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Indigenous peoples, the city and inclusive urban development policies in Latin America: Lessons from Bolivia and Ecuador

Philipp Horn

Abstract

The historical construction of indigeneity as essentially rural policy category represents a key cause for the ongoing exclusion of urban indigenous peoples and blocks progress in delivering Agenda 2030 in Latin American cities. Even in Bolivia and Ecuador where urban indigeneity is recognised through constitutional reforms there are obstacles to the delivery of policies shaped to urban indigenous interests. By reviewing experiences from these countries, this article highlights that policy delivery problems are a result of multiple factors, including (1) rural constructions of indigeneity, (2) conflicting development priorities, and (3) difficulties in promoting universal rights while simultaneously guaranteeing indigenous rights. The article concludes with policy recommendations for more inclusive urban development approaches which leave no indigenous person behind.

Key words: Indigenous Peoples, cities, urban development, Agenda 2030, Bolivia, Ecuador

1 Introduction

Agenda 2030 outlined in the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) promotes equitable and inclusive urban development which leaves no one behind. A key challenge for achieving Agenda 2030 in the Latin American context is the urban indigenous issue. More than 30% of the region’s indigenous peoples (IPs) lived in cities in 2000 and this number is likely to increase to 50% by 2030 (UN Habitat, 2010). IPs are disproportionately poorer than non-indigenous urban residents (del Popolo et al, 2009). They lack secure tenure rights, access to basic services like water and sanitation, and live in less secure and more disaster-prone neighbourhoods (World Bank, 2015).

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In addition, they are excluded from specific indigenous rights-based development agendas that have been rolled out throughout Latin America since the 1990s (Speiser, 2004).

This article highlights that the historical construction of indigeneity as essentially a rural phenomenon represents a key cause for the ongoing exclusion of urban IPs and thereby blocks progress in delivering Agenda 2030 on inclusive urban development in Latin America. It also reveals that even when urban indigeneity is recognised discursively through constitutional reform – as was done in Bolivia and Ecuador in 2009 and 2008 respectively – there are multiple obstacles to the delivery of policies that are shaped to the needs and interests of urban IPs. This policy delivery problem is a result of a variety of factors, including (1) prior constructions of indigeneity as an essentially rural category, (2) political and economic development priorities which conflict with indigenous interests and needs, and (3) difficulties in promoting access to universal rights and services while simultaneously guaranteeing IPs access to collective rights. The review of inclusive urban development obstacles is qualified through a discussion of different interventions which address specific urban indigenous rights, interests and needs. Hence, in the context of Agenda 2030, this article is timely as it illustrates not only regional but also country and city-specific challenges, barriers, and opportunities for implementing an inclusive urban development agenda so that no urban indigenous person is left behind.

The article is structured as follows: The first substantive section offers a historical review of the relevant academic and policy literature on indigeneity, development policies and the city. Drawing on a qualitative case study approach, the second substantive section investigates the causal factors (perceptions, personal views, interests etc) that shape how actors involved in urban governance in La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador translate the contents of new constitutions which promote to address urban IPs interests and needs. This part of the article draws on in-depth qualitative research undertaken in La Paz and Quito between 2012 and 2013, involving multiple qualitative methods, including: 92 interviews with national and local government officials, international co-operation experts, and indigenous residents, complemented with content analysis of relevant policy documents, participatory focus groups and participant observation in public meetings. La Paz and Quito were selected as case studies due to their status as seats of the national government, allowing access to key actors and institutions at the national and local level. Both cities also represent urban indigenous centres of their countries.²

² According to recent census data (INE, 2012), La Paz has approximately 764,617 inhabitants out of which 219,535 (29% of the city’s population) self-identified as indigenous. In total, 5% of Bolivia’s indigenous and 12% of Bolivia’s urban IPs live in La Paz (INE, 2012). In contrast, Quito has approximately 1.6 million inhabitants out of which 150,000 (7% of the city’s population) self-identify as indigenous. In total, 10% of Ecuador’s indigenous and 25% of Ecuador’s urban IPs live in Quito (INEC, 2012). Despite the fact that census
The focus on two case studies means that analysis is comparative. The comparative rationale is two-fold - within-case and between-case. Firstly, for each city, within-case comparisons help demonstrating how different actors involved in urban governance address urban indigenous interests and needs differently through policy interventions. In the context of La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador – where governments promoted a ‘return of the state’ (Elwood et al, 2016) – urban governance is mainly influenced by national and local governments and less by non-state institutions. Therefore, emphasis is put predominantly on the practices of actors in national and local governments. Following Watson (2013: 95), actors in urban governance have ‘agency, may be part of broader actor-coalitions, or work within a fragmented and possibly contradictory policy environment.’ As will be shown through in-depth empirical illustrations, these factors help explaining why specific constitutional contents on urban indigeneity are not always translated into policy practice. The between-case comparison follows the logic of a variation-finding method (Tilly, 1989). Hence, variations in findings between the cases are mainly assessed in relation to the unique processes and factors that shape how urban indigeneity is addressed in policies within each city.

Drawing on the findings from this comparative analysis, the final section provides policy recommendations for a more inclusive urban development agenda which leaves no urban indigenous person behind.

2 Indigeneity, development, and the city: A policy gap in Latin America
The central focus of this article is on indigeneity and its role in urban development policies. According to Radcliffe (2015: 2) indigeneity can be understood ‘as the socio-spatial processes and practices whereby Indigenous people and places are determined as distinct (ontologically, epistemologically, culturally, in sovereignty, etc.) to dominant universals.’ Indigeneity in this sense is a processual and dynamic category which is co-produced through multiple structural and agential forces and changes in meaning across time and space. When tracing such changes, it is important to explore ‘how, from what, by whom, and for what’ reasons indigeneity was understood and addressed differently in urban policy discourse and practice in distinct moments of time and space (Castells, 1997: 7).

