

**INDIGENEITY, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND  
URBAN POLICIES: CONFLICTING REALITIES IN  
LA PAZ, BOLIVIA AND QUITO, ECUADOR**

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## Abstract

Philipp Horn, 2015, a thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities  
“Indigeneity, Constitutional Changes and Urban Policies: Conflicting Realities in La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador”

This thesis critically examines the role of indigeneity in urban policies and planning in a context of constitutional changes that have taken place in Bolivia and Ecuador in the recent decade. It departs from previous academic and policy research which mainly studied indigenous rights in rural areas and focused on urban indigenous peoples as outlawed, excluded, or insurgent subjects. Instead, it conceptualises the translation of indigenous rights into urban policies as a complex process in which a multiplicity of social actors – including government officials and urban indigenous groups – are involved. Drawing on the practice-centric literature on urban policy and planning, it recognises that the work of government officials is influenced by multiple factors such as constitutional texts as well as their personal views, interest group demands, and the wider structural and political environment surrounding them. Government attempts to translate indigenous rights are contrasted to urban indigenous peoples’ own understandings of indigeneity and associated interests and demands. In addition, this thesis uses an asset accumulation framework as well as the concept of tactics to identify how urban indigenous peoples address and negotiate their interests and demands and try to influence decision-making processes from the bottom-up.

The thesis relies on La Paz (Bolivia) and Quito (Ecuador) as ‘illustrative cases’ to study the role of indigeneity in urban policies. As both La Paz and Quito represent capital cities, it was possible to approach government officials operating at multiple scales – international, national and local – as well as ordinary urban indigenous residents. Methodologically, the thesis employs a qualitative, case study comparison and draws on information derived from semi-structured interviews, document analysis, participant observation and participatory focus groups conducted during eleven months of fieldwork. In terms of comparison, this thesis makes use of a variation-finding approach. By explaining variations between the cases through focusing on the unique processes and factors that shaped the translation of indigenous rights within each city, it intends to offer a more nuanced and context-responsive approach for studying urban indigeneity and addressing indigenous rights in cities.

A central finding of this thesis is that the incorporation of indigeneity into urban policies and indigenous people’s own practices to fulfil their specific demands were characterised by a set of conflicting realities: First, for government officials the translation of indigenous rights into urban policies sometimes clashed with other priorities – such as addressing universal rights and interests of non-indigenous pressure groups – or with their own views of the city as a ‘white’, ‘western’, and ‘modern’ places. Second, urban indigenous peoples articulated multiple and contradictory identities. They mainly did this by voicing specific demands for land – an important asset which they associated with the preservation of a communal and traditional lifestyle but also with aspirations to lead a modern and capitalist life in the city. Third, the findings reveal that indigenous peoples – particularly their community leaders – had to enter in negotiations with governments to access different assets such as land, housing, or education. In these processes leaders manoeuvred between different worlds. They had to conform to political agendas and – particularly in the case of Bolivia – to official spatialized understandings of identity and rights which often conflicted with their own sense of being indigenous in the city.

## **Declaration**

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning

Philipp Horn

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“Im Blick zurück entstehen die Dinge,  
Im Blick nach vorn entsteht das Glück.” (Tocotronic)

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## **Note on Translations**

All translations from Spanish texts and interviews are by the author, and any errors in translation are solely his responsibility.

## List of abbreviations

AECT-Q	Tiguan association of carriers and commercial vendors residing in Quito, Ecuador
AP	Proud and sovereign fatherland (PAIS) alliance, Ecuador
AVIQ-Q	Association of indigenous vendors from Cotopaxi who reside in Quito, Ecuador
CBO	Community-based organisation
CDC	Community development centres, Quito, Ecuador
CIDOB	Confederation of indigenous peoples of Bolivia
CNTCB	National confederation of peasant workers, Bolivia
CODENPE	Council for the development of indigenous nations and peoples, Ecuador
CONAIE	Confederation of indigenous movements of Ecuador
CONAMAQ	National council of ayllus and markas of Qullasuyu, Bolivia
COOTAD	Organic code of territorial organisation, autonomy and decentralisation, Ecuador
CSUTCB-TK	Unified syndical confederation of rural workers - Tupac Katari, Bolivia
DINEIB	National directorate of intercultural bilingual education, Ecuador
FEJUVE	Federation of neighbourhood organisations, La Paz, Bolivia
FENOC-I	National federation of indigenous peasant organisations, Ecuador
ILO	International labour organisation
IMF	International monetary fund
INRA	Bolivian service for agrarian reforms
IOP	Indigenous original peasant, Bolivia
JJVV	Neighbourhood association, Bolivia
LAD	Law of autonomies and decentralisation, Bolivia
LCP	Law of citizen participation, Ecuador
LE	Law on education, Bolivia
LIE	Law on intercultural education, Ecuador
LJD	Law of jurisdictional demarcation, Bolivia
LPP	Law of popular participation, Bolivia
LPS	Law of participation and social auditing, Bolivia

LRPUEH	Law to regulate property rights over urban estates, Bolivia
MAIPO	Ministry of indigenous affairs, Bolivia
MAS	Movement towards socialism, Bolivia
MCP	Ministry for the coordination of patrimony, Ecuador
MIDUVI	Ministry of urban development and housing, Ecuador
MSM	Movement without fear, Bolivia
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
POA	Annual operational plan
PPRE	Plurinational plan against racism and ethnic discrimination, Ecuador
PRA	Participatory rural appraisal
PUA	Participatory urban appraisal
SENPLADES	National secretary for development planning, Ecuador
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollar

# 1 Introduction

This chapter explains what led to the identification of indigeneity, constitutional changes, and urban policies within Bolivia and Ecuador as core topics of study for this research. In addition, it also presents the aims, objectives and research questions posed within this thesis, as well as a brief summary of the methodological approach used during this study. Finally, it provides an overview of the structure and contents of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

## 1.1 Background

We have gone from societies dispersed in thousands of peasant communities with traditional, local, homogenous cultures – in some regions, with strong indigenous roots, with little communication with the rest of the nation – to a largely urban scheme (...). (Canclini 2005: 422)

While at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century only 13 per cent of the world's population lived in cities, it was more than 50 per cent in 2010 (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013). By 2030, it is predicted that nearly five billion people (60 per cent) of the world's 8.27 billion people will live in urban areas (UN-Habitat 2003). Urbanisation<sup>1</sup> is a global phenomenon but one which occurs at an accelerated pace in the global south – Africa, Asia and Latin America (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013; UN 2014).

Particularly in Latin America, urbanisation and population movements from the countryside into the city challenged established patterns of ethno-spatial segregation. Historically, and especially during the colonial and early post-colonial period, the Latin American city was associated with a specific group of inhabitants – ‘white’ Spaniards or people of mixed blood who were granted citizenship rights (Platt 1982). The city was also portrayed as a ‘western’ and modern place in which economic progress occurred (Hardoy 1989). In contrast, the countryside was often understood to be an indigenous place in which Latin America's native population led a backward peasant lifestyle and preserved their ancestral non-western traditions (Dussel 1993; Klor de Alva 1992; Walsh 2010). Yet,

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<sup>1</sup> According to Brenner (2013: 103) urbanisation refers to the process of how urban agglomerations “(...) form, expand, shrink and morph continuously, but always via dense webs of relations to other places, territories, and scales, including to realms that are traditionally classified as being outside the urban condition.” Hence, urbanisation refers to different processes of spatial transformation. It can refer to the fact that cities grow in size because of natural growth or because people from other places decide to migrate to the city (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013).

from the 1950s onwards, as a result of agrarian reforms, economic crisis in the countryside as well as drives to fulfil personal aspirations and goals, Latin America's indigenous population increasingly moved to cities (Albo et al 1981; Matos Mar 1966; van den Berghe 1974). According to UN-Habitat (2010) approximately 30 per cent of Latin America's indigenous population already resided in cities in 2000 and this number is likely to rise to more than 50 per cent by 2030.

The move to the city did not automatically lead to an improvement in indigenous peoples' living conditions. The evidence provided in the literature suggests that indigenous peoples remained disproportionately poorer than other urban residents and continued to be confronted by historically established patterns of exclusion and discrimination (del Popolo et al 2007). Furthermore, urban indigenous peoples have often been reported as outlawed from specific indigenous rights-based agendas ratified by international organisations and Latin American governments since the 1980s (Goldstein 2004; Speiser 2004; UN-Habitat 2010). Instead, these rights-based agendas, often guided by a static understanding of indigeneity as a social category associated with rurality, tradition and backwardness, mainly targeted 'authentic' indigenous subjects living in rural areas (Horn 2014; Quijano 2006; Speiser 2004).

In such a context, a growing body in the literature explored how urban indigenous peoples, excluded from rights and often treated as second-class citizens, managed to make a living within the city. Some studies pointed out that, in order to be treated better within the city, indigenous peoples had to hide their indigenous identity and openly adopt a western lifestyle. This process is often described as cholofication within the literature (de la Cadena 2000; Lloyd 1980; Salmoral 1994; Weismantel 2001). Other studies showed that indigenous peoples preserved certain traditions; they often moved to one neighbourhood with members of their community of origin and relied on collective work schemes (*mitas*) to self-build their new urban homes (Collaredo-Mansfeld 2009; Lagos 2012; Lazar 2008; Oehmichen 2001). In addition, more recent research conducted in Bolivia and Ecuador – two countries with a particularly large urban indigenous population<sup>2</sup> – pointed out how urban indigenous peoples have increasingly found their

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<sup>2</sup> In 2010, 62.2 per cent (more than 6 million people) of Bolivia's and seven per cent (more than 1 million people) of Ecuador's population self-identified as indigenous (INE 2014; INEC 2014). More than one third

own political voice (Becker 2010; Bengoa 2000; Guss 2006; Lazar 2008; Revilla 2011; Zibechi 2010). This literature demonstrated that within these countries urban indigenous peoples formed their own community-based organisations (CBOs) and social movements through which they demanded formal recognition of their cultural and political rights as well as access to urban public services such as water and electricity. Such demands were raised, for example, during the 2003 gas war in La Paz / El Alto, Bolivia and during urban uprisings in Quito in the early 2000s (ibid).

The specific demands of urban indigenous peoples have recently been taken into account within new political constitutions ratified by Ecuador's and Bolivia's governments in 2008 and 2009 respectively (CPE Bolivia 2009; CPE Ecuador 2008). To address indigeneity in cities, the constitutions emphasised the need to promote urban areas as intercultural, plurinational, and decolonial spaces which follow the indigenous principle of '*Buen Vivir/ Vivir Bien*'<sup>3</sup> (translated: the good life). Furthermore, the new constitutions require national and local government authorities to address the specific interests and demands of indigenous peoples – independent of their rural or urban residence – in intercultural policies in sectors as diverse as education, urban development, healthcare and housing. The constitutions also introduced specific indigenous rights such as the right to prior consultation about interventions taking place within those areas in which indigenous peoples live, the right to territorial autonomy, the right to indigenous justice, and the right to preserve their traditions and governance principles (ibid).

Recent research shows how Bolivia's and Ecuador's new constitutions are characterised by contradictions, particularly in the ways they define and address indigeneity and indigenous rights in cities. For example, while both constitutions recognise indigeneity as a core element of their country's rural and urban development agendas, the literature claims that specific indigenous rights continue to be restricted to rural population groups (Colque 2009; Goldstein 2013; Kingman 2012). According to Goldstein (2013), this is particularly clear in the case of Bolivia's new constitution which allocates specific

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of Bolivia's indigenous population and around 25 per cent of Ecuador's indigenous population live in cities (Ibid).

<sup>3</sup> The notions of '*Buen Vivir/ Vivir Bien*' originate in indigenous worldviews and are distinct from western development concepts that focus on individual wellbeing. Instead, '*Buen Vivir/ Vivir Bien*' emphasises that development should occur in community, in harmony with nature as well as with respect for cultural diversity (Acosta 2012; Gudynas 2011).

indigenous rights only to ‘authentic’, ‘backward’ and ‘rural’ people who were classified as ‘indigenous original peasants’.

Despite some studies which pointed out a set of tensions and contradictions within constitutional text, little research has investigated what indigenous rights, interests and demands actually mean to people responsible for incorporating such issues into different sector policies and urban planning practices but also to urban indigenous target groups themselves. By undertaking an in-depth comparison of processes of translating new constitutional contents and rights which address urban indigenous peoples into urban policy and planning practice in Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s capital cities La Paz and Quito, this thesis aims to address this knowledge gap.

## **1.2 Studying indigeneity, constitutional changes and urban policies**

To study the role of indigeneity in urban policies in a context of constitutional changes this thesis relied on various theories from different social science disciplines which are briefly introduced here and reviewed in detail in chapter two. First, the thesis draws on conceptual debates – mainly from the disciplines of history, politics and social anthropology – on indigeneity in Latin America with particular emphasis on Bolivia and Ecuador. A review of this literature suggests that indigeneity always represented a socially constructed category which changed in meaning over time but, nevertheless, had and continues to have real impacts on the lives of those people who are ascribed as or consider themselves to be indigenous (Canessa 2007). Unlike the literature which viewed indigeneity as a static social category associated with rurality, traditions, backwardness and exclusion (Field 1994; Klor de Alva 1992; Starn 1991), this thesis adapts a more dynamic understanding which recognises that indigenous peoples are highly diverse and heterogeneous; they are considered to be of different socio-economic backgrounds, live both in rural and urban places, and are increasingly recognised within rights-based agendas such as constitutions (Canessa 2006; Sieder 2002; Weismantel 2001).

This thesis conceptualises the translation of constitutional content and rights into public policy and urban planning practice as a process in which a multiplicity of officials operating in institutions of urban governance (Gilbert 2006; Pierre 1999), as well as ordinary indigenous peoples and their CBOs and social movements are involved. These people are considered to be social actors who define their practices not only in accordance

to norms and rules outlined in constitutions but also in relation to themselves (Touraine 2000).

It is social actors involved in urban governance – in Bolivia and Ecuador this mainly refers to national and local government officials (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013; Grugel and Riggiozzie 2012) – who are considered to play a key role in defining the translation of constitutional rights. Building upon a review of the practice-centric literature on public policy and urban planning (eg Bourdieu 1977; Flyvbjerg 2009; Moser 1993; Watson 2012; Yiftachel 2006), the thesis recognises that government officials may not always follow constitutional guidelines but define their practices in such a way that they conform with their personal views on indigeneity and urban development. Furthermore, their practices are also considered to be shaped by the specific historical, political and institutional environment in which they operate. In addition, the thesis also recognises that actors involved in urban governance may undertake practices in such a way that they conform to the agenda of their political party as well as to the demands of interest groups whom they actually represent.

Government attempts to translate indigenous rights into urban policies and planning interventions are assessed in relation to the impact they have on the living conditions of urban indigenous target groups. Like government officials, policy makers or planners, urban indigenous peoples – similar to ordinary urban residents elsewhere in the world – are also considered to be social actors who intend to address their own interests and demands within the specific political environment that governs them (Watson 2003). A review of the literature on urban indigeneity reveals that previous studies have certainly offered descriptions of some of the cultural and economic interests of urban indigenous peoples and showed how – in a context of exclusion – they addressed their interests through self-help or insurgent practices (Albo et al 1981; Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Goldstein 2004; Lazar 2008). Yet, such research rarely relied on an explicit theoretical framework to study indigenous people's interests and demands nor did it investigate the practices of urban indigenous peoples in the current political context in which their rights, interests and demands are acknowledged within constitutions. Hence, to identify the specific interests and demands of urban indigenous people as well as their own understandings of indigeneity, the thesis uses an asset accumulation framework (Moser 2009). Finally, building on de Certeau's (1984) conceptual work on tactics, the thesis

looks at indigenous peoples' own contestation and political negotiation practices to access a portfolio of assets and to influence decision-making in urban policy and planning from the bottom-up.

### **1.3 Research aims, objectives and questions**

To address the knowledge gaps, the thesis relies on the above-mentioned theoretical approaches to explore understandings of indigeneity and the practices of different social actors 'on the ground' within two cities. The overall aim of this research is to assess the political tensions associated with different notions of indigeneity, manifested in Bolivia's and Ecuador's new constitutions, viewed through the lens of La Paz's and Quito's urban indigenous peoples' practices to access and accumulate assets in processes of contestation and political negotiation with different actors working in central and local government institutions. The main objectives of this research project are therefore the following:

- 1) To examine the implementation process of different indigenous rights, manifested in the new political constitutions, in urban policy and planning practice through an analysis of relevant legislative documents and practices of different actors working in central and decentralised government institutions;
- 2) To explore understandings of indigeneity and associated asset-based demands among different urban indigenous peoples;
- 3) To investigate how urban indigenous peoples articulate their understandings of indigenous identity and asset-based demands in negotiation with actors working in different central and local government institutions.

The research objectives are summarised in the following research questions:

- 1) To what extent and how are different indigenous rights, manifested in the new political constitutions, translated into urban policies and planning practices?
- 2) How do urban indigenous peoples understand indigeneity?
- 3) How do urban indigenous peoples negotiate different understandings of indigeneity, indigenous rights, and asset-based demands with actors working in different central and decentralised government institutions?

The findings of this thesis are expected to contribute to conceptual and policy debates on understandings of indigeneity and the implementation of indigenous rights within those places in which an increasing number of indigenous peoples live – cities. Furthermore, by particularly focusing on the complex asset-based demands and tactics of ordinary urban indigenous residents, the thesis expects to generate additional and new findings on the actual interests of indigenous target groups. These findings are particularly relevant for countries like Bolivia and Ecuador in which constitutions require national and local governments to address the rights, interests and demands of such groups within new intercultural policy agendas.

#### **1.4 Research methodology**

Even though the methodology presented in this thesis seems logical and sequential, the actual pathway of producing this research was an iterative process that took four years and involved moments of difficulty, trial and error, and setbacks in producing logical arguments which are backed up with robust qualitative data (see appendix one for an outline of the research process). At the initial stages of this research, a literature review was conducted on historical, theoretical and policy debates on indigeneity and the city in Latin America with particular emphasis on Bolivia and Ecuador. It was also decided to review relevant theoretical debates on public policy and urban planning which were considered useful for a study of the translation of indigenous rights.

Subsequently, a research methodology was identified which was capable of exploring the links between indigeneity, constitutional changes, and urban policies through ‘on the ground’ social research. A qualitative, comparative case study approach was identified as most appropriate for this thesis (Mahoney 2007; Tilly 1984; Yin 2003). A qualitative methodology was chosen because it allowed an in-depth study of the causal factors (perceptions, personal views, interests, asset-based demands etc) that shape the work of different social actors such as policy makers, planners or indigenous peoples (Tracy 2010). It was decided to rely on a case-study approach as it permitted positioning the practices of different actors within the wider historical, institutional and political context in which they took place (Flyvbjerg 2006). Due to its focus on two case-study cities, comparison was part of this research endeavour. The comparative rationale of this thesis was two-fold. First, the thesis conducted within-case comparative research; it compared how, in each city, diverse actors operating in different government institutions understood indigeneity

and translated indigenous rights. The practices of these actors were contrasted to the diverse interests, asset-based demands and associated tactics of urban indigenous peoples themselves. Second, the thesis compared the findings from both case study cities with each other. It was decided to rely on the method of a variation-finding comparison (Tilly 1984); in other words, variations in the findings *between* the cases have been mainly assessed in relation to a study of the unique processes and factors that shaped the translation of indigenous rights *within* each city.

The research chose La Paz and Quito as ‘illustrative cases’ (Flyvbjerg 2006). Due to their status as capital cities, it was relatively easy to approach different actors working in national government and local government institutions as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Meanwhile, the cities were home to a large and diverse indigenous population. To assess what indigeneity meant to La Paz’s and Quito’s urban indigenous peoples it was decided to work with selected communities which reflected the diversity of indigenous groups and organisations in each city. In La Paz it was decided to work in two peripheral neighbourhoods – Pumakatari and Litoral, which were inhabited predominantly by indigenous migrants and by indigenous residents who had always lived in this area and whose territories had been absorbed by urban expansion. Reflecting on the composition of Quito’s indigenous population, it was decided to approach selected members of indigenous communes whose territories had been absorbed by processes of urban expansion but otherwise to focus on indigenous migrants who represented the majority of the city’s indigenous population. Unlike in La Paz, indigenous migrants rarely lived within one neighbourhood but often worked together with other members of their communities of origin in markets (Kingman 2012; Swanson 2007). It was decided to work predominantly with one market vendor association – the AECT-Q – which represented indigenous migrants on Quito’s San Roque market – the city’s historical urban indigenous centre (Kingman 2012).

Qualitative data collection was undertaken during 11 months of fieldwork in 2012 and 2013 in La Paz and Quito. In La Paz 29 semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors engaged in urban policy and planning and 14 semi-structured interviews with urban indigenous peoples. In Quito, 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors in urban policy and planning and 17 semi-structured interviews with urban indigenous peoples. In addition to individual interviews 12 focus groups, representing 103 indigenous

peoples, were carried out in La Paz and eight focus groups, representing 72 indigenous peoples, were organised in Quito. Content analysis of relevant documents and participant observation complemented the findings on actor's perceptions and practices gathered through interviews and focus group exercises.

After data collection, the qualitative material was processed and analysed, manually and through the use of the qualitative data processing programme NVivo, during and after return from fieldwork in Quito. After the initial data analysis, it was decided first to write the empirical chapters for each case study city. Subsequently, the literature review, methodology, introductory and concluding chapters have been drafted. The different chapters as well as the full thesis were reviewed at various stages by supervisors, internal advisors as well as by academic peers during conferences. It was also possible to disseminate the findings of this thesis to government actors and members of indigenous communities during a return visit to Quito in 2015. As a result, the thesis was refined, rewritten and restructured at different stages in order to incorporate new sources from the literature as well as recommendations and comments from reviewers, peers and research participants.

Overall, the qualitative material gathered and presented within this thesis is by no means representative of Bolivia and Ecuador in general. Instead, this thesis tells a story on the basis of a set of selected voices that represented only the government institutions and communities approached within each city. Nevertheless, they were considered relevant and illustrative as they provide important insights into the complex processes and factors which shape how government officials translated indigenous rights within cities and how urban indigenous peoples may contest and negotiate access to their aspired portfolio of assets.

### **1.5 Structure of the thesis**

The thesis contains nine chapters and an appendix section. This introductory chapter provides the background, the relevance, and the main aims, objectives and research questions that guided the study. It also summarises the research methodology and provides a short outline of the contents of each chapter.

Chapter two presents a review of the literature in which this research is embedded. Focusing particularly on Bolivia and Ecuador, it provides a historical review of conceptual and policy debates on indigeneity and the city. It reveals that urban indigeneity has increasingly been recognised within rights-based agendas but, until this point, research rarely explored what urban indigeneity and associated rights actually mean in a context of urban policy. Concerned with the translation of indigenous rights into urban policies and planning practices, the review also examines conceptual debates on the role of different ‘social actors’ – policy makers and planners involved in ‘urban governance’ but also ordinary urban indigenous target groups – who influence this process. It reviews practice-centric studies which emphasise that the top-down practices of policy makers and urban planners are not only influenced by legislative guidelines provided in constitutions but also by their personal views, by actor-groups whom they represent, and by the institutional and political environment in which they operate. It also discusses the concepts of ‘asset accumulation’ and ‘tactics’ to explain how urban indigenous target groups can address their own interests and demands and influence public policy and urban planning from the bottom-up.

Chapter three describes the research approach and methodology used in this investigation. It clarifies the reasons for relying on a combined ‘critical realist’ and ‘social constructivist’ ontological position. It also explains why it was decided to rely on a comparative, qualitative case study approach. In addition, the chapter describes the research and recounts some of the decisions made and challenges faced during its different stages which included: (1) preparing the research and addressing ethical research issues, (2) embarking on fieldwork and selecting field sites in La Paz and Quito, (3) undertaking the collection of qualitative data (ie document analysis, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and participatory focus groups) in each city, and (4) conducting data analysis and writing the thesis.

Chapter four presents city profiles of La Paz and Quito. It outlines the history of these cities and provides a background on recent patterns of ethno-racial diversification. It also offers a general overview of the political and institutional context of these cities and outlines where and in what physical and socio-economic conditions urban indigenous residents live. Finally, it introduces those indigenous neighbourhoods and organisations which were studied in detail during fieldwork.

Chapter five is the first out of four subsequent chapters which present and analyse the empirical findings of this thesis. This chapter compares how actors operating in different national and local government institutions – which influence public policy and urban planning practice in La Paz – actually incorporated constitutional content on indigeneity into their work. It is shown that government authorities – guided more by historically-established understandings of indigeneity as a rural category than by current constitutional content – mainly recognised specific indigenous rights in rural territories and rarely within cities. This is made clear in a discussion of public policies and urban development agendas of the national government as well of the municipal government of La Paz which intend to target urban indigenous peoples as part of a universal-rights-based approach. At the same time, the chapter also demonstrates how the municipal government of Palca – which is mainly responsible for administering rural territories but also claims parts of La Paz as its jurisdiction – implemented specific indigenous rights such as the right for collective land ownership. Hence, it is argued that in a context of unclear administrative boundaries different spatial understandings of indigeneity and rights overlapped and confronted each other within the city of La Paz.

Chapter six explores what being indigenous meant for different residents who self-identified as such in La Paz's neighbourhoods of Litoral and Pumakatari. It is demonstrated that residents often articulated their indigenous identity through specific demands for land – an important asset which was associated with opportunities to access other assets. Articulations of indigenous identity and associated interests and demands for assets were, however, by no means homogenous and often conflicted with each other. For example, while some residents wanted to preserve vacant land for cultural and agricultural purposes, others wanted to sell this land to newly arriving urban residents or register it with the municipal government of La Paz in order to gain access to modern urban amenities. In addition to discussing different interests and demands, the chapter also shows how residents – and particularly the leaders of CBOs – fulfilled their demands through processes of contestation and political negotiation with actors in the municipal governments of Palca and La Paz. It is shown that, during processes of political negotiation, leaders had to manoeuvre between different officially-recognised understandings of indigeneity. When approaching authorities in Palca they had to 'act' as authentic rural indigenous peasants while they had to hide their indigenous identity and behave like ordinary urban residents in negotiations with authorities in La Paz.

Chapter seven takes the reader's attention from La Paz, Bolivia to Quito, Ecuador. This chapter focuses on the role of Ecuador's national government and Quito's municipal government in translating the content of new constitutions. It is demonstrated that government authorities emphasised providing access to universal rights and services such as housing, education, or public infrastructure. While such a universal-rights-based approach also targeted urban indigenous peoples, it is shown that government authorities have rarely incorporated constitutional content on interculturalism and specific indigenous rights, such as the right for prior consultation on their territories, within public policies and urban planning interventions. Based upon the empirical findings, the chapter depicts various factors which potentially explain gaps between constitutional rhetoric and actual practices. These include that, instead of promoting indigenous rights, government authorities were often guided by other political priorities such as disempowering opposition forces – including the country's indigenous movement – or undertaking economic development programmes in areas where urban indigenous peoples live.

Chapter eight describes how different urban indigenous residents in Quito defined their own indigenous identity and associated demands for assets. The chapter distinguishes between indigenous *comuneros* who reside in semi-autonomous communes situated in the city's periphery and indigenous migrants who rarely live in one urban neighbourhood but organise themselves around their work activities. Even though these groups had different backgrounds, what they had in common was that they defined their indigenous identity around demands for land or urban space – assets which were often associated with the opportunity to live, work, and practise their traditions in community. With particular focus on the work of one indigenous organisation – the AECT-Q – which represents indigenous market vendors from Tigua, the chapter then describes how urban indigenous peoples and particularly their leaders negotiated access to assets. It is shown that indigenous leaders of this organisation often had to present their demands in such a way that it conformed to the political agenda that guided the work of actors in Quito's municipal government. Particularly in the current political context, this often meant that leaders had to hide their political affiliation to Ecuador's indigenous movement and to show support for municipal interventions – such as market relocation – which they and the members of their association would otherwise openly oppose.

Chapter nine compares and summarises the findings from both cities in relation to the three research questions. From this, the main conclusions as well as policy implications arising from this research are developed. Finally, the chapter discusses some of the methodological limitations of this research and identifies potential issues that require further investigation.

The appendix section contains a summary of the research process followed, participant information sheets for semi-structured interviews with different research participants, the list of documents consulted, and the list of people interviewed in La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador.

## 2 Literature review

This chapter addresses the central topic and research questions of this thesis from a historical, theoretical and policy debate perspective. To achieve this, the first section provides a historical review of existing conceptual and policy debates on indigeneity in Bolivia and Ecuador. It is demonstrated that, from the colonial period until the present, indigeneity has increasingly shifted from a category associated with rurality, exclusion, and tradition to a category which increasingly describes people who live in modern cities and whose specific rights, interests and demands (these terms will re-occur throughout this thesis and are briefly defined in box 2.1) are recognised in constitutions. Interested particularly in the translation of such constitutional rights within cities, the second section reviews theoretical and conceptual debates on social actors, public policy and urban planning practice, asset accumulation and tactics which are considered helpful for a study of these processes.

### Box 2.1 Definitions of the terms rights, interests and demands

**Rights** are commonly defined as legitimate claims that give rise to correlative obligations and duties (see Moser et al 2001). To have a right allows an individual or group to make legitimate claims against some other person, group, or organisation. The latter is under the obligation to ensure the rights-holder in securing the right (ibid). Throughout this thesis reference is made to the following rights (see Anaya 2004; Moser et al 2001):

- **Individual rights** – the right-bearer is an individual;
- **Indigenous rights** – this is a collective right whereby rights-bearers are groups and not individuals;
- **Universal rights** – this is an individual right with a universal domain which applies to all humans equally, irrespective of their membership to particular groups, states, religions etc.

**Interests** are here defined as prioritized concerns of specific individuals or groups (Moser 1993)

**Demands** are here defined as an insistent and peremptory request for a specific right, resource or service made by an individual or group (OED Online 2015).

### 2.1 Indigeneity and its role in the city: shifting meanings in Bolivia and Ecuador

This section reviews the academic and policy literature on the central theme of this thesis – indigeneity – with particular focus on Bolivia and Ecuador, the selected case study countries. It will demonstrate that indigeneity is best understood as a processual factor which is fluid and constantly changing in meaning over time and space (Canessa 2012). Yet, when tracing such changes it is important to explore “(...) how, from what, by whom and for what (...)” reasons indigeneity was understood and addressed differently in

different moments in time and space (Castells 1997: 7). In its historical review of indigeneity this section starts with the colonial conquest – the moment where this social category was initially defined. It subsequently traces shifting meanings of indigeneity from the colonial and early post-colonial period, to the modernist period from the 1950-1970s, to the neoliberal multiculturalist period in the late 1970-2000s, until the current political context. It will be shown that throughout the above mentioned historical periods indigeneity changed from being associated with rurality, exclusion, and non-Western traditions to a rights-based category which also increasingly describes city-dwellers. It will also be demonstrated that particularly in the current political context of Bolivia and Ecuador, in which new national governments started recognising the interests and rights of urban indigenous peoples for the first time in constitutions, there is a need for further research that investigates the role of indigeneity and indigenous rights in a context of urban policy and planning.

### **2.1.1 Colonialism: rural ‘indians’ and urban ‘whites’**

(...) in 1491 there were no Indians in the Americas; in 1492 there were tens of millions. (Canessa 2008: 354)

Prior to the arrival of the colonisers the people of what is now known as Bolivia and Ecuador lived in diverse societies<sup>4</sup>. Cities were the political, economic and cultural centres of these societies. In today’s Bolivia the city of Tiuhuanaco was the administrative centre of pre-Inca civilisations living in the area of Lake Titicaca until approximately 1200AC (Hardoy 1973). Subsequently, the Incas controlled most of the Andean region and cities such as Chukiyapu – today’s La Paz, and Kitu – today’s Quito, represented important administrative centres (ibid).

The Latin American continent, of which Bolivia and Ecuador are a part, experienced a dramatic change with the arrival of the Spanish colonisers. As indicated in the above mentioned quote by Canessa, the colonisers ignored differences among local people and ascribed the native population as ‘indians’<sup>5</sup> (Field 1994). The colonial conquest led to the

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<sup>4</sup> The phrase ‘what is now known’ is used because Bolivia and Ecuador only existed as independent countries respectively from 1809 and 1821. Before the colonial conquest today’s Bolivia and Ecuador were part of the Inca Empire and during colonial times Bolivia belonged to the Spanish vice-royalty of Peru and Ecuador belonged to the vice-royalty of New Granada.

<sup>5</sup> It is important to distinguish the term indigenous from the term ‘indian’. The term ‘indian’ was introduced by the colonisers to categorise native population groups and to position them at the lowest level of an ethno-

eradication of almost half of Latin America's 'indian' population of approximately 100 million within three decades (Quijano 2005). The colonisers also destroyed most pre-colonial cities. On the ruins of these ancient cities they built their own urban centres from which they controlled the rural hinterlands (Hardoy 1989). In today's Bolivia, Chukiyapu became the city of La Paz (Albo 2005; Guss 2006). In today's Ecuador, Kitu became Quito (Zaaijer 1991).

Following the conquest the colonisers established a political system that followed the Spanish model of 'blood politics' (Engerman and Sokoloff 2000; Quijano 2005). Based upon phenotype, cultural and linguistic background the colonisers drew real political, economic and spatial distinctions between different population groups (Fenton 2003; Harris 1995; Wade 1997). They divided Latin American societies into two different states, a Spanish republic and an 'indian' republic (Platt 1982). The Spanish republic granted rights to its primarily 'white' Spaniard and *criollo*<sup>6</sup> urban citizenry (*vecinos*). The 'indian' Republic was maintained through a 'pact of reciprocity' whereby 'indians' had to pay a tribute to the colonisers in order maintain a plot of rural land (ibid). Otherwise, 'indians' were denied from citizenship and often not allowed to inhabit cities. Instead, they predominantly served in semi-feudal conditions as peasants or miners on *encomiendas*<sup>7</sup> (Klor de Alva 1992). Hence, being part of the 'indian' republic was associated with social exclusion: it meant being set apart and locked out spatially, culturally, politically, and economically from other ethno-racial groups<sup>8</sup>.

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racial hierarchy. It is, hence, a term associated with racism, discrimination and exclusion. In contrast, indigenous refers to an identity which people self-ascribe to (Canessa 2006). Taking into account the different connotations of these terms it is, according to the perspective taken in this thesis, best to distance oneself from the term 'indian' by referring to it only in quotation marks and to use the term indigenous when appropriate.

<sup>6</sup> The term *criollo* refers to Spaniards born in the Latin American colony (Platt 1982).

<sup>7</sup> The encomienda system was established by Queen Isabella I of Castile in 1503 and was a system of forced labour: The Spanish crown entrusted colonisers (*encomendadores*) with control rights of certain areas. The *encomendadores* collected tributes from 'Indians' living in these areas (Platt 1982; Harris 1995). They also controlled the labour of rural Indians who were often forced to work, in slave-like conditions, predominantly in the sectors of agriculture or mining (Quijano 2006).

<sup>8</sup> The term social exclusion originally derived from research on multi-dimensional deprivation and poverty in countries of the global North and South (Hickey and du Toit 2007). It describes the situation of "(...) individuals or groups that are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society within which they live." (de Haan 1999: 2). According to this definition social exclusion has two dimensions: first, it describes a particular lived experience of multidimensional deprivation. Second, social exclusion emanates from the particular practices of people (ibid). The concept of social exclusion has been increasingly used to describe the lives and historical treatment of indigenous peoples (see Wade 1997).

For the colonisers, the introduction of indigeneity served in creating an inferior other – the ‘indian’, who could be exploited and used to serve the interests of a superior group, the ‘white’ European or *criollo* (Quijano 2000). It is precisely on these grounds that authors such as Dussel (1993), Mignolo (2000) or Walsh (2010) argued that the notion of modernity and its dialectic other – tradition, arose as consequence of ethno-racial ‘blood politics’ in Latin America and not only, as argued by Marx, in relation to the rising of the bourgeoisie as a new revolutionary class in Europe. In the Latin American colonial context modernity was associated with a specific place – the city, inhabited by specific people – ‘white’ Spaniards or *criollos*, and characterised by Western culture and economic progress. At the same time, tradition was associated with another place – the countryside, inhabited by specific people – ‘indians’, and characterised by non-Western culture and backwardness (Walsh 2010).

There is a consensus within the literature that the colonial conquest led to the creation of indigeneity as a social category (Bengoa 2000). However, the literature is divided in the way it studies and conceptualises indigeneity from colonialism onwards. A significant number of studies portray indigeneity as a static category; such a conceptualisation is often guided by structuralist approaches (Field 1994). Hence, scholars who view indigeneity as a static category understand it as a historical product of colonialism which, sometimes until the present, operates according to the schemes generated by colonialism (ibid). Following such an understanding historical studies, for example, illustrated how those ascribed as ‘indians’ by the colonisers remained trapped in a situation of ‘internal colonialism’ in the post-colonial period where they continued being serfs who were excluded from citizenship and urban life (Engerman and Sokoloff 2000; Klor de Alva 1992; Mahoney 2003; Salomon 1988). Writing on Bolivia, Ecuador and other Latin American countries, Quijano (2006) illustrated this point by showing how the abolition of the *encomienda* system after the fall of the colonial empire only led to the introduction of a new scheme – the *haciendas* system, which left ‘indians’ trapped in semi-feudal working conditions. Other studies, belonging to what is now known as ‘cultural survival school’ or ‘Andeanism’ (Field 1994; Starn 1991), focused less on tracing continuities in patterns of exclusion but attempted to demonstrate cultural continuities. These studies focused on remote rural communities in highland or lowland Bolivia and Ecuador to demonstrate how those ascribed as ‘indians’ by the colonisers preserved non-Western cultures and ancient economic and political principles that stand in contrast to modern urban lifestyles (ibid).

Static accounts have been increasingly criticised for reproducing colonial understandings of indigeneity, for exoticising and romanticising the lives of indigenous peoples, for portraying them as victims of exclusion, and for creating false binaries of rural traditions and a modern urban life (Stavenhagen 1981). Responding to this critique other scholars, therefore, demonstrated that indigeneity was already a more dynamic social category in the colonial period. First, the writings of Albo (2005) or Reinega (1970) showed how indigenous peoples were never passive victims of exclusion but actively resisted oppression in the colonial and early post-colonial period; examples include not only the siege over La Paz, Bolivia undertaken in the 1780s by indigenous leader Tupak Katari and his wife Bartolina Sisa but also the indigenous revolt led by Fernando Daquilema during the 1860s in Ecuador. Second, writing on Bolivian and Ecuadorian colonial cities the work of Abercrombie (1991), Hardoy (1989) or Morse (1978) showed how indigenous peoples were never expelled or fully excluded from urban life. Instead, these authors showed how indigenous peoples continued to live, though in dire conditions, within urban peripheries. They also demonstrated that it was indigenous peoples who constructed cities like Quito or La Paz (ibid). Hence, the ‘traditional’ indigenous subjects built ‘modern’ cities and often remained living within them.

The above examples illustrated that, already in the colonial and early post-colonial period, indigeneity was never fully a static social category. As will be shown in the next sections, in Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s more recent history indigeneity changed its meaning: from being associated with rurality it became an increasingly urban phenomenon; from a category of exclusion it became increasingly associated with processes of inclusion into rights-based agendas.

### **2.1.2 Modernisation: From ‘indians’ to peasants and urban cholos**

Until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s native population was mainly referred to as ‘indians’ (Canessa 2007). This tendency changed with the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a period associated with modernisation and ‘deindianisation’ (Larson 2004). The Mexican Revolution from 1910 and 1920 hereby was an important reference point for changes within both countries (Bengoa 2000). Guided by indigenism the Mexican Revolution undertook a process of acculturation; it revalued the status of indigenous peoples by emphasising and idealising the mixed biological and cultural heritage (*mestizaje*) of all Mexicans who were now granted citizenship rights (Canessa 2006).

Revolutionary forces were also strongly inspired by socialist principles and therefore they shifted the focus away from ethnicity to class and promoted the rights of a new peasant class, ie the former ‘indians’, to own land (Albo 2005). They called for the abolition of the ‘indian’ tribute, the *hacienda* system and for land redistributions (ibid).

Similar transformations occurred throughout Latin America, including in Bolivia – after the Bolivian revolution in 1952, and Ecuador – as part of land reforms in 1964 and 1970 (ibid). Here, national governments granted citizenship rights to indigenous peoples, abolished the *hacienda* system, and promised to redistribute land to those who worked it – indigenous peoples who were now ascribed as peasants (Albo 1987; Barsky 1984). The literature which studied this period in both countries, however, argued that the reforms rarely led to an improvement in the living conditions of indigenous peoples – the new peasant class (Dunkerley 2007; Korovkin 1992; Yashar 2005). In Bolivia, indigenous families were generally allocated with small plots of land from which they could not make a living (Dunkerley 2007). In contrast to Bolivia where land has been redistributed particularly in the country’s highland region, Ecuador’s government followed advice from the United States government and prioritised the creation of large-scale agro-enterprises over land redistribution<sup>9</sup> (Korovkin 1992). Hence, indigenous peoples often remained landless<sup>10</sup>.

An important consequence of the above-mentioned reforms was that Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s predominantly rural indigenous peasant population migrated in masses from the countryside towards cities. For example, in Bolivia only five per cent of indigenous peoples lived in cities at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; this number increased to more than 20 per cent by the mid-1950s (Klein 2011). The literature offered a variety of factors to explain the move towards the city in this specific historical period: first, as part of agricultural reform indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador were freed from semi-feudal conditions and received citizenship which allowed them to move freely from place to place; they were now entitled to move to cities (Lazar 2008). Second, as stated previously, in Bolivia families could not live on the land redistributed to them and,

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<sup>9</sup> Ecuador’s national government mainly followed development recommendations manifested within US President Kennedy’s 1961 ‘Alliance of Progress’ programme (see Scheman 1988).

<sup>10</sup> For example, following the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law, indigenous peoples in highland Ecuador legally owned less than three per cent of cultivable land (Korovkin 1992). Similarly, the 1972 reforms did not produce significant socio-economic improvements as only 20.1 per cent of transferred land was suitable for agricultural cultivation (Ibid).

therefore, they often engaged in processes of split-migration, meaning that some members stayed in the countryside while others moved to cities in search for work (Albo et al 1981). Third, it has also been reported that there was a severe drought in the late 1950s which led to a famine in Bolivia's highland region and to further migration towards cities (Lazar 2008). Fourth, in Ecuador, rural to urban migration mainly occurred because rural indigenous peoples remained landless and, as a consequence, they had to search for economic opportunities in growing cities such as Guayaquil or Quito (Espin 2012; Swanson 2007; Zaaiker 1991).

This movement towards the city led to an increased interest in the study of Bolivia's and Ecuador's new urban populations. For example, research on processes of rural to urban migration in La Paz, Bolivia (Albo et al 1981; Albo et al 1983) and Quito, Ecuador (Zaaiker 1991) studied the physical and socio-economic living conditions of these migrants. Such studies demonstrated that indigenous migrants often found their first urban home in densely populated run-down colonial houses, called *quintas*, situated at the periphery of colonial city centres. These studies also showed that, at later stages, indigenous peoples started occupying land in the growing unplanned urban peripheries where they often self-constructed their new homes<sup>11</sup> (ibid).

In addition to focusing on socio-economic factors, other studies also explored identity transformations among Bolivia's and Ecuador's indigenous migrants (Albo et al 1981; de la Cadena 2000; Larson 2004; van den Berghe 1974; Weismantel 2001). Some of these studies followed static conceptualisations of indigeneity as well as theories of modernisation and cultural assimilation; they therefore assumed that factors associated with indigeneity such as non-Western tradition or exclusion would lose their hold in the city. Such an understanding has been articulated particularly by van den Berghe (1974: 9):

The closer one comes to the larger urban centres and their interconnecting main roads and railways, the more processes of cultural hispanicization and the

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<sup>11</sup> Self-help housing was nothing unique to urban indigenous population groups but has been observed for low income groups across Latin America. According to Turner (1968, 1978), low income groups relied on self-help housing because of the unaffordability and difficult access to housing schemes provided by the state. Studying self-help housing in Lima, Peru, Turner (1978) also argued that such processes were in themselves beneficial for low-income groups; to be in control of their own housing was seen as a sense of empowerment in which people could take charge of the design, construction and management of their own homes in a cost efficient way.

extension of bilingualism tend to blur ethnic distinctions, and give more salience to class difference.

The period of transition between being indigenous and becoming members of urban classes was often described as ‘cholofication’ (Matos Mar 1966). Ethnographic research conducted in Bolivian and Ecuadorian cities, however, challenged modernist and assimilationist assumptions by showing that the process of ‘cholofication’ was never completed (Albo et al 1981; Lazar 2008; Weismantel 2001). First, such research showed that ‘white’ urban *vecinos* continued treating indigenous migrants like ‘indians’ or cholos (people in between ‘indians’ and *vecinos*) – they ensured that they remained excluded and discriminated against (ibid). Second, such research also showed how indigenous migrants themselves had not always adapted to ‘white’ urban culture but remained cholos; they often retained strong ties to their rural communities, preserved their indigenous languages and traditions when interacting with each other but spoke in Spanish with urban residents of other ethno-racial backgrounds (Albo et al 1981, 1983). This process of preserving and, in fact, revitalising one’s indigenous identity became ever more explicit from the late 1970s onwards.

### **2.1.3 Neoliberal multiculturalism: Indigenous peoples with and without rights**

Between the late 1970s and early 2000s the literature observed a return of the ‘indian’ as a self-identifying indigenous person throughout Latin America and especially in Bolivia and Ecuador (Albo 1991; Quijano 2006). This process has been particularly studied in Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s countryside where in a context of economic crisis and neoliberal reforms rural indigenous peoples, often with support from non-governmental organisations and the church, revitalised their identities, formed indigenous movements and started demanding specific rights from international organisations but also from their national governments (Andolina et al 2009; Marti i Puig 2010). Parallel to these processes in the countryside, another phenomenon occurred which received much less attention in the literature – the revitalisation of indigenous identities and the formation of indigenous organisations within those places, cities, which have also been affected by economic crisis and neoliberal reforms but where rights-based agendas on indigeneity have not been applied (Goldstein 2004; Lazar 2008; Kingman 2012). The literature that described and analysed these parallel, yet interrelated, processes is reviewed in further detail below.

### *The rise of rural indigenous movements*

It is not that Indians have not organised in the past. However, they have not organised along ethnic lines to promote an explicitly indigenous agenda. (Yashar 2005: 5)

From the late 1970s onwards, studies departed more and more from a narrow understanding of indigeneity as a static category associated with exclusion or ‘cultural survival’. They also departed from modernist assumptions which emphasised a shift from indigeneity to a class category. Instead, as indicated in the Yashar quote above, from this period onwards scholars observed that indigenous peoples increasingly organised around their ethnic identity. Hence, indigeneity was often understood as a political category which people used as a base for their struggles for land, socio-economic, political and cultural recognition (Gotkowitz 2008; Starn 1991; van Cott 2008).

The revitalisation of indigenous identity and the rise of rural indigenous movements have been well reported in the literature on Bolivia and Ecuador. Here the rise of two different types of indigenous movements has been observed: First, there was a rise of rural indigenous peasant movements – the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers - Tupac Katari (CSUTCB-TK) founded in 1979 in Bolivia, and the National Federation of Indigenous Peasant Organisations (FENOC-I) founded in 1985 in Ecuador (Marti i Puig 2010). These movements united rural indigenous peoples who engaged in a process of ethno-genesis; they mobilised for work and land rights while revitalising their indigenous identities (ibid). This indigenous revitalisation occurred in a context where Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s national governments, confronted by economic crisis and state bankruptcy, increasingly departed from land reform promises for peasants made in previous decades. Instead, following international donor advice, governments prioritised the creation of large-scale agro-enterprises (Korovkin 1992; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). As a consequence, rural population groups became increasingly impoverished and disillusioned with the state. This also led to an identity crisis among those social groups whose identity was relatively new and unsettled, ie indigenous peoples who were ascribed as peasant class. Questioning their class identity in a context of economic hardship, indigenous people often revitalised their ethnic identity (Albo 1991; Canessa 2006).

Second, another type of rural indigenous movement also entered the Bolivian and Ecuadorian scene in this period. The church, local anthropologists or NGOs played a

central role in forming these movements; they provided them with a political voice and assisted them in the formation of an ethnic agenda which moved beyond a focus on rights for work and land (Andolina et al 2009; Bebbington 2007; Marti i Puig 2010). As part of an ethnic agenda, these movements raised rights-based claims; they demanded the right to own land collectively, to exercise their own forms of justice, and to have their languages protected and incorporated within education schemes (Klein 2011; Yashar 2005). In Bolivia, such second-type indigenous movements include the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB) founded in 1982 which mainly represents Amazonian indigenous groups and the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) founded in 1997 which mainly represents highland groups (Klein 2011). In Ecuador, a second-type of indigenous movement represents the Confederation of Indigenous Movements of Ecuador (CONAIE) which was founded in 1986 and unites lowland and highland indigenous peoples (Yashar 2005).

### ***The incorporation of rural indigenous demands into rights-based agendas***

The above mentioned first- and second-type rural indigenous movements increasingly put pressure on national governments<sup>12</sup> but also, and often more successfully (Andolina et al 2009; Stavenhagen 1988), approached international organisations which from the late 1980s onwards increasingly followed a rights-based approach to development (Gledhill 2009; Hickey and Mitlin 2009; Molyneux and Lazar 2003; Moser et al 2001). Confronted by indigenous and other civil society organisations, international organisations such as the UN or the International Labour Organisation (ILO) held a set of international summits and conferences on human rights as well as on social, economic, cultural and specific-group rights in the 1990s (Anaya 2004). As an outcome of these summits, they ratified a set of declarations which also addressed indigenous peoples. These include, for example, the 1989 ILO 169 Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. This convention prohibited all forms of discrimination against indigenous peoples, called for a strengthening of indigenous people's territorial, economic, social, and cultural rights, and for a break from ethno-racial inequalities (for a detailed analysis of these documents see Anaya 2004).

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<sup>12</sup> Indigenous movements not only exercised pressure outside but also within governments, through newly founded indigenous parties (ie the CONAIE affiliated party Pachakutik or the CSUTCB-TK affiliated party *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Katari de Liberación* – MRTKL). For a discussion of the influence of indigenous parties see van Cott (2008).

Responding to internal and international pressure, Bolivia's and Ecuador's national governments increasingly incorporated indigenous rights into their national constitutions. Like other countries in the Latin American region, these governments introduced a similar set of rights which van Cott (2000) summarised as the 'multicultural model'. For example, within new constitutions, ratified in Bolivia in 1993 and in Ecuador in 1998, the national governments acknowledged international legislation such as the ILO 169 Convention, recognised indigenous peoples as distinct groups with specific languages and traditions, incorporated their right to manage and own land collectively, and guaranteed bilingual education in indigenous territories. In addition, the national governments installed new institutions – the Ministry of Indigenous Affairs (MAIPO) in Bolivia and the Council for the Development of Indigenous Nations and Peoples (CODENPE) and the National Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education (DINEIB) in Ecuador – that were responsible for implementing indigenous rights and addressing indigenous concerns (van Cott 2008). The national governments also indirectly strengthened the political weight of indigenous peoples through the introduction of decentralisation laws, the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP) in Bolivia and the 1997 Law of Decentralisation (LD) in Ecuador (Kohl and Farthing 2006; van Cott 2008). These laws expanded the competencies of decentralised municipalities, allocated a proportion of national tax revenues to municipal governments, and introduced direct elections at the municipal level (*ibid*). Bolivia's LPP also introduced annual participatory budgeting schemes whereby municipal authorities should plan small-scale infrastructure projects together with members of indigenous or non-indigenous peasant unions in the countryside or with neighbourhood organisations (*juntas de vecinos*, JJVVs) in cities (Kohl and Farthing 2006).

The introduction of specific indigenous rights was generally interpreted as a victory and empowerment of rural indigenous movements whose specific claims, which have been ignored for centuries, were now recognised (Canessa 2007; Sieder 2002; Valdivia 2005; Wade 1997). Furthermore, authors such as Andolina et al (2009) showed how governments, donor bodies, or NGOs which sought to address indigenous rights such as bilingual education increasingly required indigenous 'experts' who could help in the translation of these rights within concrete programmes. This further empowered indigenous communities and movements, but particularly their leaders, who often started to mobilise strategically around their role as authentic indigenous subjects in order to receive positions as NGO advisors but also as officials within newly established

government institutions such as CODENPE or DINEIB in Ecuador or MAIPO in Bolivia that focused on indigenous citizens (ibid). The process of adapting to officially established understandings of indigeneity for political advantages or to be included in specific development programmes or projects is often referred to as ‘strategic essentialism’ (Hale 1997; Spivak 1996).

Despite a clear empowerment of rural indigenous population groups, the new rights-based agendas also had their limitations – particularly in their implementation. According to Yashar (2005) a crucial factor which limited the implementation of indigenous rights was that both Bolivia and Ecuador were confronted by economic crisis and state bankruptcy and, as a consequence, they lacked human and financial resources to fund relevant programmes or projects for indigenous peoples. For example, writing on bilingual education in Ecuador Hornberger (2000) argued that DINEIB could only provide second-class education to indigenous communities as the institution simply lacked financial resources and qualified teachers. In the context of economic crisis and state bankruptcy, other studies also pointed out that national governments and donors, often guided by a neoliberal agenda<sup>13</sup>, simply prioritised capitalist interests, such as private sector investment on the countries’ rural territories, over the specific territorial rights of indigenous peoples (Andolina et al 2009; Valdivia 2005). Taking into account such tendencies, authors such as Bebbington (2007) argued that rural indigenous peoples experienced a shift from being victims of social exclusion to being affected by problems of adverse incorporation<sup>14</sup>; they were granted with rights but this did rarely lead to practical changes in their living conditions. In this context, indigenous peoples continued moving from the countryside to the city as a consequence of economic crisis and the adverse impacts of neoliberal reforms. Yet, in the city they still lacked access to specific rights. This problem will be discussed in further detail below.

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<sup>13</sup> From the 1980s until the early 2000s, Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s governments followed advice from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to implement an economic reform package which followed neoliberal principles. As part of these reforms, the governments devalued the currency, freed price and exchange rates from government control, and reduced government public spending. They also privatised core industries such as agriculture and mining and further encouraged private investment in the country’s territories (Kohl and Farthing 2006; Postero 2007; Yashar 2005).

<sup>14</sup> According to research on adverse incorporation in the field of international development, the formal inclusion of previously marginalised people into legal documents or development agendas does not *per se* lead to practical changes in the lived experiences of those people who are granted with rights (Gledhill 2009; Hickey and du Toit 2007). Instead, adverse incorporation research emphasises the need to also study potentially disadvantageous terms and conditions of inclusion that keep them trapped in a situation of marginalisation or poverty over time (Bracking 2003; du Toit 2009; Phillips 2011; Wood 2003).

### ***Urban indigenous peoples: outlawed but with a will to fight for their rights***

As outlined previously, throughout the 1970s until the early 2000s economic crisis and neoliberal reform policies affected Bolivia's and Ecuador's countryside which stimulated further migration of rural indigenous peoples to cities. By the late 1990s more than one third of Bolivia's and around one quarter of Ecuador's indigenous peoples already lived in cities (Bengoa 2000).

Within cities, indigenous peoples faced two major problems. First, they were often outlawed from newly established indigenous rights (Goldstein 2004, 2013; Speiser 2004). According to Speiser (2004), it was not international organisations which outlawed urban indigenous peoples but mainly those institutions, national governments, donor bodies and NGOs, which addressed indigenous rights only in rural policy agendas. Speiser (2004) argued that those institutions associated indigeneity with rurality because, first, indigenous mobilisation initially took place within the countryside and, second, because officials within these institutions often remained guided by a static view of indigenous peoples as rural subjects who followed non-Western traditions. Therefore, the implementation of specific indigenous rights, such as the right to manage their land collectively, remained restricted to remote rural areas (Albo 2005). The same applied to bilingual education programmes which have been implemented predominantly in villages but very rarely in cities (Albo 2005; Hornberger 2000; Kingman 2012). Similarly, new rights on decentralisation and participation mainly recognised the issue of indigeneity in rural but not in urban areas. This was particularly visible in Bolivia's LPP which reduced the involvement of indigenous peasant unions within participatory budgeting schemes to rural areas. For cities, the LPP restricted participation rights to *vecinos* – 'white' urban citizens. For this reason urban scholars working on Bolivia, such as Antequera Duran and Cielo (2011), Goldstein (2013) or Lazar (2008), argued that the LPP reproduced racist colonial patterns of ethno-racial stratification and hereby ignored the urban presence of indigenous peoples.

Second, in addition to being outlawed, urban indigenous peoples often remained treated as second-class urban citizens by municipal authorities and non-indigenous residents (Goldstein 2004). In addition, in cities – which were equally affected by economic crisis – urban indigenous peoples often found themselves already at the bottom of the socio-economic spectrum. As reported by authors such as Colloredo-Mansfeld (2009), Kingman

(2012), Lazar (2008), or Swanson (2007) Bolivia's and Ecuador's urban indigenous population mainly worked in the commercial sector as market vendors or food carriers but also as folkloric artisans, domestic workers or in the construction sector. While a small minority of urban indigenous dwellers managed to generate high incomes from such economic activities (Tassi 2010), the majority of them earned just enough to survive within the city (Barragan 2006; del Popolo et al 2007; Harris 1995). The socio-economic situation of urban indigenous peoples further worsened when municipal governments introduced neoliberal reform policies and privatised core public services such as water and gas. Associated price rises and negative consequences for the city's impoverished groups, including indigenous peoples, have been described in detail, for example, for cities such as Cochabamba or El Alto in Bolivia (Assies 2003; Perreault 2006).

In this difficult situation, indigenous peoples nevertheless increasingly revitalised and mobilised around their ethnic identities within cities. An important explanation for this phenomenon was that migrants questioned their belonging to an urban class particularly in a context of economic hardship, an absence of the state, and ongoing discrimination towards them. They therefore returned to their ethnic identity and, together with other migrants, revitalised indigenous traditions and practices in the urban context (Albo 1991; Canessa 2006).

