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Version: Accepted Manuscript

Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/pops.12310

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The struggle for the nature of ‘prejudice’: ‘Prejudice’ expression as identity performance

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(Political Psychology. 2015 DOI:10.1111/pops.12310)


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Abstract

This article develops an identity performance model of prejudice that highlights the creative influence of prejudice expressions on norms and situations. Definitions of prejudice can promote social change or stability when they are used to achieve social identification, explanation, and mobilization. Tacit or explicit agreement about the nature of prejudice is accomplished collaboratively by persuading others to accept (1) an abstract definition of ‘prejudice’, (2) concrete exemplars of ‘prejudice’, and (3) associated beliefs about how a target group should be treated. This article reviews three ways in which ‘prejudice’ can be defined in the cut and thrust of social interaction, namely, by mobilizing hatred and violence, by accusation and denial, and by repression. The struggle for the nature of prejudice determines who can be badly treated, and by whom. Studying such ordinary struggles to define what counts (and does not count) as ‘prejudice’ will allow us understand how identities are produced, norms are set into motion, and populations are mobilized as social relations are reformulated.
Citizens of today’s complex, conflicted, unequal and changing societies are continually being encouraged to espouse or relinquish beliefs that psychologists would label as ‘prejudiced’. Barely a day goes by without representatives of one or other group telling the media-consuming public to adopt a viewpoint of a social conflict and the groups involved. Consider as an opening example, the Occupy Wall Street Movement (OWSM), which emerged in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. This group laid the blame for the economic crisis of the time firmly at the door of wealthy, the super-rich, bankers, fund managers and CEOs, who were singled out and vilified as a proper target of hostility – “a band of feckless, greedy narcissists, and possibly sociopaths” (Erenreich & Erenreich, 2012, para. 3).

Under the slogan, “We are the 99%,” the Movement encouraged the middle classes to see themselves as victims and to act in solidarity against the rich. In response, wealthy bankers such as Jamie Diamond criticized the Movement for promoting the prejudice that “because you’re rich you’re bad”, denigrating the whole, when sometimes “there’s a bad apple”. ¹

Or consider how paedophilia lobby groups such as B4U-Act are seeking to undo prejudice and hostility that people might already have towards paedophiles. They are trying to redefine paedophilia as a sexual orientation rather than a category of criminality or perversion. Like homosexuality or heterosexuality, they argue, paedophilia is not chosen but a deeply ingrained orientation that is unlikely to change.² They thus contend that “minor-attracted people” are unfairly stereotyped and need to be treated with respect, compassion, and understanding; and they portray those who judge paedophiles negatively as being as unenlightened and bigoted as the homophobes of an earlier generation. Unsurprisingly, these arguments are rejected as being morally repugnant by critics across the political spectrum. For such critics, negative reactions to paedophiles are rational, decent and legitimate. The idea that they could be cast as a form of ‘prejudice’ is barely intelligible.

These rather different examples show not only that we are all potentially ‘prejudiced’ towards others, but also that the very nature of what counts as prejudice may be contested. Moreover, it may be contested precisely because group members want to shape social actions, events and definitions of reality, e.g., to encourage alignments with and against particular causes, influence our treatment of others, and impel social movements of various kinds.

Within such contestation, definitions of prejudice are used strategically to achieve personal, collective, and political ends. Arguments about the nature of prejudice are developed in the struggle over contrasting ideals for a future society, and the (re)alignment of (what counts as) prejudice is part of the dynamic process by which the status quo is
changed or preserved. The Occupy Wall Street Movement sought to change the structure and management of financial institutions, while paedophilia lobbyists seek to change the way ‘minor attracted’ people are treated by health care professionals and the criminal justice system, even to the point of promoting access to child pornography. Both examples illustrate how peoples’ beliefs about social groups and the nature of prejudice can become targets for intervention and social change. For, if negative beliefs, hostile attitudes and discriminatory behaviours toward a particular group are to be mobilized effectively, then they must be framed as reasonable and justified, whereas the beliefs of one’s opponents must be derided as bigotry (Billig, 1988).

In this article, we argue that social psychology theories and methods are ill-equipped for studying how ordinary people and their leaders define ‘prejudice’ in relation to specific issues, events and policies. Indeed, such grassroots definitions of ‘prejudice’ have been of little interest to social psychologists, who have generally sought to develop authoritative definitions and measures of prejudice. Following the lead of Allport (1954), successive generations of social psychologists sought to define the “nature of prejudice” from the top down, by isolating its characteristic features as a personality trait, cognitive style, affective response, or other psychological process (Brown, 2011; Duckitt, 1992; Dovidio, Glick & Rudman, 2005). These definitions have then been superimposed on ordinary people’s attitudes in order to identify prejudiced individuals and to pronounce one or other set of attitudes as prejudiced (or not). Defining prejudice, in other words, has been the prerogative of academic social psychologists, whereas ordinary people have been viewed as “unreflexive formulators” or “bearers” of prejudice (Figgou & Condor, 2006, p. 219). Such global and Olympian definitions of prejudice have ironically been “least useful at the very point where prejudice is most socially and politically potent” (Reynolds, Haslam & Turner, 2012, p. 59), that is, in contexts where ‘prejudice’ is being mobilized to promulgate one or another cause. We thus argue that it is sometimes necessary to reserve judgement about the nature of prejudice and instead study how people reflexively – and often with considerable passion and no little skill – construct what counts and does not count as prejudice in a given situation. This is important because, as our opening examples illustrate, such constructions may exert powerful effects in the world, regardless of whether or not they qualify as ‘true’ prejudice according to the yardstick of academic psychology.

In this article, we will treat everyday constructions of ‘prejudice’ as identity performances (Klein, Spears and Reicher, 2007). An identity performance is an identity-salient strategic action, the “purposeful expression (or suppression) of
behaviors relevant to those norms conventionally associated with a salient social identity” (Klein et al., 2007, p. 3).

From this perspective, the struggle to define the nature of prejudice is best conceived not as the work of a detached expert who must determine its true underlying nature, but as the objective of people who define prejudice to explain events, persuade and mobilize others, and act in creditable ways. Such definitions of prejudice are resources for identification and action. Thus, the idea that the super-rich are evil narcissists is a resource for constructing the identity category, “we the 99%”, for explaining the financial crisis, and for rallying people to collective action; at the same time the stereotype was produced in these identity performances. Likewise the idea that being a “minor attracted person” is a sexual orientation is both a tool for, and a product of, a collective identity project, and it provides a way for rendering the social world intelligible, allowing actors to recognise themselves and others, to rehabilitate a potentially discredited identity, to claim rights, and to act in new ways.