Even though an increasingly urban phenomenon, policy discourse and practice often remains guided by an essentially rural understanding of indigeneity. This problem has its roots in the colonial conquest – the moment in which indigeneity was established as social category and as anti-thesis to urban life. The Spanish colonisers divided Latin American societies into distinct Spanish and ‘Indian’ republics (Bengoa, 2007). The former granted rights to its primarily ‘white’ Spaniard urban citizenry, data should be treated with caution, these figures suggest that La Paz and Quito represent important urban indigenous centres of their respective countries.

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whilst the latter was maintained through a ‘pact of reciprocity’ whereby the native population (classified as ‘indians’) had to pay a tribute to the colonisers to maintain a plot of rural land (Platt, 1982). ‘Indians’ were denied citizenship and often not allowed to inhabit cities. Instead, they served in semi-feudal conditions as peasants or miners (Klor de Alva, 1992). Hence, being part of the ‘indian’ republic meant to be set apart and excluded economically, socially, politically, culturally, and spatially from other ethno-racial groups and social castes.

Indigeneity shifted in meaning from a category associated with rurality and exclusion to one associated with citizenship, development and urban space in modern Latin American history. This became particularly evident in the early 20th century when modernisation became the popular development discourse. Modernisation re-valued the status of IPs by emphasising and idealising the mixed biological and cultural heritage (mestizaje) of all Latin Americans who were granted universal rights (Canessa, 2006). It also shifted the focus from ethnicity to class, abolished semi-feudal working conditions, and introduced land reform policies (Albó, 2005). Development models that followed modernisation discourse have been rolled out throughout Latin America, including in Mexico (after the Mexican revolution in 1913), Bolivia (after the Bolivian revolution in 1952), and Ecuador (as part of land reforms in 1964 and 1970).

A consequence of the above reforms was that rural IPs increasingly migrated to cities. For example, in Bolivia only 5% of IPs lived in cities at the beginning of the 20th century; increasing to more than 20% by the mid-1950s (Klein, 2011). This shift was largely due to agricultural reforms that freed IPs from semi-feudal conditions and allowed them to move freely (Lazar, 2008). Urbanisation was also an outcome of land reform failures where IPs could not sustain a living on the plots of land allocated to them. They increasingly engaged in processes of split-migration, meaning that some household members stayed in the countryside while others moved to cities in search of work (Albó et al, 1981).

The indigenous move towards the city has been studied by scholars who focused less on the specific interests and needs of IPs but more on the resulting rise of new poor urban settlements in the periphery of Latin American cities. For example, writing on Lima, Peru Matos Mar (1957) discussed the precarious living conditions of new urban indigenous migrants who initially settled in densely populated colonial houses in the peripheries of the colonial centre. He also explored how, at later stages, IPs started occupying land in the growing unplanned urban peripheries – barriadas in the context of Peru (see also Turner, 1968) – where they self-constructed their homes. Similar tendencies have been observed in Bolivia (Albó et al, 1983) and Ecuador (Zaaijer, 1991).
Other studies focused more on processes of indigenous identity transformation occurring with urbanisation. Guided by modernisation and cultural assimilation theories, such research held the assumption that characteristics associated with indigeneity, such as non-Western tradition or exclusion, would lose their hold in the city (van den Berghe 1974). Later studies challenged such assumptions around identity transformation and the disappearance of indigeneity in the city. They revealed how IPs themselves had not fully integrated into urban culture but adapted distinct urban ethnic identities – referred to, for example, as cholos and mestizos in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru or ladinos in Guatemala. For example, writing on indigenous mestizos in Cuzco, Peru, de la Cadena (2000) shows how urban indigenous migrants strategically fused forms of community organisation associated with ‘traditional’ rural indigenous communities and ‘modern’ cities. Similarly, writing on Bolivia, Rivera Cusicanqui (2010) highlights that indigenous migrant women, even when adopting many Western cultural characteristics, created their own distinct urban indigenous cholo identity which is perhaps most visible in their particular clothing style – a wide skirt, the Manila shawl, and the Borsalino hat.

The process of preserving and revitalising one’s indigenous identity became more explicit in rural and urban Latin America from the late 1970s until the early 2000s. In this period, it was possible to observe a return of the ‘Indian’ as self-identifying indigenous person and rights-bearing subject. The recognition of specific indigenous rights, however, did not occur in urban but only in rural areas – places conventionally associated with indigeneity. In a context of economic crisis and failed land reforms rural IPs, with support from the church, academics or non-governmental organisations, questioned their peasant class status, revitalised ethnic identities, formed indigenous movements and lobbied for specific indigenous rights (Andolina et al, 2009; Korovkin, 2006; Marti i Puig, 2010; Sieder, 2012). Rural indigenous movements put pressure on national governments but also approached international organisations which from the late 1980s onwards followed a rights-based approach to development and recognised indigenous rights in new legislation like the 1989 ILO 169 Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Marschke et al, 2008; Molyneux and Lazar, 2003). Responding to internal and international pressure, Latin American governments started incorporating indigenous rights – eg recognition of indigenous languages, bi-lingual education, respect to govern and manage rural ancestral territories – through constitutional reforms. This process started in Colombia (1991) followed by other countries like Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994), Ecuador (1999) and Venezuela (1999) (Sieder, 2012). These political reforms are generally referred to as the neoliberal multicultural model (Andolina et al, 2009; van Cott, 2000).