Ethnographic work on Bolivian and Ecuadorian cities conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s certainly demonstrated how people revitalised their indigenous cultural and political traditions particularly through processes of self-help incentives and collective organisation. Writing on the Bolivian cities of La Paz and El Alto, authors such as Albo (2006) and Zibechi (2010), for example, showed how urban indigenous peoples engaged in their own neighbourhood organisations in which they reproduced indigenous governance principles such as leadership rotation or collective work schemes (in Spanish: *mitas*). Goldstein (2004), writing on Cochabamba, also showed how indigenous peoples relied on principles of indigenous community justice in order to cope with urban insecurity in the context of an absence of police and state forces. For Quito, Rojo (2012) described how indigenous homeland associations had become meeting points for indigenous migrants; within these associations they often organised festivals which helped them to bring rural traditions and dances back to the city. The preservation of indigenous traditions and culture has also been reported by Guss (2006) who studied folkloric events

such as the '*Fiesta de Gran Poder*' in La Paz, Bolivia. During this annual festival urban indigenous folkloric associations march through La Paz's city centre and perform traditional indigenous dances. Guss (2006) argued that this festival not only helped indigenous peoples to revitalise their identity, but he also interpreted this event as an indigenous takeover of a historically 'white' city.

Through engaging as urban indigenous communities and community-based organisations (CBOs)<sup>15</sup> indigenous peoples increasingly developed their own identity and also a political voice within the city. In the meantime, urban indigenous peoples also retained strong ties to their rural communities of origin and here they could observe how rural indigenous movements increasingly played an important role in negotiating and contesting for specific rights. According to authors like Albo (2006), Harris (1995), or Lazar (2008), urban indigenous peoples, and particularly their CBOs, became increasingly inspired and influenced by the work of rural indigenous movements; they therefore started voicing similar indigenous demands, for recognition, respect and political autonomy, within the cities in which they lived (ibid).

The political voice of urban indigenous peoples was increasingly raised from the early 2000s onwards where they, in alliance with rural indigenous movements<sup>16</sup> and other social movements, formed part of large-scale urban protests, such as the 2000 Water War in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Assies 2003), the 2003 Gas War in La Paz/ El Alto, Bolivia (Lazar 2008; Perreault 2006; Revilla 2011), or large-scale protests occurring in Quito, Ecuador in the early 2000s (Becker 2011; Bowen 2011). During these protests they raised claims for their rights to be recognised and respected as indigenous peoples within cities; they also protested against ongoing discriminatory practices and neoliberal reform policies which negatively affected them. As a consequence of these acts of urban insurgency<sup>17</sup> (Zibechi 2010), Bolivia's and Ecuador's pro-neoliberal governments, led by former Presidents Sanchez de Lozada and Gutierrez, had to resign respectively in 2003 and 2005.

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<sup>15</sup> Broadly defined, CBOs are 'arrangements and associations formed and located within the local space, or immediate residential surroundings of the actors [or residents]' (Shatkin, 2007: 4).

<sup>16</sup> Indigenous movements, such as the CSUTCB-TK, CIDOB and CONAMAQ in Bolivia and CONAIE in Ecuador, used these protests to contest neoliberal reforms and demanded that the rights which they had been granted would finally be implemented (Becker 2011; Postero 2013).

<sup>17</sup> In its definition of insurgency this thesis follows Mirafab (2009: 44) who defines insurgent practices as those which "aim to disrupt domineering relationships of oppressors to the oppressed, and to destabilise such a status quo through consciousness of the past and imagination of an alternative future."

Subsequently, new left-wing governments, led by Presidents Evo Morales and his party Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) and Rafael Correa and his party PAIS Alliance (AP), were elected respectively in 2005 and 2006. For the first time in their countries' histories these governments recognised urban indigeneity within new constitutions.

#### **2.1.4 Constitutional reforms and the recognition of urban indigeneity**

Bolivia's and Ecuador's newly elected governments promised to depart from the neoliberal model and to take the demands of the countries' diverse social movements, including those representing urban indigenous peoples, seriously (Becker 2011; Lalander 2010; Postero 2013; Schavelzon 2013). In order to undertake this complex task, they convened constitutional assemblies. Bolivia's constitutional assembly was led by a majority of MAS delegates and the self-identifying indigenous President Evo Morales. It also included civil society representatives<sup>18</sup> (Postero 2013; Schavelzon 2013). Unlike in Bolivia, Ecuador's constitutional assembly did not involve social movements but only elected political parties. The AP party, led by non-indigenous President Rafael Correa, won a majority of seats in the constitutional assembly but political parties which represented indigenous peoples, such as Pachakutik, were also represented (see Becker 2011; Becker 2013; Jameson 2010).

The constitutional assemblies carefully negotiated the contents of new legal documents. First, these documents further enhanced previously established indigenous rights. Both, Bolivia's (CPE Bolivia 2009, article 30.1) and Ecuador's constitution (CPE Ecuador 2008, article 57) emphasise a set of specific indigenous rights including the right to collective land titles, the right to freely practise their culture and traditions, the right of autonomous management and governance of their territories, the right for prior consultation about interventions taking place on their territories, the right to self-government, and the right to exercise justice according to their own communitarian principles. Ecuador's constitution emphasises that indigenous rights apply within the places in which indigenous people live; no clear rural or urban specification was hereby made. In contrast, Bolivia's constitution restricts specific indigenous rights to so-called indigenous original peasants (IOPs).

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<sup>18</sup> Social movements and civil society organisations involved in the constitutional assembly included (1) indigenous movements such as CSUTCB-TK, CIDOB and CONAMAQ, (2) labour unions representing miners and coca workers, (3) urban neighbourhood associations and social movements representing the country's ethno-racially diverse urban population, and (4) regional political groups that represented lowland departments such as Santa Cruz, Pando, Beni or Tarija (Postero 2013; Schavelzon 2013).

Fontana (2014) argued that, by defining indigenous peoples through the IOP category, the members of Bolivia's constitutional assembly attempted to integrate different rural indigenous groups – indigenous peasants assembled in the CSUTCB-TK as well as indigenous groups assembled in the CIDOB or CONAMAQ which mobilise more around their status as 'authentic' or original indigenous peoples. Yet, by focusing on these different rural groups authors such as Colque (2009) or Goldstein (2013) argued that urban indigenous peoples were not incorporated within this category and, hence, potentially remain outlawed from specific indigenous rights.

Within other parts of the constitutions, however, it is very clear that the issue of indigeneity has been incorporated in the definition of a new and post-neoliberal rural and urban development agenda (Escobar 2010; Nolte and Horn 2009). For example, both constitutions are guided by a new development principle called *Vivir Bien* (Bolivia) and *Buen Vivir* (Ecuador) which translated into English means the 'good life'. According to the writings of Acosta (2012), Gudynas (2011) or Schavelzon (2015), *Vivir Bien/ Buen Vivir* originates in indigenous worldviews; it emphasises that humans and nature should co-exist in harmony and that collective interests should be prioritised over individual ones. Following such an understanding, no one can live well if others live badly (Gudynas 2011). To ensure the *Vivir Bien* and *Buen Vivir* of all Bolivian and Ecuadorians these constitutions outline a vast list of rights and political promises which almost read like a wish list for a better world (Nolte and Horn 2009). For example, both constitutions ensure that every citizen should have the right to enjoy nature, universal healthcare, education, pensions, sports, or free time (ibid). Within cities, these constitution's guarantee citizens the rights – among others – to housing, water, sanitation, public spaces and participation (ibid). In fact, Ecuador's constitution guarantees urban residents their right to the city according to which they are "(...) entitled to the full enjoyment of the city and its public spaces, under the principles of sustainability, social justice, respect for different urban cultures and balance between urban and rural areas" (CPE Ecuador 2008, article 31).

When promoting these different rights and development principles the constitutions also intend to address the rights, interests and demands of specific groups – particularly the one's of their countries' rural and urban indigenous population but also of other marginalised groups such as women, Afrodescendants or the elderly (Nolte and Horn 2009). Therefore, both constitutions define their countries as intercultural societies; they

thereby emphasise that any policy or programmatic intervention should respect and address the different interests and demands of the countries' diverse social groups (ibid). The Ecuadorian constitution, for example, recognises that indigenous group rights, interests and demands should be taken into account in interventions on intercultural education (CPE Ecuador 2008, article 343), intercultural healthcare (CPE Ecuador 2008, article 358), intercultural participation (CPE Ecuador 2008, article 95), and intercultural urban development and housing (CPE Ecuador 2008, article 375). Similarly, Bolivia's constitution recognises cities as "(...) urban intercultural communities (...)" which are composed of indigenous and other ethno-racial groups (see CPE Bolivia 2009, article 218). Within cities and elsewhere, these groups should therefore be addressed through an intercultural healthcare (CPE Bolivia 2009, article 18) and education system (CPE Bolivia, article 17). Furthermore, bilingual government staff should address indigenous peoples in their own languages<sup>19</sup> (CPE Bolivia 2009, article 5.2).

Until this point, little research has been conducted on the implementation of new constitutional contents. The few studies which investigated advances and ongoing problems in the implementation processes of specific indigenous rights put emphasis on rural areas (Escobar 2010; Filho and Goncalvez 2010; Schilling Vacaflores 2010; Tockman and Cameron 2014; Walsh 2011). In the meantime, far less research has been conducted on the implementation of constitutional rights and principles which address urban indigenous peoples. The few studies on this topic pointed out that the constitutions lack concrete operational guidelines that could help policy makers in addressing the specific rights, interests and demands of indigenous people in cities (Colque 2009; Goldstein 2013; Kingman 2012).

#### **2.1.5 Moving towards a study of indigeneity in urban policy and planning**

(...) indigeneity is a changing relational field of governance, subjectivities, and knowledge that is constructed (...) by both indigenous and non-indigenous people. (Postero 2013: 116)

Following a conceptualisation of indigeneity as a processual category (Canessa 2012), this section shows how indigeneity shifted in its meaning throughout Bolivian and Ecuadorian history. As indicated in the above-mentioned quote, in both countries indigeneity does not represent a naturally-given but a socially-constructed category which was created, altered,

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<sup>19</sup> In addition to Spanish, the constitution recognises 36 official languages (CPE Bolivia 2008, article 5).

and reactivated by different people, who were guided by distinct political motivations and goals, and operated in specific historical periods (see table 2.1 for a summary). These included people in governments but later also those working in international organisations, NGOs and, most importantly, indigenous peoples themselves.

**Table 2.1 Shifting meanings of indigeneity in Bolivia and Ecuador**

Period	Who defined indigeneity?	Political model influencing how indigeneity is defined	Outcomes	Indigeneity in urban spaces
Colonialism and early post-colonialism (15 <sup>th</sup> – 19 <sup>th</sup> century)	Colonial and post-colonial state	'Blood politics'	Construction of ethno-racial hierarchies and creation of an inferior 'other' – the 'indian'	'White' spaces from which 'indians' were widely excluded;
Modernisation (1900s – 1970s)	National governments	Indigenism; Socialism	Former 'indians' receive citizenship rights, are treated as <i>mestizos</i> and viewed as belonging to different class groups.	Rural to urban migration (viewed as transition to modern urban life – cholofication); Ongoing discrimination and exclusion – treated like 'indians' or cholos.
Neoliberal period (1980s – 2000s)	Indigenous peoples; NGOs, church, international organisations; National governments.	Neoliberalism; Multiculturalism; Global rights-based agenda	Unemployment and economic crisis challenges recently established class categories and led people to self-identify as indigenous; Formation of rural indigenous movements; Recognition of rights for rural indigenous people - yet not always implemented.	Ongoing rural to urban migration; Outlawed from specific rights-based agendas for indigenous peoples; Indigenous peoples nevertheless start self-identifying as indigenous and demand recognition and rights.
Current political context (2006 until present)	National governments; Social movements and CBOs representing rural and urban indigenous groups.	<i>Vivir Bien/ Buen Vivir</i> ; Interculturalism	Indigeneity as central category of rights and development.	Recognition of urban indigeneity in new constitutions but <b>unclear how constitutional principles and rights are translated into public policies and urban planning practices.</b>

*Elaborated by the author*

The central point which ran through this section, however, was that indigeneity shifted from being a static social category which was established by the colonisers and associated with rurality, social exclusion, and non-Western traditions to a much more dynamic social category. Indigeneity became dynamic in such a sense that it described people living in

both villages and modern cities who increasingly self-identified as indigenous and have been included in rights-based agendas. A review of the literature suggested that, in the past and often until the present, the majority of studies focused on rural areas when exploring how indigeneity shifted from a category of exclusion to a politico-legal category of rights and entitlements. This literature convincingly highlighted how indigenous peoples themselves initiated this process through contestation and resistance, how – in different periods – institutions such as governments, international organisations and NGOs incorporated indigenous demands in rights-based agendas but not always implemented these rights because of other political and economic priorities.

This section also reviewed the literature which, in parallel to processes occurring in the countryside, explored why, when, and for what reasons indigenous peoples moved to the city. This literature demonstrated that, in a context where rural indigenous groups already received attention in rights-based agendas, urban indigenous peoples often remained outlawed and trapped in a situation of exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination. Nevertheless, more recent ethnographic studies also showed how, in such a context, urban indigenous peoples still managed to preserve or revitalise their indigenous traditions and cultural practices. As part of this revitalisation process urban indigenous peoples, inspired by the rise of rural indigenous movements and drawing on their own self-help and collective practices in the city, developed their own political voice. In this process, the literature also demonstrated how urban indigenous peoples raised specific claims for recognition which have been integrated within Bolivia's and Ecuador's new political constitutions ratified respectively in 2009 and 2008. These constitutions emphasise addressing the specific rights, interests and demands of urban indigenous peoples in intercultural urban development agendas and in policy sectors as diverse as urban housing, culture, or education.

Yet, until this point, little research has been conducted on what indigenous rights, interests and demands actually mean in an urban context – both, for those people who should address them in different sector policies and urban planning practices but also for those people who represent the relevant target groups – urban indigenous peoples. This thesis, hence, intends to address this gap in the literature through an in-depth analysis of the role of indigeneity and indigenous rights, interests and demands in the context of urban policy and planning practice in Bolivia and Ecuador. To achieve this, this thesis draws on

theoretical approaches from different social science disciplines which are considered helpful for such an analysis. These theoretical approaches will be introduced and discussed in further detail in the next section.

## **2.2 Public policy and urban planning: a process involving multiple social actors**

The first part of this chapter showed that understandings of indigeneity and indigenous rights have been defined and redefined by different people who operated in different historical and political contexts – a specific social structure<sup>20</sup>. It was also demonstrated how these different persons, whether indigenous peoples themselves, government officials, international donors or representatives from the church, intended to preserve or change understandings of indigeneity and indigenous rights in such a way that it aligns with their own interests and demands – they exercised agency<sup>21</sup>. These persons can, hence, be conceptualised as social actors – they operate within a specific structural environment which is characterised by specific rules and norms but they “(...) are not defined by their conformity to rules and norms, but by a relation to themselves, by their capacity to constitute themselves as actors, capable of changing their environment and of reinforcing their autonomy” (Touraine 2000: 902).

Like the processes which led to the ratification of Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s new constitutions, the translation of constitutional rights and principles into public policies and urban planning practices is likely to be a process in which a variety of social actors are involved. Such an understanding of public policy and urban planning was, for example, put forward by political scientist Scott (1999: 256):

Any attempt to completely plan a village, a city, or for that matter a language is certain to run afoul of the same social reality. A village, a city, or a language, is the jointly created, partly unintended product of many, many hands. To the degree that authorities insist in replacing this ineffably complex web of activity with formal rules and regulations, they are certain to disrupt the web in ways they cannot possibly foresee. (Scott 1999: 256)

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<sup>20</sup> The term social structure refers to the historical context and to established rules and procedures which characterise a society (Hudson and Leftwich 2014).

<sup>21</sup> People always shape and influence a social structure. As pointed out by Escobar (2001: 150): “It is not that social structures and discourses are not important, but that the subject, and place, always participate in how these forces are played out. The phenomenal world can never be reduced to outside forces.” The emphasis on people’s role in shaping a social structure requires an assessment of agency. Agency refers to the “(...) ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in doing so, to attempt to realise his or her intentions” (Hay 2002: 94).

Similar to the above quote, this thesis understands the translation of indigenous rights as a process that involves multiple hands. The first part of this section focuses on those actors which, according to Watson (2003: 396), are guided by a ‘rationality of governing’ and define how specific constitutional rights are actually incorporated into legislation, public policies, and urban planning interventions. It is argued that the composition of social actors involved in this process depends on the specific context of a city and its particular urban governance regime (Pierre 1999). Furthermore, building upon a review of practice-centric studies on policy implementation and urban planning (eg Flyvbjerg 2009; Watson 2003, 2012), it is argued that the translation of rights is not only influenced by legal texts – such as constitutions – but also by social actors’ personal views, by the demands of individuals and groups whom they represent, as well as by the specific political and institutional environment that influences their work.

The second part of this section focuses on the role of the target groups in public policies and urban planning interventions – urban indigenous peoples. According to Watson (2003, 2009) these actors do not follow a ‘rationality of governing’ but one of survival – within the specific political, institutional and structural environment that they are presented with, they often have to rely on their own practices to make a living. Following such an understanding, members of urban indigenous target groups are not viewed as passive recipients but also as social actors who intend to fulfil their specific interests and demands through their own bottom-up practices (Touraine 2000). Previous studies have already described how urban indigenous peoples relied on a set of self-help or insurgent practices to address some of their specific cultural or economic interests in Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s pre-constitution context (see section 2.1). Yet, hardly any research exists on the practices of urban indigenous peoples in the current political context in which the issue of urban indigeneity is recognised within rights-based agendas. Furthermore, existing studies have rarely investigated the interests, demands and practices of urban indigenous peoples through an explicit theoretical framework. With the intention of overcoming some of these limitations, the second part of this section will introduce an asset accumulation framework which is considered useful to identify urban indigenous people’s diverse cultural, economic but also social, political, and material interests and demands (Moser 2009). In addition to an asset accumulation framework it will also introduce theories on tactics and ordinary people’s practices (de Certeau 1984), which are considered useful for a study

interested in exploring how urban indigenous peoples themselves address their specific interests and demands through their own bottom-up practices.

### **2.2.1 The role of social actors within the state**

Whereas constitution writing and institutional reform may often be essential to democratic development, the idea that such reform alters practice is a hypothesis, not an action. (Flyvbjerg 2003: 325)

In tune with the above statement, this thesis understands the integration of urban indigeneity within Bolivia's and Ecuador's constitutions only as a starting point for analysis. In other words, it views the act of constitution writing and particularly the translation of constitutional content as a process whose outcomes "(...) may be good or bad in specific instances (...)" (Flyvbjerg 2009: 296). Following a practice-centric approach<sup>22</sup> to the study of public policy and urban planning practice, this thesis is hence interested in exploring what is actually done in Bolivian and Ecuadorian cities to translate new constitutional rights. As part of such an endeavour, it is important to identify *how* constitutional rights are translated, *who* is involved within this process, and *what* factors – in addition to constitutional content – potentially influence this process.

#### ***From constitutional rights to public policies and urban planning interventions***

It is important to make a distinction between the stage of formulating a set of constitutional rights and translating its contents into public policies and urban planning practices (Flyvbjerg 2009; Matland 1995). It is the latter stage which this thesis is particularly interested in. The translation of constitutional rights can generally be divided into two different stages – policy making and planning (Moser 1993). First, policy making refers to the formulation of laws and public policies which further define the contents of specific rights and outline how these should be delivered to specific target groups (de Leon and de Leon 2002; Gacitua- Mario et al 2009). For this thesis, it is hence important to explore how constitutional rights and intercultural principles which address indigenous peoples living in cities are incorporated into different laws and policies in sectors such as urban development, housing, citizen participation, or education.

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<sup>22</sup> Practice-centric accounts often draw on the work of Greek philosopher Aristotle who, in his work on *phronesis*, emphasised the need to generate practical over epistemic knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2009).

Second, following the policy making stage, the planning stage defines how specific laws and public policies should be operationalised and implemented (Moser 1993). This requires specific institutions – such as governments, private enterprises, or donor bodies, to define the mechanisms, concrete programmes and projects, and budgets that are required to implement policies and rights (Campbell and Fainstein 2003). Table 2.2 provides a summary of policy making and planning stages and relates them to the central subject of this thesis – the issue of indigeneity and indigenous rights within cities.

**Table 2.2 Summary of policy and planning stages**

Activity	Description
Policy making	Laws and policy documents that particularly address indigenous peoples or the role of indigeneity in cities.
Planning	Institutional guidelines: Establishment of institutions and hiring of staff responsible for implementing policies and laws on indigeneity and indigenous rights in cities; Financial guidelines: resources made available for specific policies and planning interventions that address indigeneity and indigenous rights; Programmatic guidelines: definition of specific programmes and projects that specifically target the issue of indigeneity within cities.

*Elaborated by the author*

***Social actors involved in the translation of constitutional contents on urban indigeneity***

Constitution writing and the translation of constitutional contents into public policies and urban planning are not only separate processes; they are also likely to be carried out by different institutions and social actors (de Leon and de Leon 2002). As outlined in the first part of this chapter, Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s constitutional assemblies were mainly composed of national government officials who represented different political parties (Becker 2011; Postero 2013). In the context of Bolivia, the constitutional assembly also involved members from a variety of social movements (Schavelzon 2013).

In contrast to the process of writing constitutions, the translation of constitutional rights into public policy and urban planning practice is not only influenced by national governments but by a variety of different actors involved in urban governance. The concept of urban governance was introduced in the 1990s by scholars who noted a declining influence of national governments in the planning and management of cities in Latin America and elsewhere (Gilbert 2006; Kothari 2005; Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013; Pierre 1999). In a context of globalisation, decentralisation, new public management and neoliberal market reforms, this literature noted that cities were no longer governed and

planned only by national government as responsibilities had been redistributed to lower tiers of government - ie municipalities, federal governments etc – or outsourced to non-state institutions (eg private enterprises, international donors, NGOs, or CBOs) that operated at different scales<sup>23</sup> (ibid). The translation of rights and the provision of services was, hence, considered to be determined by a variety of different civic, economic or political institutions and actors that operated at the community, city, national, regional or global level.

More recent studies which focused on the current political context of Bolivia and Ecuador still relied on the concept of urban governance but noted that the new left-wing governments led by Presidents Morales and Correa promoted an anti-neoliberal agenda and a ‘return of the state’ (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013; Grugel and Ruggirozzie 2012; van Lindert and Verkoren 2010). In this context, urban governance has been considered to be mainly influenced by the interrelated practices of actors and institutions in national and local governments and less by non-state institutions (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013). It is the practices of these different national and local actors and institutions which this thesis needs to investigate in further detail.

### ***Factors that influence the public policy and urban planning process***

In addition to identifying *who* is involved in public policy and urban planning practice, it is also important to explore what factors influence the work of these social actors and institutions. Political constitutions certainly provide policy makers and urban planners with normative guidelines that should help them in defining specific laws, public policies and urban planning interventions (Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002). Yet, a growing evidence-base within the literature shows that governments across the world, whether situated in the global north or global south, rarely implement rights-based agendas which have been manifested within constitutions (Flyvbjerg 2003; Holston 2008; Nolte and Horn 2009; Putnam 1993). Noting this problem, scholars such as Putnam (1993: 17) warn us that “constitutions are often written on water”.

To understand gaps between constitutional rhetoric and practice it is important to take into account a set of other factors which may influence what social actors in urban governance

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<sup>23</sup> Scale is a socially constructed category referring to entities such as the ‘local’, ‘national’, ‘regional’ or ‘global’ (Jonas 1994).

actually do. For example, in addition to following the guidelines of legal texts, Watson (2012: 95) argued that it is important to recognise that politicians, policy makers and urban planners “(...) also have agency, may be part of broader actor-coalitions, or work within a fragmented and possibly contradictory political environment.” Let us further discuss what the literature has to say for each one of these factors. First, like for any other person, the practices of policy makers, politicians and urban planners operating within urban governance are likely to be defined in relation to themselves – they exercise agency. Guided by this assumption, scholars such as Scott (1999) or Watson (2009) argued that urban governance regimes are not monolithic but built by a set of heterogeneous actors who hold different personal interests and hence undertake different practices.

While some social actors may certainly define their practices in relation to rights established within current constitutions and legal documents, others may still define their practices in relation to previously established norms. The key influence of history as a determining factor of the practices of social actors is, for example, emphasised in the work on habitus by Bourdieu (1977). The habitus represents the guideline for human behaviour and action. Human beings are considered to act upon internalised ‘objective’ structures, norms and values which are themselves outcomes of past events. The habitus, therefore, is “(...) a product of history, produces individual and collective practices – more history – in accordance with the schemes generated by history” (Bourdieu 1977: 54). Research on indigeneity and indigenous rights, conducted prior to constitutional reforms in Bolivia and Ecuador, certainly noted how policy makers – guided by a colonial habitus – often reproduced patterns of ethno-racial discrimination and exclusion in the present context. For example, despite anti-discrimination laws and the recognition of international legislation for indigenous peoples in the 1990s, studies conducted by Engerman and Sokolof (2000) or Lucero (2004) showed how government officials responsible for the translation of these rights continued to treat indigenous peoples, independent from their rural or urban residence, like second-class residents who were considered inferior to the countries’ ‘white’ *criollo* or *mestizo* population.

Second, while government officials, policy makers or urban planners may undertake practices which can constrain or enable the translation of specific rights, other studies highlighted that it is also important to note that the practices of actors’ themselves are influenced by power relationships and by the wider institutional environment in which

they operate (Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002). According to Bourdieu (1986), power is exercised by certain people over others. A person's power is generally determined by the amount of economic (ie money), social (ie connections, position in an institutions), or cultural resources (ie university degree) they possess. The more resources people have, the more powerful they are (ibid). In a context of government institutions, this means that actors in more senior level positions are often considered more capable to influence, shape and constrain the work of other actors. Such tendencies have been noted in studies on new government institutions such as CODENPE and DINEIB in Ecuador or MAIPO in Bolivia (Andolina et al 2009; Hornberger 2000; Yashar 2005). This research highlighted that these institutions were certainly composed by officials who promoted a pro-indigenous political agenda. However, the work of these officials was constrained by the fact that officials who held higher ranks in other national government institutions allocated insufficient financial resources and ensured that the new institutions remained weak (ibid).

It is not only senior level officials who can make use of their relatively powerful position in governments to address or withhold specific rights and services. Instead, following the work of Foucault (1978), other authors argue that power sits everywhere and can be used and (ab)used by a variety of actors who hold high but also lower positions in government institutions (Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002; Lipsky 1980). Such an understanding of power has, for example, been advocated in Lipsky's (1980) work on 'street-level bureaucrats.' According to this research, it is often low tier administrative staff in local governments which plays a central role in determining whether and how specific rights are addressed on the ground. The work of street-level bureaucrats may deviate from the agenda of more senior level officials. Hence, even though in a lower position, these actors also exercise power and undertake practices in such a way that they confirm with their own interests and views (ibid). Such tendencies have been reported by Colque (2009) who, writing on Bolivia, argued that low tier municipal staff rarely complied with new national legislation which requested from them to address indigenous peoples in their languages. Therefore, indigenous peoples – whether residing in cities or in the countryside – who do not speak Spanish often remained unable to access municipal services. Similar tendencies have also been reported by Albo (2009) and Barrera (2011) who argued that despite political changes occurring at the scale of national government, racist attitudes remained common amongst low tier administrative staff in local governments and within the country's court system.

Third, the practices of government officials, urban planners or policy makers are also likely to be defined in relation to the actor coalitions to whom they belong or which they represent (Watson 2012). For example, government officials generally belong to different political parties who represent different interest or pressure groups which can include their electoral support base, as well as international donor organisations, and private sector pressure groups (Andolina et al 2009). For example, writing on Bolivia and Ecuador in the 1990s and early 2000s, Goldstein (2004), Kohl and Farthing (2006) and Swanson (2007) noted that institutions involved in urban governance often remained dominated by non-indigenous actors who mainly represented non-indigenous groups.

In the current political context of Bolivia and Ecuador, research has mainly focused on the work of national governments and their rural development agendas. The few studies that exist on the political agenda of Bolivia's and Ecuador's national government noted that the governing parties – MAS and AP – increasingly promoted political views that stand in contradiction to some of the content on interculturalism, indigenous rights, and *Buen Vivir* promoted in the countries' new constitutions (do Alto 2008; Martí i Puig 2013; Postero 2013). Becker (2013), for example, demonstrated that leading members of Correa's AP party often shared racist attitudes and intended to systematically disempower the country's national indigenous movement – CONAIE. Furthermore, other studies pointed out that the majority of national government delegates representing the MAS or the AP have not introduced a post-neoliberal development agenda which followed indigenous principles such as *Buen Vivir* (Escobar 2010; Filho and Goncalvez 2010; Postero 2013). Instead, this literature emphasises that the government's rural development agendas mainly focused on wealth-creation through processes of resource extraction, modernisation and private sector investments. In this context, constitutional rights for indigenous peoples – ie for prior consultation – have often been violated in rural areas affected by resource extraction. Hence, like previous governments, the current governments are considered to prioritise addressing the interests of private investors or wealthier non-indigenous elites (ibid).

While the above-mentioned literature provided important findings on how current policy, planning and development interventions prioritise the interests of wealthier groups over rural indigenous peoples, not much research has been conducted on this topic in Bolivian and Ecuadorian cities. However, a review of the literature on public policy and urban planning practices in cities situated elsewhere in the global south and north also suggested

that social actors involved in urban governance often undertake interventions in such a way that these are in harmony with their own political agenda as well as responsive to the interests and demands of individuals and groups whom they actually represent (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2014; Porter 2010; Roy 2009; Yiftachel 2006). This often means that the specific interests, demands and rights of marginalised groups such as ethnic minorities or the urban poor remain unaddressed (ibid).

Writing on cities in Australia and Canada, Jojola (2008) and Porter (2010), for example, argued that policy makers and planners continue to view cities as ‘white’, imperial, and western places in which specific rights of indigenous peoples, eg for collective land ownership, are considered to be ‘not present’. Instead, land rights are addressed through western property rights models and governments only recognise individual land ownership as basic condition for granting land titles. Similar tendencies have been reported for other cities situated in the global south-east. In fact, Yiftachel (2006) showed how urban governance regimes used land regulation as a strategic tool to selectively include and exclude specific individuals and groups from inhabiting specific spaces. He considered such practices as the ‘dark side of planning’. In his own work an example of the ‘dark side of planning’ is Israel’s land politics in territories that historically belonged to indigenous Bedouin Arabs. He demonstrated how government authorities declared the nomadic and collective land-use patterns of this group – which are legally recognised within international legislation for indigenous peoples – as illegal. The government could use this planning strategy to force these indigenous groups to relocate from their land. It could subsequently provide Jewish settlers, who intended to occupy and urbanise this land, with individual tenure rights. Practices which resemble the ‘dark side of planning’ have also been reported for less ethnically divided countries. Writing on India Roy (2009) showed, for example, that social actors in urban governance in cities such as Mumbai often ‘invented’ states of exception to legalise urban land grabbing processes realised by wealthy elites or real estate enterprises while simultaneously declaring land grabbing processes undertaken by the urban poor as illegal.

Hence, despite constitutions or international legislation which grant specific individuals or groups, such as the poor, ethnic minorities, or indigenous peoples, with rights, the above-mentioned literature notes that social actors and institutions involved in urban governance often undermine the implementation of these rights and, instead, exacerbate problems such

as poverty, ethno-racial discrimination, adverse incorporation and exclusion (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013; Roy 2009; Watson 2012; Yiftachel 2006). Whether this is also the case in Bolivia's and Ecuador's current political context remains open to empirical test.

### **2.2.2 The role of urban indigenous target groups**

The success of public policies and urban planning interventions can normally best be understood in relation to the impact they have on the lives of target groups – urban indigenous peoples in the case of this thesis. Little research has been conducted on the treatment of urban indigenous peoples in Bolivia's and Ecuador's current political context. However, as was outlined in previous sections, scholars who studied Bolivian and Ecuadorian cities prior to the ratification of new constitutions, as well as research which focused on cities situated elsewhere in the global south and north, often pointed out that marginalised groups, such as the poor, rural migrants, or ethnic minorities, have often been incorporated within rights-based agendas but denied from their rights in practice. In a context of ongoing patterns of social exclusion or adverse incorporation, research on public policy and urban planning processes taking place in cities of the global south increasingly shifted its focus to the practices of ordinary people who operate outside official realms of urban governance (Goldstein 2004; Holston 2008; Miraftab 2009; Moser 2009; Watson 2003, 2009). Hence, such research viewed urban indigenous peoples, the poor, or other marginalised urban dwellers as social actors who are capable of planning their own lives according to their interests and demands, and who have the capacity to reshape and influence urban governance from the bottom-up (ibid).

Without always referring to it, this literature is often influenced by Lefebvre's (1991) work on the 'right to the city' which mainly responded to socio-economic changes in cities of the global north. Dismissive of processes of social polarisation and capitalist urban transformation in northern cities such as Paris, Lefebvre argued that ordinary urban residents, by which he mainly referred to the urban working class (Purcell 2002), should rise up, claim their 'right to the city', and stimulate an urban revolution leading to a more inclusive and emancipated urban society which is collectively produced and used by its citizens (Lefebvre 1991). Hence, the notion of the 'right to the city' should not be conflated with a legal approach to urban development (Attoh 2011). Instead, it represents an outcry to plan and design a city according to the interests and demands of ordinary people who live in the city but have been excluded from specific spaces, access to

services, political rights, or economic opportunities available in the city (Harvey 2008; Merrifield 2011).

This thesis is interested in exploring *how* urban indigenous peoples, in Bolivia's and Ecuador's current political context, manage to address their own interests and demands, and claim their rights to the cities in which they live. This, however, firstly requires identifying *what* urban indigenous interests and demands actually are.

### ***Asset-based demands of urban indigenous peoples***

As was shown in section 2.1, previous research has already described some of the interests and demands of Bolivia's and Ecuador's urban indigenous peoples. For example, Guss's (2006) study on La Paz showed how indigenous residents wanted to revitalise their festivals and ancestral traditions within their new urban communities. Albo et al (1981) and Kingman (2012) pointed out that indigenous peoples often move to the city because of an interest in finding better education or access to jobs. Furthermore, ethnographic research conducted by Goldstein (2004) and Lazar (2008) showed how urban indigenous peoples often want to live in secure neighbourhoods and have access to modern urban amenities such as housing, water, roads or electricity. Little research, however, has been conducted which attempted to look at urban indigenous peoples' rather diverse interests and demands in an integrated way or through an explicit theoretical framework. As will be argued below, the use of an asset accumulation framework is intended to help to overcome such limitations.

The concept of asset accumulation draws on the theoretical and policy-focused international development literature on poverty as dynamic category (Appadurai 2004; Bebbington 1999; Carter and Barrett 2006; Moser 1998, 2009; Sherraden 1991). It is strongly influenced by the work of Sen (1981) on entitlements, assets and capabilities and by Chambers (1994) work on risk and vulnerability. As indicated in its name, an asset accumulation framework is mainly concerned with assets and associated strategies for accumulating assets. According to Moser (2009: 18), assets can be defined as a "stock of financial, human, natural or social resources that can be acquired, developed, improved and transformed across generations." In addition to these assets, Moser (2009) also emphasises the importance of moving beyond well-established assets and to focus on more intangible assets such as political, cultural capital or aspirational capital which may further

affect what people actually want in life (see table 2.3). Writing specifically on cultural and aspirational capital, Appadurai (2004: 10), for example, argues that “(...) everyone, including the poor, express their aspirations, hopes and choices.” Appadurai (2004) also argues that people’s specific aspirations, interests and demands are likely to differ between individuals and groups who share different cultures, norms or identities. Hence, the poor are likely to want different things in life than the rich; men articulate different interests than women, and urban indigenous peoples are likely to voice different aspirations than ‘white’ residents etc.

**Table 2.3 Definition of capital assets**

Asset	Definition
Physical	The stock of plant, equipment, infrastructure, and other productive resources owned by individuals, groups, businesses or the state.
Financial	The financial resources available to people such as credits, savings, monthly wages etc.
Human	Investment in education, health and the nutrition of individuals. Labour is linked to investment in human capital, health status determines people’s capacity to work, and skills and education determine the returns from their labour
Social	Defined as the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and societies’ institutional arrangements. It is embedded at the micro-institutional level (communities and households) as well as in rules and regulations governing formalised institutions in the marketplace, political system, and civil society.
Natural	Stock environmentally provided such as soil, water, minerals or land. In rural communities land is a critical productive asset for the poor; in urban areas land for shelter is also a critical productive asset.
Political	Knowledge of existing rights, rules and procedures that characterise a given political system. Contacts to relevant actors in urban governance.
Cultural	Dress, appearance or a specific type of education. It can also refer to people’s specific habits, ie what food, music, behaviours they identify as appropriate or not.
Aspirational	A person’s own vision of a good life which is shaped by a set of individual or collective cultural norms and ideas.

*Source: Moser (2009)*

In the field of international development, an asset accumulation framework has been used as a diagnostic and analytical tool to identify – through qualitative or quantitative information – what different assets people want to access. Until this point, an asset accumulation framework has been mainly applied for the study of the aspirations, interests and demands of the urban poor but also of transnational migrants<sup>24</sup>. For example, in a longitudinal study in a poor urban community in Guayaquil, Moser (2009) discusses the different interests and demands which poor urban residents from one neighbourhood have articulated over a period of 30 years – from 1978 until 2008. During initial stages of

<sup>24</sup> Other studies also applied an asset accumulation framework to understand the changing interests and demands of urban poor communities who recently have been affected by severe weather events related to climate change (Moser and Stein 2011).

neighbourhood consolidation, Moser (2009) showed that members of the poor urban community were mainly interested in accessing housing so that they could live together with their families – they often achieved this through self-help efforts. Having a house was also seen as a precondition to access other assets such as electricity, water, or sanitation<sup>25</sup>. Moser (2009) then showed how priorities and interests of the urban poor often changed over time; instead of demanding access to housing, at later stages they demanded access to community infrastructure such as roads. She also showed how demands for assets differed between members of this poor urban community – men expressed different demands for work than women; children had other aspirations for education than their parents (ibid).

In addition to gender-based or intergenerational differences, other studies also showed that people's asset-based demands change depending on the location of their residence as well as upon the specific political context they confront. For example, in their study of a group of migrants from Ecuador living in Barcelona, Moser and Horn (2013) showed that migrants valued citizenship or temporary residency rights as particularly important because access to such political assets was associated with opportunities to access other assets such as housing, bank accounts, or education. This tendency was also confirmed in a study by Ginieniewicz (2012) who argued that political capital was considered the most important asset for Argentinean migrants in Spain. Only by developing an understanding of the existing rights, rules and procedures of their host society could they access other important assets such as a job or residency permit. Also writing on migration, McIlwaine (2011) shows how Latin American migrants in London expressed the need to adjust their human capital, eg language skills in English, in order to access crucial assets such as housing or education. Meanwhile, another study conducted by Kelly and Lusic (2004) showed how Philippino migrants' national identity and cultural background influenced their life choices in their Canadian host setting.

Overall, an asset accumulation framework has been applied to study the complex aspirations, interests and demands of different people, including the poor, women, men, children, and international migrants. Such research showed that people with distinct

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<sup>25</sup> Similar to Moser, other studies on poverty reduction in cities of the global south identified housing as the single most important asset which the urban poor require to access and accumulate other assets (Satterthwaite 2008; Turner 1976). Hence, according to these studies housing is not only associated with access to shelter; it also serves in strengthening the identity of the urban poor, provides them with opportunities to access basic services and serves as a basis for income-generating activities (ibid).

identities articulate different aspirations and demands for assets which can also change over time, generation and space. Furthermore, demands for one asset – such as education or citizenship status – are often related to aspirations for other assets – such as housing or better work.

This thesis intends to contribute to the existing literature on asset accumulation by identifying the diverse interests and demands for assets of another specific group – urban indigenous peoples. By applying an asset accumulation framework to the study of indigeneity, this research also intends to generate a more complete understanding of what it means to be indigenous for diverse people who self-identify as such within cities. Unlike previous studies on urban indigeneity, this thesis hereby focuses not just on urban indigenous peoples' specific cultural or economic demands; it is also interested in understanding their interests and demands for other assets such as housing, jobs, education, etc. It hereby intends to understand what specific indigenous interests – which, according to Bolivia's and Ecuador's new constitutions, should be incorporated into intercultural policies on housing, education, urban development, participation, etc – actually mean for indigenous peoples themselves.

#### *Contesting and negotiating access to a portfolio of assets*

The use of an asset accumulation framework is not only useful for the identification of what different people want in life; it also helps in generating an understanding of how people get what they want. A central assumption of asset-based frameworks is that assets provide people not only with access to a set of resources but also with agency. Bebbington (1999), for example, argues that assets provide people with the capability to be and act. In addition, Sen (1997) emphasises that the acquisition of assets is associated with a person's empowerment as it enables them to confront and negotiate with authorities and to influence or change the political environment that governs them. Hence, an asset accumulation approach recognises that ordinary people are social actors – they intend to satisfy their own interests within the wider structural and political environment that surrounds them (Moser 2009).

Opportunities to access and accumulate a portfolio of assets, hence, depend on two factors – personal and structural. First, the more assets a person already possesses the more likely the person is able to contest and negotiate access to other assets (Moser 2009). However,

assets are rarely distributed evenly between the members of a specific community or group. This has been recognised by scholars who applied an asset accumulation framework to the study of poor urban communities (Banks 2014; DeFilippis 2001; Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013; Moser 2009). According to this research, it is particularly those community members who obtain the relevant social and political capital – eg who have connections with social actors in urban governance and knowledge of the political system that surrounds them – that obtain leadership positions and play a central role in contesting and negotiating access to a portfolio of assets for themselves and the communities whom they represent (ibid). Yet, evidence from this literature suggests that leaders can make different use of their positions. Existing research, for example, highlighted that factors – such as gender relations, processes of electing leaders, payment of leaders by some community members, or historical position of leaders in the community – help explaining why leaders may or may not address the interests and demands of all the members of their urban community (Banks 2014; Moser 2009).

While Moser (2009), for example, described the practices of the female leader of the poor urban community in Guayaquil as benevolent and responsive to the interests and demands of most community members, other studies showed how leaders, like actors in urban governance (see section 2.2.1), can also abuse their powerful position and further exacerbate problems such as exclusion (Banks 2014; DeFilippis 2001; Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013). To take a further example, working on a poor urban community in Bangladesh, Banks (2014) argued that local leaders – disproportionately richer than other residents and well connected to local political party leaders – used their position for purposes of self-enrichment. Furthermore, to preserve their powerful position within the community they selectively rewarded their supporters while denying other residents access to crucial services and resources. Hence, according to the findings of this study it was not only actors in urban governance but ordinary people themselves who exacerbated problems such as poverty and exclusion through the uneven distribution of rights and resources.

Taking into account that urban indigenous peoples are also often living in community and organised in CBOs (Goldstein 2004; Lazar 2008; Kingman 2012; Zibechi 2010), this thesis intends to identify which members of these communities play a central role in

negotiating and contesting access to assets and whether their work benefits all or only some of the members of the communities they represent.

Second, the capacity of a person or community to access assets also depends on a variety of structural and institutional factors (Moser 2009). Structural factors may include existing norms, regulations or planning processes which may enable or constrain people's opportunities to access their aspired portfolio of assets. Furthermore, whether people can access specific assets also depends on the willingness of different actors operating in institutions associated with urban governance. The latter may or may not provide their target groups with the different assets they want (see section 2.2.1).

More policy-oriented studies on asset accumulation developed ideas what policy makers or planners should do to generate a political environment which is responsive to the asset-demands of their target groups. For example, writing on urban poverty reduction in a context of the Millennium Development Goals, Stein and Horn (2012: 669) encourage policy makers to rely on three generations of asset-policies. The first generation policy strategies should provide the urban poor with access to basic services such as housing, water or sanitation. The second-generation should further ensure the consolidation of these assets and prevent their erosion, ie through the provision of citizen rights or institutional accountability. Finally, third-generation strategies should maximise the links between different interdependent assets (ibid). Instead of focusing on pro-poor urban policy and planning models, scholars such as Sandercock (2003) developed ideas on an ideal-type model to plan for cosmopolitan cities. She emphasised the importance of addressing the diverse interests of different urban residents – including indigenous peoples. Inspired strongly by philosophical work on multiculturalism and communicative action (Habermas 1985; Kymlicka 1995), Sandercock (2003) emphasises that policy makers and urban planners – instead of being implementers of rights – should act as facilitators and conflict mediators who engage different urban residents, of different age, ethnicity, gender, or socio-economic status, in decision-making processes. Such a process should ensure that actual public policies and urban planning interventions are responsive to the interests and demands of diverse individuals and groups.

Critical towards ideal-type planning models which offer suggestions on what could be done to address historically marginalised groups, other studies put more emphasis on

exploring what ordinary people are actually doing to fulfil their specific interest, demands and aspirations within the political environment that governs them (Holston 2008; Miraftab 2009; Moser 2009; Robins et al 2008; Scott 1999; Watson 2003). What is central to these studies is that they often view the practices of ordinary people as tactical manoeuvres which play with, or potentially seek to alter, the structures and rules that they are presented with (ibid). The role of tactics as key to the practices of ordinary people is also emphasised in the work of French critical theorist de Certeau (1984: 37) who argues:

The space of tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organised by the law of a foreign power. (...) It is a manoeuvre 'within the enemy's field of vision' (...) It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It takes advantage of 'opportunities' and depends on them (...).

Depending on the structural and political environment in which people operate, they often rely on multiple tactics and practices. The urban planner Miraftab (2009) offered a useful classification of ordinary people's tactics and practices as taking place either in invented or invited spaces. According to Miraftab (2009: 38-39) tactics and practices in invented spaces are not formally recognised by actors in urban governance, often take place in a context of denial or exclusion from rights or services, and may in fact challenge the existing political status-quo. Tactics and practices taking place in invented spaces can refer to self-help action. For example, there exist rich ethnographic accounts on how La Paz's and Quito's urban indigenous peoples who, in a context in which municipal governments did not provide them with services or support, relied on self-help efforts such as the *minga / mita* (collective work schemes) to construct houses for indigenous community members who arrived at the city from the countryside (Albo 2006; Kingman 2012).

In addition to self-help practices, Miraftab (2009: 44) also emphasised that ordinary people can be involved in other 'invented practices' which she refers to as insurgent planning:

A range of actors may participate in insurgent planning practices: community activists, mothers, professional planners, school teachers, city councillors, the unemployed, retired residents, etc. Whoever the actors, what they do is identifiable as insurgent planning if it is purposeful actions that aim to disrupt domineering relationships of oppressors to the oppressed, and to destabilise such a status quo through consciousness of the past and imagination of an alternative future.

Research on Quito's, La Paz's or El Alto's indigenous peoples also studied acts of urban indigenous insurgency which led to the removal of Bolivia's and Ecuador's government (Becker 2011; Lazar 2008; Revilla 2011; Zibechi 2010). Taken together, these different studies share a focus on urban indigenous people's practices and claims, often articulated through violence or illegal acts, for political recognition, rights and power<sup>26</sup>.

In addition to practices taking place within invented spaces, Miraftab (2009: 39) also highlights that ordinary people, if provided with access to them, undertake tactics and practices within invited spaces which "(...) are defined as those grassroots actions (...) that are legitimised by donors and government interventions." In other words, practices within invited spaces are formally recognised and follow a set of rules, norms and procedures established by actors operating within the realm of urban governance. Invited practices can refer to, among others, the involvement of ordinary urban residents in registered demonstrations, processes of political negotiation, or engagement in participatory processes. As noted by Robins et al (2008), the rules, norms and procedures established by actors and governments differ in local contexts. Particularly in Latin American cities official rules, norms and procedures rarely match models of western democracy but are often characterised by patron-client relations – ie the exchange of votes and political support for favours and services between urban residents and authorities (Auyero 2000; Moser 2009). Patron-client relationships have also been reported in research on urban indigenous peoples conducted in the early 2000s by Lazar (2004; 2008). This author highlights how, during pre-election periods, urban indigenous residents often supported one or multiple party candidates in order to receive favours – ie money or infrastructure projects for their communities – should the party win the election.

With the notable exception of Lazar (2004; 2008), studies on Bolivia's and Ecuador's urban indigenous peoples mainly focused on tactics and practices that took place in invented spaces. Taking into account that urban indigenous peoples, at least according to their countries' new constitutions, should be involved within participatory and decision-making processes, this thesis also attempts to identify to what extent and how urban

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<sup>26</sup> There also exists a rich literature that described different insurgent planning practices of marginalised groups in cities in different parts of the global South. Within this literature, insurgent acts, for example, referred to violence applied by gangs who exercised political control within urban peripheries in Brazil (Holston 2008), to land invasions undertaken by women in search for housing in South Africa (Meth 2010), to anti-eviction campaigns realised by slum dwellers in South Africa (Miraftab 2009).

indigenous peoples managed to gain access to their aspired portfolio of assets by engaging in invited spaces.

In totality, the literature on asset accumulation and tactics provides important ideas on how to study interests and demands, eg for housing, land, political inclusion, cultural recognition or other assets, of urban indigenous peoples. It also provides useful entry points to study different practices taking place in invited and invented spaces, which urban indigenous peoples can potentially make use of to access their aspired portfolio of assets and claim their constitutional ‘rights to the city’.

### **2.3 Summary**

The first part of the literature review revealed the limitations of the understanding of indigeneity as a static social category associated with rurality, tradition and exclusion. Instead, it was argued that it is best to understand indigeneity as a dynamic social category which refers to people of different socio-economic backgrounds that are increasingly living in cities and whose specific rights, interests and demands have been incorporated within new political constitutions. While the existing literature on indigeneity in Bolivia and Ecuador certainly noted such spatial and legal changes, little research has been conducted on how the content of these new constitutions – particularly those which directly address the issue of urban indigeneity – have been translated into public policies and urban planning practice.

The second part of the literature review illustrated that it is useful to conceptualise the translation of new constitutional content into public policies and urban planning practices – the central object of this study – as a process which is shaped by a variety of social actors who are guided by different interests and personal views and operate in distinct institutional and structural environments. First, following the review, it is likely to be people operating in institutions associated with urban governance who are responsible for translating constitutional content into laws, policies, or urban planning interventions. A review of practice-centric studies which focus on what is actually done in processes of drafting and implementing public policies and urban planning practices highlighted that constitutional content is likely to be only one of many factors which influence the work of people involved in this process. Instead, taking into account that politicians, planners or policy makers are social actors, they may define their practices in such a way that they

align the interests of individuals and groups whom they represent with their own personal views. At the same time, their practices may also be influenced by the specific wider political, institutional and structural environment that influences their work. Hence, an in-depth analysis of these different factors might shed light on whether, to what extent and how constitutional content on urban indigeneity is actually addressed within public policies and urban planning.

Second, the literature review also suggested that public policies and urban planning interventions can best be studied in relation to the impact they have for relevant target groups – urban indigenous peoples in the context of this thesis. Like people involved in urban governance, urban indigenous peoples are also social actors who intend to achieve their personal or collective interests and demands. The review suggested that the concepts of asset accumulation and tactics might be particularly helpful in generating an understanding of what urban indigenous peoples actually want and how they get what they want within the specific political environment in which they operate.

### **3 Research approach and methods**

This chapter lays out the research approach adopted for this thesis. The first section describes the research from its ontological roots – a combined critical realist and social constructivist approach; outlines the epistemological background – a combination of abduction and retroduction; and introduces the chosen research methodology – a qualitative, case-study comparison. The second section of this chapter describes the different stages of the research process which included (1) preparing the research and addressing ethical research issues; (2) selecting fieldwork sites in La Paz and Quito; (3) collecting data in both cities; and (4) conducting data analysis and writing the thesis. This section also summarises some of the methodological and personal challenges faced particularly during fieldwork.

#### **3.1 Research approach**

This section outlines the debates about human nature and existence (ontology) and forms of explanation and representation of social reality (epistemology) within which this study is situated (Tuli 2011). The specific ontological and epistemological positions that influenced the way this research was conducted (methodology) are given.

##### **3.1.1 Ontological and epistemological background**

This thesis subscribes to an ontology that lies between the extremes of positivism and relativism. Positivism views the world as characterised by an independent and externally given natural world; and relativism claims that all knowledge is relative and depends on the point of view of the observer and his or her interpretation of reality (Bryman 2008). By combining insight from social constructivism and critical realism the thesis aims to offer a nuanced study on the translation of indigenous rights into public policy and urban planning practices. This has been conceptualised as a process in which a multiplicity of social actors in government institutions but also in indigenous community-based organisations (CBOs) are involved.

Social constructivist ontologies recognise human beings as purposeful actors who intend to cope with, challenge, or change the existing political and institutional environment that surrounds them (Bryman 2008; Connolly 2012). Conforming to social constructivist ontology, and with the theories reviewed in the previous chapter, this thesis is guided by

the assumption that different social actors such as government officials and ordinary indigenous peoples undertake practices coherent with their own personal interests, political views or demands for assets. Furthermore, it also recognises that actors often purposefully define what they do in a way that is compatible with the interests of the people they represent, such as the electoral support base of government officials or members of CBOs and the wider indigenous community in case of indigenous leaders.

At the same time, as was outlined in the previous chapter, this thesis also acknowledges that social actors are never autonomous and that their practices are influenced not only by power relations but also shaped by the specific historical, political and institutional environment in which they operate. Such an understanding conforms to critical realist ontologies which emphasise that human behaviour is always influenced by social structures (Bryman 2008; Connolly 2012). The term social structure refers to the historical context and to established rules and procedures which characterise a society (Hudson and Leftwich 2014).

The logic of inquiry that underpins the critical realist and social constructivist approach used in this thesis is a combination of retroduction and abduction (Blaikie 2000; Meyer and Lunnay 2012). Retroduction requires the researcher to analyse practices not simply through observation but by going back to the historical, political or institutional processes that may have produced them in the first place (ibid). In the context of this thesis the practices of different actors involved in the translation of indigenous rights will, for example, be studied in relation to past and present official definitions of indigeneity and indigenous rights.

In contrast to retroduction, abductive reasoning refers to the discovery of present practices that may or may not be coherent with official rules, norms and procedures (ibid). Relying on abductive reasoning, this thesis intends to explore whether and how the current practices of different social actors deviate from official understandings on indigeneity and indigenous rights. Thus there is a focus on understanding to what extent and how the practices of social actors are shaped by their own political views, interests and demands.

### 3.1.2 Research methodology

The methodology applied in this thesis is closely related to the previously outlined ontological and epistemological approach and not only describes *what* practices different social actors rely on to translate indigenous rights into public policies and urban planning practices, but more importantly, in *how* and *why* these practices occur in the first place. It is, therefore, important that the methodology is capable of analysing actors' practices in relation to their own political views and interests but also in relation to the interests and demands of the people they represent. For example, observations of the political negotiation approach of indigenous leaders combined with interview and focus group material which captures understandings of indigeneity and associated interests and demands for assets of leaders but also of the members of their CBOs, might help to explore *how* and *why* indigenous leaders realise specific practices and tactics. The methodology should also be able to analyse the role that power relations and structural factors (eg historical, institutional or political context) have on the practices of different actors. For example, the analysis of documents such as constitutions and laws which define indigenous rights, combined with material from interviews and observations of the practices and interactions of different government officials, might help in developing an understanding of *who* decides *how* specific indigenous rights are understood and addressed in practice.

A qualitative methodology, which mainly intends to explore the causes (*how* and *why*) of a phenomenon (Mitchell 2006), is therefore adopted for this thesis. A quantitative methodology which mainly seeks to measure observable phenomena through the use of statistical methods was considered inappropriate (ibid). Hence, a qualitative methodology was chosen over a quantitative methodology because of the thesis's focus on processes (translation of indigenous rights) which are studied in relation to a set of factors (personal interests, political views, demands for assets, power relations etc) that are rarely observable or statistically measurable.

Within its qualitative methodology this research applied a comparative case study approach. According to Yin (2003: 13) a "(...) case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in its real life context." A case-study approach helps positioning current practices within a historical context (Mahoney 2004). It also situates "(...) social relations between specific persons and groups in a social system of

culture” (Evens and Handelman 2006: 16). Case-study frameworks are normally based on multiple forms of data collection which allows for triangulation and the strengthening of the rigour of research findings (Tracy 2010).

A case-study approach was considered useful as it permitted a longer period of in-depth research on understanding indigeneity and the complex processes of translating indigenous rights into public policies and urban planning practices within two cities – La Paz and Quito. La Paz and Quito were not selected as random cases from which generalisations for the wider Latin American region could be drawn (Flyvbjerg 2006). Instead, these two cities were chosen as ‘illustrative cases’ (ibid) because of their unique position as capital cities of those countries which – for the first time in Latin American history – recognised urban indigenous peoples within political constitutions. Their status as capital cities facilitated access to multiple social actors involved in processes of translating indigenous rights, including officials in national and local government institutions but also ordinary urban indigenous residents and their relevant CBOs.

Comparative research is part of this case-study approach. First, it conducts within-case comparisons in both cities. It focuses on multiple social actors and historic moments within each city in order to demonstrate internal complexities, contradictions and diversities in the understanding of indigeneity and processes of translating indigenous rights (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 2003). For this reason, both cities and specific areas within each city were studied in relation to their wider surroundings. For example, the study compares how, within both cities, different government officials – guided by distinct personal interests and political views, representing the interests of different individuals and groups, and holding different positions within institutions such as municipal or national governments – translated indigenous rights into public policy and urban planning practices. The case-study approach also addresses different time periods. Current legal understandings of indigeneity, as well as associated practices to translate indigenous rights, were studied in relation to past understandings and practices. In its within-case comparison, the study also contrasts urban policy and planning interventions to the everyday interests, aspirations and demands for assets of ordinary urban indigenous residents. It also compares how different indigenous residents themselves understand indigeneity, articulate demands for assets, and engage in processes of contestation and political negotiation to influence decision-making in urban policy and planning.

