be established throughout the country, which meant one in each of the 75 districts.

4.1.2 Nepal village sites

The rationale for the choice of the three Nepalese villages was discussed in the previous chapter. Here, some historical context of these sites is introduced along with background on the political and social composition of each village.

**Village R**

A village in the North-East of Nepal in Rolpa district with an estimated population of 2,500 that is almost entirely Magar (R7 – village elder): one of the ethnic Janajati groups. Rolpa is widely considered the cradle of the civil war, being where the Maoist leaders launched the ‘People’s War’ and operated from in the early years. The Maoists chose this district because the region is remote, impoverished and had poor infrastructure, with limited government reach (Kreuttner, 2009). In addition, there was a large population of disaffected and discriminated Janajati and Dalit castes from which they drew support. Hutt (2004:113) describes the region as very politically active in promoting Magar rights and equality in the early 1990s during Jana Andolan I. This prevalent dissatisfaction with the government among the Magar, therefore, made Rolpa a fertile ground from which to recruit people to the cause.
In the early years of the civil war, when the Government and Monarchy were treating the war as a law and order issue, many villages in Rolpa including this village, were subjected to harsh police persecution and brutality during campaigns such as ‘Operation Romeo’, and, as the war escalated, became sites of extensive fighting. During the war, as government forces were pushed back and encircled larger urban areas, the village became less of a focal point for the fighting. In 2013, the village was involved in a boycott of upcoming national elections in protest at the way the Maoist party was leading the country.

Village I
This village is situated in the far West of Nepal in the Ilam district, which borders India. Topographically, the surrounding area is very hilly as the village sits on the ascent to the Himalayas. There is little infrastructure and only several of the five hundred households have electricity. The population is approximated at 3,500 and is composed of a wide range of different ethnic groups – largely Limbu, Newar and Tamang (I8 – civil society leader). Ilam was not strategically important in the war so the region was relatively untouched by the fighting. While the remoteness of the village meant it saw no direct fighting, a number of youths left to join the Maoist forces. Ilam is the principal tea-producing region for Nepal and the village saw an influx of Maoist ex-combatants and their families after the end of the war who were not native to the area: economic migrants seeking work.

Village C
Located in Chitwan district in the Southern Terai region, the population of the village is 4,000 and is composed of a diverse range of Janajati as well as Pahadi (C3 – local politician). Tharu and Madhesi, the Janajati groups who are indigenous to the Terai, make up the majority. The village is situated close to the East-West highway that runs the width of the country, lying between the cities of Hetauda (the gateway to Kathmandu) and Bharatpur. It is a bustling village that sees a lot of transient movement. It was only in the latter years of the war that the Maoists made significant movement into the Terai. Lured by the promise of equality, a number of Tharu and Madhesi youth from the village left to join the
Maoists: many of whom have not returned since the end of the war. Being close to the highway, the village saw a lot of government force activity but only experienced minor fighting and violence during the civil war. The village saw more violence in the first two years of peace as it was a site for clashes between Madhesi and Tharu groups against each other, and against state security forces during the Madhesi movements.

4.2 Mozambique

The 3rd February 1977 was the first recorded raid by the guerrilla group known as RENAMO moving across the border from Rhodesia into Mozambique (Seibert, 2003:31). Their objective: the overthrow of the one-party FRELIMO state. This attack marked the beginning of a 15-year civil war between the two forces. The war is estimated to have left 1 million dead and a third of the population displaced (Hanlon, 2010:13). In a country with a population of 16 million at the time, every Mozambican is said to have felt the impacts of violence in some form (Amnesty International, 1997:47). A defining feature of the civil war was the battle for the support and/or control of the people: a struggle that is said to have deeply divided the population between RENAMO and FRELIMO (Azevedo, 1991; Dava et al., 2013).

Mozambique was a colony of Portugal until FRELIMO liberated the country and ascended to power in 1975. The Portuguese arrived in 1498 and over the next two centuries slowly expanded into the territory of the Shona empire that ruled the region through military campaigns colonising, taking land and establishing indirect rule. Part of the strategy of control included the system of ‘regulos’. At the lowest level of administration, regulo were ‘traditional’ chiefs (African headmen) who were appointed and allowed to govern at the village-level using customary laws and traditions, while also being expected to implement colonial policy (Hanlon, 1991; Manning, 2002). Portugal asserted direct rule in 1932 and from this period began to implement an aggressive policy of segregation.

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40 Mozambique was administered through trading companies that were given free-reign to govern, provided tax was paid to the Crown (Manning, 2002)
41 The move to direct rule was part of the new Portuguese President - Salazar’s - wider policy of consolidating control over all the country’s overseas territories.
Indigenous Mozambicans were marginalised and discriminated against in many aspects of political, social and economic life: forbidden from being educated, banned from owning businesses and maintaining social control through forced labour (Ferriera, 2013; Newitt, 1995).

Cabecinhas and Feijo (2010:33) note that ‘there was always resistance against Portuguese occupation’ but it wasn’t until the late 1940s and 50s that the movement for self-determination started to become organised. The catalyst was the backdrop of a global move towards decolonisation but also a growing domestic anger among indigenous Mozambicans at an increasingly oppressive and discriminatory treatment that had resulted from the changes in governance after 1932. FRELIMO were founded in 1962 in Tanzania when three liberation groups joined together to coordinate their efforts.42 Far from creating a unifying idea of FRELIMO, however, the identity of the party was a contested and changing process, constructed around shifts in leadership and political conditions. For example, little linked the three groups ideologically other than their fight against colonialism and a sense of nationalism (Reis, 2012:2). As a result, there were deep divisions within the party over the path Mozambique should take after liberation. Several of my interviewees implied that factionalism within FRELIMO between members of the three original organisations continues to persist (M6, M10).

The liberation war lasted for 10 years, from 1964-74. FRELIMO was initially led by Eduardo Mondlane until he was assassinated in 1969 after which the Central Committee chose Samora Machel, the then head of defence, as FRELIMO leader.43 Machel was a staunch socialist and under his headship, the party consolidated to a Marxist-Leninist philosophy and aligned itself with Moscow and Peking during the Cold War (Macagno, 2009). Sumich (2010) points out that many of the early FRELIMO leadership were southern urban assimilados from Maputo who had weak ties to traditional authority. This background influenced FRELIMO’s post-

42 Mozambican African National Union (MANU), National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) and National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) (Funada-Classen, 2012).

43 Mondlane was a Mozambican anthropology professor at Syracuse University.
liberation identity and shaped the nature of the state they subsequently created, which was founded on a rejection of traditional culture and the embracing of socialism. After liberation, FRELIMO started distancing themselves from the ‘assimilados’ identity and reframing it to become associated exclusively to those who had not joined the liberation movement (Macagno, 2009). Seen as collaborators, many of these assimilados found themselves persecuted and discriminated under the new regime. Here, the political and social manipulation of the FRELIMO identity can be seen to have had implications for intergroup conflict, leading to assimilados being subjected to structural violence in post-liberation years.

With independence in 1975, Machel was installed as President and FRELIMO established a one-party system outlawing political pluralism (Cabrita, 2000). As many of the white Portuguese had fled, FRELIMO inherited a state with a seriously diminished capacity and failing economy (Hanlon, 1991). They adopted a radical socialist programme nationalising many sectors (starting with land) as part of a development strategy based on modernization and mass mechanisation (Hanlon, 1991). Part of the FRELIMO ideology was grounded in a very different relationship between the state, church and the regulos. FRELIMO harshly rejected traditional Mozambican culture and values, which were seen as backward. The regulos were disbanded and replaced by a strict party presence and top-down regulation through an autocratic state structure. Lubkemann (2005) talks about widespread popular resistance and resentment by many to this new system and the rejection of the ‘old ways’. After independence, FRELIMO severely restricted religious activity: banning some churches, outlawing educational institutes and limiting religious services and teaching (Cabrita, 2000). The frustration generated by these approaches was used by RENAMO in their appeals for popular support. Machel died in a plane crash in 1989 and was succeeded by Joaquim Chissano. From around this time, FRELIMO began to change their ideology more towards democratic socialism and a

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44 ‘Assimilados’ were a small group of indigenous Mozambicans that avoided bonded life by adopting colonial culture and, being considered ‘civilized’, were in theory Portuguese citizens; being afforded legal status as such. Macagno (2009) talks about the duality of simultaneous African and Portuguese identity creating tensions – subsequently, therefore, assimilados never truly being accepted by either side.
capitalist economy. Despite this shift, the single-party political environment of Mozambique under FRELIMO, from the time of liberation until the end of the civil war, was centralised with political space and activity heavily controlled.

An issue RENAMO used in the justification for civil war relates to the socio-economic development of the country. The FRELIMO elite were widely accused of monopolising state resources, operating on a system of patronage and corrupt clientelistic practices. This led to inequity in the development of the country, with the South (the historic stronghold of the FRELIMO elite) being favoured over other parts of the country (Hanlon, 1999; Manning, 2002). The systematic and historic impediment to socio-economic growth in particular regions has remained an ongoing point of contention between FRELIMO and RENAMO in post-war years. The Portuguese divided the country between the centre and north, areas that were used for agricultural production, and the south, which operated as a service economy providing transport links for the Rhodesian and South African economies to global markets (Bowen, 2000). After independence, FRELIMO continued this practice, concentrating their modernisation and industrialisation efforts primarily in and around the capital, Maputo, with little investment outside of the south (Manning, 2002).

FRELIMO's economic modernisation policy was accompanied by radical social re-engineering (Lubkemann, 2005). For example, to develop intensive agriculture they used ‘aldeamentos’; communal villages. The idea was to resettle disparate communities into centralised villages as a way of better implementing socialist policy, controlling the population and providing for the people. Coelho (1998) discusses the unpopularity of the aldeamentos, which forced mass communalism on communities that were traditionally used to a subsistence lifestyle. Resettlement was complimented with a series of re-education camps. Stroud (1999:362) says the intent was ‘political and moral edification of antisocial elements’. However, many document their darker side; that they were used to intern anybody the government viewed as undesirable or

45 A policy first introduced in the late 60s by the Portuguese as a means of controlling the people and inhibiting contact between the population and FRELIMO rebels.
a threat: regime opponents, unemployed, criminals, (Weinstein, 2002). 
Andersson (2016:18) talks about the camps being rife with institutionalised violence: rape, torture and indiscriminate murders. Both the resettlement and re-education policies show harsh treatment of the population under FRELIMO that served to alienate many from the regime. Again, these types of policies were the foundation from which RENAMO justified the civil war, attempting to liberate the people from the autocratic elite oppressors.46

It is impossible to discuss RENAMO and the Mozambican civil war without reference to wider geopolitical influence. RENAMO were created and sponsored by neighbouring Rhodesia’s Central Intelligence Organisation as a response to regional and international fears that a liberated Mozambique with a communist government was a threat to white Western influence in Southern Africa (Morgan, 1990; Vines, 1995). The civil war is widely held as a ‘proxy’ conflict of the Cold War, RENAMO cast as an anti-communist guerrilla force intended to destabilise and topple the FRELIMO government.47 Hailed as puppets of external Western powers, RENAMO is commonly depicted as an aggregation of FRELIMO dissidents and disgruntled diaspora who disagreed with the stringent socialist policies and authoritarian state that was being constructed in the early liberation years. As such, they were accused of being devoid of any overarching ideology (Hall, 1990). RENAMO’s main strategy was to tap into discontent against FRELIMO. Alexander (2003:185) maintains that as far as an ideology can be gleaned, it was ‘traditionalist’ and an inversion of FRELIMO policy – pro-church and pro-chieftains. Manning (1998) contends that RENAMO only began to develop a cohesive political philosophy towards the end of the civil war as it

46 It is important to recognise that these are generalisations made of what was a very complex time. For example, Sumich & Honwana (2007) make the point that experiences of aldeamentos would vary between region. There was little resistance in the north where FRELIMO has its origins but in the centre in areas like Gorongosa, not only was their dissatisfaction with the elimination of traditional culture but the aldeamentos forced groups who historically had little contact to live in very close proximity creating intergroup tensions. Sumich & Honwana (2007:12) also describe variance in RENAMO-controlled areas between ‘indigenous’ groups who would welcome a reinstatement of the regulos system compared to those who were forcibly captured during attacks on villages and relocated into areas where they were subsequently subjected to alienation and prejudice.

47 FRELIMO had been harbouring ZANU and ANC rebels. Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were a military group seeking to overthrow white minority rule in Rhodesia and the African National Congress (ANC) from South Africa. After the white regime changed to black popular rule and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980, backing for RENAMO fell solely to the South African Defense Forces.
became increasingly clear that the civil war was reaching a stalemate and compromise was likely, which would require RENAMO to establish a legitimate political persona to be able to enter mainstream politics. RENAMO as a counter-communist group was founded in 1975 under the leadership of Andre Matsangaissa. After being killed in a raid in 1979 he was succeeded by Alfonso Dhlakama who remains as Commander in Chief of RENAMO forces and the party leader to date. Since formerly entering politics, RENAMO espouses to democratic ideals and a mixed economy with a strong private sector. Throughout the post-war years, this democratic and capitalist position has seen Dhlakama strongly align RENAMO with Western governments, particularly the US.

By the time that the civil war erupted, many indigenous Mozambicans had already experienced ten years of fighting, and prior to that, around four hundred and fifty years of oppressive structural violence at the hands of their colonisers. Turning to the impact of violence during the civil war, much of the literature casts FRELIMO in a defensive role. Dava et al. (2013:69) talk about people flocking to urban areas seeking protection from RENAMO forces and the Gersony Report (1988:92) accredits only 3% of the murders witnessed by interviewees to FRELIMO. People were fleeing from well-documented acts of inhumanity and gross violations of human rights that became a trademark of RENAMO. A common tactic when entering a FRELIMO area was to target civilians as well as armed forces, with indiscriminate killing, press-gang recruitment, systematic rape and serial infanticide all pointing toward a tactical campaign based on a reign of terror intended to demoralise and destabilise (Gersony Report, 1988). Honwana (1998:75) states that ‘Renamo, in particular, developed a reputation for the ritualistic use of violence aimed at instilling incapacitating fear in rural communities’. These tactics served to ‘severely disrupt the social fabric’. In addition to using Chieftains to administer areas they controlled, RENAMO also operated using ‘Gandira’, a system that required the population to do three tasks: provide food, transport goods and weapons and provide sexual services (Igreja,

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48 Matsangaissa was a former senior member of the FRELIMO army who was imprisoned in a re-education camp after being accused of theft. He was freed when Rhodesian forces attacked the camp and was subsequently appointed as RENAMO’s leader.
2007). Debate is controversial over the level of popular backing for RENAMO, with many arguing that they received support more out of fear than to any sense of authenticity for the cause (Lundin, 2004; Honwana, 1998).

Despite the popular view that RENAMO were accountable for the vast majority of violence against the people, several of my interviewees (M13 and M19) said that questions of responsibility and apportionment of blame for wartime violence are still hotly debated, not just by the parties but also within academia. What is not in dispute, however, is the level of impact of the violence on civilians and village life. With 15 years of civil war and ten years of the War of Independence, violence was a way of life for most Mozambicans (Nordstrom, 1997:45).

Towards the end of the 1980s, both sides were beginning to recognise that an outright victory was increasingly unlikely (Hume, 1994:49). RENAMO controlled much of the countryside in the centre and north, while FRELIMO held the south and were fortified within urban areas in other parts of the country. Hume recounts the role of the church in brokering peace talks. The CCM (Christian Council of Mozambique) played a crucial role as mediator between both sides, creating trust and eventually bringing RENAMO and FRELIMO to the negotiating table. Official talks began in July 1990 in Rome, with the Community of Sant’Egidio officially sanctioned by the Catholic Church to arbitrate. Two years later, in October 1992, the General Peace Agreement was signed in Rome between RENAMO leader Dhlakama and then FRELIMO President Joaquim Chissano, formally ending the civil war.

Since the end of the war, Mozambique has enjoyed twenty years of relatively uninterrupted peace. Indeed, many scholars contend that Mozambique is a beacon of post-civil war reconstruction, experiencing low levels of continuing political violence, a strong government and rapid economic growth (Burke, 2005; Hanlon, 2010; Lundin, 2004). However, in April 2013, RENAMO forces attacked a police post in Muxungue in Sofala province. The attack sparked renewed violence between the two groups in the central region of the country. Targeted and tactical skirmishes ran until September 2014 when both sides
agreed to a peace settlement ahead of national elections in November 2014. No official figures are recorded, but deaths, from what is widely referred to as the ‘RENAMO insurgency’, are estimated in the low hundreds. During fieldwork, peace talks were still ongoing.

Turning to the role of group identity in the civil war, historically, many wars in Africa have been framed as an issue of ethnic tensions. Stewart (2002) challenges the unsophisticated nature of this analysis but demonstrated the constructed nature of many identities across the continent as a result of colonial policy. Ethnicity, however, has never been a prominent discourse as a cause of social or political conflict in Mozambique (Lundin, 2004). Part of the FRELIMO strategy after independence was to promote a nationalistic sense of identity. Lunstrum (2007:115) talks about the challenge of having to unite a multitude of different ethnic groups, all with subgroups and a plethora of languages and religions that had never shared a common sense of identity. Lunstrum goes on to say that ‘the little that did unite the people was not language, custom or ethnicity but rather a shared history of oppression under a common coloniser’. The liberation war provided the platform from which to start constructing a nationalistic sentiment. De Souto (2013) examines the narrative around nationalism from the time of independence and discusses how the national identity is predicated upon FRELIMO’s struggle for liberation. From 1975-1990, during single-party rule, FRELIMO’s history became the official history of Mozambique propagated through the Secretariat for Ideological Work (De Souto, 2013:280).

A consequence of the civil war, Azevedo (1991) argues, is that the fighting and violence between RENAMO and FRELIMO profoundly politicised society. The fighting between the two factions deeply polarised and divided not just villages, but families. There were two dominant and competing narratives around which the identities of FRELIMO and RENAMO centred during the civil war. FRELIMO cast themselves as the defenders of freedom, liberating the people from the Portuguese colonial masters, and now fighting off an imperialist-sponsored invasion. RENAMO saw themselves as the guardians of tradition fighting off an
elitist and oppressive communist regime. Dava et al., (2013:72) describe how the dichotomous narratives were a source of hatred and suspicion within communities and villages.

4.2.1 General Peace Agreement policies
The GPA came into force on the 15 October 1992, which marked the beginning of the UN-mandated UNOMOZ mission that would monitor the ceasefire, oversee the demobilisation process and observe the establishment of the first democratic elections. Within the agreement, the only explicitly named provision intended to deal with violence was DDR. However, several initiatives were informally adopted as part of the wider peacebuilding project.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
Both sides agreed to put their forces into demobilisation camps. Coelho and Vines (1995) put government figures at 61,638 troops while RENAMO 21,000. The Ceasefire Commission (CFC) was created to verify truce compliance with support from UNOMOZ. Protocol IV provisioned for the establishment of the FADM (Mozambican Defence Force): a national army with FRELIMO and RENAMO each expected to contribute half of their troops to the 30,000 strong force.

In support of the longer-term rehabilitation for those not admitted into the new standing army, a Rehabilitation Commission (CORE) was created, which was a joint group, including FRELIMO, RENAMO and UN members, with a mandate to ‘effect the economic and social reintegration of demobilised soldiers’ (GPA, 1992:23). Within the terms of the GPA were wider security sector reforms. COMPOL (National Police Affairs Commission) was designed to provide a check on the police force to ensure duties were conducted without prejudice. Additionally, distrustful of FRELIMO’s commitment to peace, and the peace process, RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama retained a mobilised security force of 300 troops intended to act as his personal guard.

**Amnesty**

Amnesty is the official pardoning of political offences but in the context of civil war, it typically refers to the exoneration of perpetrators of violent acts, giving future exemption from possible prosecution. It is controversial under international law because it effectively excuses gross violations of human rights. The rationale behind an amnesty lies in the idea that the offering of a pardon can be a strong incentive to bring warring groups to the negotiating table and to help keep them commit to a peace process (Reiter, 2011).

As early as 1988, during initial peace negotiations, FRELIMO offered unconditional immunity to any RENAMO fighters willing to lay down arms. Although not officially included in the peace agreement, on 14 October 1992 one day before the ratification of the GPA, President Chissano promulgated a general political amnesty law passed in a Parliament still entirely composed of FRELIMO members (Igreja, 2015:240). It exonerated all fighters on both sides for all crimes (except common criminal activity) committed between 1976 and 1992. The decision to use amnesty was part of a broad consensus among the political elite: the awareness that peace required unreserved ‘forgiveness’ (Igreja, 2008b). Amnesty was once again employed and extended by the government to RENAMO forces during the resurgence of fighting between 2013 and 2014.

**Community-based reconciliation**

There were no specific provisions laid out in the GPA for sub-national or village-based peacebuilding initiatives. However, many of my interviewees described a two-pronged approach emerging very informally and organically that together helped facilitate peacebuilding and reconciliation among the wider population throughout the country (M1, M3, M15, M19). The initiatives were based on a combination of appealing to traditional Mozambican culture that promotes forgiveness as a means of dealing with conflict, and through the faith community of churches which form a central pillar of Mozambican society and whose work
and teachings are heavily informed by theological ideas of forgiveness (Lundin, 2004; Honwana, 1998).

Many villages drew on traditional healing practices. Igreja et al., (2008a) and Honwana (1998) have studied the reconciliation customs extensively, and highlight how they are processes whereby an individual is cleansed of the violence they committed during the war. These practices can be seen as strongly linked to ideas of changing identity, and more specifically, as a way of moving beyond violence because through community-based rituals the person that an individual was during wartime is eradicated and therefore the intent is that they become reborn and re-established as a citizen in that village. More than just reintegrating the individual, Honwana (1998) talks about the cathartic properties these rituals held for communities. They were deeply socialising experiences. By cleansing the perpetrator a village effectively purges itself of the taint of violence and gives the individual a new identity free from the past.

The churches of Mozambique played a pivotal role in bringing RENAMO and FRELIMO to the negotiating table and with the brokering of the peace agreement (Hume, 1994). Armon et al., (1998:5) talk about FRELIMO President Chissano, in recognising the two sides were reaching a stalemate, requesting churchmen to petition RENAMO to start talks. They also discuss how members of the churches helped RENAMO articulate their political demands helping to facilitate the transition from armed opposition into democratic politics. The role of the churches as trusted intermediaries and a consistent calming voice calling for peace whenever tensions flared has continued over post-war years (M14, M15). Representatives from various religions were active in the ongoing peace talks at the time of fieldwork. Faith-based organisations were also instrumental in promoting reconciliation and restorative practice throughout the country. Based on a loose collaboration the various churches lead by the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) worked in villages, towns and cities across the country, using the religious nature of Mozambican society as a platform from which to preach tolerance and understanding (Boesenecker & Vinjamuri, 2011).
4.2.2 Mozambique village sites

Similarly to the Nepalese case above, the rationale for selecting villages in Mozambique was outlined in the previous chapter. This section details some history and politic-social context to the villages where I interviewed.

Village Ma

This village has a population of two thousand people. It is to the south of Maputo in Matutuíne, the southernmost district of Mozambique that borders South Africa. Infrastructure is extremely poor with only several households connected to a regular electricity supply. The village is impoverished, with the majority of the population surviving on subsistence farming, although, a small percentage are employed on surrounding groundnut and corn plantations in the area.

The village was shielded from much of the liberation war and civil war. Sitting in the south of the country, below Maputo, fighting did not reach the village. The war did, however, have a profound effect on the villagers as about half of the pre-civil war population ran away across the border to South Africa for fear that the village would be attacked (Ma2, Ma5). A large proportion of those that fled have not returned which means that many families remain separated. Part of the choice for interviewing in this village was to explore why people have not returned despite the years of peace, but also, because post-civil war the village saw an influx of ex-RENAMO combatants. These people moved from the centre and north of the country to Maputo in search of greater opportunities, but unable to find work and afford city living costs, they had to move further out from the capital.

Village Mb

A village of 3,000 people in the Magude District, North-East of Maputo. Like village (Ma), poverty is prevalent with a high unemployment rate. Many households are without electricity and the primary source of livelihood is subsistence farming. During the civil war, the village saw little direct violence. However, it lies near to one of the main roads running from Maputo to the north of the country and was the site of several skirmishes between the opposing
forces towards the end of the civil war when RENAMO was trying to push from the centre of the country into Maputo Province.

The village has a mixed population of FRELIMO and RENAMO ex-combatants that settled after the end of the civil war, with many whose families subsequently joined them. The village has a very proactive peacebuilding community. With the help of a local NGO, very early after the end of the war, a forum was established that was designed to bring the village together and work to bring reconciliation among the various groups – between the ex-combatants from both sides and between ex-combatants and the conflict-affected.

**Village Mc**

North-east of Maputo, this village has a population of 4,000 (Mc1) and is within Gaza Province. It was close to a garrison, constructed by FRELIMO for the civil war, and as such, was a contested area as RENAMO sought to push south towards Maputo. As a result, the village was exposed to sporadic fighting throughout the course of the civil war, the population being subjected to harsh and violent treatment at the hands of RENAMO troops (Mc1, Mc4). After the end of the war, a number of RENAMO ex-combatants settled in the village.

**4.3 Summary**

This chapter has introduced background to the civil wars in Nepal and Mozambique with a particular focus on those dimensions of conflict that have bearing on the following findings chapters: roots of conflict with attention to group dynamics, the historic development of the political environment and parties, and the interplay between political influence, group identities and violence intergroup conflict. In both cases, violence during the civil wars deeply impacted people’s lives in villages and the polarised identities of the fighting forces profoundly affected group relations. I recognise that the discussion has generalised and that experiences will have differed across time and place but this discussion is based on a wealth of academic literature attesting to the consequences of the wartime violence for intergroup relations.
While the narratives of the fighting groups dominated and essentialised how people understood and identified with groups, the dynamics were more complex than simply arguing Nepalese and Mozambican society divided into mutually exclusive groups. A more intricate process was unfolding whereby identifying with a particular group was a more complex experience. For some, it was a voluntary association, others were force recruited and for many identities were being uncontrollably imposed. In Nepal, for example, group association could be contested and fluid dependent on which side was present and scrutinising a village. Having discussed the context of the civil wars, the following chapters present findings on the transformation of intergroup relations over post-war years. Chapter 5 focuses on the political parties that were party to the peace agreement. The chapter argues that these parties continue to essentialise ideas of groups, portraying group identities grounded in the factionalism of war. Chapter 6 then compares the politicisation of these identities to experiences in villages.

