Ulinzi Shirikishi: Popular Experiences of Hybrid Security Governance in Tanzania

How to cite:

For guidance on citations see FAQs.

© 2016 International Institute of Social Studies

Version: Accepted Manuscript

Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/dech.12261

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page.
**Ulinzi Shirikishi: Popular Experiences of Hybrid Security Governance in Tanzania**

**ABSTRACT**

In the context of increasing academic and policy-related attention to ‘hybrid’ forms of security provision, which combine state and ‘non-state’ institutions, in Africa and elsewhere, this paper explores the implementation of community-based or ‘participatory’ policing (*ulinzi shirikishi*) in Tanzania. Through *ulinzi shirikishi* citizens are encouraged to form local security committees, organize neighbourhood patrols, and investigate reported crime. In contrast to earlier forms of state-sponsored *sungusungu* ‘vigilantism’ in Tanzania, community police are intended to cooperate with the Tanzania Police Force and to adhere to state law. Based on eleven month’s fieldwork in three sub-wards of the city of Mwanza, this paper argues that community policing has been fairly effective in improving residents’ perceptions of local safety. However, two important concerns emerge that may compromise the sustainability and legitimacy of community policing in the future. Firstly, organizing local policing entails considerable costs for ‘communities’, which disproportionately disadvantage the relatively poor. Secondly, controlling local service provision can enable individuals to pursue private gains, at the expense of the production of public goods. It is thus important to consider the development of hybridity over time towards models that may look less like community-based policing and more like commercial security provision.

**INTRODUCTION**

This paper explores an example of ‘hybrid’ security provision in urban Tanzania, involving the state police, local government, and ‘communities’. In accordance with a community policing strategy introduced in 2006, citizens are encouraged to engage in *ulinzi shirikishi* (participatory or collaborative security)\(^1\) through forming security committees, which organize night patrols, investigate reported crime and resolve disputes. This is not an

---

\(^1\) The term *polisi jamii* is also used to refer to community policing.
entirely new approach in Tanzania, but draws on a well-documented history of local policing through *sungusungu* vigilantism. However, today’s community policing diverges from its historical precursor in terms of the extent to which it is intended that police and organized citizens should cooperate in providing local security.

This interpretation of community policing appears to represent a good fit with much current thinking regarding desirable forms of policing in Africa and elsewhere in the Global South. In many African contexts, governance might usefully be characterized as hybrid, whereby the state exists alongside a range of ‘twilight institutions’, which ‘are not the state but exercise public authority’ (Lund 2006a: 673). Analyses of ‘the governance of daily life’ (Blundo and Le Meur 2009) and ‘everyday policing’ (Buur and Jensen 2004) illuminate the diversity of actors engaged in service delivery and the complex relationships between them, which can make it difficult to distinguish what is of the state and what is not. Appreciation of the range of institutions to which populations might look for protection has informed scholarly and policy-related literature that emphasizes the potential for community-based or other ‘non-state’ institutions\(^2\) to play a role alongside state police forces in a hybrid or ‘multi-layered’ model of security and justice provision (e.g. Bagayoko 2012; Baker and Scheye 2007; OECD 2007). Relatedly, various forms of community policing have become ubiquitous in police reform programmes across much of the Global South (Brogden 2004).

However, recognition of the analytical utility of hybridity should not be conflated with assumptions about its practical usefulness as a policy template (Mallet 2010). Attempts to engage alternative institutions in security provision raise important empirical questions, regarding who benefits from hybrid arrangements, how any costs are distributed, both across communities and between communities and the state, and how hybrid institutions evolve over time. These questions are explored here through a case study of community policing in the Tanzanian city of Mwanza. It is argued that although a hybrid policing

---

\(^2\) The term non-state actors is used here to refer to collective actors other than state police forces that carry out policing. However, it is recognized that the boundaries between state and non-state institutions are frequently difficult to distinguish in practice.
model offers certain advantages to citizens in terms of accessibility and effectiveness, two important concerns emerge that may compromise the sustainability and legitimacy of community policing in the future. Firstly, organizing local policing entails considerable costs for ‘communities’, which disproportionately disadvantage the relatively poor. In seeking to overcome the limited capacity of communities to provide effective services, community police and those who use them seek greater connections with the state and its resources. Secondly, the benefits of hybrid policing are also unequally distributed. Controlling local service provision can enable individuals to pursue private gains, at the expense of production of public goods. It is thus important to consider the development of hybridity over time towards models that may look less like community-based policing and more like commercial security provision.