Having set up the general problematic of our paper, in the next two sections we will develop our view of the strategic dimension of prejudice expressions. In the remainder of the article, we review research that shows three different prejudice-related identity performances: (1) mobilizing hatred, (2) making accusations and denials of prejudice, (3) and repressing prejudice. The review focuses primarily on research in discursive psychology that shows how people define ‘prejudice’; and it incorporates this research into the identity performance framework by showing how prejudice construction promotes identification, norm construction, and mobilization.

The strategic nature of prejudice expression

In their synopsis of the field, Crandall & Eshlman (2003) argued that diverse social psychology theories of prejudice – including symbolic racism (McConahay, 1982), aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), and automatic prejudice (Devine, 1989) – can be “reduced to” a two factor model, which proposes that:

“People acquire, early and firmly, prejudice toward racial out-groups. As cultural norms become increasingly negative toward straightforward prejudice, and as people mature, they become motivated and skilled at suppressing many of their prejudices.” (Crandall & Eshlman, 2003, p. 416).

In this formulation, individual prejudice is not expressed directly but is “modified and manipulated to meet social and personal goals” (p. 416). In short, these theories maintain that prejudice expressions are strategically responsive
to social norms and are subject to social influence. They thus anticipate variation in the kinds of prejudiced attitudes people will express in changing circumstances.

Identity has been shown to be of central concern in this variation, as prejudice expressions are strategically adapted to normative and situational demands. Self-presentation (Baumeister, 1981) and impression management (Schaller & Conway, 1999) theories argue that people tailor their expressed prejudices to social norms in order to maintain a creditable personal identity. Mere exposure to the beliefs of others has the potential to change individual stereotypes, attitudes and behaviours towards outgroup members (Paluck, 2009; Stangor, Sechrist & Jost, 2001; Zitek & Hebl, 2007). Group identities are equally important as prejudice expressions reflect the identity dynamics of the intergroup context (Harasty, 1997; Wigboldus, Spears & Semin, 2005). For example, Noel, Wann and Branscombe (1995) found that peripheral group members (but not core group members) expressed higher levels of prejudice toward outgroup members when their responses would be visible to the ingroup. Presumably, these insecure group members expressed outgroup prejudice strategically to promote acceptance and a sense of group belonging.

Although this work has made progress in understanding the functions of prejudice expressions, we believe that its underlying theory of their strategic dimensions is limited in two respects. First, it tends to focus on the effect of norms on individuals’ expressions while neglecting to study how expressions can affect social norms. Two factor models, including research on modern racism, impression management, and social influence, anticipate that social norms will determine whether genuine prejudice can be expressed or repressed. As Paluck (2012, p. 34) explains:

...when personal attitudes are aligned with the perceived norm, the norm gives individuals social permission to act. When the attitudes are not aligned, the perceived norm encourages repression of attitudinal expression ... behavioral conformity to the perceived group consensus is a normal, universal process.

Two-factor models share the “dominant” view in social psychology that human beings are “programmed for conformity” (Reicher & Haslam, 2013, p. 112). They focus attention on the one-directional influence of norms, values and audiences on individual expressions while ignoring the countervailing influence of expressions, which can affect social norms, values, and audiences and, ultimately, social reality itself.
The second, related, limitation of two factor models pertains to the resolution of the tension between ‘genuine prejudice’ and situational norms. We will argue that the strategic aspects of prejudice expressions will be most readily apparent after one speaks or acts, not before. In two factor models, by contrast, justification and suppression are psychological procedures for processing “raw” prejudices “before they are reported and before they are accepted into one’s own self-belief system” (Crandall et al., 2003, p. 417, emphasis added). The interaction between norms and attitudes is presumed to take place quietly behind the scenes, in individual minds, before prejudice is expressed. Ultimately, then, in these one-directional accounts of influence, norms inform a psychological calculus about acceptable prejudice expression, which is completed before individual speaks or acts. In contrast, we will focus on the interactional context of prejudice suppression and justification. We believe that the strategic elements of prejudice expressions will be manifest in the spaces between people, where expressions will both be tailored to situational demands and will also function to produce norms, values, and audiences, thereby serving as forces for change or reproducing of social reality.

The one-directional model of social influence can be illustrated by Klein et al.’s (2003) study, which demonstrated how prejudice expressions are strategically responsive to situational demands. They showed that Greek participants who identified strongly as ‘European’ expressed less prejudice against Turks than those who identified more strongly as ‘Greek’. Revealingly, this effect was stronger when they anticipated an encounter with a ‘European’ audience. In common with much prejudice research, the study aimed to investigate the effect of identities, norms, and situational demands on attitudes, rather than vice versa. In fact, the possibility that prejudice expressions might affect norms or identities was ruled out by the research design itself, which neglected to study how participants defined prejudice, or how such definitions might have affected others. Instead, the researchers set out with, and imposed, an authoritative definition of prejudice, asking Greek students to say how ‘close’ they felt to Turks. Although this conventional measure of prejudice as negative feelings is defensible, it inevitably limits the power participants have to define prejudice differently and thereby to actively create for themselves a normative environment in which their attitude expressions acquire moral and political meaning and value. A wide range of attitudes can count as prejudiced to people on the ground, including both irrational and rational beliefs (Brown, 2011), and negative and positive attitudes (Dixon et al., 2012). For example, professing closeness to Turks might be cast as an illegitimate expression of anti-Greek sentiment in the context of discussion of the war over Cyprus, whereas professing anything but sympathy for Turkish earthquake victims might be viewed as hate speech. In both cases, what counts as
prejudice and what is normatively acceptable is established via practices of debate and interaction within a specific context, and the resulting understanding of prejudice may not resemble the definitions imposed from above by researchers.