Chapter 5
Violence as political strategy: implications for transforming intergroup conflict

Introduction
Before large groups can be mobilised to commit mass violence and civil war, they must first believe they face a threat to their very existence. Kaldor (2013:11) says one way this can be achieved is through the political manipulation of particular understandings of groups and their relations. The ‘other’ that a group is in conflict with is turned into an enemy. If it is indeed true that political narratives are partly responsible for the mass violence during civil wars, it is reasonable to assume that political representations of intergroup conflict will also play a key role in how groups approach conflict in the years following civil
war. This chapter engages with this idea by focusing on the transformation process from the perspective of the political parties that represent the previously warring groups. It looks at the narratives they portray around group identity and intergroup conflict, as well as at how the parties themselves interact during the development of peace agreement policies.

The chapter contributes to the overall argument of the thesis by proposing that violence remains a key part of political discourse and practice between parties in Nepal and Mozambique decades after war had ended. To appreciate this violence requires a conceptual step away from dominant ways of thinking of war-related violence. The frequency with which this violence is present in interparty relations indicates that it retains a pivotal role in how parties both understand and deal with conflict. It also has implications for the long-term development of peace, highlighting the need to recognise and address such violence. Three forms of violence are introduced and that each can be seen to share a connection to the civil war, I term them civil-war-contingent violence as a means to conceptually frame, understand and analyse their effects.

I acknowledged in Section 2.4 that economic factors act upon intergroup relations, recognising the advances in thinking are showing how causes of civil war are multifaceted and interconnected. Although ideas of identity form the theoretical focus of my analysis, aspects of political economy are introduced at several points when informants suggest economic influences have a bearing on the transformation process.

Section 5.1 uses the concept of civil-war-contingent violence to describe the different forms of violence and how they are manifested. Section 5.2 reviews two peacebuilding interventions and shows how a failure to recognise and consider this violence can limit the success of such approaches. Section 5.3 looks at how political parties interact within political spaces and how the use of political space affects the transformation of interparty relations. Section 5.4 assesses the implications of this violence for interparty relation transformation and the effects it has had on the peace processes. In addition, I reflect upon the merits of
civil-war-contingent violence as a conceptual tool to understand and unpack the influence of these types of violence. The chapter ends with an exploration of one factor that could be responsible for their persistent use in post-war years.

5.1 Civil-war-contingent violence

Since the signing of their peace agreements, neither Nepal nor Mozambique has seen a resurgence of civil war or mass intergroup violence. Although in 2013-14, RENAMO forces were engaged in skirmish attacks with state forces, raising concerns about the possibility of renewed civil war, Mozambique is praised amongst the international community as a 'test case' for successful peacebuilding (Gentili, 2013; Manning, 2015). Similarly, in Nepal, despite violent uprisings in the Terai region during the early years of peace, the transformation of the Maoists into a mainstream political party and the resulting prevention of widespread political violence are lauded as a significant achievement (Denskus, 2009; Lundqvist, 2015:45).

Although both countries have experienced instances of intergroup conflict resulting in physical violence, this has typically been low-key, localised and linked to flashpoints such as elections. Even the 2013 RENAMO attacks were referred to by many of my interviewees as a strategic ploy to force FRELIMO into talks rather than as a serious risk of return to war.

As these episodes of physical violence are already well documented and studied, I began instead to focus my analysis on a number of behaviours that political parties exhibited during their interactions with one another. Although not easily definable against the main theoretical explanations of war-related violence – these behaviours can, arguably, constitute acts of violence. Despite their not involving physical violence, the violence is more direct than structural violence would recognise. Furthermore, parties were using the violence strategically to help advance their political agendas within the peace process. Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010:3) argue against a tendency in academia to talk in terms of a violence/non-violence dichotomy, maintaining that this represents an
unsophisticated understanding: violence can manifest in both categories in numerous ways. Similarly, different types of violence require different strategies if they are to be prevented or reduced. Embracing Chenoweth and Lawrence’s call for more nuanced typologies of war-related violence, and intrigued by my initial observations, I decided to develop my line of enquiry to explore this violence, the forms it takes, the impact it has on interparty relations and the implications it holds for peacebuilding.

Each of three distinct forms can be seen to share a connection to the civil war and consequently, I apply the term civil-war-contingent violence as a way to distinguish and conceptually frame their understanding and analysis:

I. **Threatening further armed revolution** – using the memory of the devastation caused by the civil war to get opposition parties to capitulate to demands.

II. **Retaining access to an armed force** – based on persisting perceptions that both ensuring group security and pursuing group interests may require the use of private mobilised troops.

III. **Claims-making related to the civil war** – political claims that employ reference to the civil war and its associated violence as a source of legitimacy.

That political parties continue to use these forms of violence calls into question the level of transformation that has taken place in interparty relations. However, this is not to imply that there has been none. The fact that neither country has slipped back into civil war is a strong indication that peacebuilding, in terms of its core function, is proving successful. Indeed, the chapter will discuss how conditions in Nepal imply a more progressive transformation among its parties than in Mozambique. The prevalence with which some parties employ civil-war-contingent violence, however, reveals the pivotal role that violence continues to play in how some political parties understand and interact during conflict, with consequences for the peace processes. In both countries, key aspects of the peace agreements remain unfulfilled as the violence is used to block, stall and impede
effective decision-making. The characteristics and implications of these forms of violence are discussed, offering insight into their meaning and impact.

### 5.1.1 The threat of armed revolution

Nieburg (1962:865) asserts that the possibility of violence is not only necessary for the functioning of large societies, but that it is even useful: ‘the threat of violence, and the occasional outbreak of real violence – which gives a threat credibility – are essential elements in peaceful social change’. Threats can be a powerful vehicle for transformation. As a way to gain compliance with demands, the threat of violence presents an attractive strategy for excluded and marginalised groups. However, although certain political parties in Nepal and Mozambique have regularly used the threat of violence, the way in which this is employed raises concerns about the long-term prospects for peace and the transformation of intergroup relations.

It is important, first, to qualify threats both in terms of type of violence and the intended change to which they are attached. Nieburg (1962:866) talks of threats as demonstrations, protests, and general civil unrest. The threats made by political parties in the cases cited above take a very specific form: the threat of violent rebellion and further civil war. A primary function of the political system is to facilitate conflict non-violently, putting in place mechanisms and procedures that allow groups to voice needs and debate difference peacefully (Schwartzmantel, 2011). Violence should be a last resort, when all other avenues of expression are spent. However, the frequency with which key political parties utilise the threat of armed revolution is suggestive of a more deliberate and targeted political strategy.

The Maoist’s ‘People’s War’ rested on claims of leading a proletarian revolution to overthrow an oppressive bourgeois elite. In post-civil war years, this dialogue has remained a cornerstone of Maoist political discourse. The party line is that revolution continues, albeit now through democratic and economic means (Haviland, 2006). Despite continuous declarations of a commitment to non-
violence, however, the threat of further armed revolution is regularly employed. In early 2008, party leader Prachanda stated: ‘if the other parties do not understand, then we will bring revolution’ (Nepal, 2008). Shortly afterwards, UCPN(M) left government claiming they would return to the jungle and take up arms again. In addition, a programme manager for a Nepalese peacebuilding organisation (K11) told me that in a speech to ex-combatants in one of the demobilisation camps in 2009, Prachanda talked of restarting the war. Such examples are indicative of UCPN(M)’s reaffirming their commitment to peaceful revolution, albeit with the suffix of ‘achieving this through armed revolution if necessary’ (Frank, 2010).

The threat of violent rebellion has also been a feature of CPN(M), a splinter party that separated from UCPN(M) in 2012 amid accusations the latter had been co-opted by the very system it was trying to overthrow. CPN(M) are a self-professed ‘revolutionary faction’ and generally regarded as extremists. Shortly after their formation, high-level party members made several public statements alluding to the necessity of another ‘People’s War’, as the first had not reached its conclusion (K11). In 2014, the party was threatening to pull out of the political process and return to the jungle. In an interview, at this time, a CPN(M) party spokesperson (K4) stated that ‘the party have considered all of our options. We feel all the other parties are disingenuous in bringing change to Nepal for the people. For the people, we must fight again’.

In Mozambique, the threat of further civil war has been a relentless feature of political discourse, most typically around election time. Several interviewees (M16, M13) corroborated that RENAMO had decried the process of all five national elections held since the end of the war, each time threatening to take up arms again. Indeed, RENAMO’s ‘talk of war’ almost represented routine behaviour. ‘We (Mozambicans) do not even discuss anymore, it is taken for granted they will threaten to fight’, said an NGO field worker involved in community reconciliation work (Mc3). Similarly, the director of a national faith-based NGO (M7) stated, ‘this is their tactic, threatening further war is how they pursue their political goals’.
In April 2013, this threat became reality when RENAMO targeted government security and administrative facilities sparked renewed hostilities. A RENAMO party member (M8) justified the violence with the accusation that FRELIMO was not meeting their political demands, chief amongst which were reforms to the electoral process ahead of the upcoming national elections. Many interviewees described the attacks as tactical, small and low key. The perception was that full-scale war was never their intent (M6, M7), the attacks were simply an extension of what Hultman (2009:821) would call a typical RENAMO way of ‘pressuring the government into negotiation’. In essence, they illustrate Nieburg’s (1962:866) point about the intermittent display of physical violence reinforcing the credibility of a threat.

In Nepal, the threat of rebellion and war has not remained exclusive to Maoist parties. The Madhesi in the Terai southern plains launched two consecutive anti-government movements in 2007 and 2008, sparking physical violence. A political representative of the Madhesi people (K9) told me that their protests centred on demands for greater political representation and access to decision-making and participation in the governance of Nepal. The threat of armed rebellion – which developed into the use of physical violence – was the primary means used because, as the CEO of an NGO advocating Madhesi rights (K19) stated, ‘the Madhesi leadership had seen and learned from the Maoists that violence was the best way to achieve political power’. Similarly, in an interview with a representative of the Janajati indigenous groups (K20), whose political ambitions echo those of the Madhesi, the representative explained, ‘the doors [to government] are closed at the moment, they do not want to discuss. We will give them time, but if they do not respond we will take to the streets to protest. If that does not work, we will take up arms’.

That the threat of armed revolution is seen as a legitimate political strategy has implications for the way in which political competition is perceived within the Nepali political system. It suggests that the issuance of threats is a political modus operandi that parties have to adopt in order to be recognised, participate
and have their needs considered. For example, in 2007, President Prachanda made a public statement in which he offered the Madhesi status as a legitimate political party if they would stop the violent movement. The risk this creates is that the threat of violent revolution becomes a feature of interparty relations from the start. In Nepal, it appears that this form of violence has spread rather than recede and the more it is adopted as a political strategy, the greater the chance it will eventually be turned into reality. As one Maoist local political leader (R4) professed, ‘it is not us [being violent] you have to worry about now, it is all the other many groups who are crying out for a share of the country’.

These observations must be placed in context. Rather than an exclusively post-war phenomenon, the Madhesi and Janajati movements are rooted in the wider democratic movement in Nepal over the past four decades. What my interviews suggest, however, is that the civil war may have influenced how some parties representing these groups view political participation and that the threat of armed violence as a strategy is seen as increasingly legitimate. Collier (2010:133), on the other hand, maintains that the majority of threats are meaningless because often groups lack the resources to initiate a revolution successfully. A view supported by my interview with the CPN(M) spokesperson (K4) who admits that he feels re-launching a civil war would be difficult because the party had lost so much popular support. In Mozambique, despite Dhlakama’s claims to be able to ‘bring war’, a number of my interviewees were sceptical – he was thought to lack both popular support and economic resources (M5, Ma4).

Rent-seeking was also seen as a driver behind the threat of armed revolution. A number of interviewees (M14, M15, M19) felt that recent RENAMO calls for regional autonomy were linked to the discovery of extensive liquid gas deposits in areas under RENAMO political authority. Rather than a desire to advance the needs of their supporters, the threat of civil war was driven by the party elite’s desire to monopolise these resources. War, it was maintained, was not the ultimate goal. The intent was that the threat of further armed revolution would force FRELIMO to concede to their demands for more decentralised autonomy, thus giving party members access to this new revenue.
I contend, however, that the fact that most threats have largely remained as such does not mean peacebuilders should disregard them. Their issuance is not the act of groups who, having explored all non-violent options, are faced with no alternative. Nieburg (1962:865) maintains that the threat of violence induces peace and non-violence by promoting structural and systemic flexibility and dynamism. It does this by fostering the inclusion of previously rejected interests and a respect for the verdict of the polls. The use of the threat of violent revolution in the case of Nepal and Mozambique, however, generates neither response. In fact, it works in opposition. The threat of armed revolution is used as a bargaining chip, employed by parties to avoid compromise or to force the opposition to concede to demands. The CEO of a Nepalese peacebuilding NGO (K19) summarised this attitude as, ‘we will talk and discuss but if we don’t get what we want, you will have war. How can you do politics properly this way?’

The continued threat of armed revolution calls into question the commitment of parties to renounce violence. The actions of RENAMO, who are often accused of doing politics down the barrel of a gun, are a clear illustration of this. In Nepal, too, the Maoists’ pledge of non-violence has come under sustained criticism as being disingenuous (Pettigrew, 2013:17; Adhikari, 2015:45). An interviewee working for a national youth NGO (K13) shared similar concerns, ‘even now, I do not think they have totally changed their ways, they could bring war again’. However, there was a noticeable change in UCPN(M)’s approach after 2013 when the party appeared to break from revolutionary rhetoric, releasing a document at the party’s 7th General Convention in which they acknowledged Nepal was no longer semi-feudal or semi-colonial. Professing that significant progress had been made in the peace process, the party declared a formal ideological move away from armed revolution; instead, efforts would go towards institutionalising peace gains. It must also be noted that since around 2011 they have issued no new threats of further violent revolution.

Beyond specific party relations, the use of the threat of armed revolution raises a more fundamental question around the transformation process and the
prospects for long-term peace. It concerns the nature of the relationship between conflict and change – more specifically societal change – after civil war. Nieburg (1962:865) maintains that threatening behaviour is intended to bring accommodation of interests. The persistence of these threats in Nepal and Mozambique suggests, however, that deep incompatibilities between political parties remain. Although political parties in any country possess differing visions for it’s future, in Nepal and Mozambique the danger is that the threats are issued primarily around dissimilarities in views on governance. Nepal has no constitution and how the country should be organised as a federal state is hotly disputed between political parties. Similarly, in Mozambique, a key issue in recent peace talks was the political division of the state – with RENAMO continually questioning the legitimacy of the democratic institutions and process. Until parties can agree on such fundamental matters, serious questions remain around the sustainability of long-term peace.

5.1.2 Retaining mobilised armed forces

At the core of a Weberian conceptualisation of the modern state is the capacity to control the means of coercion (Gerth and Wright Mills, 1946). The state should be the only entity with legitimacy to threaten or execute physical force within its territory: what is termed the monopoly on violence. Civil wars involve multiple political actors using physical violence, and as a result, the monopoly on violence is fractured (Kalyvas, 2003:4). Reconsolidating this monopoly is a core objective in re-establishing a secure peace and is typically achieved using Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) policy or reform of the security sector more broadly (SSR), (Civic and Miklaucic, 2011).

In both Nepal and Mozambique, the road to state control of violence has been troubled, with certain political actors displaying a reluctance to concede access to private armed forces, or utilising state forces for their personal use. The second form of civil-war-contingent violence is a persistence of diffuse monopolies of violence, a reluctance of political parties to give up access to a militarised and mobilised force.
As part of peace negotiations, most of RENAMO’s forces were to be reintegrated into society or a restructured military. Dhlakama, however, insisted on retaining 300 troops. My interviewees widely attributed this to personal insecurity. As a civil society leader (M5) explained, ‘he didn’t, and still doesn’t, trust the government forces to protect him, so he keeps his own men’. This personal guard remains active and, as a recent press statement by the head of RENAMO Parliamentarians suggests, shows no signs of changing: ‘They will remain with their guns in their hands because those arms are to defend the people’ (All Africa, 2015).

It was suggested that Dhlakama’s actions stem from a deep distrust of FRELIMO’s commitment to reform the state and accept RENAMO as a rival political power. The CEO of an NGO working on ex-combatant rights (M7) told of a fear amongst the RENAMO political leadership that FRELIMO want to eliminate Dhlakama, believing that if he dies, RENAMO dies with him. The armed forces are seen as a protection against this. The majority of interviewees saw the failure to demobilise this retinue and complete the disarmament process as the biggest stumbling block to peace.

FRELIMO appear equally averse to conceding any military control. One of the most contentious points during negotiations centred on the number of RENAMO troops to be integrated into the national army and security forces. FRELIMO’s position was to limit this to as few as possible and restrict access to higher ranks (M4, M11, M15). An academic (M19) studying the peace process commented that FRELIMO had slowly reneged on the agreement that the army would be comprised of fifty percent from each side: ‘They (FRELIMO) started to kick out the RENAMOs [sic]: because of age, because of lack of skills, because of

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50 Trust as a barrier to the transformation of interparty relations is a theme throughout the two empirical chapters. Theoretical notions of trust are used widely in studies of intergroup conflict and there is an extensive body of academic literature on the subject. For example, social conflict theory draws heavily on the idea of developing trust as a precursor to reducing conflict and violence (Sherif et al., 1961, Davis, 2013). Ideas of trust are also strongly linked to effective democracy (Warren, 1999). Where trust is referenced in these chapters, it does not relate to specific theories or conceptual understandings. It is used more in a practical sense of parties being able to predict that when interacting with others their needs and interests will be considered in a fair and open manner.
differences.’ The RENAMO spokesperson (M8) said the dismissal of their forces was a ploy to ensure FRELIMO plots to assassinate RENAMO leader Dhlakama would not be compromised from within.

Many interviewees were concerned at the lack of separation between state forces and the FRELIMO government. A human rights activist (M2) alleged that FRELIMO use the military and police force as enforcers, while the security services were also identified as routinely spying for the party (M18). By way of personal observation, I attended a public demonstration against the government handling of an investigation into the assassination of a prominent law professor who had stated that the constitution could be interpreted to concede to some of RENAMO’s demands for a decentralised state. The military presence at the demonstration was a clear display of force: dozens of soldiers as well as police, armoured vehicles and heavy weaponry. Their interaction with protestors – posturing with arms and use of aggressive crowd control – were obvious attempts to intimidate.

In Nepal, DDR was envisioned to take six months. Six years later Maoist forces were still in demobilisation camps. In an interview, a prominent member of the military (K6) commented that the reason the process was so drawn out was the reluctance of Maoist political leaders to give up their greatest bargaining chip – their forces – and a lack of agreement on particular aspects of the DDR process, namely the numbers of troops to be integrated into the Nepali army and the terms of the retirement package being offered to their fighters. Disagreement was felt to be due to a lack of confidence by both sides in the other’s commitment to peace, which fuelled their perception of the need to retain separate forces. This view was shared by the Director of an NGO (K19) who explained the political parties of The Seven-Party Alliance refused to compromise whilst Maoist ex-combatants, though demobilised and disarmed, were still effectively a standing force; while the Maoists countered that if they demobilised completely before a constitution was agreed, the other parties might renege on their commitments.
Additionally, in the early post-civil war years, the Maoist political leadership came under heavy and widespread criticism for their use of the Young Communist League (YCL), the party’s youth-wing, as a paramilitary force (Skar, 2008; Upreti and Vanhoutte, 2009; Joshi, 2014). The YCL were a means through which the Maoist leadership could exert control on the peace process – the most evident example being the positioning of YCL cadre at polling stations during the 2008 national elections (K21). Although Vice Chair Bhattarai declared YCL to be a necessary presence – ‘organising the masses and resisting the intimidating tactics of the reactionary classes’ (Proletarian, 2008) – a Nepali police inspector (K7) stated that UCPN(M) were claiming the YCL were necessary for law enforcement in parts of the country they had controlled during the war, places where the state security force was struggling to re-establish itself.

Their actions sparked responses from the other parties. ‘Seeing what the Maoists were doing, the other parties militarised their youth wings. They needed to be able to protect and defend against them’, said the Director of an NGO (K19). The formation of extra-state forces resulted in the creation of further multiple centres of violence and – sometimes – physical violence between the different youth wings. A programme manager for a human-rights NGO (K20) commented that up until 2012, ‘not a week would go by without a report of youth wings intimidating, threatening or fighting, somewhere in the country’.

In Nepal, since the completion of the DDR process – after seven years of negotiation the final Maoist ex-combatants were discharged from the demobilisation camps in late 2013 – there has been a marked decline in UCPN(M) threats of further revolution, coupled with a dramatic reduction in the recorded instances of YCL coercion and use of violence. There may be a causal link between use of the threat of further armed revolution and the tendency to retain access to armed forces. Military power, in whatever form, imbues a threat with the credibility that Collier (2010:133) determines is crucial to its effectiveness.
In terms of the transformation of intergroup conflict, the retention of armed forces implies a persistent distrust and a reluctance to concede security to the state. It also reinforces the belief that not all actors have precluded the need for violent revolutionary change in the future. Even now, several years after the completion of DDR, a number of my interviewees in Nepal questioned the Maoist (meaning UCPN(M)) commitment to non-violence and peace (K2, K1, K8).

Barnett et al., (2007:49) define three dimensions of peacebuilding. The first – ‘stability creation’ – relates to the core function of preventing a relapse into war by stabilising the ‘post-civil war zone’. As previously mentioned, this is principally attained through successful DDR and SSR. Yet, in Mozambique, DDR remains incomplete while in Nepal it has only recently been achieved. Many of my interviewees talked with irony about their countries being termed ‘peaceful’ when multiple armed forces still exist. An academic (M13) captured the common sentiment around this: ‘How can you realistically talk of peace, lasting peace, when both sides continue to have their own forces – it is impossible.’

If the forces have not been used to reignite civil war, it could be asked why there is cause for concern. My informants suggest that such politico-military groups serve other purposes. Both the UCPN(M) and FRELIMO used them to instil fear and compliance. They are also a way to get opponents to concede to demands. Although the stated rationale behind these extra-state forces is to protect the people and protect peace from a potential enemy aggressor, there may be far more driving it than a desire to protect the citizenry.

From a political economy viewpoint, the militarisation of the other parties’ youth wings in response to the Maoist mobilisation of the YCL can be seen as an attempt by the elites to rebalance the dynamics of power between parties. Similarly, Dhlakama’s personal guard could be viewed as a way for him to secure his position through maintaining an armed patronage network. Indeed, an academic (M13) suggested that there is a widespread view in Mozambique that

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51 The second dimension is restoring and building state institutional capacity, while the third involves addressing root socioeconomic causes.
the recent fighting was the product of Dhlakama trying to appease his retinue who were threatening to stage a coup and overthrow him. The insurgency was a means for Dhlakama to try and secure some power or resources with which to pacify his guard (M6, M13).

Forgoing access to private armed forces is critical to ensuring long-term peace – it also sends a strong message that both sides are committed to the process (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003). However, doing so makes a group vulnerable and assurance is required that there will be no further violence. Historically, peacebuilding has concentrated on protection being entrusted through state institutions (Ayoob, 2007; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Goetze and Guzina, 2008). While competent and capable institutions are undeniably instrumental, the data presented here, implies a need for a more fundamental reflection on the nature of interparty relations.

Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) maintain that private forces need to be given up as early in a peace agreement as possible. That this took seven years to complete in Nepal, while in Mozambique not only has it not been completed, but continues to remain a source of conflict, signifies a deep mistrust among political parties. There appears a persisting view among the parties that the ‘other’ continues to present a real threat that requires being able to defend against, potentially with armed violence. The demobilization of armed combatants and the demilitarisation of politics are fundamental to peacebuilding, and the fact they can go unfulfilled for so long highlights the urgent need to consider these forms of violence and their impact on interparty relations and long-term peace.

5.1.3 Claims-making related to civil war

Where civil wars end in stalemate, as in Nepal and Mozambique, the success of peace rests on the ability of the previously warring actors to transform themselves into credible political parties. It is dependent on ‘the degree to which the warring parties can make the adjustment from the battlefield to political arena’ (Manning, 2004:54). Legitimacy plays a key role in this process (Roberts,
2011a). Buchanan (2002:689) says that ‘an entity has political legitimacy if and only if it is morally justified in wielding political power’. Legitimacy is crucial to generating a stable and durable peace because 'legitimacy is what transforms coercive capacity and personal influence into durable political authority' (Clements, 2014:13). Widespread acceptance of the authority of the political establishment should create assurances that the needs of groups will be considered and appropriately responded to, precluding their need to pursue them violently.

Beyond political institutions, political parties, too, require legitimacy if they are to stand as reputable agents representing different groups within a country. Legitimacy can be conferred on them by the state, by their being recognised as formal political actors, but they also derive legitimacy through those they claim to represent. This is achieved through parties demonstrating they are acting in the interests of their constituent groups. Legitimacy from the supporter group is typically conferred through votes cast during national elections, which determines – to use Buchanan’s (2002) words – the degree of political power parties wield.

The third form of violence is based on the claims parties use to gain the support of group members and legitimise their status as political actors. Findings indicate political parties not only use but rely on the civil war as a primary source of legitimacy. Representations of group identity and intergroup relations portray understandings of conflict grounded in the civil war. Wartime imagery is invoked through what I term 'civil war-related claims-making', reproducing narratives around group interests similar to those that were being fought for during the civil war. In short, parties seek legitimacy from the groups they stand for through laying claim to the past, a past of war and violence. This civil war-related claims-making is not exclusive to rebels entering the political system, however, it is also used by parties that were in government during the war.

In Mozambique, both FRELIMO and RENAMO persistently employ representations of themselves as agents of change that link back to the violent
struggle for national reform. A civil society leader (M5) stated that the entire basis of FRELIMO’s political identity is predicated on their role as an anti-colonial movement. A political analyst (M6) explained that during the civil war the enemy changed, but the narrative of liberation remained the same and, in the post-civil war years, FRELIMO continue to lay claim to their responsibility to protect this. This is demonstrable in their slogan, ‘a Luta continua’ – the struggle continues. Started in Mozambique by Samora Machel, the liberation movement’s leader, it remains a dominant discourse in political campaigns and was evident around Maputo during fieldwork, displayed on several campaign posters. De Souto (2013) shows how FRELIMO use instruments such as memorialisation and education materials to construct a historical national narrative based on their role as the ‘protagonists of liberation’.

The political identity of RENAMO is more controversial. Hall (1990:39) is typical of many academics who, having analysed the history of the party, are disparaging of the authenticity of their political agenda. However, in the latter part of the war and into post-civil war years, an academic studying the peace process (M19) told me that the fight for democracy became central to the RENAMO political narrative and their appeal for popular support. Many of party leader Dhlakama’s speeches lay claim to the party’s role as the bringers of democratic change. For example, in an interview in the lead-up to the November 2014 elections, he boasted that he had ‘fought, and continues to fight, for democracy’ (All Africa, 2014).