COMMUNITY POLICING AND HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Community policing, and associated concepts such as partnership-policing, have been adopted in diverse states across Africa, including Ethiopia (Di Nunzio 2014), Kenya (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2002), Mozambique (Kyed 2010), Nigeria (Hills 2014), and Sierra Leone (Albrecht et al. 2014). This is due in part to the influence of donors, international non-governmental organizations and consultants who have ‘exported’ the terminology from its birthplace in the Global North (Brogden 2004). In many African contexts, interpretation of this rather elastic term has entailed the creation or co-optation of alternative security providers, with varying degrees of connection to the state police (Baker 2009a).

Alternatives to state-centric models of security provision have also attracted the attention of donors and non-governmental organizations working on Security Sector Reform (SSR), particularly in post-conflict contexts. The OECD (2007: 7), for example, has advocated a ‘multi-layered’ approach to SSR which ‘would divide international assistance between the state as a regulator, but only a minority provider, of security, and non-state justice and security service providers, given their position as the primary purveyors of day-to-day
service delivery.’

Both pragmatic and normative reasons are advanced for looking beyond the state police. Firstly, it is argued that in many African contexts, as elsewhere in the Global South, the state is not in fact the main provider of security, as state security arms are characterized by limited resources, geographical coverage, and legitimacy (Baker and Scheye 2007). Informed by critiques of the concept of the ‘failed state’, more nuanced analyses of the nature of state in Africa and elsewhere have elucidated the ‘negotiated’ (Hagmann and Péclard 2010) or ‘mediated’ (Menkhaus 2008) nature of statehood. African polities have been conceptualized as ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege et al. 2008), whereby the state is only one among multiple actors exercising public authority. Collective goods and services are delivered not only by the state, but through diverse institutional configurations, which problematize clear distinctions between state and non-state (Unsworth 2010). Baker (2010: 217), whose work has been particularly influential in illuminating the diversity of policing providers operating across Africa, thus argues a case for ‘making the starting point of reform the identification of who is providing policing, rather than who should be providing it’.

‘Hybrid’ models of security provision, which incorporate state and non-state actors, are expected to improve efficiency (Bagayoko 2012: 7; Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009: 5) and to offer a means of capitalizing on community-based resources. This is particularly appealing in post-conflict contexts where the costs of restructuring discredited state police forces may be prohibitive (Baker 2010: 214).

Normative advantages are also sometimes attributed to alternative security providers in contrast to African state police forces, which are typically widely perceived as corrupt, inefficient, illegitimate and politically partisan. The assumed advantages ascribed to community police or pre-existing local security providers echo those that have informed the adoption of participatory or community-based approaches to development in other sectors, such as compatibility with local norms, access to local knowledge and greater local legitimacy and popularity than ‘top down’ alternatives (e.g. Bagayoko 2012; Baker 2008:}
Much discussion of hybrid security governance refers to arrangements that might adequately be characterized as ‘institutional multiplicity’ (Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013), whereby multiple authoritative institutions co-exist. Increasingly, however, development organizations are considering ways in which state institutions might be integrated with their ‘informal’ counterparts to produce more effective hybrids based on ‘constructive interaction and positive mutual accommodation’ (OECD 2011: 38), that might in theory capitalize upon the assumed advantages of informal provision whilst ensuring minimum standards are maintained. It is acknowledged, however, that this is likely to be a difficult undertaking in practice, and the potential role to be played by external actors remains unclear (ibid.). Other critical perspectives caution that hybrid models might be better characterized as ‘bargain-basement governance’ (Meagher 2012: 1078), and emphasize the extent to which analysis of hybridity must take into account inequalities of power and resources. As Cleaver et al. (2013: 168 – 9) argue, the negotiations between state and society through which hybrid institutions are formed are ‘dynamic and uneven…and the room for maneuver is less for some actors than for others.’ These challenges are discussed further in the remainder of this paper, which draws on research conducted in three sub-wards of the Tanzanian city of Mwanza.