Similarly, in defining prejudice for themselves, people on the ground might direct their prejudices to social categories that do not resemble those of researchers. As is common practice, Klein et al. (2003) provided their participants with pre-given audiences and targets of prejudice: ‘European’, ‘Greek’, and ‘Turk’. However, determining whether a Greek person’s expressed closeness to Turks is prejudice or not might require disentangling multiple and contending identities and norms, for example, by differentiating between earthquake victims and political enemies. That is, the nature of the ‘objects’ of ‘prejudice’ is a matter of intense debate, controversy and local negotiation (see Potter & Wetherell, 1988). Thus, the objects of both ‘prejudice’ and ‘tolerance’ in everyday discourse are often qualified, “hyphenated categories” (Sirin & Fine, 2008), such as ‘Turkish-terrorists’ or ‘Turkish-earthquake survivors’. Again, this process rarely features in psychological research precisely because our participants are seldom asked to express prejudice in the own words, to draw the line between prejudiced and non-prejudiced views, or to express prejudice before an audience where the prospect of being challenged (or the promise of being affirmed) is a real possibility. The audience is often treated only as an idea in the mind of the speaker and is not an immediate, co-present interactional reality, itself susceptible to social influence.

We will now present our identity performance model of prejudice expressions. The model allows us to explore two-directional paths of social influence as prejudice expressions are strategically responsive to social norms, values, and audiences at the same time as being strategically deployed to shape norms, values and audiences.

‘Prejudice’ as identity performance

The present article seeks to define a ‘space’ between individual prejudices and social norms. This space is conceived as an arena of identity performances and a dynamic social psychological context where attitudes, norms and identities are forged. It is a site of genuine interaction, not between preformed norms and attitudes, but between people who define and contest the nature of prejudice, feel passionately about it (or not), and who can be persuaded and mobilized to action for or against some ‘prejudice’. Here, justification and suppression are not psychological processes that occur before people speak or act. Rather, they are accomplished in interaction, where
expressions and definitions of prejudice can help to make or break norms. Identity performances thus shape social worlds as people are mobilized to act in terms of the normative and moral framework of a shared definition of prejudice. Often, we will argue, this process depends not so much on authoritative definitions of prejudice and a priori designation of norms and identities, but on how these are actively defined by actors on the ground and on what (or whose) definitions come to be accepted.

Identity performance theory anticipates two-way channels of influence between expressions of ‘prejudice’ and social norms. On the one hand, expressions of ‘prejudice’ must be aligned to prevailing norms, and tailored to audience reception, taking into account the degree to which “fellow communicators buy into the stereotype” (Ruscher, 2001, p. 54). On the other hand, expressions of ‘prejudice’ and stereotypes about outgroup members can help to create norms and audiences by fostering camaraderie and social connectivity (Kurz & Lyons, 2009; Ruscher & Hammer, 2006). Because norms don’t fully pre-exist expressions, the outcome and effect of ‘prejudice’ expression is uncertain. Those who define or express ‘prejudice’ cannot be certain how an audience will treat their expressions. Certainly, actors must judge the norms and values of their audience, but they can never be certain what reception their expressions will have. Norms are thus routinely established ‘in hindsight’ when an expression or argument about the nature of prejudice has been accepted or rejected by an audience. What counts as prejudice is then simply what is allowed to count as prejudice; and this is liable to change along with changing events, audiences, and arguments (Durrheim & Dixon, 2004). Thus, while expressions are oriented to norms, they are also part of the process by which situational norms are created and justified. We might say that in the cut and thrust of social life, expressions of ‘prejudice’ are prospectively adjusted to norms and retrospectively productive of them.

We use methods and techniques of discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992) to study (1) the way prejudice and various social identities that are the targets of agents of prejudice are constructed, and (2) the strategic way in which these constructions are developed in interaction to persuade or mobilize audiences. For this reason, we place the word, prejudice, in quotation marks when we need a reminder that it meaning is open and depends on agreement that is reached in a particular situation. Nonetheless, we don’t treat ‘prejudice’ and identity primarily as social constructions because the act of strategic construction is itself an identity performance. Identity is a “constituent element of practice” in the sense that intelligible action requires a representation of one’s position in a set of social relations and that working for social change and holding people to account for past action depend
upon a notion of continuity of self (Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997, p. 100). In addition, identity gives human action vitality, charged as it is by social connection, social comparison, and the positive and negative poles of self-worth (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). And while these categories of identity are socially constructed in talk and action, they are constructed ‘social realities’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Searle, 1995). The attributes and status of social categories derive from the position of these categories in the social and material world.

Prejudice-related identity performances are a special category of identity performance in which people seek to reconstitute the social world from the vantage point of their own location within it. We will argue that the concept of prejudice has two primary meanings for the participants in all this activity. First, ‘prejudice’ is treated as an abstract moral category that frames the way we judge people and their actions. ‘Prejudice’ is a collection of ideas about discreditable thoughts, feelings and behaviours. The category has been developed historically, but it has acquired increased importance in secular society today, where the unacceptability of prejudice is one of the few moral certainties remaining. Second, ‘prejudice’ is a target of concrete and situated judgement of a belief or act of an individual or group, for their treatment of others: a negative belief or act is justifiable if ‘unprejudiced’, but is unjustifiable negativity if it is deemed to be ‘prejudiced’. We will show that these two meanings work in tandem within identity performances, where behaviours are judged ‘prejudiced’ or not against the backcloth of an (implicit or explicit) moral category of ‘prejudice’. ‘Prejudice’ thus is a resource and a way of performing identity and engaging with the world. And it is consequential. As the characteristically heated debates about prejudice show, such identity performances produce individual and collective subjects and can change the world. For example, we can rouse collectives and warrant all kind of violence and exclusion by establishing that a certain set of actions against another group – e.g., greedy bankers, predatory paedophiles, or invading Turks – is not prejudiced.

In the remainder of this article, we will discuss three ways in which people deploy prejudice in identity performance, by (1) constructing social categories of identification, (2) producing explanations and accounts of social events, and thereby (3) mobilizing collective action. We will consider these activities as we review three literatures that show different ways in which these activities can be accomplished, namely, by (a) mobilizing hatred, (b) making accusations and denials of prejudice, and (c) repressing prejudice.

Mobilizing hate
The consequentiality of everyday constructions of prejudice is perhaps exemplified most starkly in ‘call to arms’ discourse, through which leaders mobilize populations for war. Populations need to be mobilized because they generally don’t want war. As Hermann Goering once observed: “Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece” (cited in Gilbert, 1947, p. 278). Call to arms discourse typically features highly stylized representations of groups and futures. Leaders construe current events and decisions as momentous and historic, arguing that decisive action is needed to secure peace and prosperity and defend against future violence and despair (Oddo, 2011). This discourse is often premised upon crude representations of a prejudiced “evil other” (Graham et al., 2004, p. 211), which risk attracting criticism for being prejudiced itself. President George Bush’s war on terror speech provides a well-known example of such discourse that justifies violence by contrasting a virtuous ‘us’ with a savage ‘other’ (see Figure 1). Although such talk may reflect old beliefs and hostilities, it is also instrumental in producing ‘prejudice’ anew. It does so by creating new targets, grouping together diverse enemies, characterizing them in potent and novel ways, and promoting new norms for action against them. But most importantly, it does so by presenting itself as being ‘not prejudiced’ at all.