Second, mainly building upon this within-case comparison, the study compares processes of translating indigenous rights into public policy and urban planning practices between the two case-study cities – La Paz and Quito. Let us look also at comparative research on multiple case researches on indigeneity and indigenous rights in Bolivia, Ecuador and other Latin American countries. According to Tilly (1984: 82-83), it is possible to draw a typology of four commonly-used approaches in comparative social research:

- Individualising comparisons which “(...) contrast specific instances of a given phenomenon as a means of grasping the peculiarities of each case.”
- Universalising comparisons which “(...) establish that every instance of a phenomenon follows essentially the same rule.”
- Encompassing comparisons which situate “(...) different instances at various locations within the same system, on the way to explaining their characteristics as a function of their varying relations to the system as a whole.”
- Variation-finding comparisons which “(...) establish a principle of variation in the character and intensity of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences among instances.”

Major research on indigeneity and indigenous rights in Bolivia, Ecuador and the wider Latin American region can be classified mainly within Tilly’s first three categories – individualising, universalising and encompassing comparisons. An individualising comparison was, for example, used in Canessa’s (2012) eminent study on ‘intimate indigeneities’ in a Bolivian highland community – Wilja Kjarka. Canessa relied on Wilja Kjarka to contrast understanding of indigenous identity among members of this community with the way indigeneity is addressed elsewhere in Bolivia and in Latin America.

Universalising comparisons were used by eminent scholars interested in the expansion of indigenous rights across Latin America in the 1990s and early 2000s (Andolina et al 2009; Assies et al 2000; Sieder 2002; van Cott 2000). These studies convincingly showed that constitutional reforms and processes of expanding indigenous rights undertaken by different national governments in Latin America were influenced by very similar factors; for example, they responded to the demands of a transnational indigenous movement and incorporated international legislation on indigenous rights in domestic law (ibid). As a

consequence, the literature shows that most Latin American countries introduced similar constitutional and legal reforms – described by van Cott (2000) as a ‘multicultural model’. Using this ‘multicultural model’ as a starting point other studies, including van Cott’s (2008) own work, relied on encompassing comparisons to show how different national governments in Latin America officially recognised international legislation on indigenous rights but, for a variety of internal historical, institutional and political factors, implemented these rights differently within their respective countries (Bengoa 2000; Marti i Puig 2010; Yashar 2005).

This study certainly draws on elements of the comparative approaches outlined above. Following individualising comparisons, it accepts that understandings of indigeneity are likely to differ among members of different indigenous communities. Similar to studies that were guided by a universalising and encompassing approach, it acknowledges that both Bolivia and Ecuador recognise international legislation on indigenous rights but are likely to implement these rights differently.

Unlike previous comparative research on indigeneity, however, this study mainly relies on a variation-finding comparative approach. By using this approach, it recognises that Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s governments did not only respond to international pressure when addressing urban indigenous peoples within new constitutions. In fact, as has been demonstrated in recent non-comparative studies on Ecuador and Bolivia (Becker 2011; Schavelzon 2013), the contents of the new constitutions predominantly respond to internal demands raised during previous processes of popular resistance. Different internal demands were also articulated by a variety of social movements and political parties that were involved in constitutional assemblies (*ibid*).

Differences in internal processes have rarely been captured in previous comparative research which predominantly studied the incorporation and implementation of indigenous rights at the national and local level in relation to global and regional political trends. The intention of this thesis, therefore, is to contribute to existing comparative research on indigeneity and indigenous rights by showing how country- and city-specific processes led to the ratification and implementation of slightly different constitutional contents in Bolivia and Ecuador. More importantly, this thesis also intends to demonstrate that understandings of indigeneity and processes of translating indigenous rights into public

policies and urban planning practices varied between La Paz and Quito. Variations *between* the cases are hereby explained through a comparison of the unique local processes and factors that shaped the translation of indigenous rights *within* each city.

To compare different understandings of indigeneity and processes of translating indigenous rights within and between the two cities, the study relies on qualitative data which was collected during 11 months of fieldwork. The fieldwork process and research stages that preceded and followed fieldwork in La Paz and Quito are described in further detail in the next section.

### **3.2 Stages of the research**

This section describes the different stages of the research including: (1) preparing the research and addressing ethical research issues, (2) selecting appropriate research sites at the beginning of fieldwork in La Paz and Quito, (3) collecting data and using a set of qualitative methods in each city, and (4) analysing the data and writing the thesis. Even though these stages are presented in the above mentioned order, the actual research process was iterative – meaning activities undertaken in later stages of the research often led me to revisit earlier work. Where possible, this iterative process is described in this section (see also appendix one for a summary of overall activities and outcomes of the research process). The section also points out some of the methodological challenges faced particularly during the fieldwork stage.

#### **3.2.1 Preparing the research and addressing ethical research issues**

Between September 2011 and July 2012 I prepared the research. In this period, I drafted a literature review and research methodology which included a preliminary conceptual rationale of the thesis, its research questions and objectives as well as a fieldwork plan. This document was reviewed both by the supervisors and by an internal advisor. After this examination process in May 2012, I prepared an ethics application and fieldwork plan. My research received full ethical clearance from the University of Manchester's Ethics Committee.

Following the ethical guidelines of the University of Manchester, I informed all participants about the objectives of the research and all aspects that might reasonably be expected to influence their willingness to participate. With regards to consent, research

participants were asked to participate voluntarily and free from coercion. Consent forms were signed by research participants before semi-structured interviews. Oral consent was also obtained before focus group exercises.

The confidentiality of information supplied and the anonymity of all respondents is respected within this thesis. In the case research participants provided me with particularly sensitive information, I took care that this material was either not used or used in such a way that it could not be connected to the source. For this reason the names and addresses of people interviewed in government institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or donor institutions are not revealed. Names of indigenous leaders, CBO members, and community residents were changed to pseudonyms. I also decided to change the names and locations of indigenous CBOs to pseudonyms. This decision was not highlighted in the initial ethics application form but made during the actual fieldwork process. It represents a response to the request of some indigenous leaders who were worried that naming them, their CBO, or particular neighbourhoods could damage their reputation as community leaders. Hence, this example illustrates that I not only followed the ethical guidelines of the University of Manchester but also ensured that the integrity and specific wishes of research participants were respected at all stages of this research.

### **3.2.2 Beginning the fieldwork: approaching and selecting research sites**

Between August 2012 and July 2013 I undertook 11 months of fieldwork in Bolivia's and Ecuador's capital cities of La Paz and Quito. I divided my time equally – the first five and a half months were spent in La Paz and the remaining time in Quito. As outlined previously, La Paz and Quito were chosen because of the relatively easy access to many actors operating in different government institutions, NGOs or donor organisations. The cities were also home to large urban indigenous populations. I decided to work in selected parts of the city as it would have been impractical to work with the entirety of the cities' indigenous populations. I selected research sites that reflected the diversity of indigenous groups and organisations in each city. In addition, I selected research sites according to practical criteria which included, among others, the existence of cooperative gatekeepers and physical access via public transport.

Further details on the characteristics of the cities, their urban indigenous populations and on the selected research sites are provided in chapter four. The following sections describe

the process as well as some of the methodological and personal challenges faced during the initial fieldwork stages during which I approached and finally selected research sites.

### *La Paz*

At the start of my fieldwork I relied on a La Paz-based contact that agreed to help me in finding a research site. I accompanied this person to a meeting in the offices of a city-wide network of indigenous peasant unions. I was told that indigenous leaders from different neighbourhoods in the city would attend this meeting. What I did not know was that my contact did not have a good reputation among the members of this CBO. This became evident once we entered the CBO premises. We were instantly surrounded by a group of indigenous leaders who interrogated us about our intentions in visiting them. It turned out that one of the indigenous leaders talking to us knew the person accompanying me. The two of them had collaborated in the past and, according to this indigenous leader, my contact person failed to deliver promises to act as mediator between this CBO and officials in government (Field note diary, 16 September 2013). Following this encounter, I decided that it was best to leave the premises of this CBO in order to avoid further conflict.

On that day I did not gain access to a research site. Instead, I learned a lesson on what not to do when conducting research with indigenous CBOs in La Paz and later in Quito – raise false expectations. This experience also taught me to be cautious when selecting gatekeepers who would introduce me to indigenous CBOs and communities.

After this incident I decided not to accompany this person to other meetings. Instead, I approached the La Paz-based office of a NGO that managed community day-care centres in Pumakatari and Litoral – two neighbourhoods with a predominantly indigenous population and a variety of CBOs (see chapter 4 for background information on these neighbourhoods). The NGO invited me to participate in a meeting taking place in one of their community day-care centres in these neighbourhoods. During this meeting I was introduced to local indigenous CBO leaders who allowed me to conduct research in their organisations and in the two neighbourhoods.

Relying on an NGO as a gatekeeper also had disadvantages. For example, I was initially introduced to local indigenous leaders by a social worker from the NGO. As a consequence, local leaders believed that I was a foreign funder of this NGO. This became

clear through my first visits to the neighbourhoods where leaders often presented me their problems and asked for funding. Not wanting to raise false expectations and intending to be clear about my own role in the field (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994), I emphasised my work as an independent researcher without any ties to NGOs or donor bodies.

Being accepted within the neighbourhoods as a researcher was a long process. It required me to re-visit leaders, CBO members and ordinary residents several times and without being accompanied by NGO staff. At this early stage of fieldwork, the distribution of participant information sheets was particularly helpful as these documents provided written evidence about my actual purpose in visiting the neighbourhoods, as well as on my status as a university student unable to pay people for participating in the research. Over time, indigenous leaders, CBO members and residents in the neighbourhood stopped asking me for funding but often referred to me as the German researcher (*el investigador Aleman*) or as Philipp, the indigenous person from Germany (*Felipe, el indígena de Alemania*). Being called by these names suggested that people not only knew and accepted my position as researcher, but that they were also aware of my research interest (indigeneity) and of my status as foreigner (German).

### ***Quito***

Having already conducted fieldwork in La Paz, I arrived in Quito with a better strategy on how to position myself as researcher, and manage expectations with potential research subjects. I was also aware that selecting a research site was only the beginning of a longer process of engagement with members of indigenous CBOs and communities both as a researcher but, more importantly, as a person they trusted.

A local academic recommended me to approach members of an indigenous community that migrated to Quito from the rural parish of Tigua situated in Ecuador's Cotopaxi province. I was told that members from the Tigua community were running an indigenous school, called Pachamama College, for indigenous market vendors working mainly in an area of Quito's city centre. The building of the Pachamama College was also used for meetings of different indigenous associations from the area.

Unlike in La Paz, I did not approach the Pachamama College through a gatekeeper but visited the director of this school by myself. During this first meeting I was welcomed, but

at a distance, and questioned about my actual intentions in doing this research. It turned out that the director had been approached by researchers in the past. He was tired of providing foreigners with information without receiving anything in exchange. Initially, he asked me to make a donation to the school and in exchange I would be allowed to conduct research on its premises. I was aware that reciprocity is an important element of doing research with indigenous organisations and communities (Smith 1999). At the same time, both for ethical and personal reasons, I did not want to comply with the director's demand to provide monetary support for the school. Instead, aware of the fact that the school was understaffed, I offered to volunteer as an English and Sociology teacher for the remaining five months of my fieldwork in Quito. The director accepted this offer and, in exchange, he introduced me to various leaders of the Tiguan migrant community and allowed me to undertake participatory focus groups with students from the school.

My position as volunteering teacher in the Pachamama College provided an excellent opportunity to conduct participant observations and to develop contacts with the school's indigenous students. My ongoing presence in the school also helped me in building trust with teachers and different indigenous leaders who used the school's premises for community meetings. After some time I was often invited to attend CBO meetings taking place in the school but also in other parts of Quito. In addition, students and indigenous leaders often invited me to their homes where they told me more about the reality of their lives as indigenous peoples in Quito through interviews or informal conversations.

While the identification of a research community was a relatively straight forward process, I confronted new challenges at the beginning of fieldwork in Quito. On one of my first visits to San Roque I was robbed by a local youth gang and lost my camera, money and field notes of the day. When sharing my experience with members of the Pachamama College I was simply told that robberies – armed or unarmed – are part of everyday reality in this neighbourhood and in Quito in general. This was something I was not used to in La Paz – a city in which I always felt safe. The fact that robberies were a rather normal part of life in Quito confirmed to be true – throughout fieldwork I got robbed three more times in different neighbourhoods. Yet, having learned from my initial experience, whenever possible I avoided carrying a camera, laptop or other valuables on me.

### 3.2.3 Methods of data collection

After initial stages of familiarisation with the city and identification of research sites, I collected qualitative data that provided me with detailed information on the understanding of indigeneity and processes of translating indigenous rights. During fieldwork I used a variety of qualitative data collection methods – content analysis of secondary ‘grey’ data, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and participatory focus groups (see table 3.1). The use of multiple data collection methods allowed triangulation, enabled the interweaving of different perspectives within one complex story, and strengthened the rigour of the overall findings (Tracy 2010). The different methods of data collection are described in further detail below.

**Table 3.1 Selected methods to address the research questions**

Research questions	Issue to study	Methods selected
To what extent and how are different indigenous rights, manifested in the new political constitutions, translated into urban policy and planning practice?	Past and present official understandings of indigeneity and indigenous rights; Information on current practices (eg allocation of human and financial resources for different programmes).	Content analysis
	Actors’ personal interests and political views on indigeneity, indigenous rights and urban development; Actors’ perceptions on power relations, individuals and groups they represent, and wider historical, political, and institutional context; Practices to translate indigenous rights into public policy and urban planning practice.	Semi-structured interviews
	Interactions and power relations between different social actors; Practices to translate indigenous rights into public policy and urban planning practice.	Participant observation
How do urban indigenous people understand indigeneity?	Own understandings of indigeneity; Personal interests, aspirations and demands to accumulate a portfolio of assets.	Semi-structured interviews
	Own understandings of indigeneity; Personal interests, aspirations and demands to accumulate a portfolio of assets.	Participatory focus groups
How do urban indigenous peoples negotiate different understandings of indigeneity, indigenous rights, and asset-based demands with government officials in different institutions?	Past and present processes of contestation and political negotiation.	Content analysis
	Contestation and negotiation tactics; Actors’ perceptions on power relations, individuals and groups they represent, and wider historical, political and institutional context.	Semi-structured interviews
	Interactions and power relations between different social actors; Contestation and political negotiation tactics.	Participant observation
	Contestation and political negotiation tactics; Perceptions towards leaders and CBOs; Perceptions towards government.	Participatory focus groups

*Elaborated by the author*

### *Content analysis*

I studied a range of secondary or ‘grey’ data sources during fieldwork in La Paz and Quito (see references and appendix two for a list of documents used in this thesis):

1. **Existing secondary literature on topics such as** indigenous rights in Bolivia and Ecuador, history of treatment of urban indigenous peoples, and processes of indigenous contestation and political negotiation.
2. **Historical and present documents which make statements on indigenous rights or on the treatment of indigenous peoples such as** constitutions, laws, policies, development plans, or programme and project documents drafted by national and local government institutions.
3. **Documents which provide general information on indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador as well as on the selected cities of La Paz and Quito.** These included national censuses, city maps or municipal data sets.
4. **Articles in newspapers** that focus on the treatment and practices of urban indigenous peoples.

Content analysis provided initial ideas on how indigeneity, indigenous rights and urban development were defined in texts drafted by different actors and institutions, eg representing government, academia or the media, at different moments in time. Content analysis of documents was also helpful as it provided details on the operationalisation of indigenous rights and concrete implementation practices. For example, a review of La Paz’s and Quito’s urban development plans and annual operational plans helped in uncovering legal (definition of indigeneity), financial (allocation of monetary resources for projects targeting indigenous peoples) and institutional (employment of staff focusing on indigenous rights) practices that potentially facilitated or hindered the translation of indigenous rights.

The analysis of other sources such as national censuses, maps, municipal socio-economic development diagnoses, or newspaper articles provided a useful background to understanding the living conditions of urban indigenous peoples. Secondary data deriving from these documents helped to identify how many indigenous people live in each city. It also provided details on where and in what physical, socio-economic and political conditions these people are living.

Content analysis, however, also had limitations. First, the analysis of laws, policies and planning regulations provided this study with information on how specific rights should be implemented but it could not always provide details on what actually happened. Indeed, as outlined previously, a variety of social actors are involved in implementation processes. In these processes, social actors might not always follow documented guidelines. Instead, they might implement the contents of a document by serving their own interests and views. Second, secondary data on urban indigenous peoples, whether published by research institutes, media outlets, or government institutions, can be of varying quality and reliability. Responding to these constraints, I treated the contents of documents critically and, whenever possible, findings from content analysis were triangulated with primary data collected through semi-structured interviews, participant observation or participatory focus groups.

### *Semi-structured interviews*

Semi-structured interviews allow gathering detailed information on people's perceptions, interests, views, demands and practices (Lindlof and Taylor 2011). Semi-structured interviews are designed to be open-ended and conversational. They follow a rough guide of topics that may or may not always be covered throughout the interview. Due to their flexible and open-ended design this method allows questions to be raised based upon what the interviewee is saying.

In both cities, using a rough topic guide<sup>27</sup>, I recorded a total of 92 semi-structured interviews, 48 in La Paz and 44 in Quito. The semi-structured interviews may be categorised into three broad groups – (1) interviews with academics, (2) interviews with government officials, NGO staff, and members of donor organisations, and (3) interviews with members of indigenous CBOs (see table 3.2). Appendix four provides a list of all semi-structured interviews and offers some background information on the interviewees. In keeping with the University of Manchester's ethical guidelines, the names of interviewees in government, NGO or donor institutions are not mentioned. The names of community members have been turned into pseudonyms. Interviewees who were academics generally wanted me to mention their name in the dissertation.

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<sup>27</sup> Prior to the interview, informants were told in a participant information sheet about the topics and questions to be covered (see appendix three).

**Table 3.2 Number of interviews in La Paz and Quito**

	Academics	Government officials/ NGO staff/ Members of donor organisations	Indigenous communities	Total
La Paz	5	29	14	48
Quito	3	24	17	44
Total	8	53	31	92

*Elaborated by the author*

Most interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. Seven interviews were documented through field notes and the remainder were audio-recorded. This provided more than 65 hours of recording. Eighty-eight interviews were undertaken in Spanish and three interviews, involving members of the German development cooperation (GIZ), were conducted in my native language – German. Even though I consider myself relatively fluent in Spanish, I was aware that I often missed subtle messages. Only after going back to my field notes or during the process of transcribing interviews could I interpret and reflect upon these more subtle messages.

The following sections outline in detail the interview approach and topics addressed with the three different groups of interviewees.

### ***Academics***

I decided to approach local academics with expertise on my research topic in order to capture their perception on the situation of the cities' urban indigenous peoples and on processes of translating indigenous rights into public policies and urban planning practices. In addition to this information, local academics generally provided me with contacts for different indigenous communities and government officials whom they considered worthwhile approaching. In total five interviews with academics were carried out in La Paz and three in Quito.

### ***Government officials, NGO staff, and members of donor organisations***

Semi-structured interviews with government officials, NGO staff and members of donor organisations were particularly useful as they allowed me to gather information on their personal interests and political views on topics such as indigeneity, indigenous rights, and urban development. I also used the interviews with these individuals to gain a detailed understanding of the different practices that facilitate or hinder the process of translating

indigenous rights into public policies and urban planning practices. Interested in their perceptions on power relations and the institutional and political context as well, I asked these representatives about their position within the institution or political party to which they belonged and about the people and groups they represented.

I ensured that the voices of actors with different functions and levels of seniority (eg deputy-ministers, unit directors, project coordinators, civil servants and administrators) were taken into account (see appendix four). I also approached government officials operating at different scales of urban governance (eg national government or local government). In La Paz I completed 29 interviews (11 in national government, two in the departmental government of La Paz, 10 in the municipality of La Paz, two in the municipality of Palca, and four with members of NGOs or donor organisations); and in Quito 24 interviews (eight in national government, 12 in the municipality of Quito, one in the departmental government of Pichincha, and three with members of NGOs or donor organisations).

Access to government officials, NGO staff and members of donor organisations was relatively unproblematic in both cities. One notable exception in terms of ease of access was the municipality of Palca – the rural municipality neighbouring La Paz which claims administrative authority over the selected research sites of Pumakatari and Litoral (see chapter 4). Officials in this municipal government initially seemed hesitant to engage in interviews as they feared that I was supporting the municipality of La Paz with which they had fundamental disagreements on administrative and political issues (23GB). This again was an important lesson on how researchers are perceived within adversarial political environments and required me to clarify my own positionality (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994). Only after distributing participant information sheets and engaging in various conversations, in person and via the telephone, could I convince officials in the municipality of Palca that I was a foreign researcher, without political affiliation to local parties, who was interested in the work of their institution. Once again, this experience showed the need for researchers to spend a longer period of time in the field in order to build trusting relationships with potential research participants.

Instead of relying on emails, interviews were best scheduled via visiting the offices of relevant institutions or using the telephone. Following Latin time (*hora latina*),

interviewees often cancelled or postponed interviews which made it difficult to manage my time efficiently. Nevertheless, once I conducted an interview with one person I often could successfully rely on a snow-balling technique, eg asking the interviewee to take me to another subject who later guided me to another informant etc, and plan future interviews with those who provided crucial information for this thesis.

### ***Interviews with members of indigenous CBOs***

I decided to conduct interviews mainly with members and particularly leaders of indigenous CBOs. This decision was made after a review of the literature on political practices of urban indigenous peoples which emphasised that urban indigenous leaders often drive processes of contestation and political negotiation in the name of their CBO and wider indigenous community (eg Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Lazar 2008; Kingman 2012; Zibechi 2010). During interviews with indigenous leaders and CBO members I gained inside knowledge of urban indigenous people's own understandings of indigeneity and associated demands for specific assets including indigenous languages, social, cultural, economic and political networks, land, jobs, housing, education, urban infrastructure etc. Additionally, interviewees generally provided me with detailed accounts of how they contested and negotiated access to different assets in the past and also the current political context. This provided me not only with inside knowledge about their practices but also on how they perceived the historical, political and institutional environment that surrounded them.

During fieldwork I conducted interviews with different members and leaders from a variety of CBOs operating in the chosen research sites – eg neighbourhood associations (JJVVs), indigenous peasant unions, and folkloric associations in La Paz and indigenous commercial associations and commune councils (*cabildos*) in Quito. In total, I conducted 14 semi-structured interviews in La Paz and 17 in Quito. In both cities indigenous CBO members and leaders were initially sceptical to give an interview. Yet, as has already been outlined in section 3.2.2, my engagement in a range of different community activities helped me to build trust with CBO members and leaders. Hence, after a while people generally agreed to participate in interviews.

I was aware that a single focus on CBO members, and particularly their leaders, would not allow me to write a nuanced study that captured the voices of a diversity of ordinary urban

indigenous residents. In fact, in both cities indigenous leaders were mainly elderly men. Aware of this tendency, I also explored the understanding of indigeneity and associated asset-based demands by ordinary indigenous people, eg women or younger community members, who were generally less involved in CBOs and in the public representation of their indigenous communities. This was achieved through two other qualitative data-collection methods – participant observation and participatory focus groups.

### ***Participant observation***

Participant observation, generally associated with anthropological and ethnographic research, requires the researcher to spend a significant amount of time observing and interacting with different individuals or groups (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994). By observing and participating in key events relevant to the study, which are reported in field note diaries, the researcher can identify general principles and practices and produce empirically situated knowledge (Mitchell 2006). Participant observation also allows studying and comparing people's behaviour in different contexts or institutional environments which are mediated by power relations, eg through comparing people's behaviour at home with their behaviour during community meetings or processes of negotiation with government officials (Rogers and Vertovec 1995).

During fieldwork in La Paz and Quito, participant observation often complemented the interviewing process and allowed me to capture a greater diversity of perspectives and voices. First, after completing recorded interviews research participants sometimes provided me with further relevant information 'off the record'. Second, before, during or after the process of interviewing I often had the opportunity to observe crucial activities relevant for this thesis. For example, interviews with government officials were often disrupted by phone calls or by the spontaneous visits of colleagues. This allowed me to gain an inside knowledge of their working routines. It also provided me with ideas on their relations to colleagues in inferior or superior positions as well as on their overall position in the institutions in which they worked.

Interviews with indigenous leaders often took place in their homes or in the main offices of their CBOs. Before, or after, the actual interview I often had the chance to spend time with the interviewee, their families, friends or CBO colleagues. This often allowed me to engage in informal conversations with other indigenous peoples, women, younger

residents, or other CBO members, who did not hold leadership positions but who could provide me with further information relevant to this thesis, including their perceptions of indigenous leaders, power relations within the community, understandings of indigeneity and associated asset-based demands.

After the completion of recorded interviews research participants sometimes invited me to attend events or meetings that were relevant for my research. For example, indigenous leaders in La Paz and Quito sometimes invited me to their CBO assemblies, to accompany them to meetings with government officials, or to attend festive events in their communities. This provided me with an opportunity to observe how different community members interacted with each other, how they behaved in front of government officials, and how they entered into actual processes of contestation and political negotiation.

I also took the role of a participating observer particularly during my engagement as volunteering English and Sociology teacher in the Pachamama School in Quito. The voluntary work and participation in the activities of this organisation not only allowed me to build trust with different students and CBO members meeting on the premises of the school, it also provided me with an opportunity to engage in informal conversations with different people representing different age and gender groups.

Undertaking participant observation also made me address a set of barriers. For example, I was aware of socio-economic and cultural barriers between myself, a white, male, middle-class and foreign researcher, and the indigenous persons whom I observed and in whose activities I sometimes participated (Smith 1999). During fieldwork in La Paz and Quito I attempted to bridge cultural barriers through my efforts to develop a tacit knowledge of my research subject's cultural and linguistic vocabulary, practices and rituals (Geertz 1983). For example, in La Paz I enrolled in an Aymara course which provided me with a basic vocabulary in this language. I did the same with Kichwa in Quito. When interacting with indigenous peoples in the selected research sites I often gained respect for 'trying' to speak in their language. Particularly during CBO meetings members would sometimes talk in their native languages. Despite some basic skills in Aymara and Kichwa, this left me 'lost in translation' and without an understanding of what was going on. However, sometimes a member of the CBO would sit next to me and translate key points that were being addressed during the meeting. I am aware that information translated from

indigenous languages to Spanish and from Spanish to English only provided me with a partial understanding of what was actually discussed in these meetings. Fortunately, during most occasions urban indigenous residents in La Paz and Quito interacted with each other in Spanish – a language I was comfortable with.

### *Participatory focus groups*

I conducted participatory focus groups which involved ordinary indigenous community members of different ages, socio-economic positions and genders. This allowed me to gain a more nuanced knowledge of diverse understandings of indigeneity and associated aspirations and demands for assets. The focus groups were held in community day care centres in the neighbourhoods of Pumakatari and Litoral in La Paz and in the Pachamama School in Quito. Focus groups normally lasted no longer than two hours. In La Paz's Pumakatari and Litoral neighbourhoods I conducted 12 focus groups in community day care centres which included a total of 103 people, a majority of them Aymara women between the ages of 18 and 60 years. In Quito I held eight focus groups in the indigenous weekend Pachamama College involving 72 students, the majority of them indigenous migrants of Kichwa descent from the Tigua community aged between 18 and 40.

The focus groups relied on methodological guidelines and tools that closely followed a participatory urban appraisal (PUA) approach (see Moser and Holland 1997; Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Moser and Stein 2011). The PUA, inspired by Chambers' (1994) work on participatory rural appraisals (PRAs), emphasises the need for researchers to 'hand over the stick' to the people being researched and empower them to determine the research agenda (Moser and Stein 2011). PUAs gather visual instead of written or verbal information. PUA findings from different focus groups were triangulated by repeating similar tools and techniques with other focus groups.

In this research PUA tools were used to identify urban indigenous people's own understandings of indigeneity as well as associated aspirations, interests and demands to access and accumulate assets such as land, housing, socio-cultural networks, urban infrastructure etc. PUA tools also helped in gaining an understanding of indigenous people's perceptions of their CBOs and relevant government institutions, NGOs, or donor organisations. The different tools were implemented by the focus group members under my guidance. In order to ensure that focus groups felt a sense of ownership over their

work they were allowed to keep the actual flow charts and notes of their presentations within the community centres. For the purpose of data analysis and with their consent, I took photos of every activity and final outcomes. The following participatory tools and techniques were used and applied in chronological order with the different focus groups:

### ***Ice breaker***

To start the participatory focus groups, I made use of a tool which is often used as part of goal-oriented project planning (ZOPP) exercises (GIZ 1997). I asked focus group members individually to provide brief answers to two questions and write or draw them on a small piece of paper (see box 3.1 for an example). In La Paz participants were asked to provide answers to the questions ‘1) How does the community centre help me, my family or the community?’ and ‘2) What does it mean to be indigenous in the city?’ In Quito participants were asked to provide answers to the questions ‘1) What does it mean to be indigenous in the city?’ and ‘2) What would be the Quito of your dreams?’ The notes were later organised into different themes. The data collected using this technique helped in gaining an understanding on how community members understood their own indigenous identity in an urban environment, how they perceived life in the city, what aspirations and demands for assets they had, and, in the context of La Paz, how they perceived their local community day care centre<sup>28</sup>.

### ***Listing and ranking of problems***

During listing-and-ranking exercises focus groups were asked first to list types of problem they faced and subsequently rank these problems. This facilitated an understanding of the core problems urban indigenous peoples have to face in their communities and city. Box 3.2 provides a visual example of a listing-and-ranking exercise realised with a focus group in La Paz.

### ***Causal flow diagrams***

Causal flow diagrams can identify the nature and causes of problems and explore how a specific problem, or its cause, can be resolved (Moser and Stein 2011). Each focus group was asked to list potential causes and solutions of the prioritised problem ranked highest

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
<sup>28</sup> In La Paz I used the premises of a local NGO to conduct participatory focus groups. The social worker of this NGO asked me to incorporate this first question. The findings of this question were shared with only the NGO and the focus group members consented to this decision.

in the listing-and-ranking exercise. This allowed me to deepen my understanding of existing problems as well as of potential self-help, contestation and negotiation tactics.

### ***Institutional maps***

Institutional mapping allows focus group members to identify relevant institutions, eg CBOs, NGOs, government institutions etc, operating inside or outside their communities (Moser and Stein 2011). To delimit their neighbourhood or urban indigenous community from outside spaces I drew a circle on a sheet of paper. The inside of the circle referred to the community or neighbourhood focus group members lived or worked in and the outside referred to spaces outside their community or neighbourhood. After listing all institutions on the map focus group members were asked to rank each institution (+ very negative, ++ negative, +++ neutral, ++++ good, +++++ very good). This exercise helped identifying community members' awareness of existing institutions and their perceptions of the actual work of relevant institutions. Box 3.3 shows a focus group in Quito preparing their institutional map.

#### **Box 3.1 Ice breaker exercise: Examples from Quito**



*Samples of answers to question two: What does it mean to be indigenous in the city?*

**Box 3.2 Listing and ranking of problems: illustration of the process**



*Listing and Ranking exercise undertaken by a group of Aymara Women in Litoral, La Paz. 10 December 2012 (Photo taken by the author)*

**Box 3.3 Institutional mapping: illustration of the process**



*Institutional mapping exercise undertaken by a group of Tigua migrants in the Pachamama College in Quito. 28 April 2013 (Photo taken by the author)*

### **3.2.4 Data analysis and writing of the thesis**

The analysis of data underwent various stages, the first one being the transcription of semi-structured interviews using Microsoft Word. I decided to transcribe and analyse interviews, documents, and other relevant data in Spanish and to translate into English only those passages which I would cite in the dissertation. Interview transcription was started during fieldwork in La Paz and Quito and completed after my return to Manchester. It took a significant amount of time because I decided to transcribe my interviews in Spanish. The transcription of interviews deepened my understanding of the topic, allowed me to modify or specify questions for interviews yet to come, and helped me in the identification of key empirical patterns within the data.

On return from fieldwork I read and re-read my interview transcripts, field note diaries, and findings from the participatory focus groups and content analysis. I later uploaded most of the data on NVivo, the qualitative software processing programme. NVivo offered a robust method to analyse and categorise my large quantity of qualitative data. Even though I used NVivo to categorise my data, I still had to draw on my own empirical thinking and interpretation when coding the data into broad themes, sub-themes and specific headings (Yin 2003). The coding took place in line with central elements addressed in the research questions.

The interpretation of data was effected through ‘pattern matching’ and ‘process analysis’ (Mahoney 2000; Mahoney 2004). The technique of ‘pattern matching’ helped in making causal claims and inferences through the identification of repeated occurrences of specific findings within and between the two case-study cities (Mahoney 2000). The technique of ‘process analysis’ helped in identifying historical sequences which could be ordered temporally and causally connected to the outcome of a specific event of interest (Mahoney 2004). Taken together, these techniques were useful as they allowed making more robust claims from the qualitative data collected in both cities.

Following the two-fold logic of comparison used in this thesis, I first wrote empirical chapters for each case study and described similarities and differences within each city. Subsequently, the findings from both cities were compared with each other in order to explain variations in understandings of indigeneity and processes of translating indigenous

rights into public policy and urban planning practice. I then rewrote the literature review, methodology, and drafted the introductory and concluding chapters.

When rewriting the literature review I incorporated new writings, eg relevant studies published during and after my fieldwork in Bolivia and Ecuador. My research findings, particularly on the processes of political negotiation, also required me to engage with new areas of literature on tactics, invited and invented practices. Before my fieldwork I did not clearly define which comparative approach this study would rely on. Therefore, after fieldwork I also revisited the methodological literature on comparative social research and engaged more closely with existing comparative studies on indigeneity and indigenous rights in Latin America. These papers, as well as my fieldwork experiences, were integrated into the methodology chapter.

The different chapters of my thesis were reviewed at different stages by my supervisors and other internal advisors. I also presented the contents of different chapters as papers at various conferences, workshops, lectures and seminars. Finally, I had the chance to disseminate my empirical findings to indigenous residents and government officials as part of a work-related visit to Quito in May 2015. Drawing on the feedback from supervisors, internal advisors, different academic audiences, and research participants, I rewrote and edited elements of my PhD thesis several times before submitting it for final examination.

### **3.3 Summary**

The first part of this chapter outlined the rationale of this thesis from its ontological and epistemological roots to its research methodology. It showed that the combination of a critical realist and social constructivist approach is particularly useful for this study which is interested in exploring (1) how the specific structural environment (history, institutional and political contexts) shapes the practices of different actors involved in the translation of indigenous rights and (2) how, at the same time, these actors shape and reshape the structural environment that surrounds them to address their personal interests and demands. Following this ontological and epistemological approach, it was argued that a qualitative, comparative case-study approach is particularly useful for this study. The first section of this chapter also briefly explained why La Paz and Quito represent useful cases to help illustrate the complex process of translating indigenous rights into public policy

and urban planning practices. In terms of its comparative focus, this section also offered an explanation and justification as to why it was decided to rely mainly on a variation-finding comparative approach.

The second part of this chapter outlined the different stages of the research (see also appendix one for a chronological summary of activities and outputs). Overall, the research process was iterative, meaning that the elements described in this section (preparing the research and addressing ethical research issues, selecting fieldwork sites, data collection, data analysis and writing) rarely occurred in isolation but often influenced each other. This led, for example, to a constant checking and re-evaluation of the literature, ongoing analysis and re-interpretation of empirical findings and rewriting of parts of the thesis. Before chapters' five to eight present the empirical findings from both cities, chapter four briefly provides city profiles of La Paz and Quito and introduces the selected research sites.

## 4 La Paz and Quito: city profiles

This chapter provides city profiles for La Paz and Quito. It shows the general demographic, political and administrative features that characterise each city. Particular emphasis is put on a description of the cities' growing indigenous populations. The chapter also provides some background information on the research sites where fieldwork was undertaken with indigenous residents from each city. The concluding section of this chapter provides a brief comparison of the main features of La Paz and Quito.

### 4.1 La Paz, Bolivia

In 1960 only 36.8 per cent of Bolivia's population lived in cities. This number increased to 66.8 per cent in 2010 (INE 2014). Similar to most Latin American countries, Bolivia's urban population is concentrated in a few major cities. According to Andersen (2002), more than one third of Bolivia's urban population lives within the metropolitan region of La Paz and El Alto.

The city of La Paz is in Bolivia's Andean highlands close to Lake Titicaca (see figure 4.1 for a map of Bolivia including departments and department capitals). La Paz is the administrative seat of the national government<sup>29</sup> of Bolivia and capital of the department of La Paz. The city itself is governed by the municipal government of La Paz which follows general laws on urban policy and planning provided by Bolivia's national government (see chapter 5). According to most recent census data, the city of La Paz had 764,617 inhabitants in 2012 and was Bolivia's third largest city after Santa Cruz and El Alto (INE 2014).

A significant proportion of La Paz's population self-identified themselves as indigenous. According to 2012 census data, 28.17 per cent (approximately 219,535 individuals) of La Paz's population claimed to belong to an indigenous people or a specific nation (INE 2014). Approximately 60 per cent of self-identifying indigenous peoples were of Aymara origin and six per cent claimed to be of Quechua origin. Approximately 19 per cent of people who self-identified as belonging to an indigenous people or nation claimed to be *mestizo*. Furthermore, around one per cent claimed to be of Afro-Bolivian origin and the

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<sup>29</sup> The city of Sucre is the constitutional capital of Bolivia. Yet, with exception of Bolivia's constitutional court, the national government has its seat in La Paz.

remainder belonged to one of the other 33 officially-recognised indigenous peoples mentioned in the constitution (INE 2014).

**Figure 4.1 Map of Bolivia**



*Elaborated by Cartographic Unit, University of Manchester*

La Paz's current ethno-spatial, socio-economic and demographic characteristics can be understood only in relation to the city's history. La Paz was founded in 1535 on the ground of the pre-colonial Inca settlement of *Chukiyapu Marka* (Guss 2006). While there is no record of the number of indigenous peoples residing in La Paz during the time of the Spanish conquest, Guss (2006) highlights that in 1573 about 5,820 indigenous peoples and only 260 Spaniards lived in the area of today's La Paz. The colonisers excluded indigenous peoples from urban life by pushing them out of the inner city. The inner city, following 15th century European models of architecture and planning, was structured


according to a grid model and inhabited by white Spaniards, *criollos*, and *mestizos*. Indigenous peoples mainly resided in unplanned territories on the urban periphery and in rural areas surrounding the city. They worked as peasants, domestic servants, market traders or artisans and were often excluded from other economic activities (Arbona and Kohl 2004).

Indigenous peoples have never forgotten their relationship to the pre-colonial settlement (Albo 2006). Since its foundation in 1535 the city had two names; the *criollo* and *mestizo* population referred to the city as La Paz whilst indigenous peoples called the city by its pre-colonial name - *Chukiyapu Marka*. At various moments in the history of the city of La Paz indigenous peoples actively resisted colonial and postcolonial domination. For example, in 1789, in an attempt to fight the colonial regime, the Aymara leader Tupak Katari and his wife Bartolina Sisa mobilised an army of 40,000 indigenous people and held an eight-month siege of the city of La Paz (Albo 2006).

For the first 350 years of its existence La Paz was mainly a transport hub and administrative centre for the coordination of the agricultural activities of the nearby countryside. Since 1830, the city was also home to the 'Higher University San Andres' (UMSA), one of Bolivia's largest and most influential universities. In 1889 La Paz became the administrative seat of Bolivia's national government. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century the city also became Bolivia's centre for industrial textile production.

From the 1950s onwards indigenous peoples, coming from nearby highland rural communities, increasingly migrated to La Paz in search of a better living (Guss 2006). Push factors included failed land reforms and economic crises which made it difficult for indigenous peoples to sustain a peasant lifestyle (see chapter 5). Pull factors included educational and economic opportunities available in the city. The mass migration of indigenous peoples to La Paz did not only lead to an increase in the city's population but also to processes of unplanned and rapid urban expansion (Albo et al 1981). Between the 1970s and the 1990s La Paz doubled in physical and population size (Arbona and Kohl 2005). Figure 4.2 shows the growth of the urban area in La Paz between 1976 and 1996.

**Figure 4.2 Urban expansion in La Paz: 1976-1996**




*This map draws on data provided by the municipality of La Paz (La Paz 2006). It has been elaborated by the Cartographic Unit, University of Manchester*

In the 1950s indigenous migrants predominantly settled in La Paz's north-western or north-eastern peripheries which are characterised by steep hills. Migrants who arrived from the same rural communities normally settled in one urban area (Albo et al 1981). By the 1970s La Paz's northern peripheries were already densely populated and newer generations of indigenous migrants started to settle in La Paz's south-eastern periphery or on the plateau west of La Paz which represents today's municipality of El Alto (Arbona and Kohl 2004).


The mass migration of indigenous peoples to La Paz did not change previously established ethno-spatial divisions and patterns of social exclusion. Using 2001 census data, the municipality of La Paz undertook a visual data-mapping exercise which supports the fact that the city's indigenous population, predominantly of Aymara descent, rarely resides within the urban core but mainly lives in peripheral urban neighbourhoods (see figure 4.3). These predominantly 'indigenous' peripheral neighbourhoods are characterised by an absence of access to crucial services such as sanitation systems (see figure 4.4). Houses within these neighbourhoods are often built on earth floors (see figure 4.5). In addition, there were crucial differences in the levels of education among indigenous and non-indigenous residents. Figure 4.6, for example, shows that illiteracy rates were significantly higher in La Paz's 'indigenous' peripheries than in neighbourhoods with fewer indigenous residents. Taking into account this data, present day La Paz remains an ethno-spatially divided city in which indigenous peoples tend to live in peripheral areas characterised by poorer physical and social infrastructure than the city's non-indigenous urban core.

**Figure 4.3 Residents self-identifying as Aymara in La Paz (2001)**




*This map was produced by the municipality of La Paz and published within its municipal data atlas (La Paz 2006). It has been formatted and translated into English by the Cartographic Unit, University of Manchester.*

**Figure 4.4 Houses without access to sanitation systems in La Paz (2001)**




*This map was produced by the municipality of La Paz and published within its municipal data atlas (La Paz 2006). It has been formatted and translated into English by the Cartographic Unit, University of Manchester.*

**Figure 4.5 Houses built on earth floors in La Paz (2001)**



*This map was produced by the municipality of La Paz and published within its municipal data atlas (La Paz 2006). It has been formatted and translated into English by the Cartographic Unit, University of Manchester.*

**Figure 4.6 Illiteracy levels in La Paz (2001)**



*This map was produced by the municipality of La Paz and published within its municipal data atlas (La Paz 2006). It has been formatted and translated into English by the Cartographic Unit, University of Manchester.*

The city of La Paz did not expand into unpopulated areas but often absorbed rural communities. Rural communities affected by urban expansion were often inhabited by indigenous peasants of Aymara descent, who from now on will be referred to as *comuneros*. Processes of urban expansion also had political and administrative implications as the city of La Paz grew beyond its own municipal boundaries. This was particularly evident in southern La Paz where the city expanded into rural territories administered by the municipalities of Palca and Mecapaca (see figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). Hence, by the time fieldwork was started in La Paz, three municipal governments who were controlled by different political parties and followed distinct political agendas claimed influence over territories in La Paz's southern periphery. Municipal governments exercising political and administrative control in these territories included La Paz, which throughout the fieldwork period was controlled by the political party 'Movement without Fear' (MSM), as well as Palca and Mecapaca, which at that time was controlled by the political party 'Movement towards Socialism' (MAS).

***Background to the selected research sites: Pumakatari and Litoral***

The neighbourhoods of Pumakatari and Litoral<sup>30</sup> which are situated in La Paz's south-eastern district of Ovejuyo (see figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6) – an area for which the municipalities of La Paz and Palca both claim political and administrative control – were selected for fieldwork. These neighbourhoods reflected La Paz's composition of the indigenous migrant and *comunero* populations. According to information provided by a member of staff in the municipality of La Paz, approximately 7,850 people lived in the neighbourhoods of Pumakatari and Litoral (12GB). Like most residents in the district of Ovejuyo, residents in the two neighbourhoods were predominantly indigenous peoples of Aymara origin (see figure 4.3). Similar to most of La Paz's peripheral neighbourhoods, Pumakatari and Litoral were characterised by poorer housing conditions and inferior access to physical infrastructure than central neighbourhoods (see figures 4.4 and 4.5).

Pumakatari and Litoral were inhabited by a mixture of indigenous migrants and *comuneros* with diverse socio-economic backgrounds but who all similarly often lacked secure land tenure rights. The residents of the neighbourhoods were organised in a variety of community-based organisations (CBOs) including three neighbourhood organisations

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<sup>30</sup> In order to respect the wish of research participants to stay anonymous it was decided to not mention the actual names of their neighbourhoods and of their CBOs but to make use of pseudonyms.

(JJVVs), two indigenous peasant unions, two folkloric clubs, one parental school association, and five community centres for children.

*Comuneros* represent the original residents of Pumakatari and Litoral. Throughout the colonial and republican period they worked as landless peasants in semi-feudal conditions on *haciendas* (Espinoza 2004). Following land reforms in 1952, the *hacienda* system was abolished and *comuneros* were granted with individual and collective land titles. The rural municipality of Palca, in coordination with the national government, administered the land redistribution for *comuneros* (Espinoza 2004). By the late 1980s Pumakatari and Litoral increasingly became affected by the urban expansion of the city of La Paz. Some *comuneros* in the area wanted to benefit from processes of urban expansion and hence sold parts of their land to land speculators or newly arriving indigenous migrants who predominantly came from rural Aymara communities near the city of Achacachi in Bolivia's Lake Titicaca region. The above mentioned processes of land speculation and land use transformation were not unique to Pumakatari and Litoral but have been observed in other Bolivian cities as well as in cities across Latin America (Goldstein 2013; Lombard 2014).

From the 1990s onwards Pumakatari and Litoral transformed from being evidently rural areas into urban neighbourhoods (see figure 4.7). As a consequence of rapid urbanisation taking place outside its formal municipal boundaries and with an interest in expanding its local tax base<sup>31</sup>, the municipality of La Paz redefined its municipal boundaries in 1995 through the municipal law 1669. Pumakatari and Litoral, along with other areas affected by urban expansion, were now considered to be part of La Paz's municipal territory (Arbona and Kohl 2004). La Paz's legal claim over newer peripheral urban settlements was neither fully legal nor did it stay uncontested as the municipality of Palca, currently with support from the departmental government of La Paz and the national government, continues to claim administrative authority over these neighbourhoods (see figure 4.8).


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<sup>31</sup> Following decentralisation reforms in 1994 (see chapter 5), local municipalities were allowed to collect taxes and public service charges from local residents.

**Figure 4.7 The urbanisation of Pumakatari and Litoral between 1990 and 2014**



Pumakatari and Litoral in 1988 (*photo and copyright to publish received by 6IB*)



Pumakatari and Litoral in June 2003 (*Google Earth image*)



Pumakatari and Litoral in November 2014 (*Google Earth image*)

**Figure 4.8 Municipal boundary between La Paz and Palca in Litoral in 1994**



*Photo and copyright to publish received from 6IB*

## 4.2 Quito, Ecuador

Similar to Bolivia, in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Ecuador (see figure 4.9 for a map of the country) was transformed from being a predominantly rural into an urban society. Only 33.9 per cent of the country's population lived in cities in 1960. This number increased to 67.4 per cent in the year 2010 (INEC 2014). As in Bolivia, internal rural to urban migration constituted one of the main reasons for urbanisation in Ecuador. Ecuador's urban population is mainly concentrated within two large cities, the coastal city Guayaquil and the capital city Quito. More than one third of the country's urban population resides in these cities (Carrion et al 2003).

**Figure 4.9 Map of Ecuador**




*Elaborated by Cartographic Unit, University of Manchester*

Quito, with an altitude of 2,800 metres in the Andes, is Ecuador's political capital and second-largest city after Guayaquil. Unlike in La Paz where political conflicts over the administration of specific urban areas remained a common feature, there existed no major


political conflicts over the administration of urban space in Quito. The municipal government of Quito was the only local government responsible to govern and administer the city of Quito as well as neighbouring suburban and rural areas (see figure 4.10 for a map of the Metropolitan District of Quito and figure 4.11 for a map of Quito’s urban neighbourhoods). During the period of fieldwork Rafael Correa’s political party PAIS Alliance (AP) held a majority in the municipal assembly of Quito. Hence, unlike in La Paz, Quito was governed by the same political party as the national government which was responsible for outlining the country’s overall urban development agenda.

**Figure 4.10 Map of Metropolitan district of Quito**



*This map was developed by the Cartographic Unit, University of Manchester using data from the municipality of Quito (DMQ 2012a).*

**Figure 4.11 Neighbourhoods within Quito's core urban area**



*Source: Lopez (2009)*

In 2010 approximately 2.2 million people lived in the metropolitan district of Quito of whom 1.6 million resided within Quito's urban and suburban areas (DMQ 2012b). According to 2010 census data<sup>32</sup>, 10 per cent of Ecuador's current indigenous population and 25 per cent of Ecuador's urban indigenous population resided in Quito (INEC 2014). At the city level seven per cent of Quito's population, approximately 150,000 people, self-identified as indigenous (Ibid). Hence, in terms of size and proportion, Quito had less indigenous inhabitants than La Paz. The relatively small size of Quito's indigenous population was, however, questioned by most indigenous residents approached in this study who generally pointed out that more people are likely to be indigenous than mentioned in the census. They often explained this tendency by highlighting that the

<sup>32</sup> Question 16 of the census asks participants whether they self-identify as indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian, *mestizo*, or other (INEC 2014). Question 17 asked those self-identifying as indigenous about their belonging to a specific people or nation.

people conducting the census rarely asked indigenous peoples about their identity affiliation (see also chapter 8 for further explanations).

Quito's indigenous population can be categorised broadly into migrants, people who came to the city from other parts of Ecuador during different time periods, and *comuneros*, people who lived in legally recognised indigenous communes whose territories have been absorbed by processes of urban expansion. According to information received from municipal staff in Quito, 140,000 of the city's 150,000 urban indigenous peoples were migrants and the remainder were *comuneros* (1GE; 20GE).

The current position of Quito's diverse indigenous migrant and *comunero* population is best understood in relation to historical processes of urbanisation and urban expansion. Today's Quito had been populous prior to the Spanish conquest. According to Lozano (1991) human activities within the area can be traced back to 4000 BC when 'Quitú' people were reported to live in the area. The 'Quitú' were later conquered by 'Caras', 'Shiris' and 'Incas' (Lozana 1991). In 1542, the Spanish colonisers conquered this Inca settlement and constructed a city (Zaaijer 1991). Similar to La Paz, the colonisers constructed a segregated urban space in which 'white' *criollos* inhabited the planned central city and indigenous peoples lived in unplanned urban settlements in the periphery or in surrounding rural communities (Salomon 1988). It is unclear how many indigenous peoples lived in Quito during the foundation of the colonial city. However, data from 1784 revealed that out of Quito's approximately 24,000 residents, 18,000 were *criollos*, 4,500 were *mestizos*, and 1500 were indigenous (Salmoral 1994).

During the colonial period indigenous peoples mainly worked as servants and domestic workers for the *criollo* elite. They traded agricultural products at local markets situated in San Roque – an area in the eastern part of today's *Centro Histórico* (see figure 4.11). Indigenous peoples were often impoverished and lacked access to adequate food, water, and basic services (Milton 2005).

During the late colonial and early republican period the urban indigenous population of Quito has been said to have declined (Milton 2005). Three factors are normally mentioned to explain this phenomenon (Salmoral 1994; Salomon 1988): first, hard labour conditions and lack of access to food and healthcare led to an increase in diseases and death among

indigenous peoples. Second, indigenous peoples naturally mixed with *criollos* and became *mestizos*. Third, *mestizaje* did not only occur through biological mixing but also through cholofication, generally defined as the change in cultural as well as socio-economic practices.

Throughout the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Quito grew significantly as rural peasants, often from an indigenous origin, migrated to the city to find work or access to better education (Zaaijer 1991). Similar to the case of La Paz, pull factors stimulating the migration to Quito were failed land reforms which made it difficult for highland indigenous peoples to make a living as peasants. The influx of indigenous and other migrants led to a process of unplanned urban growth and expansion. Incoming indigenous migrants initially settled in eastern parts of today's *Centro Historico* (see figure 4.11) where they often lived in densely populated run-down colonial houses which lacked access to water and sanitation services (Espin 2012). In search for better housing indigenous peoples increasingly relocated to Quito's growing peripheral neighbourhoods, such as Chillogallo, Carcelen, Guanmani or Quitumbe (see figure 4.11), or to suburban areas such as Calderon (see figure 4.10).

Within their new neighbourhoods indigenous migrants either rented a house or constructed their own homes on land which had often been bought from land speculators. Most residents in these peripheral settlements lack secure tenure rights. For example, in 2012 the municipality of Quito reported that approximately 45,000 houses, comprising 180,000 residents, in more 'indigenous' areas such as Quitumbe and Calderon lacked access to a land title (DMQ 2012c). Furthermore, these houses often lacked access to basic services such as electricity, water, and sanitation (Ibid). Hence, similar to La Paz's indigenous peoples, Quito's indigenous migrant population often lived within areas that were characterised by a lack of access to physical infrastructure services.

Unlike in La Paz, indigenous migrants often only settled in these areas with their families and did not reproduce their indigenous communities within residential areas of the city (Espin 2012). Instead, indigenous migrants recreated their indigenous communities and associated organisational activities around their places of work (Kingman 2012). The majority of Quito's indigenous migrants were engaged in commercial activities. They often worked as market vendors, street vendors, artisans, carriers, or vegetable peelers in

one of Quito's large markets such as San Roque situated in the *Centro Historico*, the Mayorista market near the Chillogallo neighbourhood, or the markets of the suburb Calderon (Ibid). Indigenous migrants from the same community of origin normally organised themselves in commercial associations based upon their work (Ibid).

The metropolitan district of Quito is also home to indigenous *comuneros* who reside in communes. Communes are considered to be rural communities which, according to the 1937 Law of Communes and recent constitutional reforms (see chapter 7), have a semi-autonomous status. They can manage internal affairs through their own councils (*cabildos*) and government authorities are required to consult *cabildos* prior to any intervention taking place in their territory.

The metropolitan district of Quito comprises 49 indigenous communes (see figure 4.10) which are home to approximately 10,000 *comuneros*. The communes have been affected by processes of urban expansion occurring in the city since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. By 2012, 24 communes were already part of urban or suburban Quito (see figure 4.10). As in La Paz's urban periphery, land was often illegally subdivided by *comuneros* or other land speculators. As a consequence, urbanised communes are now inhabited by a diversity of indigenous and non-indigenous residents representing all parts of the socio-economic spectrum (DMQ 2012a).

Despite their different relationships with the city, Quito's indigenous migrant and *comunero* population had in common that they were generally less educated than non-indigenous residents. For example, in 2012 about 13 per cent of Quito's overall indigenous population was considered illiterate (DMQ 2012b). In comparison, only four per cent of *mestizos* reported to be illiterate (Ibid). It is also important to note that Quito's indigenous migrants and *comuneros* are affected by ethno-racial discrimination. For example, the municipality of Quito reported that 12 per cent of Quito's non-indigenous residents did not want to have indigenous peoples as their neighbours (DMQ 2012b).

### ***Background to the selected research sites***

Reflecting on the composition of Quito's indigenous population, it was decided to conduct fieldwork predominantly with indigenous migrants who represented the city's urban indigenous majority. Nevertheless, selected interviews have been conducted with

*comuneros* residing in areas affected by urban expansion in the areas of Calderon and *Aeropuerto* (see figure 4.10).

More in-depth research has been conducted with a group of indigenous migrants that originally came to Quito from the rural parish Tigua which is situated in Ecuador's Cotopaxi province. Overall, approximately 7000 Tiguans lived in different neighbourhoods of Quito (9IE; 12IE). Tiguans are renowned in Ecuador and internationally for their paintings which depict colourful scenes of rural communal life (see figure 4.12). In Quito, approximately 300 Tigua migrants were engaged in the production and sale of paintings (12IE). This group of Tigua artists predominantly sold their paintings at the weekend market in the 'El Ejido' park situated in Quito's tourist district *Mariscal Sucre* (see figure 4.11). The remaining Tiguans were predominantly working as market vendors or food carriers in Quito's San Roque and Mayorista markets.

**Figure 4.12 Tigua paintings**



*Photo taken by the author on Quito's El Ejido artisan market (16 March 2013)*

Similar to the majority of indigenous migrants (Kingman 2012), Tiguans recreated their urban indigenous communities and organisational networks around their work places. The group of Tiguans approached in this research was organised predominantly within the market vendor association AECT-Q (Tigua association of carriers and commercial

vendors residing in Quito) or AVIC-Q<sup>33</sup> (Association of indigenous vendors from Cotopaxi who reside in Quito). These associations held their meetings close to their members' work places. For example, the AECT-Q convened association meetings on the premises of the indigenous weekend school Pachama College which was situated near the central San Roque market. In addition to being a meeting ground for the AECT-Q, this school provided weekend education to 85 indigenous migrants from Tigua aged between 18 and 55 years. Similar to the wider Tiguan community, the majority of these students worked as market vendors and lived in different peripheral neighbourhoods of the city. The Pachamama College, hence, served as an ideal starting point to approach various indigenous leaders and members of the wider Tiguan migrant community in Quito.

### 4.3 Summary

This chapter offered an overview of La Paz's and Quito's general demographic characteristics, introduced the different actors and government institutions responsible for governing these cities, described the main features of their urban indigenous populations and provided some background on the research sites. La Paz and Quito certainly share a set of similarities – they are both the seat of their countries' national governments and experienced rapid processes of urbanisation and urban expansion during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In both cities, urbanisation and urban expansion coincided with processes of ethno-racial diversification and an increasing urban indigenous presence. The urban indigenous peoples of both cities are diverse, representing migrants from different parts of the country but also *comuneros* whose territories were absorbed during processes of urban expansion. Urban indigenous peoples in both cities generally face poorer socio-economic living conditions than non-indigenous residents.