**ULINZI SHIRIKISHI**

*Ulinzi shirikishi* has been adopted by the TPF in response to challenges similar to those affecting other police forces in the region. The police to population ratio in Tanzania is very low, estimated at 1:1081 in 2014 (OSFCVPI and OSIEA 2013: 20), and shortages of vehicles and fuel limit the capacity of police to respond to reported crime. Low salaries and poor working conditions have a negative impact on police morale and motivation (TPF 2009). The police are consistently rated as the most corrupt public institution in Tanzania in popular surveys, and human rights organizations regularly document partisanship favouring the ruling party and abuses of human rights including extra-judicial killings and torture (HRW 2013; LHRC and ZLSC 2015; TI-Kenya 2014).
Community policing is intended in part to improve the public image of the police and increase communication between citizens and officers to facilitate intelligence gathering. For example, mobile telephone numbers of senior officers have been published and the post of ward police officer (polisi kata) was created to encourage the formation of long-term relationships between local officers and the communities amongst which they work.

Community policing also involves citizens taking responsibility for their own security through ulinzi shirikishi, which is the focus of this paper. The TPF Annual Report for 2012, for example, acknowledges that, ‘It is no longer possible for the TPF to fight against crimes with a big chance of success without community participation’ (quoted in OSFCVPI and OSIEA 2013: 20). In addition to reporting crime and sharing intelligence, ‘communities’, organized at the level of the sub-ward, are exhort to participate in crime prevention through forming local security groups which may conduct night patrols, arrest suspected offenders, facilitate dispute resolution, and investigate reported crime.

Ulinzi shirikishi is framed in the contemporary language of ‘community policing’, but the approach is informed by Tanzania’s history of local policing in the form of sungusungu ‘vigilantism’. Sungusungu organizations originated in the early 1980s in or near Kahama District, Shinyanga Region, in response to high rates of violent cattle raiding to which the state response was deemed inadequate. They were initially very popular, and spread fairly quickly among the Sukuma and Nyamwezi population of west-central Tanzania, including Mwanza Region (Abrahams 1987). Sungusungu was led by a publicly selected village-level leadership and all able-bodied male residents were required to arm themselves in preparation to pursue thieves should an alarm be raised. Villagers contributed to a sungusungu fund in order to provide food or a small fee for participants, which was supplemented by fines levied. Sungusungu also tried and punished suspects, a process that interviewees in Mwanza reported relied heavily upon the use of the kiboko (hippopotamus

---

3 The sub-ward (mtaa) is the lowest level of local government in urban Tanzania. The rural equivalent is a village (kijiji).
4 In some places unmarried women also took part in sungusungu, overseen by female commanders (Abrahams 1987: 184).
hide whip) and other forms of torture (see also Abrahams 1987; Bukurura 1994; Heald 2002; Mwaikusa 1995).

The leadership of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Tanzania’s ruling (and then only) party, recognized both the pragmatic benefits of endorsing an effective crime prevention strategy that required no state funding, and the convenient compatibility of sungusungu with the party’s ideological commitment to Tanzanian socialism and grassroots mobilization (Heald 2002: 9). Sungusungu groups were subsequently promoted across the country under the auspices of local administration and participation was made compulsory, facilitated by CCM’s network of ten-cell leaders. Sungusungu’s role in tackling crime was officially recognised in 1989 through an amendment to the People’s Militia Act, which bestows powers equivalent to those of a police constable on any ‘organised group operating with the authority and under the aegis of government…for the protection of the sovereignty of the United Republic or for the protection of the people or the property of the United Republic by whatever name known whether Wasalama, Sungusungu, or any other….’