Figure 1. Excerpts from Bush 2001, War on terror speech

- We’re a nation that can’t be cowed by evil-doers...
- We will rid the world of the evil-doers. We will call together freedom loving people to fight terrorism...
- we’re facing a new kind of enemy, somebody so barbaric that they would fly airplanes into buildings full of innocent people.
- ... the prime suspect’s organization is in a lot of countries – it’s a widespread organization based upon one thing: terrorizing. They can’t stand freedom; they hate what America stands for.
- I say to the American people we’ve never seen this kind of evil before. But the evil-doers have never seen the American people in action before, either – and they’re about to find out.

(cited in Graham et al., 2004, p. 213)

The representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in call to arms discourse is explicitly designed to mobilize populations. As George Creel, propagandist for the US Committee for Public Information, recognised: “The ‘mind’ of the people must be mobilized as well as its man-power” (Creel 1941, cited in Graham & Luke, 2003, p. 149). We argue that
constructions of the nature of ‘prejudice’ play an important role in this process of mobilizing minds. Leaders are able to rouse populations to action by constructing a category of people who personify ‘prejudice’ and hatred of us and by portraying our response as justified and ‘not-prejudiced’.

Social identity theory offers an explanation of how such discourse can mobilize the mind of the people. Social identity provides the basis for action, giving people categories for self-definition and self-recognition (Turner et al., 1987). These self-conceptions should not be thought of only as cognitive categories and associated traits, but also as representations of people in situations and in social relationships (Reicher & Haslam, 2013). As such, the self is not a fixed structure but is dynamically responsive to the situational organization of social reality (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). As the events of 9/11 illustrate very well, situations can make identities salient (e.g., “American people”), and they help to give meaning to the categories involved (e.g., as hated by outsiders, victims of terror).

At the same time, identities are also constructed in talk, especially by leaders and other prototypical group members (Reicher et al., 1997). This, too, is illustrated by the outpouring of discourse and emotion as people debated the events of 9/11 and their meaning. President Bush’s framing of the events came to dominate representations in the US media (Entman, 2010), thought alternate (non-violent) ways of framing and response existed at the time (Chomsky, 2011). It is also important to recognise the interests served by this framing of ‘us’ and ‘them’. As is often the case with war talk, the war on terror successfully resolved the legitimacy crises of Bush’s presidency, which had been plagued by the disputed 2000 election results and endless “dumb-Bush” jokes (Oddo, 2011).

Social identity is thus both responsive to the social situation and a point of intervention where the situation may be constructed: “social identity not only reflects existing forms of social organization, but is also a means of envisioning and creating new forms of social reality” (Haslam & Reicher, 2007, p. 142). There is always the possibility for openness, creativity, and change. Leaders serve as the “entrepreneurs” of identity, interpreting social relations, and producing categories of identity as they mobilize populations (Haslam & Reicher, 2007). Call to arms discourse well illustrates how the nature of ‘prejudice’ is constructed to depict ‘us’ and ‘them’, to explain events, and to lend meaning to situations and social relations. These provide audiences with categories for self-definition and self-recognition. Hostility toward ‘them’ can then be produced as a creditable emblem of ‘our’ identity, while they are deemed ‘prejudiced’.
Such definitions of ‘prejudice’ not only reflect pre-existing norms; they are also designed to create norms of what counts or does not count as ‘prejudice’. Call to arms discourse does this by “demarcating group membership” – ‘us’ and ‘them’ – and by identifying detractors among ‘us’, a dangerous minority who have been hoodwinked by enemy propaganda (Oddo, 2011). Call to arms discourse thus motivates populations to feel and express new, heightened forms of belonging and of ‘antipathy’ toward newly defined groups. These representations cannot be dismissed as irrational prejudices for they are justifiable ways of understanding and reacting that are rooted in social reality (e.g., Americans being targeted by terrorists) and have an experiential veracity (Oakes et al, 1994). As ‘prejudice’ expressions give meaning to concrete situations, they function to cement reality as well as (re)producing social norms and identities.

We are now in a position to appreciate how definitions of ‘prejudice’ can mobilize “the mind of the people”. They do this by creating salient social categories that serve as the platform for creative and meaningful action. They also provide motives for action. The psychological motives of self-esteem and positive distinctiveness that are the hallmarks social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) become deeply social motives when they are considered from the perspective of people deciding how to live and act in concrete situations, such as those occasioned by call to arms discourse. ‘Prejudice’ is a tool for creative leadership and engaged followership (Haslam & Reicher, 2007). It is a resource for strategically diagnosing problems with the past, present and future, for developing a vision of social change, and for action. By mobilizing people to reach out for this vision, ‘prejudice’ is also the basis for experientially potent and situated forms of group belonging and social connection.

The identity performance model of ‘prejudice’ stands in sharp contrast to Allportian two-factor models: As our discussion of call to arms discourse has demonstrated, the identity performance model does not treat justification and suppression as private psychological processes that help individuals articulate their genuine prejudices in normatively appropriate ways. While acknowledging normative and situational constraints of action, the identity performance model is especially useful in explaining how actions and arguments affect audiences by affirming or threatening their identities and by persuading them to adopt certain beliefs and behaviours (Klein, Spears & Reicher, 2007). To serve these social functions, ‘prejudice’ must be justified or suppressed publically, in accounts about intergroup relations, where it will be able to move an audience. In the process, the mind of the people – the cognitions and affects associated with ‘prejudice’ – is engineered in performances that: (1) produce social identities,
(2) provide explanations (construct social reality), and 3) mobilize people to action. ‘Prejudice’ expressions have norm- and reality-making powers because they can recruit people to adopt particular forms of social connection (identification) and beliefs (explanations), and to act collectively in these terms (mobilization) to defend or attack a social order.