Similar claims are apparent in Nepal. Since the signing of the CPA in 2006, the main Maoist party UCPN(M) have vehemently adhered to the same litany – that a people’s revolution through armed conflict was the best route to bring radical political, social and economic reform to the country. A press statement in 2010 marking the 15th anniversary of the ‘People’s War’ typifies the party’s representation of themselves and the conflict: ‘We revise our strong resolution and firm commitment to move forward in the direction of ceaseless revolution to make the Great Dreams of the Martyrs come true’ (Prachanda, 2010). The CEO of a peacebuilding NGO (K19) commented, ‘they are always talking about the great
‘People’s War’ and what they still want to achieve’. In 2012, a splinter group within UCPN(M) formed the CPN(M). A CPN(M) party spokesperson (K4) claimed that the reason for the breakaway was a reinvigorated commitment to the objectives of the armed struggle. Nepali Congress (NC), as the first political party in Nepal and the forerunner of multiparty politics, ground their identity in appeals to their democratic credentials. GP Koirala (2006:15), party head until 2010, notably states in his book: ‘I wish that there should be no need for future generations to fight for democracy like I have had to.’ NC’s representations of themselves and the peace process convey a consistent message of the merits of their sacrifice and ongoing struggle to bring freedom, liberation and democracy to the people of Nepal.

Representations of intergroup conflict remain largely backward-looking, entrenched in narratives of civil war and violent struggle linked to political and societal change. Said (1978) argues that representation is always a political choice. In this, he is referring to the conscious agency an actor has in selecting the accounts and imagery they choose to use. My interviews in both countries suggest that civil war-related claims-making, the retrospective representation of understandings of groups and interests centred around the civil war, is purposive. Political actors deliberately lay claim to the past to justify their continued relevance as political representatives. A political activist (M4) described the use of the war narrative by the two dominant parties in Mozambique as hijacking the political process. The parties cling to their identities from the war because these provide convincing platforms from which to display their capacity as agents of change: ‘I am important because I fought and brought you freedom (FRELIMO), I am important because I fought to give you democracy (RENAMO).’

As well as offering a source of legitimacy, civil war-related claiming is also used by political parties to discredit other parties in the process. More often than not, claims made by party members around conflict do not relate to the group itself but rely heavily on othering. A clear example from Mozambique is FRELIMO’s use of the phrase ‘bandidos armados’ to refer to RENAMO. ‘Armed bandits’ was a
label employed during the civil war to discredit RENAMO, portraying them as criminals and terrorists (Wiegink, 2015:3). At a press conference in June 2014, FRELIMO spokesperson Damião José used it to describe RENAMO behaviour leading up to the insurgency. Use of the phrase, however, has not been limited to the recent fighting. Instead, it appears as a regular feature in FRELIMO statements throughout the post-civil war period.

RENAMO claims, meanwhile, continue to draw on the communist roots of the FRELIMO party, referring to it to as an oppressive, corrupt communist government that denies freedom of speech and tramples on democratic principles. At a RENAMO political rally in February 2015 Dhlakama exclaimed, 'the FRELIMO communists must not continue to enslave these provinces' (Mozambique News Agency, 2015). Much of the party’s portrayal of FRELIMO plays to an image that is elitist, authoritarian and ignorant to the needs of the majority of Mozambicans (M3, M4). Many of my interviewees described the use of these representations as a pervasive feature of the interparty relations between RENAMO and FRELIMO. A political analyst (M6) recounted that ‘at least once a week newspapers will contain a story in which one party or the other will labour on misdeeds dating back to the civil war’.

In Nepal, NC and other parties are the target of UCPN(M) claims that they are an enemy of the people. Statements regularly refer to the parties as supporters of the pre-‘People’s War’ imperialist autocratic regime that marginalised and discriminated. An academic (K22) stated, ‘they [UCPN(M)] are always making out the other main parties are resisting change, that they want the old system back’. UCPN(M) portrays NC and CPN-UML in particular as wanting to fortify the elitist feudal system that led to the civil war. In 2010, for example, Maoist Party Chairman Prachanda issued a statement accusing them of reneging on the peace deal, 'the present government, which has set a new record of murder, terror, abduction, impunity, price hike and corruption, is heading toward regressive direction [sic]' (Ranjitkar, 2010).
Similarly, the Maoists themselves are portrayed by the other parties – in the words of a civil society leader (K8) – ‘as a disingenuous bunch of thugs who have no respect for democracy or the people’. A recurrent claim relies on questioning UCPN(M)’s commitment to peace, casting doubt on their renouncement of violence. In 2011, a CPN-UML spokesperson commented on the stalling of the peace process, ‘only when the Maoists accept the democratic principles will we have a truly functional democracy’, while in January 2012 Sushil Koirala stated, 'Nepali Congress has sacrificed everything to bring the Maoists into the political mainstream'.

Violence is employed in two ways through this civil war-related claims-making. Firstly, it is used to directly attack and discredit other parties by drawing on particular atrocities or key incidents from the war. In Mozambique, a prominent academic (M3) commented, ‘they [parties] purposefully play on violence each other committed, saying “Remember them, remember what they did to your husbands, to your families.”’ Igreja (2008b:539) conducted an analysis of parliamentary debates in Mozambique and concluded ‘both parties wage fierce political battles where memories of the violent past are used as the principal weapon’. In Nepal, political parties have been embroiled in a bitter public dispute over responsibility for the 3,400 Nepalese who were forcibly disappeared during the conflict. The parties have engaged in a blame game that has come down to arguing over very personal and specific cases.

The second way violence is employed is in its use to question the legitimacy of parties. NC and CPN-UML in Nepal, for example, have persistently challenged the Maoist party’s renouncement of revolution through violence. Their claims centre on the use of the YCL as a paramilitary force. However, an ex-combatant representative (K14) related that because the other parties militarised their youth wings in response, UCPN(M) frequently engage in counter-claims that violence was instigated by the youth wings of NC and CPN-UML. Similarly, in Mozambique, continuing to refer to RENAMO as ‘armed bandits’ implies that the party is still committed to violence. Rather than being related to a particular
issue or policy, such claims are an existential attack on the very nature of the opposing party as a legitimate entity.

All sides commit heinous acts in war. Political actors who use violence related to the war in their representation of the other become the target of accusations themselves. The only way to rebuff these is by valorising their violent acts, which they do by invoking narratives that glorify violence – the celebration of Heroes’ Day is an example – appealing to a nobler cause such as defending the nation. De Souto’s (2013) work examining the FRELIMO strategy to memorialise their role as liberators through channels such as state education is another example. The provocative attack on the RENAMO base in 2013 that was the prelude to renewed violence was vindicated as a necessity to combat ‘internal terrorism’ (Reliefweb, 2013), and thereby protect the country (M6). The RENAMO spokesperson’s parliamentary statement cited in the previous Section 5.1.2 is an affirmation of the ongoing need for a mobilised force to defend the people.

Civil war-related claims-making thus provides a source of political legitimacy while simultaneously undermining that of the opposition. Relying on such claims appears to lock the parties into a self-perpetuating pattern of interaction as they continue to reproduce narratives of themselves from the civil war. For these representations to remain relevant, understandings of the ‘other’ must also be sustained: laying claim to being defenders of democracy requires an ‘other’ that represents a threat to it. In essence, they need each other and they need the past. Political discourse and space around policy-making remain dominated by narratives of intergroup conflict trapped in the polarised factionalism of the civil war decades after the fighting has finished.

The need to draw on past experiences to help frame the present makes history an intrinsic part of political discourse. Wiersma (2009:15) talks about the contested nature of history and how politicians can abuse it, telling a story of the past that best suits their interests. The use of history to mobilise groups to war is well studied. Simon et al., (2000:195) discuss how historic fictions that were part of Hutu Power propaganda became perceived realities. McDowell and Braniff
suggest that ethnonational identities politicised during the Yugoslav wars drew on centuries-old events to stoke intergroup hatred. Igreja (2008b) talks about memories of the civil war being used as weapons in Mozambican Parliamentary debates.

The concern in Nepal and Mozambique is that the use of civil war-related claiming continues to reproduce essentialised and polarised narratives, dominating political discourse decades into peace. Actors externalise violence as a destructive force which they project onto the opposition at the same time as they afford their own violence an exempted status – necessary in order to bring change. With multiple sides employing civil war-related claims, the result is a blame game where the historicity around the civil war remains a battleground. The only surety is that violence endures as a prominent weapon in a war between the previous warring political parties for political legitimacy from their constituent groups. More than this, it illustrates how violence remains an inherent part of relations between the previously warring political actors, both in terms of how they understand their own group identity and the identity of the other they were previously fighting.

Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010:4) maintain the need to challenge oversimplified explanations for civil war-related violence. I have presented three behaviours and strategies that political parties use in their interactions with one another that I maintain constitute forms of violence. To understand them as violence, however, requires a move away from dominant explanations. They do not involve physical violence, and yet, the way they are employed is more direct and deliberative than structural violence, which is more systemically embedded in socio-political institutions (Galtung, 1969).

The focus on political parties emerged as I began to discern patterns to this violence. Its persistence after the war prompted investigation into what it denotes about the degree of transformation between parties and the wider implications for peacebuilding. While I am not suggesting that all parties use all three forms – or to the same degree – their presence signifies that violence
continues to play a prominent role in how some parties understand and think about their relations. As part of my recognition that the behaviours of parties are complex, I have suggested that more may be driving the violence than a desire to advance the needs of the group. To this end, I have discussed a number of aspects of political economy such as rent-seeking and interparty power dynamics as influencing factors.

I suggest that all three forms of violence can be seen to share a link to the civil war – either as a direct product of it, or in requiring it to have happened in order for them to be recognised as an effective political instrument. I apply the term civil-war-contingent violence, therefore, as a way to conceptually frame, understand and analyse these forms of violence collectively. Having introduced the idea, the rest of this chapter looks to why it needs consideration, explores why it remains so prevalent and the implications that it may have for long-term transformation of intergroup relations and peace.

5.2 Efforts to transform relations

The picture presented so far of relations among parties makes for pessimistic reading. However, I do not wish to imply that no transformation at all has taken place. My point is rather that the prevalence with which civil-war-contingent forms of violence continue to be present in interparty relations suggests limited transformation. I will now turn my attention to several initiatives that can be seen as attempts to transform intergroup conflict in post-civil war years. What they reveal is that this violence can negatively affect the success of such peacebuilding interventions. Two examples that are prominent within the data are discussed. The first relates to the concept of nationbuilding and centres around the idea of fostering a sense of national identity to bridge the divide between RENAMO and FRELIMO groups. The second focuses on the NTTP (Nepal Transition To Peace) initiative, designed to bring Nepali political parties together to facilitate more constructive decision-making.
5.2.1 Developing a national identity

A pluralist approach to identity says that an individual will simultaneously identify with many different groups (Sen, 2007). Drawing on Sen's ideas suggests that reducing the salience of the essentialised wartime identities – getting people to see themselves as part of other groups – can help reduce intergroup violence. The concept of nationbuilding utilises theory of identity – Lotz (2010:223) deems nationbuilding to be the ‘creation and strengthening of a shared national identity’. The virtue of fostering a collective national sense of character is to bridge the gap between fighting groups and ‘thereby subordinate prejudices to the assimilating logic of a common civil culture that is not hostile to national identity’ (Kiwuwa, 2007:8). The theory posits that subgroup interests should not be pursued violently because to do so would be harmful to the greater good of the national interest. In essence, all groups under the national identity should be secondary considerations.

In Mozambique, creating a national appreciation of what it means to be Mozambican has been a government project since the end of the war. Seleti (1997) describes the fostering of Mozambican-ness as intended to unite the disparate indigenous groups and put the country on the road to development and prosperity. An academic studying the peace process (M13) said, ‘Machel, he had a vision. He didn’t want people to say: I am from this tribe or that area, but that we are all together, that we belong to one nation – to say, I am from Mozambique.’

A number of interviewees attributed a sense of national Mozambican identity as a key factor in the success of the country’s peacebuilding (M5, M13, M15). It was felt that Mozambicans are acutely aware and accepting of difference, encapsulated in the oft-cited phrase: ‘One Mozambique, all Mozambican.’ Indeed, a sense of pride was often noted in conversations discussing the national identity. As one interviewee stated: ‘We are all Mozambican with our differences and we embrace this difference’ (M6). In fact, one political analyst suggested (M7) that many Mozambicans draw strength from their national identity, looking to it as a means through which to reconnect and unite the people.
I suggest, however, that due to the nature of current interparty relations a caveat be put on the ability of national identity to create a stable, long-term peace in Mozambique. Kiwuwa (2007:8) maintains that the purpose of a national identity is 'not to repress sub-national identities, but rather to dilute their political relevance and their ability to structure or impact to any meaningful degree'. The political discourse and civil war-related claims-making around intergroup conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO contradict the idea of a united nation. Indeed, the tropes that parties invoke are predicated on divisive tactics, perpetuating deep divisions and the polarisation of society. Much of the general dialogue – rather than on particular issues or policy positions – centres around reifying wartime factionalism and draws heavily on a discourse of physical violence. A civil society leader (M4) suggested that over the past few years, RENAMO has started to politicise ethnic identities that, historically, have not been a cause of conflict. By appealing to the historic marginalisation of particular ethnic groups to gain support, RENAMO risk subsuming these identities into the RENAMO-FRELIMO essentialisation.

In Mozambique, the national identity remains contested as both RENAMO and FRELIMO try to link party identity to the national character. FRELIMO present themselves as the liberators: anti-imperialist forces who saved the country from colonial rule. Part of their political strategy is to reinforce their connection to the national identity by claiming RENAMO are not Mozambican, but are rather the product of imperialist design (M19). At the same time, RENAMO claim to be the bringers of democracy and freedom, saving the Mozambican people from the grip of an oppressive, authoritarian socialist regime.

That the parties are so actively staking a claim to national identity highlights the importance of reflecting on the politics of national identity building. Hobsbawm (1992) maintains that national identity is ‘constructed from above’, a product of the political elite. Who is involved in constructing it and how it is understood will have serious repercussions on the capacity to unite the previously warring groups in the aftermath of civil war. FRELIMO have been in control of
government for three decades and have therefore been able to construct an ‘official’ narrative around national identity built in its own image. Salgado (2016:77) discusses state and privately owned media. The former is ‘government-aligned’ and pro-FRELIMO, blocking any non-party voices. The latter – notionally independent – is equally restricted due to difficulty in accessing state-controlled information and stringent government checks. The dominance of this FRELIMO-centric view of the nation in the public domain was corroborated by several of my interviewees (M5, M6, M13). One cited the example of Heroes’ Day, an annual event celebrating fighters of the liberation war. ‘Do you think FRELIMO would ever allow RENAMO fighters to be honoured like this? It would be unthinkable’ I was told by a national representative for ex-combatants (M1).

The normative notion of national identity building in civil war-affected countries is to prevent violence by diffusing group differences (Lotz, 2010). However, the inequality in Mozambique between the parties raises questions around motive. A political economy analysis of interparty power dynamics would interpret FRELIMO’s influence over the national identity as a means of maintaining control of the state. Although the promotion of a national identity after civil war offers an appealing strategy to transform violent relations, what the case of Mozambique shows is that the nature of interparty relations can have serious implications for its effectiveness. Through claims-making that employs narratives of war and violence both parties are simultaneously trying to capture and impose their own identity onto Mozambican nationalism.

5.2.2 Neutral spaces

A common strategy in peacebuilding is to bring warring parties together in a neutral space. The idea behind this is that providing conditions where actors can suspend preconceived ideas and be free of the pressures and constraints of the wider situation will allow them to work toward common solutions.
The Nepal Transition To Peace (NTTP) was one such initiative. Established shortly before the end of the civil war in 2005, it was designed as a platform for peace actors to come together and discuss how to end hostilities. The NTTP Forum brings major political parties and key civil society leaders to an informal and confidential dialogue process that supports political negotiations on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), constitutional development, peace building, and transitional justice’, Asia Foundation (2014:1). Its main goal was to enable the various political parties to develop common ground on areas of policy where they held opposing positions.

Discussions were kept private, making the NTTP what Cornwall (2002) calls a ‘closed space’ and, in the words of a programme manager for an LNGO working on political reconciliation, somewhere that ‘the main parties could discuss openly and collaboratively, think freely and outside of the box’ (K21). Members were urged to be ambitious and creative, to talk about what they thought should be done for the betterment of the country rather than be confined by political realities and positions. The idea was to go ‘beyond what their party thinks, or what their party has envisioned’ (K21). It was said that there was no other forum in the peace process that afforded this opportunity and that NTTP provided a valuable space away from the public antagonisms and fighting that characterised party relations.

NTTP acted as an enabler in the transformation of interparty relations, helping to change parties’ perceptions of one other. The programme manager (K21) talked about the parties using NTTP as a space to prevent violence in the run-up to the first national elections. High-level party members were in constant contact through the forum, and when reports came in of political cadre provoking violence they were able to call the party leader in the region concerned to demand it be stopped. Such visible demonstrations of their commitment to non-violence were arguably crucial to helping in the development of trust (K21).

Despite these achievements, the programme manager (K21) remained sceptical of their being translated into wider transformation in interparty relations. NTTP
neutralised political identities. Members were asked to leave their political affiliation at the door and enter meetings as problem-solvers, able to think of solutions free from party positions. At the same time, though, this left the solutions ignorant of the political reality they hoped to transform and, as Section 5.1 demonstrates, the political reality of how parties understand and relate can be highly resistant to transformation.

This observation resonates with Aggestam et al.'s (2015) critique of contemporary liberal peacebuilding. By seeking consensus the NTTP approach denies the contested nature of politics – which raises questions about the extent of any transformation it can hope to achieve. In addition, the people drawn to such peacebuilding spaces will also influence the capacity for transformation. As the programme manager (K21) pointed out, the politicians who attended were progressive elements within their respective parties. The inference is that wider transformation will remain difficult as hard-line party members will resist the advancements made.

The earlier discussion around Mozambican national identity suggests that interparty relations influenced by civil-war-contingent forms of violence can affect and undermine interventions designed to transform intergroup relations. Similarly, interviews suggest that the NTTP had limited impact because it failed to deliberate on how advances made within its space could affect wider change. In both cases, a failure to consider interparty relations impeded the ability to effect transformation.

The example of national identity building in Mozambique raises an interesting point linked to theories of the social contract, nationbuilding and relations between people and the state. Nationalism is more than simply constructing an identity. It is about strong institutions that inspire confidence and legitimacy in the capacity to govern (Baradat, 2015:58). Contestation of the national identity indicates the parties lack faith in the state's ability to deal with their conflicts equitably, and may go some way towards explaining the persistence of violence in their interactions. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge state institutional
capacity – and how political parties understand and relate to the state – as a factor in the observations made in this chapter. However, beyond institutions – and this is a key point emerging from the analysis – it is also a matter of trust, not just in the system, but that the other parties will abide by decisions and accept the decision-making process.

Discussion of these interventions highlights that institutional capacity may not be enough to transform conflictual interparty relations in post-war contexts. More interventions that explicitly target political parties and work to transform the relations between them are needed. A better appreciation of how they understand conflict may help to explain why violence continues to be a seen as a legitimate option.

5.3 Creating space for change

Cornwall (2002) argues that rather than being neutral, spaces are shaped and constructed. Having used the idea of civil-war-contingent violence to explore how violence remains a key part of interparty relations, attention turns here to the influence of the wider political system. Cornwall's concept is used to examine party interaction in political spaces during policy-making and to consider how political processes and mechanisms affect the transformation of interparty relations. I suggest that relative to Mozambique, conditions in Nepal have facilitated a faster transformation in interparty relations. The rationale for this rests on Nepali parties displaying a marked reduction in their reliance on civil-war-contingent forms of violence over a shorter timeframe than RENAMO and FRELIMO. A more pluralist political environment may be a contributing factor.

First, relations between parties representing the previously warring groups and parties without such links will be considered. In Nepal, the former have shown more receptiveness to new and alternative political parties than RENAMO and FRELIMO. Indeed, both RENAMO and FRELIMO appear acutely reluctant to allow other political actors into formal political spaces. Although, it should be noted that much of the space in Nepal has been ‘claimed’ rather than ‘invited’. Second,
the process of transformation within the previously warring political parties will be explored. Nepalese parties appear to afford an environment that is more open to divergent views, producing a more discursive intraparty culture relative to Mozambique where parties are more hierarchical and intolerant of dissensus within party ranks.

5.3.1 New parties and political space

As the main protagonists of the civil war and signatories to the peace agreement, the previous belligerents are crucial to a transition to peace. However, peacebuilding and the introduction of democracy should herald an ‘opening up of the political space for equal participation, representation and choice-making’ (Norberg and Obi, 2007:6), allowing different actors and groups to have a voice. How the wartime parties respond not just to each other, but also to new political parties, can offer insight into the transformation process.

Interviews with prominent members of two opposition groups in Mozambique revealed their experiences of interacting within the formal political space. The Party for Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD) was established in 2004 by an ex-member of RENAMO who, until he was ousted in 2000, was generally held to be Dhlakama’s right-hand man (M18). The PDD member (M18) interviewed saw the party leader’s rejection as deliberately orchestrated by FRELIMO in order to weaken RENAMO. Influenced by this experience, PDD was seen as being founded out of a desperate need to create ‘democrats’ in Mozambique. The interviewee talked of a façade generated by the two parties: ‘they talk about democracy, but there is none in practice’ (M18). Since setting up the party, it was explained that RENAMO and FRELIMO have undertaken a campaign to discredit the party and its leaders legitimacy. For example, FRELIMO were seen as using the secret intelligence service to undermine PDD’s political strategy: ‘before we go to a place to do campaigning FRELIMO is already there, doing what we want to do’.
The third largest party to emerge in the 2014 national elections, MDM (Democratic Movement of Mozambique), owes its origins to a split within RENAMO. A prominent member from MDM (M10) related how party founder Daviz Simango was banned by RENAMO from standing for election as Mayor of the city of Beira for a second time: ‘they did not like that he was so popular’. Disgruntled, Simango left and formed MDM in early 2009. However, MDM’s inclusion in the formal political process has been far from straightforward: ‘we were barred from contesting in nine of the thirteen constituencies and also we could not stand in Maputo’ (M10). The party member went on to describe the party’s experience: ‘Many times we are told we cannot go to a particular area and canvass: if you want to have a political meeting you must have a permission from the Governor or from the District Chief.’

RENAMO and FRELIMO attitudes was summarised by the interviewee in his account of the 2009 parliamentary elections. At the time, RENAMO were threatening to boycott the process but, scared by the gains MDM had made in local elections, FRELIMO deliberately courted RENAMO, saying that if they did not participate they would lose their position as main opposition: ‘it was clear that MDM was put into a “sandwich” situation – we were squeezed out by the two of them’ (M10). The MDM member’s description chimed with the views of several other interviewees. The Director of a faith-based NGO working on community reconciliation (M3) explained: ‘They [FRELIMO and RENAMO] have a mutual interest in preserving their power, because of this, they won’t let anyone else in.’

23 years into peace, the country remains a two-party system dominated by one side. Interviewees talked candidly about a lack of separation between party and state and accusations of election rigging were common. A political activist (M6) queried why it took a month to count votes after the recent national elections. He went on to say he knew party members who had disclosed that FRELIMO had purchased two of every ballot box, to ‘help ensure a victory’. A number of other interviewees recounted similar stories, adding that FRELIMO resist accountability by never acknowledging the accusations.
It would seem that not only have political spaces been what Cornwall (2002) would deem ‘closed’ to alternate political parties, but that FRELIMO and RENAMO actively manipulate the political system to block their participation. Although it is perhaps unsurprising that the adversarial behaviour between parties representing previous combatants described in Section 5.1 extends to emergent political parties, given observations in the previous chapter that they even appear reticent to acknowledge each other as legitimate political entities.

In Nepal, Sapkota (2014:16) describes how in the 1990s Nepalese movements were characterised by political and ideological interests. However, post-2006 this changed when issues of rights around identity became the leading discourse. Indeed, identity-based politics exploded after the end of the civil war as dozens of groups started claiming rights to representation in governance and decision-making (International Crisis Group, 2011). The early post-war years, however, were characterised by feuding and deadlock among the three main parties (UCPN(M), NC and CPN-UML) as they struggled to assert control (K22). A prominent civil society leader (K8) suggested that the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance had remained unified during Jana Andolan II against the common enemy of the king, but ‘with him gone, they descended into a fight of self-interest’. The resultant power positioning meant the parties had no interest in political actors with no influence in government: ‘the three main parties controlled politics, there was no need for them to listen to us minority groups’, said a programme manager for a Nepalese NGO working on peacebuilding (K11). For most of the smaller parties, the result has been marginalisation.

Despite this, however, it is important to note a shift in Nepalese politics over post-war years as these new actors have found ways to access and influence political processes – even if this is through their ‘claiming’ space rather than being ‘invited’ to the table by the dominant actors. The Madhesi Movement represents a key catalyst in this regard. The two successive movements were, in part, a response to government failure to recognise the Madhesi people and to acknowledge calls for a regionally autonomous Madhesh. Although this goal has
not been realised, the movements were successful in providing the Madhesi with a platform into politics. Although initially the Madhesi movements were branded as terrorism committed by criminalised armed groups (Small Arms Survey, 2011:11), their persistence eventually forced the government to recognise the legitimacy of their claims and to broker an agreement with the group’s political representatives. This brought them into mainstream politics: ‘they [the main parties] realised they could no longer ignore us, we would not go away. All we wanted was a chance to have a say’, commented a political representative of the Madhesi (K9). Although the inclusion of Madhesi in debates around the nature of a Federal Nepal had to be ‘claimed’, the pressure also served to push federalism onto the national agenda, opening up a political space for other marginalised groups such as the Tharu, Janajati and Dalit (K9).

The ability to express demands, however, does not automatically equate with the ability to effect change. Political processes remain dominated by the three main parties who, enjoying a collective majority in government, control who is ‘invited’ into political spaces. In the 2015 national elections, for example, despite the fact that the fourth and fifth largest parties were representatives of the Madhesi, the parties had to organise protests in an attempt to get their interests considered.52 While the opening up of political space to alternate actors has been slow, resistance does appear to have receded as the main parties have shown a willingness to engage with new parties, although the continuing need to claim space shows that gaining recognition and equality is an ongoing struggle.