Early sungusungu approximated the ‘ideal type’ definition of vigilantism suggested by Abrahams (2007: 423), comprising ‘an organized attempt by a group of “ordinary citizens” to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resort to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts.’ Under CCM sponsorship, the relationship between sungusungu and the state became more complicated, and sungusungu reportedly took on administrative functions including tax collection and enforcing participation in ‘nation-building’ projects (Abrahams 1987: 191; Hangaya 1989: 37 – 8; Shivji 1990: 17). However, relationships between police and sungusungu remained largely antagonistic due to competition over the financial spoils of policing and the extra-legal nature of sungusungu’s methods, and CCM,

5 The ten-cell system was introduced by the Tanganyika African National Union (which subsequently merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party to form CCM) in 1964. Ten-cell leaders (balozi wa nyumba kumi) are elected by residents of every approximately ten houses. Historically they performed roles including registration of births, marriages and deaths, monitoring of visitors to their locality, and mobilisation of citizens to carry out communal works mandated by CCM. However, in today’s multiparty context the ability of CCM representatives to influence their neighbours may be waning (Cross 2014).
local administrations, and police sometimes came into conflict over sungusungu (Brockington 2001: 9 – 10; Heald 2002: 9).

Sungusungu were first deployed in Mwanza town by the government in 1983 (Campbell 1989: 46). Subsequently sungusungu groups were formed on ‘agizo ya chama’ (party orders). However, in Mwanza state-sponsored sungusungu maintained greater resemblance to its ‘traditional’ counterpart than is likely to have been the case in the country’s other sizeable urban centres, reflecting the town’s large Sukuma and Nyamwezi population and proximity to areas in which sungusungu had developed without external intervention. For example, initiation rituals were practised, although these were sometimes attended by senior figures in the administration.

The return to multiparty competition in 1992 precipitated the decline of CCM-introduced sungusungu in many parts of the country, including urban Mwanza. Sungusungu has continued to operate, typically with close ties to local administration, in rural areas with large Sukuma and Nyamwezi populations where it was not introduced purely under party sponsorship and there is a long history of similar forms of local organization (Abrahams 1987).

TPF policy documents explicitly differentiate between contemporary community policing and sungusungu (e.g. TPF 2007), however, senior police leading reforms nationally acknowledged that popular familiarity with sungusungu had facilitated the introduction of community policing, reflecting the extent to which ‘new acts of public authority seem to fare well when they can “piggy-back” on familiar idioms’ (Lund 2006b: 692).

Like sungusungu, ulinzi shirikishi is legally justified by reference to the People’s Militia Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (1989). TPF literature on community policing also

---

6 Interview Chairman of sub-ward C, 28 August 2011.
7 The legitimacy derived from links to sungusungu is vulnerable, however, in today’s competitive multiparty system due to the continuing strong popular association of sungusungu with CCM (Cross 2014).
cites the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982, which mandates local
government authorities to ‘maintain and facilitate the maintenance of peace, order and good
government’ and to take all actions necessary ‘for the suppression of crime, the
maintenance of peace and good order and the protection of public and private property
lawfully acquired’ (cited in TPF 2007: 22–3). However, at the time of writing there was no
further more specific legislation pertaining to community policing and the general features
of its implementation described below are subject to variation between sub-wards in terms
of both strategies adopted and the scope of activities undertaken.