The indigenous ‘traditional’ and non-indigenous ‘modern’ dichotomy has been increasingly criticised as too simplistic and misleading. For a critical and up-to-date discussion of this topic see Germond-Duret (2016).

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This new indigenous development model had its limitations – particularly in the process of implementation and in its spatial application. Governments and donor bodies prioritised addressing universal development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – predecessors of the SGDs – over specific indigenous rights (Comim, 2015; Telles, 2007). Others highlighted how Latin American governments, guided by a neoliberal development agenda, prioritised addressing capitalist interests, such as private sector investments in rural territories, over protecting indigenous territorial rights (Andolina et al, 2009). This led to ongoing socio-economic hardship amongst rural IPs and further stimulated rural-to-urban migration (Bengoa, 2007). In addition, push factors for rural-to-urban migration included declines in agricultural activities due to climatic events like droughts (particularly in Bolivia and Peru) and armed conflict (particularly in Colombia and Central America). Pull factors included access to employment and educational opportunities available within cities.

Within cities, IPs remained excluded from new indigenous rights-based development agendas. A common explanation for this phenomenon is that government and donor institutions responsible for implementing indigenous rights still associated indigeneity with rurality because (1) indigenous mobilisation initially took place within the countryside and (2) officials within these institutions conceived of IPs as ‘traditional’ rural subjects (Speiser, 2004; UN Habitat, 2010). In addition, urban IPs confronted distinct problems in cities – discrimination, unemployment, missing basic services etc – which were not addressed in existing indigenous rights agendas (Rivera Cusicanqui, 2010). The focus of most of the literature on urban indigeneity was precisely on providing a description of urban IPs particular problems. For example, in studies on Bolivia (Lazar, 2008), Ecuador (Colloredo-Mansfeld, 2009; Kingman, 2012), or Mexico (Oehmichen, 2001), urban IPs are described to be working in precarious conditions in the informal sector as market vendors, food carriers, folkloric artisans, builders, or domestic workers. While a minority manages to generate a high income from such activities and forms a new urban indigenous bourgeoisie (Tassi, 2010), the majority earns just enough to survive in the city and remains trapped in poverty or extreme poverty (del Popolo et al, 2009). This situation worsened when municipal governments across the region introduced neoliberal reform policies and privatised core public services such as water and gas (Assies, 2003; Perreault, 2006).

In this difficult situation, urban IPs increasingly revitalised and mobilised around ethnic identities. They seemingly questioned their belonging to an urban class in a context of economic hardship, absence of the state, and ongoing discrimination towards them. They therefore returned to their ethnic identity and revitalised indigenous traditions and practices in the urban context (Canessa 2006). This trend is particularly noteworthy in Bolivia and Ecuador. Writing on the Bolivian
city of El Alto, Lazar (2008) showed how IPs developed a new form of urban indigenous politics within neighbourhood organisations in which they reproduced rural indigenous governance principles such as leadership rotation or collective work schemes in the context of their neighbourhoods. Additionally, writing on urban Guaraní organisations in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, Postero (2006) showed how urban IPs not only relied on rural logics in internal urban organisational processes but claimed official recognition of their customs and habits in municipal participation processes. Goldstein (2004), writing on Cochabamba, showed how IPs relied on principles of indigenous community justice to cope with urban insecurity in the context of an absent state. For Quito, Colloredo-Mansfeld (2009) and Kingman (2012) described how indigenous homeland associations became meeting points for indigenous migrants; within these associations they discussed community politics but also organised festivals which helped them to bring rural traditions and dances back to the city.

The above practices not only represent a revitalisation of indigenous community and traditions in an urban context. They also reveal that urban IPs developed their own political voice. This became evident from the 2000s onwards when urban IPs – in alliance with popular urban classes, rural peasants, miners, and rural indigenous movements – formed part of large-scale urban protests such as the 2000 Water War in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Assies, 2003), the 2003 Gas War in La Paz/ El Alto, Bolivia (Perreault, 2006), or civic uprisings occurring in Quito, Ecuador in the early 2000s (Becker, 2011; Colloredo-Mansfeld, 2009). During these events, urban IPs protested against neoliberal reform policies but also contested to be recognised as IPs with distinct interests and needs in cities. A consequence of these events was the ousting of pro-neoliberal governments in 2003 (Bolivia) and 2005 (Ecuador).

After a transition period, new left-wing governments, led by Presidents Evo Morales and Rafael Correa, were elected respectively in 2005 and 2006. Shortly after, the governments ratified new constitutions which introduced a post-neoliberal and pro-indigenous development model which is framed around principles of Vivir Bien (Bolivia) and Buen Vivir (Ecuador) (in English: living well). According to Gudynas (2011), Vivir Bien/ Buen Vivir originates in indigenous worldviews; it emphasises that humans and nature should co-exist in harmony and that collective interests are prioritised over individual needs. Furthermore, both constitutions recognise that development can only occur if the interests and needs of historically marginalised IPs are respected in intercultural policies. They thereby not only recognise indigeneity in rural areas but also in cities. The Ecuadorian constitution, for example, recognises that indigenous rights, interests and needs have to be addressed in urban development and housing (article 375) (ANRE, 2008). Similarly, Bolivia’s constitution recognises cities as urban intercultural communities composed of indigenous and other
ethno-racial groups (VEPB, 2009: article 18). Within cities and elsewhere, the interests and needs of these groups should be addressed through an intercultural education and healthcare system (VEPB, 2009: articles 17, 18). A growing literature explores the implementation of new constitutional contents around indigeneity. Yet, until this point, the majority of these studies investigated advances and ongoing problems in implementing this new development agenda in rural areas, as opposed to cities (Elwood et al, 2016; Escobar, 2010; McNeish, 2013; Tockman and Cameron, 2014; Walsh, 2010).