One reason for this closing off of space may be that the previously warring parties have used their status as signatories to the peace agreement to create a bubble of exclusivity around the peace process – closing off decision-making to new and alternate political parties. As implementation stretches out (as has occurred in both Nepal and Mozambique), a tension arises between what can continue to be termed initiatives specifically attached to the peace process and

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52 Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum, Nepal (Madheshi People's Rights Forum, Nepal) gained 54 seats representing 9% of the votes. Tarai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party (Terai-Madesh of Nepal) gained 21 seats representing 3.5% of the votes.
issues of broader political and socio-economic change. The point at which peace processes end and wider societal transformation begins is a contentious issue in peacebuilding, and what emerges from this research is that the boundaries can be blurred. Well into the post-war period, parties in both Nepal and Mozambique continue to conflate issues specific to their relationship in the civil war with wider political decisions about the future of their countries.

During my fieldwork in Mozambique, for example, peace talks were taking place between FRELIMO and RENAMO around the recent fighting. These were closed (space) negotiations to which other political parties were not invited, despite MDM holding seats in Parliament. Although talks centred on the issue of RENAMO disarmament, the agenda included both the (RENAMO supported) issue of regional autonomy and broader socio-economic reforms, as a negotiator involved in the talks explained (M16). In Nepal, despite the question of federalism being opened up by the persistence of Madhesi representatives, a political representative of the Janajati (K10) discussed how the government had stopped their negotiations, effectively excluding 36% of the population from the debate.

The purpose of discussing this behaviour, the closing off and capture of political space, is to illustrate its influence on the peace processes and its hampering of the transformation of interparty relations. It is beyond my data, however, to assess the motives driving these actions. Where civil wars end in negotiated settlements the creation of power-sharing arrangements can be crucial to establishing a stable peace (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003; Gates and Strøm, 2007). Effective power-sharing should provide the parties of the previously warring groups with a guarantee of their role within the new political process, access to government and confidence that the political system will deal with conflict in a fair and open manner. This, in turn, should reduce the need to pursue political objectives through other means such as violence (Gates and Strøm, 2007:1). Observations presented here, however, indicate that the signatory parties may misuse the power-sharing arrangement, presumably to favour their access to decision-making and the distribution of resources. There is a need to be aware of
the implications political arrangements negotiated at the ending of a civil war can have for the longer-term development of political space if new and emerging parties are not to be marginalised or ignored.

5.3.2 Transformation within political parties

As internal change will determine how a party understands and interacts with others, it is also important to consider transformation within political parties. In interviews, a theme that repeatedly emerged as a barrier to the transformation of interparty relations related to leadership. Both Mozambique and Nepal have seen a minimal shift in party leadership over the post-civil war years, and many heads and prominent members were at the vanguard of the armed forces of their respective parties during the civil war.

A recurrent suggestion attributed this to a militarised mindset: ‘to them [Maoist leaders], violence and war are a way of life. I do not see this changing’ (K16). ‘The problem with the political leaders is that they are military men and they still think as though they are fighting’ (M3). Taken alone, however, this may be too simplistic an explanation – at times the elites of RENAMO and Maoist parties have removed themselves from politics without instigating further intergroup violence.

Self-interest and a desire for power were also presented as major causes of the retention of party leadership by wartime leaders. Interviewees supported their comments with examples of how some leaders had tried to actively resist change in order to maintain their position. A political analyst (M6) in Mozambique described how former President Guebuza circumvented political structures in the run up to the 2014 general election in efforts to hold on to the Presidency for a third term. These were tactics that were corroborated by several other interviewees (M7, M19). While my interview with the PDD member (M18) shows a similar assessment of RENAMO, the dismissal of the party leader was ‘because Dhlakama believed what they [FRELIMO] were saying. He came to think, this man is dangerous, he’s threatening my position.’ Further investigation
using a political economy examination of the power dynamics between the elites and their reticence to relinquish party control – looking at the networks of patronage they surround themselves with, for example – would be helpful. The CEO of a Mozambican NGO working to rehabilitate ex-combatants (M1) stated that many RENAMO parliamentarians are in politics not out of a desire for a life of public service but for the economic benefits that can be reaped by being part of Dhlakama’s close retinue.

Whatever the reasons behind their actions, it is commonly believed that the leaders’ reluctance to cede control coupled with their predisposition to violence has hampered the transition to peace. Many interviewees speculated that change – more democratic political practice and non-violent conflict – would only occur once these leaders had gone. For example, the CEO of an ex-combatant rights-based NGO (M14) said: ‘RENAMO will only become democratic and peaceful when Dhlakama is dead’, while the programme manager of a human rights NGO in Nepal said: ‘for peace in Nepal, we need Prachanda gone’ (K20). There is a sense of fatalism attached to this assessment as it implies a lack of agency; that there is no ability to affect any transformation other than simply waiting for the problem to go away. My data, however, does not support their beliefs. As Section 5.1 discussed, UCPN(M) have significantly reduced their use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence in spite of Prachanda’s continued leadership.

Another theme to emerge across interviews was the way in which wider relational and structural dynamics within parties influenced the process of change. In Mozambique, party organisation was viewed as an impediment to the constructive transformation of relations as, decades into peace, both RENAMO and FRELIMO remain regimented and hierarchical. ‘They [the parties] talk of democracy, but it is just talk, they do not practise [sic]. If you look, they are still run like military organisations’ (M3). In the case of FRELIMO, change was equated with force ‘you do not leave, you are pushed out by the ambitious, and this is often violent’, said a political analyst (M6).
Several interviewees spoke of the need to present a strong image, both within and without the organisation. ‘What you need to understand is that they have to talk powerfully, to show strength. To give ground to your opponent is to appear weak’, explained a civil society leader (M4). What such comments strongly imply is a lack of tolerance for dissent. Neither RENAMO nor FRELIMO are seen as encouraging dialogue and debate within party ranks. This suggests that violent understandings of intergroup conflict are entrenched within the parties rather than the result of leadership. If this is true, the situation is unlikely to disappear when leaders change.

More positively, however, several respondents talked of the potential for more constructive relations between RENAMO and FRELIMO following the election of FRELIMO Prime Minister Nyusi in November 2014. The primary reason being that Nyusi represents a break from the past: ‘he has no link to the wars, his father was a liberation fighter, but he has never fought’ (Ma2). As such, there is a sense he could lead FRELIMO in a new direction: ‘Nyusi is not like the others, he is free from the past, he will be able to bring good changes’ (M5). Several interviewees, however, expressed scepticism, believing that current political behaviours and practices are so rooted in the party that he will encounter immense opposition (M19, M14). Such a view supports the idea that intraparty resistance to transforming interparty relations is due to more than party leadership alone.

By way of contrast, Nepali parties are considerably more tolerant, allowing space to a more diverse range of political views. Over the post-war years, internal divisions within UCPN(M) have led to the party splintering. An academic studying the peace process (K18) summarised the situation: ‘the Maoists have always been very divided, fighting amongst themselves’. The split of CPN(M) in 2012 epitomises these internal tensions over the identity of the party and what they stand for. Another example is offered by the notoriously tense relationship between party Chair Prachanda and Vice Chair Bhattarai, which has been at times, very public and is said to divide party loyalties (K17). The other parties, namely NC and CPN(UML), have a longer history, being established before the
advent of multiparty democracy in 1990. As a result, they were spoken of as considerably more stable in terms of party cohesion. There appears a culture within these parties that is accepting of open, public debate between members (K22, K8).

I have used Cornwall’s (2002) ideas of political space to examine the transformation of interparty relations by looking at how parties participate in, and use, these spaces to pursue their interests in the peace process. This has been done in two ways. First, by looking at the space given to political parties other than those representing the previously warring groups; and second, by looking at space for transformation within political parties. Cornwall (2002) describes closed spaces as offering limited access – typically to an exclusive set of actors operating behind closed doors. In both countries, commitment to a multiparty political system that is open, inclusive and tolerant of diverse political actors and groups was enshrined in the peace agreements. However, the data presented here suggests that Nepal – at least initially – saw strong resistance to opening up participation in decision-making around the peace processes to political parties beyond the previously warring parties. Groups such as the Madhesi have had to claim this right, sometimes violently. Nevertheless, over time the political landscape has changed dramatically. As a result of repeated claims by new and emergent parties, the list of those invited into formal space has expanded.

In Mozambique, the post-civil war political system has been dominated by relations between RENAMO and FRELIMO who have manipulated political structures to block access to new actors such as MDM and PDD. An illustration of this was provided by the MDM party member (M10) who told of FRELIMO and RENAMO ‘ganging up’ on MDM, obstructing their ability to engage in campaigning. Although it may seem counterintuitive for RENAMO to act in this way – opening space up to an additional actor could, theoretically, draw support away from FRELIMO, helping to diffuse their historic dominance – as the party member went on to explain (M10), ‘RENAMO think it is better for them to be the only opposition’ rather than have other parties encroach on their political space.
As a result of this, Mozambican political relations have remained polarised rather than pluralised – and largely closed to new political parties.

From the data – which records a noticeable reduction in the use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence – it appears that the political environment of Nepal has been more conducive to transforming interparty relations than that of Mozambique. For example, UCPN(M) has suffered from almost continual in-fighting (particularly due to Chairman Prachanda and vice-chair Bhattarai’s contentious relationship) and splintered a number of times over post-war years. As these divisions have happened the use of the threat of armed revolution as a political instrument seems to have become confined to the smaller extreme parties such as CPN(M). Pluralism – the provision of space both between and within political parties that is tolerant of alternative discourses – may well be responsible. Schwarzmantel (2011), for example, discusses an extensive body of academic literature linking political pluralism with the reduction of violence. Indeed, democratic systems are based on the idea that giving political voice to diverse sections of society precludes their need to pursue their interests using violence (Saideman et al., 2002; Reynal-Querol, 2002).

In Nepal and Mozambique, both internal and external party relations are characterised as fractious, unstable and confrontational (K8, K9, K13), while the collapse of successive governments amid interparty quarrels and the failure to agree on fundamental questions such as the constitution demonstrate that consensus remains elusive. Such an assessment supports the idea that striving for agreement among parties in post-war parties may be unrealistic (Hirsch, 2013; Maddison, 2015). The concept of agonism is being used to critically reflect on the type of political relations that are realistically achievable in post-war contexts. Nepalese politics may at first appear closer to Aggestam et als, (2015) idea of agonistic party relations, in which contest and dissensus are the modus operandi. The continuing presence of civil-war-contingent forms of violence, however, indicates that the dissensus is founded more on antagonistic behaviour than agonism, which is about respect and acceptance of alternative and differing positions (Hirsch, 2013, Maddison, 2015). It is important to offer a historical
context to this observation. Pluralism in Nepal was born out of the long and contentious struggle for democracy, and a pluralistic political environment was already emerging in the lead-up to the civil war. Mozambique, on the other hand, has transitioned from colonial state to authoritative one-party system to democracy. My point, though, is that Nepal’s more pluralistic nature may have reduced the need to rely on civil-war-contingent forms of violence and, in the process, helped to move interparty relations in a more progressive direction than has been the case in Mozambique.

5.4 The need for political reconciliation
The final part of the chapter will turn to why civil-war-contingent forms of violence should be regarded as a cause of concern and, using ideas of identity, offer a possible explanation for their persistence in interparty relations. That these forms of violence have been present throughout 9 years of peace in Nepal and 23 in Mozambique, and that the patterns to their use implies that violence remains a central part of parties’ understanding of their relations with one another, has serious implications for the peace process. In both countries, the development and implementation of policies designed to help deal with the violence have far exceeded planned timeframes. Indeed, civil-war-contingent forms of violence can be seen to plague decision-making. RENAMO has withdrawn from the political process and threatened further civil war on numerous occasions, for example, which has repeatedly brought discussions to a halt; while the refusal of UCPN(M) to demilitarise the YCL destabilised peace in Nepal by undermining and prolonging the DDR process (K6). Across both countries, civil-war-related claiming undermines parties’ acceptance of one another as legitimate political opponents with whom they are willing to negotiate on equal terms.

As a result, parties appear to be locked into patterns of interaction characterised by belligerence rather than by a genuine desire to take policy-making forward in a constructive way. Such a view is confirmed by many of my interviewees: ‘Whenever one party attempts to assert control of the political process and
execute change, other parties block’ (K22). In a similar vein, the Director of a national NGO working on peacebuilding initiatives (M3) commented that ‘the only time you see both parties agreeing on anything is when they debate wages’.

The effects of civil-war-contingent violence are most evident in the fact that key elements of the peace agreement in both countries remain incomplete. In Nepal, the TRC has yet to be formed. The constitution was promulgated in November 2015, but has not yet been ratified as major objections by Madhesi and Janajati political groups have led to protests and strikes across the country, some of which have turned violent. DDR, which was anticipated to take six months, took six years. In Mozambique, DDR has yet to officially end and debates around the political structuring of the country remain a deeply divisive issue. Both DDR and state reform were key negotiation points in the recent peace talks seeking to end the renewed fighting in 2013-2014 (M15, M16).

Beyond their impacts on the peace process, civil-war-contingent forms of violence also have a bearing on the transformation of interparty relations. The types of behaviour and relations that they produce are far from what Lederach (2003:26) would characterise as healthy: ‘discovering opportunities to learn and find constructive solutions to conflicts’. Indeed, relations among the political parties appear locked into patterns of interaction based on antagonism and confrontation. Although there has not been a resurgence of widespread physical violence and civil war, the prevalence of civil-war-contingent forms of violence questions the degree to which transformation has occurred among the political parties.

The presentation and examination of these forms of violence and their impact on the peace process reveals not only the need to increase awareness of their existence, but also suggests that working with parties to reduce their use could positively influence the transformation of interparty relations and peacebuilding. As a concept, civil-war-contingent violence offers a means to explore in more depth the binaries used to describe interparty relations – destructive/constructive (Lederach, 2003) or antagonistic/agonistic (Aggestam,
et al., 2015) – and to consider how the transition from one to the other can happen in post-war contexts. Distinguishing between these three forms of violence – threat of armed revolution, retention of armed forces and civil war-related claims-making – allows for a more nuanced analysis of particular political behaviours and strategies that embody destructive and antagonistic relations.

Although I connect the three through a mutual link to the civil war, uniting them under the term 'civil-war-contingent violence', I do not mean to present them as solely a product of the civil war. Lederach's (2003) conflict transformation approach advocates the importance of understanding current conflict in relation to the past. The inference that the more pluralistic political system of Nepal has been more conducive to transformation, for example, is made with awareness that this environment pre-dated the civil war. The term 'civil-war-contingent violence' merely offers a way to understand, differentiate and examine this violence.

Identifying civil-war-contingent violence and demonstrating its effects on the peace process fails to explain why parties continue to see it as a legitimate means for pursuing their interests – or how to mitigate its use. Rather than simply describe interparty relations, many of my interviewees offered their thoughts on what was needed to transform the destructive patterns of interaction. Most felt political reconciliation – in the sense of building constructive and 'better relationships' (Bloomfield et al., 2003:12) – was the answer. When pressed on what this might look like, the typical response involved education. As a religious leader (M14) commented: 'the politicians need to be educated on how to govern properly and do politics peacefully'. However, what form they felt this political education should take varied. A project manager for a faith-based NGO (M3) believed that teaching party members how to engage in open and fair debate was crucial, whereas in Nepal, a civil society leader (K8) and an NGO worker promoting youth rights (K13) cited a need for parties to be more responsive to the people. Notwithstanding such differences, interviewees were united around
the need for parties to be taught how to conduct democratic politics and practices.

Despite these beliefs, the utility of educating politicians in good governance as a way of bringing about political reconciliation could be questioned. Caddell’s (2005) account of the history of the political parties in Nepal demonstrates that many of the Maoist leaders were involved in politics and the democratic movements decades before they initiated civil war. What separated them from other parties was their commitment to violence as a way of bringing change. In Mozambique, an academic (M13) and a political analyst (M6) both described Dhlakama as a consummate politician with decades of experience. Educating politicians in better governance practices, then, may not be sufficient to reduce their reliance on civil-war-contingent forms of violence.

Turning to ideas of identity, persistence of these forms of violence may partly rest with how the political parties understand themselves and each other. Many of my interviewees described interaction between parties in terms characteristic of wartime relations. The Mozambican political environment was termed a battlefield by a prominent civil society leader (M14): ‘both sides are continuing to play, and have continually played a security forces game’. In Nepal, the CEO of an NGO (K19) stated: ‘the parties are not interested in peaceful politics, the war may have ended in a stalemate but they are still acting as though they are trying to win a fight’. Similarly, a negotiator involved in the peace talks (M16) in Mozambique encapsulated many of the descriptions attributed to the parties’ relations with this comment: ‘they still regard each other as enemies, the fighting continues, they just transferred it into the political domain’.

The words echo the suggestion of many interviewees: the physical fighting may have ended, but for the political parties representing the previously warring groups, interparty relations remain reminiscent of war. The RENAMO spokesperson’s (M8) claim that FRELIMO is plotting to assassinate party leader Dhlakama and the way in which political parties use the civil war within their claims are just two examples. Often, the content of claims reference the future as
well as the past. UCPN(M), CPN(M), NC, RENAMO and FRELIMO all allude to some form of ‘continuing struggle’, heavily laced with undertones of violent revolution or the need to combat it. What emerges is a sense of war for political survival. Just as civil war aims for complete subjugation of the enemy, the claims parties make go beyond trying to undermine one another on specific issues or policies. Instead they go straight to the core of a party’s identity, challenging their very existence as a legitimate political entity. A key barrier to the transformation process, my analysis infers, is that previously warring parties continue to see an enemy rather than a political opponent.

Many of the illustrations woven through this chapter portray a political discourse polarised by continuing claims that parties are engaged against a foe. Overarching narratives invoke a sense of struggle – either for radical reform or to curb a threat to society. Similarly, political practice is plagued by interactions that suggest parties are trying to control processes, or block other parties’ access to political spaces. In democracies, competition for political power is an ongoing conflict that unfolds as an open-ended process, tempered through episodic elections (Young, 2000; Dalton et al., 2011). My interviewees, however, talked with a sense of finality about the way that parties in Nepal and Mozambique engage in political processes – as if they were trying to eliminate the opposition and capture the political space exclusively for themselves.

The idea of an enemy implies combat and is inherently linked to violence or the possibility of violence. As Tu (2013:10) states: ‘when there is an enemy, one no longer controls one’s own fate, but it is tied to the enemy’s’. This returns us to the idea of polarisation, and the way in which an enemy (the essentialised other) represents an existential threat during war (Sen, 2007). Under conditions of either ‘us’ or ‘them’, violence is seen as a legitimate means of ensuring survival. The idea that the parties representing the previous warring groups continue to see each other as enemies rather than legitimate political opponents also resonates with the way Mouffe (2000:15) uses identity to differentiate between antagonistic and agonistic politics in terms of the enemy/friend distinction.
The political parties representing the previously warring groups are complicit in fuelling this perception. It has been discussed how claims made to validate the parties’ legitimacy as political representatives draw extensively on narratives from the civil war. As long as parties continue to rely on these narratives as a way of gathering support, they have a vested interest in reifying and perpetuating them. To justify such portrayals and ensure they remain relevant to the party supporter base, the perception that an enemy still exists must be maintained. There is, therefore, a mutual interest in reifying these polarised perceptions of intergroup conflict.

Under these conditions, it becomes easier to understand how hard it is for parties to move away from the use of civil-war-contingent violence. To reject violence is to reject the part of their identity that the violence is connected to. It requires a re-imaging of the group, and of its interests, needs and goals. Volkan (2009b:209) shows how challenges to identity brought on by conflict can trigger an existential crisis, generating uncertainty and feelings of vulnerability. If a change in identity is perceived as a threat to the group’s cohesion – or even to its very existence – it will be resisted out of fear of being eradicated. Retaining a wartime identity, then, offers a semblance of security. Furthermore, even if a party were to renounce the use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence there is no assurance that their opponents would reciprocate – making the threat of annihilation a real one. This is why it remains easier to look to the past for legitimacy and identity – even if this means reifying commitments to violence – than attempting to redefine the party and perhaps face a future where political survival is uncertain. There are exceptions to this pattern. UCPN(M), for example, broke from it with their redefinition of the party identity in the 7th Party Congress manifesto (2013) in which the need for armed struggle was formally renounced.

Kaldor (2013) argues that exposure to violence during civil war can cause the internalisation of polarised narratives of intergroup conflict. A similar phenomenon may be taking place through parties’ use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence in post-civil war years. Threats of armed revolution and civil
war and the existence of separate mobilised armed forces reinforce the sense that a group's existence is threatened. At the same time, the use of civil-war-related claims-making serves to reproduce and reconstruct polarised group identities and relations that accentuate ideas of the enemy. While I approached this research from a multi-identity perspective (Sen, 2007), political parties appear to be perpetuating the inverse – continually reproducing essentialised ideas of group identity from the time of the civil war. One inference is, that although it might be possible to stop civil war and physical fighting overnight, transformation of interparty relations and reduction of the use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence may depend on working with parties to deconstruct understandings of the other as 'enemy'. For, as long as they continue to maintain this belief, violence will be perceived as a legitimate part of how they understand their relations.

5.5 Summary
Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010:4) maintain the need for more nuanced understandings of violence in post-civil war situations. Moving beyond unsophisticated explanations that talk simply about violence or non-violence, they reason that different types of violence require different strategies if they are to be prevented or reduced. The chapter looked at the process of transformation from the perspective of political parties that claim to represent the previously warring groups, and introduced the idea that violence has remained a prevalent feature of how parties interact years – and even decades – into peace.

This violence, however, does not fit into contemporary explanations. It is neither direct physical violence, nor indirect structural violence that limits and discriminates through state structures and institutions. Three forms were presented: the threat of further armed revolution, the retention of access to armed forces and civil war-related claims-making. Collectively, I have used the term civil-war-contingent violence as a means of distinguishing the three forms and to conceptually frame, understand and analyse their impacts on interparty relations and the wider peace process.
Civil-war-contingent violence has plagued interparty relations in both Nepal and Mozambique over post-war years. The regularity with which the three forms are employed indicates that violence remains a fundamental part of how parties understand their relations with one another and demonstrates limited transformation in interparty relations. That neither country has relapsed into war, however, suggests some change has taken place, while the data presented in Section 2.3 propose that the more pluralistic nature of the Nepalese political environment has enabled greater transformation than the bipolarity of Mozambique. The point is, though, that conflict is relational, so if one party is using these forms of violence then it can be said violence is present in their relations.

This chapter set out to investigate civil-war-contingent violence and its impact on the peace processes in Nepal and Mozambique. In turn, this has highlighted the need to be more cognisant of these forms of violence and of their role in interparty relations, and for greater effort to be made in reducing their use by political parties if interparty relations are to be truly transformed.
Chapter 6
A peace for whom? Peacebuilding, political representation and the future of intergroup violence

Introduction
The previous chapter concentrated on the transformation in relations from the perspective of political parties. Here, I look to understandings and experiences of intergroup conflict among those of my interviewees who were involved in peacebuilding within the six villages. The chapter also engages with the two gaps discussed in Chapter 2 surrounding local involvement in peacebuilding and the nature of political representation in post-civil war contexts. The findings are presented in three sections, structured around the three areas that the thesis aims to contribute new knowledge.

Section 6.1 looks at interviewee perspectives of villagers’ participation in the peace process as a way to engage with the critique that contemporary peacebuilding categorises and dichotomises actors and activities into definitive
notions – such as national and local, for example. Section 6.2, through focusing on how people in the six villages understand their relations with political parties, investigates ideas of political representation. Finally, Section 6.3 focuses on the experiences of post-civil war violence and the transformation of intergroup conflict. The main contribution of the chapter to the overall thesis argument is to show that violence between the previously warring groups has not been a major cause for concern. Indeed, interviewees described a rapid transformation away from the violence that characterised intergroup relations during the civil wars. The research revealed, however, a widespread perception that further intergroup violence and civil war are thought to be a distinct possibility in the future, which carries the implication that the population could be polarised and mobilised to war again, despite the lack of intergroup violence in the villages.\(^{53}\) Interparty relations and the use of civil-war-contingent violence are discussed as contributing factors to this perception.

### 6.1 A disconnected peace

The logic informing the ‘local turn’ in the peacebuilding literature stems from the notion that for peace to be sustainable, peacebuilding cannot be the exclusive domain of a small group of elite such as political leaders. Instead, it must be meaningful to, and involve, the wider population (Goetze and Cuzina, 2008; Hughes et al., 2015). However, as research in this area remains embryonic, how to involve local actors and, indeed, who constitutes them, is poorly conceptualised and understood (MacGinty, 2015; Pugh, 2013). Additionally, little regard is paid to local peacebuilding in the relational sense of how it interacts with actors and activities operating at other levels (Paffenholz, 2015).

In this section, I engage with these ideas by using Cornwall’s (2002) categories of political space and Marston (2000) and Cox’s (1998) understanding of levels as social constructs.

\(^{53}\) Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the term ‘the villages’ refers directly to the six villages I visited in Nepal and Mozambique.
First, consideration is given to perspectives on the overarching peacebuilding project. Drawing on Lederach’s (1997) pyramid of peacebuilding, I focus on interventions – such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration or truth and reconciliation commissions – that are national in scope. Second, I explore the interventions intended to foster peace at the local level in particular communities and villages. My main finding is that formal decision-making spaces were closed to all but political party elites, and that village-based peacebuilding was seen as divorced from the wider national project. However, despite a lack of space in which to participate, informants talked about how people have tried to access and influence decision-making using a range of informal channels to claim space. These are discussed in part three. The outcome of these discussions shows that the ideas of actors and activities attached to particular notions of level are complex, contested and can change over time.

### 6.1.1 Perspectives on national peacebuilding

In both Nepal and Mozambique, those participating in peace negotiations exhibited awareness of the need to involve and benefit the wider population if peacebuilding was to be sustainable. In Nepal, Section 10.7 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (USIP, 2006:15) makes a direct petition: ‘We sincerely appeal to the entire Nepali population to actively participate and make successful the historic campaign of building a new democratic Nepal and establishing lasting peace.’ A prominent civil servant, (K5) who had worked on the government’s peacebuilding strategy since its inception, stated that although there was no specific mention of sub-national initiatives in the CPA, all political party representatives sitting on the High-Level Peace Committee (HLPC) recognised the need for some form of localised peacebuilding, as well as soliciting public contributions in the TRC process.\(^{54}\) Although no comparative reference to local initiatives is found in the GPA, an interviewee (M15) who had been present during the Rome Accord negotiations verified that both FRELIMO and RENAMO appreciated the degree to which the civil war had taken a toll on the civilian population, and were supportive of the need for wider reconciliation.

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\(^{54}\) High-Level Political Committee (HLPC): a joint NC, UCPN(M) and CPN-UML committee designed to maintain consensus, cooperation and unity among the major parties as a means to help draft the constitution and implement the peace process.
Interviewees involved in peace talks at various points over post-war years corroborated this point (M16, M14).