There are important differences between these two cities (see table 4.1). First, more government actors with distinct political affiliations influenced urban policy and planning practice in La Paz than happened in Quito. The cities' unique composition of government employees and activists will be taken into account in chapters 5 and 7 which describe how indigeneity and indigenous rights are translated into official urban policy and planning practices.

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<sup>33</sup> As is the case in La Paz, in order to respect the wish of research participants to stay anonymous it was decided to not mention the actual names of selected commercial associations but to make use of pseudonyms.

**Table 4.1 Basic characteristics of La Paz’s and Quito’s indigenous population**

	<b>La Paz, Bolivia</b>	<b>Quito, Ecuador</b>
<b>Governments influencing urban policy and planning (political party)</b>	National government (MAS) Municipality of La Paz (MSM) Municipality of Palca (MAS) Municipality of Mecapaca (MAS)	National government (AP) Municipality of Quito (AP)
<b>Approximate population size</b>	764,617	1,600,000
<b>Indigenous population</b>		
<i>Number</i>	219,535	150,000
<i>% of overall urban population</i>	29	7
<i>Composition</i>	Migrants and <i>comuneros</i>	Migrants and <i>comuneros</i>
<i>Location of residence</i>	Peripheral neighbourhoods	Peripheral neighbourhoods, city centre, communes
<i>Organisational structure</i>	Organisation and development of indigenous communities around places of residence: eg neighbourhood associations, indigenous peasant unions, folkloric associations	<i>Comuneros</i> : Organisation in <i>cabildos</i> Migrants: Organisation and development of indigenous communities around places of work – eg commercial associations
<b>Selected research sites</b>	Fieldwork conducted within the indigenous neighbourhoods Pumakatari and Litoral	Fieldwork conducted with selected <i>comuneros</i> and with commercial associations representing migrants from Tigua

*Elaborated by the author*

Second, even though smaller in its overall population, La Paz is home to a significantly larger indigenous population than Quito. Third, the organisational structure and basic community characteristics of indigenous peoples differed between the two cities. In La Paz, indigenous peoples, migrants and *comuneros* alike, often live in peripheral neighbourhoods together with members from their communities of origin. Within these neighbourhoods migrants and *comuneros* are engaged in different residential organisations. In contrast, Quito’s indigenous population, particularly migrants who represent the city’s indigenous majority, are more dispersed across the city and rarely organise around their places of residence but more around their places of work. The particular characteristics relating to the cities’ indigenous populations were taken into account during the process of selecting specific research sites – the neighbourhoods Pumakatari and Litoral in La Paz and the Tigua migrant community as well as selected communes in Quito. Chapters 6 and 8 will focus in more detail on these different research sites; they will show how indigenous residents in the selected research sites in La Paz and Quito define their indigenous identity and how they contest and negotiate their specific interests and demands with different government representatives.

## **5 The role of indigeneity in public policy and urban planning practice in La Paz**

The historical subject of the Bolivian state is no longer the colonial subject or the working class. It is the indigenous person, indigenous like the president, indigenous like the majority of Bolivia's rural and urban population, indigenous as a planetary paradigm. These are the people we are working for. (27GB)

As highlighted in this testimony of a deputy minister in Bolivia's ministry of culture, indigeneity plays a central role in current Bolivian politics. This has been made explicit in the country's new political constitution, ratified via public referendum in 2009. This constitution, whose contents were summarised in chapter two, not only recognises the specific rights of so-called indigenous original peasants (IOPs), it also promotes a development agenda which follows the principle of *Vivir Bien* and interculturalism. As part of this new development approach it particularly emphasises addressing the specific interests and demands of rural and urban indigenous peoples within different sector policies including justice, education but also urban development. As was outlined in the literature review, the constitution does not provide concrete guidelines on how to practically implement these different rights and development principles and leaves government institutions and officials responsible for this process with room to experiment.

This chapter therefore explores to what extent and how new constitutional content on indigeneity are addressed within laws, public policies and urban planning interventions that have an impact on the case study city – La Paz. It draws on findings from document analysis, observations and interviews with government officials operating in those institutions that influence policy and urban planning practice in this city. These included Bolivia's national government (section 5.1) and the municipal governments of La Paz (section 5.2) and Palca (section 5.3). The central argument of this chapter is that government officials operating in each one of these institutions focused not solely on constitutional content when addressing the issue of indigeneity. Throughout this chapter it will become clear that a variety of factors – particularly history but also the legal, institutional and political context as well as government officials' own views on indigeneity and urban development – equally contributed to the fact that indigeneity was addressed in very different and sometimes contradictory ways within public policies and urban planning practices.

## 5.1 Bolivia's national government

Following the ratification of Bolivia's new constitution, Evo Morales was once again elected as President of Bolivia; with 64 per cent of the public vote and 88 out of 130 seats in parliament his party, Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), held an absolute majority. This section examines how the national government incorporated new constitutional rights and principles on indigeneity and interculturalism in a variety of laws which directly affect cities and urban indigenous population groups including those living in La Paz (see table 5.1).

**Table 5.1 National legislation that incorporates new constitutional rights in Bolivia**

Law	Key contents
Law of Autonomies and Decentralisation (LAD 2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outlines different competencies and development priorities for local governments;</li> <li>• Introduces autonomous indigenous original peasant territories as new local government entity in rural territories;</li> <li>• Defines different development goals and principles for rural and urban areas.</li> </ul>
Law of Participation and Social Auditing (LPS 2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defines different mechanisms of participation and social control for central and decentralised government units.</li> </ul>
Law of jurisdictional demarcation (LJD 2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Restricts the application of indigenous justice to rural spaces inhabited by IOPs;</li> <li>• Outlines relationship between ordinary and indigenous justice.</li> </ul>
Law to regulate property rights over urban estates and housing (LRPUEH 2012)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New regulation on land titling procedures in cities;</li> <li>• Defines <i>Vivir Bien</i> within urban areas.</li> </ul>
Law of Education "Avelino Simani – Elizardo Perez" (LE 2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduces Bolivia's new intercultural/ intracultural/ plurilingual education system which is applicable in every part of Bolivia.</li> </ul>

*Based on content analysis undertaken by the author*

By far the most important law regulating the translation of new constitutional rights into practice is the Law of Autonomies and Decentralisation (LAD) which was ratified in July 2010. This law deepened decentralisation within Bolivia and outlined the responsibilities and competencies of central and local governments. Following previous legislation on decentralisation such as the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP), the LAD automatically recognised municipal and departmental governments. In addition, following the constitutional mandate (CPE Bolivia 2009, art. 269), the LAD (2010: art. 6) also introduced IOP territories as a new local government unit<sup>34</sup>. In order for IOP territories to

<sup>34</sup> The LAD as well recognises autonomous regional governments as new decentralised government units. It hereby incorporates autonomy demands articulated by the four Bolivian departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija who stand in direct opposition to Evo Morales's MAS. For further details see Nolte and Horn (2009).

become autonomous local governments, indigenous communities and groups have to comply with a variety of criteria. They have to prove that they inhabit collectively-owned territories which are recognised and registered by the Bolivian Service for Agrarian Reforms – INRA (LAD 2010: art. 6). This suggests that the granting of IOP status is likely to be restricted to rural territories. In addition to this criterion, indigenous communities have to undergo a rather complex and bureaucratic application process involving multiple stages; these include preparing a formal application to the government, holding referenda within their own communities, preparing autonomy statutes, and receiving approval by the constitutional court (LAD 2010: art. 56-63). The complexity of the process meant that by 2013 only five applications, none of them from indigenous communities in urban areas, had been completed; they are still awaiting approval from the constitutional court (see Tockman and Cameron 2014 for a detailed discussion).

The LAD (2010: art. 79-100) defines that every decentralised government unit has to comply the rights and development principles manifested in the new constitution as well as with national legislation ratified for different policy sectors. It also emphasises that each local government unit has to draft a charter (*Carta Orgánica*) which outlines its administrative structure and competencies (LAD 2010: article 3). In addition, it also sets development priorities for different types of local government which are summarised in article 8 (LAD 2010):

1. Autonomous indigenous original peasant governments should promote their development as nations and peoples as well as the management of their own territories.
2. Departmental autonomies should drive local socio-economic development and productiveness within their jurisdiction.
3. Municipal autonomies should boost economic, human, and urban development through the provision of public services to their population. They should as well assist rural development.

According to this definition, development priorities differ among local governments. IOP territories should focus on the promotion and preservation of indigenous cultures and governance principles. It is only for these local governments that the LAD (2010: art. 42) emphasises the application of specific indigenous rights manifested in article 30 of the new constitution (CPE Bolivia 2009). In contrast, within its definition of development priorities for municipal governments – which include those responsible for the

administration of La Paz – issues such as indigeneity or indigenous rights have not been mentioned (see also LAD 2010: art. 79-100). However, these governments should simply comply with relevant national legislation that addresses indigenous affairs and intercultural concerns within policy sectors such as education, housing or healthcare (ibid).

The definition of different development priorities for distinct local governments responsible for administering rural IOP territories, departments and cities, seems controversial particularly in a context where Bolivia's constitution highlights that principles such as *Vivir Bien* (CPE Bolivia 2009: art. 8, 306) – prioritising community over individual interests – and interculturalism (CPE Bolivia 2009: 98, 218) – addressing the specific rights, interests and demands of groups such as indigenous peoples – should be applicable across Bolivia. To understand deviations from the constitutional text in the LAD, it was necessary to speak with national government officials who were responsible for the draft of this new law. For example, a deputy minister in Bolivia's Ministry for Autonomies, who played a key role in the formulation of the LAD and represents a senior MAS official, provided his interpretation on how local development should occur in different parts of the country:

Indigenous peoples can maintain all their organisational and governance criteria according to their traditions and ancestral knowledge in their own territories. By contrast, in territories in which modernity has been developed, I'm speaking about urban municipalities, the big cities of our department: here we need to have a different focus. The respect of private property and of individual rights according to the liberal model is what we have to stimulate in urban areas. By contrast, in the rural areas and particularly in our indigenous territories, where we as well have individualism but to a lesser degree, we subordinate individualism to collective indigenous rights. (22GB)

Following the above-mentioned testimony, this senior official remained guided by a rather static and rural understanding of indigeneity. This is most likely one of the reasons why, despite recognition of urban indigenous peoples within Bolivia's constitution, legislation such as the LAD associates indigeneity, indigenous rights and principles with rurality but not with cities – places that were historically associated with modernity and Western culture.

Understandings of cities as non-indigenous spaces were not only articulated by this senior official but also by another deputy minister, who himself was of indigenous origin and also involved in the preparation and current implementation of the LAD. He stated: “Of course, indigenous people live in the city but they cannot claim an indigenous autonomy in this area as they are a minority. They have to adapt themselves to the rules of the city” (21GB).

In a context where senior government officials remain guided by historically established static and spatial understandings of indigeneity as a social category which is restricted to rural areas, it is unsurprising that the contents of the LAD do not mention the need to address specific indigenous rights, interests and demands within cities. Government staff in other sector ministries was certainly aware that this problem existed among their own ranks. A deputy minister working for the ministry of culture and responsible for administering the issue of intercultural relations, for example, pointed out the following:

I know that we introduce problems with our new laws and reality. Of course, there are a large number of indigenous people living in cities. I live in the city! But our laws are still drafted by people who follow historical imaginaries and discourses. These people might also be indigenous but in their minds they are still living in 1952 and want to encourage our indigenous peoples to stay in or return to rural areas where they can work their land. In the city, they believe that people are no longer indigenous. (14GB)

As indicated in this statement, history and not necessarily the new content of the constitution continued to guide the work of government officials responsible for the draft of new legislation. Indeed, other legislation which addressed indigenous rights and concerns also seemed guided by a rather static and rural understanding of indigeneity. For example, following constitutional guidelines (CPE Bolivia 2009: art. 192), the ministry of justice ratified a new law on jurisdictional demarcation (LJD 2010). The LJD (2010: art. 7) recognises Bolivia as society in which multiple legal systems co-exist in equality; these include indigenous justice and ordinary justice. The recognition of indigenous justice allows indigenous communities to rely on their own authorities and legal principles which emphasise collective over individual rights (LJD 2010: art 13). Yet, like the recognition of IOP territories in the LAD, this law restricts the application of indigenous justice to rural areas in which IOPs live (article 8, 11). Cities, meanwhile, remain governed by principles

of ordinary justice. A deputy-minister in the ministry of justice, who was involved in the formulation of this law, gave the following reasons for the spatial restriction to rural areas:

In the cities we have ordinary justice but some of them [indigenous people] don't want this. Instead, they want to apply indigenous justice. But it is an urban area, a city, right? You can be Aymara or Quechua in the city but you are living in a modern legal environment. By contrast, in the countryside this is different. There you have a communitarian authority and there you can rely on indigenous justice. (...) In the city this is impossible because here we are governed by different rights. (19GB)

The above-mentioned statement once again illustrates how government staff associated indigeneity, and in this case indigenous justice, only with specific rural territories. It is likely that such a static understanding of indigeneity as a rural category, and not necessarily new constitutional content on topics such as interculturalism, shaped the draft of new legislation.

It may also be noted that new legislation was often simply built upon legal principles and laws that had been ratified before Bolivia's new constitution. This was, for example, the case with the new Law of Participation and Social Auditing (LPS) which was ratified in February 2013. This law introduces a variety of social auditing mechanisms, eg within policy sectors such as healthcare (art. 8.11), education (art. 8.12), or environmental management (art. 8.14), and participation channels, eg participatory budgeting (art. 36), or policy dialogue roundtables (art. 39), at the level of central and local government. Yet, in its definition of civil society organisations which are invited into social auditing and participatory schemes, the LPS simply follows territorial principles which have already been established by the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP). Hence, for rural territories the LPS (2013, art. 14) emphasises that indigenous peasant unions and indigenous communitarian organisations should be involved in participatory and social auditing processes. By contrast, within cities participation is restricted to neighbourhood associations – so called *juntas de vecinos* (JJVVs). As has been outlined in chapter two, previous research emphasised that a singular focus on *vecinos*, historically associated with 'white' and *criollo* urban residents and currently a way to describe urban residents as neighbours, within the LPP hid the issue of ethnic diversity within cities (Goldstein 2013). Hence, by reproducing the content of previous legislation, current laws continue to

introduce a participatory model which does not take into account the issue of indigeneity within cities.

The different laws discussed above rarely incorporated constitutional content such as addressing intercultural diversity and specific indigenous rights within the city. This tendency was also visible in legislation which directly targeted urban development. At the time fieldwork was being conducted in La Paz, the national government ratified only one new law which focused on urban development – the 2012 law to regulate property rights over urban estates and housing (LRPUEH). A deputy minister working in the ministry of public works, services and housing explained why the national government put such little emphasis on urban issues: “In the current government of President Evo Morales public policy is focused on setting economic incentives in the countryside and of improving people’s lives in villages” (24GB).

While the government seemed to prioritise rural development incentives, what issues were prioritised within the LRPUEH? The LRPUEH emphasises to provide city-dwellers with tenure rights if they can prove that they have lived on the same plot of land for more than five years (LRPUEH 2012: art. 10). The government thereby embarked on a gigantic task. According to a senior civil servant in the ministry of public works, services and housing (25GB), by 2012 almost 60 per cent of Bolivia’s urban home owners still lacked a land title<sup>35</sup>. Unlike for rural or IOP territories, the LRPUEH (2012: art. 11) only recognised individual but not collective or communitarian tenure rights within cities. Within the same law *Vivir Bien* is defined as access to material goods such as individual land tenure rights and housing (LRPUEH 2012: art. 4). A deputy minister working for the ministry of public works, services and housing, who was involved in the formulation of the LRPUEH, further elaborated how the national government understands *Vivir Bien* within cities:

The concept of *Vivir Bien* means improving people’s lives through practically transforming the negative and critical conditions that characterise our urban areas. Around one million people do not have secure living conditions. They lack a land title, or a job, and sometimes even a place to live. We have to respond to the interests of these people which by the way also include those who are indigenous. You know, at the moment we simply do not have time to define new legislation

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<sup>35</sup> According to the most recent census, 59.73 of Bolivia’s overall urban population are home owners (INE 2014). The census does not provide details on their tenure status. For this reason this thesis had to rely on information provided by government staff.

that specifically addresses indigenous demands for collective land rights in cities. (24GB)

This senior official certainly recognised that urban indigenous groups express specific demands for collective land ownership within cities. Yet, the priorities of his ministry currently lie on other issues – the need to target universal rights for land ownership, housing and urban public services which directly affect indigenous peoples as well. As outlined by another senior civil servant working in the same ministry, the provision of such rights could best be achieved through private sector cooperation: “We rely on the private sector to implement large scale infrastructure works. This allows us to work competitively and to generate a reasonable profit. We prioritise sub-contracting small to medium level enterprises for these tasks” (25GB). This point was further underlined by a national government ombudsman (13GB) who highlighted that “(...) indigenous communitarian economic principles have to subordinate themselves to the urban economy which was predominantly driven by private enterprises”.

Addressing universal rights and private sector interests, instead of promoting specific indigenous rights, represented a key concern within the national government’s urban development agenda and elsewhere. Such a priority was also made in the government’s socio-economic policy agenda where the national government emphasised regaining control of the economy and expanding the resource extraction sector; this helped in generating additional government revenues which were often used for the funding of universal social protection schemes that addressed every Bolivian (Filho and Goncalvez 2010; Tockman and Cameron 2014). These included the pension scheme *Renta Dignidad* or the fund for school children *Bono Juancito Pinto* (ibid). The prioritisation of achieving universal welfare through the expansion of the resource extraction sector, however, also came with a price: the national government often ignored or sometimes violated specific rights for indigenous peoples on prior consultation when undertaking resource extraction activities directly on their territories (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013; McNeish 2013).

The central finding so far has been that the national government addressed the issue of indigeneity differently for rural and urban areas. In addition, constitutional development principles such as *Vivir Bien* have also been addressed differently within specific sector

policies. One reason for these different interpretations was provided by a deputy minister responsible for decolonial affairs and working in the ministry of culture:

All our ministries are like islands and have their own dream of constructing a new Bolivian state. All these people will provide you with different clichés of what *Vivir Bien* means. *Vivir Bien* and housing, *Vivir Bien* and land, *Vivir Bien* and indigenous people...They don't have a shared vision; they rely on their own clichés. (27GB)

According to this testimony the absence of inter-institutional cooperation and communication seems to represent a central factor in explaining why ministries interpret *Vivir Bien* differently for specific sector policies and population groups. In the same interview, this government official highlighted that his ministerial unit for decolonial affairs had been made responsible for promoting inter-institutional cooperation but lacked the human and financial resources needed to undertake this task.

It was not only Bolivia's national government which struggled in the promotion of new constitutional contents on indigenous rights and interculturalism within different sector policies. Instead, government officials often pointed out that Bolivian society was simply not prepared for some of the ideas and principles introduced in the new constitution. A deputy minister working in the ministry of autonomies highlighted this point as follows:

During 187 years of republican domination and previous colonial domination we developed as a capitalist society. This happened at the expense of our communitarian values which have been repressed through racist politics and discrimination. This generated a negative consciousness among us Bolivians, particularly in cities which were the colonial centres. We cannot reverse this consciousness from one day to the next. (...) It will take some years. I have more hope in our children who will receive a different education and are more likely to change our society. (21GB)

To overcome racist attitudes within Bolivian society this official proposes to wait for better educated citizens. This, however, requires a different educational system which decolonises the minds of Bolivians. The new law of education (LE) ratified in 2010 and drawing on article 17 of Bolivia's constitution, precisely seeks to achieve this goal. The LE is different from previous intercultural education models introduced in the 1990s which predominantly targeted rural indigenous areas. According to the LE, each student has to learn about traditional indigenous cosmovision and about modern 'Western' science

(LE, article 3.10). Besides Spanish, each student has to learn one indigenous language in school, ideally the one which is mostly used in the local area (LE, article 7). The LE therefore introduces an intercultural (learn about other peoples' culture), intracultural (learn about one's own culture), and plurilingual (learn Spanish and an indigenous language) education system (LE, article 3). At first sight the LE offers a more universal approach on intercultural education. However, in an interview with a senior member of staff in the ministry of education, it became clear that plurilingual education had not been implemented equally across Bolivia:

There is a territorial principle (...) meaning that if we are in Aymara territory we have to teach the Aymara language and values. If there is a Guarani in this territory it is the responsibility of the parents to teach this child the Guarani language. (...) In cities people mainly speak Spanish so it is not necessary to teach indigenous languages (18GB)

Indeed, when conducting fieldwork in the city of La Paz, a city where the vast proportion of inhabitants speak Aymara as their first language (see chapter 4), research participants generally confirmed that the new intercultural education was being delivered only in Spanish. During interviews and informal conversations indigenous residents complained about the absence of Aymara-speaking teachers and highlighted that school teachers often refused to learn their language. Hence, local realities in La Paz seemed to differ from national legislation which promoted a plurilingual education agenda. The following sections will further analyse how indigeneity has been addressed within local policies and urban planning interventions in La Paz.

## **5.2 The municipality of La Paz**

Bolivia's national government was not the only institution involved in the process of translating constitutional rights and contents. As defined in the new LAD (2010), local governments were also responsible to incorporate new constitutional content and associated national legislation within their political agendas. In La Paz, the municipal governments of La Paz and Palca both claimed political and administrative control over this city. Before focusing on Palca, this section first discusses what was actually done by the municipal government of La Paz to translate constitutional content particularly on topics such as indigeneity and interculturalism into public policies and urban planning practices.

During the period of conducting fieldwork, the political party *Movimiento Sin Miedo* (MSM) held a majority in the city council. The political party MSM, in charge of La Paz's municipality for more than 10 years, stood in opposition to Evo Morales's MAS party. With 648 members of staff and an annual municipal budget of 1.630.077.718 Bolivianos (approximately 141 million GBP) in 2012, La Paz was by far one of the richest municipal governments, in terms of human and financial resources, in Bolivia (La Paz 2011). The municipal budget allocated for the administrative year 2012 was made up of national government transfers (27 per cent of the total budget in 2012), money collected from property tax and public service charges (70 per cent of the total budget), and additional loans (3 per cent of the total budget) received from donor organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (La Paz 2011: 24).

The municipal government complied with administrative and political guidelines outlined in the 2009 constitution and associated legislation ratified by the national government. For example, following the guidelines of the LAD (2010), it ratified a *Carta Orgánica* that outlined its key competencies and development priorities. The *Carta Orgánica* provided a good background to understanding how the municipal government understood and addressed new constitutional content on indigeneity, development or interculturalism. Article one of the *Carta Orgánica* certainly recognised the intercultural and plurinational character of the city (La Paz 2012). Within article 5 it also recognised the 'Chola Paceña', the indigenous market woman of La Paz, as official symbol of the city. Within the same article it also recognised Spanish and Aymara as official languages (ibid). Yet, recognising Aymara as an official language seemed to have more symbolic than practical relevance. It was symbolic in that it was used in banners which were dispatched across the city (see box 5.1) – here the municipality was advertised as the strong city (*con fuerza* – Spanish, *con ñeq'e* - Aymara). In practical terms, Aymara was certainly a widely-spoken language among the local population (see chapter 4), but not among local government staff. According to a survey conducted by the municipality's intercultural unit only two per cent of municipal staff knew how to speak Aymara (1GB).

Although the *Carta Orgánica* recognised indigenous cultural symbols and languages, it did not incorporate the issue of indigeneity in its description of the urban development planning agenda. Instead, following legislative guidelines in the LPP or LPS, the *Carta*

*Orgánica* referred to all inhabitants of the city of La Paz simply as people or *vecinos* (La Paz 2012: art. 8).

**Box 5.1 La Paz’s municipal slogan – La Paz, strong city**



*Source: La Paz (2011)*

While the *Carta Orgánica* relied on constitutional content such as interculturalism and ethnic diversity, it did not draw on the concept of *Vivir Bien* in its definition of development. Instead, the *Carta Orgánica* relied on principles of human and sustainable development when defining its overall urban development planning agenda (La Paz 2012: art. 12). Human and sustainable development (*carta orgánica*, article 8.2) were defined as “(...) a political, philosophical and institutional concept in which people represent the centre and end of the actions of the autonomous municipal government of La Paz which intends to improve and dignify people’s living conditions (...)”. To understand this departure from development principles outlined in the constitution, it was necessary to speak with municipal staff who played a key role in drafting this document and who were responsible for incorporating its content into the city’s urban development agenda. A civil servant working in the municipal human development unit, for example, stated the following:

The constitution does not define clearly how *Vivir Bien* can be achieved. We therefore continued to rely on sustainable urban development which we used in the past. This helps our residents to live better. By this we bring *Vivir Bien* to our people. We just use another concept to achieve the same thing. (10GB)

According to this testimony it was simply because of the absence of clear guidelines on how to implement new principles such as *Vivir Bien* that municipal staff decided to rely on a human and sustainable development model. Another justification was offered by the director of La Paz's development planning unit:

First they [national government] did not want to approve our *carta orgánica* because we used the term sustainable development...but we defended ourselves by showing them that technically it means the same as *Vivir Bien*. Of course, you could say that sustainable development is adapted from the Europeans or the Americans and doesn't fit our indigenous Bolivianism. In the end, it is only politicians that fight over names to achieve the same things. For me only the contents matter. Yes we are in opposition to the MAS but that does not mean that we are against new constitutional principles. Simply speaking, for me, as an economist educated in the United States, *Vivir Bien* and sustainable development mean exactly the same thing. (4GB)

Within this statement the senior official suggested two reasons which potentially explain why the municipal government did not rely on *Vivir Bien*: First, the reliance on another development model could be interpreted as a political attempt by the municipality to turn its back on the political agenda and ideological model of the opposition party – the MAS – which was in charge of the national government. Second, and more importantly, it is likely that senior municipal staff opted to rely on a human and sustainable development approach because they previously received training on these approaches but not on *Vivir Bien*. Indeed, like the director of La Paz's development planning unit, other senior civil servants mentioned that they received postgraduate training either in the United States or in the prestigious Catholic University of La Paz (3GB; 5GB; 11GB). According to Kohl and Farthing (2006) from the 1990s onwards the Catholic University offered public policy and administration courses which followed a so-called 'Harvard Programme'. The curricula of these courses were strongly influenced by neoliberal theories and Western planning principles which focus on sustainability, the protection of individual liberties, infrastructure provisioning, wealth creation, and growth.

It was precisely the above-mentioned topics which played a central role in public policy and planning practice in La Paz. According to article 13 of the *Carta Orgánica* development can be achieved through improving the local physical and socio-economic infrastructure, creating jobs by attracting private enterprises, protecting the environment, coordinating the spatial planning of all districts, strengthening participation, and promoting tourism and intercultural diversity within the city (La Paz 2012). These specific pillars of the human and sustainable urban development model were outlined in detail in the municipal government programme, valid from 2010 to 2015 (La Paz 2009). Furthermore, the municipality's annual operational plan outlined how these development pillars could be achieved practically through a set of specific interventions (La Paz 2011). Table 5.2 provides an overview of the 10 development pillars of the municipality and offers a brief summary of the activities that were planned for 2012.

A review of the development agenda and the annual operational plan revealed that the municipal government at no stage explicitly mentioned the issue of indigeneity in relation to any of its multiple interventions. The director of La Paz's human development unit explained this as follows:

With our interventions we want to improve the quality of life for all residents. As part of our work we do not have a specific focus on indigenous residents but we address them anyways. For example, if it is a black child or an indigenous child: they both get free meals at school. They both can enter improved healthcare centres. (11GB)

According to this testimony the municipal government, similar to sector ministries that focused on urban development at the level of national government, simply followed a universal targeting approach through which it also expected to address indigenous residents yet without necessarily taking into account their specific rights. Such an understanding of how to address indigenous peoples was generally highlighted in most interviews with civil servants. The universal targeting agenda of the municipality is briefly outlined below for three of its core activities – the provision and maintenance of physical infrastructure, participation and spatial planning.

**Table 5.2 The ten pillars of La Paz’s urban development agenda**

Development pillar	Planned Activities in 2012
1) <i>Barrios de verdad</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Infrastructure works in more than 39 poor urban communities in La Paz’s urban peripheries;</li> <li>• Incorporation of peripheral settlements into La Paz’s spatial planning regime.</li> </ul>
2) Cheap and efficient transport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Repairing and paving of streets;</li> <li>• Design of a city-wide new bus network;</li> </ul>
3) Modernisation of the city centre	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Repairing and repaving streets and public squares;</li> <li>• Construction of three new market halls to accommodate street vendors;</li> <li>• Construction of tourist information centres.</li> </ul>
4) Community with nature	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More than 400 infrastructure projects to protect the city from disasters;</li> <li>• Incorporate disaster prone areas into spatial plans;</li> <li>• Educational campaigns.</li> </ul>
5) Community care	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction of a women’s safety centre;</li> <li>• Workshops on maternal health; parenting; healthcare.</li> </ul>
6) Better education and healthcare in an intercultural municipality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction or refurbishment of 40 schools, three cultural centres, and eight healthcare facilities,</li> <li>• Provision of free school meals for children;</li> <li>• Promotion of cultural events at city and district level.</li> </ul>
7) Leading city, Safe city	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction of street lights and new municipal police stations;</li> <li>• Citizen security workshops.</li> </ul>
8) Opportunities for progress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction of convention centre and tourist view points;</li> <li>• Job training for high school students.</li> </ul>
9) Autonomous and participatory governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participatory budgeting exercises with neighbourhood organisations for the realisation of road improvements and small scale community infrastructure projects;</li> <li>• Realisation of one municipal assembly to inform residents about progress of work in the municipality;</li> </ul>
10) Metropolitan governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enter a dialogue with neighbouring municipalities to resolve boundary conflicts;</li> <li>• Promote the metropolitan region.</li> </ul>

Sources: *La Paz (2009); La Paz (2011)*

### 5.2.1 Physical infrastructure improvements and participation schemes

One of the prime activities, as also shown in table 5.2, undertaken by the municipality of La Paz was the promotion and maintenance of the city’s physical infrastructure. According to the annual operational plan more than 70 per cent of the municipal budget for 2012 was dedicated to specific infrastructure projects (La Paz 2011). In 2012 alone the municipality attempted to build eight new healthcare centres and three market halls; it also aimed to renovate 40 schools – one of them in the selected fieldwork sites of Litoral and Pumakatari. Within these peripheral neighbourhoods the municipality also intended to repair the local sanitation system, a project worth 900 million Bolivianos. Furthermore, in cooperation with local residents involved in participatory budgeting exercises, the municipality executed small-scale infrastructure projects in every district of the city (ibid).

Following national legislation such as the 1994 LPP or the 2013 LPS, the municipality involved JJVVs – particularly their leaders – in participatory budgeting schemes. A civil servant in the district municipality South was certainly aware that the involvement of such organisations did not necessarily have a specific ethnic focus. Nevertheless, he argued:

In all of our work, besides the work of the department of culture, we do not focus on the topic of ethnicity and the specific demands of groups with different cultural backgrounds. No need to play minority politics. Our infrastructure is for all *vecinos* of La Paz. But don't get me wrong here. Our *vecinos* are of all backgrounds. They include indigenous people who can equally participate in the preparation of the annual operational plan. (7GB)

Following this interpretation, indigenous people are considered to be recipients of universal infrastructure interventions. As residents they can also take part in participatory budgeting schemes. A specific focus on the role of indigeneity seemed also absent from other participatory forums within the municipality which included annual municipal assemblies and sector policy councils in which municipal staff presented residents, mainly those organised in JJVVs, with a report on the progress of their realised activities. This was made clear by the director of La Paz's participation unit: "Within our municipal assemblies we invite the members of our territorial organisations. Whatever their background may be, they can come. (...) We have not developed any particular programme that involves indigenous organisations" (8GB).

A member of the urban development programme of the NGO UNITAS provided an explanation for the ongoing municipal focus on infrastructure provision and territorial participation:

I think that the responsibilities of municipalities outlined in the neoliberal reforms in the 1990s remain intact and represent the main responsibility of today's urban municipalities. This explains why the municipal agenda in other sectors is not progressing sufficiently as authorities are often unwilling to really modify their responsibilities (...) This is interesting. I mean the whole idea of doing infrastructure work with *JJVVs* at the local level was part of the neoliberal development model. Even in today's anti-neoliberal Bolivia people associate this with local level politics. (...) All you do at the local level is infrastructure, nothing more and nothing less. This is clearly happening in La Paz. (9GB)

Municipal staff also agreed that the focus remained on infrastructure provision. They often referred to the 1994 LPP as a main guideline for their work. A project coordinator in La Paz's development planning unit explained this as follows:

The law of popular participation defined the main responsibilities of urban municipalities. This was infrastructure provisioning through participatory budgeting. Evo Morales's government does not really introduce new laws for our cities. With no new legislation, what else can we do besides following older laws?  
(3GB)

Hence, it was not necessarily an absence of political will to address other issues, such as indigeneity, within interventions on topics such as infrastructure or participation. Instead, as clearly indicated in the above testimony municipal staff often lacked concrete operational or legal guidelines that would allow them to address such topics within their political agenda.

### **5.2.2 Spatial planning**

The *Carta Orgánica* emphasises that a principle task of the municipal government should be the regulation of urban space and the registration of land use patterns (La Paz 2012: art. 63-64). It highlights that neighbourhoods should be planned in such a way that access to basic services such as water, electricity and roads – as well as education or healthcare – can be guaranteed (La Paz 2012: art. 63-64). In order to receive access to crucial public services such as water, electricity, or roads, urban residents in Bolivia generally need to have proof of tenure rights (Kohl and Farthing 2006). To identify gaps in land registration and titling procedures, the *Carta Orgánica* outlines that the municipal government should set up land-use plans for each neighbourhood (La Paz 2012: art. 63-64). Particularly in peripheral areas the municipality should provide residents with formal titles or provide them with intermediary residency status which would allow them to claim services (ibid).

To achieve such goals, the municipality strengthened the capacity of La Paz's spatial planning unit which, according to a senior civil servant working in this unit, since 2010 received double the amount of annual funding in order to complete land registration processes particularly in the city's periphery (5GB). In 2012, this unit, for example, was allocated 6.2 million Bolivianos for this task (La Paz 2011). While titling procedures have been established in most neighbourhoods the municipal government struggled to do this in areas which have been affected by boundary conflicts – such as Pumakatari or Litoral. A

civil servant responsible for spatial planning procedures in these areas explained this problem as follows:

It is really difficult in the South of the city where the municipality of Palca also claims control over the land. With the MAS supporting them and us being in the opposition we have not been able to resolve the boundary conflict or to find a cooperative solution. (...) In the meantime, we have residents living there that require basic services so we need to somehow address them and incorporate them in our system. (6GB)

Indeed, within La Paz's development agenda one core goal was to resolve municipal boundary conflicts and to generate metropolitan governance agreements. However, similar to the above-mentioned testimony, in multiple interviews municipal staff argued that no conflict solution was in sight (4GB; 7GB; 13GB). In this context, to ensure that local residents could receive services from La Paz, the spatial planning unit authorised households in affected neighbourhoods like Litoral or Pumakatari with tenure rights or preliminary residency allowances. For example, according to information provided by a senior civil servant of La Paz's territorial planning unit, by 2012 approximately 25 per cent of households in Pumakatari had already received an individual land title from the municipal government and more than 70 per cent of households had preliminary residency allowances (5GB). While the provision of tenure rights was generally viewed as a necessary step to address the basic needs of residents, another civil servant also offered another explanation for why the municipality was involved in areas affected by municipal boundary conflicts:

These areas are affected by urban expansion. The new people that settled there have very different demands from its original indigenous owners. Only our municipality can address their interests. By providing them with tenure rights they become part of our jurisdiction and eventually this will allow us to take full political control over governing this neighbourhood. (12GB)

According to this testimony the provision of tenure rights to households in areas affected by unresolved boundary conflicts helped the municipal government in strengthening its political and administrative control rights over these areas. Such political motivations were not only highlighted by municipal staff in La Paz; as will be shown in section 5.3, similar attitudes of reclaiming political control through titling were also shared by staff which belonged to the municipal government of Palca.

In processes of granting tenure rights, La Paz's spatial planning unit only recognised individual land ownership. A senior civil servant explained this as follows (5GB): "In the city we do not recognise collective land which is managed by indigenous communities. They can claim this in the countryside but in our city we can by law only provide individual land titles." Hence, this member of staff simply seemed to follow national legislation such as the LRPUEH (2012). Yet, when asked about whether and how the spatial planning unit takes into account issues such as indigeneity or interculturalism, the same person provided the following response:

In terms of indigenous peoples and interculturalism, well, let me be honest! This is a topic we really have not developed much in our unit or in fact in the municipality. We really have a limited understanding of what this actually means within the city. The national government talks a lot about the importance of being indigenous or not, being cholo or cholita. I mean we address them as residents but we have not done much on this topic specifically. (5GB)

A lack of training and actual knowledge, in addition to an absence of national legislation on such topics for cities, seemed to constrain most members of municipal staff in practically addressing the issue of indigeneity within specific sector policies. However, within the above testimony one aspect was incorrect; as will be shown in the next section, La Paz's municipal government has done something to generate a deeper understanding of such topics.

### **5.2.3 Interculturalism within La Paz's municipal government**

The reality here is not black and white. In the municipality of La Paz many discussions are taking place in which people try to propose more inclusive, intercultural, and pro-indigenous policies. Maybe it is not the majority but there are people who want to address the rights of ethnic groups. (NGO worker, Oxfam 2GB)

In addition to recognising La Paz as intercultural city, the municipal government set up a new intercultural coordination unit in the year 2010. This unit comprised only four members of staff whose main task it was to mainstream the idea of interculturalism into other municipal sector units. However, as was outlined by the director of this unit, until this point not much progress has been made to advance intercultural affairs:

Until now, the practices in this municipality remain mono-cultural and anti-indigenous. This underfunded delegation of four people does, in reality, not have

the capacity to reverse dominant forms of thinking among municipal staff. We can change very little in a municipality in which people's minds are predefined and difficult to change. (1GB)

Yet, the fact that the municipal government set up this specific unit could already be interpreted as an attempt to 'reverse dominant forms of thinking.' A lack of human and financial resources, as mentioned in the above testimony, seemed to reduce the actual impact this unit could have on the activities carried out by other municipal sector units. Yet, even though this unit lacked sufficient funding from its own institution, it did receive external support from non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam which, as visible in the quote that started this section, expressed an interest in working on intercultural affairs. With funding provided by Oxfam the unit could, for example, organise a small conference on the topic of promoting interculturalism, indigenous rights, and decolonisation within the city of La Paz. The conference proceedings were summarised in a book edited by Sousz et al (2010). This book introduced a far more radical understanding of interculturalism than the one advocated in official municipal documents such as the *Carta Orgánica*; it highlighted that a truly intercultural municipal policy must recognise the pre-colonial existence of the indigenous settlement *Chukiyapu Marka*. It as well emphasised that, in order to promote intercultural living within the city, it was important to respect and further strengthen the indigenous elements of *Chukiyapu Marka* through the legal recognition of indigenous festivals, the training of public staff in indigenous languages, the respect of indigenous religious practices, and the recognition of indigenous justice, collective land ownership, and autonomy rights within neighbourhoods with a large proportion of indigenous residents. While this book offers some important ideas for municipal reform, which often resembles constitutional content, it did not have a major impact on the actual work within the municipality. This was further outlined by the director of La Paz's intercultural coordination unit:

We can write what we want but this will not produce much change. The enemy is in our house. This is the big problem. We cannot sensitise people or cause change within the municipality if they [municipal staff/ planners/ policy makers?] claim to know the truth and do not want to listen. They will continue managing urban territories according to their truth. For them, there is no alternative. (1GB)

What the director has referred to as 'truth' was outlined in detail previously; it refers to undertaking municipal policy and planning interventions which address the universal interests and rights of all residents including indigenous peoples. As part of such

interventions, specific indigenous rights for indigenous justice or collective land ownership did not play a central role. Yet, such rights were recognised by another municipal government – Palca – which also exercised influence within parts of the city.

### **5.3 The municipality of Palca**

By considering more than one third of La Paz as part of its jurisdiction, the municipal government of Palca made a significant administrative claim over political control in this city (World Vision 2012). According to 2012 census data, outside the area of La Paz, Palca had 16,019 inhabitants (INE 2014). More than 90 per cent of Palca's population self-identified as Aymara and was predominantly engaged in peasant activities (ibid). At the time of conducting the fieldwork, Evo Morales's party MAS held a majority within the municipal council. The municipality itself was composed of 35 members of staff and relied on an annual budget of approximately 17 million Bolivianos (1.48 million GBP) and, hence, was equipped with significantly fewer resources than the municipality of La Paz. The absence of financial and human resources had direct repercussions on Palca's ability to provide basic public services to its citizens. According to a World Vision (2012) study, 98.7 per cent of Palca's rural residents lacked access to basic physical and socio-economic infrastructure such as paved roads, water or sanitation.

At the time the fieldwork for this thesis was undertaken, Palca's municipal government did not have a municipal development plan or *Carta Orgánica* outlining its policy and planning agenda. Instead, according to municipal staff approached in Palca (23GB, 26GB), the municipal government drew on the new constitution and relevant national legislation, including the 1953 Agrarian reform degree and collective land rights outlined in the 1996 INRA law<sup>36</sup>, to define its activities. Following these documents, within its jurisdiction the municipality recognised collective land ownership and specific indigenous rights such as indigenous justice. The mayor of Palca justified this as follows:

Brother Evo and his government clearly say in the constitution that our indigenous original peasants can govern themselves according to their own principles and law. This is what we allow our residents to do in our municipality. What else should we do? Anyway, the few people that work in the municipality do not have the resources to exercise control. (26GB)

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<sup>36</sup> The INRA law recognised rural collective land ownership through introducing *Tierras Comunitarias de Origen* (TCOs) (see Crabtree and Chaplin 2013).

According to this testimony the municipal government not only seemed to rely on an indigenous rights-based agenda because of the presence of a predominantly indigenous population, but it also seemed to apply such an agenda for much more pragmatic reasons. By recognising specific indigenous rights, ie on collective self-governance, the municipal government delegated responsibilities, such as the provision of public services and the protection of rights, which it could not address itself directly to its residents. Such tendencies have also been confirmed in an interview with the director of the social development unit of the departmental government of La Paz (28GB): “Rural areas like Palca do not have the capacity to govern their people. We observe that in these areas governments simply allow their communities to let them govern themselves.”

The municipality did, however, not only exercise influence over its rural territories but also over those peripheral urban areas which were also claimed by the municipal government of La Paz. Reasons for maintaining or regaining control over these areas were outlined by Palca’s mayor, himself an indigenous resident living in one of the neighbourhoods affected by boundary conflicts:

We are all indigenous peoples here. We used to live and still live in community, like our ancestors. We all eat the same. We have our own festivals. We practise *Vivir Bien* here. Throughout the last decades they [the municipality of La Paz] tried to break our traditions and brought in individualism. They discriminated and marginalised the ancestral residents who used to cultivate their land here. They tried to destroy our culture through turning our territory into a city. Now we are strong and they will not be able to do this anymore. Thanks to brother Evo and Cesar [referring to president Evo Morales and the governor of the MAS-led local government of La Paz, Cesar Cocarico] we are taking back what belongs to us. This is our land. It belongs to us and our ancestors. (...) Through taking our rural land back we indigenous people are constructing our own form of *Vivir Bien*. (26GB)

According to the mayor of Palca, land within neighbourhoods such as Litoral and Pumakatari has been considered sacred rural indigenous territory. While his statement mainly provided a heroic and romantic interpretation of indigenous peoples and their connection to rural land in this area, another civil servant in the same municipality offered a more pragmatic reason for Palca’s territorial claims (23GB): “We lack resources because La Paz stole our land. We are about to get back what belongs to us. By regaining control over this area we can increase our budget and bring *Vivir Bien* to our indigenous brothers and sisters.” Hence, instead of reinventing indigenous traditions, according to this

testimony Palca's main interest was to increase its municipal income – most likely through collecting property taxes from residents living in more densely populated urban areas.

In order to substantiate their administrative influence within these neighbourhoods, the municipality of Palca constructed its town hall in the neighbourhood of Litoral. Furthermore, like the municipal government of La Paz, Palca granted land titles and construction permits to local residents; this allowed the municipal government to increase its political control and tax base within this area (23GB). Yet, in contrast to La Paz, the municipality of Palca also legally recognised collective tenure rights particularly of those people who used to inhabit these lands prior to urbanisation. A civil servant explained this as follows (23GB): “Of course we respect collective land ownership in Litoral and Pumakatari. It is part of our rural jurisdiction and we apply the same rights there as elsewhere.” Like civil servants in the municipal government of La Paz, staff in Palca's municipality simply referred to legislation on land tenure to justify its political agenda on land policy and administration. However, in contrast to La Paz which followed legislation such as the LRPUEH (2012) and granted individual tenure rights, this municipal government relied on the contents of the new constitution and on previous legislation such as the INRA law or the 1953 Agrarian reform decree. According to the Agrarian Reform decree, for example, land in today's Pumakatari neighbourhood has been redistributed to 30 peasant families in the 1950s. Each family thereby received three hectares of land and together they jointly owned five hectares of communal land. According to informal conversation with staff in the municipal government of Palca, these tenure rights were considered to apply until the present context and the legalisation of subdivisions could be authorised by the municipal government which historically administered these areas – Palca and not La Paz (Fieldwork diary, 17 January 2015).

#### **5.4 Summary**

This chapter showed how different institutions involved in urban governance in La Paz, Bolivia's national government and the municipal governments of La Paz and Palca, addressed the issue of indigeneity in a variety of new laws, public policies and urban planning regulations and interventions. The way indigeneity was addressed in different documents and practices did not always confirm with new constitutional content and intercultural development principles which emphasised addressing specific indigenous rights, interests and demands equally within rural and urban spaces. Instead, in addition to

Bolivia's new constitution, a variety of other factors influenced how government officials operating in different institutions addressed indigeneity within public policies and urban planning practice.

First, history mattered. This was shown particularly at the level of national government where government officials who were involved in the draft of new legislation often remained guided by a historically-established colonial understanding of the countryside as indigenous and traditional space, and the city as modern and non-indigenous space. This represented one of the reasons why new legislation on topics such as justice or decentralisation only addressed specific indigenous rights within rural territories.

Second, in addition to their own historically-rooted understanding of indigeneity, government officials often simply followed pre-existing legislation which addressed rural and urban areas differently. At the level of national government this was particularly visible in the way civil society involvement was defined in the new LPS (2013). Instead of addressing a diversity of actors with different cultural backgrounds within the processes of participation, this law mainly followed its predecessor – the 1994 LPP – and defined civil society involvement according to territorial principles. As a consequence, indigenous communitarian or peasant unions could participate in budgeting processes in the countryside but not in the city where participation remained restricted to neighbourhood organisations. Similarly, at the local level, municipal governments such as La Paz, mainly represented urban residents, and Palca, mainly represented rural indigenous peasants, and followed different legislation on land administration. While La Paz followed legislation on urban development such as the LRPUEH (2012) and focused on the provision of individual tenure rights, Palca followed legislation on rural development such as the 1996 INRA law or new constitutional rights for IOPs and also recognised collective tenure rights.

Third, the restriction of specific indigenous rights to rural areas did, however, not mean that governments failed to address indigenous peoples within cities. This was evidently the case for Bolivia's national government and La Paz's municipal government which, even though guided by distinct development models and priorities, wanted to address indigenous peoples as ordinary citizens who can claim access to universal rights and public services such as housing, water, electricity, or roads.

Fourth, government institutions were not monolithic but promoted more than one approach to address indigeneity. For example, within La Paz's municipal government, particularly in its intercultural unit, there also existed government officials who openly departed from a universal rights-based approach. Instead, they promoted a more intercultural policy agenda that took the rights, interests and demands of urban indigenous peoples seriously. However, lacking relevant funding and human resources as well as being confronted by a municipality which often faced more urgent development priorities, the intercultural unit simply lacked power to implement and achieve its goals.

Finally, despite the fact that indigeneity continues to be addressed differently for rural and urban areas it was possible to depict cases where such understandings overlapped and confronted each other. This was evident for the selected case-study neighbourhoods of Pumakatari and Litoral which found themselves in the middle of municipal boundary conflicts between La Paz and Palca. These neighbourhoods were home to a large number of self-identifying urban indigenous peoples. The next chapter will now examine how some of the residents of these areas understood indigeneity, what their specific interests and demands were, and how they addressed their specific interests and demands in relation to opportunities that were provided to them by multiple government institutions, with distinct political agendas on indigeneity, which operated within their neighbourhoods.

## 6 Indigenous identities and processes of political negotiation in La Paz

This morning I took a minibus from the city centre to the neighbourhood of Pumakatari to meet Don Francisco, a local community resident, who showed me around the area. Even though the traffic was moderate, it took me more than 90 minutes to get there. After driving through the city's affluent areas of San Jorge, Obrajes and Calacoto, I drove through Cota Cota before eventually arriving in Pumakatari. Pumakatari was different from the areas the bus passed through before. Here the built environment changed from high-rise modern buildings to small unpainted brick houses. Most streets were unpaved and street names were hand painted on walls. Most Spanish speaking people left before the bus entered Pumakatari. Afterwards, mainly elderly women in *polleras*<sup>37</sup> took a seat in the bus and talked loudly in Aymara and Spanish. The conversations competed in their noise level with the minibus driver's radio which played Colombian music. After the bus driver indicated my final destination, I walked around for ten minutes to find Don Francisco's house. I passed by more indigenous women who were selling vegetables on the street. On Don Francisco's street I saw teenager's playing cards, chatting in Aymara, and listening to loud Reggaeton music. They were wearing baggie pants and New York Yankees base caps. On the same street I saw some cows that ate grass on a small and empty plot (...) Don Francisco introduced me to his different worlds. He lives in his small house in Pumakatari where he wants to enjoy all public services provided by the municipality of La Paz. Meanwhile, in the neighbouring community of Litural he owns a small plot of land where he cultivates potatoes. (Field-note diary, 15 September 2012)

This field-note extract – written after one of many visits to La Paz's peripheral neighbourhoods of Pumakatari and Litural – could not better describe the complex characteristics of these two neighbourhoods. At first sight, Pumakatari and Litural shared features typical of most peripheral neighbourhoods of La Paz. They are characterised by a dense but often unplanned built environment. Side roads were unpaved and often in a bad condition. Similar to most residents in La Paz's urban periphery a large proportion of Pumakatari's and Litural's inhabitants were engaged in economic activities such as street vending. In addition, Pumakatari and Litural were also characterised by specific rural features. For example, the few remaining green spaces were used by residents as pasture land or for the cultivation of vegetables. The majority of current residents had migrated to Pumakatari and Litural throughout the last three decades. Most of these 'migrants' originally came from small rural communities situated on the Bolivian *Altiplano*. Meanwhile, some residents, from now on referred to as *comuneros*, lived in Pumakatari and Litural long before the city of La Paz expanded into this area.

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<sup>37</sup> Pollera is the Spanish name for a big one-piece skirt which is traditionally worn by indigenous women residing in La Paz (Tassi 2010).

Migrants and *comuneros* both self-identified as indigenous (see chapter 4). Drawing on primary data collected in La Paz, this chapter outlines how some of Pumakatari's and Litoral's indigenous residents defined their indigenous identity. It is shown how indigenous identity was often articulated through specific aspirations and demands for land. Depending on the residents' status as migrant or *comunero* but also on their gender and age, land was associated with distinct opportunities to access a portfolio of other assets that would allow them to express their specific indigenous identity.

Having established different understandings of indigenous identity the rest of the chapter uses three in-depth illustrations to describe how some indigenous residents, particularly the leaders of indigenous community-based organisations (CBOs), could fulfil their aspirations and demands for assets through processes of contestation and political negotiation with relevant central and local government units whose political agendas on indigeneity have been outlined in the previous chapter. Particular emphasis is put on the different and changing tactics indigenous leaders relied on to succeed in their political negotiations.

### **6.1 Indigenous identities and asset demands in Pumakatari and Litoral**

According to 2001 Bolivian census data and to a survey conducted by the municipality of La Paz (2010), more than 80 per cent of Pumakatari's and Litoral's residents self-identified as indigenous people with Aymara origin. Pumakatari's and Litoral's indigenous residents rarely matched the specific criteria that are used for the definition of indigenous original peasants (IOPs) in Bolivia's 2009 constitution and associated legislation. This point was made explicit in an interview with Raul Prada – a local academic – who stated that Pumakatari's and Litoral's residents are officially not considered indigenous:

In neighbourhoods like these no one can claim to be a true indigenous person because the people that live there are no longer the ancestral owners of the territory. They are not organised in the traditional *ayllu* structure. They do not have an organic relationship to nature and mother earth [*pachamama*]. This is all impossible in the city. They are not what the constitution considers indigenous original peasants (4EB)

For Prada, the people who reside in Pumakatari and Litoral therefore do not represent IOPs. Indeed, as outlined in chapter 4, *comuneros*, residents who inhabited the area before

urban expansion, lost most of their ancestral land and now represent a minority. Similarly, those indigenous residents who migrated to Pumakatari and Litoral left their ancestral land behind them and, hence, did not fall into the IOP category. Yet, why did so many residents in Pumakatari and Litoral self-identify as indigenous? What did indigeneity mean to indigenous residents in these neighbourhoods? Don Pascual – migrant, member of a neighbourhood association (JJVV) in Pumakatari, and involved in a local folkloric association – provided some answers to these questions:

What they write about us indigenous people in the laws is not reality. The times are changing and so are we. We learned and experienced new things. This makes it difficult for us to return to something we did in the past. It's like if I wanted that my son returns to our old land at the lake [Lake Titicaca] and lives a backward life. He grew up here, went to school in the city, and knows his way around in this place. This doesn't mean that he forgot where he originates from. He speaks Aymara with us at home but also with his friends and in his rap band. He stays in touch with the community [at Lake Titicaca], and practises his traditions at the festivals of the neighbourhood [zona]. View it like this, Don Philipp, all of us are part of two worlds. We live in the city but our cultural background of the past continues to shape our present. We are indigenous and will stay indigenous even in this place. (3IB).

A similar explanation was provided by Don Carlos (14IB) – *comunero* and member of an indigenous peasant union in Litoral: “This land belongs to my indigenous brothers and sisters. It has been taken away from us by corrupt land speculators [*loteadores corruptos*]. We might not get it back. All we want is to live here and have our traditions respected.” Don Pascual and Don Carlos both emphasised their attachment to their neighbourhoods. Don Pascual and his family decided to come to this neighbourhood in search for a better life. Don Carlos expressed scepticism towards the urbanisation of his previous rural land but he also was aware that he cannot reverse this tendency. Despite the fact that their neighbourhoods were increasingly modern and urban, Don Carlos's and Don Pascual's testimonies also indicated how they preserve certain values and practices they inherited from their ancestors.

In contrast to relevant policy and planning regulations which view indigeneity and specific indigenous rights as being restricted to rural areas and processes of modernisation as reserved to cities (see chapter 5), most indigenous residents approached in Pumakatari and Litoral aspired to combine a modern urban life with indigenous traditions. Such tendencies were already visible in Don Pascual's description of his son who practises his Aymara

language through rap music. Another similar example was provided by Don Roberto, a young *comunero* from Pumakatari:

This is how we live our life here or, better, how we are indigenous here. Take me for an example. I work my land here. I grow my potatoes and herd some animals. I am engaged in the indigenous peasant union [*sindicato de campesinos indígenas*]. I dance during the festival. At the same time, I do my job as a construction worker in El Alto. This helps me to pay the bills for my house. I want to go to university and create my own business. All this is what I want and what I am, my friend. (13IB)

Although Don Roberto sought to preserve the traditional life of an indigenous peasant, he also aspired to lead a modern urban life. To achieve this, he built a house on land which he registered with the municipality of La Paz. From this municipality he demanded access to basic public services such as water, gas, and electricity. He also aspired to enrol in a university and wants to set up his own business in La Paz.

Similar aspirations of mixing indigenous traditions with modern urban amenities were articulated by most indigenous residents approached in Pumakatari and Litural. Most indigenous residents hereby referred to the important role of land when articulating their indigenous identity and associated demands for assets. This does, however, not mean that being indigenous meant the same for all residents. Depending on their background as migrants, *comuneros*, men, women, youngsters, or the elderly, they generally associated land with different opportunities to access other assets that would enable them to express a diversity of indigenous identities. The following sections illustrate this aspect in further detail.

### **6.1.1 Land as a physical asset**

The insecurity of tenure rights was cited as being one of the biggest problems in the neighbourhoods. This was highlighted in the listing and ranking tools used by focus groups. Table 6.1 provides an example of the listing and ranking of problems. It shows that – for the eight Aymara women in this focus group – insecure land titles represent the main problem in the neighbourhoods next to other concerns such as insufficient street lighting, bad roads, insecurity, or alcoholism in the area. The latter problems were often associated with people’s behaviour during folkloric festivals in the neighbourhoods, a phenomenon discussed in further detail in sections 6.1.3 and 6.2.3.