**Accusations and denials of ‘prejudice’**

Though, intriguingly, there are occasions when people label themselves as ‘prejudiced’ (Goodman & Rowe, 2014), these occasions may well provide the exception that proves the rule of the identity performance model of prejudice. Some observers have suggested that a ‘norm against prejudice’ functions to suppress expressions of ‘prejudice’ and to ensure that negative beliefs and reactions toward a particular group are portrayed as being ‘not prejudiced’ (e.g., Billig, 1988; Goodman & Burke, 2010). Gadamer (1975, p. 270) argued that this Enlightenment norm against prejudice arose from the distinction between the scientific truths and the unreason of the *ancien régime* but was itself an expression prejudice, the “fundamental prejudice against prejudice itself”. The norm against prejudice is thus a hypocritical one, embodying ambivalence between the expression and suppression of prejudice. This is so because criticisms of prejudice are themselves prejudiced against the thing criticized. For example, criticism of the prejudices of evil terrorist attackers is also a way of expressing a prejudice against them.

As a first consequence of this hypocritical norm, the meaning of ‘prejudice’ is articulated most explicitly in accusations that characterize the thinking and behaviour of others (Billig et al., 1988). Second, its operation means that expressions of hostility and negative beliefs about outgroups will often be successful for persuading and mobilizing others only to the extent that they are treated as being ‘not prejudiced’. If hostility and negative beliefs and actions cannot be avoided, ‘prejudice’ must be denied or disavowed. Billig (1988) argues that the commonplace phrase “I’m not prejudiced but...” exemplifies ambivalence between prejudiced common sense and the imperative to deny prejudice. By means of disclaimers and other rhetoric, speakers anticipate unstated accusations and are able to deflect criticism, laying claim to be members of the “moral community” of the unprejudiced (Billig et al., 1988).

Along similar lines, van Dijk (1992) argues that the denial of prejudice is one of the “crucial properties of contemporary racism” (p. 87). His work has shown how disclaimers, mitigations, reversals and other discursive devices allowed speakers to block inferences that particular negative sentiments about outgroups represented a “more permanent attitude” (p. 90), either of speakers or the group they represent.
The denial of prejudice has been observed in a variety of contexts, suggesting that the norm against ‘prejudice’ is widespread (Augoustinos & Every, 2007). van Dijk (1992) studied the phenomenon in European Parliamentary and newspaper discourse, but prejudice denial has also been observed in television debate (Condor et al., 2006), interviews (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Figgou & Condor, 2006; Tileagă, 2005) and in ordinary conversations (Barnes, Palmary, Durrheim, 2001). Denial of prejudice need not be done by speakers themselves; it can be done on their behalf by others (Condor et al., 2006). Such denial epitomises the ambivalent liberalism of the ‘new racism’, but also features prominently in the discourse of fascists and other groups aligned to the extreme right (Durrheim, 1997; van Dijk, 1992). Denial of prejudice is not only a feature of race discourse but also characterizes ‘prejudiced’ talk about categories such as women (Gough, 2001), old people (McVittie, McKinlay & Widdicombe, 2003), and nations (Condor, 2000).

Much like the mobilizations of hate considered in the previous section, denials of ‘prejudice’ can be treated as identity performances that are both sensitive to and productive of identities and social norms. Much of this research has highlighted the function of denial for presenting an individual speaker as a creditable and unprejudiced “decent person” (Tileagă, 2005), but denial also serves collective identity functions, “defending the ingroup as a whole” from being characterized as racist (van Dijk, 1992, p. 89). Denials are necessary when accusations of ‘prejudice’ are made or anticipated because they do the work of identity and norm construction: they instantiate norms of tolerance as they display the creditable identities of those who are untainted by ‘prejudice’.

This research teaches us a very important lesson about how particular understandings of ‘prejudice’ gain social acceptance. To deny ‘prejudice’, speakers must develop a serviceable account of “the ‘proper’ prejudice” (Billig, 1999, p. 152) – a moral yardstick against which their own expressions can be constructed as ‘unprejudiced’. They do this both by accusing others of ‘prejudice’ and by distancing themselves from common sense representations of irrational bigots with enduring ‘prejudiced’ attitudes (Billig, 1988; van Dijk, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). By contrast, they present their beliefs, actions and feelings about outgroups as the unbiased observations of reasonable people; or they excuse their derogatory outbursts as momentary failures of self-control (Figgou & Condor, 2006). Collective understandings of ‘genuine prejudice’ are thus developed in accusations and denials of ‘prejudice’. Ideas about the abstract moral category of ‘prejudice’ and its instantiations are developed as people distance themselves from ‘prejudice’. ‘Prejudice’ is thus produced in talk that marks its absence by presenting instances of ‘non-
prejudice’. For example, objections to programs designed to improve housing and health care outcomes for the disadvantaged can be plausibly reframed as principled conservatism rather than irrational racism, thus removing these attitudes from the category of ‘prejudice’.

In addition to taking bearings from the stereotypical image of the irrational bigot, denials also construct ‘prejudice’ with reference to the kinds of beliefs and practices that people find necessary to defend in a particular society or situation. ‘Prejudice’ is thus always rooted in social reality as speakers give the concept substance by singling out concrete acts and opinions as being ‘not prejudiced’. With such a carefully wrought category of ‘prejudice’, contentious acts can be recast as instances of something else. For example, Condor (2000) found that her English interviewees denied a sense of national pride, enacting local norms of modesty to manage collective guilt associated with a history of imperialism. Similarly, the proponents of anti-immigrant policies in Europe deny prejudice by recasting their attitudes as the natural reactions of people who are “worried” because immigration is “out of control” (van Dijk, 1992, p. 112) or who feel “afraid” or “threatened” (Figgou & Condor, 2006, p. 235). By excluding these reactions from the category of ‘racism’ or ‘prejudice’, a definition of ‘prejudice’ is developed that is grounded in social reality, serving concrete explanatory and practical needs of the place and time.

The dialogical processes of accusation and denial of ‘prejudice’ described above are instrumental for changing or preserving the social order. This is so because accusation and denial set norms into motion and thereby play a part in producing social reality. Accusations and denials of ‘prejudice’ are at once responses to and instantiations of the hypocritical norm against ‘prejudice’ and they thus help to preserve categories, meanings and boundaries, e.g., between citizens and immigrants. In the process, they articulate a way of being ‘not-prejudiced’ in a world of inequality, oppression and exclusion. They refashion the abstract moral category of ‘prejudice’, whilst also giving it concrete form and application to real issues and dilemmas confronting people living in that world.