In short, indigeneity became an increasingly urban phenomenon. Despite these spatial shifts, indigenous rights-based development agendas remain guided by an essentially rural understanding of indigeneity, leaving urban IPs trapped in a situation of exclusion. In such a context, it is unlikely that the SDGs around inclusive cities which leave no one, including urban IPs, behind will be achieved in Latin America. Bolivia and Ecuador are potential exceptions. While current governments in these countries started to address urban indigeneity discursively through constitutional reforms, the translation of constitutional contents into urban policy interventions has so far received hardly any attention. The remainder of this article addresses this knowledge gap.

3 Indigeneity and urban policies in La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador

According to Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s constitutions, indigenous interests and needs should be addressed in urban policies. Yet, what are urban indigenous interests and needs? Urban IPs in both cities are highly heterogeneous, representing migrants who came to the city from the countryside and comuneros (IPs with ancestral roots to territories which have been by urban expansion) of different ages and genders.

In La Paz, migrants and comuneros predominantly live in self-constructed houses in peripheral neighbourhoods characterised by worse access to basic services like water and sanitation than more central non-indigenous neighbourhoods (Arbona and Kohl, 2005; La Paz, 2010). Particularly in the South of the city, new peripheral settlements were built on the territories of previously rural indigenous communities which, according to land reforms occurring in the 1950s and 1990s, received the rights to govern and manage their territories collectively and in relative autonomy (Espinoza, 2004). These new peripheral settlements are, hence, composed by (1) comuneros who lost parts of their territories as consequence of urbanisation and (2) indigenous migrants who bought small plots in these areas from land speculators – often without formal recognition from the municipal government of La Paz. In Quito, indigenous migrants initially settled in eastern parts of today’s historical city centre where they live in densely populated, dilapidated colonial houses which

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4 The interests and needs of urban IPs in both cities are discussed in detail in Horn (2015). The short summary presented here draws predominantly on this study.

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lack access to water and sanitation services (Kingman, 2012). In search for better housing, IPs increasingly relocated to growing peripheral neighbourhoods in the South or North of the city. Here, they either rented a house or constructed their own homes on land which had been bought illegally from land speculators. In 2012, the municipality of Quito reported that approximately 45,000 houses, comprising 180,000 residents, in more ‘indigenous’ peripheral neighbourhoods in the North lacked access to a land title, water, and sanitation services (DMQ, 2012a). Quito is also home to 24 communes – previously rural indigenous communities which according to the 1937 Law of Communes have semi-autonomous status and the right to govern their territories – which have been affected by urban expansion and are now situated within urban and suburban territories controlled by the municipal government of Quito (DMQ, 2012b).

In both cities, IPs generally shared in common that they expressed particular interests and needs. They wanted to enjoy modern amenities (basic services, education, employment etc) available in the city. At the same time, they wanted to preserve or reinvent some ancestral traditions. These interests and needs were articulated through claims around land and the use of urban space. Independent of their background, most IPs in both cities highlighted their desire to receive tenure rights. This was seen as a pre-condition for gaining access to public services like water, sanitation and electricity.

While indigenous migrants in both cities as well as comuneros in Quito demanded individual tenure rights from their respective municipal governments, comuneros in La Paz – affected by the urbanisation of their territories - also sought to regain recognition for collective land rights granted to them as consequence of land reforms in the 1950s and 1990s. In addition, comuneros in both cities perceived themselves as ancestral residents of their territories and, in line with international and national indigenous rights legislation, claimed rights to political autonomy and prior consultation about interventions taking place on their territory. Furthermore, in both cities IPs associated urban space with the possibility to exercise cultural practices. Elderly migrants and comuneros often referred to their right to hold folkloric festivals in urban public spaces as this allows them to preserve ancestral traditions which they brought from the countryside to the city. In contrast, younger IPs fused indigenous traditions with modern urban culture. For example, in La Paz youngsters mixed Aymara with Spanish urban slang during HipHop shows on the streets of their neighbourhoods. In addition to claims around land and the cultural use of urban space, most IPs approached in both cities demanded to receive bi-lingual and intercultural education which respects and addresses their cultures, traditions and distinct histories within the city in which they live.
Crucially, in both cities, government authorities did not always undertake policy interventions that matched such interests and needs. The reasons for these policy delivery gaps varied within and between La Paz and Quito.

### 3.1 Urban indigeneity and policy practice in La Paz

Despite a moderate recognition of urban indigenous interests and needs in Bolivia’s constitution, legal rhetoric and associated policy practices remained guided by an essentially rural understanding of indigeneity. This meant that specific indigenous rights, interests and needs were not always addressed in La Paz. Bolivia’s head of the Vice Ministry of Decolonisation, part of the Ministry of Cultures, provides some insight as to why this was the case:

> In cities where modernity has been developed we respect private property and individual rights according to the liberal model. By contrast in rural areas and particularly in our indigenous territories we subordinate individualism to collective indigenous rights.