Despite this recognition of the need for more popular participation, the peace processes in both cases appear to have been dominated by decision-making that Cornwall (2002) would describe as closed, i.e. heavily restricted to all but political elites. In Nepal, policy-making was explained by many as decided exclusively by the party leadership and carried out behind closed doors (K8, K12, K16). The NTTP is one such example. Designed to facilitate innovative problem-solving, discussions were intentionally not made public to help foster trust between the parties (K18). As one respondent working on the DDR (K19) process commented: ‘everything was done in secret, out of the public eye’. The Head of Country for a human rights INGO (K18) told how many civil society organisations had collectively – and repeatedly – petitioned parties and policy-makers for public engagement on the terms and mandate for the truth commission. Their calls have largely been ignored and provoked no action by parties to meet this demand.

The situation was slightly different in Mozambique. Apart from demobilisation, the peace process contained few components that might call for public consultation. A civil servant (M12) informed me: ‘It was a conscious decision not to go for a TRC like neighbouring South Africa.’ The choice of a blanket amnesty rested on the argument that attempting to identify and prosecute all perpetrators was neither realistic nor practical, a decision agreed with by nearly all my respondents and supported by literary sources (Lundin, 2004:11; Cobban, 2007:16). However, when probed, interviewees (Ma5, M16) confirmed that the decision was taken without any formal or informal engagement with the public. Amnesty and traditional conflict resolution practices were thus chosen with only tacit agreement from the wider population.

DDR was the sole element of the peace agreement where the policy-making of political elites and government had a direct impact on intergroup relations within the three Mozambican villages. When asked how considerate decision-
makers were to the needs of ex-combatants, responses were generally negative. One of the most common examples cited was the compensation process, which was viewed as woefully inadequate. Discussing the provision of skills training, a representative for ex-combatants (Mb4) said: ‘many sold the tools they were given to train because there were no jobs to give them employment’. The retirement package may have equated to several years’ salary, said another representative (Mc2) but: ‘when you are supporting families who have no work, it did not give people sustainable livelihoods’. The same representative also commented on the acute lack of gender-sensitivity in DDR programmes. For example, demobilising female ex-combatants were given men’s civilian clothing. These faults were directly attributed to the government and parties’ failure to consult or assess effectively the needs of the ex-combatants.

The formal policy-making processes in both Nepal and Mozambique, which were a space closed to all but political party elites and government policy-makers, are reminiscent of top-down peacebuilding practices that are exclusionary of wider public participation (Roberts, 2011a; Caplan 2012). For example, civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations in both Maputo and Kathmandu involved in lobbying on the peace process described difficulties accessing and participating in decision-making spaces. A programme manager for an INGO (R3) stated: ‘they [political parties] refuse to listen to us and those affected by war’. Similarly, a project lead (K20) working for a Nepali-run peacebuilding NGO that acts as a conduit for nearly 100 district-based organisations discussed the difficulty in finding a platform to voice community views to politicians, ‘they simply do not want to listen’. Interviewees working to promote the rights of ex-combatants in Mozambique (M1, M2, M7) also expressed frustration that their appeals for the voices of ex-fighters to be considered were ignored or marginalised. Such examples demonstrate that even among actors who can be considered as operating at a national-level, space to access and influence decision-making are subject to power dynamics that have seen these civil society actors largely excluded.
The term ‘top-down peacebuilding’ is often used to refer to the peace process as being the sole domain of the international community and in-country elites (Goetze and Cuzina, 2008; Atashi, 2009). Relations between political elites and the international community in Nepal and Mozambique, however, do not conform to this idea. In Nepal, where UNMIN was given oversight of the DDR process, a number of informants explained that from the outset the mission was plagued by poor decision-making and ineffective management of the demobilisation camps. Stories of ex-combatants breaking out to terrorise local communities and of weapons going missing were commonplace (K17, I5, R5). In addition, the UN was charged by political elites from across the parties with being unable to facilitate a deal that the Maoist political leaders, PLA commanders and other parties were all happy to approve, with the result that the DDR process was severely delayed beyond its original six-month deadline. In the end, disillusioned by their lack of progress, the government expelled UNMIN (K6, K17). The mission was formerly closed in January 2011 and Nepal’s political elite were left to complete the process. A Nepalese army general involved in DDR (K6) said, ‘All those involved were fed up. Nothing was happening. We knew we could do it better and faster, so we did.’

In Mozambique, FRELIMO and RENAMO used a blanket amnesty to deal with violence after the end of the civil war, and again as part of the deal to stop the armed fighting that took place in 2013-14. Several informants involved in the Rome peace talks told me that these decisions were taken against the advice of foreign governments and the UN who were pushing for more punitive transitional justice measures such as a truth and reconciliation commission (M15, M19). A member of the team involved in negotiating at the Rome peace accord said that amnesty coupled with community reconciliation was chosen because the political elite wanted a Mozambican approach to peacebuilding (M16). What their comments refer to is what Honwana (1998:2) talks about as trauma and healing rituals that are by their very nature ‘locally specific’. In essence, the peace process was to be informed by Mozambican culture and ideas of peace and justice, rather than international ones. This demonstration – national elites closing decision-making space to international actors – shows that
even when contexts appear top-down the dynamics of interaction between and across actors at higher levels of decision-making are complex and contested.

My analysis revealed a popular perception in the villages that people had been disconnected from the peacebuilding project and, indeed, there seemed to be little or no consultation outside the parties. Informants from across the field-sites in Nepal told how villagers had little awareness of the peace process – either of what was being agreed and implemented nationally, or of peacebuilding interventions in their own area (C2, R2). Several interviewees implied that many Nepalese and Mozambicans do not regard the peace process as something that involves – or is even for – them and there was a strong impression that the overarching peace project had not been inclusive or meaningful for those living within the villages I visited. As one ex-combatant (I5) in Nepal explained: ‘The peace is not for us.’

Yet such observations need to be tempered by questions around what levels of participation are achievable, or even appropriate, during peacebuilding. Village consultations on the overarching peace project, for example, may well be unrealistic given government resources and capability, topography in these countries and the remoteness of some villages. The politics of inclusion and exclusion in peace processes are complex. However, what is shown here is that despite the recognition by political elites in Nepal and Mozambique of the need for wider societal participation in peacebuilding, their conception of it remained based on the notion of the population as recipients of a peace process negotiated and developed by the elites alone rather than allowing wider public involvement, whatever form that participation may take.

6.1.2 Village-based peacebuilding

Beyond the overarching peace process and the policies that were nationwide in scope, both countries included provisions in their peace processes intended to bring reconciliation and overcome violence among the wider population. These interventions were more decentralised and intended to address violence in a
way that was sensitive to local dynamics – recognising that different parts of the
country had been affected by the civil war in different ways and would therefore
have different needs that could not necessarily be addressed through national
initiatives such as demobilisation or truth commissions. The two countries’
approaches, however, were very different. In Nepal, the government favoured
Local Peace Committees (LPCs). As LPCs operated at district level, they were
responsible for overseeing peacebuilding activities across all villages within a
particular district. In Mozambique, peacebuilding was more village-specific.
Individual communities undertook their own traditional conflict-resolution
practices or were supported by programmes sponsored by local churches and
faith-based organisations.

LPCs were the Nepalese answer to community conflict transformation, designed
to promote peace within districts (Sapkota, 2009), although the extensive
scrutiny they have undergone since inception has resulted in mixed evaluations.
A common comment in interviews was that they were restrained from the outset
by a lack of clear mandate. As an LPC member (R6) explained: ‘the Ministry did
not issue clear directives for how we should operate’; while a Village
Development Committee member (I7) commented: ‘there were no provisions or
guidance, we had no instructions on what to do’. Similarly, an NPSP (2009:iv)
report writes: ‘All interviewees expressed their frustrations with an unclear
mandate and the sense of duplication of efforts.’ A lack of national direction
appears to have resulted in disparate and inconsistent programmes across the
districts (K19).

Although LPCs were intended to assist the transformation to peace and provide
mediation within the towns and villages in each district, there was little evidence
of their dealing directly with issues of conflict. An LPC (I4) member described
their principle function as information gathering: the identification of conflict-
affected and disappeared, and the management of compensation payments.
When asked about the ability of the LPCs to support conflict-affected victims, the

55 Administratively, Nepal is divided into seven provinces. Below these are 75 districts, and below these,
Village Development Committees (VDCs).
LPC member (I4) remarked that provision was very limited: ‘the role of LPCs was simply administrative – find and verify the status of victims in the district and pass this information on to the Ministry’. My interviews suggest that the LPC focus was too narrow. Another LPC member (R6) commented that the committees were perceived solely in terms of service delivery and that even this was restricted to compensation for victims, before adding that the LPCs should be creating ‘regular interactions, creating a harmonious environment in the community’. A genuine desire seemed to exist for the LPCs to branch out into work based around village conflict, rather than just provide financial support (I5, C2).

The determining factor in whether interviewees believed LPCs to be a positive force or not seemed to depend on individual expectations. This returns us to the issue of their initial mandate being unclear. Very few people I interviewed – other than those who were members of LPCs or working as part of one – were clear about the role and function of the committees. A number did not even know they existed (R3, C1). Even among LPC members, descriptions of Committee duties were diverse and the lack of a clear mandate meant members had largely to interpret what they were expected to do. However, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) did exhibit an awareness of the limitations of the LPCs in their current guise. An official within MoPR (K5) told how they were starting to revise LPC guidance as part of a learning and reflection exercise. It must be noted, though, that the process of consultation proposed to inform this review was with a number of national-level NGOs. It was not suggested that MoPR would seek views sub-nationally at district or village level.

The proposition that LPCs need to branch out into direct village-based reconciliation reveals a discrepancy between the expectations of policy-makers and interviewees working in the villages that I visited on the role of the LPCs. Policy-makers and political elites’ conception aligns more with what Buckley-Zistel (2009) would describe as punitive and economic notions of transitional justice: LPCs were designed to identify victims and perpetrators. The former would be compensated for the impacts of war, while the latter would fall under
the jurisdiction of the TRC. However, the inference amongst informants was that transitional justice measures using more psycho-social or cultural practices were needed to facilitate reconciliation within the villages and bring groups together to deal with the after-effects of war and violence. The incongruity between the two approaches may be the result of the failure to open up decision-making space, an act that would have allowed a more accurate assessment of the needs of conflict-affected people.

A common concern among interviewees was that many LPCs were deeply divided (R4, R6, I6, C4). In an observation shared by others who have studied the committees (Yadav, 2013; Upreti, 2014), effectiveness was believed to be hampered by factionalism and internal power struggles. Because the MoPR mandate stipulated that nine of the twelve seats on the executive decision-making board had to be local political party members, LPCs became politicised. In addition, the board was appointed rather than elected. The ability of the LPCs to function was therefore heavily dependent on the willingness of parties to cooperate (R6, I4). Politicisation also created difficulties for those trying to access the services. The director of an LNGO (R2) commented: ‘People found LPCs hard to engage with because of the competition within them.’ A major concern was that domination by a party would typically equate with an abuse of power, and use of the LPC to benefit the party’s supporters. As a result, many LPCs were seen as creating an informal patronage system that allowed the party with the biggest majority to distribute resources and funds to family, friends and other members of their party (I1, C1, R6). An activist for conflict-affected people’s rights (C1) stated ‘I see people registering for compensation and getting money who never experienced bad things, they are just relatives of board members.’ The interparty dynamics within LPCs underline how factors such as corruption and patronage are interwoven with and influence issues of identity in peacebuilding contexts. The ‘wrong’ political affiliation could significantly affect a person’s ability to access and receive assistance.

In addition to the power struggles between board members, interviewees described how the interparty dynamics of LPCs were heavily influenced and
shaped by interparty behaviour at the national level (C1, I6). As a former local politician (R5) explained, ‘You must understand because of the hierarchical party structures, what happens at the top directly affects what happens at the bottom.’ Indeed, interparty relations were seen as a major obstacle to LPC performance and the discussion over the previous paragraphs draws attention to the complexity of interparty relations across levels. Local party members’ struggles for power and control of the LPCs were interlaced with and influenced by the dynamics of party relations in Kathmandu.

An LPC in Rolpa, however, seemed to counter the trend. Several interviewees who had at times been involved in the Rolpa LPC (R6, R7) said that they had effectively managed the interparty fighting that had plagued other LPCs. Success was attributed to the use of a rotating system in which the Chair changed every six months. This power-sharing arrangement avoided power struggles and ensured that all members were guaranteed a period in which to steer the direction of the LPC. The interviewees went on to comment that this rotation system also promoted more consensual decision-making. As no one person held the Chair permanently, it encouraged members to be more cooperative. An LPC member (R6) suggested that individuals who, while they were Chair, were willing to accommodate other members, encouraged reciprocal behaviour and helped to build trust between parties. The members believed that the system limited politicisation of the Rolpa LPC and helped mitigate against the corruption and patronage practices that afflicted other districts.

In Mozambique, village-based peacebuilding was undertaken in two ways: traditional conflict resolution practices – which involved the use of healers and cleansing rituals to purge ex-combatants of their war identities, allowing them to be reborn into society as rehabilitated individuals (Honwana, 1998:78) – and through faith-based organisations. The Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) was instrumental in the brokering of peace between the warring parties (Hume, 1994) and has continued to play a key role in encouraging reconciliation amongst the wider population (M7).
There was a unanimous belief amongst those I interviewed that traditional Mozambican conflict resolution practices were a natural choice for building peace: ‘There really were no other options to bring peace and justice for Mozambicans’ (M12). A negotiator involved in the peace talks at the time of fieldwork (M15) commented: ‘It was clear that things that work in other countries, like the TRC in South Africa, would not work here. This was a Mozambican conflict that required a Mozambican solution.’ Interviewees praised these time-honoured cultural practices for their effectiveness. A Chieftain commented (Mc1): ‘This is the way communities have dealt with conflict for centuries.’ Their comments reveal the rationale behind their use: trust. A project manager for a faith-based NGO said: ‘People know them; trust them. They know they work.’ Questions about the role of the church elicited a similar response: trust was the key to success. ‘In many communities, the church is the community hub’, and the ‘messages of forgiveness and reconciliation are part of church teachings’ (M4).

There was a consensus among my interviewees, both in the three villages and in Maputo, that tradition and religion were the right approach to village-based peacebuilding in Mozambique. Respondents were also in agreement that the government’s policy-based approach to building peace (DDR and amnesty) was detached from traditional and faith-based interventions. Asked in what ways the political parties and government contributed to these interventions, responses could be summarised as ‘they didn’t’. In effect CCM, other religious groups, and individual villages themselves were left to deal with the legacy of violence from the civil war, bring wider reconciliation and create peace. Where local political involvement did take place, there was no nationally coordinated effort to support it (M7, Mb3). Village-based peacebuilding was undertaken independently without any political party or government input: ‘No. They [parties and government] have done nothing’ (M3). People did not speak about the lack of government involvement with negativity, however, as many believed it was the right path for Mozambique to have taken.
Despite the LPC approach to peacebuilding in Nepal being very different, the discussion offers an insight into national parties’ and policy-makers’ understandings of ‘local’ peacebuilding. Although the political elite in both countries acknowledged the need for widespread reconciliation and local peacebuilding, the way that village-based peacebuilding was understood and implemented reveals that ‘local’ initiatives were divorced from the overarching peacebuilding project. LPCs, together with both traditional conflict resolution and church-based reconciliation, operated in isolation, almost entirely independently from those policies that were more nationally focused.

There are potential consequences in failing to integrate local activities into the wider peacebuilding project. To cite just one example, that the TRC in Nepal has yet to be formed. A government-issued ordinance (Nepal Government, 2012) makes direct reference to the TRC’s mandate to make ‘recommendations for reparations to conflict-affected victims’. Yet, as LPCs have already started to make reparations, in effect victims have been compensated before the process intended to establish the truth of what happened – as a basis for making informed judgments on amounts to be paid – has not yet even started.

This discussion highlights the need for greater sensitivity around how peacebuilding that is framed as ‘local’ is perceived, as well as where locally based initiatives sit within the overarching policy approach. In the case of Nepal, the disconnect between the LPCs and the TRC may have consequences for the conflict-affected, an example which supports calls amongst some academics for increased integration of peace policies (Villalba, 2011:3; de Greiff and Duthie, 2009). The findings also suggest the need to be mindful of the relational dimension between the different layers of peace policies and the way in which they integrate – or fail to. As the next section demonstrates, the way in which village-based peacebuilding interacts with nationwide policies has implications for how villages engage with peace processes.
6.1.3 Challenging top-down peacebuilding

The lack of space for the interests of groups and actors other than political parties in formal decision-making does not mean that people were merely passive recipients of peacebuilding interventions, nor that they lacked the capacity to try and influence policy. Informants described a number of ways that village-level actors used informal space to claim access to the formal decision-making process. The examples demonstrate that peacebuilding is not simply imposed top-down unchallenged, but that the interaction between actors and activities across levels is more complex than can be understood through a national-local binary.

Village R was involved in general boycott that was happening across the Rolpa district ahead of upcoming national elections in 2013. It was a demonstration of dissatisfaction with the performance of some of the political parties (R4, R2). The boycott sent a powerful message, effectively challenging the legitimacy of the Nepali political system by saying ‘we do not recognise or endorse your governance’ (R7). The boycott was a demand for more representative political actors but, as one village member (R7) said, ‘It was also a statement about how we see the peace process.’ The protest centred on the Maoist party elite’s failure to fulfil their promise to improve infrastructure and socioeconomic conditions for the villagers (R4, R7). In response, key members from both UCPN(M) and CPN(M) came from Kathmandu to the district to discuss concerns around the parties’ national agendas. The boycott shows an inverse of the top-down power relations commonly understood to characterise peacebuilding. Here, a localised actor (the villagers) were able to claim space, informally, to directly make the needs and interests of its members heard by party elites.

Aside from the Madhesi, there are 59 recognised distinct indigenous groups in Nepal. Collectively known as Janajati, historically they have been marginalised and excluded from the political system but, since the end of the civil war, Janajati representatives have been campaigning for their greater inclusion in governance across all levels of society. The Chair of a national NGO representing Janajati rights (K10) told me the groups are calling for a system of proportional
representation that would see each of them having their own permanent positions in government to ensure their interests and needs are given equitable consideration in formal political decision-making. In the NGO Chair’s words: ‘They demand to be heard.’ The groups vary dramatically in size, with one – the Kusunda – numbering only 164 people, all of whom live in a remote village in the far west of the country. Although their demands have so far gone unanswered, the example of the Kusunda calls into question the classifications – such as those in Lederach’s pyramid (1997) – used to define actors as local or national. In this instance, a very localised actor – in terms of geography – is claiming the right to be a national actor politically: to participate in and influence the future of Nepal.

In Mozambique, a community peacebuilder (Mb2) recounted her experience of helping to organise a non-violent demonstration that involved thousands of ex-combatants. The demonstrators marched on the Prime Minister’s residence to demand an improvement in long-term assistance and social security benefits. After sustained efforts, the movement succeeded in pressurising the government to respond to their demands and change the DDR policy (Mb2).

The movement was started by a few community peacebuilders, mainly ex-combatants themselves, who mobilised others in their villages and, as a national representative of ex-combatants (M1) highlighted, FRELIMO and RENAMO members joined together in the campaign. More than a simple demonstration of local actor agency mobilising members and organising the campaign, it illustrates Sen’s (2007) belief that individuals are able to simultaneously identify with multiple groups, and that doing so may help to diffuse the essentialised understandings of group membership that can lead to violent relations. The interests of the ex-combatants were prioritised over the political identities of RENAMO and FRELIMO, allowing people from both sides to unite in pursuance of a common goal. By transcending the polarised discourse of the political parties, the two formerly opposed sides were able to unite under a new group identity of ‘ex-combatant’, forging more constructive relations and allowing the assertion of shared needs.
On 23 October 2013, Nanda Prasad Adhikari and his wife, Ganga Maya, began a hunger strike in protest at the failure of successive governments to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Nepal. Their son, Krishna Prasad Adhikari, was believed to have been killed in 2004 by Maoist forces and the hunger strike was a demonstration against what they saw as a miscarriage of justice, namely a failure to hold their son’s killers to account (Human Rights Watch, 2014). After eleven months, the couple died of starvation. In an interview, an INGO worker (K17) explained that a shift had occurred in the attitude of the political parties towards the TRC after the hunger strike began. Whereas previously they had refused to engage with the topic, declining to move the TRC forward without a guarantee of amnesty, the widespread media coverage the Adhikari’s received was, the INGO worker felt, responsible for reigniting a national dialogue. The individuals of one family from a remote village in western Nepal became the focus for a national debate over the treatment of victims of civil war violence. The family, my interviewee implied, were the catalyst that galvanised Nepalese civil society and international NGOs to apply pressure to the political elite to open up the discourse around the TRC.

The four examples cited illustrate the potentially national effect on policy of very localised actors - people from villages - using informal spaces to try and access decision-making. Together, they challenge the notion of the limited role local-level actors can play in peacebuilding. They show that not only is there a demand for wider inclusion, but that these village-based actors can – and did – find ways to project their voice into national policy-making.

During formulation of the peace agreements, political elites in Nepal and Mozambique were conscious of the need for wider public participation in peacebuilding. The experiences of those working on peacebuilding in the villages where my interviews took place, however, suggest that this translated into a limited understanding of inclusion, one in which the peacebuilding strategy was devised by political leaders and government and then cascaded down. While I am not suggesting that informants expected consultation to take place in every village across Nepal or Mozambique, political elites did seem unresponsive to
any input – whether from international actors or civil society – that didn’t come from political party circles. Interventions to facilitate reconciliation in individual villages were also divorced from policies that were more national in scope. Informants discussed how the lack of communication around peacebuilding had generated feelings among many that the process was not for them. However, in spite of this, and of the lack of opportunity for participation in decision-making, some village-based actors have proactively used informal channels to claim space and influence policy-making.

These observations have two implications. First, despite the tendency in much of the peacebuilding literature (MacGinty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015) to talk about the role of local involvement in similar terms to those used by the political parties discussed here – that is to say, local actors participating primarily through localised interventions – my findings reveal that people’s understandings of their involvement is complex and does not necessarily adhere to neatly bounded conceptualisations. It is, therefore, overly simplistic to equate local actors with local activities. There may in fact be a demand among the wider population to allow local actors a say in the wider development of peace. Second, the academic literature is increasingly advocating for more integrated approaches to peacebuilding across policies and sectors (van der Leest et al., 2010; Zelizer, 2013); a position supported by the four examples cited above of the claiming of space.

Lederach’s (1997) pyramid of peacebuilding allows us to see political parties as examples of national actors, while my informants working on peacebuilding in villages are examples of local actors. Ideas of level have been woven through the discussion to look at the different ways in which the two interact. What emerges challenges the belief that actors and activities can be neatly divided into such categories. How they are understood and operate in relation to levels is considerably more complex. Both actors and activities are contested, constructed and changeable. Village R’s involvement in the boycott reverses the traditional view of top-down power dynamics between national and local actors, while the closing of space to the international community, the defiance of international
conventions around amnesty, and the dismissal of a UN mission test assumptions about the dominance of international actors (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006:18). Similarly, the case of the Kasunda highlights the importance of reflecting on different perspectives and of how a group's understanding of their participation in peacebuilding may vary significantly from conventional thought. In this case, a group seen by others – geographically – as exceptionally localised, saw themselves – politically – as actors of national importance. The shift in thinking by policy-makers in Nepal – the recognition that they may need to decentralise LPC work, reorienting it from district to village-based work – demonstrates the socially constructed nature of level and of how understandings of ‘local’ change over time (MacGinty, 2015).

This section has examined peoples’ experience of participation in peacebuilding in the villages I visited. The findings support the literature currently questioning the traditional dichotomous national-local nexus view of peacebuilding (Hughes, et al., 2015; Paffenholz, 2015) and suggest more attention be paid to relational dynamics across levels, which Paffenholz (2015:857) identifies as historically overlooked. How different actors understand their roles – the ways in which they and different peacebuilding activities interact – is considerably more complex and raises more questions than it is possible for a binary view to explain. The power struggles between party members in Nepal over access to LPCs also reinforce the argument of academics such as Donais (2012:112) who challenge the belief that local peacebuilding is a harmonious space free from conflict and tensions.

6.2 The representative–constituent connection

‘Who is the ultimate judge of the [democratic] legitimacy of representative claims? The constituency.’ Saward (2010:145)

Bartels (1991:457) argues that ‘The appeal of representative democracy hinges on the responsiveness of elected politicians to the preferences and interests of their constituents.’ This section considers interviewees’ view that the connection
of people in the villages to political parties is a factor in their disconnection from the peace process. Ideas of political representation as a dynamic and interactive process (Saward, 2010; de Wilde, 2013) are used to explore understandings and experiences of relations between political parties and people in the six villages.

I make the case that political party elites are detached from the groups they claim to represent. My reading of the data suggests that parties understand their relations to constituent groups solely in terms of the national election process. The perception that parties do not adequately represent the needs of groups in the peace process may be due to relations that are top-down and which consequently offer little opportunity for groups to voice their interests and needs to national party members. While this may not be unique to either Nepal or Mozambique, or to emerging democracies more generally, it should be noted that many of the parties in both countries are new to democratic politics and to the role of political representation. As such, the more historically developed relations between representatives and represented that are characteristic of more established democracies have not yet had a chance to develop. In fact, parties have displayed little interest in developing relations beyond those of the formal election process. As a failure to respond to the needs of constituent groups risks replicating the conditions – of unresponsive governing actors – that can lead to civil war, this represents a danger to the peacebuilding process and establishment of long-term peace.

Interviewees suggest that political parties’ understanding of representation aligns with the dominant approach in peacebuilding: a narrow limited relationship that takes place through formal institutionalised national elections (Collier, 2010; Call, 2012; Donais, 2012). There is, however, a belief that people want more responsive and interactive relations with political parties that transcend beyond election processes. This view supports the literature that is calling for more nuanced thinking around relations between representatives and those they represent (de Wilde, 2013) The discussion centres around three themes: perceptions of the role and behaviour of political parties; an example of how parties can be held accountable outside formal elections through a boycott
of national elections in Nepal; and challenging the notion of constituents as unified and benevolent groups.

### 6.2.1 Responsible representatives

Legitimacy – where representatives derive their authority to speak on behalf of others from – and accountability – the means by which groups can judge and hold representatives to account – are core to political representation (Warren, 2009). Accountability, in particular, is crucial in post-civil war contexts. A state's failure to respond to the interests of a group is often a primary cause of civil war (Tilly, 2003). As gatekeepers to the government and state, it is vital that political parties instil confidence that they are acting in their constituent groups’ best interests (Bjornlund et al., 2007:64).