It was through such a process of social change that immigration policies in Europe and elsewhere came to be formulated. The economic inequalities produced in the wake of racial imperialism set contemporary global migrations into motion. In this context, anti-immigration attitudes became viewed as ‘racist’ and thus their expression required delicate formulation and denial. In his infamous “Rivers of blood” speech before the British Parliament in 1968, Enoch Powell was decidedly indelicate in issuing a call to arms. He argued that the nation must be mad to allow an influx of immigrants into the country. He warned immigrants would unite with their families,
multiply, and eventually displace the native born Englishman from their workplaces, neighbourhoods, and hospital beds. His speech provoked limited outrage in Parliament at the time, but it was soon condemned as an expression of racial hatred by all except the extreme Right, and it led to his sacking from the conservative shadow cabinet. Powell had actually attempted to avoid criticism from an anticipated “chorus of execration” by presenting himself as a reasonable observer, compelled to tell the truth and warn against a future that filled him with foreboding. However, he made the cardinal error of explicitly naming race, talking about “‘negroes’ and ‘white people’” (Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008, p. 13).

Nowadays, opponents of immigration also purport to speak truth and reason, but they have learned lessons from history about how to formulate such opinion. That is, they have learned that they should: (1) provide good reasons for why immigrants must be kept out but without racial referents, (2) distinguish between good and bad immigrants, (3) show sympathy for immigrants, and, above all, (4) deny racism (see Burke & Goodman, 2012; Figgou & Condor, 2006; Goodman & Burke, 2010; Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2011). In his 2005 speech, for example, British conservative party leader, Michael Howard, sympathized with refugees, but portrayed “illegal immigrants” as “terrorists and people smugglers” who are “a threat to our borders, to our lives, to our livelihoods and to our health” (Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008, p. 10). The constructed identity of the immigrants and the nature of the threat they posed had changed from Powell’s day, and the opinions were framed by a revised understanding of ‘prejudice’ that had developed in the context of the war on terror – an understanding that, crucially, avoided explicit racial labelling.

Earlier arguments about immigration, threat, and the nature of ‘prejudice’ had helped to produce the new morality of the day. They had also shaped institutional practices and policies and thereby contributed to the production of social reality. Common-sense ideas about what constituted unacceptable ‘racism’ and ‘prejudice’ helped people formulate reactions and policies that could be portrayed as ‘non-prejudiced’ and reasonable. Of course, racial stereotypes of human traffickers and immigrant-terrorists that Powell could not have imagined were necessary to undergird new forms of discrimination, exclusion, and violence; but these stereotypes – and their advocates – could be legitimated by employing a suitably defensible (re)definition of ‘prejudice’.

There was a time when supporters of immigration had the upper hand in the morality play of accusations and denials of ‘prejudice’. Those who opposed immigration were viewed as ‘prejudiced’. Over time, however, the operation of this norm has created a new situation in which the association of anti-immigration attitudes with racism
has become so strong that it has become viewed as ‘prejudice’. Anti-immigration supporters can now be depicted as bigots who unreasonably dismiss the views of anyone who challenges their agenda. Emboldened by this ideological shift, anti-immigration lobbyists can now undermine liberal opposition by casting it as irrational prejudgement that limits freedom of expression, prevents rational debate, and challenges the democratic process (Augoustinos & Every, 2010; Goodman, 2010; Goodman & Burke, 2010; Burke & Goodman, 2012). Each camp – liberal and conservative – depicts immigrants in racial terms, and each accuses the other of racism.

Rather than stepping into this fray to adjudicate, armed with an authoritative definition of prejudice, we argue that there is merit in studying the ways in such identity performances are implicated in the construction of social reality and exercise material and ideological effects in the world.

**Repressing ‘prejudice’**

The review thus far has considered two ways in which prejudice-related identity performances can be undertaken: (1) in categorical depictions and explanations that seek to mobilize hatred, and (2) in accusations and denials that construct ‘prejudice’ by distancing oneself from it. These literatures show that ‘prejudice’ has no fixed content, but is developed in struggles over identity and over the value of actions, policies and beliefs – as they unfold within concrete historical and political circumstances. The nature of ‘prejudice’ is produced in identity performance and collective struggles that express creditable ways of being and acting. We now consider a third kind of identity performance in which prejudice is expressed, and its nature forged, in the absence of explicit practices of mobilization, accusation or denial.

The repression of prejudice has emerged as a dominant theme in social psychology since the 1990s, supported by new technologies to measure implicit, unconscious or automatic prejudice and stereotyping (Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997; Greenwald, & Banaji, 1995). Early research treated automatic associations as ‘bona fide’ pipeline to “genuine prejudice", free of social influence (Fazio et al., 1995). However, it soon became apparent that implicit prejudice and stereotyping are malleable (Blair, 2002) and subject to internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones & Vance, 2002). In other words, implicit reaction-time measures of prejudice appeared to be as susceptible to social influence effects as self-report measures. The ‘bona fide’ pipeline turned out to be a less transparent conduit to “genuine prejudice” than was first hoped.
Experimental research has often neglected to study how “unconscious processes...are revealed in social life” (Banaji, Lemm & Carpenter, 2001, p. 136, our emphasis), perhaps because implicit association measures are designed to rule out the self-presentational concerns. Recently, however, researchers have begun to study the way repressed prejudice might serve persuasion and mobilizing functions in identity performances. These highlight the way that prejudice can be communicated without being explicitly expressed or denied, showing how repressed themes may help to establish creditable ways of being and acting. For example, Bergsieker, Leslie, Constantine and Fiske (2012) reviewed evidence of “innuendo effects” by which “audiences draw negative inferences from communicators’ faint or uni-dimensional praise of targets” (p. 19). By way of innuendo, speakers could communicate prejudice indirectly, “stereotyping by omission”. By picking up absent suggestions, readers of uni-dimensionally positive depictions of a woman’s warmth also attributed her less competence in an academic context (Kervyn, Bergsieker & Fiske, 2012).