Despite being responsible for the decolonisation of Bolivian politics, this official actually replicated spatialised understandings of identity and development established since colonial times which associated indigeneity and ‘tradition’ with rurality but not with ‘modern’ cities. Such sentiments were shared by many national government officials and municipal staff in La Paz. It is therefore not surprising that legal discourse around indigeneity remained restricted to rural areas. This rural bias is already visible in the new Bolivian constitution. While recognising urban indigeneity and urban indigenous interests and needs, the constitution restricts specific indigenous rights – for territorial autonomy, prior consultation, and indigenous justice – to so called indigenous native peasants (INPs) (VEPB, 2009: article 30.1). Fontana (2014) argued that by defining IPs through the INP category, Bolivia’s constitutional assembly sought to create synergies between different rural indigenous movements which mobilise around their indigenous, native or peasant status. Hence, urban IPs are not forming part of this category (see also Albro, 2010; Goldstein, 2012). This trend became also visible in the most recent census undertaken in 2012 where indigenous self-identification fell from 62% in 2001 to 41% in 2012. Indigenous self-identification particularly decreased in cities. For example, while more than 50% of La Paz’s residents identified as indigenous in 2001, it was only 29% in 2012. Tamburini (2013) explained this variation by the fact that the government did not include the category of mestizo into the self-identification question. Instead, it only asked people whether they self-identify as INPs. According to Schavelzon (2014), the grammatical combination of indigenous, native, and peasant, most likely stopped many urban indigenous residents – who departed from a peasant lifestyle and articulated new urban ethnic identities – from self-identifying as indigenous in the census. In a context where the government
strategically defines indigeneity as rural category and where consequently less urban residents identify as indigenous, it is not surprising that the majority of new laws (for autonomy, indigenous justice and participation) only address indigenous rights in rural areas (see table 1).

### Table 1: Bolivian national legislation, indigeneity, and the city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Key contents</th>
<th>Recognition of urban indigeneity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law of Autonomies and Decentralisation (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2010)</td>
<td>• Introduces autonomous indigenous original peasant territories as new local government entity in rural territories.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law of Participation and Social Auditing (Ministerio de transparencia institucional y lucha contra la corrupción, 2013)</td>
<td>• Defines mechanisms of participation and social control for central and decentralised government units.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law of jurisdictional demarcation (Ministerio de Justicia, 2010)</td>
<td>• Restricts the application of indigenous justice to rural spaces inhabited by INPs;</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law to regulate property rights over urban estates and housing (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2012)</td>
<td>• Establishes criteria for formalisation of tenure; • Only recognises individual land ownership within cities.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law of Education ‘Avelino Sinani –’</td>
<td>• Introduces new intercultural, intracultural &amp; plurilingual</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on content analysis undertaken by the author

New legislation on cities – places generally conceived of as non-indigenous, western, and modern – also fails to recognise the issue of indigeneity. This was evident for the 2012 law to regulate property rights over urban estates and housing (LRPRUEH) which – guided by western property models – recognises individual but not collective tenure rights. While this law indirectly addresses some of the interests of indigenous migrants in La Paz who wanted individual tenure, it ignores the demand of urban indigenous comuneros in La Paz who want to preserve collective territorial rights in a context of urban expansion.

The only national law which did not restrict the application of indigenous rights to rural areas was Bolivia’s new law on intercultural education. This law emphasised addressing the cultural needs of IPs wherever they lived. However, a discrepancy appeared between legal discourse and practices to implement intercultural education in cities like La Paz. During focus groups and interviews, indigenous residents in La Paz complained about the absence of Aymara-speaking teachers and highlighted that school teachers and municipal government staff often refused to address them in their language. A senior civil servant in the ministry of education explained the reason for this – urban areas are again conceived of as non-indigenous territories:

Our teachers follow a territorial principle when offering intercultural education. This means that if they are in Aymara territory they teach the Aymara language and values. If there is a Guarani in this territory it is the responsibility of the parents to teach this child the Guarani language. In cities people mainly speak Spanish so our teachers find that it is not necessary to teach indigenous languages.

In its urban policy and planning agenda, La Paz’s municipal government – governed by a political party in opposition to President Evo Morales’s political party Movement Towards Socialism – followed newly ratified or previously established national legislation. This meant that specific indigenous rights, interests and needs often remained unaddressed. A civil servant working in La Paz’s development planning unit and responsible for citizen participation, for example, explained why specific indigenous organisations were not invited to official participation processes:
The new law of participation defines what we urban municipalities should do. Like the 1994 Law of Popular Participation it focuses on participatory budgeting processes for infrastructure provisioning which involve residents organised in neighbourhood associations [juntas de vecinos].\(^5\) Evo Morales’s national government does not say anything about how to specifically involve indigenous residents in cities. Therefore, we do not involve specific indigenous organisations.

In other policy sectors, such as land management, the municipal government followed the LRPRUEH and did not recognise specific indigenous territorial rights claimed by comuneros. The director of La Paz’s spatial planning unit explained this decision: ‘I know that in some peripheral neighbourhoods’ IPs have ancestral connections to their land but we cannot grant them collective tenure rights. They can claim these rights in the countryside but in our city we only provide individual land titles’. This decision was not only made because policy makers held a rural understanding of indigeneity or simply followed constitutional guidelines and national legislation which restricted collective land ownership to rural INP territories. It was also made because the municipal government sought to expand its political control over territories affected by urban expansion. This was made explicit by a senior planner and advisor to the mayor of La Paz:

La Paz grew physically and now has new neighbourhoods. These areas are affected by urban expansion. The new people that settled there have different demands than the original indigenous owners of these lands. Only our municipality can address the interests of our new urban residents. By providing them with tenure rights they become part of our jurisdiction and eventually this will allow us to take full political control over governing these neighbourhoods.

Addressing conflicts between universal and specific group rights in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, hence, represented an ideological, legal, and political problem in La Paz to which municipal authorities have not found or did not intend to find practical solutions.