When asked to discuss the main causes of their prioritised problem of insecure land titles, this focus group mentioned the administrative conflict between La Paz and Palca, issues of corruption, and conflicts with their neighbours (see figure 6.1). To address the issue of insecure land tenure, members of this and other focus groups often mentioned the option of physically occupying their plot. Physical occupation referred to the construction of either a house or wall around the plot. It also referred to the fact that residents ensured that at least one household member permanently remains on the plot. Other solutions to the problem of insecure land tenure mentioned by focus group members were to get a lawyer or to learn more about their rights as home owners. One focus group member – Doña Maria – further explained the causes and potential solutions for the problem of insecure land tenure in an informal conversation:


According to Doña Maria most residents in the neighbourhood have a land title that was either authorised by La Paz or Palca. The two municipalities sometimes authorise land titles for the same plot of land. Doña Maria is affected by this problem of double tenure. In 1994 Doña Maria and her family bought a plot of land in Pumakatari. The family, with help of friends who already lived in the area, constructed their own home. In 1998 Doña Maria’s family, with the help of the local JJVV, started the complex bureaucratic journey of applying for a land title. It took them two years to fulfil all the bureaucratic formalities and to eventually receive a land title from La Paz. In 2002 a person, who identified himself as *ex-comunero* from Pumakatari, knocked on her door and claimed that the plot belonged to him. He proved that he owned this land by showing her an authorised land title from Palca. Doña Maria closed her door and, from that moment on, to avoid that the *comunero* take over their plot, she made sure that her house was always occupied by a family member. She said that the comunero returned to her house a few more times but that her occupation strategy helped to prevent him from taking over her plot. (Field-note diary, 7 December 2012)

**Table 6.1 Listing and ranking of problems in Pumakatari**

List of Problems (1) <sup>1</sup>	Ranking (2)	Prioritisation (3)
Insecure land titles	3+3+3+3+3+2+3+2 = 22	1
Insufficient street lighting	2+1+3+3+2+3+2+1 = 18	2
Bad roads	3+3+3+3+1+2+1+3 = 17	3
Insecurity in the area	3+3+3+2+1+3+2+2 = 19	2
The bad consumption of alcohol by neighbours	2+1+1+2+2+3+3+2 = 14	5
Lack of money	2+2+2+2+1+2+1+2 = 14	5
Bad service bus drivers	1+2+2+2+1+2+2+2 = 14	4
Garbage gets rarely collected	1+1+1+2+1+2+1+2 = 11	6

Source: Focus group with eight Aymara women (five migrants / three comuneras) in a community centre in Pumakatari (6 December 2012)

**Figure 6.1 Causal Flow diagram: The problem of land tenure in Pumakatari**



*Source: Focus group with eight Aymara women (five migrants/ three comuneras) in a community centre in Pumakatari (6 December 2012)*

Alongside the shared problem of insecure tenure, migrants and *comuneros* associated land with different aspirations and opportunities to access, accumulate and maintain other physical assets. For migrants, as well as for *comuneros* with an urban home, an individual land title was considered crucial as it facilitated access to water, sanitation, electricity, and paved roads which would be provided by the municipality of La Paz (see chapter 5). For example, Don Luciano, migrant and leader of a JJVV in Pumakatari (2IB), articulated this point as follows “For people that live in Pumakatari it is important to have a nice house and a land title from the municipality of La Paz. This helps them to get all the necessary services. We want better water services and that the roads here are paved. This will allow us to achieve *Vivir Bien* here.”

In contrast, *comuneros* who owned a rural plot of land articulated distinct interests and demands. During various informal chats *comuneros* pointed out that they identified themselves as ancestral owners of the land in this area and, aware of the fact that Pumakatari and Litoral continued to be affected by processes of urbanisation, they wanted to secure ownership over the remaining pieces of rural land within the area. In addition, as pointed out by Don Francisco – a *comunero* with an urban home in Pumakatari and a rural

plot of land in Litoral – some *comuneros* also aspired to reclaim tenure rights over lost lands:

This land was rural land and it belonged to us. We were the original owners of big extensions of land. We want that the state recognises this land again as our collective land. We want to manage our land according to our own principles. We do not want to pay charges for services from La Paz. We do not need them [La Paz] here. (7IB)

The importance of collective land ownership and relative autonomy over the use and management of such plots was highlighted during most interviews and informal conversations with *comuneros* from both neighbourhoods. In general, *comuneros* rarely demanded access to urban infrastructure services for their remaining rural plots of land. This can also be explained by the fact that they attached a specific financial-productive value to their land.

### **6.1.2 Land as financial, natural and productive assets**

Apparently, they call their land rural to pay less tax. Of course, if you are rural you are with Palca. They charge you less. Some of them own big extensions of land. Imagine how much money they save by not paying taxes. (...) Yes, some of them use their land for agriculture but most of them use it as future investment. You should know that the *comuneros* have power in this area. Everyone who owns land has power. At the moment, land might not be that expensive in Litoral but it is getting more expensive over time. In the future a square metre might cost USD100. Who knows! If you own a big plot of land in this area you can make real money in the future. Until this point you call this land rural, ancestral, indigenous, or whatever. This allows you to keep it. (9IB)

This testimony by Don Pedro, migrant and member of a JJVV in Litoral, indicates the productive and financial value *comuneros* attach to their land. By registering their plots as collectively-owned rural land with the municipality of Palca *comuneros* not only sought to preserve traditional land management principles, it also helped them avoid paying urban public service charges and at the same time gain legal permission to use the land for agriculture. For example, on their land, often surrounded by a dense, urban, built environment, *comuneros* herded animals and grew vegetables (see box 6.1) which also served as an additional income source. It was mainly women who were responsible for selling vegetables and meat products on one of La Paz's many street markets (see box 6.2). In addition, Don Pedro also suggested that *comuneros* used their agricultural land as future investment. They wait for the value of their land to rise during further urbanisation

processes. Once the land value is high enough they sell parts of their land to incoming migrants and relocate their agricultural activities to other areas. The story of Don Francisco – a *comunero* with an urban home in Pumakatari and a rural plot of land in Litoral – confirmed Don Pedro’s remarks:

Today, Don Francisco explained how his family owned a large plot of rural land in Pumakatari and another one in Litoral. Don Francisco and his brother sold their land in Pumakatari to incoming indigenous migrants in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, they kept their land in Litoral. In 1998 Don Francisco married his wife Doña Diana, an Aymara woman from the rural community Huni which is situated behind Litoral and belongs to Palca. Doña Diana and her family own a piece of land in Huni. At the moment, to earn some extra money, Don Francisco thinks about selling some of his land in Litoral to incoming migrants. However, he wants to maintain the land in Huni for agricultural purposes. He mentioned as well that, if the city of La Paz grows into Huni, they might as well sell this land for a good price in the future. (Field-note diary, 25 January 2013)

Generating additional income from their land through agricultural activities, land speculation, and tax savings was a common practice for *comuneros* in the neighbourhoods. However, indigenous migrants were also engaged in agricultural labour and in the trade of agricultural products within the city. The case of Don Jose – a migrant and member of a JJVV in Pumakatari – illustrates this point:

My village is near Lake Titicaca. My family goes there to help out in the community. My father is old and needs help to work our fields. So, we have to help him. On our fields we grow potatoes. Sometimes we have more potatoes than we can eat so we bring some with us to La Paz and sell them on the market. You can sell them for a better price here. (5IB).

Similar to *comuneros* who maintained their rural land in Pumakatari and Litoral, Don Pedro’s family preserved links to his rural land near Lake Titicaca. His family used this land to herd animals and grow vegetables which could later be sold on the street markets of La Paz.

According to the testimonies presented above, both migrants and *comuneros* used or aspired to use their remaining rural land as an additional source of income. At the same time, they received a substantial part of their income by engaging in La Paz’s urban economy. For example, in addition to his agricultural activities on his rural plot of land in Litoral, *comunero* Don Francisco worked as bus driver in La Paz. Similarly, in addition to

his agricultural activities near Lake Titicaca, migrant Don Jose worked as construction worker in Pumakatari. These income diversification strategies were not unique to the two of them. According to statistical data provided by the municipality of La Paz (2010), 50 per cent of Pumakatari's and Litoral's population was registered as economically active within La Paz's urban labour market. These people were mainly engaged in formal sector wage employment, the transport and construction sector being the most popular for men; domestic work being the most popular for women together with commercial activities such as street vending.

**Box 6.1 Land protection strategies by residents in Litoral**



A typical scene in the barrio of Litoral: next to a newly-consolidated urban home there is a free spot of land owned by a *comunero* who uses the land to herd cows. In a context of insecure tenure rights the presence of the animals on an open rural plot, similar to the walls on the neighbouring urban plot, help residents to demarcate their land.

*Photo by the author, 13 November 2013*

### Box 6.2 The trade of agricultural products as additional source of income



A group of *comuneras* from Litoral selling their vegetables on a street in La Paz's market district of Max Paredes. They come here every Saturday to sell products they grow on their rural plots in Litoral. During the week most of the women laboured as domestic workers.

*Source: Photo by the author (20 October 2012)*

#### 6.1.3 Land as a cultural asset

Pumakatari's and Litoral's indigenous residents, migrants and *comuneros* alike, also attached a specific cultural meaning to vacant land and public spaces on which they maintained and reinvented specific indigenous traditions and practices. This was particularly visible during the annual festival *Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced*, La Paz's second-largest indigenous folkloric festival<sup>38</sup> held for three days and nights each September. During the festival the main road of Pumakatari is taken over by thousands of Aymara men and women. Participants are mainly *comuneros* and migrants from local neighbourhoods. However, the event is also attended by indigenous people from other neighbourhoods in La Paz or nearby rural communities. On a central stage different folkloric associations normally entertain the cheering crowd with presentations of the *Morenada*, a traditional Andean dance (see box 6.3). In the side streets the visitors can purchase traditional snacks and beer.

<sup>38</sup> According to Guss (2006), there exist 387 indigenous folkloric festivals in La Paz.

**Box 6.3 Dance performance during the *Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced***



*Photo and copyright to publish received from 7IB*

According to the Bolivian anthropologist Espinoza (2004), the origins of the *Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced* date back to colonial times when today's neighbourhood of Pumakatari was still part of a rural *hacienda*. According to oral histories she collected from *comuneros*, Espinoza (2004) describes how ancestors spotted a virgin on the hacienda fields. The saint, whom they called *La Mamita Merced*, promised them a good harvest which indeed transpired in the following months. To commemorate this occasion the ancestors constructed a chapel for the virgin which lay on a street of Pumakatari. On this communal public space the ancestors organised a festival every year in September to honour the virgin and to prepare for a good planting and harvest season. To ensure that the planting season is followed by a productive harvest, peasants relied on festive rituals such as the *ch'alla*. During the *ch'alla* people donated parts of a drink, normally alcohol, to mother earth [pachamama] and danced excessively. Today's *comuneros* keep this tradition alive in the urban neighbourhood of Pumakatari. The *comunero* Don Francisco (7IB) explained this as follows: "The *Fiesta de la Virgen Merced* is part of our century-long history in this area. Like our ancestors, we worship the virgin. We dance and drink for her. The *fiesta* helps us to maintain our traditions."

During fieldwork in La Paz, the *Fiesta de la Virgen de la Merced* was organised by folkloric associations which were presided by *comuneros*. According to the newspaper *La Razon* (23 September 2012), 30 different folkloric associations were involved in the preparation and organisation of the annual festival in 2012. One of these folkloric associations was the *Fraternidad Morenada Union Central Puma*. *Comunero* Don Francisco and his wife Doña Diana were members of the leadership board of this folkloric association. While the leaders in this folkloric organisation were all *comuneros*, other members were indigenous migrants. For example, Don Jose – an indigenous migrant and member of a JJVV in Pumakatari – was a member of this folkloric association. In an interview, he highlighted the importance of being involved in the organisation of the festival:

I am glad to be part of the *folkloristas* [referring to the folkloric organisation]. With them I help organise the *Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced*. We used to have *fiestas* like this one in our communities on the *Altiplano*. Taking part in their *fiesta* [referring to *comuneros*] reminds me of the festivals in my own community. (5IB)

A similar explanation was provided by Don Pascual – indigenous migrant, member of another JJVV in Pumakatari, and member of the same folkloric association: “Back in my home in Achacachi we celebrated well. We celebrated our animals and plants. To make them grow you have to share your drinks with the *pachamama*. At the *Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced* we do the same.” (3IB) The testimonies of the different *comuneros* and migrants suggest that the festival represented not only an act of dancing and drinking; it also helped both *comuneros* and migrants to take over public spaces with their indigenous traditions and practices. Diana, Don Francisco’s wife, expressed this as follows: “The fiesta brings the countryside to the city. During the festival we, the indigenous peoples of the neighbourhood, rule this place.” (8IB)

Not everyone in the neighbourhood viewed the ‘*Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced*’ as a positive example for the protection and revitalisation of indigenous culture. In fact, indigenous culture and the use of public space were understood differently by residents belonging to different gender- and age-groups. First, most elderly men approached in this study interpreted the festival and associated acts of excessive drinking as their highlight of the year. In contrast, with the notable exception of Doña Diana and some other *comuneras*, most women approached in informal conversations and in focus groups

perceived the annual festival as problem as they associated the excessive drinking during this event with an increase in violence in their neighbourhoods and in their own homes (see also section 6.2.3). Second, the festival was also perceived differently by residents in different age-groups. While elderly residents mentioned the festival as an example of the revitalisation of their culture, younger indigenous residents, migrants and *comuneros* alike, often disliked the music and dances of the festivals and portrayed them as outdated. Instead, younger indigenous residents preferred to articulate their indigenous identity through other means such as Aymara Rap in which they would mix modern and trendy fashion and music with their language of origin (see Box 6.4).

**Box 6.4 Aymara Rap performance in Pumakatari**



This photo was taken during the event ‘Pum arap’ during which teenagers from the neighbourhood performed their own rap songs. Most of the lyrics were in Aymara. Research on urban indigenous people in El Alto reported on the important role of music, eg hip hop or punk, as a means of reinventing indigenous identity within the urban context (Homberger and Swijnhart 2013).

*Source: Photo by the author (9 November 2012)*

In addition to the annual ‘*Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced*’ or Aymara Rap performances, indigenous residents also relied on other practices which helped them to exercise and reinvent their indigenous traditions and culture in public spaces in their neighbourhoods. Don Roberto – *comunero* in Pumakatari – explained this as follows:

Our neighbourhood of Pumakatari is built on the ruins of *ayllus*. Where I live there always was an *ayllu*. Now this *ayllu* is part of the city of La Paz. The government says that *ayllus* only exist in the countryside. I say, the *ayllu* exists where indigenous people live. We live in the city, in the urban *ayllu*. Here we practise the ancient traditions of the *ayllu* – leadership rotation, *mitas*, justice, festivals etc. (13IB)

Don Roberto mentions that indigenous residents carry out activities (eg indigenous justice, leadership rotation or *mitas*<sup>39</sup>) that are commonly associated with rural indigenous communities which he refers to as *ayllus*. The *ayllu* represents a traditional, pre-colonial form of governing and managing land in the Andean region. Anthropological research highlights that particularly in rural areas of Bolivia the *ayllu* structure remained intact during colonial and post-colonial times (Harris and Tandeter 1987; Platt 1982). In his statement, Don Roberto goes beyond a ruralised understanding of the *ayllu* by explicitly referring to Pumakatari as urban *ayllu*. Similar to Don Roberto, during interviews and informal conversations indigenous residents often referred to their neighbourhoods as *ayllus* to justify specific practices such as enforcing indigenous justice (see box 6.5).

**Box 6.5 Signs of indigenous justice in Pumakatari**



The photo shows a doll hanging on a street light in Litoral. The doll indicates that local residents exercise lynch mob justice within the area – a phenomenon occurring in cities throughout Bolivia (Goldstein 2004). In informal conversations residents talked about cases in which thieves were tied to lampposts and punished. However, they did not refer to these acts as ‘lynch mob justice’ but as ‘indigenous justice’. This was outlined by Don Pedro, member of a JJVV in Litoral: “The municipality of La Paz calls it lynching. In reality, it is indigenous justice. The constitution recognises this. We do nothing illegal here. We practise our rights in our *ayllu*” (91B)

Source: Photo by the author (18 October 2013)

**6.2 Processes of contestation and political negotiation**

The previous section showed how indigenous residents articulated land claims which were associated with opportunities to access and accumulate other assets that allowed them to express a variety of indigenous identities in their urban neighbourhoods. This section now illustrates how some residents managed to contest and negotiate their demands for assets with different central and decentralised government units.

<sup>39</sup> The *mita* is a mandatory labour service that was initially introduced by the Incas and later adapted by the Spanish colonisers to control the work of miners in Bolivian cities such as Potosi (Saignas 1985).

Existing research on urban indigenous peoples in Bolivia (Albo 2006; Goldstein 2013; Lazar 2008; Zibechi 2010) emphasised the importance of CBOs in processes of contestation and political negotiation. Indeed, CBOs played a central role in both neighbourhoods and most residents approached in this study belonged to multiple ones. The case of *comunero* Don Francisco and his wife Doña Diana illustrates this point (information derived from: 7IB, 8IB). In order to protect his rural plot of land Don Francisco was a member of the indigenous peasant union of Litoral. This peasant union mainly worked with the rural municipality of Palca which was governed by Evo Morales's party Movement Towards Socialism (MAS). At the same time, to improve public infrastructure services for his urban home in Pumakatari, he was a member of a JJVV in that neighbourhood. This JJVV worked in cooperation with the municipality of La Paz which was governed by the political party Movement Without Fear (MSM). In his free time, Don Francisco and his wife Doña Diana were engaged in the folkloric association '*Fraternidad Morenada Union Central Puma*'. Here they practised traditional dances which they performed during the annual '*Fiesta de la Virgen de la Merced*'. To receive legal authorisation of the festival, the folkloric association predominantly approached the municipality of Palca or the Ministry of Culture. In addition, Doña Diana was member of the parental association in the local school.

The example of Don Francisco and Doña Diana not only shows how residents engage in multiple CBOs but also how membership in such organisations was gendered. For example, Don Francisco's wife Doña Diana's was not involved in local JJVVs or peasant unions. These organisations were generally dominated by men. Instead, fulfilling her role as a woman and mother, Diana was mainly responsible for caring for her children. She was therefore involved in organisations such as the school parental association that relate to her role as mother. Similar tendencies were seen for most residents approached in the neighbourhoods. Hence, like elsewhere in Latin America, community organisation in Pumakatari and Litoral followed principles of *machismo* and *marianismo* according to which men often take a stronger political position within the community than women whose role is more reduced to domestic affairs (Moser 2009).

During fieldwork in Pumakatari and Litoral it also became clear that it was not any member of a CBO but particularly their indigenous leaders who played a crucial role in processes of contestation and political negotiation. Indigenous leaders often had the

necessary political capital, here defined as knowledge of existing rules and procedures that characterise a particular political system (Ginieniewicz 2012), which allowed them to approach actors in different central and decentralised government units. During political negotiations indigenous leaders manoeuvred between different worlds. First, aware of the distinct understandings on indigeneity and indigenous rights within government institutions (see chapter 5) indigenous leaders tactically manoeuvred between their own identity and different officially-recognised, static, and spatially-fixed-identity categories when engaging with government units. Second, when negotiating access to crucial rights and services the leaders used their powerful positions within CBOs, on the one hand, to address the interests of their CBO members and, on the other hand, to fulfil their personal aspirations. In other words, they rarely addressed the interests of those indigenous residents – eg women or younger residents – who were less involved in CBOs. The remaining sections of this chapter use three illustrations to describe the contestation and negotiation tactics of leaders and resulting outcomes in further detail.

### **6.2.1 Neighbourhood organisations and *vecino* leaders**

Most of Pumakatari's and Litoral's residents, migrants and *comuneros* alike, demanded individual tenure rights which would allow them to access urban infrastructure and public services from the municipality of La Paz. The tactics used by residents and leaders in particular to access urban land, receive an individual title, and receive public services changed significantly over time (see table 6.2). Almost all residents who were approached during the fieldwork for this study in both neighbourhoods explained that the state was absent during the initial stages of urbanisation in the area occurring in the 1980s. During this period, without interference from national or local government authorities, *comuneros* sold parts of their land to land speculators or directly to newly arriving indigenous migrants. New settlers lacked land titles that proved their land ownership. The only document they normally received was a confirmation of payment (*minuta de compra*) from a land speculator (information derived from: 5IB, 6IB, 10IB). Residents often illustrated how they quickly built a house on their plot and how they subsequently ensured that at least one household member always remained vigilant on the plot. This helped them to avoid letting their land being invaded by incoming migrants or taken back by *comuneros*.

**Table 6.2 Accessing tenure rights and public services in Pumakatari and Litoral**

Year	Regulation	Implementing government unit and key contents	Tactics used by indigenous residents and leaders
Until 1994	None	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Self-help: Ownership through occupation;</li> <li>• Reliance on indigenous governance principles in neighbourhood organisations.</li> </ul>
1994	Law of popular participation (LPP 1994)	Municipality of La Paz (municipal law 1669 – La Paz 1995) issued individual titles for land occupants.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adapt the organisational criteria of JJVVs outlined in the LPP;</li> <li>• Adaptation of 'white' <i>vecino</i> identity and hide indigenous features;</li> <li>• Establishment of clientelist ties with government representatives.</li> </ul>
2012	Law to regulate property rights over urban estates and housing (LRPPUEH 2012)	National government & municipality of La Paz provided individual titles to land occupants.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adaptation of 'white' <i>vecino</i> identity and hide indigenous features;</li> <li>• Establishment of clientelist relations with government units.</li> </ul>

*Elaborated by the author*

During the early stages of urbanisation in the 1980s and 1990s, residents founded their own urban neighbourhood organisations to improve the infrastructure of their new neighbourhoods. According to Albo (2006) the organisational structure of La Paz's new neighbourhood organisations often resembled the one of traditional rural indigenous communities. This was also the case in Pumakatari and Litoral where neighbourhood organisations relied on rural indigenous governance principles which included, among others, a focus on leadership rotation and a prioritisation of deliberation over democratic representation. Don Pascual (3IB), a migrant and member of a JJVV in Pumakatari, explained this as follows: "Everything worked like in the countryside [el campo]. We rotated our leaders. We voted them by using the *fila* [cueing] system. We held many assemblies to discuss problems. This is how it was." Besides making use of traditional governance principles in decision-making processes, members of JJVVs also relied on traditional indigenous practices such as the *mita*. Don Jose – migrant and member of another JJVV in Pumakatari – described how the first neighbourhood organisations made use of the *mita* during the early stages of urbanisation in the neighbourhood:

In the 1980s my dad was one of the founders of this neighbourhood organisation. At that time I was five or six years old. There were no roads to get into the city. So, my dad and other neighbours did *mitas* every weekend. They worked like our brothers and sisters in the community [referring to rural indigenous communities]. They used dynamite to pave out the land. All this here was a rocky hill and we made it a road. Thanks be to God that no one died during this work and that there were no severe accidents. (5IB)

Don Francisco – *comunero* and member of another JJVV in Pumakatari – further confirmed this explanation: “In the past we did *mitas*. We left our houses and cleaned the streets together. We went outside when there was a problem with the water. That no longer exists.” (7IB).

Although the first neighbourhood organisations seemed to rely on rural indigenous traditions, this tendency changed in later stages of neighbourhood consolidation. As stated in other research on urban communities in Bolivia (Revilla 2009; Kohl and Farthing 2006), a crucial turning point in the history of collective organisation was the ratification of the Law of Popular Participation (LPP). Don Francisco made a similar point for the neighbourhoods of Pumakatari and Litoral:

To move forward as a neighbourhood organisation we adapted to what the law 1551 [LPP] says. This law told us that all of us should be *vecinos* and that we have to organise ourselves democratically. There should be only a few leaders per neighbourhood organisation which we elect at the polls every two years. The leaders have to follow the rules. They can hand in suggestions for the POA [annual operational plan]. Then the municipality of La Paz will do the infrastructure work for us. (7IB)

According to Don Francisco, neighbourhood organisations were compelled to change their internal structure to those criteria established in the LPP. The old neighbourhood organisations became JJVVs. His statement also suggests that, as part of this process, JJVV members had to emphasise their role as *vecinos* and work with the municipality of La Paz, which from this point was responsible for driving urban development within the neighbourhoods. Indeed, as outlined in chapter 4, with an interest in expanding its tax base after the 1994 LPP, the municipality of La Paz redefined its municipal boundaries in 1995 through the municipal law 1669 (La Paz 1995). The areas of Pumakatari and Litoral, along with other areas affected by urban expansion, were now considered part of La Paz’s municipal territory. As a consequence, the municipality issued local residents with

individual land titles and invited the leaders of newly established JJVVs to take part in annual participatory budgeting processes.

The municipality of La Paz restricted JJVV membership to those residents who were granted with an individual land title (information derived from 12GB). Hence, from this moment on, having a land title was the basic condition for citizen participation and associated processes of negotiating access to public services with the municipality of La Paz<sup>40</sup>. According to the LPP, only one JJVV could represent a specific territory. Hence, in present-day Pumakatari and Litoral there are three JJVVs which represent a defined territory within the neighbourhoods. These JJVVs are members of a wider citywide network of JJVVs – the federation of neighbourhood organisations (FEJUVE).

To understand the work of these organisation, eight JJVV members often with leadership roles (see: 1IB, 2IB, 3IB, 5IB, 6IB, 7IB, 9IB, 10IB) as well La Paz's FEJUVE leader (11IB) were interviewed. In addition, it was possible to capture the perceptions of ordinary residents and JJVV members without leadership functions during informal conversations and in focus groups. Indigenous residents, who were not members of JJVV leadership boards, often expressed a sense of mistrust towards their JJVVs. For example, during institutional mapping exercises all 12 focus groups, predominantly comprising women, mentioned their local JJVV as an existing institution but rated them with an average score of 'two' (bad). In informal conversations focus group members justified this by highlighting that, as women, they felt excluded from decision-making processes in JJVVs whose leaders were predominantly male. Furthermore, they often mentioned that JJVV leaders manage to bring infrastructure services such as paved roads to the neighbourhood but these are often concentrated near their own homes and rarely benefit people who live elsewhere. Nevertheless, they also mentioned that they had no other option than to rely on these CBOs in order to get at least some community infrastructure within their neighbourhoods. For this reason, focus group members rarely evaluated JJVVs with rank 'one' (very bad).

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<sup>40</sup> Most residents approached in Pumakatari and Litoral claimed to be land owners and, hence, were represented through JJVVs. This is not the case in every urban neighbourhood in Bolivia. In fact, in many other neighbourhoods a majority of residents rent houses and because of their status as tenants they are denied participation in JJVVs (see Kohl and Farthing 2006).

JJVV leaders played a central role in negotiating demands for land and public services. They generally did this through their formal involvement in annual participatory budgeting procedures organised by the municipality of La Paz. Don Pascual (3IB) – member of a JJVV in Pumakatari – explained this process as follows: “Since I am member of this JJVV the infrastructure works have been always approved and implemented by the municipality of La Paz. You go to the yearly meeting and they put your demand into the annual operational plan. That’s it.”

In addition to negotiating access to physical infrastructure in participatory budgeting exercises, leaders of JJVVs have been recently involved in new participatory spaces which the municipality of La Paz introduced in their new *carta orgánica*. These include, among others, municipal assemblies in which municipal staff presents new large-scale urban development projects to civil society representatives. As outlined in chapter four, the municipal assemblies are, in principle, open to the participation of different CBOs. Yet, in practice, only JJVV leaders attended the events; members of other CBOs such as women’s organisations, youth tribes or cultural associations felt uninformed. During fieldwork there was the opportunity to attend a municipal assembly which focused on the issue of metropolitan governance. The assembly was dominated by municipal staff making long speeches and there were few opportunities for CBO leaders to voice their demands. Despite these limited moments for CBO leaders to actually participate, it was particularly surprising to observe the performance of indigenous JJVV leaders from Pumakatari and Litoral during this event:

Don Francisco and Don Luciano seemed like completely different persons today. Normally Don Francisco wears a red poncho in official JJVV meetings and speaks in Aymara with Don Luciano and other members of the JJVV directive. Today, like everyone else in the audience, both men were wearing tailored suits with batches of the MSM tied to their jackets. Not once did I hear them say a word in Aymara. They only spoke in Spanish and were proud to show me off when meeting acquaintances from the municipality during lunch break. They continuously praised the work of the municipality and expressed their support for the party and the issues discussed within the assembly. (Philipp Horn, field-note diary, 3 December 2012)

At first it seemed strange how Don Francisco and Don Luciano behaved during the municipal assembly. During internal meetings of their JJVV leadership board, they openly expressed their indigenous identity through their traditional dress and use of the language

Aymara. In fact, to ensure that indigenous identity is preserved within the neighbourhood, Don Luciano, who was the leader of this JJVV, used the JJVVs premises to hold meetings for a popular school [escuela popular] in which the local youth could practise their Aymara skills through rap performances (see box 6.5).

Although traditional indigenous characteristics such as speaking Aymara characterised Don Francisco's and Don Luciano's everyday life in the neighbourhood, it no longer seemed of importance in processes of political negotiation with members of the municipality of La Paz. When interacting with officers of the municipality it seemed as if they had slipped into the shoes of different persons; they became *vecinos*. They no longer dressed, spoke, nor acted indigenous. Instead, they wore a modern suite, spoke Spanish and articulated their support for the MSM – a political party whose agenda they often criticised during internal JJVV meetings. Don Luciano (2IB) explained this behaviour as follows: “You cannot wear a poncho when talking with the functionaries [funcionarios] in La Paz. To get the things we want from them we need to act and talk like them. This helps us in developing friendships and friendships help you a lot in the municipality.” Don Luciano points out that, in processes of political negotiations with the municipality of La Paz, JJVV members have to comply with established understandings of urban *vecino* identity that guide the work of this municipality. Members from other JJVVs also underlined this point. For example, Don Pedro – migrant and member of a JJVV in Litoral – highlighted the following:

I know how to talk to my neighbours [vecinos] and to the municipality. It's like two different worlds. Here we are Aymaras but there you cannot be an Aymara. Do you understand me? When I go to the municipality I learned to become one of them. I am very passive and respectful. I respect my engineers and my architects there. They receive me well in their office. This helps me to bring back infrastructure works [obras]. For example, look outside my house here. The road to my house is now paved. (...) This is good for my family but also for my neighbours. (9IB)

In other words, JJVV leaders like Don Pedro and Don Luciano mobilised on officially recognised, static and spatially fixed identity categories, eg they became *vecinos*, in order to achieve their personal interests and the interests of some residents in their neighbourhood. In addition, Don Pedro's and Don Luciano's testimonies also emphasise the importance of developing friendships with municipal staff. The emphasis on friendship

as well as showing loyal support to local politicians and bureaucrats suggests that there exist clientelistic relationships between JJVV members and municipal staff. This trend was further described by Don Jose, migrant and member of another JJVV in Pumakatari, whose community benefits from the municipal programme of '*barrios de verdad*':

I cannot complain about the work of the municipality. I am a leader here since 14 years. I know all their bureaucracy. By now, the architects [arquitectos] in the municipality are my friends. For example, when I tell them that we need a road paved they will do this for our community. It was the same with *barrios de verdad* which is the project that was introduced by the old mayor Juan del Granada. I filled out all the forms correctly and prepared the application for this project very quickly and gave it to my friends in the municipality. Can you believe it? They gave *barrios de verdad* to my neighbourhood. Forty neighbourhood organisations applied for it and we got it simply because I am well respected in the municipality and know their procedures. (5IB)

In addition to an emphasis on clientelistic ties, eg offering support and 'friendship' to powerful actors in government in exchange for personal favours to the leader and the community, Don Jose also refers to the community as 'my community.' Such references were made by most JJVV leaders who, as was pointed out in informal conversations with people who were not involved in leadership boards, often realised community politics without community consultation. It is probably for this reason that ordinary community members often expressed their scepticism towards the work of their local JJVV.

The issue of clientelism was further made explicit by the leader of the city-wide network of JJVVs – the FEJUVE. Even though the LPP defined JJVVs and FEJUVE's as politically independent units, La Paz's FEJUVE was directly linked to the political party MSM. Their offices were situated within the premises of the municipality of La Paz. The leader of La Paz's FEJUVE (11IB) highlighted his connection to the MSM as follows: "I always supported the work of the MSM. They help us, we help them. There are some neighbourhood organisations that don't want to work with the MSM. They founded their own FEJUVE. Believe me, if you are with them [MAS], you don't get any services to your community."

### **6.2.2 Indigenous peasant unions and indigenous leaders**

Some *comuneros* also wanted to protect their remaining plots of rural land for different and sometimes contradictory purposes which included, for example, the protection of

community values or their interest in reselling plots for a higher price in the future. To protect their rural land, *comuneros* were organised in indigenous peasant unions which mainly negotiated with the rural municipality of Palca.

**Table 6.3 Accessing collective land rights in Pumakatari and Litoral**

Year	Regulation	Implementing government units and key practices	Tactics of indigenous residents
Until 1952	Hacienda system	National government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Land belongs to hacienda owners;</li> <li>• Indigenous peasants serve as landless semi-feudal peasants</li> </ul>
1953	Agrarian reform decree (following the 1952 Bolivian Revolution)	National government abolished the hacienda system and distributed land to peasants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adapt class identity instead of indigenous identity when interacting with government authorities</li> </ul>
1997	National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA 1997)	National government and municipality of Palca deepened land redistributions and, in addition to individually-owned plots of land, recognised collective land ownership patterns in indigenous communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shifting focus from class to indigenous identity when engaging with actors in government</li> </ul>
2010	Law of Autonomies and Decentralisation (LAD 2010)	National government and municipality of Palca recognise individual and collective land rights of IOPs and grant IOPs access to specific constitutional rights.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adapt a role of 'indigenous original peasants' when interacting with government authorities.</li> </ul>

*Elaborated by the author*

The present activities of indigenous peasant unions can be best understood by placing them into the historical context of the neighbourhoods. Hence, it is first important to describe *comuneros*' historical ties to remaining plots of rural land in an otherwise urban environment (see table 6.3). According to Espinoza (2004), until the agrarian reforms of 1952, land in today's Pumakatari and Litoral belonged to wealthy hacienda owners. The area of Pumakatari belonged to the Patiño family and the area of Litoral was owned by the 'Carmelita Sisters' – a catholic convent for nuns. The ancestors of today's indigenous *comuneros* served as landless semi-feudal peasants on these haciendas. Following the 1952 Agrarian reforms, land was redistributed to those who worked it – Litoral's and Pumakatari's indigenous *comuneros*. According to information provided by a civil servant in Palca's municipality (23GB), the land in the area used to belong to 30 *comunero* families in Pumakatari. Each *comunero* family received land rights to a plot of approximately three hectares, and about five hectares were reserved as communal land for grazing. No account of land redistribution in Litoral existed. However, Don Carlos (14IB), *comunero* in Litoral, made the following indications: "In the 1950s, after the revolution,

they gave land titles to those families that should own the land. They divided it into big, very big, plots. I think 24 or 25 families lived here back then. They owned everything from the cemetery to the Valle de los Animas.”

According to Espinoza (2004), the 1952 Bolivian Revolution and subsequent agricultural reforms also defined the organisational structure of the *comuneros*. From 1952 onwards, Pumakatari’s and Litoral’s *comuneros* organised in peasant unions linked to the national confederation of peasant workers (CNTCB). In 1979 the Unified syndical confederation of rural workers - Tupac Katari (CSUTCB) – founded by the indigenous Katarista movement – replaced the CNTCB. Hence, the neighbourhoods’ peasant unions became members of a national union network that mobilised both on peasant and indigenous rights.

Since the 1980s, the expansion of the city of La Paz strongly impacted the area. As a consequence, most peasants sold parts of their land to land speculators or incoming migrants. In this process, *comuneros* observed how land speculators sold their land for much higher prices to newly arriving migrants. According to Don Pedro, migrant and member of a JJVV in Litoral, this generated anger among *comuneros*:

They sold their land. They sold and sold and the city grew into this area. Soon they realised how much they lost in this process. Some of them sold their land for five Bolivianos [approximately GBP 0.50] per square metre. The person they sold it to then sold it to a migrant for five or ten times the price. The *comuneros* were the losers in this process. At that moment, their peasant unions started to fight for the protection of their remaining land. (9IB)

Pumakatari’s and Litoral’s indigenous peasant unions relied on different tactics to protect their land. Members of unions often herded animals onto empty rural plots to demarcate their land. A member of staff in La Paz’s district municipality South (7GB), pointed out that members of the indigenous peasant union of Litoral also used violence to protect their land: “They attacked people as soon as they entered green spaces in the area. They attacked municipal staff as well. When we did our cadastral measures some years ago they were beating us with sticks. They did all they could to avoid being registered by us.”

Besides incidents of violence *comunero* leaders mainly relied on processes of political negotiation to protect their land. According to Don Roberto (13IB), a young *comunero* and member of the indigenous peasant union of Pumakatari, there was always close

cooperation with the rural municipality of Palca: “Our union was always with Palca. We registered our land there. In Palca they understand us. In La Paz they want to destroy our fields. Why should we work with them?”

Depending on the political context, *comuneros* reported reliance on different official identity categories and associated legal discourses to justify their ownership of remaining plots of rural land. In the 1990s *comuneros* such as Don Francisco (7IB), member of the indigenous peasant union in Litoral and of the JJVV in Pumakatari, emphasised the important role of existing land redistribution schemes: “My mother was told about the INRA law. They told her to fill out the papers and bring them to the INRA institute and to Palca. They told her that if all the papers are correct, our land in Litoral will be protected from the invaders.” In addition to the INRA, Don Carlos (14IB), member of the indigenous peasant union in Litoral, highlighted the role of the 1952 land reforms in processes of land tenure protection: “We always avoided violent confrontation as much as possible. In the peasant union our brothers and sisters learned about the law. We always try to follow the law. First, it was the laws of the 1950s. Then it was the INRA that helped us. Now it is the new laws of Evo.” Don Carlos also explained how his indigenous peasant union started to shift its negotiation strategy and how members ‘became’ IOPs since Evo Morales’s MAS was elected into national government and into the municipality of Palca:

Comrade Evo says that the indigenous original peasants are the owners of their territory. The brothers and sisters in the municipality of Palca support this. They say that communities belong to the indigenous original peasants. That means the land belongs to us. We are the indigenous original peasants here. Over time we’ve forgotten that this land used to be ours. Thanks to comrade Evo, we will no longer forget this. We are writing a new constitution for our indigenous union. Here we say that we, the original indigenous peasants of Litoral, have the right to gain back our old territory. We want autonomy for our land. This is what we want. (14IB)

The incorporation of the IOP category and the articulation of demands for local autonomy were also outlined by Don Jorge, *comunero* from Pumakatari and member of the CSUTCB-TK federation that represents all indigenous peasant unions in the province of Murillo<sup>41</sup>:

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<sup>41</sup> The province of Murillo is situated in the department of La Paz. It comprises the municipalities of La Paz, El Alto, Achocalla, Palca, and Mecapaca. The CSUTCB mainly represents rural fractions within these municipalities.

The municipal conflicts became part of our daily life here but neither La Paz nor Palca own this place. This place is ours. When the Spaniards arrived they partitioned our land. They built their *haciendas* on our land. They built their cities where we lived. They took our resources. Now they are gone and others claim to be the owners. The administrative division here is colonial but we the indigenous original peasants are the true owners of this land. Comrade Evo says that we indigenous original peasants should live in autonomy. We will follow what he says. (4IB)

*Comunero* leaders generally relied on their ties with different officials in government and national indigenous movements that are in line with Evo Morales's MAS party. This helped them in successfully negotiating demands for local autonomy and ownership of rural land. Don Francisco (7IB) outlined this point as follows: "Here in the city they are not with the indigenous people. They are *vecinos* [neighbours]. We do not work with them in the city. We work with our people. We work with the CSUTCB, and with the municipality in Palca. They understand our concerns."

During fieldwork in both neighbourhoods I accompanied Don Francisco and other *comunero* leaders to various meetings of the CSUTCB-TK federation of the Murillo province which has its seat in the centre of La Paz. I also accompanied them to meetings with the municipality of Palca. During these meetings *comunero* leaders handed in different documents that demanded recognition of Litoral as an autonomous IOP district. Within these meetings *comunero* leaders also openly demanded permission to manage land within the neighbourhoods according to their own principles. When making these claims, *comunero* leaders directly referred to the law of autonomies (LAD) ratified by Evo Morales's MAS government in 2010 (see chapter 4 for further details). Besides a direct legal reference to new rights for IOPs, they also acted like IOPs when negotiating with the municipality of Palca. During meetings they wore traditional hats and addressed their conversation partners in Aymara. In contrast to political negotiations with the municipality of La Paz, *comuneros* openly expressed their indigenous identity in political negotiations with the municipality of Palca (see box 6.6). In other words, the leaders of indigenous peasant unions, similar to JJVVs, made strategic use of officially accepted static and spatially fixed identity categories and associated rights when negotiating with different decentralised and central government units. Similar to leaders in JJVVs, they changed their negotiation tactics over time. A member of staff in La Paz's municipality explained this as follows:

Back in the days they were the peasant class. They talked with the socialists to protect their land. Now the name has changed. With the MAS's rise to power, being indigenous is the new fashion [*es la nueva moda*]. The old peasants are now indigenous original peasants. Their interests didn't change but their name did. (8GB)

#### **Box 6.6 Members of Litoral's indigenous peasant union in negotiations**



At this meeting members of Litoral's indigenous peasant union discussed criteria they had to fulfil for an application as an IOP district. The meeting was attended by municipal staff from Palca and by members of the CSTUCB. It took place on the premises of the CSTUCB federation in La Paz. The participants at the meeting wore typical indigenous peasant clothing. Participants mainly spoke in Aymara with each other.

*Source: Photo by the author (14 November 2012)*


### **6.2.3 Folkloric associations and indigenous leaders**

Indigenous residents attached a strong cultural meaning to public places within their neighbourhood. The *Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced* was one example of cultural occupation of public space in the neighbourhoods. Interestingly, this festival was declared illegal by the municipality of La Paz. According to Don Jose (5IB), migrant and member of a JJVV in Pumakatari – "(...) every year there are problems with La Paz. They don't allow us to hold the festival." A member of staff in La Paz's district municipality South (7GB) confirmed this point as follows: "As long as I am working here we prohibit them to run the fiesta. Why? They block the traffic. They are a security risk. They drink so much that things get completely out of control. We cannot allow something like this." Indeed, in 2012, the national newspaper *La Razon* (20 September 2012; 23 September 2012) reported that the municipality of La Paz declared the *Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced* as

illegal because of excessive alcoholism and associated criminal activities in the neighbourhood.

Some residents, particularly women, were aware of the security threat the festival posed for their neighbourhoods. They often associated the festival with a rise in violent behaviour and alcohol abuse (see section 2.1.3). For example, four out of 12 focus groups prioritised the issue of violence or insecurity as main problem in the neighbourhood. In a causal flow diagram one focus group of six Aymara women mentioned the annual festival as a security problem and highlighted alcoholism, excessive behaviour, the absence of the police and the presence of too many people in the neighbourhood as the main causes of the problem (see figure 6.3 for an illustration). To overcome problems of violence and insecurity, the women in this focus group shared the sentiments of the municipality of La Paz and suggested that the annual festival should be prohibited. Alternatively, they suggested increased police control, improved rehabilitation facilities for alcohol abusers, or to rely on indigenous justice.

**Figure 6.3 Causal flow diagram: The issue of insecurity in Pumakatari**



*Source: Focus group with six Aymara women (migrants) and two Aymara men (migrants) in a community centre in Litoral (10 December 2012)*

Despite opposition from female residents and from the municipality of La Paz, the festive events took place as planned in 2012 and 2013. The festival went ahead because folkloric associations such as the *Fraternidad Morenada Union Central Puma* entered into political negotiations with the neighbouring municipality of Palca and with officials in the Ministry of Culture in which the residents claimed their rights to realise the festival by slipping into the role of IOPs. *Comunero* Don Francisco described this process as follows:

Back in the days we always had problems with the police. Since the MAS has been in government in Palca and in La Paz [he refers to the seat of the national government] we no longer have this problem. They support us indigenous original peasants in the area. The mayor of Palca is an indigenous original peasant himself. He comes to our festival. He has plenty of friends in the MAS that as well support our festival. La Paz complains about our festival but they cannot do much about it. The government is on our side (7IB)

Don Jose provided a similar description:

The MAS is in support of us indigenous original peasants. La Paz is not with the MAS but Palca is. We go to them to get our licence. There, our indigenous brothers and sisters understand us. They know what rights we indigenous original peasants have. Don Franco [another member of the folkloric association], Don Manuel [mayor of Palca] and other folkloristas are now planning to register our festival as national patrimony in the Ministry of Culture. If they register us there, no one can complain about our festival anymore. (5IB)

The descriptions by members of folkloric associations are certainly accurate. According to the newspaper *La Razon* (20 September 2012; 23 September 2012), the municipality of Palca officially authorised the festival in both years. This limited the actions the municipality of La Paz could take. *La Razon* (20 September 2012) explained this process as follows: “The municipality of La Paz will monitor the events in cooperation with the police. The mayor, however, confirmed that because of border conflicts with Palca the *folkloristas* have an advantage because they obtained legal authorisation for this event from this municipality.” This legal authorisation helped *folkloristas* to prevent interventions by the police. Don Jose (5IB) explained this as follows: “The police are more accountable to the national government. The national government is controlled by the MAS. Palca is with the MAS. We are with the MAS. This is why the police won’t interfere.”

Similar to members of JJVVs and indigenous peasant unions, *folkloristas* were highly aware of existing official, static and spatially-fixed understandings on identity and rights within the municipality of La Paz and other decentralised and central government units. To gain authorisation for their festival, members of folkloric associations therefore negotiated with pro-indigenous political actors of the MAS government in the municipality of Palca as well as in the national government.

### 6.3 Summary

This chapter showed what being indigenous means to some of the residents of two neighbourhoods in La Paz – Pumakatari and Litoral. Residents generally shared in common aspirations to preserve their language Aymara as well as some ancestral traditions and practices. Yet, in the meantime they also wanted to lead a prosperous life in the city.

Despite these similarities, different residents, eg *comuneros*, migrants, elderly residents, younger generations, men and women, articulated different ways of how they would like to fuse traditions with a modern urban life. This diversity of indigenous identities was articulated through residents' specific demands for land – an important asset which they associated with different opportunities to access other physical (eg houses, urban infrastructure), productive (eg communal agricultural land), financial (eg a stake in the urban land speculation market), or cultural (eg public space for festivals, rap performances, or indigenous self-governance) assets. In addition to diverse expressions of indigenous identities and associated asset demands among different groups, it is also important to point out that there existed intra-group differences; for example, some *comuneros* sought to preserve the remainders of their collectively-owned land for agricultural purposes (ie land as a collective and productive asset) while others wanted to sell this land for a good price at the urban land speculation market (ie land as financial asset). All this suggests that indigenous identities and associated asset demands were not only diverse but often conflicted with each other.

Pumakatari and Litoral, hence, did not represent 'indigenous communities' where people lived with each other in harmony, peace and equality. Instead, these neighbourhoods, like most neighbourhoods elsewhere in this world (Banks 2014; DeFilippis 2001), were characterised by internal hierarchies, conflicts of interest and power relations. In this

context, one's position within the neighbourhood also determined one's opportunities to access a portfolio of assets and to live out one's indigenous identity. This chapter showed that a resident's capacity to access a portfolio of assets required them to engage in one or multiple CBOs. Within the neighbourhoods CBO involvement was often restricted to men. As a consequence, men had more opportunities to access their aspired portfolio of assets and to live out their indigenous identity than, for example, women.

The findings also revealed that it was predominantly the indigenous leaders of local CBOs who played a central role in engaging with government representatives. These leaders obtained the necessary political capital, here defined as knowledge of existing rules and procedures that characterise a particular political system (Ginieniewicz 2012), that allowed them to successfully claim their interests and demands in negotiation with relevant government officials. Three in-depth illustrations described the contestation and political negotiation tactics of leaders as changing over time, space, and depending on the political actor they engaged with. In the past, emphasis was put more on self-help interventions. In the present political context, indigenous leaders benefited from the fact that different governments, with distinct political agendas and understandings of identity, operated within their neighbourhoods. They often developed personal and clientelistic ties with different governments. Leaders also articulated their interests and demands in line with the specific political agenda of the bureaucrat they negotiated with. Furthermore, they adapted to static and spatially-fixed understandings of identity that guided the political agendas of different governments (see chapter 5). This meant that at one moment indigenous leaders would become *vecinos* and MSM supporters only to be IOPs and MAS supporters in another context. These tactics of manoeuvring between different identity categories and political affiliations helped indigenous leaders and their CBO members to fulfil their interests and demands; it helped them to live out their indigenous identity. In this process they probably asked themselves: To be or not to be indigenous in processes of political negotiations? This is the question for indigenous leaders!

## **7 The role of indigeneity in public policy and urban planning practice in Quito**

Similar to Bolivia, Ecuador's national government introduced a new constitution in 2008. This constitution not only defines the principles according to which different state institutions should operate. Within its 444 articles it also outlines the country's development and political agenda for a variety of policy sectors. For example, it defines the country's development agenda through the notion of *Buen Vivir* – to guarantee the good life it grants all Ecuadorian citizens with universal rights to education, healthcare, housing but also to the city. In addition, the constitution calls for a break from historical inequalities and emphasises strengthening the rights of previously marginalised groups such as indigenous peoples. Wherever indigenous peoples live, whether in rural or urban areas, the government should ensure that they experience *Buen Vivir* by taking into account their specific rights, interests and demands through an intercultural approach. As was already outlined in chapter two – even though Ecuador's constitution provides a long list of rights, it does not necessarily offer operational guidelines on how to translate these rights into practice.

This chapter deals with how some elements of this ambitious constitution – its contents on indigeneity, indigenous rights and an intercultural development agenda – have been translated into public policies and planning practices particularly in those places – cities – where such topics historically did not play a central role. To illustrate the translation of new constitutional contents the chapter mainly focuses on the case-study city – Quito. It presents findings from document analysis, observations, and interviews with government officials operating in those government institutions – Ecuador's national government (section 7.1) and Quito's municipal government (section 7.2) – which influenced public policies and urban planning practices in this city. The central intention of this chapter is to reveal a gap between constitutional and legal rhetoric which puts the specific rights of indigenous peoples at the centre of Ecuadorian politics and actual practices. It is argued that specific indigenous rights and intercultural principles were often inadequately addressed as they conflicted with other government priorities such as setting new economic incentives, promoting tourism, or guaranteeing access to universal rights and public services. In addition, it is also demonstrated that the translation of new

constitutional contents on indigeneity was sometimes not achieved because government officials involved in different stages of the policy implementation process either lacked political willingness or sufficient training to address issues such as indigeneity within their work.

### 7.1 National government of Ecuador

After the ratification of Ecuador's new constitution in 2008, Rafael Correa's party PAIS Alliance (AP) was re-elected with 52 per cent of the vote, and claimed 69 out of 124 seats within Ecuador's parliament. By the time of the fieldwork in Quito, the national government had already drafted a set of new laws and planning documents that directly addressed the constitutional content on indigeneity, indigenous rights and principles of interculturalism which should be applied by all sector ministries and local governments including the municipal government of Quito (see table 7.1).

**Table 7.1 National legislation that incorporates new constitutional rights in Ecuador**

Document	Key contents
The Organic Code of Territorial Organisation, Autonomy and Decentralisation (COOTAD 2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outlines competencies of decentralised government units;</li> <li>• Introduces specific competencies for indigenous territorial circumscriptions and communes;</li> <li>• Recognises communes as semi-autonomous local governments in urban areas.</li> </ul>
Law of citizen participation (LCP 2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defines mechanisms of participation and social auditing at the level of central and local government.</li> </ul>
Plurinational Plan Against Racism and Ethnic Discrimination (PPRE 2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outlines the government agenda on targeting racism and ethno-racial discrimination against indigenous peoples.</li> <li>• Requires the establishment of national government institutions which monitor the implementation of indigenous rights in different policy sectors.</li> </ul>
Presidential decree 60 (DP 2012)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Declares that every government institution must be composed by staff representing the different ethno-racial groups living in the country.</li> </ul>
Law on Intercultural Education (LIE 2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduces Ecuador's new intercultural education system that is applicable for all citizens.</li> </ul>

*Based on document analysis undertaken by the author*

In order to effectively translate new constitutional rights within Ecuador's diverse regions, cities and villages, the national government deepened decentralisation. The new decentralised structure of the state is outlined in the new organic code of territorial organisation, autonomy and decentralisation (COOTAD) which was ratified in October 2010. The COOTAD defines the competencies and responsibilities of central and local government units. The latter include regions, provinces, cantons and rural parishes (COOTAD 2010: art 4). Article 73 of the COOTAD (2010) also recognises autonomous

municipal and metropolitan districts as local government units; these are densely populated urban areas, eg Quito or Guayaquil, that are located across different cantons. In addition, Article 93 of the COOTAD (2010) grants indigenous territorial circumscriptions and communes with specific administrative rights to implement indigenous rights which are outlined in article 57 of the new constitution (CPE Ecuador 2008). Unlike previous legislation which defined communes as rural territories, the COOTAD (2010: vigesima cuarta) also recognises the presence of communes within urban areas: “(...) where communes exist whose total or partial territory is situated within urban areas, cantons or autonomous municipal districts must, via their legislative bodies, consult and involve these communes in the governance of their community land and goods.”

The COOTAD significantly broadened the competencies of local governments which previously were mainly responsible for the provision of physical infrastructure. For example, municipal governments responsible for the administration of cities received the competency to introduce spatial planning criteria, boost local economic development, protect intercultural diversity, plan and regulate transport, and improve local healthcare and security (COOTAD 2010: art. 84). In accordance with the constitution and new national legislation, municipal governments must also ensure that diverse residents – including indigenous peoples – are involved in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of public policies and urban planning interventions (ibid). With more responsibilities granted to local governments, the COOTAD increased the budget of local governments. Prior to Correa’s rise to power in 2006 local governments received approximately 14 per cent of national government revenue. This nearly doubled to approximately 28 per cent from 2006 onwards (SENPLADES 2009).

Even though key policy and planning responsibilities have been transferred to local governments, the COOTAD (2010) allocated Ecuador’s national government with the responsibility to draft new legislation which sets guidelines on how specific constitutional content such as intercultural education (CPE Ecuador 2008: art. 343), intercultural healthcare (CPE Ecuador 2008: art. 358) or intercultural urban development (CPE Ecuador 2008: art. 375) should be addressed within all cities including Quito.

### 7.1.1 Institutional restructuring

To ensure that sector ministries take into account the aspect of indigeneity within all sector policies, the national government drafted a set of new laws in advance. For example, Ecuador's government drafted a new law on citizen participation (LCP) in 2010 which guarantees to involve indigenous peoples and their collective organisations within processes of participation (art. 1) and social auditing (art. 46). The LCP (2010: art. 81), for example, recognised that indigenous peoples have the right to prior and informed consultation on interventions taking place in their territories. In terms of social auditing, the LCP (2010: art. 47) defines that specific government institutions and civic oversight councils should monitor the implementation of indigenous rights and concerns within policy sectors as diverse as housing, urban development or education. The importance of relying on such institutions was also emphasised within the national government's plurinational plan against racism and ethnic discrimination (PPRE 2009). Furthermore, to guarantee that indigenous peoples were involved in decision-making processes, Rafael Correa issued a presidential decree which emphasised that each government institution should introduce affirmative action policies and hire indigenous staff (DP 2012). According to a senior civil servant in Ecuador's secretary of peoples, who was responsible for monitoring the implementation of this decree, the composition of indigenous staff within government institutions should match their proportion within the overall population; hence, seven per cent of staff within each institution should be indigenous (6GE). By the time of conducting fieldwork in Quito, only 10 per cent of national and local government institutions fulfilled this target (6GE). According to a senior civil servant in the ministry for the coordination of patrimony (MCP), the following national government institutions complied:

Only those institutions that work directly on indigenous concerns hired indigenous people. These are mainly the CODENPE (national council for the development of indigenous peoples and nations), the Secretary of Peoples, and our unit. In other ministries you can search hard to find indigenous staff. Maybe the porters or cleaners belong to this group but no one else. As always, it is not the indigenous people that make the decisions in this country. It is not us who define our *Buen Vivir*. It is the old elites and believe me their vision of *Buen Vivir* is different to ours. Most of us here in the government don't even want to understand what *Buen Vivir* or interculturalism means. They don't want to think about diversity. To be honest, they don't care about indigenous people and all these other groups. (15GE)

Despite this critical interpretation it is also important to emphasise that the presidential decree was only introduced a few months prior to the interview with this senior civil servant. Another senior civil servant in the national secretary for development planning (SENPLADES) argued that it will take time to change the staff composition within other government units (19GE): “Institutional change is difficult to bring forward in the short term. We have bureaucrats working here for more than 40 years and we cannot replace them with indigenous peoples from one day to the next. We will achieve such institutional changes in the long term and indigenous peoples will play a central role in it.”

During fieldwork in Quito, the national government did, however, also undertake reforms which produced short-term institutional changes. Institutions working specifically on indigenous rights and concerns were particularly affected by these reforms. Contrary to the LCP (2010) and the PPRE (2009) which emphasised the need to strengthen the role of civic oversight councils and government institutions which monitor the implementation of indigenous rights, the national government actually limited the influence of existing institutions that were responsible for this task. This was, for example, the case for the MCP – the government institution which published the PPRE (2009) and was responsible for assisting all sector ministries in the process of implementing constitutional rights on intercultural affairs and indigenous peoples. During my visit to this institution government officials, including those interviewed for this thesis, were clearing their desks. They prepared to be relocated into the ministry of culture. For government officials working in the MCP, the transfer of their institution also had implications for their work:

Once we move to the ministry of culture the focus of our work will be significantly reduced. We will be asked to organise cultural events and to promote the indigenous patrimony of our country. Indigenous issues will be reduced to what they were a long time ago – folklore and tradition. Other topics will no longer be within our competence. We will no longer monitor the work on indigenous justice, on investments into economic programmes for indigenous peoples, on the strengthening of relations of the state with the indigenous movement, on the role of indigenous issues in the city. The government decided that there is no need to have an institution working on such topics anymore. In fact, I think soon no one will work on these topics. (15GE)

The MCP was not the only government institution which was affected by institutional changes and a loss in responsibilities. Ecuador’s secretary of peoples, responsible for the monitoring of indigenous affairs within different policy sectors, was about to be integrated

into a new national secretary of policy management which should coordinate the implementation of constitutional principles such as *Buen Vivir* for all sector ministries. A senior civil servant who used to work in the secretary of peoples mentioned that the closure of their institution will have the following consequences:

Less than 25 per cent of our staff will relocate to the new ministry and out of those even fewer will continue working on indigenous questions. In the new ministry the government wants to monitor how *Buen Vivir* is achieved for all citizens. Unlike in our secretary of peoples, indigenous affairs will play only a minor role on their agenda. (6GE)

A reduction in the influence of institutions that address indigenous peoples could also be observed for CODENPE. Established prior to Correa's government in 1998, CODENPE had the task of monitoring indigenous affairs and implementing specific indigenous development programmes such as promoting micro-credits and saving schemes within indigenous communities. In the financial year 2012 CODENPE was still allocated USD12 million of government funding to undertake such work (PPER 2010). Yet, according to information provided by the director of CODENPE (2GE), Ecuador's national government cut the budget of this institution by more than two thirds in 2013. It also reduced its staff by more than a third. The same director described this change as follows (2GE): "You can see that Correa keeps us so that he can say 'Look the indians have their own institution.' Yes we do have our institution but without any money from the government we cannot do much."