There are also similarities in practice between the operation of sungusungu and today’s
community police. Ulinzi shirikishi typically follows one of two general models. In some
neighbourhoods, as was the case for sungusungu, all households must provide either a
participant for nightly patrols when required by a timetable or a monetary contribution
towards equipment, such as batteries for torches, or food for participants. Alternatively,
local young people (usually, although not always, men) may be selected to undertake
patrols in exchange for a small allowance, funded through community contributions.
Patrols are intended to deter crime and to apprehend would-be criminals. Although they
may now also use mobile phones, community police in Mwanza reported using whistles to
communicate as early sungusungu did, and the weapons available to participants, such as
machetes, sticks, clubs, and sometimes bows and arrows and spears, are those used by
sungusungu in Mwanza in the past. Patrols are managed by a locally elected security
committee, typically composed of relatively senior residents, which operates under the sub-
ward government\(^8\) and alongside other committees responsible for matters including health
and sanitation. In addition to crime prevention, community police and security committees
may be involved in resolving marital disputes, debt recovery, and other civil matters.
Former leaders of sungusungu were included in community policing structures in all three

\(^8\) The sub-ward government (serikali ya mtaa) is elected on a party political basis every five years
through a secret ballot of all permanent residents aged 18 and above. The governing committee is
comprised of a chairperson and six councillors, of whom at least two must be female. Members
are not paid and no regular funding is received from higher tiers of government, thus capacity to
formulate and implement policy is limited and the extent to which sub-ward governments are
active at all is variable.
However, *ulinzi shirikishi* differs from *sungusungu* in terms of the extent to which it is envisaged that community-based policing should be integrated with TPF-provided services. Apprehended suspects are supposed to be delivered to a police post, rather than tried and punished in the sub-ward, and some community police may receive a small amount of police training. In addition to joint patrols and intelligence sharing, the police in parts of Mwanza delegated investigation of crime and arrest of suspects to community police, recognizing the ability of local residents to gather intelligence through informal methods. The community police in all three sub-wards in which research was carried out sought guidance from retired police officers, soldiers, and recipients of state militia training. Community police also adopt some of the practices and symbols of the state police, as discussed further below.

Integration is also apparent between community policing and established institutions of sub-ward governance. There is some overlap between community policing and functions of the sub-ward government in terms of dispute resolution and non-participation may be sanctioned through the creation of by-laws passed by the governing committee. The selection of security committees follows established local governance procedures and organizing community policing is discussed at public meetings, like other local government matters. Popular participation in community policing occurs alongside participation in multiple other local development activities such as infrastructure upgrading or environmental management.

*Ulinzi shirikishi* might thus be described as a hybrid form of security provision that blends practices and sources of authority derived from ‘tradition’, state policing, sub-ward local governance structures, and ‘communities’. This institutional innovation has brought about some perceived benefits for residents of Mwanza, which are outlined in the following section. However, the case also illustrates the risks of essentializing hybrid modes of governance (Meagher 2013). A more ambiguous picture emerges from analysis of how gains, and costs, resulting from community policing are distributed, and the evolution of
ULINZI SHIRIKISHI OVER TIME.

USER PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY POLICING

The following discussion is based on research conducted over 11 months in three largely residential low-middle income sub-wards of Mwanza, referred to here as A, B, and C. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with elected sub-ward government members, security committee members, participants in community policing, former sungusungu commanders, and ten-cell leaders in the three sites. Police officers interviewed included the ward police officers allocated to each site, district and regional level officers responsible for community policing in Mwanza, and officers leading the implementation of community policing nationally. 36 residents in each sub-ward, randomly selected from every n\textsuperscript{th} dwelling\textsuperscript{9} passed on a transect walk of the sub-wards, completed a survey including closed and open-ended questions regarding perceptions of neighbourhood safety, community policing, and state policing in the sub-ward. The discussion is also informed by participation in night patrols in sub-wards A and B.

The main security-related concerns residents reported having prior to the introduction of ulinzi shirikishi were thieves, sometimes armed with knives, machetes, or other weapons, who targeted pedestrians in the neighbourhood, opportunistic theft of items left outside homes, such as clothes drying on washing lines, and ‘fishing’ for valuables through wire mesh windows. Burglary was also a concern, as Mwanza’s landscape is littered with large stones that could be used to break corrugated iron doors.