Municipal authorities did address indigenous interests and needs in other policy sectors such as housing or urban infrastructure provisioning. A member of staff in La Paz’s development planning unit, for example, stated:

The national government talks about indigenous people and the city in the constitution but does not really introduce new laws to direct our work. With no new legislation, we address our own local political priorities. We do not follow Morales’s indigenous Bolivianism.

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\(^5\) The 1994 Law of Popular Participation not only recognises neighbourhood associations but also regional grassroots organisations (organizaciones territoriales de base – OTBs) – including indigenous organisations – who should be involved in participatory processes according to their customs and habits (Postero, 2006). Yet, as highlighted by Rivera Cusicanqui (2010), in practice OTBs are only recognised in rural indigenous territories and not in cities.
city, we roll out interventions which improve the quality of life of all residents including indigenous ones. We offer housing, water, electricity and roads for all. No need for minority politics.

As suggested above, infrastructure interventions indirectly targeted IPs as they mainly took place in peripheral neighbourhoods – home to the majority of La Paz’s indigenous population which precisely demanded such interventions. In 2012 alone, the municipal government built eight new healthcare centres and three market halls in peripheral neighbourhoods with a majority indigenous population (La Paz, 2011).

While improving universal access to infrastructure for IPs, most municipal government authorities failed to implement a more intercultural urban development agenda. A notable exception was La Paz’s intercultural unit, a new local government entity established by the municipal government in 2010. This unit was allocated the task to mainstream new indigenous rights and intercultural urban development principles into the work of all municipal sector units. While the intercultural unit was only allocated four members of staff and lacked municipal funding, it received external support from Oxfam. With Oxfam funding, the unit organised a small conference on promoting interculturalism, indigenous rights, and decolonisation in La Paz. The conference proceedings emphasise that it is important to respect and further strengthen the indigenous elements of Chukiyapu Marka (the Aymara name of La Paz) through legal recognition of indigenous festivals, training public staff in indigenous languages, respecting indigenous religious practices, and recognising indigenous justice, collective land ownership, as well as autonomy rights across the city (Sousz et al, 2010). These policy recommendations are not per se new or innovative but simply represent an urban application of the neoliberal multicultural model. They emphasise addressing some cultural and political rights of IPs without explicitly targeting structural factors which contribute to the ongoing socio-economic and spatial exclusion of IPs in this city. While the intercultural unit introduced these ideas for municipal reform, it did not provide practical guidelines on how to implement them nor did it influence the work of other municipal units. The director of La Paz’s intercultural co-ordination unit explained the reasons for the latter problem:

We can write what we want but this will not produce much change. The enemy is in our house. This is the big problem. Municipal staff in other units claim to know the truth and they do not want to listen to us. They will continue managing urban territories according to their truths. For them, there is no alternative.

These ‘truths’ were illustrated in detail previously. They refer to the fact that most government authorities do not explicitly focus on urban indigeneity in urban policy and planning interventions as they remain guided by understandings of the city as non-indigenous and modern place, follow
constitutional and legislative guidelines which replicate rural understandings of indigeneity, seek to gain political control over previously semi-autonomous indigenous territories affected by urban expansion, or struggle to respect collective indigenous rights while simultaneously ensuring that urban residents – including IPs – can access universal rights and services.

3.2 Urban indigeneity and policy practice in Quito

Unlike Bolivia, legal discourses and policy practices in Ecuador were not necessarily informed by an essentially rural understanding of indigeneity. This is already visible in the constitution which specifies a set of similar indigenous rights as the Bolivian constitution but without spatial restrictions (ANRE, 2008: article 57). Complying with constitutional guidelines, Ecuador’s national government ratified legislation (on participation, decentralisation, and institutional restructuring) which recognised indigeneity and specific indigenous rights also within cities (see table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Key contents</th>
<th>Recognition urban indigeneity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic Code of Territorial Organisation, Autonomy and Decentralisation</td>
<td>• Outlines competencies of decentralised government units including indigenous territorial circumscriptions (ITCs) and communes; • Recognises communes as semi-autonomous local governments in urban areas.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organic law of citizen participation</td>
<td>• Defines mechanisms of participation and social auditing; • Indigenous rights for prior consultation recognised for ITCs and communes.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurinational Plan Against Racism and</td>
<td>• Outlines mechanisms to target institutional racism and</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Discrimination</th>
<th>discrimination against IPs;</th>
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<tr>
<td>(SENPLADES, 2009)</td>
<td>• Requires the establishment of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>national government institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>which monitor the</td>
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<td>implementation of indigenous</td>
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<td>rights in all policy sectors and</td>
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<td>territories of the country.</td>
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*Based on document analysis undertaken by the author*

In the implementation process, national and municipal government authorities often ignored new national legislation. The main reasons for this gap between legal discourse and implementation practice was that specific indigenous rights conflicted with the government’s actual political agenda. This was made explicit by a senior official in the national secretary for development planning (SENPLADES):

> Our government mainly works for Ecuadorians citizens. The Indians are a minority. As in any democracy a minority does not rule. We treat our Indians as equals with the same universal rights and services. Unlike previous governments, we no longer want to have this politics of difference. Our history is a history of difference. Now we want to be one people governed by a strong government. For this reason, we decided to close those institutions that were controlled by opposition forces and focused only on minority groups.