In addition to budget and staff cuts which limited CODENPE's capacity to address its different tasks, this institution – like the MCP and the secretary of peoples – was also threatened with closure. According to information provided by officials in CODENPE and the national secretary for development planning – SENPLADES (2GE; 19GE), the national government attempted to integrate CODENPE into new national equality councils which unite a diversity of social groups including indigenous peoples, Afrodescendants, women, children, the elderly etc. To achieve this fusion, the government was still in the process of drafting a new law on the regulation of equality councils. Until the ratification

of this new law<sup>42</sup>, CODENPE was still responsible for addressing indigenous affairs – though with less money and staff allocated to do this task.

All civil servants approached in the MCP, Secretary of Peoples and the CODENPE shared in common that they associated budget and staff cuts as well as the closure of their institutions with a weakening of their responsibilities and a declining government focus on indigenous affairs within all policy sectors. While the responsibilities of MCP were narrowed down to addressing indigeneity within policies on culture, CODENPE and the secretary of peoples were about to be integrated into new institutions which focused more on monitoring the implementation of universal and not necessarily specific indigenous rights. A senior civil servant working in SENPLADES who was involved in planning and implementing institutional reforms explained this shift away from indigenous affairs as follows:

Our government mainly works for Ecuadorians citizens. The indians are a minority. As in any democracy a minority does not rule. We treat our indians as equals with the same universal rights and services. Unlike previous governments, we no longer want to have this politics of difference. Our history is a history of difference. Now we want to be one people. For this reason we decided to close those institutions that focus only on minority groups and we integrated them into new institutions that see that all our rights, our human and universal rights, are addressed. (19GE).

Following this testimony, institutions which address or monitor the implementation of rights of indigenous peoples, here derogatively referred to as ‘indians’, do not seem to play a central role in the actual political agenda of Ecuador’s national government which centres more on the provision of universal rights. In addition, this testimony also describes institutional reforms as an attempt by the government to distance itself from the political agenda of previous governments. Indeed, as outlined in chapter two, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s national governments, responding to social movement demands, often introduced institutions on indigenous affairs – including CODENPE – which were rarely administered by the state but by indigenous movement affiliates themselves (van Cott 2008). As has been outlined in other studies (Becker 2011, 2013; Marti i Puig 2013), Rafael Correa’s government attempted to strengthen the historically weak Ecuadorian

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<sup>42</sup> The law for the establishment of equality councils was ratified in 2014. It remains to be seen how indigenous affairs are dealt with in this new institution.

state and to reduce the involvement of social movements, including those representing indigenous peoples, within government institutions. Hence, undertaking institutional reforms such as those outlined above might also help in achieving this political goal.

While institutions responsible for assisting and monitoring the implementation of indigenous rights across policy sectors were faced with a threat of closure, other sector ministries still had to follow the constitutional mandate and address indigenous rights and intercultural principles within their work. In the context of this research, particular focus was thereby put on those policy sectors – education, healthcare and urban development – within which the national government carried a central responsibility. The following sections will explore how constitutional rights for urban indigenous peoples and principles such as interculturalism have been addressed within these policy sectors.

### **7.1.2 Education and healthcare**

The national government made good efforts to integrate specific constitutional rights for urban indigenous peoples within their universal policy agenda on education and healthcare. For example, drawing on Ecuador's new constitution, the national government ratified a new law on intercultural education (LIE) in 2011. Article 2z of the LIE (2011) states that interculturalism refers to "(...) unity in diversity. It strengthens intercultural and intracultural dialogue and valorises the practices of different cultures which stand in harmony with human rights." The LIE (2011: art. 5) highlights that intercultural education is applicable to all Ecuadorian citizens whether they resided in either a rural or an urban location. Therefore, the ministry of education is obliged to develop a new national curriculum that incorporates ancestral languages and indigenous history (LIE 2011: art. 6). In addition, depending on the regional context, local schools have to incorporate specific cultural elements that are characteristic for a particular region, village or city (ibid).

As part of these educational reforms, the national government opened a new deputy ministry of intercultural education. At the same time, DINEIB – the institution that implemented bilingual education schemes since the 1990s and mainly relied on indigenous staff and donor funding (Andolina et al 2009; Hornberger 2000), has been integrated as a sub-unit of the deputy ministry of intercultural education. Similarly, schools which were part of the old bilingual education system were reintegrated into the new national intercultural education system as long as their staff could prove or obtain relevant

qualifications to work as teachers (LIE 2011: art. 13). Bilingual schools which could not comply with this criterion have been allowed to continue operating only if they were situated in remote rural areas or marginalised urban neighbourhoods in which, by the time of the ratification of the new law, no other educational centres operated (LIE 2011: art. 13). In the context of Quito, this meant that bilingual schools which predominantly operated on a voluntary basis and were operated by indigenous peoples themselves often had to close their premises. See chapter 8 for a case study on this topic.

Indigenous leaders, who were previously working in schools associated with the DINEIB system often perceived the new LIE and associated institutional reforms with a loss in political autonomy and influence<sup>43</sup> (information derived from: 13IE, 16IE). Hence, they shared similar sentiments to staff that worked in CODENPE, the MCP or the Secretary of Peoples. Yet, a senior civil servant who played a key role in drafting the LIE also highlighted the benefits of Ecuador's new education system:

Wherever indigenous peoples reside, whether they live in the countryside or in the city, they can now access intercultural education. What happened in the past? Look, everybody knew that bilingual education was for poor indigenous peasants. Even the indigenous leaders in DINEIB didn't send their children to bilingual schools. They sent them to private schools in cities. Back in the old days, we had education for Ecuadorians and a separate system for poor indigenous peasants. Now it is all one system. Even better, the white and *mestizo* children should now learn about indigenous culture. With that we aim to stop racism and improve education for all in the long term. (4GE)

The attempt to incorporate indigenous languages and intercultural topics within universal and state-run education schemes did, however, also produce new practical challenges. The same senior civil servant also summarised those challenges as follows:

Society is not yet prepared and neither are the people to decide who should make these changes. In our ministry people responsible for writing new curricula don't know much about indigenous history or languages. In our schools, particularly in cities like Quito, teachers and students are often racist. They don't speak or want to speak indigenous languages. They believe indigenous peoples are not part of the city. We started training the teachers but it will take years until our reforms have an impact on the ground. (4GE)

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<sup>43</sup> See chapter 8 for further details.

According to this testimony, new legislation could not stimulate practical changes in a context where lower-level bureaucrats such as teachers were unwilling to implement the new content. Indeed, the ongoing problems of racism and discrimination within cities – places which were historically considered to lack an indigenous presence – have been reported by most indigenous research participants (see chapter 8) but also by government staff that worked on addressing urban indigenous peoples and intercultural principles within other policy sectors. For example, similar to reforms emanating from the ministry of education, Ecuador’s ministry of health followed the constitutional mandate to introduce intercultural healthcare services (CPE Ecuador 2008: 358). For this purpose the ministry opened a new unit that specifically focused on intercultural health. Following an interview with the deputy minister of this unit (17GE), the ministry of health was still in the early stages of drafting programmatic papers to explain how ancestral medicine could be incorporated into Ecuador’s health care system<sup>44</sup>. At this time, the new unit was mainly responsible for monitoring whether hospitals and healthcare centres employed staff that spoke indigenous languages. Particularly within cities little progress was made on this topic. According to the deputy minister (17GE) by 2012 less than five per cent of urban hospitals hired staff who spoke indigenous languages. She also noted that doctors or nurses were often simply unwilling to attend language courses offered by the ministry of healthcare. Instead, she highlighted that “(...) most of the doctors tell us that before they learn an indigenous language, the indigenous peoples should themselves start to learn the language which is spoken in the city – Spanish.”

### **7.1.3 Urban development**

While Ecuador’s ministries of education and health adopted the content of the new constitution and directly addressed urban indigenous peoples through new legislation or programmatic efforts, other ministries still struggled to integrate the topic of indigeneity within their work. This was, for example, the case in Ecuador’s ministry of urban development and housing (MIDUVI). Following Ecuador’s new constitution, MIDUVI defined *Buen Vivir* through the notion of the ‘right to the city’. According to a senior civil servant working in this ministry (16GE), the Ecuadorian state represented the main guarantor of the ‘right to the city’. Such an interpretation differs from theoretical work

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<sup>44</sup> By the time of conducting fieldwork in Quito, the ministry of health had not drafted policies or planning documents on intercultural health. However, the ministry published a book which provided case studies on the application of traditional and ancestral medicine in other Latin American and European countries (Ministry of Health Ecuador 2010).

undertaken on this topic which views the ‘right to the city’ as the right of ordinary citizens to have democratic control over the city and to access, occupy, design and build cities according to their own interests, desires and aspirations (Lefebvre 1991; Harvey 2008).

By the time the fieldwork was being conducted in Quito, MIDUVI had not established what specific indigenous and intercultural ‘rights to the city’ actually meant and how they could be addressed in specific interventions by the ministry. A senior civil servant in this ministry explained as follows:

We realise that cities are the places which are the most diverse. Most of the Ecuadorians live there. They come from all parts of the country. Many of them belong to indigenous peoples or nations for which our constitution grants new rights. These groups were never taken into account by us. The constitution requires us to develop specific programmes that address indigenous peoples and other groups but at this moment we simply lack knowledge on how to do this. No one has really helped us to work on these topics. Most of us here are civil engineers or architects who were never trained on cultural issues. We simply do not know what interculturalism and indigenous rights mean in relation to our work which centres on providing housing and urban infrastructure to people living in cities. (16GE)

A lack of training and knowledge, together with an absence of support from other institutions working on indigenous affairs, seemed to represent a central reason as to why civil servants within this government ministry had not worked directly on issues such as indigeneity and interculturalism<sup>45</sup>. This tendency was unlikely to change particularly in a context where the national government was in the process of closing precisely those institutions – such as MCP – which were responsible for assisting different sector ministries in drafting and implementing legislation and programmes on such topics. In such a context, instead of addressing indigenous ‘rights to the city’, MIDUVI mainly focused on granting urban residents with their universal right to housing and public infrastructure. Since the election of Rafael Correa into office in 2006, the government significantly increased its annual budget for housing programmes, housing subsidies, and

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<sup>45</sup> Similar trends have also been reported by senior civil servants working in other policy sectors such as justice. For example, by 2012 the national government did not follow article 171 of the constitution which calls for the introduction of a new law to regulate the parameters of indigenous justice. A senior civil servant in the ministry of justice explained why not much progress had been made on this topic: “The constitution wants us to incorporate indigenous justice. In this ministry and in the courts we find this difficult. I personally have problems in recognising lynch-mob justice as part of the law. (...) Myself and other colleagues do not know how to integrate indigenous justice. We are educated on human and universal rights. We simply do not know how to incorporate indigenous justice into our work and we have not received funds to hire consultants that could advise us on this topic.” (22GE).

urban public infrastructure investment. For example, while in 2006 MIDUVI had an annual budget of USD 65 million, it received USD 168 million in 2007 and USD 194 million in 2012 to undertake such interventions (PPRE 2009). According to civil servants in MIDUVI and SENPLADES, indigenous peoples indirectly benefited from such interventions. A senior civil servant in MIDUVI explained this as follows:

Our policies target the entire population of Ecuador but particularly those who are the most vulnerable. By coincidence indigenous peoples but also Afro-Ecuadorians belong to this group. They are often in receipt of our housing subsidy schemes or social housing programmes. (16GE)

The fact that urban indigenous peoples indirectly benefited from universal targeting schemes was also confirmed in other interviews. A senior civil servant in SENPLADES (19GE), for example, explained to me that “*Buen Vivir* is a universal idea. If indigenous people in our cities live badly they should have access to universal rights for housing, public services, or education. We don’t want them to be poor; we simply want them to live in conditions that equal those of every other citizen.” To demonstrate improvements in the living conditions of urban indigenous peoples, this senior civil servant provided me with statistical evidence elaborated by SENPLADES. According to this information, only 47 per cent of urban indigenous peoples had access to adequate housing in 2006; this number increased to 72 per cent in 2009. Similar trends have also been reported in the government’s new plan against racism and ethnic discrimination (PPRE 2010).

Overall, this section demonstrates that, despite a new constitution and a set of legal documents which emphasise addressing the specific rights, interests and demands of urban indigenous peoples, national government institutions often struggled to effectively implement or incorporate the contents of such documents within their actual practices. At the same time, at the city level local governments, according to the new COOTAD, already had to address the rights and demands of urban indigenous population groups who lived within their constituency. The following section will outline how one local government, the metropolitan district municipality of Quito, addressed indigeneity and associated constitutional rights in urban policy and planning practice.

## **7.2 The municipal government of Quito**

With more than 2,000 members of staff and an allocated annual budget of USD 669,223,017 in 2012, Quito’s metropolitan district municipality was by far one of the

richest local governments, in terms of financial and human resources, in Ecuador (DMQ 2011). From 2009 until February 2014, Rafael Correa's AP party held a majority in Quito's municipal council. In February 2014 the AP, led by Mayor Augusto Barrera, lost the municipal elections against the opposition candidate Mauricio Rodas who represents the party '*Movimiento Sociedad Unida Mas Accion*' (SUMA). The findings presented in this section draw on fieldwork conducted in 2013 and only refer to some of the policy and urban planning practices undertaken by the government of Augusto Barrera.

Under the legacy of Augusto Barrera, the municipal government of Quito incorporated new constitutional rights for indigenous peoples and development principles such as interculturalism into its new urban development and territorial development plans (DMQ 2012b; DMQ 2012c). Drawing on the 2008 constitution and relevant national legislation such as the COOTAD, the new urban development plan defined Quito as a plurinational and intercultural city (DMQ 2012b: 8). As in the constitution, Quito's municipal government defined its urban development agenda as guided by principles of *Buen Vivir* and the notion of the 'right to the city' (see box 7.1). According to the urban development plan *Buen Vivir* requires the municipality to "(...) guarantee universal access to public services to all urban and rural parishes. (...) To achieve this, it is important to close gaps and to promote gender, ethnic, and intergenerational equality." (DMQ 2012b: 11). The municipal government's focus on providing access to universal services while protecting the rights of specific individuals and groups was further explained by the director of the municipal development planning unit:

We follow the ministry of urban development and rely on the concept of the 'right to the city' to bring *Buen Vivir* to all of our citizens. The 'right to the city' means that all citizens have access to public spaces, social services, infrastructure, etc. We want them to lead a happy and fulfilled life. (...) We know that *Buen Vivir* means different things to different people. We want to be closer to our citizens and promote universal rights while protecting the diversity of our beautiful city. You mentioned indigenous people. Within our sector policies and in the practices of our zonal administrations, we take their rights and demands into account as much as we take into account those of women, children, and others. (5GE)

According to this testimony, the municipality directly addresses the specific rights and demands of indigenous peoples. Indeed, contrary to previous urban development plans of Quito (DMQ 2003), the new urban development plan recognises the presence of urban indigenous peoples within the city (DMQ 2012c: 11). In addition, complying with the

COOTAD the municipal government also recognises the presence of indigenous communes within their jurisdiction (DMQ 2012b: 34). In its diagnosis of existing socio-economic problems for the city's overall population the municipality incorporated indigeneity at the indicator level and identified that indigenous peoples were disproportionately poorer, less educated, and had poorer access to public services than other ethno-racial groups (ibid).

**Box 7.1 We work for a Quito of *Buen Vivir* (Municipal slogan)**



*Photo taken by the author*

In order to promote *Buen Vivir* for all residents, Quito's municipal government defined a set of core development pillars and associated policy priorities which have been outlined in detail in the urban development plan (see table 7.2 for a summary). The subsequent sections describe to what extent and how indigeneity and specific indigenous rights were actually addressed within different policies and urban planning interventions.

**Table 7.2 Sector policy strategies in Quito’s development plan**

<b>Policy sector</b>	<b>Pillar in development plan (Key contents and programmes)</b>
<b>Institutional competencies</b>	<p><b>The city of Quito – capital/ district/ region</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cooperation of municipality with communes;</li> </ul> <p><b>Participatory, efficient, autonomous and democratic Quito</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote co-governance between municipal and zonal administrations;</li> <li>• Involve communes in policy and planning procedures.</li> </ul>
<b>Economic development</b>	<p><b>Quito – Productive and solidary</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulate street vending;</li> <li>• Construct new commercial centres and industrial parks;</li> <li>• Promote large-scale economic infrastructure projects which strengthen tourism.</li> </ul>
<b>Social housing and land titling</b>	<p><b>Quito, place for life and co-living</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote public and private housing projects;</li> <li>• Issue tenure rights within peripheral neighbourhoods.</li> </ul>
<b>Social policy</b>	<p><b>Quito, accessible for all citizens</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guarantee access to public services throughout the municipal district;</li> <li>• Improve provision of social infrastructure in urban periphery, suburban and rural areas;</li> <li>• Promote social services that are sensitive to diverse cultural groups.</li> </ul> <p><b>Quito, place for life and co-living</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote access to public squares;</li> <li>• Build public spaces and parks in peripheral neighbourhoods.</li> </ul>
<b>Participation</b>	<p><b>Participatory, efficient, autonomous and democratic Quito</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encourage participation and social control in all policy sectors;</li> <li>• Strengthen neighbourhood organisations through construction of community spaces;</li> <li>• Promote participatory budgeting;</li> <li>• Ensure intercultural diversity in participation.</li> </ul>
<b>Culture</b>	<p><b>Millennial Quito, historic/ cultural/ diverse</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build new cultural spaces in marginalised neighbourhoods;</li> <li>• Research and promote the specific culture of districts and communes;</li> <li>• Promote ancestral traditions, practices and languages;</li> <li>• Promote intercultural dialogue.</li> </ul>

Source: DMQ (2012b)

### **7.2.1 Institutional competencies**

In two of its core pillars, ie ‘the city of Quito – capital, district, region’ and ‘participatory, efficient, autonomous and democratic Quito’, Quito’s urban development plan (DMQ 2012b) emphasises the need to transfer the responsibility of implementing sector policies and projects from the central municipality to zonal administrations. When implementing different sector policies and planning interventions, zonal administrations should take into account the specific interests and demands of diverse local residents – including indigenous peoples. This was made explicit in an interview with the director of Quito’s territorial planning unit (8GE): “Our zonal administrations must work with the people living within their jurisdiction. In those neighbourhoods with a strong indigenous presence they should accommodate the interventions and the specific cultural demands of these groups.” The director of the zonal administration of Calderon, a suburban area which was home to a large number of indigenous migrants and communes, further confirmed this tendency:

We tailor the different projects of the municipality according to the preferences of the residents in our different barrios and communes here in Calderon. For example, we work with the indigenous communes in Llano Grande or San Miguel. They want us to assist them financially in the preparation of ancestral cultural events and festivals. We also attempt, wherever possible, to address those indigenous peoples in these communes who don't speak Spanish in their native tongue. (14GE)

As indicated in this testimony, the zonal administration also collaborated with communes. According to the COOTAD (2010), municipal governments should respect the autonomy of communes and involve them in their decision-making processes. To coordinate the work with communes, Quito's municipal government hired one member of staff. This civil servant offered a mixed balance on the work with communes:

In the past, the law of communes granted indigenous communes autonomy. This autonomy had a price. These areas lacked any kind of services. The *cabildos* always wanted municipal services but we refused to give anything to them as they did not belong to our administrative jurisdiction and had to approach the ministry of agriculture. Imagine you had areas in this city which never received any attention from the municipality. I'll give you some details. In total, only 30 per cent of commune residents have access to paved roads, sanitation, and piped drinking water. This is a shame. (...) We now have new laws that allow us to intervene and provide them with services. There definitely is some progress. However, the municipality still struggles to work with the communes. They do not always respect their right to autonomy. The district administrations, the secretary of culture, or the human development unit do a great job working with them but other municipal units still struggle a lot with the communes. For example, the people in the municipal water company do not recognise *cabildos*. They would not sit down and explain their work to *cabildos* and commune assemblies. They want to treat them like neighbourhoods and not as independent units of the state. They don't respect their culture. It is even worse when it comes to economic development programmes. The municipality does not involve them at all on these topics. They go in and do whatever they want to do. Sometimes that works but a lot of times it creates conflict. (1GE)

According to this interpretation, the specific cultural and political rights of communes were not addressed and respected equally by every municipal policy sector unit. This sentiment was also shared by *cabildo* members of indigenous communes themselves. For example, Enrique, a previous indigenous leader from the commune Llano Grande explained this as follows:

Calderon [referring to the zonal administration] is with us. We want to organise a festival and they help us. Some even speak Kichwa with us. It is different for others in the municipality of Quito. They don't respect our *communes*. They don't respect our territories. They take it away from us without asking. (5IE)

A differentiated approach of working with indigenous peoples, whether living in communes or as migrants within neighbourhoods of the city, could indeed be observed within different policy sectors. As will be outlined in the following section, particularly in the municipal agenda on economic development, indigenous rights and interests were often inadequately addressed.

### **7.2.2 Economic development**

As part of its economic development agenda the municipal government of Quito, in collaboration with the national government, focused on two large-scale projects in 2012 and 2013. The first project included the finalisation of the construction of Quito's new airport which is situated in a suburban area west of Quito (see figure 4.10 in chapter 4). To attract international businesses and to generate employment opportunities, the municipal government was also in process of preparing the construction of three new industrial parks to be located directly next to the airport (DMQ 2012b: 37). Quito's new airport and the new industrial parks are, however, sited on the territory of a number of indigenous communes including Oyambaro and Agila. According to *cabildo* members from these communes – Freddy (15IE) and Luis (17IE), at no stage did Quito's municipal government consult them about interventions taking place on their territory. The two *comuneros* understood this as a violation of their right to prior consultation about economic interventions taking place in their territory which is enshrined within the constitution (CPE Ecuador 2008: art. 398) and within the new LCP<sup>46</sup> (2010: art. 81).

Municipal staff was aware of the violation of indigenous people's rights to prior consultation. For example, the civil servant responsible for coordinating the municipal government's work with communes stated the following (1GE): "The municipality prioritises efforts of urbanisation over the protection of communes. As soon as there is a project, like the new airport, that strengthens the urban economy, we forget about the rights of indigenous peoples." A similar interpretation was also provided by the director of Quito's territorial planning unit (8GE): "With the new airport project we generate jobs and improve the lives of all residents including indigenous ones. The improvement of lives comes with a cost. You cannot address everyone as equal all the time."

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<sup>46</sup> The airport conflict and associated processes of indigenous rights violation have also been discussed in a news blog entry – see Bayon (2013) for further details.

A prioritisation of economic interests over specific indigenous interests and demands<sup>47</sup> was also visible in the second large-scale economic infrastructure project which Quito’s municipal government attempted to start at the end of 2013 – the revitalisation of the city centre neighbourhood San Roque (see box 7.2). In cooperation with the ministry of urban development and housing, Quito’s municipal government attempted to invest USD 136 million within a period of three years to renovate public spaces and colonial houses within this neighbourhood (DMQ 2011). Furthermore, the municipal government agreed to renovate vacant buildings – such as an ex-prison or a school building in the San Roque area – so that these could be sold to private investors in the tourism sector or turned into the administrative seats of organisations such as the United Nations (1GE; 5GE).

**Box 7.2 City centre revitalisation efforts in Quito’s San Roque neighbourhood**



This is how the San Roque market area looked like during fieldwork in Quito.

*Photo by the author*



This is a digital image from the municipal government of Quito which provides an idea of how the San Roque area could look like after renovation efforts.

Source: Image and copyright received from 8GE

As part of this city centre revitalisation programme, the municipal government also attempted to close Quito’s central San Roque market, located east of the city centre. As was outlined in chapter 4, Quito’s central San Roque neighbourhood and particularly its

<sup>47</sup> Such tendencies are not unique to Quito’s municipal government. In fact, other studies reported how Ecuador’s national government also openly violated indigenous people’s right to prior consultation in those rural territories where it wanted to expand resource extraction activities (Pellegrini et al 2014). Income generated from resource extraction is then often used for the provision of universal services and the introduction of social protection schemes that help to combat poverty (Becker 2011; Nehring 2012). Hence, universal rights and interests are prioritised over specific indigenous rights. This was also made clear in an interview with a senior civil servant in SENPLADES (19GE): “The central idea is to rely on extractive industries in the present in order to stop extraction in the long term. We know that this may be irresponsible and particularly the indigenous peoples living in affected areas are against it. We understand them but we cannot listen to them. We must be pragmatic. They also want to get out of poverty. We can only finance poverty reduction through petrol money. For this reason we have no time to consult people that oppose us.”

market represented one of the places in which indigenous migrants had always lived and worked since the colonial period (Kingman 2012). Municipal staff was certainly aware of the historical presence of indigenous peoples within this city centre neighbourhood but often justified the need to relocate them. A civil servant in Quito's commercial unit explained this as follows:

We want to boost the self-esteem of indigenous vendors. We train them in the municipality and provide them with licences to sell their products in allocated spaces. These spaces can no longer be in the city centre. We must relocate them. In the centre there are a lot of tourists and the San Roque area has a lot of potential for tourism and for private sector investment. At the moment, the indigenous people in the area disturb this development. Some of them are impolite towards tourists that don't want to buy from them. In this city no one should disturb anyone else. My right to the city stops once I violate the rights to the city of others. (23GE)

As in the above mentioned testimony, most members of municipal staff emphasised that the promotion of tourism, private sector investments into colonial houses and the attraction of wealthier residents in city centre neighbourhoods was more important than the preservation of indigenous work and living spaces. Hence, similar to Quito's airport project, the municipal government seemed to prioritise the economic interests and demands of some individuals and groups over those of indigenous migrants. For a more detailed discussion of the interests and demands of indigenous migrants in San Roque see also chapter eight.

Unlike previous municipal governments which displaced street vendors in Quito's city centre via force (Swanson 2007), the current government at least attempted to ensure that indigenous market vendors would be relocated to other work and living spaces in peripheral neighbourhoods like Chillogallo, Guanmani, Quitumbe or Calderon (8GE; 23GE). It was within these peripheral neighbourhoods of the city that indigenous peoples were often directly and indirectly addressed by different policy and planning interventions.

### 7.2.3 Social housing and land titling

Within its urban development plan Quito's municipal government did not mention the issue of indigeneity when outlining its housing policy (DMQ 2012b). The director of Quito's municipal housing enterprise explained this as follows:

There is no differentiation in our social housing approach for indigenous people. We run housing projects for indigenous families, *mestizo* families, and everyone else. I think though that indigenous peoples benefit from our policies. We target those poor people in the city whose housing conditions are inadequate and the indigenous peoples often belong to this group. (13GE)

Instead of directly addressing the housing needs of indigenous peoples, this testimony suggests that the municipal government indirectly addresses parts of this group through its focus on targeting the poor. As part of this targeting approach the municipal housing enterprise mainly undertook social housing projects in the city's peripheral neighbourhoods of Quitumbe, Guanmani, Chillogallo or Calderon – places in which many indigenous migrants lived or were about to be relocated to. To address housing deficits in these peripheral areas<sup>48</sup>, the municipal enterprise for housing undertook 12 social housing projects in 2012 and 2013 which provided a new home to approximately 10,000 residents living within these neighbourhoods. In addition, the municipal housing enterprise also promoted the generation of self-help and community-led housing initiatives in peripheral neighbourhoods which it attempted to support through legal and technical advice and through the provision of start-up loans (DMQ 2012c: 37). While members of staff in the municipal government could not provide me with data which specified whether indigenous peoples actually benefited from social housing projects, it was possible to observe that urban indigenous migrant organisations from San Roque made use of municipal incentives on community-led housing. Chapter eight will offer further details on the work of some of these indigenous migrant associations.

As part of its new territorial development plan (DMQ 2012c: 19), Quito's municipal government also attempted to provide households in peripheral neighbourhoods such as Calderon or Quitumbe – where a large number of indigenous people lived – with tenure rights. It hereby targeted those areas where more than one third of households still lacked a land title which they required in order to claim access to municipal services such as

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<sup>48</sup> Approximately 100,000 residents within peripheral neighbourhoods in Quito were considered to live in inadequate housing (DMQ 2012b: 18)

water or electricity. Similar to the municipal government of La Paz, Bolivia, Quito's municipal government only recognised individual land ownership and refused to provide tenure rights for collectively-owned urban land. The director of Quito's territorial planning unit justified this as follows (8GE): "Only indigenous people in the countryside can claim collective land titles on their ancestral territories. There is no such thing as collective land ownership in Quito or in any city in Ecuador. This never existed in our history." Such a historically rooted perception of cities as modern places in which indigenous rights for collective land ownership simply do not apply was problematic particularly in the context of Quito where urban indigenous migrants and *comuneros* often expressed the desire to inhabit and own urban spaces collectively and in community (see chapter eight).

#### **7.2.4 Social policy**

The main focus of our municipality is to generate social equality throughout the entire territory of the metropolitan district. For example, until the present, most of our schools and hospitals were located in the city centre and in the wealthy districts north of the centre. In the areas that grew the most, Quitumbe, Calderon, Guanmani, etc., there is hardly any social infrastructure. The majority of indigenous people live in these peripheral neighbourhoods and communes – so we also target them. (8GE)

Following the above interpretation of the director of the territorial planning unit, Quito's municipal government also indirectly targeted indigenous peoples by undertaking social infrastructure works within those peripheral neighbourhoods in which they predominantly live. Peripheral neighbourhoods in Quito, in comparison to wealthier city centre neighbourhoods, often lacked adequate social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, parks or day-care centres which could cater for all of its residents (DMQ 2012c: 22-23). To address this problem, the municipal government invested one quarter of its annual budget in 2012 into the provision of social infrastructure in the city's urban periphery (DMQ 2011). By 2012, the municipality intended to construct 24 new schools and three new healthcare centres within the areas of Calderon, Chillogallo, Guanmani and Quitumbe (DMQ 2011). Within various interviews it became clear that indigenous migrants and *comuneros* living in these areas benefited from these interventions (see also chapter eight). For example, Jaime, resident of the sub-urban indigenous commune 'San Miguel del Comun' which was situated in Calderon, highlighted the following:

Ten years ago there was no school in this area. Our children had to take the bus to the city. This sometimes took up to three hours one way. Therefore, a lot of the

families moved away from here if they could. We no longer have this problem. Since 2011, there is a new primary school around the corner. Our lives have become a lot easier with this. (8IE)

In addition to undertaking specific social infrastructure projects, Quito's municipal government also ran a set of social development programmes which addressed particularly vulnerable population groups including the elderly, young people, children, and people with disabilities. There has been no direct reference to indigeneity in the descriptions of such programmes in the urban development plan or in relevant policy brochures. However, according to municipal staff indigeneity has been taken into account in the implementation of programmes in neighbourhoods or communes where indigenous peoples lived. The case of the programme '60 y piQuito' (Sixty years and small) illustrates this point. '60 y piQuito' was a preventive healthcare programme for elderly people. As part of this programme, the municipality of Quito provided workshops and courses on healthcare prevention for people older than 60 years. These workshops were undertaken in more than 120 local community centres across the city (information derived from 9GE). While the municipality's healthcare unit developed a guideline that outlines the core aims and objectives of the programme, zonal administrations were responsible to adjust the programme according to the context of the local community. It is at the local level that indigenous rights and demands were directly incorporated. The director of the zonal administration of Calderon illustrated this as follows:

In some of the communes but also in other neighbourhoods a lot of the elderly attending '60 y piQuito' are indigenous. Unlike the young indigenous migrants they really sometimes don't know how to speak Spanish. To communicate with these people we either hire people that speak Kichwa or we work with community residents who can translate to the elderly what our community workers are saying to them. (14GE)

During fieldwork in Quito it was possible to attend a '60 y piQuito' meeting in the commune of Llano Grande which is situated in the area of Calderon. The workshop facilitator, an indigenous *comunero* himself, did indeed address participants in Kichwa. He also engaged participants in an exchange about their own ancestral traditional healthcare practices and use of herbal remedies (Field note diary, 20 June 2013). Hence, specific indigenous interests and demands, such as being addressed in one's own language, have been taken into account at the implementation stage of this project.

### 7.2.5 Participation

Quito's urban development plan describes its participation approach in the pillar 'Participatory, efficient, autonomous and democratic Quito'. In line with the new constitution and the new law on citizen participation, it highlights that Quito's diverse population should be involved in the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of municipal sector policies and local development programmes (DMQ 2012b: 44). Yet, in practice – and particularly with its new airport programme and also for its revitalisation plan of the San Roque area – the municipal government did not involve 'diverse' population groups, ie indigenous peoples, affected by its interventions. This was confirmed during interviews with indigenous *comuneros* and migrants who lived near the airport or San Roque areas. It was, however, also noted by members of municipal staff themselves. For example, a civil servant working in Quito's social inclusion unit and mainly responsible for addressing vulnerable groups such as indigenous migrants highlighted the following (20GE): "The municipality would not involve people who are set against the official economic agenda. Why would they involve *comuneros* in the airport project? To make life easier, they involve only those people that support them in the first place." The selected involvement of people within participatory processes has also been reported in other studies on contemporary Ecuador. For example, Becker (2011) noted that the national government increasingly refused to involve indigenous movements, such as CONAIE which is associated with the political opposition, in participatory processes. Such tendencies have also been confirmed in interviews with national government staff. A senior civil servant in the MCP for example highlighted:

Participation, well there is not much participation. Correa's socialism refers to the empowerment of the state. The state gets stronger and civil society is no longer invited to join decision-making processes. Our citizen councils comprise people who are in support of Correa. You won't find indigenous leaders from the CONAIE in there. Anyone who does not support the government's agenda does not have a voice. (15GE)

While such tendencies also applied to the municipal airport and market relocation project, the municipal government did establish participatory spaces in which a variety of residents – including urban indigenous peoples – have been invited. For example, each zonal administration was responsible for undertaking annual participatory budgeting activities in which residents were invited to propose physical and social infrastructure projects for their neighbourhood. In 2012, the municipal government allocated USD 1.3 million for

participatory budgeting exercises (DMQ 2011). Unlike in La Paz, Bolivia, involvement within the participatory budgeting process was not restricted to neighbourhood organisations (*organizaciones barriales*) but open to different civil society organisations (CBOs) that operated within the area. The municipal government thus also attempted to involve indigenous peoples in this process. The director of Quito's municipal participation unit explained this as follows:

In our participatory budgeting exercises we want to involve indigenous organisations. Initially, these organisations were very sceptical about working with the municipality. They didn't trust us. This is not surprising. In the past, the municipality used to discriminate against the indios. It took time to improve our relationship with them. We changed the procedures to meet their needs. Instead of running meetings on a weekday, they asked us to organise assemblies for participatory budgeting on Sundays. The people from the communes wanted at least one Kichwa-speaking person from the municipality to be there. We can now provide them with this service. (7GE)

Indeed, throughout my fieldwork in Quito I attended two participatory budgeting exercises – one in the city centre and one in Calderon. As suggested within the above testimony, these exercises took place on a Sunday morning and did involve one member of municipal staff that could address participants in Kichwa. During both events CBOs which represented *comuneros* and indigenous migrants were represented and received the opportunity to articulate their specific demands. For example, during a participatory budgeting exercise in Calderon representatives from Llano Grande managed to gain approval from the municipal government to undertake infrastructure improvement works on one of the central roads running through their indigenous commune.

In addition to participatory budgeting exercises, the municipal government of Quito also set up new community spaces, so-called *centros de desarrollo comunitario* (CDC's, community development centres). CDC's represented new community spaces which the municipality used for workshops such as the '60 y piQuito'. These new spaces could also be used for activities by local CBOs. By 2013, more than 150 CDCs operated in Quito's different neighbourhoods and communes (DMQ 2012c). From July 2013 onwards the municipal government, in collaboration with the urban indigenous organisation Tinkunakuy, was about to start a series of workshops that specifically targeted indigenous peoples. While these workshops took place after my fieldwork in Quito, the person responsible for their organisation provided me with the preliminary programme and guest

list. According to this material, the municipal government allocated USD 5000 to run 25 workshops in different CDCs which were home to a large indigenous population, including San Roque. In total, 250 members representing different indigenous CBOs had been invited to discuss which specific cultural demands indigenous residents had and how these could be incorporated into the municipal activities on healthcare and culture which took place in CDCs.

### **7.2.6 Culture**

Specific cultural demands of indigenous peoples were not only taken seriously within CDCs but within the wider municipal agenda on culture which is summarised in the development pillar ‘Millennial Quito: historic, cultural, diverse’ (DMQ 2012b). Among others, Quito’s development plan highlights diversifying the cultural landscape of the city and taking into account the specific cultural practices and traditions that characterise each area of the metropolitan district. To achieve the latter, the municipal government’s cultural sector unit was at the stage of conducting a study in which it sought to record the specific cultural characteristics of urban and rural parishes as well as communes. In addition, the director of Quito’s cultural sector unit also explained what the municipal government already did to promote cultural diversity:

In the past, we only ran events in the colonial city centre. Now we have moved beyond the city centre and address the cultural interests of all our residents. Each area is unique. All areas are diverse. With diversity I mean that we have so many forms of cultural expression. Some of them are articulated by indigenous groups. But there are as well the practices of youth collectives, foreigners, gay people and so many other groups. We try to promote their cultural practices at a local level. There, we fund events of all the diverse groups in this city. (24GE)

Similar to other policy sectors, the secretary relied on zonal administrations to identify the particular cultural characteristics of each neighbourhood and to fund events that respond to local cultural interests. For example, in areas which were predominantly inhabited by indigenous inhabitants the municipality funded traditional cultural events such as ‘Inti Raymi’ – the festival of the sun which is celebrated annually in June. According to information provided by a member of staff in Quito’s secretary of culture (24GE) the municipality of Quito allocated more than USD 160,000 to fund celebrations of ‘Inti Reymi’ in 30 neighbourhoods in 2013. Indigenous migrant associations that were approached during fieldwork also benefited from this funding scheme (see chapter eight).

Quito's cultural sector unit also sought to promote intercultural dialogue between residents of diverse ethnic backgrounds. However, according to the director of the cultural sector unit, efforts have been limited:

In practice, few intercultural encounters occur in this city. The white people who live in the wealthy North would not go to an indigenous event in the South. Indigenous people often do not want to encounter white people as they fear discrimination. This city was always more for the whites. The white people were first-class people and the indians and negros were second-class people. Then you have machismo. Bringing women and men together as equals is also difficult to achieve. We want to build an intercultural Quito in which we can all look into each other's eyes as equals. For that, we need to transform everyone, including ourselves. This will take a long time. (24GE)

As highlighted in this quote, ethno-racial discrimination towards indigenous peoples remained part of everyday life in Quito. Principles such as interculturalism manifested within the new constitution and incorporated within public policies at the national and city level, could only have limited impact on practically transforming urban societies whose history was characterised by separation and exclusion and not inter-ethnic encounters. The association of indigeneity with discrimination and exclusion remains dominant within today's Quito and, as will be outlined in the next chapter, represented a central element of being indigenous in this city.

### **7.3 Summary**

This chapter showed how different institutions involved in urban governance, Ecuador's national government and Quito's municipal government, addressed constitutional elements of indigeneity within new laws, policies and urban planning practice. It was shown that good efforts have been made to integrate new constitutional content within new national legislation – ie on participation, institutional restructuring, or education, but also within urban development planning documents. However, the findings presented in this chapter also revealed that specific indigenous rights which have been addressed within such documents were not always implemented. A variety of factors explained the gaps between legal rhetoric and actual practice.

First, the personal attitudes of those responsible for the implementation process mattered. For example, as was mentioned in interviews with various senior civil servants, national government programmes on intercultural and bilingual education and healthcare often

seemed to fail because street level bureaucrats – who often remained guided by racist attitudes and a historical understanding of cities as ‘white spaces’ in which Spanish represents the main language – were unwilling to implement the content of such programmes.

Second, despite legal rhetoric which promoted the specific rights of different groups including indigenous peoples, Ecuador’s national government and Quito’s municipal government actually followed a different political agenda which prioritised the promotion of universal rights and services. The focus on a universal rights-based agenda was summarised as follows by a senior civil servant in SENPLADES:

In the past we had two political systems. One was for the poor indigenous peoples. Indigenous leaders gained powerful positions in this system. However, the state did not put money into it and this ensured that indigenous peoples stayed poor. The other system was for the richer white Hispanic people. This system ensured that the rich stayed rich. We bring these systems together and create a state for all Ecuadorian citizens. In the Ecuador of Rafael Correa it is the state that takes responsibility. The indigenous leaders don’t like this as they lost power. However, the indigenous population is with us. We provide better services to them and all other segments of society. It is this principle of universal rights and equality that stands at the centre of our revolution. (19GE)

The above-mentioned changes have been implemented at the level of national government where those institutions – often composed of indigenous staff with affiliations to the country’s indigenous movement – which monitored the incorporation of specific indigenous rights within all policy sectors were either downsized, closed or reintegrated into new institutions which focused more on promoting *Buen Vivir* to all population groups. In Quito it was also possible to observe that the local government mainly introduced policies and urban planning interventions which addressed the city’s overall population.

Third, through its promotion of universal rights and interests government institutions nevertheless indirectly or directly targeted urban indigenous peoples. They targeted them indirectly through public infrastructure provisioning programmes taking place in the areas in which they lived. Indigenous peoples, who often represented the poorest groups within cities, also benefited directly from housing interventions which targeted the urban poor. In addition, even though Quito’s municipal government drafted specific cultural and social

development programmes (without explicitly referring to the issue of indigeneity), it ensured that zonal administrations addressed the specific cultural and linguistic interests and demands of indigenous target groups when implementing such programmes.

Fourth, in addition to prioritising universal over specific indigenous rights, it was also possible to observe that Quito's local government prioritised economic interests – such as generating employment, promoting tourism and attracting investors – over the specific rights of indigenous peoples. This was visible in the case of the new airport project and in city centre revitalisation plans in the San Roque area where indigenous residents' rights to prior consultation or to be involved in decision-making processes have been ignored. Having established what was actually done, or not done, by different government institutions to address urban indigenous peoples, the next chapter will now examine how different indigenous residents in Quito understood indigeneity; what their specific interests and demands were; and how they addressed their specific interests and demands within the current political environment that governed them.

## 8 Indigenous identities and processes of political negotiation in Quito

The government here in Quito takes away the last bit that is left of our indigenous community in this city. They take away our vending spaces. They punish us and discriminate us when we sell our products on the streets. We want that they give us a secure place where we can sell our products. We want that they help us to build houses and community spaces in which we can organise and eventually live again as indigenous community. (6IE)

The indigenous migrants have different demands in comparison with us living in the communes. The migrants struggle to find work and a place to live in the city. They are confronted by discrimination. We are as well fighting against discrimination but we do have a place to live which was always ours. Our problem is that the city enters into our communes. We want to get our territories back and receive autonomy. (15IE)

Quito's indigenous population was highly diverse. For example, the majority of Quito's indigenous peoples were migrants who came to the city from the nearby countryside in search for a better living. At the same time, Quito was also the home of so called *comuneros* who always lived near the city and whose territories have been affected by processes of urban expansion. Being indigenous had slightly different meanings for migrants and *comuneros*. This was already visible within the testimonies which started this chapter. The first testimony was from Natalia who came to Quito from the Cotopaxi province. Like many other indigenous migrants Natalia made a living in the city's San Roque market which, as was outlined in the previous chapter, faced threats of closure by Quito's municipal government. The second testimony was from Freddy, a *comunero* from the commune Oyambaro which is partially situated on Quito's new airport. Both Natalia and Freddy mentioned that being discriminated against represented a central part of being indigenous in the city. In addition, the two of them viewed municipal interventions taking place within their work or living spaces as a threat to their indigenous identity and sense of community. In this context, they articulated different demands: Natalia aspired to access a new plot of land on which she and her indigenous community from Cotopaxi could live, work and interact in community. In contrast, Freddy wanted to regain political control over the territories which historically belonged to his commune.

Similar to Natalia and Freddy, most indigenous migrants and *comuneros* approached in Quito associated being indigenous with discrimination but also with specific interests and

demands to preserve or regain access to a plot of land or space within the city. Yet, as will be shown in the first section of this chapter, depending on their role as migrants or *comuneros*, but also their age and political status within their community, urban indigenous peoples often associated land with different opportunities to access and accumulate a portfolio of other assets.

Having established what indigeneity means to different people, the second section uses three illustrations to show how one group of indigenous migrants from Tigua – and particularly the leaders of their market vendor association AECT-Q – sought to fulfil their specific demands through a variety of self-help, contestation and political negotiation tactics. The activities of the AECT-Q were by no means representative for the work of Quito's indigenous CBOs. Nevertheless, it is argued that they provide significant insight into how indigenous leaders – with varying success – articulated their personal interests as well as the demands of their indigenous community in such a way that it conformed with the different political agendas on indigeneity and urban development of the different actors in government with whom they interacted.

### **8.1 Indigenous identities and asset demands**

Seven per cent (approximately 150,000) of Quito's population self-identified as indigenous in 2010 (INEC 2014). According to an indigenous migrant, Oscar, from the organisation RUNAKUY Quito's indigenous population was larger but people often simply did not want to identify as indigenous. He explained this as follows:

Back in pre-colonial times we were all natives. In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century almost half of Quito's population were indigenous. Currently we are less than seven per cent. There were no massacres against indigenous peoples in Quito. There was no fever that wiped us out. We are seven per cent simply because many of us fear discrimination. In reality, there is a lot more of us but we are often too scared to show our indigenous identity in public. (1IE)

What can happen when a person does show their indigenous identity was outlined by Luis, a *comunero* from the commune Agila near Quito's airport:

My mother always brings my daughter Maria to her school in Tumbaco [suburban neighbourhood of Quito]. A couple of weeks ago the two of them embarked on their usual bus journey and the driver and the money collector mocked my mother for her clothes and for her bad Spanish [she mainly spoke Kichwa and knew only a

few sentences in Spanish]. They called her and my daughter *indias sucias* [dirty ‘indians’]. The money collector prevented them from taking a seat. He said ‘Go all the way to the back so that no one else needs to smell and see you dirty indians.’ (...) We get treated like this a lot. Sometimes they don’t let you onto the bus or into shopping malls. They make you feel like you don’t belong in this city. (17IE)

Everyday discrimination was not only a problem for Luis and his family but also for most indigenous peoples approached throughout this research. For example, within participatory focus groups indigenous migrants from the Pachamama College generally highlighted discrimination against indigenous peoples as the most severe problem they confronted in Quito. Table 8.1 provides an example of such a listing and ranking exercise with one group of indigenous migrants which, in addition to discrimination, also mentioned other problems such as a lack of community, insecurity and drug dealing in their work environment<sup>49</sup>.

**Table 8.1 Listing and ranking of problems of indigenous migrants in Quito**

Problem	Ranking	Prioritisation
Bad treatment and discrimination against indigenous peoples	3+3+3+3+3+3+3+3=24	1
Lack of community	2+3+3+2+3+3+3+3=22	2
Insecurity	3+2+3+1+2+3+2+2=18	3
Lack of work	3+3+2+1+1+3+3+1=17	4
Drug dealers on the street	3+2+3+1+2+2+1+2=16	5
To be a young father/ mother	1+1+1+1+3+2+3+1=13	6
Contamination	1+1+2+1+2+2+1+2=12	7

*Source: Focus group with 8 indigenous migrants (5 female/ 3 male) in the Pachamama College situated in Quito’s San Roque market area, 8 May 2013*

Within a causal flow diagram the members of the same focus group mainly associated personal characteristics – eg their physical appearance, language skills, and rural background – as some of the causes why they were affected by discrimination (see figure 8.1). To overcome problems of discrimination research participants in the Pachamama College, therefore, often explained that they had to hide their features which would point towards their indigenous background. They did this, for example, by wearing jeans and shirts instead of traditional ponchos or dresses, by speaking Spanish in public spaces, or – in the case of men – by cutting their long hair. Such changes in appearance in public helped them to ‘become one of them’. In other words, to avoid discrimination within the

<sup>49</sup> Most of the indigenous migrants in this focus group worked in Quito’s San Roque market which is renowned as a hotspot of crime, prostitution and drug trafficking within the city. Within most interviews indigenous migrants expressed an awareness of this problem.

city indigenous peoples – like the ones in the Pachamama College – would undergo a process of *mestizaje* or cholofication (see chapter two); they would become ‘white’ urban residents.

Taking into account ongoing patterns of discrimination and indigenous people’s responses to this phenomenon it was unsurprising that only a small proportion of Quito’s residents self-identified as indigenous. At the same time, research participants also mentioned that indigenous peoples often did not receive the option to self-identify as such. Rodrigo, member of the AECT-Q in San Roque, for example stated:


No one told us that the census<sup>50</sup> has a question about our ethnic background. When they knocked at our door they did not ask us whether we are indigenous. Maybe they just noted us down as *mestizos* because we do not look like stereotypical indigenous people. But we are indigenous peoples and it is sad that they make us invisible in the city. (9IE)

According to Rodrigo, a change of lifestyle in the city did not automatically coincide with a full departure from one’s indigenous identity. While hiding indigenous features might have been a solution to cope with the problem of discrimination, most research participants approached in Quito mentioned that they wanted to preserve specific indigenous traditions within the city. For example, when referring to solutions to the problem of discrimination focus group members also demanded respect for their traditions and cultures in an urban environment. At the same time, they aspired to be treated as equals and to enjoy the amenities of an urban life – housing, access to markets, etc – whilst having their specific rights respected (see figure 8.1). When articulating such aspirations to combine tradition with a modern urban life, most research participants often referred to the important role of land or urban space. Yet, as is shown in the following sections, depending on their status as *comuneros* or migrants but also on their age or position within their community, different people associated access to land or urban space with the opportunity to accumulate other assets which would allow them to lead rather different urban indigenous lifestyles.

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<sup>50</sup> In a recent publication Martinez Novo (2014) argued that Ecuador’s government strategically used the 2010 and previous censuses to portray indigenous peoples and associated social movements, which often represented the political opposition, as a minority whose interests and demands were of marginal concern. Therefore, people responsible for collecting census data were sometimes encouraged to not ask people about their ethnic affiliation.

**Figure 8.1 Causal flow diagram: Discrimination against Quito's indigenous peoples**



*Source: Focus group with nine indigenous migrants (five female, three male) in the Pachamama College situated in Quito's San Roque market area, 8 May 2013.*

### **8.1.1 Indigeneity and the city: the case of *comuneros***

We are ancestral indigenous communes. We lived here before the city of Quito was built. Even though we are increasingly part of this city, the way we live here and manage our territory as an indigenous community makes us different from the rest. We try our best to protect Llano Grande from the evils of the city. (5IE)

Like Enrique, an elderly *comunero* from the commune Llano Grande which is situated in the area of Calderon, most *comuneros* approached in this research mentioned that the ownership and management of their land represented an important part of their indigenous identity. Within the above testimony Enrique also associated land with the preservation of community and a set of ancestral traditions. This sentiment was mainly shared by elderly

*comuneros* – for example Enrique, Jaime from the commune San Miguel del Comun or Luis from the commune Agila (information derived from: 5IE, 8IE, 17IE). These *comuneros* knew what life was like prior to the arrival of the city and they often aspired to return to their old peasant lifestyles<sup>51</sup>. During interviews Enrique, Jaime and Luis all described to me how, in the past, they used to cultivate potatoes, okra or corn; in fact, according to Jaime the best corn in South America used to grow in the fertile valleys around Quito. I could only confirm this trend when enjoying homemade *chicha* [corn beer] during our interview. Similarly, these *comuneros* often explained how, in the past, they had autonomy over their territories and that they preserved specific traditions such as the *minga* [collective work schemes], leadership rotation, indigenous justice and the communal transfer of land from family to family. Jaime, for example, explained his strong relationship to the lands of his commune as follows:

For us being indigenous means to be recognised as owners of our ancestral territories. On our territories we could maintain our traditions. The way we worked and inhabited our territories defined our indigenous community. (...) Our food used to come from our territories. Our festivals and dances honoured different seasons which affected our territories. (...) Now, with the city coming closer, our territories are under threat (8IE)

According to Jaime, land was not just simply a natural asset. Instead, he associated land with opportunities to access other assets such as productive (cultivation of crop), cultural (festivals), social (community) and political (territorial autonomy and self-governance) capital which, together, defined his indigenous identity. Yet, for elderly *comuneros* the urbanisation of their communes – which occurred from the 1980s onwards (Gomez Murillo 2009) – seemed to be associated with a loss of their indigenous identity and of their territorial autonomy. In today's metropolitan Quito 24 out of 49 communes are located in urban areas. Similar to other peripheral areas in Quito, new residents often arrived in communes and self-constructed new homes on vacant plots of land.

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<sup>51</sup> The characteristics of communes, prior to the arrival of the city, have also been described in previous studies (Gomez Murillo 2009). These studies emphasised that Quito's communes – of which there are 49 – had existed long before the colonial conquest. With the arrival of the colonisers the indigenous peasants residing in these areas were integrated into the *encomienda* and later into the *hacienda* system. Following the 1937 Law of Communes and subsequent land reforms indigenous peasants formed communes on previous *hacienda* territories from the late 1950s onwards. The territories of communes were registered by Ecuador's Ministry of Agriculture. On these territories *comuneros* were allowed to govern themselves through autonomous *cabildos*.

The arrival of new residents also changed the demographic composition of communes. This was highlighted in an interview with Rebecca (4IE), *comunera* from Llano Grande, who stated that in the past the 2500ha of commune land belonged to only 12 *comunero* families. However, as some *comuneros* decided to sell parts of their land, the area became increasingly urbanised. As a consequence, in present day Llano Grande, there lived approximately 12,000 inhabitants with different socio-economic and ethno-racial backgrounds. The twelve families representing indigenous *comuneros* hereby represented a minority. *Comuneros* from other communes, such as San Miguel del Comun, Agila, or Oyambaro, outlined similar tendencies – they mentioned how they became a minority population within their own territories (8IE; 15IE; 17IE).

In 1993 Quito's 49 communes were officially integrated into the metropolitan district of Quito (DMQ 2012a). From this point onwards, Quito's municipal government involved itself in the territorial management of communes often without respecting their status as semi-autonomous jurisdictions (see chapter seven). For example, as was highlighted in most interviews with *comuneros*, municipal authorities issued newly arriving residents with individual land titles and provided them with access to services; they often undertook such activities without the consent of commune authorities who were assembled in *cabildos*. Furthermore, as was outlined for the construction of Quito's new airport and neighbouring industrial parks in chapter seven, municipal authorities recently undertook large scale infrastructure projects on commune territories without consulting local *cabildos*.

Quito's municipal government also sought to include *comuneros* within their jurisdiction and offered them to register their land with Quito and no longer with the Ministry of Agriculture. In exchange, the municipal government promised to integrate communes within their road network and to provide them with access to water and electricity<sup>52</sup>. Elderly *comuneros* often denied such offers as they viewed them as a reduction in the political autonomy of their communes. Enrique, an elderly *comunero* in Llano Grande explained this as follows:

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<sup>52</sup> According to a study conducted by the municipal government of Quito, in 2012 70 per cent of Quito's approximately 10,000 *comuneros* still lacked access to basic services such as water or electricity (DMQ 2012a).

Of course we want water, electricity, roads, schools, and all this. We don't live in the jungle here but are part of the capital city of Ecuador. As *cabildos* we wanted to pay the municipality for services but this was not enough for them. You see, the problem is that they want us to turn into *barrios* [neighbourhoods]. This means it would be no longer our *cabildos* that make decisions here but the municipality of Quito. You know how this municipality works; they give us services but take our territories. You see how they give permissions for people to build houses on our territories. Everything has a price but losing our rural territory and independence is too big of a price to pay. (5IE)

The arrival of the city and the increased influence of the municipal government of Quito within communes were, however, not perceived as a threat by every *comunero*. In fact, as outlined by elderly *comuneros* themselves, it was often their own neighbours – also *comuneros* with ancestral ties to their rural territories – who contributed to the urbanisation of their own communes through subdividing land and illegally selling it to new residents. Jaime explained this as follows:

Some of us no longer cared about our community. Instead of reserving their land for their family they sold it at a high price to people that came from other parts of the country. It is our own people that sold our land and left their territories behind. With this they destroyed our community. (8IE)

As indicated in Manuel's interpretation, for a lot of *comuneros* land has been associated with opportunities to strike financial benefits – and not with opportunities to preserve indigenous cultures and traditions. It was also for monetary reasons and not only for a violation of commune's territorial rights that other *comuneros* viewed the construction of the new airport as a problem. Freddy, a younger *comunero* and *cabildo* member from the commune Oyambaro (near Quito's airport), for example stated the following:

We do not mind that they build the airport here. All we want is that they share some of the benefits. They turn our land into valuable land. As it is our land they should compensate us<sup>53</sup>. The main reason I am angry is that I did not receive any money from Quito or the national government. I could be rich by now but the government keeps all the money to themselves. (15IE)

While for some *comuneros* land was associated with the preservation of indigenous tradition or with opportunities to generate financial benefits, for others owning a plot of land within Quito's urbanised communes meant leading a modern life in the city. In fact,

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<sup>53</sup> Freddy's demand to be compensated is also enshrined within new national legislation. Article 81 of Ecuador's 2010 law on citizen participation, for example, stated that indigenous communities have the right to be compensated for interventions taking place on their territories.

in contrast to elderly *comuneros*, younger *comuneros* rarely opposed urbanisation efforts by the municipality of Quito. Rebecca, a young *comunera* from Llano Grande, explained this as follows:

Of course I am an indigenous *comunero* but unlike my grandfather or my father I want to be part of this city. Our days as peasants are over. We want to lead a prosperous life in the city. We may protect some of our community land and traditions but when it comes to my own home I am with Quito. I registered with them. Now they deliver electricity and water to my house. (4IE)

The idea that *comuneros* themselves want to be part of a modern city was not only shared by people like Rebecca. Municipal staff in Quito often provided a very similar interpretation and highlighted that the majority of indigenous *comuneros* did not necessarily want to regain their territorial autonomy; instead, like most urban residents, they wanted to receive access to public infrastructure and services which was provided by Quito (1GE; 14GE).