In A, all able-bodied male residents were required to participate in patrolling in accordance with a timetable, under the direction of twelve elected male and female makamanda (commanders), who also took it in turns to patrol. The makamanda received disputing parties in an office adjacent to the sub-ward office and located suspected criminal offenders and debtors for a fee, sometimes following referral of complainants by local police. Some

\textsuperscript{9} This number varied between the case sites depending on the total number of dwellings in the sub-ward, to ensure that the entire area was included in the sampling process.
of the *makamanda* were also elected members of the sub-ward government and the sub-ward chairman was an active participant in night patrols. Elected sub-ward governance roles are unsalaried. With the exception of the sub-ward chairperson, who ran a fishing business, the commanders supported themselves through low paid jobs in the informal economy, such as selling produce in local markets.

In B, local young men, aged 17 – 29, were paid a small allowance through monthly community contributions to conduct night patrols, which they did to supplement their incomes from other employment. Recruits were vetted by an elected security committee, made up of more senior residents, and approximately six guards reported nightly to the sub-ward chairman, a retired police officer.

In both A and B, *ulinzi shirikishi* was largely considered by residents, local leaders and local police to have brought about a considerable improvement in neighbourhood safety. In contrast, in sub-ward C, patrolling lapsed soon after community policing was introduced following an encounter with a group of armed would-be thieves, which reduced residents’ willingness to participate. Rumours that the sub-ward secretary had previously embezzled public money also made many reluctant to contribute funds to employ guards. A third of surveyed residents were either unaware that there was any system of community policing in place or could not specify what community policing entailed in the sub-ward. The majority of residents interviewed did not consider safety to have improved over recent years and were more likely to feel unsafe than residents of the other sub-wards, despite reported experience and perception of insecurity having been similar in A and B prior to the introduction of *ulinzi shirikishi*.

---

10 For example, in sub-ward A, a densely populated informal settlement located in an area reputed to have some of the highest rates of crime in the city, 86 per cent of participants claimed it had been ‘very dangerous’ or ‘not safe’ to walk around their neighbourhood after dark before community policing began. Since community policing was initiated, however, only 14 per cent gave negative responses, and twice as many participants (64 per cent) said to walk alone at night would be ‘quite safe’ or ‘very safe’. The same pattern was apparent in responses given by residents of sub-ward B, where the proportion of those who considered their area to be unsafe at night before community policing started was 82 per cent, but only 6 per cent when the survey was conducted.
Popular appreciation of the role of the community police in improving neighbourhood security reflected the extent to which policing services can otherwise be difficult to access in low-middle income areas. There was variation between the sub-wards in terms of their proximity to a police station. A police post was located only a five minute walk from A’s sub-ward office, whilst B and C were located approximately 2 and 2.5 kilometers away from a police post respectively. However, this was not reflected in differing perceptions of police availability and responsiveness between the sub-wards. Police patrols are typically limited to tarmac roads and do not pass through low-middle income residential areas. Officers remaining on duty at a station overnight may not be permitted to leave the station to respond to incidents reported there,11 and police mobility is in any case limited by shortages of vehicles and fuel. The police station closest to sub-wards B and C, for example, did not have a vehicle, meaning that response to an emergency incident would have to be dispatched from the district’s central police station, approximately 8 and 12.5 kilometres away from B and C respectively. Although there was a car available at the police post nearest to A, there is only one paved road passing through area, the majority of which is not accessible by motor vehicle. It is thus easier for residents to report a crime to an actor within the sub-ward, whose geographical proximity and ability to reach an incident without depending on a vehicle enables them to respond more quickly.12

In addition to being convenient and improving response times, the location of community police within the sub-ward gave them an advantage over police in terms of intelligence gathering and investigation, and they were often assumed to already know who committed crimes locally. Indeed this is one of the assumptions underpinning the introduction of ulinzi shirikishi. As one survey participant explained, ‘they are closer to us than the police and they have the ability [to investigate crimes in the area] because they live with the community and the vibaka [petty criminals]’.13 Residents could report suspicions without being required to produce evidence and community police could fairly easily incorporate nocturnal surveillance of certain households into their patrols in order to reassure

11 Interview community policing commander, sub-ward A, 25 November 2011.
12 Some crimes, however, must be reported to the police, for example if a victim wishes to claim insurance or to obtain free medical treatment for injuries caused by the incident.
13 Survey participant 82.
suspicious neighbours.