From my analysis it emerged that parties in both countries displayed reluctance to be transparent in their operations as political entities. In the previous section, the parties were accused of conducting decision-making behind closed doors and of closing off participation to all but the party elites. This behaviour, however, rather than exclusive to policy-making around the peace agreement, was symptomatic of how interviewees viewed the parties more broadly. A human-rights NGO worker (M2) in Mozambique, commenting on RENAMO’s political practice, stated: ‘Nowhere will you find any documents or reports from them that set out their policies and their agenda. They do not have any, they are not interested in being a legitimate party.’ A faith-based NGO worker (Mb2), meanwhile, highlighted the poor RENAMO party presence to be found outside Maputo and other major urban areas: ‘If you go to villages you cannot find these people [RENAMO representatives]. They are never anywhere around.’

Similar behaviours were reported in Nepal. Very little information on party operations or activities is published or publicly accessible. As one interviewee (K20) commented: ‘Nothing is written down. This is because they fear reprisal if they do – that they will be held responsible for their actions.’ In addition, as an ex-local politician (C3) pointed out, party positions frequently changed,
sometimes from one day to the next: ‘We are never clear where we stand.’ These and similar comments suggesting that parties set out to avoid accountability reveal a situation that is the antithesis of what the ideal of what representative democracy should be. In Mozambique, FRELIMO seemed the only exception to this trend. In a view supported by several informants (Mb2, Mc3), an academic (M13) described them as highly organised and effective in dissemination of their policies.

Issues around transparency raise concerns about how the parties view accountability. An LPC member (I4) summarised the behaviour of Nepali parties in this comment: ‘If it is not written anywhere, it does not exist.’ Such an attitude allows parties to operate a policy of denial, and they can – and often do – refute previous positions (K22). The claim that political parties (and formal political institutions) function with impunity is prevalent in analysis of the Nepali peace process (Bhattarai et al., 2010; von Einsiedel et al., 2012:83). A similar lack of accountability to the people is apparent in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the primary hurdle to the establishment of which has been the main parties’ insistence on an amnesty clause. ‘They [political leaders] want the amnesty because they know they will be open to indictment for war crimes if they are not granted this exclusion’ (K18). Several interviewees also talked about impunity not simply as a practice but as a culture within parties (R7, I1).

By way of explaining the lack of transparency, parties were seen to equate accountability almost solely with elections. As a human rights campaigner (Mc3) put it: ‘Responsibility to the public stops once elections are done, until the next election time.’ Two other interviewees expressed the view that once national elections were over, parties considered these their mandate and gave no further thought to their constituents (M6, R1). The belief that parties see people solely as a ‘vote bank’ (R2, M14, Mc4) regularly arose, in the words of one community leader (R7): ‘They do not care about us, they only care about getting our vote.’ The issue of political parties exploiting people as ‘vote banks’ is not exclusive to post-war contexts or to emerging democracies. Considerable study has also been
made of the problem within established democracies (de Wit 1997; Schaffer, 2008).

As well as relations between representatives and constituents, accountability involves the political institutions and processes designed to moderate interaction, and the balances and checks that are needed to ensure it takes place. In this respect, it is noticeable that all the parties display a similar disregard for the formal institutionalised democratic processes. In Mozambique, many respondents pointed to the election process as an illustration of the parties’ attitudes toward accountability. Since the end of the war RENAMO has consistently lost national elections, and interviewees highlighted Dhlakama’s rejection of the results and continual threats to pull out of politics. The director of an NGO (Mb3) said: ‘RENAMO should listen to the people, not do what they [RENAMO] think’, while a civil society leader (M4) commented: ‘Look at their behaviour, it shows they do not respect democratic process or the people.’ However, FRELIMO’s refusal to entertain RENAMO calls for a recount after every election was viewed with equal suspicion, and conspiracy theories were rife about how FRELIMO had rigged the votes. ‘Our last elections [November 2014] it was a month between voting and the results announced. How can it take this long? They are not being open and honest’ (M5). As discussed in Section 5.1, the parties’ behaviour – including the threat of armed revolution, or withdrawal from government as a strategy to force other parties to capitulate to their demands – implies a contempt for political process.

Concerns around transparency, accountability and the way in which parties engage in democratic processes are part of the reason they are not believed to be pursuing the interests of groups in the peace process. There is, however, more to it than this. The disconnect also stems from a perceived lack of interest by the parties in forming relations with their constituent groups that would enable awareness of what these groups’ interests and needs are. For some I met, the problem was the generality with which parties talked about their constituents. In Mozambique, several interviewees exclaimed that politicians talk effusively about ‘the people’ as a generic body: ‘But whose people are these? I do not know
them’ (Mb5). Another interviewee (Ma4) commented: ‘They talk about Mozambique and Mozambicans, but they do not really know the people and it means nothing to us.’

RENAMO’s accountability to their supporter base, whom they are accused of treating with indifference, was also raised as a concern. A project worker for a women’s rights NGO (Mc3) explained: ‘RENAMO are very badly organised politically, they have no relationship or connection to the people.’ Similar responses were elicited when I asked why recent fighting was not more widespread: ‘because RENAMO did not go to the people, they did not explain what is the need to fight [sic]’ (Mb2). In Nepal, many respondents talked about strict party hierarchies, characterising party-constituent relations as top-down. A local politician (I3) stated: ‘We know everything that the national parties are doing, but no, we do not send them information.’ In terms of transparency, although in general FRELIMO were seen as operating more openly, several interviewees saw their relations as equally unidirectional – i.e. top-down. A political analyst (M6) commented: ‘The party [FRELIMO] elite is very closed and they are not receptive to the views of others, even their own supporters.’ The statement was followed by an expression of scepticism as to how reflective party policies are of the needs and interests of members.

Despite the widespread perception that representatives do not adequately reflect the needs of groups in the peace process, and the disconnect with national party members, several interviews suggest that people retain a strong sense of affiliation to parties: ‘Nepalese society is very political. Everyone belongs to a party and they care deeply about the party’ (I1); and, ‘party membership is deeply important to Mozambicans because these are the people they fought for, even if they do not agree with what the leaders do’ (Mb3). Indeed, in both Nepal and Mozambique, many interviewees told me that people are very proud of their political identity. The belief that groups’ interests aren’t adequately represented seems, therefore, connected more to the way in which party identities are constructed through the interests political elites choose to pursue.
In a fledgling post-civil war democracy, developing a strong connection between representatives and represented is vital if violence is to be overcome. A sustainable peace depends on groups believing they have adequate access to political processes and, as the main vehicle for voicing their interests and needs, parties have a vital role to play. In Nepal and Mozambique, however, a strong sense of disconnect exists. Parties are seen as unrepresentative, and even disinterested in forming strong relations with their constituent groups. In post-civil war contexts, responsive political parties are of paramount importance. Acting without regard for their constituent groups or the wider population, or showing contempt for political processes, may lead groups to pursue their interests in other ways, including civil war. The following section offers an example of how one village circumvented formal institutions and processes to call their representatives to account.

### 6.2.2 Demanding better representation

Discussion so far has centred on constituents playing a passive role, one in which they lack any real influence in their relations with political parties. Interviewees in the villages I visited, however, revealed a number of cases in which people had been able to claim space and exercise agency outside formal election processes. Section 6.1.3 discussed five cases that demonstrated village-level actors circumventing formal political processes to influence peace policy decision-making. Their actions can also be seen as articulating dissatisfaction with the political parties’ performance of their representative role. The demonstrations by the ex-combatants in Mozambique and the Madhesi and Janajati movements in Nepal were expressions of discontent with the way the groups’ interests and needs were being portrayed in the policy-making process, a complaint that those meant to be acting on their behalf were doing so inadequately. As a result, the groups were forced to use direct non-formal actions to bring the parties and policy-makers to account.

Although historically peacebuilding has concentrated on the political elite as the voice of the people, there has been increasing attention in both academia and
practice looking toward more active citizen participation in political processes – the ‘deepening democracy’ debate (Gaventa, 2006b). The examples I have presented support the idea that localised actors can and do participate in political processes and decision-making, albeit having to try and claim space using informal and alternative methods. This participation is largely reactive, however, in the sense that it occurred when there was a perceived failure of national representatives to be acting in the interests of the groups. In essence, they were active because they were forced into self-agency.

While the need for public mobilisation in this way is not exclusive to these cases, or even post-war contexts, it is of particular concern in countries recovering from civil war because the necessity to act is likely to signify issues with the peace process and can carry risks of renewed violence. The boycott in Rolpa, for example, sparked fear that the Maoists were preparing for a new civil war and, in response, the state significantly increased its presence within the region. In this section, I build on the discussion of the boycott by drawing on the experience of interviews from village R in the district as an example that challenges the perception of representative–represented relations in post-civil war contexts as asymmetrical and top-down, and that the ballot of national elections are the only way in which represented groups can hold national-level party members to account.

In a representative democracy, constituents primarily exert power over representatives at the voting booth. Outside elections, the behaviour of the latter rarely provokes constituents to challenge their legitimacy. This, however, is exactly what took place in Rolpa. Dissatisfaction with the political situation was strong enough to cause people to take a collective stand and boycott the national elections of November 2013. A number of my interviewees described a strong historic connection of people in Rolpa to the Maoists from long before the insurgency and the district is widely regarded as the birthplace of the ‘People's War’ and a focal point for the Nepali armies’ attempts to curb the civil war (K22, K14).
A community leader (R7) from the village recounted an intriguing history of political unity. Despite the factionalism that has been a staple of Nepalese politics for decades (Caddell, 2005:74), he described the villagers’ resistance to being politically divided. In the run-up to elections, discussions were held to decide whether the village would vote CPN(M) or UCPN(M) as a collective: ‘After days of discussion, we decided neither...we would boycott.’ The decision was based on the Maoist parties’ performance. ‘When we discussed as a village, we were very clear why we should go against elections [sic]. Because this election will do nothing.’ He described a ‘frustration and tiredness in people because the promises and resolutions are not fulfilled and nothing is achieved’. Over nine years of peace, the political parties were viewed as having delivered no perceptible improvement for the villagers.

A local politician (R4) involved in organising the boycott commented: ‘Prachanda became Prime Minister but he couldn’t do anything for the people. Others come and go, but the status and lifestyle of the people stay the same.’ Although his comments are referring to the Maoist parties with whom the villagers identified, they could equally well apply to the other parties. There was a consensus amongst these interviewees that NC and CPN-UML were ‘trying to reinstate the old system, bring back the previous constitution and undermine what we achieved through the People’s War’ (R4).

Although initially national politicians were prohibited from entering the district, high-profile members from several political parties (Maoist-aligned) were eventually allowed to come from Kathmandu to try to convince people to vote. The politicians’ motives, however, were viewed as purely self-serving: ‘they do everything for their village only. They come here so that they will get again a vote [sic]. This is wrong’ (R7). Ultimately, the people of the village remained resolute and unified with the wider district in refusing to vote. The local politician (R4) went on to say that in the months following the elections he had remained in talks with the national parties about the region’s relations with their national political representatives. The parties were receptive to their demands,
and he remained hopeful a compromise could be reached that would lead to the parties better reflecting the district, and villagers’, interests.

The actions of the villagers involved in the boycott is a demonstration of Cornwall’s (2002) ‘claimed space’: the ways in which groups can confront political parties at national level to make them more responsive to the needs of their constituents outside the narrow confines of formal national election processes. In Nepal, national politicians answered the boycott by travelling to hear villagers’ concerns and by continuing to engage in direct talks with local village representatives. The case of the villagers in Rolpa, along with the other examples of village-level actors claiming space discussed in the previous section, indicate that groups take action because their interests are not being considered. This finding may signify a need to re-evaluate the way in which political parties interact with constituent groups during peace processes.

6.2.3 Constituent expectations of representatives

So far, discussion has concentrated on political parties’ claims to represent the previously warring groups. The prevailing view of political representation is founded on what Saward (2010:6) calls the ‘presence’ perspective: representation as an institutional act that is a direct result of elections. This approach treats claims as bounded and predictable because it assumes that the needs and interests of constituent groups are fixed and essentially unchanging (Schaap et al., 2012). Post-civil war contexts, however, are volatile and in a state of often rapid change. Not only are some political parties new to democratic politics, so too are the population. Such conditions challenge assumptions that group interests are predictable – or even that groups have formed and are able to articulate their interests effectively. RENAMO and FRELIMO, for example, may polarise Mozambican society, but these political groups simultaneously contain many different sub-groups – family, job, ethnicity – all with very different needs. Here, I will discuss some themes emerging in interviews that question whether political parties are solely to blame for the disconnect and poor relations related so far.
The Madhesi movement is widely held to have started as a direct result of Maoists ‘selling dreams’ – promises which they failed to deliver once in power (I8). An NGO worker (C2) explained that the fact that the political reality of what the Maoists could deliver was very different to what they had pledged created frustration. The Maoists not delivering on their promises, such as greater representation of the Madhesi people in the governance of the country, led to Madhesi interests being pursued by themselves through the, at times physically violent, Madhesi movements (K9). The issue of unrealistic expectations around what political representatives can achieve goes beyond the Madhesi. An academic studying the peace process (K21) stated: ‘Every group is shouting, demanding their entitlements, but they don’t realise it is not practical that every demand can be met.’

The problem of unrealistic expectations has two aspects. First is the pace with which people expect representatives to effect change. A local politician (R4) explained: ‘People don’t realise that things take time. They think one day you vote and the next a road or a school is built.’ Similar sentiments were expressed in Mozambique. A district government official (Ma1) believed that people were too idealistic: ‘I think that people are not well informed about politics. They expect them [political parties] to transform their lives overnight.’

The second aspect relates to the type and degree of change parties can deliver. Informants indicated that a massive incongruity exists between the assumptions made by groups and the practical reality of what the political parties can achieve. ‘They [people] do not understand that there is a political process, that decision-making takes place,’ an NGO worker (Ma5) said, ‘people just expect their lives to be completely transformed.’ A representative for ex-combatants (Mc4) explained: ‘People think politicians have all the power to do anything.’ However, my analysis reveals that unrealistic expectations are the result of a two-way process and are often raised by the parties themselves: ‘they promise these things, you see it at rallies, but they don’t tell people that it takes time’ (M3). In Nepal, a prime example is offered by the promises the Maoists made to the
Madhesi during the war, but the words of a civil society leader (K8) imply that other parties are just as guilty: ‘All the parties appeal to hopes that they know they cannot fulfil – just for a vote.’

One theme emerged in Mozambique that was not present in Nepal. Discussing what drives people’s identification with parties, several interviewees said that – in rural areas more than in urban – political ideology was not the main connection. Instead, kinship and ethnic/tribal ties were thought to be a stronger determinant. A civil society leader explained, ‘People do not vote for Dhlakama because of his politics. They think he is from my area, therefore he can be trusted.’ A number of interviewees believed that geographical links, which in Mozambique correlate with ethnic divides, were the primary decider of how people connected to national politics (Ma3, M16). A political analyst told me: ‘Voters look to the leaders and where they come from, more so than looking to the party.’

Such statements demonstrate the complexity of party identification and the dangers of assuming it can be governed by affiliation to political ideology or agenda alone. In Mozambique, people do not necessarily look either to political policies or to performance to assess how likely a representative is to respond to their needs. A number of interviewees underlined that people also use their political identity in a much more instrumental way. Parties can and do buy loyalty and support, effectively using ‘cash to buy votes’ (Ma3), and several interviewees suggested that people reciprocate in this type of behaviour – using politics for economic self-gain. Election campaigns, for example, were described as an opportunity for acquiring material benefits: ‘You see people wearing FRELIMO T-shirts everywhere but they are not supporters. They just want a T-shirt. Next week you will see them at the RENAMO rally’ (Mb2). These comments show that more can be going on in the dynamics of relations between political parties and their constituent base as party affiliation is not always politically driven but can be influenced by economic factors. Here, informal patronage networks develop through the exchange of financial or material reward in return for votes.
Two findings emerge from this analysis. First, as evidenced by the interviewee comments that people are treated as vote banks and politicians are not seen outside election campaigning (R2, M14, Mc4), the research suggests that parties understand relations with their constituent groups largely through the formal national election process and there is little contact outside this. This observation supports evaluations in peacebuilding literature that political representation in post-civil war contexts is equated almost exclusively with institutionalised elections (Nooruddin and Flores, 2009; Collier, 2010). However, this finding is neither new, nor exclusive to Nepal, Mozambique or other democracies (emerging or established). Limited conceptions of political representation – the relations of people to the political process and to their representatives – form part of the ‘deepening of democracy’ debate which argues for the need to find new and alternate ways for people to participate in politics (Gaventa, 2006b; Goldfrank, 2007).

Second, my analysis from both countries infers that party relations are top-down. The lines of communication – described as hierarchical and unidirectional (R6, Ma2), with little opportunity for group interests to be conveyed to the party at national level – may be one factor contributing to the sense of disconnect from the peace process. Although relations that are largely one way are a feature of many representative democracies, they are of particular concern in countries emerging from civil war. The dominant ‘presence’ view of political representation focuses on institutionalised elections because it views group interests to be largely stable and fixed (Schapp et al., 2012:112). While this may be a relevant assessment in established democracies, where the development of relations over extended periods allows parties to better understand and more accurately represent their constituents, it is not necessarily the case in more new democracies.

Political parties were seen as displaying little desire to develop relations with supporters outside elections, while concerns around their transparency and accountability indicate that groups have little confidence in the previously
warring parties to act as responsible political agents. A prime example is the lack of political will – for fear that political elites will be indicted for war crimes – to form the TRC. Another, in Mozambique, is the continual contestation of election outcomes. Political parties need to form stronger and closer relations with their constituent groups and develop processes and structures that improve their awareness of – and response to – the needs and interests of groups. As discussed previously, good relations between political parties and the groups they represent are of particular significance in countries recovering from civil wars. Indeed, as Chapter 4 discussed, the civil wars can, in many ways, be seen as caused by unmet expectations of groups.

The analysis demonstrates that political representation – and specifically relations between political parties and those they represent – is considerably more complex than an analysis of elections and voting patterns alone is able to capture. To truly understand the nature and effectiveness of political representation in post-civil war countries, the subtleties of how both political parties and constituent groups understand political representation must be appreciated. These findings support the literature calling for political representation to be studied and understood as a dynamic process of interaction (de Wilde, 2013; Young, 2000).

### 6.3 Transformation – the village perspective

The picture that emerges suggests that the villages were left to deal with violence and to build peaceful relations without formal intervention by either government. The final part of the chapter explores how those working for peace within the villages I visited experienced both intergroup violence and the transformation of group relations. My main finding is that intergroup violence was not a concern amongst those I spoke with. Indeed, most interviewees

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56 I recognise that there is a diverse range of third parties and non-governmental organisations, both international and domestic, working to bring reconciliation within communities. I am not implying, therefore, that communities have undertaken peacebuilding alone, but rather that this has happened largely without state intervention.
perceived groups as having displayed a remarkable capacity to overcome the violence that characterised group interaction during the civil war.

Offsetting this, however, was the belief that return to civil war remained a real possibility. Civil-war-contingent forms of violence and the interparty relations they generate were seen as one factor contributing to this. Despite the current absence of intergroup violence, informants believed society could once again be polarised and groups mobilised to armed violence. As an NGO worker in Nepal (R2) stated: ‘Violence is not a problem, but I fear it could be.’ Similarly, in Mozambique a representative of ex-combatants (Mc4) claimed ‘It is not a case of ‘if’ [war comes]. It is when’. I suggest that two factors fuelling this perception are a lack of socioeconomic development, and the essentialised and polarised narratives of groups that are continually being reproduced through civil war-related claims-making. A number of interviewees believed that political elites could learn from the process of restoring peace that has been happening in the villages, and I explore this idea using a pluralist theory of identity (Sen, 2007). Reflecting on the swift pace of transformation, I propose that in the everyday space of the village many group identities are simultaneously competing for people’s attention. That many of these command higher priority than political party identities could be key to helping diffuse the polarisation that continues to plague parties at national level.

6.3.1 Intergroup violence within villages

Questions around intergroup violence elicited the most fervent responses from my interviewees. Almost unanimously, the violent group relations associated with the civil war were not viewed as a source of violent conflict into peacetime. My interviewees were not implying a total absence of violence. Indeed, both countries have seen episodic physical violence. The difference is that this violence was attributed to the manipulation of political elites rather than an issue of intergroup relations in the six villages themselves.
When asking people to qualify their understanding of violence, the majority of respondents were talking about it in its physical form. In Nepal, however, conversations about intergroup relations would often raise issues around discrimination. Rather than characterised by physical violence, these relations resonated with Galtung’s (1969) idea of structural violence. A human rights activist (R1) and a civil society leader (I8), for example, talked about the marginalisation of Dalits and Janajati groups in their villages, while a representative of the Madhesi (K9) talked ardently about how the ‘Pahadi’ (upper castes) continue to undermine his people and culture. These examples all relate to the historic systemic discrimination against particular groups within Nepalese society. The issue of structural violence as a root cause of the civil wars was described in the case-study chapter, and the contribution the persistence of these historic intergroup dynamics may have on fuelling the expectation of renewed war is discussed in more detail in the following section where I reflect on the lack of socioeconomic change in villagers’ lives. However, outside of this structural violence, there was no indication that physical violence or, indeed, violence in forms such as civil-war-contingent violence, was a cause of concern in any of the three Nepalese villages.

In Nepal, although some informants did discuss tensions between groups, conversations around conflict in the villages typically centred on returning ex-combatants as a specific group causing these tensions in the villages, rather than as an issue of people in the village who identify with the different warring groups. An NGO project manager (C3) said: ‘Things were tense at first. People did not know how to treat or respond to the fighters.’ While an ex-combatant (I5) related their personal experience: ‘I had problems when I first returned, people would shun me. I was treated as an outcast.’ One interviewee (I6) described how, for the previous eight years, he had lived one kilometre away from the person suspected of killing his father. He was emphatic that the man was responsible and lived in hope that one day a trial would be convened and the truth revealed. Despite the pain of having to see ‘this man walk free every day’, they had never come into conflict. The interviewee’s way of coping was to avoid contact where possible, and the two had never exchanged words.
Although such experiences were common among my interviewees, they were not perceived as involving any form of violence. Indeed, the process of reintegration was generally seen as a resounding success. An important caveat to these perceptions though is that there have been no official attempts to monitor ex-combatant reintegration. A member of the Nepali Army involved in development and implementation of the DDR strategy admitted that in fact little was known about where most ex-Maoist fighters were – or what they were doing there (K6). Indeed, I heard many rumours while in Kathmandu of a group of Maoist ex-combatants who, fearing they would not be welcomed back into Nepalese communities, had pooled their retirement payments from the DDR process and decided to build their own village. I tried many avenues and contacts to try and locate this group, who were thought to be in the Chitwan district, but despite many people talking about this group of ex-combatants no one seemed to know where they, or their village, was - leading me to conclude that this was merely rumour and evidence of a pervasive anxiety over the reintegration process.

In Mozambique, too, in terms of persisting violence the end of the civil war was largely viewed as uneventful. An NGO project lead (Ma5) captured the typical sentiment: ‘People just went back and got on with their lives.’ Community reconciliation was hailed almost universally as a triumph. When questioned about intergroup violence within communities, not one interviewee had seen or heard of any specific incidents – although they often qualified statements by saying that this did not mean that it had not happened, just that it had not happened to their knowledge. A civil society leader (M14) commented, ‘I have travelled all over the country and I have not seen or heard of problems of violence in communities.’ These findings are corroborated in the academic literature (van den Bergh, 2009; Gentili, 2013). In fact, few academics offer a contrary view. Although Honwana (1998:75), writing five years into peace, describes local tensions which ‘reflect the deep social divisions spilling over from the long war [...] consolidating peace in Mozambique is thus dependent on extending its benefits to all levels of society’, according to my informants at least, the tensions have not yet resulted in intergroup violence.
This is not to say that physical violence has been totally absent. As previously stated, both countries have seen intermittent outbreaks of it. It is, however, viewed as a product of national-level politics, imposed on the villages from outside and mandated by elites trying to manipulate political events for their own ends. Many interviewees spoke about these outbreaks, explicitly linking them to particular flashpoints such as national elections. In Nepal, a civil society leader (I1) said: ‘always there is violence around elections. This is the fault of the parties. The way they talk, the language they use, it provokes violence.’ An ex-local politician commented on it (R4): ‘The leaders, they deny knowledge of local political violence and even condemn it, but they are the cause of it.’ My respondents justified their views by underlining the hierarchical nature of the parties: ‘nothing happens unless it is cleared from the top’, said a local politician (I3). The Madhesi-rights movements and the volatile relations between the militarised youth wings of parties were often cited by informants as examples of the political manipulation of group relations as the driving forces behind the violence the country has experienced since the end of the civil war.

In Mozambique, politically driven intergroup violence was strongly associated with external actors, deliberately brought into communities to provoke trouble. A village religious leader (Ma2) explained: ‘They hire people to come and cause the trouble’, while a village chieftain (Ma3) added: ‘The people that start violence, we do not know them. They are not from our community.’ Such statements chime with the earlier discussion of how many interviewees viewed the small-scale attacks by RENAMO forces 2013-14 as an attempt to force FRELIMO to capitulate to their demands rather than as a serious effort to mobilise people and reignite war.

One way in which interference by political elites can be seen to impact on intergroup relations is through the DDR and TRC processes. Summarised by the phrase ‘favouring your own’, it involves patronage networking whereby parties with power over decision-making leverage their influence to benefit and distribute resources to their own group, for example, favouring their ex-
combatants. Interviewees described discrimination against RENAMO ex-forces by the FRELIMO government. Two members of domestic NGOs (Mb4, M7) working with ex-fighters recalled the extensive difficulties they had faced in engaging with government to extract any kind of help for programmes to support RENAMO ex-combatants. Another advocate for ex-combatants (M1) described heavy resistance by a ‘FRELIMO-controlled government’ to recognise RENAMO troops as a legitimate group who should receive equal treatment to FRELIMO ex-forces. A further example of discrimination was provided by a prominent academic who has studied the peace process (M19). His view – that changes in security policy by FRELIMO, since 2012, have seen RENAMO fighters pushed out of the army – was supported by the RENAMO spokesperson (M8). Practices such as these, several interviewees informed me (Ma5, Mc3), led to palpable tensions between ex-combatants from the two sides living in the same villages. In particular they generated feelings of resentment and marginalisation amongst RENAMO forces. A national representative of ex-combatants (M1) stated: ‘FRELIMO’s actions caused real tension in communities between the ex-forces of both sides.’