Being indigenous in the city, hence, had multiple and sometimes contradictory meanings for *comuneros*. For the elderly it was associated with aspirations to regain autonomy over their land and to revitalise past traditions and agricultural practices. At the same time, younger *comuneros*, without necessarily neglecting their indigenous roots, preferred to lead a modern urban life – land ownership was also important for this; yet, for these people land ownership was not associated with agricultural activities but with receiving tenure rights from the municipal government of Quito or with opportunities to generate financial benefits from selling parts of their land to new residents.

### **8.1.2 Indigeneity and the city: the case of indigenous migrants**

The majority of Quito's indigenous peoples were migrants who came to the city from rural areas. Migrants often maintained strong ties with their rural homelands. This was pointed out in an interview with Natalia (6IE), an indigenous leader representing migrants from Chimborazo: "For me and for most of the members of my organisation being indigenous means staying in touch with our community back in Chimborazo. It means to know our language Kichwa and our traditions as indigenous peasants." The importance of one's rural origin was also emphasised by students at the Pachamama College. During breaks between classes students often told me how they would visit their grandparents or other

family members during bank holiday weekends or how they still returned annually to their village to help out during the harvest.

Despite such strong ties to their rural communities, indigenous migrants were predominantly engaged in making a living in the city. Quito's migrant population belonged to the city's poorest population groups (DMQ 2012; Espin 2012; Swanson 2007). The majority of migrants approached in this research were engaged in low-income activities and predominantly worked as market traders, street vendors, vegetable peelers, cooks, domestic workers, or folkloric art traders. They predominantly worked in Quito's central San Roque market or at the 'Mercado Mayorista' which is situated near the neighbourhood Chillogallo in the south of the city. As was pointed out in informal conversations with students from the Pachamama College and in interviews with indigenous market vendors, migrants often worked six to seven days a week from the early hours of the morning until the late evening. In such a context, markets were not only sites of work but also represented domestic and community spaces. Daniel, a migrant from the Cotopaxi region who worked in Quito's San Roque market and was a member of the evangelical indigenous organisation FEIRPI, highlighted the important role of markets as communal spaces as follows:

Here we all work next to each other. Of course we sell products but, more importantly, we are together with other people from our community. I work together with my daughter. The stall next to me is owned by one of my aunts. Opposite me work other people from my community in Cotopaxi. (7IE)

As with elderly *comuneros* who associated their territories with agricultural activities and the preservation of their indigenous community, indigenous migrants not only associated their workplace – the market – with commercial activities (financial capital) but also with the preservation of community, family and friendships (social capital). For example, as outlined by Daniel, market vendors from one community of origin were generally assembled within one market vendor association and worked next to each other. This was certainly the case with the market vendors from Tigua who were assembled in the AECT-Q. When visiting this association's market lane in San Roque, it was often possible to observe how market vendors chatted vividly with each other in Kichwa; some took care of their own children but also those of their colleagues; when a conflict emerged then association members would resolve it among themselves. For example, during one visit to

the San Roque market a member of the AECT-Q was accused of stealing money from another association member. To resolve the conflict, the vendors called the AECT-Q leader Juan who later punished the thief by asking him to pay back to the victim double the amount of money he stole. According to Juan, exercising justice, or indigenous justice as he would call it, was part of his everyday work as community leader in the market (Field note diary, 15 May 2013).

In addition to interacting with each other during work hours, market areas like San Roque incorporated other community spaces in which indigenous migrants would gather for association meetings, festivals, school lessons or other leisure time activities. For the members of the AECT-Q, the Pachamama College was such a community space (see section 2.2.2 for a detailed discussion). Similarly, other migrant associations such as FEIRPI also rented buildings in the San Roque area in which they would run community meetings or religious services.

Taking into account their long working hours in the markets, most migrants also lived nearby; they often rented a small room in large houses in the city's San Roque area which were owned by their market vendor association. These houses were often overcrowded and lacked access to basic services. For example, approximately 200 indigenous migrants from Tigua who were members of the AECT-Q lived in 50 small rooms in a colonial-era house in San Roque. This house was rented by the AECT-Q and only contained one bathroom and one kitchen.

**Table 8.2 Ice breaker exercise: ‘What would be the Quito of your dreams?’**

<b>What would make Quito a better city?</b>	<b>Number of focus group members pointing out this theme</b>
Everyone should have a nice house to live	16
Make Quito a safe city without crime and violence	13
Provide more work opportunities	12
Residents should respect each other / treat each other as equals	11
Create more green spaces and public spaces	9
Reduce contamination and create a clean city	5
Have a government that understands the needs of people	4
No response	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>

*Source: Eight focus groups conducted with 72 Kichwa students in the Pachamama College situated in Quito's San Roque market area*

Even though indigenous migrants lived in community, they often did so in dire conditions. To improve their lives within the city, they generally expressed aspirations to live in a nicer house which contained all modern amenities – ie water, electricity, a television, etc – needed to live in the city. Such aspirations were, for example, articulated during participatory focus groups with students in the Pachamama College. During icebreaker exercises these students were asked to write down what would be the Quito of their dreams (see table 8.2). The answer which was most common was that students wanted to live in their own house. They also aspired to receive better work opportunities, have time to enjoy the green spaces of the city, and to be less exposed to violence and crime.

Some indigenous migrants already managed to lead a better life within the city by moving away to other neighbourhoods with their families. The case of Ricardo was such an example. After three years of living in the overcrowded house which was managed by the AECT-Q, Ricardo's family decided to move to the peripheral neighbourhood of Guanmani, situated in southern Quito, where they could rent their own little flat which included a kitchen and bathroom. Even though Ricardo and his family now rented out a better place to live, they also faced new problems:

Of course, things improved for us. We now live in a nice flat but it is so far away from where we work. It takes us sometimes three hours to get to San Roque from our flat in Guanmani. But this is not the most important problem. We now live far away from our other brothers and sisters [referring to members of his indigenous community that migrated to Quito] who live in the north, the centre or elsewhere. Everyone had to take what they could get, you see. (...) If we continue like this we will lose our sense of indigenous community. (14IE)

In addition to problems such as long journeys from their urban home to their workplace that were common for most people living in Quito's peripheries, Ricardo pointed out another problem – the declining sense of community and the associated loss of indigenous identity – which were unique for indigenous migrants. The desire to preserve or regain their sense of community was not only expressed by Ricardo but also by many indigenous migrants. For example, when asked 'what does it mean to be indigenous in the city?' 14 out of 72 indigenous students from the Pachamama School mentioned that they wanted to live in community. Eleven out of 72 students were even more concrete – they wanted to be in community in San Roque and not elsewhere in the city (see table 8.3).

As seen in the responses of focus group members to two different questions, indigenous migrants – like most *comuneros* – often sought to combine a modern life in the city with the preservation of indigenous traditions. This was also emphasised in an interview with Oscar, an indigenous migrant and member of the migrant organisation RUNAKUY:

Most of the people in the city want to have a house, a car, and some money to spend on their family. We want this as well but, in addition, we want to build our community again in the city. Living, working, learning, celebrating, and experiencing life together in community is the most important aspect for us. It allows us to keep our indigenous traditions alive in this large city. (1IE)

Combining both worlds – a modern urban life and preserving indigenous community traditions – was, however, not always easy. The case of Ricardo who moved away with his family to find a better place to live and simultaneously felt that he lost his connection to his community illustrated this point. In addition, other factors further challenged the notion that indigenous migrants could live, work and interact with each other in community. For example, as was outlined in chapter seven, the municipal government was preparing for the closure of the San Roque market – one of Quito’s urban indigenous centres. Indigenous migrants generally viewed the closure of the market and of other indigenous meeting spaces within the area as a threat to their sense of community. Jose, a member of the AECT-Q explained this as follows (16IE): “If we don’t do anything against this relocation it will be over. We will no longer have a space to be with each other in community. We will no longer be indigenous.”

**Table 8.3 Ice breaker exercise: ‘What would be a Quito for indigenous peoples?’**

What do indigenous peoples want to live better in Quito?	Number of focus group pointing out this theme
A city where we can live in community	14
Not being discriminated	13
To be allowed to stay as community in San Roque	11
Be organised	9
Not being poor	7
Have better paid work	6
No responses	4
Change our identity/ become mestizos	3
Have our rights respected	3
Respect nature	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>

*Source: Eight focus groups conducted with 72 Kichwa students in the Pachamama College situated in Quito’s San Roque market area*

## 8.2 Processes of contestation and political negotiation

The previous section showed how Quito's indigenous residents, whether *comuneros* or migrants, articulated their indigenous identities in relation to claims for land or urban spaces which they associated with opportunities to access a variety of physical (housing), social (community spaces), financial (money generated from selling or subdividing land), cultural (festivals), human (education, work), or political (territorial autonomy or exercise of indigenous justice) assets. This section now shows how some of Quito's indigenous residents managed to access and accumulate such assets.

To address their asset-based demands, Quito's indigenous migrants and *comuneros* shared in common that they relied on their collective organisations. Enrique, an elderly *comuneros* from Llano Grande, highlighted this point as follows:

We, the indigenous residents of our commune, want to maintain autonomy over our land and protect our traditions. Therefore, we must organise ourselves so that we can convince the people in government to give us what we want. For this reason we preserve our *cabildo*. We as well have other organisations in our commune. For example, we have four cultural groups that work on maintaining our language, dances and traditions. All of us *comuneros* are member of at least one of these organisations. (5IE)

Like Enrique, *comuneros* from other communes also reported to be organised in *cabildos* and other organisations such as folkloric clubs or peasant associations (information derived from: 4IE, 8IE, 15IE, 17IE). Similar to *comuneros*, collective organisation was also a central part of everyday life for indigenous migrants who were mainly organised in commercial vendor associations whose members came from the same rural community of origin. According to a study conducted by Kingman (2012) just within Quito's San Roque area more than 30 indigenous migrant commercial associations represented different indigenous migrants. It was these organisations, and particularly their leaders – who like in La Paz, Bolivia were predominantly men – that played a central part in negotiating with relevant government personnel over rights to preserve or access new work, community, and living spaces. A leader of the AECT-Q, Raul, emphasised this point as follows:

We all have the same problems. We work and live in poor conditions. We search for better places to live and work. To overcome our problems we have to go back to our defining characteristic; we have to mobilise and organise ourselves in community. Being organised means being indigenous. With the help of our market vendor

organisations we can rebuild our indigenous community in the city. We, the indigenous market vendors from Tigua, will find a way to stay together. As a leader I will do my best to achieve this goal. (3IE)

Taking into account that most of Quito's indigenous peoples were migrants and that the San Roque market faced a threat of closure during the period of fieldwork, it was decided to focus mainly on the work of one community-based organisation (CBO) which represented migrants from this area – the AECT-Q. Throughout the last three decades leaders of the AECT-Q relied on a variety of self-help practices and engaged in processes of political negotiation with government actors in order to access spaces in which their members could work, interact and live in community. Aware of the fact that different governments shared distinct attitudes towards indigenous peoples and Ecuador's indigenous movement, these leaders often had to alter their contestation and negotiation tactics in such a way that it conformed to the political agenda of the government representative whom they approached. By relying on such tactics these leaders managed – with varying success – to address their personal interests as well as the asset-based demands of their association members. The remaining three sections of this chapter offer three case studies which describe some of the tactics that have been employed by the leaders of the AECT-Q.

### **8.2.1 Accessing collective work spaces**

The majority of Tiguans assembled in the AECT-Q worked in Quito's San Roque market which, during the time the fieldwork was conducted, was faced with a threat of closure. Being confronted with threats to relocate from their work places in San Roque was nothing new for members and leaders of the AECT-Q. Indeed, city centre revitalisation efforts had already been planned by the former mayor of Quito – Paco Moncayo – and his 'Democratic Left' party which held a majority in the city council from 2000 until 2009. This municipal government drafted a city centre plan in which it outlined a set of interventions to make Quito more attractive for international tourists (DMQ 2003). For example, to increase safety and security within the city centre the municipal government attempted to prohibit street vendors from selling their products within this part of the city. It also promoted the temporary relocation of market vendors in order to renovate parts of the San Roque market (ibid). Confronted by relocation and displacement threats, indigenous leaders from the AECT-Q mentioned that they relied on a diverse set of tactics to address the interests of their members who predominantly worked as street or market

vendors. For example, according to Raul, former leader of the organisation and teacher in the Pachamama College, the AECT-Q articulated their demands to preserve or gain access to new work spaces in such ways that they were in line with the municipal agenda on promoting tourism:

Paco Moncayo wanted to bring more tourists to Quito. This helped the Tigua painters a lot. We went to the municipality and showed them our paintings. We explained to them that the tourists come to Ecuador to see our folkloric art. We told them that we, the indigenous people from Tigua, are a tourist attraction. This worked and from this point the municipality did not make problems for us anymore. Until today our brothers and sisters who work as painters can sell their products in the park. (3IE)

Indeed, Tigua painters managed to gain access to new commercial spaces in the city's 'El Ejido' park which is located between the city centre and Mariscal Sucre – Quito's traveller district (see figure 4.11 in chapter 4). While painters could mobilise around Quito's municipal tourism agenda, such a negotiation approach did not work for Tiguas who traded products such as vegetables and fruit in the San Roque market or on the streets of the city centre. According to former AECT-Q leader Rodrigo (9IE), civil servants in the municipal government refused to change their decision to relocate indigenous vegetable or fruit vendors whom they often described as an 'eyesore' for tourists who came to visit the city. Such a negative perception of indigenous market vendors has been reported in other studies. Weismantel (2001), for example, argued that municipal authorities across Ecuador historically viewed urban markets as indigenous and, hence, messy and dangerous places that disturbed the structure of the 'white' and 'orderly' city. Such racialised understandings most likely influenced urban planners and policy makers in Quito's municipal government who decided that it was best to displace indigenous street vendors from the city centre.

In a context where political negotiations did not produce positive results for all market vendors, the leaders of the AECT-Q had to find alternative solutions – they relied on their connections to other indigenous market vendor organisations who confronted similar problems<sup>54</sup>. In October 2001 the AECT-Q, in alliance with 14 indigenous market

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<sup>54</sup> The information provided in this paragraph was provided to me in various interviews with former leaders of the AECT-Q – Raul, Juan, Juan Carlos and Rodrigo (3IE, 9IE; 12IE; 13IE). In addition, information on the actual commercial centre was provided to me by Jatun Ayllu's former leader Feliciano who by the time

associations, founded the organisation *Jatun Ayllu* which represented more than 3,000 San Roque-based indigenous market vendors. *Jatun Ayllu* was directly affiliated with the national indigenous movement CONAIE and its political party Pachakutik which, as was outlined in chapter two, played a powerful role in Ecuadorian national politics in the early 2000s. With help from CONAIE leaders and other indigenous organisations such as CODENPE, *Jatun Ayllu* developed a plan to construct a new indigenous commercial centre which could provide space for all its members. *Jatun Ayllu* suggested to the municipal government of Quito that it would finance the construction of the commercial centre with money donated by its members and through financial support from CODENPE. In exchange, the organisation demanded from the municipal government receipt of a plot of land. Following an extensive period of political negotiations, Quito's municipal government did, indeed, provide *Jatun Ayllu* with a 41,000 square-metre plot of land in the Chillogallo district situated in Southern Quito in 2008. The municipal government also guaranteed not to displace indigenous migrants from San Roque until the new commercial centre had been built.

The dream of a new commercial centre for all indigenous migrants from San Roque was, however, a short one. In 2010 Quito's municipal government reclaimed the 41,000 square metres of land, declined building permission, and stopped processes of political negotiation with *Jatun Ayllu*. A former member of *Jatun Ayllu*, Orlando, mentioned the following reasons for the abrupt end of the commercial centre project:

*Jatun Ayllu* was with CONAIE. Being with CONAIE was helpful as different people in government would open their doors for us. At present, CONAIE opposes Correa's party. Everyone who is with the opposition struggles to receive anything from the government. Hence, when Augusto Barrera and the Alianza Pais got elected here in Quito it was over for us. No more *Jatun Ayllu* and no more commercial centre. (2IE).

According to this interpretation, the end of the commercial centre project was a political manoeuvre by a newly-elected municipal government which, like Ecuador's current national government, was interested in disempowering opposition groups like the

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of conducting fieldwork was leader of another urban indigenous market vendor association – Intimama (11IE).

country's indigenous movement<sup>55</sup>. People working in Quito's municipal government have confirmed such tendencies. For example, a civil servant working for the municipal commercial unit and responsible for the administration of markets argued:

We do not work with *Jatun Ayllu* because they support CONAIE, Pachakutik and all of the other social organisations that want to cause social unrest in this country. They are corrupt, internally divided, and don't respect their base. Why should we still set out to help them to build their commercial centre? We work for the people that elected us. We do not work for the opposition. (23GE)

In addition to mentioning specific political motivations which led the municipal government to halt the commercial centre project, this civil servant also highlighted that indigenous organisations like *Jatun Ayllu* themselves failed to be accountable to their members. Problems such as corruption within *Jatun Ayllu* were indeed mentioned as another cause for the failure of the commercial centre project. Juan Carlos, a member of AECT-Q, explained this as follows:

Our brothers and sisters paid money to *Jatun Ayllu* so that they would build the commercial centre. It was clear that most of the money did not go into the commercial centre but into the pockets of *ponchos dorados* [rich indigenous leaders]. With no commercial centre in sight and our money gone, we decided to leave *Jatun Ayllu*. Now we work only for the Tiguans. (13IE)


Similar to Juan Carlos's testimony, other indigenous migrants approached in the Pachamama College, for example, mentioned that they paid *Jatun Ayllu* leaders a sum of USD150 to secure themselves a spot in the new commercial centre. Three years after the official cancellation of the project, their money has not been returned to them. In a context where Quito's government cancelled their commercial centre projects and in which *Jatun Ayllu* leaders seemed to enrich themselves personally from the money of their members, indigenous migrants no longer trusted the work of different state and civil society organisations which should address their interests. Such trends were, for example, made explicit in institutional maps drawn by focus groups in the Pachamama College (see figure 8.2 for an example). In this institutional map, the focus group members evaluated actors and institutions associated with the government, eg Rafael Correa, Ministry of Education,

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<sup>55</sup> Such tendencies were also highlighted in chapter seven as well as in other studies on Ecuadorian politics under Rafael Correa (Becker 2011, 2013).

and Quito's municipal government, but also indigenous movements and CBOs, eg CONAIE, ECUARUNARI or Jatun Ayllu, as very negative.

**Figure 8.2 Institutional map of the San Roque market area**



*Source: Focus group with seven indigenous migrants (four male, three female) in the Pachamama College situated on Quito's San Roque market, 28 April 2013.*

While government institutions and national or city-wide indigenous movements have been evaluated negatively, the members of this focus group perceived international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Plan International<sup>56</sup> and their own indigenous market vendor association – the AECT-Q – more positively. The positive perception of the AECT-Q could most likely be explained by the organisation's ongoing effort to unite Tigua vendors within one commercial, community and living space (see also sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3). To continue their work in the current political environment, the leaders of the AECT-Q decided to depart from *Jatun Ayllu*<sup>57</sup> and continued working only for their Tigua migrant base. Yet, for an organisation whose leaders were affiliated with CONAIE, entering into political negotiations with the AP-led municipal government continued to be difficult. The AECT-Q member Juan Carlos explained this as follows:

<sup>56</sup> As mentioned in previous research (Moser 2009), Plan International represents an important organisation which facilitates urban development at the community level in Ecuador. During the period of fieldwork in Quito, Plan International worked in the San Roque area on issues such as child labour and the training of street vendors. It particularly worked with adolescents and young adults. It provided them with access to free day care facilities and educational workshops (Informal conversation with member of staff of Plan International, 12 March 2013). Most of the focus group members were attending some of Plan International's activities and therefore evaluated this organisation positively (Field note diary, 28 April 2013).

<sup>57</sup> During the period of fieldwork in Quito the city centre offices of *Jatun Ayllu* were closed. According to various indigenous migrant leaders *Jatun Ayllu* had not realised any organisational activities since 2011.

We want to be reallocated all to one market in order to continue working and living as community. They [commercial unit of the municipality of Quito] don't understand this. When working with us vendors they no longer recognise our association. They believe we are still with *Jatun Ayllu* and with the CONAIE. Instead of talking to our leaders, they work with each of our members individually. This might mean that each one of us will be allocated to different places and we won't be addressed as community. (13IE)

Lacking political allies within Quito's municipal government, indigenous leaders could only influence decision-making processes through preparing their community members for individual meetings with members in the commercial unit. Ricardo, an AECT-Q leader, described this as follows:

The municipality asks each vendor to mention their preferred work location and after assessing these places they might relocate them there. We tell all our vendors to name the Mayorista market. If we are lucky we will all receive a space on this market. In the current political situation there is not much else what we can do. (14IE)

During fieldwork in Quito, indigenous leaders of the AECT-Q not only experienced difficulties in negotiating their demands to gain access to new collective work spaces. As will be shown in the following section, in the current political context they also struggled to preserve their educational, cultural and associational space – the Pachamama College.

### **8.2.2 Accessing community spaces: the story of the Pachamama College**

To make a living in the city every member of a Tiguan migrant family had to work and this often meant that their own as well as their children's education was inadequate. Leaders of the Tiguan migrant community were aware of this problem and sought to find ways of educating the members of their migrant community. Raul (3IE), teacher in the Pachamama College and AECT-Q member, highlighted this point as follows: "We wanted our members to be able to lead a better future life in the city. We also wanted that they did not forget about their ancestors in Tigua. Therefore, we had to teach them." Since 1986 Raul and other migrants from Tigua, who received the privilege of secondary education, started to provide open market classes in Spanish, Kichwa and maths to Tiguan migrants.

To improve their pedagogical skills, Tiguan migrants volunteered every weekend in a bilingual school which was situated in the Cotopaxi province near the Tigua communities. Following the reforms on intercultural education in the 1980s, this bilingual school was

administered through the National Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education (DINEIB) and was entirely run by indigenous for indigenous people. Through volunteering in this school Tiguán migrants learned about intercultural education and this allowed them to introduce the same curriculum and pedagogical principles to their urban community in Quito.

With the help of acquaintances in DINEIB and within the CONAIE, the AECT-Q managed to negotiate access to a vacant building near the San Roque market in which they opened the Pachamama College in 1994<sup>58</sup>. Similar to previous open-market classes, the Pachamama College was managed entirely by volunteer teachers who were associated to the AECT-Q. In contrast to conventional schools, the Pachamama College provided classes to indigenous migrants of all ages. In fact, most of the students attending the school were young adults who, after having received no education during childhood, aspired to receive a school diploma at a later stage in life. The school operated only on Saturdays so that students and teachers could work full time throughout the week. By being recognised as an official extension of the school in the Cotopaxi province, the Pachamama College received accreditation from DINEIB as a registered bi-lingual education institution in 1995 and was allowed to certify students with secondary education certificates.

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<sup>58</sup> Information on the history of the Pachamama College has been provided to me in interviews with the teachers Raul, Juan Carlos and Jose (3IE; 13IE; 16IE).

### Box 8.1 Community activities at the Pachamama College



Celebration of the Inti Reymi on the premises of the Pachamama College (June 2013)

*Photo by the author*



Graduation of Tiguan migrant women in 2009

*Photo: Raul (3IE)*



Monthly AECT-Q meeting with CONAIE leaders present (April 2013)

*Photo by the author*

The premises of the Pachamama College were not only used for purposes of education but also for association meetings of the AECT-Q and for the realisation of a variety of community events (see box 8.1). Jose, teacher in the Pachamama College, explained this as follows:

This is not just a school. Here everything happens. The association holds weekly meetings on our premises. We use the space to celebrate our Inti Reymi. In the Pachamama College we resolve our conflicts as well. For example, last year one brother, a migrant from Tigua, was beating up another brother of our community. We did not report this to the police but resolved it in community. We asked Francisco, a leader in the community back in Tigua, to come here to resolve the issue. We all met in the courtyard of the Pachamama College and Francisco punished our brother with 20 whip lashes and community work. This is how we indigenous migrants practise justice. (16IE)

After 17 years of operating as a formally-registered weekend school recognised by DINEIB<sup>59</sup>, the director of the Pachamama College was notified by Ecuador's ministry of education in January 2013 that the school had to stop its activities by the end of the following academic year in 2014. The letter specified that, according to article 13 of the new law on intercultural education (LIE)<sup>60</sup>, bilingual weekend schools which relied on voluntary teachers were no longer allowed to operate in neighbourhoods in which other registered schools provided intercultural education to students during weekdays. For the following academic year, the students of the Pachamama College should, therefore, be relocated to nearby secondary schools. Furthermore, the premises of the Pachamama College should be returned to its owner – the municipal government of Quito.

The reasons for the school's closure were certainly legitimate. Voluntary teachers often lacked university education themselves and were not certified by the ministry of education. At the same time, within the San Roque neighbourhood there operated four normal schools which could absorb some of the students. Yet, in addition to the letter which provided the legal justification for why the school must be closed, teachers and students of the Pachamama College often highlighted that the actual reason for the closure of the school was also another one; they assumed that the municipal government sought to renovate their school building in order to subsequently sell it to private investors. Such trends were indeed confirmed by municipal staff itself. The director of Quito's territorial planning unit for example stated:

As with other buildings in the neighbourhood such as the ex-prison or the market itself, we intend to renovate the Pachamama College buildings. This neighbourhood has a lot of potential. It is right next to the colonial city centre. A building like this could be a new cultural centre, a hotel, an apartment complex. We have not established any further plans for this building at this moment but, yes, it will no longer belong to market vendor associations in the future. (8GE)

Hence, as part of city centre revitalisation efforts the members of the AECT-Q were not only about to lose their spaces of work but also their central community space. According to teacher Juan Carlos the closure of the Pachamama College had the following consequences:

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<sup>59</sup> As part of wider educational reforms the Ecuadorian government closed DINEIB and reintegrated this institution into the ministry of education in 2013 (see chapter 7).

<sup>60</sup> For a more detailed discussion of the new law see chapter 7.

The closure will be devastating. Who can teach our children about our community better than we people from the community? Our school is the centre of our community and by taking it away it will weaken us. The closure of the school will stop our association members from learning and working at the same time. Our brothers and sisters will become poorer. (13IE)

Similar to Juan Carlos, many students associated the closure of the school and their potential integration into normal schools which operated throughout the week with a decline in their personal income. Adult students in particular decided to stop their education as they could simply not give up their job on the market throughout the week<sup>61</sup>.

Confronted by the imminent closure of their school, AECT-Q leaders swiftly engaged in the search for new community spaces so that they could continue their activities elsewhere. They thereby entered into a process of political negotiation with authorities in Quito's municipal government. The teacher Raul highlighted this as follows:

Before Correa we could take to the streets and fight for our rights as indigenous peoples. Remember all the marches by the CONAIE? Well, we were always participating. You know we are part of the CONAIE. The current government criminalised indigenous protest and the CONAIE. They would put you in prison if you went on the streets with them. Today, under the government of Correa, it is no longer a fight which we carry out on the streets but one which we can only win through words. If we want them to give us a new space for our school we must be careful with the words we use though. If you want to achieve something you must be with the government and not with those that oppose them. You must go to those in the government and talk their language. (3IE)

Indigenous leaders like Raul, who were also involved in negotiating access to new market spaces, have learned that, in the current political context, their affiliation to indigenous movements such as CONAIE hindered them in addressing their specific demands. As shown within the above testimony, indigenous leaders therefore started to adjust their negotiation tactics; they became active supporters of the political agenda which they had previously opposed. I had the chance to observe such tendencies when accompanying AECT-Q leaders and Pachamama College teachers Jose, Juan Carlos, and Raul to meetings with members of Quito's city centre zonal administration which took place in a

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<sup>61</sup> Parents were also concerned about sending their children and adolescents to schools that operated on a weekly basis. Even though municipal authorities informed them that they could apply for the government's new *Bono de Desarrollo Humano* which provided them with a monthly USD 35 in exchange for sending their child to school, they often argued that they would earn more money with their child working on the market.

nearby community development centre (CDC). For example, during one meeting these leaders openly articulated their support for the government's decision to close their own school. They highlighted that, as supporters of Rafael Correa's AP party, they would appreciate it if they could use the space of the CDC to continue their cultural and educational activities. To prove their support towards the AP, these leaders showed photos of their members who were wearing shirts of the AP and participating during the annual Labour Day march. In response, municipal staff granted the AECT-Q permission to use the CDC once a month for two hours in order to undertake cultural events; however, they did not permit AECT-Q leaders to continue their educational activities (fieldwork diary, 25 May 2013). In a follow-up interview a civil servant in Quito's city centre zonal administration explained why the municipal government permitted the realisation of only cultural events on its premises:

In our municipal development plan we aim to promote cultural diversity. So we have no problem if this association wants to celebrate their festivals in our CDCs. They can do this. They can use the premises for their *Inti Reymi* or folkloric dance events. (...) We cannot allow them to run their school in the CDCs. In the Ecuador of Rafael Correa it is the state that provides education and not its citizens. (12GE)

Overall, in Quito's current political context, the leaders of the AECT-Q could not negotiate access to new permanent educational spaces within the city centre. However, through slipping in the role of political supporters of the AP, they at least managed to secure access to a new space in which they could hold cultural events.

### **8.2.3 Accessing collective living spaces**

Besides aspirations to work and socialise in one collective space, indigenous migrants often highlighted that they wanted to live in community. At the time of conducting fieldwork in Quito, indigenous associations such as the AECT-Q still rented a colonial house in the San Roque area (see section 8.1.2). With its 50 small rooms this house could, however, not provide a living space for all members of the association. Housing was not only a problem for indigenous migrants but also for a large number of Quito's population. In 2012, 132,461 residents lacked access to adequate housing in Quito (DMQ 2012b). As has already been indicated in the previous chapter, Quito's municipal government sought to target the housing problem through the implementation of large-scale social-housing projects. In addition, it promoted the creation of resident initiatives to design and

implement their own housing projects. In exchange, the municipal government provided these resident initiatives with financial and technical support as well as with access to cheap vacant public land within the city's periphery.

Aware of the housing needs of their members', leaders from the AECT-Q made use of the municipal governments' housing agenda. In fact, during the time of conducting fieldwork in Quito, leaders of the AECT-Q but also of other indigenous organisations – such as the AVIC-Q (Association of indigenous vendors from Cotopaxi who reside in Quito) and Intimama – who previously belonged to the *Jatun Ayllu* network were in the process of designing as well as implementing their own housing projects in which they wanted to guarantee each of their association members a plot of land on which they could build their own house (see table 8.4).

**Table 8.4 Housing projects of indigenous migrant associations**

Association	Membership basis	Housing project	Expected residents	Finance	Interactions with municipality
<b>AECT-Q</b>	Indigenous migrants from Tigua who worked as market vendors on Quito's San Roque and Mayorista markets	Build up to 150 houses and a community centre on 12 hectares of urban land in Quito's Guanmani district.	800	Financial support from MIDUVI  Saving group schemes for AECT-Q members	Received a plot of land from the municipality of Quito.  Awaiting building permission.
<b>AVIC-Q</b>	Indigenous migrants from Tigua and elsewhere in the Cotopaxi province who predominantly worked in the San Roque and Mayorista markets	Build up to 400 houses and a community centre on 20ha of land in Quito's Guanmani district.	2000	Saving group schemes for AVIC-Q members	Applied for land and building permission.
<b>Intimama</b>	Indigenous migrants from the Chimborazo province who predominantly worked as market vendors and in commercial centres in Quito's city centre.	Build up to 45 houses on 2ha of land in Quito's Quitumbe district.  Space for a community centre; a cooperative bank; and a sports ground.	200	Saving group schemes for Intimama members	Received a plot of land and building permissions from the municipality of Quito.  In process of applying for access to public services (eg water, electricity, roads etc.)

*Source: Interviews with leaders of the three associations (2IE; 3IE; 10IE; 11IE; 12IE)*

In order to implement their housing projects the leaders of the three organisations had to negotiate access to a plot of land and building permissions with the municipal government of Quito. They all received support from an architect who was previously employed by the municipal government of Quito (10IE). According to information received from this architect and from some of the leaders of the associations, by May 2013 the three housing initiatives were at different stages. Intimama had already received a plot of land and relevant building permits. The members of the associations had already finalised the construction of 45 houses and they were in the process of negotiating access to public services such as water, electricity and roads (10IE; 11IE). The AECT-Q received a 12 hectare plot of land in Quito's Guanmani neighbourhood from Quito's municipal government in 2012. In addition, the AECT-Q was granted USD 100,000 of financial support from Ecuador's Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MIDUVI) to cover two-thirds of the costs of this land in Guanmani (3IE; 10IE; 12IE). In the meantime, AVIC-Q was still in the early stages of applying to receive access to a plot of land in Quito's Guanmani district (2IE; 10IE).

Despite being at different stages of their housing projects, the leaders of these three organisations had in common a reliance on similar political negotiation tactics when interacting with people in the municipal government. Orlando, the leader of the association AVIC-Q, provided a clear illustration of the negotiation approach of indigenous leaders:

In the commercial unit they all knew me and didn't want to see me. They accused me of being of the opposition because I used to be with CONAIE and *Jatun Ayllu*. Go away *indio sucio* (dirty 'indian') they said. The people in the municipal housing enterprise did not know me. I told them that I represented indigenous people who lived in bad conditions in San Roque and elsewhere in the city. I told them we wanted to get better housing. I as well told them that I and the members of AVIC-Q were with the government. I showed them pictures of how we supported the government during marches. They liked this and in exchange they looked at my project proposal and allowed me to apply to get some vacant land in Guanmani. This is how it worked here in Quito – we do something for them and they do something for us. (2IE)

A similar explanation was made by Juan, a leader of AECT-Q:

I would tell no one in the housing unit that I was with *Jatun Ayllu*. I tell them that I am with the government and want to help the authorities to solve their relocation

problem. I bring the project and they can give me cheap land. This helped me to get on well with the people there. (12IE)

Orlando's and Juan's statements indicate how indigenous leaders have adjusted their political negotiation approach in such a way that it conforms to the political agenda of Quito's municipal government. They departed from being relocation opponents and indigenous movement affiliates and, instead, they emphasised their support of the AP party and its city centre revitalisation and market relocation agenda. Hence, the ability to manoeuvre between different political agendas seemed to define the success of indigenous leaders in political negotiations. This was made clear by another leader of the AECT-Q – Juan Carlos:

I have learned from my mistakes. In the past we used to be with one political group but we soon learned that you don't get anything with this. Our governments change from one day to the other here in Ecuador. You need to become flexible. You should never show whom you really support. To achieve the goals of our organisation you have to work with every government and support each of their campaigns. This means that sometimes we need to be with the indigenous movement and sometimes not. What matters is that you have good relations with all of them. (13IE)

Indigenous leaders not only had to manoeuvre between being supporters of distinct political agendas: in addition, they also had to present their housing projects in such a way that it complied with the specific demands of their association members. The AVIQ-Q leader Orlando explained this as follows:

The municipality does not care about our community values. All they want is that we leave the city centre. We need to show our support to get things done. It is my brothers and sisters in the association that want to live in community. I will have to make sure that I cater for their interests as well when I plan our community. (2IE)

Indeed, when working with members of their own associations indigenous leaders generally presented their housing projects as a way of reinventing indigenous community. For example, in various meetings the AECT-Q leader Juan promised the members of his association to construct a new community centre on the plot in Guamani where, after the closure of the Pachamama College, they could continue educational activities. During interviews the leaders of the AVIQ-Q and Intimama – Orlando and Feliciano – also mentioned that they intended to construct community centres and an indigenous church on

their new plots of land so that their association members could gather for cultural events (2IE; 11IE).

In addition to presenting housing projects in line with the political agenda of the municipal government and with the demands of association members to live in community, it became increasingly clear throughout fieldwork that indigenous leaders also intended to benefit personally from these projects. For example, AECT-Q's leader, Juan, made this point as follows:

This is my project. I made the connections to the government. I gathered some financial support. I have always represented my community and their needs. I helped them to save money and now I can give them financial support so that they can pay for their houses. All this takes me a lot of my time and effort. In exchange for all this, I expect a little contribution from the members of AECT-Q. I give them credit but like the other banks I charge them an interest rate. This is how I do business. (12IE)

Indeed, the leader of the AECT-Q – similar to leaders of the AVIQ-Q and Intimama – operated and managed collective savings groups in which association members had to pay a monthly contribution. When a member experienced a monetary emergency the AECT-Q leader provided its members with micro-credits with a 25 per cent interest rate. Juan intended to also provide association members with micro-credits so that they could pay for their new plot of land – for which he charged each household USD3000. During fieldwork AECT-Q members often mentioned to me that they increasingly mistrusted their leaders as they had not provided them with evidence of the actual cost of the land. In the meantime, other association members also mentioned that, after having received access to their plot of land, AECT-Q leaders also started to sell plots of land to people outside of their community. In an informal conversation the AECT-Q leader Juan confirmed this trend; he explained that, in a context in which some members could not pay for their allocated plots, he was left with no other option than selling vacant plots to other people who were often willing to pay him an even larger sum of money. Indigenous leaders like Juan, therefore, were no longer only involved in the recreation of new urban indigenous communities. Instead, like *comuneros* who subdivided their land for newly arriving non-indigenous residents, they gained personal benefit by selling their newly-acquired land to anyone who could pay them a good price.

### 8.3 Summary

This chapter illustrated that for Quito's indigenous migrant and *comunero* population being indigenous was often associated with being discriminated against because of their status as 'others' within a historically 'white' urban environment. Despite patterns of discrimination, indigenous migrants and *comuneros* have nevertheless developed their own indigenous identities within the city – they often wanted to preserve specific indigenous traditions and practices while, at the same time, enjoying the amenities of a modern urban life. Most indigenous peoples, independent from being *comuneros* or migrants, articulated their demands to combine indigenous traditions with a modern life through specific claims for land or urban space. They generally associated access to land or urban space with opportunities to access a portfolio of other assets such as physical (eg housing, roads, water, electricity, televisions), financial (money generated from selling land), human (eg use of spaces for educational purposes), cultural (eg realisation of festivals and rituals), social (eg use of land as collective living, work and social space), and political capital (eg preservation of territorial autonomy).

The articulation of specific asset-based demands was, however, by no means homogenous. Instead, among *comuneros* and migrants, there existed intra-group differences – they expressed diverse indigenous identities, articulated different asset-based demands, and undertook specific practices which sometimes conflicted with the interests and demands of other members within their community. For example, elderly *comuneros* often associated commune lands with the opportunity to exercise territorial autonomy, to preserve ancestral traditions, and to lead a rural peasant lifestyle. In contrast, younger *comuneros*, without necessarily neglecting their indigenous traditions, preferred to leave their autonomy status behind and to register their land with the municipal government of Quito so that they could receive access to public services and infrastructure. Similarly, while some indigenous migrants certainly wanted to preserve their collective living, working and community spaces in San Roque, others preferred to leave their community and to live in better housing conditions elsewhere in the city. Meanwhile, other *comuneros* but also migrants – particularly their association leaders – (ab)used their role as land owners and, instead of creating or preserving indigenous communal living spaces, they often sold their land for a competitive price to people from outside their indigenous community.

Quito's municipal government was certainly responsive to some of the interests and demands which have been articulated by indigenous peoples approached in this research – for example, it provided some *comuneros* and migrants with opportunities to access housing and public services; it also allowed indigenous migrants to undertake cultural activities in their community development centres. At the same time, other municipal interventions such as the closure of the San Roque market and the revitalisation of the nearby neighbourhood represented a direct threat for indigenous peoples who wanted to preserve their working, living, and social spaces within the city. In this context, the leaders of indigenous CBOs – such as those representing AECT-Q – played a central role in negotiating access to new working, community, and living spaces with relevant actors in Quito's municipal government. Within three illustrations it was shown how indigenous leaders had to modify their negotiation tactics over time in such a way that they expressed their demands in line with the specific political agenda of different actors in municipal governments. For example, while in the past indigenous leaders managed to successfully negotiate their demands by emphasising their alliance to national indigenous movements, they could no longer do so in the present political context in which Quito's municipal government, led by the AP party, viewed such movements as their opposition. In order to succeed in political negotiations, indigenous leaders now had to hide their affiliation to indigenous movements and emphasise their support for a political agenda – eg market relocation and displacement – and a political party – the AP – which they had previously opposed. It was this ability to manoeuvre between different political agendas which allowed indigenous leaders to address some of their own personal interests – ie generate financial benefits through new housing schemes – as well as some of the demands – ie gain access to collective living and community spaces – of their indigenous membership base.

## 9 Conclusions

This thesis has presented a critical examination of the role of indigeneity in urban policies and planning practices in a context of constitutional changes that took place in Bolivia and Ecuador. By undertaking such an endeavour, this study moved beyond previous academic and policy research on indigeneity which, as was mentioned in the introduction and discussed in detail in the first part of chapter two, mainly studied indigenous peoples and rights within rural areas or focused on urban indigenous peoples as outlawed and excluded subjects but not as target groups of specific rights-based agendas.

In seeking to understand the incorporation of constitutional content and rights which address urban indigenous peoples, the thesis has drawn on a theoretical approach that conceptualises the translation of constitutional rights into urban policy and planning practice as a process in which a multiplicity of social actors – officials working in government institutions associated with urban governance but also urban indigenous target groups and their community-based organisations (CBOs) – are involved. Government attempts to translate constitutional rights were considered to be influenced by a variety of factors – including government officials’ personal views, interest groups and other actor-coalitions, or the wider structural, political and institutional environment. At the same time, it was argued that the practices of government actors can be understood best in relation to interests and demands of indigenous target groups. In order to determine urban indigenous peoples’ specific interests and demands it was decided to rely on an asset accumulation framework. Furthermore, drawing on conceptual work on tactics, the thesis also looked at indigenous peoples’ own practices to access assets and to influence urban policy and planning practice from the bottom up.

On the basis of a review of the literature and guided by the selected theoretical approach – which was introduced in chapter two, the following research questions were formulated:

- 1) To what extent and how are different indigenous rights, manifested in the new political constitutions, translated into urban policies and planning practices?
- 2) How do urban indigenous peoples understand indigeneity?
- 3) How do urban indigenous peoples negotiate different understandings of indigeneity, indigenous rights, and asset-based demands with actors working in different central and decentralised government institutions?

Relying on the methodology of a qualitative, case study comparison (see chapter three) the thesis explored each of the research questions by focusing on two case-study cities – La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador. Chapter four offered a history of these cities and provided a contextual background on their ethno-racial composition as well as on their current institutional and political context. Focusing on La Paz, chapter five compared how officials operating in different national and local government institutions incorporated constitutional contents on indigeneity into urban policies and planning practices. Chapter six subsequently discussed how different residents in La Paz’s Pumakatari and Litoral neighbourhoods defined their indigenous identities through a set of asset-based demands; it also explored how some residents in these neighbourhoods – particularly CBO leaders – claimed access to their aspired portfolio of assets. Chapter seven then focused on Quito, Ecuador and explored how different actors in national and local government addressed indigeneity in policies and planning interventions which affected this city. Afterwards, chapter eight described understandings of indigeneity and asset-based demands of diverse urban indigenous residents – *comuneros* and migrants – living in Quito. Focusing particularly on the work of the leaders of one indigenous migrant association – the AECT-Q, the chapter also examined some of the tactics people employed to access assets.

This final chapter concludes the thesis. The first three sections will compare the findings from both cities in relation to the research questions – section 9.1 focuses on similarities and differences in government actors’ practices to translate constitutional content; section 9.2 offers a comparison of understandings of indigeneity and associated asset-based demands among urban indigenous residents in both cities; and section 9.3 discusses the different negotiation tactics employed by La Paz’s and Quito’s urban indigenous residents. In addition to providing answers to the research questions, the objective of these sections is to draw conclusions on the relevance of the findings for different conceptual and theoretical debates discussed in the literature review. The final section will consider the implications of the overall findings for understanding urban indigeneity and its role in urban policy and planning in Bolivia, Ecuador and elsewhere; it will also offer some reflections on the chosen research methodology before concluding with a discussion of some of the methodological limitations of this study and directions for future research.

### **9.1 Indigeneity in urban policies and planning**

Bolivia's and Ecuador's new constitutions have introduced a rights-based agenda to development which is remarkable and unique for Latin America. They share in common that they guarantee all citizens of their respective countries access to education, housing, participation, or public services such as water or sanitation. As part of such a universal rights-based agenda, these constitutions also recognise that specific group interests and demands – including those of urban indigenous peoples – have to be acknowledged as part of an intercultural approach that should be applied in the above-mentioned policy sectors but also within the country's overall urban development agenda. In addition, the constitutions introduce specific indigenous rights – ie on indigenous justice, territorial autonomy, or collective land management. While recognising the issue of urban indigeneity, the constitutions, however, do not provide operational guidelines on how to translate into practice the different rights and development principles which address urban indigenous peoples. In such a context, government actors and institutions responsible for the implementation of the content of new constitutions have been left with room to experiment.

A discussion of the literature in chapter two revealed that the adaptation of an indigenous rights-based approach was nothing unique for Bolivia's and Ecuador's current governments. Instead, previous governments openly recognised different rights of indigenous peoples. Yet, the review of the literature also uncovered ambiguities of previous rights-based agendas and associated practices – for example, officially recognised rights for land redistribution were threatened by the economic modernization project; later, collective land rights for indigenous peoples were often ignored in order to push through neoliberal reforms. The findings from both case-study cities on the translation of current constitutional contents for urban indigenous peoples revealed that ambiguities continue at present. A central finding of this thesis was that within their current urban policy and planning agendas, government authorities have put more emphasis on the provision of universal rights and services than on the specific rights of urban indigenous peoples (see also table 9.1). This was particularly the case in those urban policy sectors – housing, urban infrastructure and service provisioning – in which the municipal governments of La Paz and Quito invested most of their financial and human resources. In these policy sectors the issue of indigeneity was not recognised. Municipal

authorities have generally mentioned the absence of new national legislation as a reason for not addressing the specific interests and demands of urban indigenous peoples.

With a lack of clear legislative and operational guidelines, policy makers and urban planners either relied on previous legislation – such as Bolivia’s 1994 Law of Popular Participation – or followed specific urban development models when defining interventions on housing, urban infrastructure and public service provision. The municipal government of La Paz – in political opposition to the development model (*Vivir Bien*) promoted by the MAS-led national government – relied on a human and sustainable development approach. In contrast, the municipal government of Quito – in alliance with the AP-led national government – relied on the notion of the ‘right to the city’. Yet, unlike Lefebvre’s (1991) work on the ‘right to the city’ which emphasises the need to design and build cities according to residents’ own interests and demands, actors within Quito’s but also within La Paz’s municipal government viewed the state – and not ordinary people – as the key institution responsible for defining what the ‘right to the city’ should mean. In the context of the municipal governments of La Paz and Quito, the rights to urban housing, public infrastructure, and services – defined through western and individual rights-based models – were hereby considered universal rights which were applicable to all residents. Following such an interpretation, urban indigenous peoples – like any other urban resident – were considered target groups and could access these rights. In other words, they were no longer outlawed or excluded subjects but included as ordinary citizens who could claim access to universal but not collective indigenous rights.

As indicated above, the absence of new national legislation justified that specific indigenous rights were not incorporated into policies in sectors such as housing or urban infrastructure. Yet, even when new legislation incorporated the issue of indigeneity – as was the case in policy sectors such as intercultural education, participation, or indigenous justice (see table 9.1) – national and local government authorities have not always translated the content of such legislation into actual programmatic interventions within cities. The reasons why specific indigenous rights often remained unaddressed, however, differed between both case-study cities.

### **9.1.1 The importance of history in La Paz**

Historical continuities or what Bourdieu (1977: 54) calls *habitus* – practices which are “(...) a product of history (...)” and operate “(...) in accordance with schemes generated by history” – helped explain why the issue of urban indigeneity was hardly addressed within national legislation in Bolivia as well as in urban policies and planning practices in its capital city – La Paz. Here, the analysis of relevant policy documents as well as of interview material revealed that indigeneity remained associated with criteria established by the colonisers such as rurality, tradition and backwardness. Guided by such a colonial *habitus*, government authorities generally drafted legislation which restricted the application of specific indigenous rights (ie for autonomy, indigenous justice, or collective land management) to rural areas in which authentic indigenous subjects – so-called indigenous original peasants (IOPs) – lived. At the same time, the issue of indigeneity was not recognised by national legislation on cities – places which were historically conceived as ‘white’, western, and modern. This was for example the case for the 2012 LRPUEH which – guided by western property models – recognised individual tenure rights within cities but not indigenous peoples’ rights to own and manage land collectively. The only law which did not restrict the application of indigenous rights to rural areas was Bolivia’s new law on intercultural education which emphasised addressing the linguistic and cultural needs of indigenous peoples wherever they lived. However, it was possible to note a discrepancy between legal discourse and practices to implement intercultural education within cities. Here, teachers and other street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) were generally portrayed as unwilling to incorporate indigenous languages into their curricula as they remained guided by an understanding of the city as a Spanish-speaking place.

Similar to Bolivia’s national government, local governments also relied on the legal understanding of cities as places in which indigenous rights did not apply. For example, the municipal government of La Paz – predominantly responsible for the administration, governance and planning of Bolivia’s capital city – hardly considered the implementation of specific indigenous rights. Instead, the municipal government mainly focused on providing access to universal rights and services. Within participatory processes it mainly involved urban residents (*vecinos*) organised in neighbourhood associations (JJVVs) and did not welcome specific indigenous CBOs such as indigenous peasant unions. In policy sectors such as spatial planning and land management it followed the LRPUEH which only recognised individual tenure rights. The low priority of addressing specific

indigenous interests and demands was also made explicit by the fact that the municipal government of La Paz allocated insufficient financial and human resources to the intercultural sector unit which was responsible for mainstreaming indigenous affairs and intercultural principles into the work of other municipal sector units<sup>62</sup> (see table 9.2).

In contrast to the municipal government of La Paz, municipal governments such as Palca, mainly composed of indigenous staff and historically responsible for the governance and planning of rural jurisdictions, openly recognised indigenous rights to exercise indigenous justice and to manage land collectively and in autonomy. Instead of JJVVs, this municipal government predominantly involved indigenous peasant unions in participatory processes. The case of Palca, however, also illustrated how legal distinctions between cities and rural jurisdictions could overlap in previously rural areas which had been affected by urban expansion and municipal boundary conflicts. This was the case for the neighbourhoods of Litoral or Pumakatari in which Palca's and La Paz's municipal governments both sought to gain administrative and political control. In such a context of municipal boundary conflicts, different spatialized understandings of rights – ie rural / indigenous and urban / non-indigenous – confronted each other.

### **9.1.2 Different political priorities in Quito**

While national legislation on indigeneity predominantly targeted rural areas in Bolivia, Ecuador's national government ratified legislation – ie on intercultural education, participation, social auditing, land tenure rights and political autonomy – which also recognised indigeneity and specific indigenous rights within cities (see table 9.1). Such legislation was certainly incorporated within the urban policy and planning agenda of the municipal government of Quito. While this municipal government did not mainstream the issue of indigeneity within any of its urban policies or planning interventions, it sought to target the interests and demands of indigenous peoples in those areas in which they lived. This was particularly the case in policy sectors such as culture or healthcare but also in participatory budgeting processes. Here, Quito's municipal government requested from

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<sup>62</sup> Similar trends were also mentioned by members of staff in those national government institutions – ie the deputy minister of intercultural affairs and decolonialism (see table 9.2) – responsible for mainstreaming indigenous rights into all national policy sectors. Lacking funding, human resources and confronted by non-cooperative attitudes of staff in other ministries – particularly those working on urban development – the existence of these institutions had more of a symbolic rather than a practical relevance.

zonal administrations to adjust their interventions so that they conformed to the specific cultural demands of indigenous peoples (see table 9.2).

Apart from the above-mentioned interventions, the findings suggested that Ecuador's national government and Quito's municipal government rarely implemented specific indigenous rights manifested in the new constitution and in associated legislation. With the exception of intercultural education, gaps between legal discourse and implementation practice could not be explained by historical factors but by the fact that specific indigenous rights conflicted with the political agenda of governments that centred more on the provision of universal rights. Furthermore, as part of its political agenda, the AP – in control of Ecuador's national and Quito's municipal government – sought to increase state control in urban governance and to disempower political opposition forces which included the country's indigenous movement (Becker 2011). For example, guided by such an agenda, the national government closed institutions – such as CODENPE, DINEIB, MCP or the Secretary of Peoples – which were predominantly composed of staff with indigenous movement affiliations (see table 9.2).

Distinct government priorities could also be noted in the work of Quito's municipal government. Here, specific indigenous rights – such as the right to prior and informed consultation or the right to be involved in decision-making processes – were not recognised once they conflicted with the government's economic development agenda or with the interests and 'rights to the city' of other and often wealthier target groups such as tourists or private investors. This was made explicit in the case of the construction of Quito's new airport which was built on commune territories without consulting relevant indigenous authorities. Similarly, within Quito's San Roque area the municipality, without consulting relevant indigenous organisations, was in the process of closing down collective indigenous work, living and cultural spaces in order to regenerate the area and make it more attractive for tourists and wealthier urban residents.

**Table 9.1 Incorporating constitutional content within different policy sectors**

Policy sector	Recognition of specific constitutional content on urban indigeneity within national legislation		Actual urban policy and planning practices in the case-study cities	
	Bolivia	Ecuador	La Paz, Bolivia	Quito, Ecuador
<b>Housing, urban infrastructure and public services</b>	<i>No</i> – absence of new legislation	<i>No</i> – absence of new legislation	<i>Municipal government of La Paz:</i> Universal rights-based approach without focus on indigeneity, reliance on human and sustainable development model. <i>Municipal government of Palca:</i> Universal rights-based approach without focus on indigeneity.	<i>Municipal government of Quito:</i> Universal rights-based approach without focus on indigeneity, reliance on ‘right to the city’ as urban development model.
<b>Education</b>	<i>Yes</i> – intercultural, intracultural and plurilingual education applicable across Bolivian territory LE (2010)	<i>Yes</i> – intercultural education applicable to all citizens (LIE 2011)	<i>National government as implementing institution:</i> Indigenous languages not taught in schools; Teachers often untrained or unwilling to learn indigenous languages.	<i>National government as implementing institution:</i> Indigenous languages not taught in schools; Teachers often untrained or unwilling to learn indigenous languages.
<b>Land tenure</b>	<i>No</i> – indigenous rights to manage and own land collectively recognised in rural areas (LAD 2010), but not in cities (LRPUEH 2012)	<i>Yes</i> – though collective land ownership rights for indigenous peoples are restricted to urban communes (COOTAD 2010)	<i>Municipal government of La Paz:</i> Recognises only individual tenure rights. <i>Municipal government of Palca:</i> Recognises individual and collective tenure rights.	<i>Municipal government of Quito:</i> Recognises only individual tenure rights; Requires communes to register their land individually with Quito in exchange for services.
<b>Participation and social auditing</b>	<i>No</i> – involvement of indigenous peoples in participatory and social auditing processes is restricted to rural areas and IOP territories (LPS 2013)	<i>Yes</i> – Ensures intercultural diversity in participatory and social auditing processes across Ecuadorian territory; Grants indigenous peoples rights to prior and informed consultation about interventions taking place on their territory (LCP 2010)	<i>Municipal government of La Paz:</i> No recognition of indigeneity in participatory processes. <i>Municipal government of Palca:</i> Involvement of indigenous peasant unions in participatory processes.	<i>Municipal government of Quito:</i> Involves indigenous organisations in participatory budgeting processes; Ignores rights to prior and informed consultation in order to promote large scale economic development projects.

Policy sector	Recognition of specific constitutional content on urban indigeneity within national legislation		Actual urban policy and planning practices in the case-study cities	
	Bolivia	Ecuador	La Paz, Bolivia	Quito, Ecuador
Indigenous Justice	<i>No</i> - Indigenous justice recognised only in rural IOP territories (LJD 2010)	<i>No</i> – absence of new legislation	<i>Municipal government of La Paz</i> : Not recognised <i>Municipal government of Palca</i> : Tolerates indigenous justice	<i>Municipal government of Quito</i> : Not recognised

**Table 9.2 Government institutions responsible for monitoring indigenous affairs**

Case study	Institutional approach	Actual practices
<b>La Paz</b>		
National government	<i>Mainstreaming</i> - Establish government institutions which mainstream indigenous rights across sector ministries.	Allocation of insufficient human and financial resources to specific institutions working on indigeneity such as the deputy ministry of decolonial affairs or the deputy ministry of intercultural affairs;
Municipal government of La Paz	<i>Mainstreaming</i> - Establish government institutions which help to incorporate the issue of indigeneity and intercultural affairs within all municipal sector units.	Allocation of insufficient human and financial resources to the only institution – municipal intercultural unit – which works on indigenous affairs.
Municipal government of Palca	No specific institutional approach	No specific institutional practices.
<b>Quito</b>		
National government of Ecuador	<i>Mainstreaming</i> - Establish government institutions which ensure that indigenous peoples are addressed within universal rights-based agendas.	Closure of institutions working specifically on indigenous affairs including CODENPE, DINEIB, MCP, and Secretary of Peoples; Reintegration into other government institutions which focus less on specific indigenous rights and more on the provision of universal rights to all citizens.
Municipal government of Quito	<i>Targeting</i> - Zonal administrations should address the specific interests and needs of urban indigenous peoples in those areas in which they live.	No specific municipal unit that specifically works on indigenous affairs; Two members of staff hired in the municipal social inclusion unit which worked with communes and migrant groups; Zonal administrations addressed indigeneity in policy sectors such as participation, healthcare, or culture.