Two key pillars of the political agenda of Ecuador’s national government and its relation to the treatment of IPs are mentioned in this testimony. Firstly, similar to Bolivia, Ecuador promotes a political agenda which prioritises the universal rights of all citizens – including IPs – over specific group rights. Secondly, and slightly different from the Bolivian context, Ecuadorian authorities generally referred to IPs and their political organisations derogatively as ‘Indians’ and oppositional forces. Such tendencies have also been reported in previous studies by Becker (2013) and Elwood et al (2016) who showed how the government tightened control of indigenous civil society and intra-state pro-indigenous organisations with the intention to increase centralised state control over indigenous territories, resource management, and provisioning of services such as intercultural education. This trend of state interference was also clearly visible during fieldwork in Quito.

Acting against new legislation such as the law of citizen participation and the national plan against racism, the national government was in the process of closing institutions that were predominantly composed by staff with indigenous movement affiliations and responsible for
monitoring indigenous affairs. These included the national council for the development of indigenous nations and peoples (CODENPE), the secretary of peoples (SP), and the ministry for the co-ordination of patrimony (MCP). The government replaced the indigenous leaders of these institutions with pro-government indigenous professionals. It then reintegrated staff from these institutions into new centralised government units whose competences were restricted. For example, in 2013 MCP staff were integrated into the ministry of culture where they no longer worked on mainstreaming indigenous rights into all policy sectors but only promoted the preservation of indigenous cultural events.

At the city level Quito’s municipal government – where Rafael Correa’s political party Alianza País (AP) also held a majority\(^6\) – followed the above mentioned political agenda. Following national government guidelines, municipal staff prioritised addressing universal over specific indigenous rights. For example, the director of Quito’s municipal housing enterprise highlighted: ‘There is no differentiation in our social housing approach for indigenous people. We treat housing as a universal human right and run housing projects for indigenous families, mestizo families, and everyone else’. Indeed, between 2012 and 2013 alone, the municipal government implemented social housing projects in predominantly indigenous peripheral neighbourhoods and provided approximately 10,000 residents with a new home (DMQ, 2012a). Hence, by providing access to universal rights and services, local authorities certainly addressed the interests and needs articulated by some urban IPs.

While promoting universal rights, Quito’s municipal government ignored specific indigenous rights once they conflicted with the government’s economic development agenda. This trend is not unique for Quito but characteristic for current Ecuadorian politics in which the government often violates indigenous rights for prior consultation in order to undertake economic activities such as resource extraction for the generation of public funds which can be channelled to the provision of social services (Elwood et al, 2016; Pellegrini et al, 2014).\(^7\) In Quito, this trend was visible in the city’s airport project as well as in attempts to revitalise parts of the city centre. With national government support, municipal authorities were in the final stages of the construction of Quito’s new airport in 2012. To attract international businesses and to generate employment opportunities, municipal authorities also planned the construction of three new industrial parks to be located directly next to the airport. However, these large-scale infrastructure projects took place on the territory of a number of suburban indigenous communes – who according to the new constitution and the 2010 Organic Code of Territorial Organisation, Autonomy and Decentralisation – should have administrative control over their territories and be consulted about interventions taking place on

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\(^6\) After my fieldwork in Quito, municipal elections took place in 2014 where AP lost its majority in the municipal council. At present, the political party Sociedad Única Mas Acción – in opposition to Rafael Correa – holds a majority in the municipal council.

\(^7\) Similar trends can be observed in the Bolivian context, for example in the case of TIPNIS (McNeish, 2013).
their territories. According to political leaders of these communes, the municipal government failed to comply with this legislation. This was also confirmed by municipal authorities themselves. A civil servant in Quito’s territorial planning unit, for example, stated: ‘With the new airport project we generate jobs and improve the lives of all residents including indigenous ones. The improvement of lives comes with a cost. You cannot address everyone as equal all the time’. As a consequence, citizen involvement on topics like the airport project remained selective. The director of Quito’s participation unit put it this way: ‘As [a] municipality we would not involve people who are against our agenda. Why would we involve comuneros in the airport project? To make life easier, we involve only those people who support this project in the first place’.

Similar tendencies could also be observed in the city’s central San Roque market, an area in which a large number of Quito’s indigenous migrants live and work (Kingman, 2012). In co-operation with the ministry of urban development and housing, Quito’s municipal government invested USD 136 million to revitalise this part of the city to make it attractive for private investors and tourists. As part of this revitalisation effort, the municipal government intended to close the central San Roque market and relocate indigenous vendors to other parts of town. The justification for replacement was provided by a member of staff in Quito’s commercial unit: ‘The area has a lot of potential for tourism and private investment. The indigenous people disturb this development. In this city, no one should disturb anyone else. My right to the city stops once I violate the right to the city of others.’ In other words, instead of addressing specific indigenous rights, interests and needs, municipal authorities prioritised addressing the economic interests of wealthier target groups such as private investors or tourists.

Even though Quito’s municipal government ignored specific indigenous rights, interests, and needs in its economic development interventions, it addressed them in healthcare and cultural interventions taking place in neighbourhoods with an indigenous majority. Unlike in La Paz where authorities sought to mainstream intercultural affairs into the work of all local government units, Quito relied on a policy targeting approach. An example of such a targeted intervention was the healthcare programme ‘60 y piQuito’. As part of this programme, the municipality of Quito provided workshops and courses on healthcare prevention for people older than 60 years. These workshops were undertaken in more than 120 local community centres across the city. Zonal administrations were responsible to implement the programme in such a way that specific cultural demands of residents were taken into account. The director of the zonal administration of Calderon illustrated what this meant in practice:
In the communes but also in some neighbourhoods most of the elderly attending ‘60 y piQuito’ are indigenous. To communicate with these people, we hire staff that speak Kichwa or we work with community residents who can translate to the elderly what our community workers are saying to them.