This kind of partiality was also apparent in Nepal. The previous section described how LPC boards were subject to political capture, making them vulnerable to nepotistic practices. The regional director of an NGO (R2) discussed how he knew – from talking with other peacebuilders throughout the country – that it was common practice for the party that dominated a committee to distribute support to ‘victims’ of their own political group. In addition, a number of interviewees (K18, R1, I6) commented that shifts in political control of government had a direct impact on conflict victims. ‘Whichever party controlled government, controlled the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and so could set policy at national level that would favour filtering funds to their supporters’, said an NGO regional director (R2). My informants described these practices as a source of tension among the conflict victims affected by the different sides from the war.
Interviewees were virtually unanimous that without this external political influence communities would be free of intergroup violence. In fact, violence between groups has not been regarded as a problem within any of the six villages during the post-civil war years so it is reasonable to infer that communities have undergone a good degree of conflict transformation. Despite the absence of violence, however, and the fact that the transformation seems to have been largely expeditious – ‘people just went back to their lives’ (Mb3) – there was a clear sense among interviewees that further intergroup violence was a strong possibility in the future.

6.3.2 The expectation of future violence

In virtually every interview, a caveat was placed on the sustainability of the transformation within the villages: intergroup violence has not been a problem yet, but it could be. Many respondents thought there was a strong likelihood that violence could erupt in the near future, suggesting they believe that groups could again be mobilised into violent action. Here I explore this perception, the factors driving it, and the implications it might have for the sustainable transformation of intergroup relations and long-term peace.

Many interviewees expressed the belief that there was a high risk of renewed violence. An NGO programme manager (I2) said, ‘The community is peaceful now, but that does not mean it will stay like this.’ A sense of fragility was conveyed – the possibility that intergroup conflict could easily be generated and turn violent: ‘there may be no recorded incidents of violence and retaliation/revenge, but the people are not truly reconciled’ (M3). In Mozambique, responses were considerably more negative than in Nepal. Indeed, more than a risk, further intergroup violence was seen as inevitable. A civil society leader (M5) commented: ‘I am positive that war will come again.’ Similarly, a village elder (Mb1) told me: ‘I have foreboding [sic] that the war is going to start again. You can tell people know it.’
It is important to note that the Mozambican interviews played out against the backdrop of recently renewed fighting and a volatile peace process. Despite the heightened situation, however, many interviewees displayed a sensitivity to context and presented their views not just as a product of current circumstances, but as a historical issue that predated the recent insurgency: ‘I have been working on peace for twenty years and the situation is always on the tipping point’ (M5).

While trepidation over a resurgence of war was pervasive, opinion was divided as to which groups it would start among. In Mozambique, many thought it would be FRELIMO and RENAMO; a belief reinforced by the recent fighting. However, some felt that the fact that the urbanised population was considerably more diverse and politically aware than it had been twenty or thirty years before would influence the dynamics of intergroup violence. ‘Society is much more divided now. It is not just FRELIMO or RENAMO. There are many other groups, many other ways to draw lines. When violence comes, it will be much more brutal and devastating because of this’ (M14). In Nepal, although interviewees viewed the Maoists with concern, it was the multitude of new groups seeking political representation – such as the Madhesi, Dalit or Janajati – who were seen as the most likely cause of further intergroup violence. The director of an LNOG (R2) stated: ‘All of these groups, all wanting to have a say and control, it is creating a lot of new conflicts.’ A Maoist local politician (R4) claimed: ‘it is not us you have to worry about. It is all the other groups.’ These observations show that the dynamics of intergroup conflict are changeable over post-war years. While future violence was expected from old candidates such as RENAMO and Maoists, it was also suggested that new tensions and sources of conflict between different sets of groups could erupt into violence. Ten or twenty years into peace, it cannot be assumed that renewed conflict is always attributable to the ‘usual suspects’.

As well as these oral accounts, there were non-verbal signs that people anticipated violence. Travelling through Rolpa district was the only time I witnessed a physical military presence outside Kathmandu. Our bus was stopped and we were subjected to bag searches three times. My fellow passengers
explained that the checks had been introduced as a precaution shortly after the declaration of the boycott. The region’s historic links with the Maoists meant the recent boycott actions had led to anxiety in Kathmandu that there could be intentions in the district to restart the civil war. Speaking to village members, however, revealed a different perspective. A community leader (R7) told me that, far from wanting further war, they were equally worried and had held village meetings to discuss what to do if war did restart.

During my fieldwork, RENAMO seemed to issue daily statements changing their position as to whether they would pull out of the peace process and renew fighting or not. My personal observation was of a palpable tension as the threat of violence hung over the capital. Many interviews were conducted with an air of caution and unease. Informants were willing to speak, but were aware of their environment, looking to see who was watching and listening. A village chieftain (Ma3) talked of how his village was suffering an exodus because of the fighting as members fled across the border to South Africa: ‘People were hearing reports on the radio of RENAMO attacks. They were scared the war was starting again and so ran.’ He went on to say that some people who had escaped across the border during the civil war had never returned: ‘They stay away because they are anxious the war will restart.’ Despite twenty years of peace, people in this village still did not consider the situation as stable and believed that war could restart at any time.

The pervasiveness of this belief raises two questions. What is driving it? And, if informants do not consider intergroup violence to have been an issue since the end of the war, why do they continue to believe groups could be polarised and remobilised? Although there may be many contributing factors, section 5.4 discussed how the lack of political reconciliation remained one of the biggest barriers to sustainable peace. From interviews in the six villages, the dynamics of relations between parties and the use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence appear to fuel the perception that war remains a distinct possibility. An LNGO worker (C2) explained: ‘The politicians, they are not good. They cannot agree on anything. People are worried. It could turn bad and again we will have war.’ A
civil society leader (I9) said: ‘We have no constitution after ten years and all these different parties making strikes, agitating people [sic]. It is like a bomb waiting to go off.’ An elder in the village in Rolpa (R7) said that villagers had discussed what to do if war restarted, based on the belief that political factionalism among elites could very likely erupt into widespread violence.

In Maputo, many described party relations as though the parties were still fighting and there was a palpable expectation of war. In the villages, there was a similar view. A faith-based NGO project manager (Ma5) commented: ‘This time fighting was small but I do not think they [political elite] will get a permanent compromise.’ A representative of ex-combatants (Ma4) stated, ‘they [political elites] hate each other too much, too much bad blood. It can only end in more blood’, while a chieftain remarked, ‘I heard Dhlakama speak [on the radio]. His talk of this tribe or that tribe needing to unite is dangerous. He is looking to make war.’ The prevalence with which interviewees in the villages and capital spoke of the expectation of further intergroup violence and civil war reinforces that there is a need to be aware of, and to address, civil-war-contingent forms of violence. As a traditional leader in Mozambique (Ma3) told me: ‘They [political parties] are always talking like war. People are worried the violence will start again.’

The expectation of further war indicates that informants believe conditions exist which could be used to mobilise groups. Two factors which may be contributing to this are a lack of socioeconomic development and the continual reproduction of wartime narratives in political discourse and practice.

In both countries, there was a sense that people felt progress had been made politically since the end of the wars. Many of my interviewees in Nepal listed these achievements: establishment of a republic, multi-party democracy and the abolition of the monarchy. Hailed as significant political gains, these were all viewed with optimism. Despite caveats around the combative behaviour of FRELIMO and RENAMO, many interviewees pointed to the national elections as evidence of progress. An ex-combatant representative (Ma4), for example, stated: ‘There have been five national elections now. I think Mozambicans are
more happy now we have democracy.' While a civil society leader commented (Ma2): ‘Our democracy is not perfect, but it is still much better than what we had before.’

His statement captures a widespread awareness amongst interviewees that political restructuring cannot happen overnight, and that it will take longer still before it is able to function effectively. However, many went on to express a desire to move past these political developments and to concentrate on other aspects of peace: ‘Enough. We have our political change. Now it is time to look to bring change in other parts of our lives’ (I4). It was inferred that socioeconomic development was of greater importance in terms of meeting the interests of people in the villages. ‘Political change is good, but it is not feeding my family’ (Mb5). ‘What we really need are opportunities to be able to change our lives’ (I5). Although interviewees expressed a range of interests, all of them related to socioeconomic development: improved employment, education, healthcare and provision for the vulnerable and disadvantaged.

I do not wish to imply that the post-civil war period has been devoid of change or that politicians are ignorant of the need for development. President Guebuza of FRELIMO is seen as a staunch capitalist, promoting entrepreneurship (M6). In recent peace talks, that RENAMO leader Dhlakama had socioeconomic reforms as one of his five key talking points represented – as several interviewees noted – a significant shift in political strategy (M6, M19). While in Nepal, a number of NGOs have started to switch their priorities from rights-based and reconciliation advocacy to socioeconomic needs. As the CEO of a Nepalese peacebuilding NGO (K19) commented: ‘Although work still needs to be done institutionalising the political accomplishments, we recognise that a diverse society has many needs.’ It is, however, important to note that any shift in discourse among politicians may be attributable to factors other than a response to popular needs. In Mozambique, self-interest among political elites was raised several times. There were comments, for example, expressing cynicism at the timing of RENAMO’s re-orientation toward socioeconomic reform, which just happened to coincide with
the discovery of liquid gas reserves in areas of the country where their political support was strong (Ma5, Mc3).

While it is true that political improvements have been made since the end of the civil wars, informants suggest that for the majority of Nepalese and Mozambicans within the villages I visited, the hoped-for opportunities that would have allowed them to improve their lives have not materialised. Upreti et al. (2012), in their research, assert that the circumstances of most Nepalese are the same as before the war and that many are actually worse off. A local politician (R4), for example, believed that the Rolpa boycott was driven by concern over lack of development. UCPN(M) claimed that once in power they would make the district their regional headquarters, yet despite several terms in office, the region has seen little investment and development. Many villages are still not accessible by road, for example, and villagers' lives have changed little. A community leader (R7) said that the decision to make a stand was born from the villagers' belief that: ‘We have had eight years of peace; nothing has changed.’

What emerged strongly was a sense of frustration at the lack of socioeconomic transformation. An ex-combatant (I5) in Nepal stated: ‘I joined [the Maoists] because they promised there would be equality in the society and the people in the society would be treated fairly [sic]. This has not happened.’ Another ex-combatant (R3) exclaimed – ‘we felt regretful. We did great contribution to the party but the result was very distressing. Our issues were not given time [sic]’. A faith-based LNGO worker (Ma5) recounted his experience: ‘I hear many times that they [people] do not see any benefit from their fighting. Their lives have not got better for it.’ In addition, a project manager for an LNGO working with ex-combatants (Mc4) said that many now resented what they saw as ‘lost productive years’. Formal education was viewed as one of the greatest losses and the post-war years had offered little opportunity to fill the gap. Many interviewees gave lack of employment as a key example of how parties have failed to provide for people after the civil wars (K22, M7). In Mozambique, interviewees pointed to several violent demonstrations that had taken place in Maputo. Rather than motivated by the parties, they were in response to broader
dissatisfaction at government increases in fuel and food prices (M6, M19). Similarly, in Nepal, thousands of street demonstrations (bandhs) have taken place since the end of the war, many of them centred around protests over government socioeconomic policy (K22).

The state of affairs interviewees describe resonates with Galtung's (1969) concept of structural violence. If peacebuilding is to deal with violence effectively and bring lasting and sustainable peace, the root causes of war must be addressed (Galtung, 1976; Lederach, 1997; Yanacopulos and Hanlon, 2006b). The lack of development within the villages I visited reveals that many of the conditions that led to the take-up of arms continue, while the interviews suggest that widespread frustration with the lack of change that peace has brought could be used by parties to mobilise further intergroup violence. A human-rights activist (R1) told me: ‘You see [political parties] in their campaigns. They use inequalities, differences, and may turn violent [sic].’ In a similar vein, an NGO worker (Mb2) explained: ‘I worry that the poverty could bring more war [sic].’ So far no political party, not even RENAMO during the recent insurgency, has exploited the continuing structural violence, but there is widespread concern that they might.

Civil war-related claims-making raises a further question around the sustainability of the villages remaining free from intergroup violence. Igreja (2008b) discusses how the official silence around the civil war in Mozambique was seen as an instrument to bring peace, and how the belief that it was impossible to seek accountability for all the atrocities was a driving force for amnesty. However, his argument that the parties have broken this silence is supported by the findings – presented in Chapter 5 – showing how parties use the civil war and its associated violence as a source of political legitimacy.

The official political silence then transferred to the rest of society so that it was seen as taboo for anyone to talk about the war (M21, M5). A negotiator involved in the Rome peace talks (K16) and an NGO worker (Mb2) suggested that the approach of ‘forgive but don't forget' had hindered reconciliation. The silence
meant people had not been able to deal with the violence of the past and their wounds, left to simmer, could be used to re-polarise communities. There is research suggesting that not allowing people to talk about the past prevents effective reconciliation. In Rwanda, the post-genocide government banned any explicit reference to the ethnic identities (Hutu and Tutsi) and Power (2013:1) contends that this ‘has failed to allow Rwandans to meaningfully explore and deconstruct the identities and attitudes which led to the 1994 genocide’. Although new identities are constructed over the old ones, intergroup tensions from wartime still exist and can be reignited. Power’s theory is supported by the discussion in Section 5.2.1 in which I discuss a caveat around the effectiveness of a national identity in Mozambique being able to bring enduring peace under current political conditions.

Another emerging body of literature explores the relationship between memory and the ability of society to achieve reconciliation after civil wars (Charbonneau and Parent, 2012). In Mozambique, despite the taboo within communities on conversations around the civil war, public and political discourse remains dominated by a narrative that continually reproduces and reifies its memory. An NGO project lead (Mc3) stated: ‘You hear them say: “Remember them. They killed your sons, your husbands.” In this language, you are making them into enemy again [sic].’ Civil war-related claims-making repeatedly exposes people to the polarised intergroup relations of the war. An academic (M19) stated: ‘Talking of war and violence plays into the old ideas. People start to remember the divides and they come.’ The claims are a constant reminder of the violence of the past and, as a direct result of them, several interviewees placed caveats around the success of wider social reconciliation. The refusal to allow people to move on from the trauma of the past means it could be used to mobilise violence again in the future (Mb1, Ma5).

The information interviewees provided suggests that the behaviour of the political parties and their use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence contributes to their belief that a return to violence and civil war remain a strong possibility.
6.3.3 Learning from the village context

The lack of intergroup violence in the six villages I visited reveals that a swift transformation in relations has taken place, and several interviewees suggested that political elites could learn from what has taken place in the villages (K16, R5, M3, Mb1). Many attributed the success to weariness. People were acutely aware of the destructiveness of war and had no desire for it to continue: ‘People were simply tired of violence. They were tired of the fighting’ (C4). Several informants in Mozambique (M7, Mc4) said that those who had experienced the war(s) felt it was vital to communicate to those who had not – particularly the younger generations growing up who had never experienced war – the devastation it causes. Their hope was that this would help to avoid war in the future. When interviewees talked about the effects of violence and civil war, many did not do so in terms of physical destruction. Instead, the impacts were related in terms of their effects on relations, of ‘families and villages having been torn apart’ (K21). Rebuilding was seen more as an exercise in re-establishing peaceful relations than in rebuilding destroyed infrastructure. This insight into what communities see as important in the post-civil war environment – in this case, the restoration of cohesive non-violent relations – is an interesting point for research exploring the importance of transforming intergroup relations in post-war periods.

Relying on political elites to weary of war, however, is not the most proactive approach, and the renewed fighting in Mozambique suggests politicians do not tire easily. Pluralistic ideas of identity (Sen, 2007) could be useful in explaining why groups in the villages have overcome the legacy of violence. In everyday living, individuals can simultaneously belong to any number of groups. Over the course of an interview, for example, identity was often expressed in more than one way: career, domestic relationships, peer groups, and community groups or associations. Different identities take priority depending on context and time and, as a result, group identity is subject to a state of flux. Under these conditions, political identity commands a considerably lower priority. The
director of an LNGO in Mozambique (Mb3) commented: ‘Go to any village and you will find RENAMO and FRELIMO living not just side by side, but within the same families.’ An academic studying the peace process (M13) supported this view: ‘All over Mozambique, in many households, you will find both RENAMO and FRELIMO supporters.’ What their comments show is family membership taking precedence over political membership. Similar comments were made in Nepal. A community leader (R7) told me: ‘We know who the non-Maoists are in the village, but it is not an issue.’ The interviewees’ words suggest tolerance and a situation in which political identities cohabit without confrontation and conflict. The competing identities create opportunities for people to identify with groups in new ways, allowing them to shed the exclusivity of their wartime identities. The words of a peace researcher (M19) in Mozambique are enlightening in this respect: ‘I asked, “Where are the ex-fighters?” The response? “You want to talk to an ex-combatant? You will find none of those here. You can talk to my brother-in-law though.”

Political group identity emerges as a priority for people in the villages much less frequently than do other group identities, such as being a family member. Indeed, for the majority political group identity only comes to the fore around key events such as elections. As a result, the essentialised wartime identities that continue to polarise and dominate interparty relations do not command the same traction. Instead, they are diluted by an array of competing identities.

Despite the consensus among interviewees that intergroup violence had not been an issue over post-war years, and that the transformation in relations had been remarkably swift compared to that between political parties, I do not wish to paint an idealised picture of the villages I visited as totally free from intergroup conflict. The discussion around LPCs showed that local political elites were complicit in developing patronage networks that could exclude people based on political affiliation. Specifically, it is violence as a feature of intergroup conflict that has not been present. However, informants continue to believe that further civil war is a strong possibility.
The fact that relations between the national-level parties – through their use of the three different forms of civil-war-contingent violence – contribute to this belief reinforces the need for the violence be to addressed. Not only does it impact on decision-making and the implementation of peace policies, it means that people expect - and are living in fear of – future war. Informants perceive two issues as adding to this expectation, issues that could again be used to polarise and mobilise the villages to civil war: a failure to address the socioeconomic roots of the war and the use of civil war-related claims-making.

6.4 Summary
This chapter set out to examine the transformation of intergroup relations away from violence within the six villages. It contributes to the thesis by showing that violence between the previously warring groups has not been a feature of relations over post-war years. There was, however, a pervasive concern that intergroup violence, in the form of civil war, remains a possibility and the relations of political parties at national level were seen as a key cause of this. That expectations of a return to war can be seen to be fuelled by civil-war-contingent forms of violence supports my proposal that there is a need to be more aware of these forms of violence during peacebuilding and to work to mitigate their use.

The chapter also engaged with ideas of level and the nature of political representation in post-civil war contexts. In Section 6.1, I explored interviewees’ perceptions of how people in the villages I visited understood and experienced the peace process. I introduced ideas of level to argue that actors and activities cannot be thought of in simple binary terms such as national and local (Paffenholz, 2015). In this, my findings resonate with the emerging literature that argues that interaction between levels in peacebuilding is considerably more contested and complex than a binary opposition would allow (Hughes et al., 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). Section 6.2 used the concept of political representation as a dynamic and interactive process (de Wilde, 2013) to look at relations between political elites at national level and the groups they claim to
Chapter 7
Conclusions

Introduction
In this thesis, I set out to investigate post-civil war violence as a concern of intergroup relations in Nepal and Mozambique. The research started from the premise that long-term exposure to violence during civil war risks violence becoming embedded in the patterns and cycles of how groups deal with conflict, and as such, may account for the persistence of violence into post-civil war years. The purpose of the study was to look at the transformation of intergroup relations as groups interacted during the development and implementation of policies within the peace agreements that dealt with violence. The intent was to explore the role that violence played in this process through answering the
question: *how, and why, are groups that were fighting during civil war transforming the way they approach conflict in post-war years?*

The thesis engaged with a gap in existing literature around understandings of war-related violence and calls for more nuanced explanations of post-civil war violence. The need for the research stemmed from Chenoweth and Lawrence's (2010) argument that different forms of violence, and the different strategies behind its use, will demand differing methods and measures to overcome. Historically, post-civil war violence has been studied as an issue of wartime elites trying to undermine peace processes and restart civil war, or as an issue of violence becoming culturally embedded in interpersonal relations (Suhrke 2012:2). This research presented a different view to these two leading approaches by exploring violence as a potential continuance of wartime group relations into peace years.

The way I set out to answer the question provided an opportunity to explore two additional areas of emerging research in the peacebuilding literature. The first related to the idea of levels of peacebuilding, the types of actors and activities attached to concepts such as local and national and how they interact. The second concerned the nature of political representation in post-civil war contexts looking at how political representatives and those they claim to represent understand their relations outside of formal institutionalised national election processes. Both of these gaps were examined through an exploration of interviewee understandings and experiences of participating in the peace process.

In this final chapter, I elaborate on the argument and look at the implications of the findings more broadly, drawing out what they mean for the field of peacebuilding. The chapter divides into five parts. Section 7.1 reviews and synthesises the discussions within the empirical chapters to offer an answer to the primary research question. Section 7.2 then considers the broader implications of my argument. Section 7.3 reflects on limitations in the study and findings. Section 7.4 proposes recommendations for future research while
Section 7.5 concludes with a formative assessment of the contribution that the thesis offers.

7.1 Empirical findings

The main argument that I made is that violence has remained a prominent feature of interparty relations years, and decades, after the end of the civil wars in Nepal and Mozambique. This violence, however, is not easily identifiable against the leading theories that explain civil war-related violence as physical or structural. I discussed three behaviours used by political parties as part of their interactions with one another that I maintain constitute violence: threatening further armed revolution, retaining access to armed forces and civil war-related claims-making. Collectively, I named them civil-war-contingent violence as each can be seen to share a link to the civil war, either as the result of the war happening or requiring it to have happened. The use of the term is to provide a means to conceptually frame these forms of violence and analyse their effects.

Chapter 5 was structured around describing this violence and its impacts on both interparty relations and the peace process more broadly. Chapter 6 compared the transformation experience among the parties to those of intergroup relations in villages, however, it went further and also explored experiences and relations of people in villages to the peace process and political parties as a way to engage with the literature gaps around levels of peacebuilding and political representation. The chapter concluded that, although violence does not appear to have been a significant cause of concern in the villages where I interviewed, many interviewees were apprehensive at the prospect of the outbreak of future civil war. The relations between political parties, and specifically the use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence, appear to be a key factor fuelling people’s expectations.

It was not my intent to focus so extensively on political parties, and specifically those parties that were party to the peace agreement and who are claiming to represent the previous warring groups. I was intrigued by the frequency with
which these parties employed the different forms of civil-war-contingent violence as they interacted during policy making, seeing patterns and cycles to their use 9 years into peace in Nepal and 23 in Mozambique. The rationale for channelling the findings down this line of enquiry was that both political party relations and the three types of violence I concentrate on have historically received little attention. Yet, my analysis suggested they were having a significant impact on the ability of in-country actors to deliver peace.

Chapter 5 looked at the transformation process from the perspective of political parties. Embracing Chenoweth and Lawrence’s (2010) call for the disaggregation of simplistic terms such as ‘violence and non-violence’ in favour of more nuanced thinking around civil war-related violence. Section 5.1 concentrated on describing the three different political strategies and presenting them as forms of violence. The concept of civil-war-contingent violence was introduced as a tool to collectively understand this violence. Section 5.2 examined two peacebuilding interventions intended to help deal with violence: the development of a national identity in Mozambique and the Nepal Transition to Peace organisation providing a neutral space for problem-solving. It showed how civil-war-contingent forms of violence and the types of interparty relations they foster can undermine these two approaches.

Section 5.3 talked about the resistance of interparty relations to transformation by examining how parties can manipulate formal political spaces, closing off access to decision-making around the peace process to new and alternative political parties. In addition, ideas of space were used to examine intraparty dynamics. I proposed that the more pluralistic political environment of Nepal has facilitated a faster reduction in the use of certain types of civil-war-contingent violence, such as the issuance of the threat of armed revolution, relative to the predominantly two-party system of Mozambique. Although, it is important to note that many parties in Nepal still frequently employ civil war-related claims-making.
The final part of the chapter, Section 5.4, considered the implications of interparty relations and civil-war-contingent violence on the overall peace process. I maintained that the different forms of violence have fuelled antagonistic and obstructive behaviours that have compounded decision-making. Many of the policy provisions in the peace agreement took far longer to implement or deliver than originally envisioned, while in both countries key aspects of the peace agreement remain unfulfilled. It was discussed that part of the reason for the persistence of civil-war-contingent violence may be due to parties continuing to see an enemy rather than a legitimate political opponent. This enemy perception may be linked to the continual reification of factionalised and essentialised portrayals of group identities from the time of war through the parties claims-making practices. The chapter concluded by calling for more attention to civil-war-contingent forms of violence as a means of helping facilitate the transformation process between political parties in post-war years. Their continued presence suggests that violence can remain a pivotal part of how these parties under themselves and each other long after physical fighting stops. Dealing with this violence requires recognising that they are deeply embedded in interparty relations.

Chapter 6 looked at the transformation process within the villages where I interviewed. The chapter also engaged with the issue of the way levels are analysed within peacebuilding and the nature of political representation. Section 6.1 reviewed interviewee perspectives of how people in villages experienced and participated in the peace process using Cornwall’s (2002) ideas of political space and the idea of levels as a social construct (Marston, 2000). Many informants felt that people were detached from the overall peacebuilding project, that the peace process was the exclusive domain of political elites. In addition, it appeared that political party members see interventions intended to build peace within villages (LPCs in Nepal and traditional or church-based reconciliation in Mozambique) as divorced from more national in scope initiatives such as DDR or truth commissions. Formal policy decision-making space was characteristic of Cornwall’s ‘closed’ space and the way the peace process was implemented suggests elites view peacebuilding as a top-down enterprise, supporting the
literature that is critical of this contemporary view (De coning, 2013, Paris and Sisk, 2009, Roberts, 2011a). Despite a lack of access to formal political decision-making space, I discussed a number of examples that show that village-level actors were using informal political spaces to try and make claims and influence discourse and decision-making on national-level policies. These actions imply that village-level actors want to participate and not just be passive recipients of peacebuilding. It also demonstrates how ideas of the actors and activities involved in peacebuilding that are assigned exclusive labels, such as national and local, are actually more fluid social constructs dependent upon how those involved view their role and participation (MacGinty, 2015; Hughes et al., 2015).

Section 6.2 examined perceptions of relations with political parties. It discussed a deep disconnect between parties and those they claim to represent. Many identified with parties as a group but did not seem to identify with the political leadership - believing these political actors to not be accurately representing group needs. The findings support the literature that is critical of representation in post-war contexts - being narrowly defined in terms of national elections (Collier, 2010). There appeared a desire for a more interactive relationship with political parties outside of election cycles, again supporting research that is arguing for representation to be understood as a dynamic continuous process, rather than as a formalised and institutionalised product of elections (de Wilde, 2013 and Young, 2000). It was outside the scope of this research to explore exactly what an alternate relationship would look like and how it would work.