### 9.1.3 Concluding reflections to the first research question

Overall, similar to research on the implementation of constitutional rights elsewhere in the world (Flyvbjerg 2003; Putnam 1993), the findings from this thesis revealed that constitutional contents on urban indigeneity have not always been incorporated into urban policies and planning practices in La Paz and Quito. The conceptualisation of urban policy and planning as processes undertaken by social actors – who want to address their own

personal views and whose work is influenced by the specific structural environment in which they operate (Touraine 2000) – hereby helped in uncovering gaps between constitutional rhetoric and actual practices.

In La Paz it was shown that constitutional content on urban indigeneity and intercultural urban development often conflicted with the personal views of government officials who often remained guided by a colonial habitus (Bourdieu 1977) and a static, spatial and monocultural understanding of indigeneity as a rural category associated with tradition and backwardness and a perception of the city as ‘white’, modern and non-indigenous place (Dussel 1993; Walsh 2010). Such a historically rooted explanation did not serve to explain urban policy and planning practice in Quito. Instead, here it was rather the fact that constitutional rights on indigeneity conflicted with other political priorities of government authorities – such as disempowering indigenous movements or strengthening the ‘right to the city’ of wealthier urban population groups.

Even though it was possible to denote discrepancies between constitutional rhetoric and practice, the findings of this thesis do not necessarily confirm with studies conducted elsewhere in the global south (Roy 2009; Yiftachel 2006) which suggested that the practices of actors and institutions involved in urban governance often represent the cause for problems such as poverty, ethno-racial discrimination, exclusion or adverse incorporation. Instead, the findings of this thesis were more nuanced and, similar to research conducted by Scott (1999) or Watson (2012), suggested that different institutions of urban governance in La Paz and Quito were composed not of monolithic but heterogeneous social actors who held distinct political affiliations, personal views and addressed the interests and demands of different interest groups in their practices. Hence, while a majority of actors refused to recognise specific indigenous rights within cities, others – though often lacking sufficient human and financial resources to undertake their work – openly sought to incorporate constitutional content on indigeneity into their urban policy and planning practices. In La Paz, this was exemplified through a discussion of the work of the municipal intercultural unit or a description of some of the practices of actors in Palca’s municipal government which, similar to the municipal government of La Paz – sought to gain administrative control over areas affected by urban expansion. In Quito, similar tendencies could be observed in the work of some zonal administrations which targeted indigenous peoples in specific policy areas such as culture or healthcare.

Finally, even though rarely focusing on specific indigenous rights, the findings also suggest that most actors involved in urban governance in La Paz and Quito nevertheless sought to improve the living conditions of urban indigenous peoples. They intended to achieve this by treating urban indigenous peoples not as ‘others’ but as ordinary urban residents who should have equal access to universal rights and services such as housing, land titles, water, electricity, education, or healthcare. Whether such a universal targeting approach conformed to the specific interests and asset-based demands of indigenous peoples themselves will be discussed in the following section.

## **9.2 Indigeneity and asset-based demands**

Besides comparing current practices to translate constitutional content on indigeneity into urban policy and planning practice, this thesis also explored what indigeneity meant to those people who self-identified as such in La Paz and Quito. It is important to note that the indigenous residents approached in both cities were highly diverse. They could be broadly divided into *comuneros*, people that always resided within the premises of today’s cities, and migrants who arrived to the cities from other parts of Bolivia or Ecuador. The characteristics of *comuneros* and migrants were, however, different in each city. La Paz’s *comuneros* and migrants had in common that they mainly lived within the city’s urban periphery. This was shown in case studies on the neighbourhoods of Litoral and Pumakatari. In contrast to La Paz, Quito’s *comuneros*, agglomerated in 49 communes, rarely shared their living spaces with indigenous migrants. Instead, Quito’s indigenous migrants’ residences were frequently dispersed across the city. In this city, migrants often interacted with members of their community of origin within their work places. This was shown in a case study of indigenous market vendors who belonged to the AECT-Q.

Indigenous residents – whether *comuneros* or migrants – approached in both cities similarly belonged to different age groups, genders, and socio-economic classes. Among the indigenous residents approached within this research were wealthy indigenous movement leaders and rich land owners. Meanwhile, others were impoverished street vendors or people without an income source. Some of the approached indigenous residents had university degrees while others had never been to school.

Notwithstanding their diverse backgrounds, indigenous residents in Quito, independent from being migrants or *comuneros*, generally mentioned that being indigenous in the city

was associated with being a victim of discrimination. Associations of indigeneity with ethno-racial discrimination were highlighted less by indigenous peoples approached in La Paz. A potential factor explaining this difference could be that La Paz – with one third of its population self-identifying as indigenous – was a far more ‘indigenous’ city than Quito, a city where less than seven per cent of residents considered themselves to be of indigenous descent.

While associations of indigeneity with discrimination were different in La Paz and Quito, indigenous residents in both cities generally expressed their indigenous identity through specific demands for land or urban space. Yet, different indigenous residents from each city associated land or urban space with opportunities to access a variety of other assets and, hence, with very different indigenous lifestyles. Thus, within and between these cities it was possible to identify distinct meanings of indigeneity. Table 9.3 offers a brief description of how land was associated with opportunities to access physical, natural, financial, cultural, social or political capital.

**Table 9.3 The centrality of land for urban indigenous peoples**

Land and its link to other assets	Examples
Physical capital	Housing; Public infrastructure such as roads, water pipes, street lightning; Public services such as water or electricity.
Natural and productive capital	Associated with cultivation of agricultural goods.
Financial capital	Used to generate profits on competitive urban land speculation markets.
Cultural capital	Site of festive rituals, cultural events, and place of worship.
Social capital	Space to live, work, and interact as indigenous community.
Political capital	Space on which indigenous communities can govern themselves in autonomy and exercise their own principles of governance and justice.

### **9.2.1 The association of land with indigenous tradition and community**

Within each city it was possible to note that residents associated land with opportunities to preserve traditions and practices which are considered stereotypical for a rural and authentic indigenous lifestyle (Field 1994). For example, particularly elderly *comuneros* in La Paz and Quito associated land with the preservation of a peasant lifestyle and with opportunities to cultivate agricultural goods (natural capital). Similarly, these *comuneros* sought to preserve collective ownership rights over their lands. They also wanted to manage their territories with autonomy and according to their own governance principles (political capital). Hence, processes of urbanisation and the increased influence of the

municipal governments of La Paz and Quito – who often disrespected collective land ownership patterns on their territories – were generally perceived to threaten their political autonomy.

Associations of land as a collective good were not only highlighted by *comuneros* but also by indigenous migrants. This was particularly the case in Quito where indigenous migrants from San Roque who – threatened by the closure of their work and educational spaces in the neighbourhood – aspired to regain access to new collective living, working and cultural spaces within the city. Furthermore, the association of land and urban space with the preservation of community (social capital) and ancestral traditions (cultural capital) was also expressed by elderly indigenous migrants and *comuneros* in La Paz. These residents jointly celebrated the annual *Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced* in public spaces within the neighbourhood. During this festival they would interact with each other in Aymara, perform traditional dances, and revitalise specific rural rituals such as the *ch'alla* – the donation of alcohol to ‘mother earth’ (*pachamama*).

### **9.2.2 The association of land with a modern and capitalist urban lifestyle**

While elderly people normally associated land with the preservation of ancestral cultural practices, younger migrants and *comuneros* from both cities often fused their indigenous traditions with western culture that was popular within the cities in which they lived. In La Paz, indigenous youngsters mixed Aymara with Spanish urban slang during HipHop shows on the streets of their neighbourhoods Litoral and Pumakatari. Similar to La Paz’s younger Aymara residents, Kichwa youth approached in Quito often reinvented their language by fusing it with Spanish or even English terms. The appropriation of indigenous languages by younger urban indigenous residents in both cities illustrates that specific ‘traditional’ indigenous features were not static but rather dynamic and changing over time, space, and across generations.

In addition to wanting to preserve their sense of community and revitalising certain traditions on a plot of land or within a specific space in the city, most indigenous migrants and *comuneros* in Quito and La Paz also associated land with the accumulation of other assets which rarely conformed to a static, essentialised, and traditionalist understanding of indigeneity. For example, both in La Paz and Quito, migrants and *comuneros* often aspired to receive individual tenure rights from municipal governments in order to access urban

infrastructure such as water, electricity, or roads (physical capital). In other words, similar to most urban residents they wanted to lead a modern life within the city and therefore sought to access universal rights and services which were provided to them by local authorities.

Finally, it is also important to note that some urban indigenous peoples' demands for collective land ownership or for the preservation of collective work, living and cultural spaces should not automatically be conflated with aspirations to preserve a traditional indigenous lifestyle. This was particularly visible in La Paz where some indigenous *comuneros* sought to preserve or regain access to collective land in order to later subdivide and sell it expensively on the city's land speculation market. Hence, these *comuneros* associated land with monetary profit (financial capital) and often contributed to the destruction of their own 'indigenous communities'. Similar tendencies have also been reported in Quito's communes. Furthermore, the prioritisation of generating financial benefit over preserving or creating indigenous communal living spaces could also be observed in the practices of indigenous migrant leaders from Quito's AECT-Q who, after gaining access to new living spaces, sold land to their members or, when they were unable to pay their leaders, to people outside their association.

### **9.2.3 Concluding reflections to the second research question**

Whereas the previous literature mainly focused on selected cultural or economic demands of urban indigenous peoples (Albo et al 1981; Guss 2006; Kingman 2012), the analysis presented here offers a more holistic understanding of what it means to be indigenous within the city. Within La Paz and Quito it was possible to observe that different indigenous residents articulated multiple indigenous identities and as a consequence, often expressed diverse and sometimes contradictory interests and demands. Hence, within these cities indigeneity was not a static but a dynamic social category (Canessa 2006; Weismantel 2001) which changed in meaning over time and space and meant different things to different people – ie leaders, men, women, youngsters, the elderly, migrants, *comuneros* etc.

An asset accumulation framework helped to draw out the complex and differential outcome in understandings of indigeneity as dynamic category. Unlike previous studies which applied an asset accumulation framework to the study of urban poverty and

emphasised the centrality of housing (Moser 2009; Satterthwaite 2008), the findings from this thesis suggest that land seemed to be the most important asset for urban indigenous peoples in La Paz and Quito. Land was associated with varying opportunities to access one or multiple other assets such as cultural (eg festivals and collective land management), financial (eg money generated from reselling land), physical (eg access to water, electricity or roads), social (eg meeting space), natural/ productive (eg for agricultural activities) or political (eg associated with rights for governance and autonomy) capital. In other words, land was generally associated with the preservation of specific indigenous traditions but, simultaneously, with opportunities to benefit from modern amenities and economic opportunities available within cities.

### **9.3 Accessing assets: contestation and negotiation tactics**

To gain access to their desired portfolio of assets, indigenous peoples in both cities took an active role and often organised in CBOs through which they would voice their interests and demands. In La Paz, indigenous migrants and *comuneros* residing in the Litoral and Pumakatari neighbourhoods were often member of multiple CBOs such as indigenous peasant unions, JJVVs and folkloric clubs. In Quito, migrants mainly organised around their places of work. For example, Tiguan market vendors who worked in Quito's San Roque market organised in the indigenous market vendor association AECT-Q. In contrast to migrants, Quito's *comuneros* organised in *calbidos* and cultural clubs.

Previous research showed that in a context where urban indigenous peoples have been outlawed and excluded from rights-based agendas, they generally relied on their own self-help practices (Albo 2006; Kingman 2012) or raised their specific claims for recognition during acts of urban insurgency (Becker 2011; Lazar 2008; Revilla 2011; Zibechi 2010). While indigenous residents in both cities certainly confirmed such tendencies, the findings from this thesis suggested that – particularly in La Paz's and Quito's current political context – indigenous CBOs made use of what Mirafteb (2009) calls invited spaces. In other words, they entered into processes of political negotiation with relevant government authorities or made use of existing participatory spaces.

The empirical findings from both cities also suggest that it was especially the indigenous leaders of CBOs that played a central role in processes of political negotiation. It was these leaders who obtained the relevant social capital – ie connections to actors in

government – and political capital – a good knowledge of existing rules and procedures that characterise a given political system (Ginieniewicz 2012). Similar to previous research (Lazar 2008), the findings revealed that in La Paz and Quito entering into political negotiations often required to establish clientelist networks. In addition, the findings suggest that indigenous leaders also acquired another skill – the capacity to act as a supporter of the political agendas of different government institutions – to succeed in processes of political negotiation.

### **9.3.1 Variations in indigenous leaders' political negotiation tactics in La Paz and Quito**

Depending on the specific political context characterising their city, indigenous leaders had to rely on different negotiation tactics in La Paz and Quito. In Litoral and Pumakatari, the selected case-study sites in La Paz, indigenous leaders had to adjust their negotiation tactics to the specific political agenda of different government institutions which exercised political and administrative influence within their neighbourhoods. In other words, depending on the specific moment of time, space and on the government actor they engaged with, indigenous leaders tactically manoeuvred between being urban residents (*vecinos*) and authentic indigenous original peasants. Hence, going beyond existing work on 'strategic essentialism' (Hale 1997; Spivak 1996) which emphasised how indigenous peoples politically mobilised on their indigenous identity to claim access to rights, the findings from La Paz reveal that people often mobilised not just on their indigenous identity but tactically moved between multiple officially-recognised identity categories to gain access to assets.

The ways indigenous leaders in La Paz manoeuvred between different identities was outlined through three case studies. The first case study showed how migrants and *comuneros* organised in JJVVs to secure access to urban services such as water, sanitation or electricity. Leaders negotiated with the municipality of La Paz which, since the 1994 LPP, increasingly provided residents residing in the new urban peripheries with individual titles and improved access to basic services. It was shown that to gain access to infrastructure and basic services, indigenous leaders often had to hide their indigenous identity and adopt the role of 'white' and Spanish speaking *vecinos* during processes of political negotiation with municipal staff in La Paz. Meanwhile, the other two case studies showed how the same leaders would approach the municipal government of Palca in order

to gain access to rights and services – eg collective tenure rights or to receive permissions for folkloric festivals – which the municipal government of La Paz would not provide. In negotiations with actors in this municipal government, which followed a rural development agenda and promoted indigenous rights, the same leaders would now emphasise their indigenous identity and act like authentic indigenous original peasants.

Indigenous leaders in Quito were presented with fewer negotiation partners and often had to side with the political agenda of a specific political party or social movement which was influential in a particular moment of time. This was shown in three case studies which discussed the work of the leaders of the AECT-Q. Before the AP party took control of the national government and Quito's municipal government, indigenous leaders of this organisation highlighted how they affiliated themselves with the national indigenous movement CONAIE and its associated political party Pachakutik in order to resolve problems such as the threat of displacement from their working spaces. Meanwhile, the affiliation with Ecuador's national movement CONAIE also helped AECT-Q leaders to gain accreditation from DINEIB, an institution that was predominantly composed of CONAIE leaders, for its Pachamama College in the 1990s.

The empirical findings suggested that the political affiliation with CONAIE was, however, no longer of use to AECT-Q leaders after Correa's AP won a majority in Ecuador's national government and in Quito's municipal government in the mid-2000s. As outlined in previous sections both governments viewed indigenous movements such as CONAIE as part of the political opposition and systematically disempowered this organisation. Confronted by such political changes, indigenous leaders had to alter their approach in negotiations. They now had to hide their indigenous movement affiliation and support a political agenda – on city centre revitalisation and market relocation – which they had previously opposed. This, however, allowed them to negotiate access to new living spaces for members of their community.

### **9.3.2 Indigenous leaders and community representation**

The findings from both cities confirm that the work of indigenous leaders often benefited members of indigenous communities in La Paz and Quito. During focus groups conducted in both cities indigenous research participants generally highlighted that without the work of their leaders – who engaged in relations with authorities that conducted work within

their communities – they would have not received access to crucial assets. In La Paz, for example, JJVV leaders managed to bring public infrastructure and services such as water, electricity or roads to their neighbourhoods. Similarly, without the work of leaders of folkloric associations, local residents would not have managed to receive permission for their annual *Fiesta de la Virgen de la Merced*. Meanwhile, in Quito indigenous leaders of the AECT-Q provided their residents with vending spaces or educational opportunities.

The findings, however, also suggest that relationships between indigenous leaders and community members were not straightforward but complex and characterised by a set of contradictions and conflicts of interest. For example, indigenous leaders did not always distribute resources equally to all members of their community. This was particularly visible in La Paz's Pumakatari and Litoral neighbourhoods where indigenous residents often highlighted that JJVV leaders – who were predominantly elderly men – mainly ensured that urban infrastructure and services would reach their own homes as well as the homes of close male friends or neighbours. In such a context, women and younger residents in particular often felt excluded from the work of their local leaders, who in the majority were elderly men.

In Quito, the findings indicated that indigenous leaders sometimes (ab)used their position to personally enrich themselves. This became evident in the descriptions of the work of indigenous leaders from *Jatun Ayllu* who relied on donations from their own members to fund a new commercial centre. As was pointed out by different research participants, after the failure of this project these leaders never returned the money to their members but kept it for themselves. Tendencies of personal enrichment could also be observed for the leader of the AECT-Q who viewed his new housing project not only as an opportunity to create an urban indigenous community for association members. Instead, he also perceived it as an opportunity to generate monetary profits by selling land to anyone interested in buying it.

In addition, the activities of indigenous leaders and their CBOs sometimes stood in direct opposition to the interests and asset-based demands of other urban indigenous residents. This was especially evident in the Pumakatari and Litoral neighbourhoods – areas which were composed of a mixture of indigenous residents. Here, *comunero* leaders often sought to receive collective land ownership rights from Palca over areas which were already

inhabited by indigenous migrants who themselves held individual tenure rights from La Paz. Similarly, the attempt of leaders of folkloric associations to gain permission for their annual festival was not appreciated by every indigenous resident. Particularly indigenous women perceived the festival as a security threat and associated it with an increase in alcohol consumption and violence.

### **9.3.3 Concluding reflections to the third research question**

Overall, the findings from both cities suggested that members of urban indigenous communities in La Paz and Quito were not passive but also social actors (Touraine 2000) who wanted to fulfil their own interests and demands for assets as much as was possible within the specific political environment that governed them. In the current political context, indigenous peoples mainly made use of invited spaces (Miraftab 2009); they approached government authorities for political negotiations or engaged in participatory processes.

The findings also revealed that it was not every urban indigenous resident but mainly community leaders that played a central role in these processes. Indigenous leaders obtained the social and political capital that was required to enter into processes of political negotiations with relevant government authorities. In addition to such characteristics, the findings from this thesis also suggested that if indigenous leaders wanted to succeed in processes of political negotiation they also needed another skill – they had to be capable of performing different roles and rely on plural political tactics (de Certeau 1984). The tactics of indigenous leaders were different in each city. To address their specific asset-demands, indigenous leaders in La Paz had to approach different government actors and conform to multiple yet very different officially recognised identity categories. When interacting with Palca they had to perform as authentic and traditional indigenous subjects while in negotiations with La Paz they had to become ‘white’ residents of the modern city. Meanwhile, indigenous leaders in Quito had to shift from being indigenous movement affiliates to being supporters of a political party which perceived indigenous movements as their opposition.

Finally, the findings revealed how indigenous leaders not always addressed the interests and demands of all their CBO members or of the communities whom they represented. Instead, they often used their powerful position to enrich themselves personally or to

provide close friends with access to resources while denying such access to other community members. Hence, urban indigenous communities – as with most urban communities elsewhere in the world (Banks 2014; DeFilippis 2001; Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013) – were divided places characterised by their own internal hierarchies, conflicts of interest, and unequal power relationships.

#### **9.4 Final comment**

Focusing on these countries – Bolivia and Ecuador – which for the first time in Latin American history recognised urban indigeneity within constitutions, this thesis offered an in-depth study of how specific indigenous rights, interests, and demands were actually incorporated into urban policies and planning practices and how ordinary urban indigenous peoples themselves articulated and addressed their specific interests and demands for assets. A central finding of this thesis was that the translation of constitutional contents on urban indigeneity as well as indigenous people’s own practices to fulfil their specific asset-based demands were not straight-forward but characterised by a set of tensions and conflicting realities. This thesis revealed at least three conflicting realities:

- First, for government officials, planners, or policy makers new constitutional contents on urban indigeneity and specific indigenous rights often clashed with other political priorities – ie addressing universal rights or addressing other interest groups – or with their own personal views towards the city as non-indigenous, ‘white’, modern and western place.
- Second, urban indigenous peoples – often living in internally divided communities – themselves articulated not one but multiple and sometimes contradictory indigenous identities. While some associated being indigenous with the preservation of a rural, and traditional lifestyle, others wanted to depart from such a lifestyle and – like most urban residents – enjoy a modern lifestyle within the city.
- Third, in order to lead the life they wanted to lead, urban indigenous peoples – particularly indigenous CBO leaders – often had to manoeuvre between different worlds. In political negotiations they had to conform with political agendas as well as to official, and particularly in the case of Bolivia, spatialized understandings of identity which sometimes stood in contradiction to their own personal views and sense of identity. Furthermore, within their own indigenous communities they often needed

to represent their work in such a way that it responds to the interests and demands of their members. Yet, in reality, indigenous leaders often undertook practices which were more responsive to their own interests and demands than to the ones of the members of their community or the CBO who they represent.

#### **9.4.1 Policy implications**

The findings from this thesis suggest that there is a need for different, nuanced, and context-responsive approaches to studying indigeneity and addressing indigenous peoples in urban policy and planning practices. The findings particularly challenge generalisations made in previous studies which – guided by post-colonial, static, or romanticist understandings of indigeneity – argued that urban indigenous peoples interests and demands are not taken into account once authorities in urban governance follow western models of development which prioritise individual and universal rights over specific group rights (Jojola 2008; Porter 2010). Instead, the findings from La Paz and Quito showed that most urban indigenous peoples actually wanted to receive access to universal rights and urban public services such as individual land titles, water, electricity or roads. In other words, urban indigenous peoples were not that different from other urban residents; they simply wanted to lead a modern and often capitalist life in the city. Hence, the application of a universal rights-based approach or the use of western planning models which focus on individual over collective rights might actually yield results which are responsive to the interests and demands of most urban indigenous peoples.

The findings also showed that specific indigenous rights and urban development planning models which advocate the design of more inclusive, intercultural and diverse cities – such as those established in Bolivia's and Ecuador's new constitutions but also the one's developed by planning scholars such as Sandercock (2003) – are unlikely to materialise in practice in settings where public officials responsible for their implementation hold a range of preconceived notions (ie of cities as non-indigenous spaces), follow different political priorities (ie addressing the interests of the wealthy and not of indigenous peoples), or operate in a particularly conflictive political environment (ie when operating in areas affected by municipal boundary conflicts).

Despite showing tensions between legal rhetoric, policy and planning ideals, and actual practices, the research findings also provided positive examples of urban policy

approaches at various levels (national government, municipal government and neighbourhood) and stages (policy making and planning) which could allow that the complex and sometimes divergent interests, demands and rights of urban indigenous peoples are taken into account within urban policy and planning processes. For instance, a positive example was provided for the case of Quito where zonal administrations ensured that the issue of indigeneity was taken into account within those neighbourhoods in which indigenous peoples lived. Here, zonal administrations addressed indigenous people's interests when implementing municipal policies on healthcare prevention, culture, or participatory budgeting. Such an approach could be extended to other policy sectors such as economic development, housing, or urban infrastructure provisioning where – at least in La Paz and Quito – the issue of indigeneity was not taken into account.

A positive example of addressing urban indigenous affairs at the local government level could also be identified in La Paz where the municipal government set up an intercultural unit which was allocated with the responsibility to mainstream the issue of indigeneity across the work of all sector units. A mainstreaming approach was also introduced by Bolivia's and Ecuador's national governments. Here specific institutions – such as Bolivia's deputy ministry of decolonial affairs or Ecuador's CODENPE or MCP – were responsible for assisting other sector ministries in the draft [and implementation] of much needed new legislation that incorporated the issue of urban indigeneity. However, the findings also suggest that there was a need to strengthen these institutions – both, in terms of financial and human resources – so that they can actually undertake their allocated tasks and create a supportive legislative, policy and planning environment which is responsive to the interests and demands of urban indigenous peoples.

A final set of relevant policy issues derive from the findings on the interactions between actors in urban governance and urban indigenous target groups. It was shown that it was predominantly indigenous CBO leaders who negotiated access to rights and assets with relevant government agencies. Reasons for the central role of indigenous leaders in negotiation processes were, on the one side, that they obtained the relevant social and political capital to do such work and, on the other side, that government authorities mainly invited these people to participate in decision-making processes. Yet, the findings also revealed that leaders – predominantly elderly men – not always had the collective interests and demands of their community in mind but often (ab)used their position to enrich

themselves personally and to preserve their powerful position. To ensure that policies and planning interventions actually reach urban indigenous target groups, government authorities should pay more attention to the issue of power relations and internal conflicts that occur within the communities and neighbourhoods in which they work. Central and local government authorities should also create invited spaces for citizen involvement and participation which are open not only to a set of leaders but also to a wider range of ordinary indigenous community members including women and adolescents. The market relocation approach of Quito's municipal government – led by the AP party – could potentially serve as a positive example on how to generate such invited spaces. Here, municipal authorities stopped working with indigenous CBO leaders but directly negotiated with individual market vendors whose voices were previously not taken into account (see chapter eight).

In summary, the findings suggest that, in order to address indigeneity within urban policies, it is important to erase a set of preconceived notions among government officials and to overcome a set of structural, institutional and political obstacles which were specific for each city. At the same time, a range of policy and planning interventions could already be identified on national and local government scales but also at the level of neighbourhoods which – if strengthened through financial and human resources – could ensure that the issue of indigeneity and associated constitutional content are mainstreamed into urban policies in the selected case-study cities – La Paz and Quito. While mainly referring to La Paz and Quito, the findings from this thesis are also relevant to other cities and countries – situated elsewhere in the global north and south – which contain large and diverse urban indigenous population groups. The outcomes emphasise that, instead of following a set of *a priori* assumptions or urban policy and planning ideals, it is important to identify what indigeneity actually means for different social actors involved in urban governance but also to indigenous target groups themselves. Hence, before defining policy recommendations for other cities, it is best to conduct further in-depth and empirically grounded research which captures the perceptions, interests, asset-based demands and associated practices of diverse social actors who operate in these cities which are characterised by their own institutional, political and structural environment.

#### **9.4.2 Reflections on the methodology**

As the findings showed, the translation of constitutional content on indigeneity into urban policy and planning practice is a process undertaken by multiple social actors who want to achieve their own personal goals but whose practices are also facilitated or constrained by specific institutional and political configurations, social relations or established norms and regulations which are context-specific for each city. A combined social constructivist and critical realist approach – which can capture the interplay of agential and structural factors – hereby provided an appropriate ontological basis for this research.

The use of a qualitative case-study approach – outlined in detail in chapter three – was useful for this research because it allowed the combined use of a variety of methods. These included content analysis, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and participatory focus groups which helped in exploring *how* different social actors understood and addressed indigeneity and constitutional content within their diverse practices and tactics. A case-study approach – and particularly the reliance on La Paz and Quito as illustrative cases – has been helpful as it permitted capturing the practices of a diverse set of social actors operating at different scales (national, city, neighbourhood), within diverse institutions of urban governance, as well as within urban indigenous communities. The use of case studies also allowed taking into consideration a variety of causal factors – ie history, an institutional and political context, and social relations within communities – which influenced the practices of different social actors.

By focusing on two case-study cities the research was also comparative in nature. Unlike previous comparative research on indigeneity in Bolivia and Ecuador which mainly relied on individualising, universalising or encompassing approaches (see chapter three), this thesis predominantly made use of a variation-finding comparison. This approach was useful as it helped reveal that processes such as the translation of constitutional content – which were often similar for both case-study cities (ie specific indigenous rights were hardly recognised in urban policies) – can be influenced by very different causal factors (ie the cities' unique histories, political and institutional structure). Hence, variations in the findings *between* the cities could best be explained through shedding light on the unique processes and factors that shaped the translation of indigenous rights *within* each city.

### **9.4.3 Limitations to the methodology and directions for further research**

This final section outlines some of the weaknesses and limitations of the selected methodology and, based upon this discussion, makes suggestions for future research which could further contribute to the existing literature on urban indigeneity. A first weakness of the methodology relates to its breadth and associated lack of depth. By undertaking a two-case-study city multi-layered comparison which captured the voices of selected actors operating in multiple institutions and at multiple scales (national, city, and neighbourhood), this research offered a rather broad overview on current understandings of urban indigeneity and practices of translating constitutional content into urban policies in La Paz and Quito. A focus on breadth logically means that this thesis sometimes lacked depth as – at least in the scope of a PhD research project conducted by one student with limited resources and time – it could not provide detailed accounts of the diverse practices which took place within approached institutions or communities. For example, due to time constraints it was often possible to approach only one or two members of staff per government sector unit. While these actors certainly provided useful illustrations of their work priorities, future research could focus in further detail on the work of more diverse actors within one policy sector (eg education, healthcare, housing etc). Such research could, for example, contrast the work of senior policy workers responsible for the draft of legislation with the practices of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) who are responsible for the translation of such legislation.

Within the selected indigenous communities it would also be recommended to conduct further research and to provide more room for the voices of people which – due to time constraints and because of my position as a white male researcher with limited language skills in indigenous languages – were not sufficiently captured in this thesis. These include, among others, women and those indigenous residents or community members who did not speak Spanish. To involve these people whose voices were rather ‘silent’ in this study, it would be best to rely on a team of multiple researchers which would include men, women, indigenous, non-indigenous people but also community members themselves. Such an approach could not only help in generating a more complete understanding of what indigeneity and indigenous rights mean in cities; it could also further deepen our knowledge about internal hierarchies within urban indigenous communities and shed light on the complex relationships between community leaders and ordinary residents. Finally, such an approach could lead to the creation of intercultural

knowledge which is co-produced, used, and applied by researchers, activists and indigenous communities themselves (Smith 1999).

A second constraint of this thesis has been time. Given the fact that this research covered implementation and negotiation practices only until 2013, further and more longitudinal research could explore how patterns of addressing indigeneity and indigenous rights in urban policy and planning practice changed over time. This could be particularly interesting in the current context of Quito where, after recent municipal elections, a new government was elected which, in contrast to the previous municipal government, stands in opposition to Rafael Correa. Following the findings of this research, political changes in governments should lead to changes in urban policy and planning practice and to shifting negotiation strategies by urban indigenous leaders. Longitudinal research will be of critical importance to put this assumption to an empirical test.

A final limitation of the methodology, generic to the case-study approach, relates to the potential to generalise the findings to other institutions, indigenous communities, cities or countries. It is important to emphasise that the findings presented within this thesis were by no means representative of the understanding of indigeneity and associated urban policy, planning or political negotiation practices in La Paz, Quito or other cities situated in Bolivia, Ecuador and elsewhere. Nevertheless, they provide useful illustrations of the complex, dynamic and changing nature of indigeneity as a legal category, a lived experience and a political category which people use during political negotiations.

Within Bolivia and Ecuador knowledge of urban indigeneity and associated practices could be further deepened by extending research to more indigenous communities within La Paz or Quito or by comparing these cities to other cities within the respective countries. A further strand of future research could make use of the theoretical and methodological approach used in this thesis and apply it to a study of urban indigeneity within cities in which a large number of indigenous peoples live but where – until this point – constitutional changes have not occurred. Such research could, for example, focus on countries in the global north – particularly Canada, the United States, Australia, or New Zealand – which have recently been experiencing processes of indigenous urbanisation (Jojola 2008; Porter 2010). In the global south, research could focus on African and Asian countries where tribal population groups have been increasingly affected by the

urbanisation of their territories (Adetula 2005; Hodgson 2011; Li 2000; Shah 2010; Wodon et al 2005). The aim of carrying out such research would be, as was shown in this thesis, to undertake theoretically-informed, empirically-grounded and policy-relevant research on the different, potentially contradictory, and constantly changing meanings of indigeneity in diverse global urban contexts.

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# Appendices

## Appendix one: Research process followed (2011-2015)

Period	Activities	Outcomes
September 2011 – February 2012	Start of the research: Literature review on indigeneity, urban policy and planning practice. First draft of research methodology and fieldwork plan.	Mid-year review paper for supervisors  Presentation of literature review at a seminar of the Americas Research Group, University of Manchester, UK.
February 2012 – June 2012	Reformulation of literature review and methodology; redefinition of thesis objective, research questions.  Presentation of thesis project to continuation review panel, comments from internal advisor.	Continuation review passed - no corrections to be made.  Literature review presented at the Postgraduate Conference for Latin American Studies (PILAS), University of Oxford, UK
June 2011 – August 2012	Preliminary document analysis of relevant historical and legal documents.  Preparation of fieldwork and ethics application.	Fieldwork and ethical approval received from the University of Manchester, UK.
August 2012 – January 2013	Fieldwork in La Paz, Bolivia involving selection of research sites and data collection (document search, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and participatory focus groups).  Review of relevant local academic literature on indigeneity, indigenous rights, and urban development.  Transcription of interview material.  Co-organisation of the international conference “Bolivia 2013: key questions in the social sciences”, La Paz, Bolivia	Paper on theoretical framework and preliminary findings from La Paz - presented at the conference “Bolivia 2013: Key questions in the social sciences”, Museum for Ethnography, La Paz, Bolivia.  Three fieldwork reports submitted to supervisors.
February 2013 – July 2013	Fieldwork in Quito, Ecuador involving selection of research sites and data collection (document search, semi-structured interviews, and participatory focus groups).  Review of relevant local academic literature on indigeneity, indigenous rights, and urban development.  Transcription of interview material.  Voluntary work as English and Sociology teacher at the Pachamama College – an indigenous weekend school based in Quito.	Presentation of theoretical framework and preliminary findings at the Faculty of Architecture and Planning, Central University of Ecuador, Quito.  Three fieldwork reports submitted to supervisors.
August 2013 – October 2013	Transcription of interview material and preliminary analysis of empirical findings.  Redefinition of thesis objectives and draft of preliminary abstract.	Annual review with supervisors and internal advisor.  Paper on preliminary findings presented at the International Conference ‘Interrogating Urban Crisis’, DeMontfort University, Leicester, UK.

<b>Period</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Outcomes</b>
October 2013 – March 2014	<p>Data analysis of empirical findings from La Paz and Quito (manually and using NVivo).</p> <p>Following comments by supervisors and the internal advisor, familiarisation with new literatures on indigeneity, urban policy and planning, and political negotiations.</p> <p>Thesis writing, draft of two empirical chapters on Bolivia; comments by supervisors.</p>	<p>Lecture on processes of urban development, urban expansion and indigenous rights in Bolivia, delivered to a class of Masters student in the ‘Global Urban Development and Planning’ course, University of Manchester, UK.</p> <p>Paper on empirical findings in Bolivia presented at Americas workshop, Newcastle University, UK.</p>
March 2014 – August 2014	<p>Thesis writing, editing of chapters on Bolivia, draft of two empirical chapters on Ecuador, draft of comparative analysis chapter.</p>	<p>Two papers on empirical findings from Bolivia and Ecuador presented at (1) Postgraduate Research Conference, University of Manchester, UK, (2) Annual Royal Geography Society conference, London.</p> <p>PhD seminar on reflexivity and ethical research (using findings from my own work), Planning Department, University of Manchester, UK</p> <p>Annual review with internal advisor and supervisors.</p>
September 2014 – December 2014	<p>Thesis writing, rewriting of methodology chapter and literature review (incorporation of new literatures), introduction &amp; conclusion.</p> <p>Exchange with second supervisor on thesis scope, objective, and structure of the literature review.</p>	<p>Publication of book review ‘Indigenous peoples, poverty, and development’ in Journal of Development Studies.</p> <p>First draft of thesis.</p>
January 2015 – March 2015	<p>Restructuring and rewriting of the literature review, methodology and introduction chapters.</p> <p>Further review of the literature on comparative research and indigeneity.</p>	<p>PhD seminar on the key concepts of my literature review, Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester</p>
April 2015 – June 2015	<p>Thesis writing, more information on indigeneity in the literature review, incorporation of the variation-finding method into the methodology, new comparative analysis chapter which focuses on variations between the cities.</p> <p>Visit to Quito, Ecuador and dissemination of research findings.</p> <p>Comments by supervisors on second draft of thesis (mainly how to narrow the scope of the literature review)</p>	<p>Paper on empirical findings from Ecuador presented at the <i>Centro Nacional de Estrategia para el Derecho al Territorio</i>, Postgraduate University of the State of Ecuador, Quito.</p> <p>Assistant and participant in the working group ‘environmental and indigenous rights’ during the Latin American consultations on the post-2015 development agenda taking place in Quito (organised by the University of Sheffield, FLACSO, and the United Nations, Ecuador).</p> <p>Second draft of thesis.</p>
July 2015 – September 2015	<p>Thesis writing, incorporation of comments of supervisors – rewriting of literature review and restructuring, proof-reading and editing of all chapters.</p> <p>Final comments by supervisors on third draft of thesis and final editing.</p>	<p>Paper on the comparative methodology and findings from La Paz and Quito presented at the Doing Global Urban Research International Conference, University of Loughborough, UK.</p> <p>Third draft of thesis.</p> <p>Thesis printing and submission.</p>

## **Appendix two: List of documents consulted<sup>63</sup>**

### **1) Bolivia**

#### ***Documents from national government***

- CPE Bolivia. 2009. *Constitución Política del Estado de Bolivia* [Political constitution of the state of Bolivia]. La Paz, Vicepresidencia del Estado.
- INE. 2014. *Resultados: Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda 2012* [Results: Population and housing census 2012]. La Paz, Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
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- LE. 2010. *Ley de Educación Avelino Siñani-Elizardo Pérez* [Law of education Avelino Siñani-Elizardo Pérez]. La Paz, Ministerio de Educación.
- LJD. 2010. *Ley de deslinde jurisdiccional* [Law of jurisdictional demarcation]. La Paz, Ministerio de Justicia.
- LPP. 1994. *Ley de Participación Popular* [Law of popular participation]. La Paz, Lexivox.
- LPS. 2013. *Ley de participación y control social* [Law of participation and social auditing]. La Paz, Ministerio de transparencia institucional y lucha contra la corrupcion.
- LRPUEH. 2012. *Ley de regularización del derecho propietario sobre bienes inmuebles urbanos destinados a vivienda* [Law to regulate property rights over urban estates]. La Paz, Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo.

#### ***Documents from local governments (municipality of La Paz and departmental government of La Paz)***

- La Paz. 1995. *Ley Numero 1669* [Law number 1669]. La Paz, Gobierno Municipal.
- La Paz. 2006. *Atlas del municipio de La Paz* [Municipal data atlas of La Paz]. La Paz, Gobierno Municipal.
- La Paz. 2009. *Programa de Gobierno 2010-2015* [Government programme 2010-2015]. La Paz, Gobierno Municipal.

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<sup>63</sup> All these documents are also listed in the references.

La Paz. 2010. *La Paz 10 Años en cifras 2000-2009. Compendio Estadístico de Bicentario* [La Paz – ten years in numbers 2000-2009]. La Paz, Gobierno Municipal.

La Paz. 2011. *Plan Operativo Anual 2012* [Annual operational plan 2012]. La Paz, Gobierno Municipal.

La Paz. 2012. *Proyecto Carta Organica del Municipio de Nuestra Señora de La Paz* [Project of the political charter of the municipal government of La Paz]. La Paz, Gobierno Municipal.

### ***Newspaper articles***

La Razon. 2012a. *En Chasquipampa piden controlar la entrada folklórica* [In Chasquipampa they ask to control the folkloric parade]. La Paz, La Razon, 20 September 2012.

La Razon. 2012b. *Fiesta en Chasquipampa se prolonga al menos 36 horas* [The festival in Chasquipampa will be prolonged for at least 36 hours]. La Paz, La Razon, 23 September 2012.

## **2) Quito**

### ***Documents from national government***

COOTAD. 2012. *Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y Descentralización* [Organic code of territorial organisation, autonomy and decentralisation]. Quito, Presidencia de la República del Ecuador.

CPE Ecuador. 2008. *Constitución Política del Estado de Ecuador* [Political constitution of the state of Ecuador]. Quito, Asamblea Nacional de la Republica del Ecuador.

DP 2012. *Decreto Presidencial 60* [Presidential decree 60]. Quito, Presidencia de la República del Ecuador.

INEC. 2014. *Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda 2010* [Census for population and housing 2010]. Quito, Instituto Nacional de estadística y censos.

LCP. 2010. *Ley Orgánica de Participación Ciudadana* [Law of citizen participation]. Quito, Presidencia de la República del Ecuador.

LIE. 2011. *Ley Orgánica de Educación Intercultural* [Law of intercultural education]. Quito, Presidencia de la República del Ecuador.

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SENPLADES. 2009. *Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir 2009-2013* [National Plan for the good life 2009-2013]. Quito, Secretaria Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo.

***Documents from the municipality of Quito***

DMQ, Distrito Metropolitano de Quito. 2003. *Centro Histórico de Quito – Plan Especial* [Historical city centre of Quito – special plan]. Quito, Municipio de Quito.

DMQ, Distrito Metropolitano de Quito. 2011. *Quito Distrito Metropolitano: Plan Operativo 2012 y Plan Plurianual 2012-2014* [Metropolitan district of Quito: Operational plan 2012 and pluriannual plan 2012-2014]. Quito, Municipio de Quito.

DMQ, Distrito Metropolitano de Quito. 2012a. *Boletín Estadístico Mensual Noviembre* [Monthly statistical bulletin November]. Quito, Municipio de Quito.

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DMQ, Distrito Metropolitano de Quito. 2012d. *Ordenanza 0337* [Ordinance 0337]. Quito, Municipio de Quito.

***News blogs***

Bayon, M. 2013. *Interrogantes del Nuevo Aeropuerto Internacional de Quito ubicado en un área indígena del periurbano* [Interrogating Quito's new international airport situated on periurban indigenous territories]. Quito, La Ciudad Viva (9 September 2013).

### **Appendix three: Topics covered during semi-structured interviews**

Semi-structured interview questions were prepared and adjusted for each specific interviewee and this makes it impossible to provide a representative question guide. Instead, this appendix provides a sample of the participant information sheets that has been given to all interviewees in La Paz and Quito. This document – and particularly the question ‘What would I be asked to do if I take part?’ – contains a summary of the topics covered in interviews with (1) government officials, NGO staff, and members of donor organisations and (2) members of indigenous CBOs.

#### ***Sample 1: Participant information sheet for governments, NGOs, and donor organisations***

**What is the title of the research?** Indigeneity, Constitutional Changes and Urban Policies: Conflicting Realities in La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador

**Who will conduct the research?** Philipp Horn

**What is the aim of the research?** The doctoral research project aims to examine and compare the implementation process of new constitutional rights for indigenous peoples in the cities of La Paz and Quito. Therefore, it will analyse relevant practices of different actors in government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donor agencies. Complementary to this it will also examine urban indigenous peoples’ own ways to secure a living and to challenge or change the political environment that governs them.

**Why have I been chosen?** As a member of the government department, non-governmental organisation, donor agency, of (name of the institution to be provided) you represent a key person that can provide crucial information for this research.

**What would I be asked to do if I took part?** As a public stakeholder, NGO staff or donor you will be asked about your perceptions of indigenous peoples and indigenous rights. Furthermore, you will be asked to identify and describe existing policies, planning regulations and associated projects and interventions that seek to implement these indigenous rights in cities/ particular communities. You will as well be asked about the impact of these interventions on the lives of urban indigenous peoples, and how these interventions could be improved. To identify these issues you will take part in an interview on a one-to-one basis.

**What happens to the data collected?** Collected data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in Philipp Horn’s office and data in electronic formats will be password protected in a secure location during the analysis phase. Collected data will be archived after

analysis. After 10 years remaining material data will be shredded and all electronic data on laptops and USB hard drives will be wiped.

**How is confidentiality maintained?** In reporting, your anonymity will be maintained as follows: The researcher is aware that some people might provide very specific information which makes them recognisable within their organisation, community or city. To avoid the recognition of these people this research will black-out sections of text that potentially refer to recognisable information. Furthermore, confidentiality will be ensured to the highest possible degree through anonymising all information gathered from research participants. Any identifiers such as person or place names will be removed and replaced with pseudonyms. Publications of the research findings will also adopt these pseudonyms. Original names and other identifiers will be kept separately in a different location or on a different USB stick and with a different access password.

**What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?** Your participation in the study is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. Furthermore, you are allowed to decline answers to particular questions/ topics. The following will happen in the case you no longer want to take part within this research: The information that you provided will be deleted and not used in any research documents.

**Will I be paid for participating in the research?** No

**What is the duration of the research?** Participation in the interview or group work will take up to one hour.

**Where will the research be conducted?**

In public spaces located in the community and/or premises of public institutions, NGOs, or donor agencies.

**Will the outcomes of the research be published?** Yes, in forms of a PhD dissertation and potentially other publications (e.g. academic journal, book chapter, policy report etc.). The outcomes of the research will be discussed with communities and relevant officials.

**Contact for further information** Philipp Horn (Philipp.Horn@manchester.ac.uk, project mobile phone number)

**What if something goes wrong?** In case anything goes wrong, please contact the principal investigator of this research. His contact details are provided above. If you wish to make a formal complaint about the conduct of this research please contact:

Head of the Research Office, Christie Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom.

*Sample 2: Participant Information Sheet for CBOs and indigenous communities*

**What is the title of the research?** Indigeneity, Constitutional Changes and Urban Policies: Conflicting Realities in La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador

**Who will conduct the research?** Philipp Horn

**What is the aim of the research?** The doctoral research project aims to examine and compare the implementation process of the new constitutional rights for indigenous peoples in the cities of La Paz and Quito. Therefore, it will analyse relevant practices of different actors in government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donor agencies. Complementary to this it will also examine urban indigenous peoples' own ways to secure a living and to challenge or change the political environment that governs them.

**Why have I been chosen?** As a member of the selected community of (name of the community to be provided) or the community-based organisation of (name of the institution to be provided) you represent a key person that can provide crucial information for this research.

**What would I be asked to do if I took part?** As a member of the community you will be asked about your perceptions of new constitutional rights for indigenous peoples and associated interventions by public institutions, non-governmental organisations or donor agencies taking place in your community. Furthermore, you will be asked what being indigenous means for you. You will also be asked to identify the most important resources you need to live (e.g. house, land title, education, right to vote etc.). You will as well be asked what you/ the members of your household/ the members of your community/ external stakeholders are doing to access and avoid losing these resources, and what could be done to further improve access to resources. To do this you will take part in an interview on a one-to-one basis.

**What happens to the data collected?** Collected data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in Philipp Horn's office and data in electronic formats will be password protected in a secure location during the analysis phase. Collected data will be archived after analysis. After 10 years remaining material data will be shredded and all electronic data on laptops and USB hard drives will be wiped.

**How is confidentiality maintained?** In reporting, your anonymity will be maintained as follows: the researcher is aware that some people might provide very specific information which makes them recognisable within their organisation, community or city. To avoid the recognition of individuals this research will black-out sections of text that potentially refer to recognisable information. Furthermore, confidentiality will be ensured to the highest

possible degree through anonymising all information gathered from research participants. Any identifiers such as person or place names will be removed and replaced with pseudonyms. Publications of the research findings will also adopt these pseudonyms. Original names and other identifiers will be kept separately in a different location or on a different USB stick and with a different access password.

**What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?** Your participation in the study is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. Furthermore, you are allowed to decline answers to particular questions / topics. If you should no longer wish to take part in this research, then the information that you have already provided will be deleted and not used in any research documents.

**Will I be paid for participating in the research?** No

**What is the duration of the research?** Participation in the interview or group work will take up to one hour.

**Where will the research be conducted?** In public spaces located in the community and/or premises of community-based organisations.

**Will the outcomes of the research be published?** Yes, in the form of a PhD dissertation, and potentially other publications (eg academic journals, a book chapter or policy report etc.). The outcomes of the research will be discussed with communities and relevant officials.

**Contact for further information** Philipp Horn (Philipp.Horn@manchester.ac.uk, project mobile phone number)

**What if something goes wrong?**

In case anything goes wrong, please contact the principal investigator of this research. His contact details are provided above. If you wish to make a formal complaint about the conduct of this research please contact:

Head of the Research Office, Christie Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom.

## Appendix four: List of Semi-Structured Interviews

### Semi-Structured Interviews with Academics in La Paz, Bolivia

Code	Name	Background	Recorded (Yes/No, field notes)	Duration (minutes)	Date
1EB	Godofredo Sandoval	Academic	No, field notes	NA	17 September 2012
2EB	Eduardo Acevedo	Academic	No, field notes	NA	18 September 2012
3EB	Xavier Albo	Academic	Yes	82	14 October 2013
4EB	Raul Prada and Victor Hugo Quintanilla	Activist academics	Yes	59	30 January 2013

### Semi-Structured Interviews with Academics in Quito, Ecuador

Code	Name	Background	Recorded (Yes/ No, field notes)	Duration (in minutes)	Date
1EE	Jose Yanez de Posa	Activist academic	Yes	54	9 April 2013
2EE	Eduardo Kingman	Academic	Yes	38	19 April 2013
3EE	Ileana Almeida	Activist academic	Yes	82	14 May 2013

**Semi-structured Interviews with government officials, NGO staff, and members of donor organisations in La Paz, Bolivia**

Code	Institution	Position	Recorded (Yes/ No, field notes)	Duration (minutes)	Date
1GB	Intercultural coordination unit (Municipal government La Paz)	Director	Yes	47	10 October 2012
2GB	Oxfam	NGO worker	Yes	25	6 November 2012
3GB	Development planning unit (Municipal government La Paz)	Project coordinator	Yes	49	14 November 2012
4GB	Development planning unit (Municipal government La Paz)	Director	Yes	72	16 November 2012
5GB	Territorial planning unit (Municipal government La Paz)	Senior civil servant	Yes	36	16 November 2012
6GB	District municipality South (Municipal government La Paz)	Civil servant	Yes	19	27 November 2012
7GB	District municipality South (Municipal government La Paz)	Civil servant	Yes	30	27 November 2012
8GB	Participation unit (Municipal government La Paz)	Director	Yes	43	27 November 2012
9GB	UNITAS, Urban Programme (NGO)	Programme director	Yes	65	29 November 2012
10GB	Human development unit (Municipal government La Paz)	Civil servant	Yes	43	6 December 2012
11GB	Human development unit (Municipal government La Paz)	Director	Yes	36	7 December 2012
12GB	Territorial planning unit (Municipal government La Paz)	Civil servant	Yes	45	10 December 2012
13GB	National Office of the Ombudsman (National government Bolivia)	Senior civil servant	Yes	43	11 December 2011
14GB	Ministry of Culture (National government Bolivia)	Senior civil servant	Yes	46	9 January 2013
15GB	PADEM Bolivia (NGO)	Project coordinator	Yes	37	9 January 2013
16GB	GIZ (donor organisation)	Project coordinator	Yes	40	10 January 2013
17GB	Ministry of Culture (National government Bolivia)	Senior civil servant	Yes	22	11 January 2013
18GB	Ministry of Education (National government of Bolivia)	Senior civil servant	Yes	40	14 January 2013
19GB	Ministry of Justice (National government Bolivia)	Deputy minister	Yes	31	15 January 2013

<b>Code</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Recorded (Yes/ No, field notes)</b>	<b>Duration (minutes)</b>	<b>Date</b>
20GB	Bolivian Parliament (National government Bolivia)	Member of Parliament, representing MAS	Yes	49	15 January 2013
21GB	Ministry of Autonomies (National government of Bolivia)	Deputy minister	Yes	46	16 January 2013
22GB	Ministry of Autonomies (National government of Bolivia)	Senior civil servant	Yes	36	16 January 2013
23GB	Municipal government Palca	Civil servant	Yes	58	17 January 2013
24GB	Ministry for Public Services and Housing (National government Bolivia)	Deputy Minister	Yes	27	17 January 2013
25GB	Ministry for Public Services and Housing (National government Bolivia)	Senior civil servant	Yes	35	17 January 2013
26GB	Municipal government Palca	Mayor	Yes	72	18 January 2013
27GB	Ministry of Culture (National government Bolivia)	Deputy minister	Yes	25	21 January 2013
28GB	Social Development Unit (Departmental Government La Paz)	Senior civil servant	Yes	21	21 January 2013
29GB	Planning Unit (Departmental Government La Paz)	Director	Yes	20	21 January 2013

**Semi-structured Interviews with government officials, NGO staff, and members of donor organisations in Quito, Ecuador**

Code	Institution	Position	Recorded (Yes/ No, field notes)	Duration	Date
1GE	Territorial planning unit (Municipality of Quito)	Civil servant	Yes	26	22 March 2013
2GE	CODENPE (National government Ecuador)	Director	Yes	35	9 April 2013
3GE	Heifer International (NGO)	Director	Yes	43	2 May 2013
4GE	Ministry of Education (National government Ecuador)	Senior civil servant	Yes	44	7 May 2013
5GE	Development planning unit (Municipality of Quito)	Director	Yes	63	10 May 2013
6GE	National Secretary of Peoples (National government Ecuador)	Senior civil servant	Yes	50	16 May 2013
7GE	Participation unit (Municipality of Quito)	Director	Yes	48	21 May 2013
8GE	Territorial planning unit (Municipality of Quito)	Director	Yes	51	22 May 2013
9GE	Healthcare Unit (Municipality of Quito)	Director	Yes	36	23 May 2013
10GE	Planning unit (Local government of Pichincha)	Director	Yes	33	23 May 2013
11GE	Community development centre San Diego (Municipality of Quito)	Social worker	Yes	20	27 May 2013
12GE	District administration Manuel Saenz (Municipality of Quito)	Director	Yes	36	27 May 2013
13GE	Municipal housing enterprise (Municipality of Quito)	Director	Yes	54	29 May 2013
14GE	District administration Calderon (Municipality of Quito)	Director	Yes	44	29 May 2013
15GE	Ministry for the Coordination of Patrimony (National government Ecuador)	Senior civil servant	Yes	30	5 June 2013
16GE	Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (National government Ecuador)	Senior civil servant	Yes	56	5 June 2013
17GE	Ministry of Health (National government Ecuador)	Senior civil servant	Yes	66	6 June 2013
18GE	GIZ (donor organisation)	Programme director	Yes	43	10 June 2013
19GE	SENPLADES (National government Ecuador)	Senior civil servant	Yes	60	10 June 2013
20GE	Social inclusion unit (Municipality of Quito)	Civil servant	Yes	29	11 June 2013
21GE	GIZ (donor organisation)	Programme director	No, field notes	NA	12 June 2013
22GE	Ministry of Justice (National government Ecuador)	Senior civil servant	Yes	38	13 June 2013
23GE	Commercial unit (Municipality of Quito)	Civil servant	Yes	42	10 July 2013
24GE	Cultural unit (Municipality of Quito)	Director	Yes	43	16 July 2013

**Semi-structured Interviews with representatives of indigenous CBOs in La Paz, Bolivia**

Code	Pseudonym	CBO background	Recorded (Yes/No, field notes)	Duration	Date
1IB	Nico	JJVV in Pumakatari	Yes	92	18 October 2012
2IB	Luciano	JJVV in Pumakatari	Yes	52	25 October 2012
3IB	Pascual	JJVV in Pumakatari and “Fraternidad Morenada Union Central Puma”	Yes	61	1 November 2012
4IB	Jorge	Indigenous peasant union in Litoral	Yes	40	6 November 2012
5IB	Jose	JJVV Pumakatari and “Fraternidad Morenada Union Central Puma”	Yes	38	12 November 2012
6IB	Arturo	JJVV in Litoral	Yes	31	15 November 2012
7IB	Francisco	JJVV Pumakatari, an indigenous peasant union in Litoral and “Fraternidad Morenada Union Central Puma”	Yes	75	19 November 2012
8IB	Diana	“Fraternidad Morenada Union Central Puma” and parental association in Pumakatari	Yes	40	19 November 2012
9IB	Pedro	JJVV in Litoral	Yes	50	5 December 2012
10IB	Maria	JJVV in Litoral	No, field notes	NA	7 December 2012
11IB	Arturo	FEJUVE La Paz	Yes	20	11 December 2012
12IB	Alberto	Indigenous Forum La Paz	Yes	42	12 December 2012
13IB	Roberto	NA, resident in Pumakatari	Yes	43	24 January 2012
14IB	Carlos	Indigenous peasant union in Litoral	Yes	21	30 January

### Semi-structured Interviews with indigenous CBO representatives in Quito, Ecuador

Code	Pseudonym	CBO Background	Recorded (Yes/No, field notes)	Duration	Date
1IE	Oscar	RUNAKUY	No, field notes	NA	8 April 2013
2IE	Orlando	AVIC-Q	Yes	50	10 April 2013
3IE	Raul	AECT-Q, Pachamama College.	Yes	114	27 April 2013
4IE	Rebecca	Cabildo Llano Grande	Yes	60	16 April 2013
5IE	Enrique	Cabildo Llano Grande	Yes	97	30 April 2013
6IE	Natalia	AVIC-Q	Yes	51	18 April 2013
7IE	Daniel	FEIPRI	Yes	39	23 April 2013
8IE	Jaime	Cabildo of the commune San Miguel del Comun	Yes	86	25 April 2013
9IE	Rodrigo	AECT-Q	Yes	23	26 April 2013
10IE	Manuel	NA, architect advising AECT-Q, AVIC-Q, Inti Mama	No, field notes	NA	2 May 2013
11IE	Feliciano	Inti Mama	No, field notes	NA	5 May 2013
12IE	Juan	AECT-Q	Yes	45	8 May 2013
13IE	Juan Carlos	AECT-Q, Pachamama College,	Yes	49	10 May 2013
14IE	Ricardo	AECT-Q	Yes	55	11 May 2013
15IE	Freddy	Cabildo of the commune Oyambaro	Yes	58	28 May 2013
16IE	Jose	AECT-Q, Pachamama college	Yes	40	4 June 2013
17IE	Luis	Cabildo of the commune Agila	Yes	42	6 June 2013