How though might it possible to observe stereotypes being communicated when they are omitted from talk? Bergsieker et al. (2012) rely on their “intuition that conspicuous omission implies negativity” (p. 19), but repressed themes may be evident in the traces they leave in their absence and in the responses they invoke. Dialogical repression may be studied by examining the “the absences, rather than the presences, in dialogue” (Billig, 1999, p. 140). These appear in conversations when speakers change the subject, redirecting talk away from potentially troubling topics. The focus here is not the explicit expression, accusation or denial of prejudice, but the ways in which these possibilities are “collaboratively avoided” as speakers skirt around troubling themes, changing the direction of dialogue that threatens to encroach on the topic of prejudice, replacing this with more polite conversation.

One way this can be done is by “alluding to race”, presenting a puzzle that invites hearers to develop common sense understanding of what has been communicated allusively. Whitehead (2009) demonstrates this process by considering a story that a participant in a ‘race training’ workshop told about how difficult it was growing up as “a black man”. He recounted a time when he had trouble opening a bank account because the manager thought he was acting fraudulently. He then said that he had “no idea why this guy thinks that” (p. 336), thereby inviting the audience to silently supply the reasons, including various forms of racial accounting. By posing a puzzle, the speaker could make the racial identity and racial motivations available without mentioning race overtly, thereby “attenuating potential inferences about his own racial motivations” (p. 337). The speaker could avoid the potential trouble of
explicitly accusing the bank manager of being a racist white person while gesturing toward this as an implicit explanation. In so doing, not only did the speaker use a racial account to explain an event but he also communicated what kinds of things are best not to be spoken explicitly, thereby reinforcing anti-prejudice norms.

Durrheim (2012) describes a similar process of “stereotyping by implication” in which speakers allude to racial stereotypes by suggesting category–feature associations without explicitly stating them. When his white interviewees were asked how they felt about having a black neighbour on a newly desegregated South African beach, many said things like: “It doesn’t bother me at all, as long as they behave themselves”. The interviewees thereby implied that a problem of misbehaviour might become an issue with black neighbours without directly saying that blacks misbehave, get drunk, are noisy or rude. The interviewers could thereby explain why they behaved in an arguably discriminatory manner without making racial stereotypes explicit, relying on hearers to do part of the work, applying racial common sense to render the explanation intelligible.

To collaborate in avoiding potentially troubling topics, interactants must develop a shared sense of ‘genuine prejudice’ that should be left out of polite conversation (see Durrheim, Greener & Whitehead, 2014). Shared understandings of unutterable ‘prejudice’ are commonsense conceptions of unacceptable topics and depictions that are developed by witnessing denials and accusations (as discussed in the previous section) and seeing how stereotypes can be invoked allusively, by implication, and repressed. The residues of these processes quietly circulate in conversation as “implicit themes” (Billig, 1988) or “latent voices” (Burkitt, 2010) as speakers maintain and give substance to unsayable prejudice by keeping it absent whilst gesturing toward it. In jointly navigating around conversational taboos, speakers evoke the proverbial ‘elephant in the room’ as “the unsayable will be present” as an implicit theme, “marked by its absence” (Billig, 1999, p. 151).

Here is yet another reason why ordinary people are invested in the concept of ‘prejudice’ and the specific expressions, behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes that can be considered to be genuinely ‘prejudiced’. Not only is the concept of ‘prejudice’ and its instantiations necessary for strategic expression, accusation and denial of ‘prejudice’, but also it forms the backcloth against which polite conversation can be routinely steered away from the potentially shameful, embarrassing or troubling topics of the racism, sexism, nationalism, homophobia, and do on. Once denial of ‘prejudice’ becomes necessary, the damage to one’s reputation may already have been done. It is preferable, therefore, to attend to these concerns earlier, managing ‘race trouble’ by keeping racial stereotypes or attitudes
implicit (Durrheim, Mtose, & Brown, 2011). This can be done by communicating racial meanings indirectly, gesturing towards racial common sense to render a particular attitude or course of action intelligible, but without having to articulate racial stereotypes in florid detail.

As treated in this paper, therefore, the repression of ‘prejudice’ is not primarily an individual psychological process or discursive act. It is better viewed as a collaborative identity performance in which speakers and hearers, working together, avoid the potential shame or censure that may be occasioned by denials or accusations of prejudice. Interactants can be as accountable for hearing as they are for uttering ‘prejudice’; and it is best therefore to leave ‘prejudice’ alone. Whereas explicit denials of ‘prejudice’ often anticipate unexpressed accusations, in repressive formulations both the accusations and denials remain unsaid while the dialogical structure of accusation and denial continues to structure interaction. The taboo against expressing ‘prejudice’ thus helps to produce shared definitions of its nature that can be used to silently persuade others into accepting particular beliefs, courses of action, and ways of being. The quiet work of reproducing the racial order can proceed whilst the risk of noisy allegations of racism are minimized.

By shaping social norms in this way, the quiet arts of ‘prejudice’ repression can play a part in the success of clamorous call to arms discourse. All of this denial and repression of ‘prejudice’ creates the social context for occasions when such norms can be subverted or even reversed. For example, it allows call to arms discourse to be recognised as marking exceptional circumstances, and thus lends it power for mobilizing populations on the basis of stereotypical categories and explanations that remain implicit in ordinary polite conversation.

**Conclusion: The struggle for the nature of ‘prejudice’**

In his monumental book, *The nature of prejudice*, Allport (1954) has defined the field of prejudice research in social psychology for over 60 years (see Dovidio, Glick & Rudman, 2005). While acknowledging the social, political, and economic dimensions of prejudice, Allport sought to pin down its primary psychological nature (cf. Allport, 1962). Successive generations of social psychologists have refined his definition, applied it to new contexts, and constructed an increasingly sophisticated array of measures of prejudice. This work has sought to develop and operationalize authoritative definitions of prejudice and to develop theories that can explain how, when and why ordinary people express such prejudices. Certainly, this endeavour has occasioned more than a little struggle among social
psychologists themselves, and debates about how to define and measure prejudice have occasionally boiled over (e.g., Banaji et al., 2004; Tetlock, 1994). Nonetheless, this work is united in its aspiration to develop authoritative measures of prejudice, grounded in the idea that prejudice has a distinctive underlying psychology (cf. Durrheim, 2014). Prejudice measures are then applied in a top-down manner, ex cathedra, allowing the expert’s definition of prejudice to trump individuals’ understandings of themselves and their relations with others. By adopting this approach, social psychologists have tended to treat ordinary people as the “unreflexive formulators” or “bearers” of prejudiced attitudes, whereas “the privilege to define prejudice...has been restricted largely to the reified universe of academic social psychology” (Figgou & Condor, 2006, p. 219).