Section 6.3 focused on perceptions and experiences of intergroup conflict within villages. Again, there was a discrepancy in views. Village interviewees did not recognise or relate with the representations of intergroup conflict that parties portray – essentialised, polarised group relations similar to wartime. The key finding is that intergroup violence was not viewed as being a feature or concern within villages. Factors I discussed that could, in part, be responsible for this perception were a lack of relevance of the national political discourse to everyday life within villages and that there is a plurality of identities in the everyday, all demanding attention, which may contribute to diffusing the polarisations
in identity which are being presented by the political parties. However, although intergroup violence had not been viewed as a problem within the villages, the relations of political parties and the use of civil-war-contingent violence appeared to be having an effect on village understandings of conflict. It was proposed that the political parties were responsible for generating a pervasive expectation of further intergroup violence and the possibility of further civil war in the future. Two factors were advanced as possible drivers of this anxiety - a fear that communities could be mobilised to physical violence due to a lack of change in socioeconomic conditions (peace efforts were not seen as addressing the socio-economic causes of the wars), and a sense that people were being prevented from ‘moving on’ from civil war due to the continual reproduction of the war narrative in the political discourse through civil war-contingent claims-making.

The research question sought to assess how and why the relations of the groups that were fighting during civil war transform away from violence in post-war years. What the findings show is a very different understanding and experience between the political parties who claim to represent the previous warring groups and villages where members of these groups live and interact on a daily basis. Chapters 5 and 6 have answered the how and why transformation took place from the two perspectives, but an objective of the research was to explore post-war violence as an issue of intergroup relations. It is important to reflect on what the findings say about the role of violence in how groups deal with conflict after civil wars.

In villages, little transformation has taken place over post-war years. This is because intergroup relations appear to have undergone a remarkably swift transition, my interviews suggesting that violence largely ended as an intergroup issue with the ending of the wars – as one NGO worker (Mb3) commented, ‘people just went back to their lives’. Where physical violence has surfaced, interviewees attributed it to people from outside of villages coming in and trying to provoke violence. The violence seemed to take place around key political events, for example, in the lead-up to elections, and as such, my interviewees saw
this physical violence to be politically motivated by parties at the national level. It is reasonable to conclude therefore that violence has not been a significant feature of intergroup relations in post-war years. A caveat could be placed on the sustainability of this assessment, however, as my findings imply that there are conditions still present in Nepal and Mozambique that interviewees felt could lead to people being polarised and mobilised to intergroup violence – that groups could be politically manipulated to civil war once again.

7.2 Implications and contributions

There are a number of practical and theoretical contributions that emerge from the findings I present in this thesis that have implications for the field of peacebuilding. Sections and sub-sections of Chapters 5 and 6 reflect on the findings in the individual discussions. Here, I take a step back to consider three core contributions that come from answering the research question.

I set out to explore how post-war violence might be an issue of intergroup relations from the civil war persisting into peace years to offer a different perspective from the dominant ’legacies’ and ’cultures’ approaches (Suhrke 2012:2). In so doing, the research was responding to calls for better understandings of war-related violence – to disaggregate the forms it takes, reasons for its use and how to mitigate against it (Chenoweth and Lawrence’s, 2010). First, the main contribution of the thesis has been to show that transformation from the violence that characterised group relations during civil war is more complex than can be determined by looking merely for the presence or absence of physical violence.

Based on observations of relations between political parties I introduced the idea that violence has remained a key part of how some parties understand and deal with conflict, particularly those claiming to represent the previous warring groups. I described three behaviours that I argue constitute forms of violence: the threat of armed revolution, retaining armed forces and civil war-related claims-making. The empirical chapters showed how this violence has affected
interparty relations and impacted on the implementation of the peace processes by impeding policy decision-making. The concept of civil-war-contingent violence offers a way to conceptually understand and analyse these forms of violence and the research, therefore, presents a new way of understanding post-civil war violence.

Second, to deal with this violence, it is not enough to acknowledge their presence and to work to stop or prevent their use. Conflict transformation says that how parties’ deal with conflict between them is a product of historic interaction, shaped by relations built up over time (Lederach, 2003:36). Within my data, there were discernible cycles to the use of the different forms of violence that are still present today - years and decades after fighting stops. The persistence of this violence is suggestive of limited transformation in interparty relations over extended timeframes and is indicative of Lederach’s (2003) notion that conflicting actors can become locked into patterns of violent, destructive interaction that are resistant to transformation.

In both cases, there appeared a distinct absence among international and domestic actors alike of peacebuilding interventions aimed at explicit and sustained attempts to engage political parties over the nature of their relations in post-war years. This observation supports Castillejo’s (2016:1) point that international peacebuilding, to date, has tended to overlook engagement with political parties. Where there were efforts that can be said to be trying to foster more constructive relations they tend to be issue-based, designed to bring parties together to address particular problems or make a decision on a specific aspect of the peace process. This was the objective of the NTTP for example. In Mozambique, interparty relations are thrust into the limelight and become a focus of third-party intervention whenever RENAMO threaten to pull out of political process and restart war, prompting actors such as the churches to once again try and broker the peace. The second contribution is to show the importance of being more conscious that violent behaviours are part of long-standing patterns of interparty relations and to reduce their use and effect more
positive transformation will require more active and prolonged engagement with parties to break these violent cycles.

Third, the research offers a theoretical contribution to the study of political representation. Dynamic understandings and explanations of political representation (de Wilde, 2013), seeing it more as an interactive process than the traditional ‘presence’ view that understands groups and interests as largely static entities (Schaap, et al., 2012), were used to conceptualise the nature of the relationship between representatives and those they claim to represent. The research needed a way to analyse a more dynamic process of representation. Saward’s (2010) model of claims-making was used in a cyclical way to assess how the needs and interests of groups were being portrayed over time to see how they changed and how constituent groups viewed these representations. Cornwall’s (2002) concepts of political space were used to look at the interaction between representative and represented, as well as how the political procedures and channels designed to facilitate policy-making influenced relations. While I was focusing exclusively on intergroup conflict and peacebuilding, the framework could hypothetically be used to study the relationship between representative and represented in a more dynamic way in regard to any issue or policy in other countries and contexts.

7.3 Reflections on the research

Having reviewed the findings and contributions, here I take a step back to critically reflect on some of the limitations of the study in regard to the overall approach, methodology and findings. The way in which I investigated the research question was channelled through a particular worldview – using critical social constructivism, conflict transformation and ideas of identity to analyse the transformation of intergroup conflict utilising qualitative data. There were many ways I could have looked at, and investigated, the transformation process but my choices were based on informed judgement as to the best way to answer the research question. Throughout the thesis, I have referenced various alternative approaches as I set out the rationale for the research but there are several that
need mention as they have particular bearing on the findings and future research.

At various points, I have talked about the dominant liberal peacebuilding paradigm, which has historically placed prominence on the role of international actors for peacebuilding to be successful. The role of international actors is being increasingly scrutinised, challenging the idea that they are inherently benevolent and that peacebuilding should be imposed from the top-down (De Coning, 2013:5). Although the role of foreign influence was woven through the case study descriptions, I intentionally concentrated on the transformation process from a domestic perspective so that the study could engage with literature that is calling for more in-country and local ownership of peace processes (Hughes et al., 2015). While I recognise that peacebuilding and the transformation of intergroup relations cannot be separated from the involvement and influence of international actors, both Nepal and Mozambique had UN missions for example, the intent of this study was to concentrate on in-country actors and discourses shaping how groups overcome violence in the aftermath of civil war. Looking at the role of international actors in this process would be one of the primary ways I would advocate building on this research to take it forward.

From a theoretical perspective, while pluralistic ideas of identity provided the main vehicle for conceptualising groups and analysing how intergroup relations were changing, the argument in my empirical chapters concentrates on essentialist ideas of group identity. This was driven by observations of the behaviours of political parties, rather than my intentional deviation from the theoretical approach.

Identity is used extensively in the study of civil wars but it is often accused of producing unsophisticated understandings by attributing violence to particular identity types (Collier, 2010, Sen, 2007). What these superficial explanations frequently omit are more detailed explorations into the factors and influences that may be shaping particular ideas of identity in order to fuel conflict and violence between groups. Far from treating group identities as independent
entities, at various points throughout the empirical chapters, I have discussed how a number of different economically driven factors may have been motivators behind my findings to show how aspects of political economy are interwoven with ideas of identity, and so will be influencing the transformation process. Dhlakama’s armed guard acting as a personal patronage network to ensure his position as party leader, or that power-sharing arrangements brokered at the time of signing the peace agreement was allowing the previous belligerent parties to capture formal political space, for example.

The use of political economy was not the theoretical focus for the thesis as the intent was to explore post-war violence as a potential issue of group relations, which identity lends better to analysing than political economy that concentrates more on elite and individual behaviours. But it is important to show that I was mindful of these dynamics as research is increasingly showing that civil wars are not reducible to exclusive explanations of identity or political economy but are complex with a multitude of interconnected factors and causes.

From a methodological standpoint, there are aspects of the research that need consideration as they give perspective to the findings and the claims that are presented from the data. There is a difference in the data between Nepal and Mozambique. In the empirical chapters, I draw more on Nepalese informants to support arguments. This was due to limited access in Mozambique as ongoing peace talks made site visits outside of the south impractical. Although I visited the same number of villages in each country, socio-political diversity of those in Mozambique was much more limited. While I am mindful of these differences, the purpose of the research was not to produce a like for like comparison across the countries but to draw insights on the transformation process from the two contexts and employ the data illustratively to support my argument. In addition, while the sample size of villages is small, the purpose was to look at the transformation in group relations by focusing on a limited number of sites to gain in-depth and rich data that supported the aim of understanding why transformation was taking place, not just observing relations to understand what was changing. The findings, therefore, can be seen as representative of the
villages where I interviewed but are not meant to be a commentary and claims on group relations at a district, regional or country level. I recognise that there will be variance in experiences between individual villages that makes more general extrapolation problematic.

Within the villages themselves, the interviewee sample was small given the population at some sites numbered thousands. Again, sampling was purposive, targeting individuals who had worked extensively on activities designed to deal with violence and build peace. The logic was to be selective, choosing those interviewees who had observed group interaction in the villages over extended periods, so as to be able to give a good account of group relations. There is a risk that drawing on a limited number of interviewees means that data could be influenced by vested interests, or just reflect the views of the village elites. While recognising this possibility, Chapter 4 talked about the ways in which I worked with research assistants to identify interviewees to limit these issues as far as possible.

The research sought to contribute to emerging literature that is looking to expand thinking of peacebuilding actors and activities in terms of unsophisticated binary understandings of levels such as local or national (MacGinty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). To explore this methodologically, I used Lederach's (1997) pyramid of peacebuilding. Political party members and other interviewees in capitals were seen as national actors, while my interviewees in the villages, local actors. As such, my interviews can be seen to replicate the binary that Paffenholz (2015) is critical of. The study has limited engagement with this topic because the focus was predominantly post-war violence but the purpose for my inclusion of this debate was because the choice of the two types of interviewee presented an opportunity to explore and challenge the idea of peacebuilding as a top-down enterprise. While I recognise the methodological limitation and acknowledge there are many other ways in which levels can be conceived (district, region), all of which will also be influencing and impacting on the peacebuilding process, through Section 6.1, I was able to present new empirical evidence that supports the literature that is calling for more nuanced
understandings of levels of peacebuilding and how they relate, showing how ideas of national and local are more complex and contested.

The final aspect of the thesis for critical consideration concerns the main findings and argument. I posed the idea that violence is not only present but has retained a prevalent role in party relations in both Nepal and Mozambique. This is not to imply that no transformation has taken place, or that all parties are using the three forms of violence and to the same degree. Indeed, Chapter 5 offered a more nuanced analysis by suggesting that the more rapid reduction in the use of some forms of civil-war-contingent violence that was observed in Nepal relative to Mozambique may be attributable to a more open pluralistic political environment in the former. The point is that conflict is relational so if one party is using these forms of violence, then violence can be said to be present. However, the frequency with which they are employed by parties in Nepal and Mozambique with discernible patterns, RENAMO’s regular issuance of a threat of further war after every election, for example, is suggestive that violence remains a pivotal part in how parties in these countries understand and interact with one another. The focus of the thesis has been on presenting this violence, describing the different forms and analysing its impact to highlight the need to consider the potential effects on long-term peacebuilding. Further research could be conducted to probe in more depth into each form, motivations behind its use and the actors using it.

The three forms of violence discussed are not immediately identifiable against the leading theoretical understandings of civil war-related violence as physical or structural. Although all invoke ideas of physical violence or imply the possibility of physical violence, they do not necessarily see if directly manifest. The parties employ these forms of violence strategically in their interactions with one another suggesting more conscious agency than structural violence, which is more systematically ingrained in socio-political and economic institutions (Galtung, 1969). Because they do not conform to these explanations I wanted a way to differentiate the violence, to be able to explain and analyse them as a distinct phenomenon. It was seeing a shared connection to the civil
war - using the idea of war or requiring it to have happened for effect - that I
decided to employ the term civil war-contingent violence. There is a risk that
using this term implies that these forms of violence are being exclusively
attributed to the civil war. This is not, however, what I am suggesting. The civil
war-related claims-making described is very specific to, and reliant on, the civil
wars. Threatening further civil war and maintaining private armed groups,
however, need not necessarily be solely attributable to the civil wars. The
purpose behind the use of civil-war-contingent violence is to provide a way to
start to collectively categorise and conceptualise this violence, to understand and
analyse it, and to begin an academic discourse around it.

7.4 Recommendations for future research
Based on the findings presented, there are a number of areas where I would
recommend additional research. At various points throughout the thesis, I have
acknowledged that there are forces that will have been acting on the
transformation process that were not a focus in this study. Lederach’s conflict
transformation approach embraces complexity and recognises there are
limitations to being fully cognisant of everything that is going on in a conflict:
particularly in contexts of civil war. However, Lederach (2003:20) advocates
working on the principle of always trying to be better informed, and as such, a
first step in taking the work forward would be to explore the impact of these
other influences on the transformation of intergroup relations – namely, a more
detailed look at aspects of political economy and the role of international actors
and dynamics. Furthermore, accepting the discrepancy between the village data
in Nepal relative to Mozambique, supplementary fieldwork could be conducted
in Mozambique when conditions are less sensitive. Looking at the experience of
intergroup relations in villages in other parts of the country where socio-political
dynamics will be very different to the south would introduce a broader
representative sample than could be obtained during my data collection. I offer
five additional recommendations that would further this research.
First, more study into the key finding: civil-war-contingent forms of violence. This research could look to a more in-depth exploration of the three types of violence discussed: the reasons for their use, their impacts on the peace process, their relative effects and possible interconnections. Also, looking to investigate other behaviours and strategies that political parties use in their interactions with one another that could constitute as acts of violence but that are not easily distinguishable against dominant approaches. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, more consideration could be given to the utility of civil-war-contingent violence as a way to conceptualise, understand and analyse these forms of violence as well as how these ideas relate to thinking of violence as physical or structural.

Second, I would advocate extending the study to additional post-civil war contexts. Baxter and Jack (2008:544) talk of the value of case studies for studying complex phenomena and, bearing in mind the limitations of comparison of civil war contexts, expanding the study to different countries could help to corroborate or refute the results presented here. Furthermore, there is contestation amongst civil war academics about the way in which civil wars end (negotiated settlement or outright victory) impacting on the chances for long-term peace (Sigdel, 2014). For example, Toft (2010:7) maintains that a rebel victory offers the greatest chance for lasting peace, democracy and economic prosperity. Both Nepal and Mozambique concluded in a stalemate, with peace agreements based on power-sharing arrangements. A future study might look to examine the transformation process in countries where civil wars end with a decisive winner.

Third, I discussed in Chapter 2 how political representation in post-war contexts is conceptualised exclusively in relation to formally institutionalised elections (Collier, 2010; Call, 2012). However, I deliberately took an approach to relations between representatives and those they claim to represent drawing on ideas of political representation as a dynamic and evolving process of interaction (de Wilde, 2013). The use of Saward’s (2010) Representative Claims-Making model in a cyclical way to look at interaction between representatives and the
represented over extended periods, coupled with Cornwall’s (2002) categories of political space, offers a way to explore the nature and role of political representation in countries emerging from war beyond looking at just national elections. This could be used in other post-war contexts, or in a further study of Nepal and Mozambique focusing more wholly on issues of political representation.

The fourth recommendation concerns the connection drawn between civil-war-contingent forms of violence and the pervasive belief amongst my interviewees that further civil war is a real possibility. Additional research could consider in more detail the impact of this perception and what is generating it to give nuance to the drivers and explore the causal nature of the relationship. The research might look to see if fear is created by particular representations of conflict that parties make through their use of civil war-related claims-making, such as referencing specific atrocities. Or, the research could examine if the expectation of war is attributable to particular forms of civil-war-contingent violence. For example, does the issuance of threats of further armed revolution create greater expectations of further civil war than civil war-related claims-making?

Another potential avenue within this theme is to examine how people experience the representations of intergroup conflict that parties make through the use of civil war-related claiming. My research examined publically published party texts and press articles from major newspapers. Much of the literature was not in English and although I had key texts translated, it did restrict what I could access. There are many more forms of media and organisational channels through which people will be exposed to political discourse that will be influencing their perceptions of the peace process. In both countries, the radio was referenced by a number of my interviewees as being a major source of information dissemination. How, and what, information people receive could provide valuable insight into how communities understand the peace process and how they are affected by the intergroup narratives publically projected by the political parties. An interesting dimension would be to investigate the effects of simultaneously conflicting discourses – those narratives promoting peace and
reconciliation at the same time as the parties playing to the polarised intergroup narratives from the war.

The fifth recommendation relates to the political reconciliation discussion in Section 5.4. I suggested that part of the problem for the persistence of civil-war-contingent forms of violence may be that parties are continuing to see an enemy rather than a legitimate political opponent. There is a strong body of literature in the psychosocial field that looks at the process of enmification – turning the other into the enemy (Tu, 2013). What is needed here, and where evidence is lacking, is a reversal of the process: de-enmification. The antagonism/agonism nexus is based on an enemy/friend distinction (Aggestam, et al, 2015) but current research offers little insight into how one might transition from the former to the latter. It appears intergroup violence has not been a significant concern within villages and it was suggested by several interviewees (M3, R2) that politicians should look to villages to learn from their example. Local peacebuilding practices are widely studied, not just in Nepal and Mozambique but in many other countries such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda and Fambul Tok in Sierra Leone. However, the focus tends to be on these very specific interventions. One possible avenue to explore is to look at the transformation of intergroup conflict within villages more as a relational process that happens through everyday interaction to see how enemy deconstruction occurs as a way of offering insight for political actors.

7.5 Conclusion

Civil wars will end. One side achieves a victory or there is a signing of a peace agreement, but either way, formal hostilities between the fighting factions stops. Yet the cessation of hostilities does not axiomatically equate with a reduction in violence – indeed, there is evidence to suggest that post-war societies can be more prone to violence than they were pre-war (Suhrke, 2012:1). Brubaker and Laitin (1998:425) write ‘violence is not just a degree of conflict but a form of conflict, or a form of social and political action in its own right’. This statement prompted the prominent civil war scholar Stathis N. Kalyvas (2000:2) to ask ‘not
what causes civil war, but what causes violence in civil war’. Over the past several decades, significant advances have been made in research on the causes of civil war and the nature of violence in war. Yet, for all the attention civil war related violence receives, post-war violence remains little researched or understood (Suhrke and Bardel, 2012). Often, post-civil war violence is explained simplistically, as a by-product of the civil war. The purpose of this thesis was to contribute to this emerging field of study, seeking to better understand what causes post-war violence, how it relates to civil war and the different forms it can take in order to inform better peacebuilding interventions to reduce its effects.

Existing literature on post-civil war violence falls into two broad categories (Suhrke, 2012:2). It is seen as a problem of prevention, stopping the leaders of the previous warring groups from restarting civil war. Or, alternatively, it is considered an issue of criminalised or socialised interpersonal violence. However, civil wars, by their very nature are fought between large groups. I used the intergroup nature as inspiration for offering a new perspective on the problem of post-war violence. The research started from the idea that prolonged exposure to the polarised group narratives and intergroup violence committed during civil wars could become embedded in group relations – part of the patterns and cycles of how these groups approach conflicts - and so could persist into post-war years. The thesis looked to examine the transformation that groups go through in how they understand and deal with conflicts and the role of violence in this process. It did so by exploring how groups interacted during the development and implementation of policies intended to deal with violence that were part of the peace agreements. The rationale for the research rested on the idea that a more informed understanding of if, and how, violence might be part of intergroup relations in post-civil war years could inform more effective peacebuilding interventions in civil war stricken countries.

The main finding of the research is that intergroup violence has not been a problem within the villages where I interviewed. However, the story is very different among the political parties representing the previous warring groups.
The study found that violence can remain a central feature of how political parties relate to one another, decades into peace years. This violence is not physical but is linked to the idea of civil war, and I discussed three different ways the parties employ this violence as part of strategies to pursue their political objectives. Through one of these forms of violence – civil war-related claims-making – the parties are continually reproducing and perpetuating essentialised group identities from the time of war in political discourse and practice.

Because of the prevalence and persistence of these types of violence, I made the case that it indicates transformation of interparty relations has been limited. In Mozambique, RENAMO and FRELIMO appear locked into the same pattern of relations twenty years on as they were at the end of the civil war. In Nepal, the picture was slightly different. Over the past decade, interparty relations have changed, with the violent strategies becoming more and more marginalised to the extreme political elements and I proposed that the greater plurality of political parties, coupled with a more open and discursive political environment, may be a contributing factor to the more progressive transformation seen in Nepal, relative to Mozambique. Despite these changes in Nepal, interparty relations remain plagued by deadlock and intermittent use of civil-war-contingent forms of violence, suggesting the parties are still trapped in negative cycles of interaction.

These relations between political parties have implications for the peace process. They prevent parties from cooperating and, as a result, key elements of the peace agreements remain incomplete. Beyond this national political picture, the research indicated there are wider implications for society. The use of these forms of violence are seen as generating an anticipation that parties could, should they wish, mobilise groups once again to incite further civil war and intergroup violence.

It seems that long into peace, political parties can remain locked into patterns and cycles of relations that are harmful to the development of peace. Assumptions cannot be made that just because a peace agreement is signed that
years or even decades of violent group relations will change overnight. The thesis makes the case that more attention needs to be paid to interparty relations during peacebuilding. There is a need to develop a better appreciation of how the political parties that represent the previous warring groups relate and interact during conflicts between them – what perceptions and meanings the parties attach to themselves, each other and to conflict - and to consider how this leads to the use of violent or non-violent ways of interacting. Being more sensitive to, and actively trying to reduce the use of civil-war-contingent violence within interparty relations could aid the transformation of post-civil war countries towards non-violence and peace.

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Appendices

Appendix A: interview questions

Questions were structured and tailored around three different types of interviewee: representatives, policy-makers and local peacebuilders.

1. Representatives

   I. What is your role as a political representative?
   II. Whose interests do you represent?
   III. What are the main objectives you were trying to achieve on behalf of this group through the peace process?
   IV. How do you interact with this group in order to understand and appreciate their interests?
   V. Have these interests changed over time? If so, how and why?
   VI. What has been your experience of interacting with other representatives during policy-making?
   VII. What have been the barriers and successes you encountered during policy-making?
   VIII. What impact do you think you have had on the policy process, and what would you do differently if you could do it again?
   IX. What do you think have been the main causes of conflict during the peace process?
X. Has violence been an issue in post-war years?
XI. If so, what were the causes, who was it between and how did the violence manifest?
XII. Has peacebuilding been successful? Why?

2. Policy-Makers

I. What were the main issues you were trying to address?
II. Did you engage with interest groups? If so, which ones and why?
III. What was the engagement strategy, and were there any issues or problems you faced? If so, what were they, and with whom?
IV. Which groups/organizations/individuals were involved in the policy process?
V. Were there any particular groups whose views were helpful, or a hindrance? If so, who and why?
VI. What were the priorities for addressing conflict that emerged?
VII. How effective has the policy been in meeting your intended goals? What were the main successes and barriers you faced?

All of the above will be suffixed with: ‘did this change over time, and if so, what were the reasons for the change?’

3. Local Peacebuilders

Perceptions and understandings of violence and conflict:
I. Has intergroup violence been a problem in the community after the end of the civil war?
II. What do communities view as the cause(s) of violence?
III. How does violence impact on intergroup relations within communities?
IV. Have intergroup relations transformed over time, and if so, between who and how?
V. What have been the main factors for the transformation?
VI. Have there been any specific aids or barriers to transformation?

Representation of interests:
VII. Are communities aware of the peace process?
VIII. What are the opportunities for communities to engage with political parties and policy-making?
IX. How representative are political parties seen of group interests?
X. How is public interest, as portrayed more broadly, representative of the needs of local communities

Impact of policy:
XI. How does the work of your organization relate to national policy?
XII. Does national policy reflect the priorities and realities faced by local communities?
XIII. Have initiatives arising from the policy transformed intergroup relations within the community? If so, how?

Open Q to finish:

XIV. If you were developing the policy, how would you have done it, and why? (Q1, Q2 and Q3)

4. Mozambique

To take into account the RENAMO insurgency and ongoing peace talks, I asked three additional questions in Mozambique of all interviewees:

I. What do you think the fighting started again?
II. What impact has the violence had?
III. What are the long-term prospects for peace in Mozambique?
## Appendix B: thematic node structure for data analysis

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Appendix C: interview codes

1. Nepal

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<th>Village R Informant Description</th>
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<td>Nepali Congress party member</td>
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<td>War reporter/human rights activist</td>
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2. Mozambique

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**Appendix D: fieldwork timeline**

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<td>7 – 9th March</td>
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Appendix E: Lederach’s (1997) ‘levels of action’ in peacebuilding

Types of Actors

Level 1: Top Leadership
Military/political/religious leaders with high visibility

Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership
Leaders respected in sectors
Ethnic/religious leaders
Academics/intellectuals
Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership
Local leaders
Leaders of indigenous NGOs
Community developers
Local health officials
Refugee camp leaders

Approaches to Building Peace

Focus on high-level negotiations
Emphasizes cease-fire
Led by highly visible, single mediator

Problem-solving workshops
Training in conflict resolution
Peace commissions
Insider-partial teams

Local peace commissions
Grassroots training
Prejudice reduction
Psychosocial work in postwar trauma