Quito’s cultural sector unit relied on a similar approach. It requested zonal administrations to identify the particular cultural characteristics of each neighbourhood and to fund events that respond to resident’s interests. In neighbourhoods predominantly inhabited by indigenous inhabitants the municipality funded traditional cultural events such as ‘Inti Raymi’ – the festival of the sun which is celebrated annually in June. According to information provided by a member of staff in Quito’s secretary of culture, the municipality allocated more than USD 160,000 to indigenous community organisations in more than 30 neighbourhoods so that these organisations could run folkloric festivals themselves and according to their specific interests. This certainly helped indigenous residents to revitalise their ancestral traditions in the city.

As the above examples illustrates, Quito’s municipal government has introduced interventions which directly address indigenous interests and needs. Yet, like in La Paz, these interventions only take place in selected policy sectors such as culture, healthcare or social housing. In the meantime, the city’s broader economic development agenda remains anti-indigenous. In the context of Agenda 2030, the question now is how to design an urban development agenda which takes indigenous rights, interests and needs seriously in all policy sectors so that no indigenous person is left behind.

4 Conclusions and Policy Implications

This article highlighted that in Latin American cities IPs are disproportionately poorer and more likely to be affected by patterns of exclusion than non-IPs. They are also excluded from specific indigenous rights-based development agendas. A review of the literature revealed that these problems can be explained by the fact that in the past and present context indigeneity is mainly understood to be an essentially rural category. Even in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador – where governments currently recognise urban indigeneity discursively in constitutions – there continue to be obstacles in delivering policies that are shaped according to urban IPs interests and needs.

Policy delivery problems were explained by a variety of factors. In La Paz, national and local government officials ignored specific indigenous interests – especially those around political autonomy and collective tenure rights – because they remained guided by a rural understanding of indigeneity. In contrast, in Quito national and local government authorities failed to address specific indigenous rights, interests and needs because they were guided by other political and economic
priorities (ie promoting large scale economic development programmes). This trend was also visible in La Paz where municipal authorities prioritised gaining political control in indigenous territories affected by urban expansion over respecting the collective tenure and self-governance rights of indigenous comuneros who always lived in these areas. In both cities, it was also possible to observe that authorities struggled to promote access to universal rights and services while simultaneously guaranteeing IPs access to their collective rights. In fact, authorities prioritised the former and thereby addressed core interests and needs of IPs for housing and basic public services while ignoring interests for political autonomy and collective tenure.

Policy interventions which directly attempted to address indigenous interests and needs were also evident. These included the indigenous policy mainstreaming approach of La Paz’s municipal intercultural unit and Quito’s targeted cultural and healthcare interventions in predominantly indigenous neighbourhoods. These interventions can best be interpreted as an urban application of the previously established neoliberal multicultural model; they respect the cultural and political rights, interests and needs of IPs as long as these do not interfere with the wider political and economic agenda of governments.

Despite advances in selected policy sectors, the ongoing failure to address indigenous interests and needs in urban policies can be interpreted as a barrier for achieving the inclusive development vision promoted in the SDGs. Drawing on the above analysis, it is possible to conclude with a set of policy recommendations which could help in generating a more inclusive urban development agenda in Latin America in which no urban indigenous person is left behind:

(1) **Changing attitudes:** Throughout the region, it is essential to erase preconceived notions of indigeneity as essentially rural category associated with ‘tradition’ and ‘underdevelopment’ among government officials and wider Latin American civil society. The consolidation of intercultural and bilingual education can thereby be a long-term solution to this structural problem. National governments throughout the region, including Bolivia and Ecuador, have already ratified legislation on intercultural and bilingual education. It is now time to actually implement these education schemes particularly in cities, where people from different cultural backgrounds predominantly live and interact with each other.

(2) **Integrating universal and collective rights frameworks:** In Latin America, leaving ‘no one behind’ means providing people with access to universal rights and services whilst simultaneously protecting the specific rights of marginalised groups such as urban IPs. While academics and politicians address this problem in new development rhetoric around ‘Vivir Bien/ Buen Vivir’, the findings presented here reveal that, in practice, policy makers and planners still struggle or do not intend to resolve conflicts between distinct rights-based categories (e.g. between
universal, individual rights to shelter, land, and urban public services and specific, collective indigenous rights). Future policy-relevant research on the practical integration of different rights-based categories and on the operationalisation of new development concepts is therefore essential. Such research should build on the experiences of IPs themselves who, when expressing their everyday interests and needs, draw equally on collective indigenous and universal human rights discourse.

(3) **City-specific solutions to global urban development goals:** Rapid and scalable solutions to resolve poverty and exclusion amongst urban indigenous populations are unlikely. Instead, it is important to identify those practices that work best in the specific context of individual cities and to subsequently strengthen and deepen such interventions across different policy sectors. This requires paying close attention to the work of not only national but also local governments and, as previously indicated in other studies (Albro, 2010; Colloredo-Mansfeld, 2009; Goldstein, 2012), of indigenous communities themselves. For example, in La Paz, this means expanding the work of the intercultural unit both in terms of financial and human resources so that it can undertake its allocated tasks. In Quito, zonal administrations should extend their institutional targeting approach and address the specific rights and needs of IPs – including the right for prior consultation – in other vital urban policy sectors such as economic development or land use planning. Undertaking the latter would represent a first step to break away from the neoliberal multicultural model and to define pro-indigenous interventions that directly target those cultural, social, economic, and political forces which continue to co-produce IPs as socially excluded and marginalised urban groups.

These policy recommendations serve as a starting point for the design and implementation of an inclusive Latin American urban development agenda which recognises regional, national and local development challenges and opportunities, and takes urban IPs interests and needs seriously.

**References**


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