Two-factor models of prejudice in social psychology recognise that people do not express genuine prejudice entirely unreflexively but are also motivated to suppress it, especially in contexts where social norms oppose prejudice expression (Crandall, Eshleman & O’Brien, 2002). Nonetheless, as we have argued, these theories embrace a somewhat static, one-directional view of social influence effects, emphasising the impact of norms, identities and situations on individual expressions. While we do not dispute its valuable contributions to the field, we have argued that this work largely ignores how people define ‘prejudice’ for themselves and thus misses the power that these definitions have for creating norms, identities and situations and for orchestrating social change.

To understand the two-way channels of social influence, we need to resist the temptation to begin our investigation with an authoritative definition of prejudice. Instead, we need to proceed by investigating the way people conceive of ‘prejudice’ in their lives. Shared understandings of ‘prejudice’ are developed in social processes of agreement and disagreement, in argument and debate (cf. Billig, 1987), where “multiple voices seek to mobilise people in different directions” (Reicher & Haslam, 2013, p. 112). Working definitions of ‘prejudice’ are realised in the cut and thrust of interaction between speakers and hearers (Durrheim, Greener & Whitehead, 2014; Whitehead, 2012). These include definitions of ‘prejudice’ as an abstract moral category as well as its concrete instantiations. In the end, what counts as ‘prejudice’ is that body of beliefs, feelings and action that are allowed to pass as ‘prejudice’, either tacitly or explicitly, directly or by way of contrast. In this sense, ‘prejudice’ is a “collaborative accomplishment” whose nature “ultimately depends upon its acceptance or rejection on the part of an audience” (Condor et al., 2006, p. 458).

We have characterized the social process of ‘prejudice’ definition as “identity performance” (Klein, Spears & Reicher, 2007). Here we have been guided by the “elaborated” (better yet, invigorated) social identity model that views
identity as both a resource for and a product of action (see Drury & Reicher, 1999; Reicher & Haslam, 2013).

Prejudice-related identity performances are ways of being, acting and judging that seek to change or preserve social relations. They are collaborative accomplishments of actors and audiences that result in people being recognised as creditable or judged to be morally deficient. In this article, we have reviewed three ways in which prejudice is produced in collaboration: by mobilizing hatred and hostility, by accusation and denial, and by repression. We have described two-way channels of influence between definitions and expressions of ‘prejudice’, on the one hand, and contextual norms and identities, on the other. Successful portrayals of ‘prejudice’ and ‘non-prejudice’ depend upon skilful, norm- and identity-sensitive expressions. But, these are not simply acts of conformity in which genuine prejudice is calibrated to conform to prevailing norms. There is room for manoeuvre because norms and identities are only validated in hindsight as social agreement is reached (or not) and as people are mobilized (or not). The norms and identities are thus both the conditions for and the products of identity performances, and the collaborative accomplishment of ‘prejudice’ can be viewed as a dynamic process that transforms the conditions for action into its products.

What is accomplished by the collaborative accomplishment of prejudice and why might we move this process to the centre stage of prejudice research? Several traditional theories have described the manifold functions of prejudice: individual ego-defence (Adorno et al., 1950; Duckitt, 1992), positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), identity management (Schaller & Conway, 1999; Baumeister, 1981), social connection and solidarity (Ruscher & Hammer, 2006), group belonging and positioning (Blumer, 1958; Bobo et al., 1997), system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and a resource in ‘realistic’ conflicts for material resources (Sherif, 1967).

By advancing a model of ‘prejudice’ as identity performance, we draw attention to a set of accomplishments related to social change and the preservation of the status quo. ‘Prejudice’ is a resource for explanation, identification, and mobilization, and, ultimately, for the production of norms, situations, and social reality itself. These constructive functions arise in everyday life as definitions of ‘prejudice’ move others to adopt beliefs, identify with causes, act, and thereby produce their social world. As Reicher (2012) explains, “wherever we find prejudice, it has been mobilized, it has been mobilized deliberately and it has been mobilized for gain” (p. 30). In a context where multiple voices attempt to mobilize populations in different directions, prejudice-related identity performance can provide a
“way of manoeuvring through the world as one sees and experiences it” (Reicher, 2011, p. 445), mobilizing people by aligning identities, feelings, beliefs, and collective actions.

Prejudice-related identity performances can be used to defend social reality as well as to change it. Call to arms discourse, protest movements like Occupy Wall Street and the ‘paedophilia is sexual orientation’ movement, and arguments about immigration all seek to reformulate the nature of ‘prejudice’ as a way of reconfiguring social relations and practices. These movements rouse populations by shaping identities, delineating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, identifying ‘reasonable’ targets of opprobrium, and mobilizing people to action.

In this view, the nature of ‘prejudice’ is defined in identity performances, not in social psychology laboratories and textbooks. Since ‘prejudice’ is a resource for and product of contestation, action and identity, we should not expect that lay definitions would kowtow to authoritative definitions, or that ordinary struggles to define the nature of prejudice would wither in the cold glare of the expert gaze. No authoritative definition of ‘the phenomenon’ will silence the arguments and pave the road for untroubled ways of being and acting. No amount of methodological innovation will trump the understandings of ordinary people seeking to make sense of, and shape, their relations with others. This realization sets an agenda for social psychological research that goes beyond identifying prejudiced individuals, explaining how they got that way, and trying to rehabilitate them. It also moves beyond research that seeks to map out the language of racism or identify prejudiced discourse. Instead, it studies discourse and interaction in order to understand how the very definition of ‘prejudice’ is jointly defined and negotiated, and deployed in social interaction to achieve social and political outcomes.

Notes


2. B4U-Act (http://www.b4uact.org/) use psychological research to argue that paedophilia is sexual orientation (e.g., Jefferson, 2012; Seto, 2012; See APA correction http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/13-67-DSM-Correction-103113.pdf)

3. For example, the earthquake of 1999 led to Greeks voting ‘Yes’ in 2005 for negotiations for Turkey’s EU entry.
4. Supporters of immigration also rely on racial stereotypes and explanations to strengthen their case. For example, arguments that promote sympathy for refugees fleeing persecution elsewhere are bolstered by a view of the racial elsewhere as a violent place that abuses human rights (cf. Every & Augoustinos, 2008).

5. Academic work on prejudice has nonetheless provided ideological resources that frame and inform the everyday usage.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/014466605X40770


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