In contrast, residents reported factors that reduced their willingness to report crimes to the police. Commonly held views included the fear that police would accept a bribe from those arrested in return for their release, which puts those reporting crimes at risk (see also Plyler 2007: 133–4), the likelihood that police would in any case expect a complainant to locate and deliver a suspected offender to the police station themselves, and the expectation that they would be asked to pay an informal fee to have their case processed. Indeed several respondents who had reported incidents to the police had abandoned their cases before they reached court when the costs became prohibitive.

_Ulinzi shirikishi_ is thus valued by many residents of Mwanza, for whom it has brought access to a local policing service that was deemed largely absent previously. However, whether this hybrid model is in itself deemed desirable and represents an optimum policing solution is questionable. The following sections argue that community policing imposes considerable costs on communities that are unequally distributed, whilst enabling some to pursue private gains, with implications for how equitable and legitimate the service is perceived to be.

**The costs of hybridity**

A ‘participatory’ policing model offers considerable efficiency gains to the under-resourced TPF. Capitalizing upon the knowledge residents have of their neighbourhoods (and neighbours) can enhance the effectiveness of crime prevention and investigation activities. Institutionalizing citizen patrols and delegating crime investigation also reduces demands on officers and available vehicles and other resources, making it ‘a cheap way to reduce crime.’

However, organizing local policing entails considerable costs for citizens, which are likely to be unequally distributed across and between communities. The limited nature of available resources also compromises the quality of service provided, leading participants and users of the service to desire further connections to the state.

---

14 Police sergeant during observation of community policing training, 19 November 2011.
Community policing requires citizens to contribute either time and labour or money to support security groups. The large majority of those interviewed considered it ‘fair’ in theory to make a contribution. Participation of this kind is central to the way in which many public goods and services are locally provided in Tanzania. This reflects understandings of participation that underpinned local development strategies during Tanzania’s socialist era, whereby in pursuit of *kujitegemea* (self-reliance) citizens were obliged to contribute labour and resources to build the nation (Marsland 2006). Continuities in understandings of participation are apparent in the way in which leaders go about mobilizing communities to engage in *ulinzi shirikishi* today (Cross 2014). In practice, however, popular willingness to bear the costs of local policing is undermined by collective action problems, which are exacerbated by observed and suspected inequality in the distribution of demands across communities.

Participating in patrols is physically demanding and potentially dangerous. Groups are typically poorly equipped and although they are armed with locally available weapons they risk encountering *majambazi* (armed criminals) with automatic weapons. In all three sub-wards in which research was carried out community policing patrols had previously been attacked resulting in injury to participants, including one non-fatal shooting. The community police were also at risk of being mistaken for criminals, and thus attacked by either police or other residents. Furthermore, participating in patrols limits opportunities to pursue livelihoods for those who are not in regular employment.

These costs are typically not borne by the relatively rich. In wealthy residential areas, well-equipped commercial security guards are an affordable alternative to organizing community-led patrols, and the term community policing might be used to refer not to patrolling local streets, but to helping an individual officer to pay school fees or donating equipment to the police. The 2008 TPF Annual Report, for example, includes a list of donations received from individuals and businesses as being successful outcomes of various community policing initiatives (TPF 2008: 58–9). Within sub-wards A, B, and C participation in patrols also reflected socio-economic inequalities, whereby those who were
sufficiently well-off were often permitted to pay a fee in lieu of patrolling themselves, whilst the poor were obliged to provide their labour for free. It is notable that when participation in sungusungu became compulsory in urban areas, the principle that all should participate was also frequently undermined in practice as the relatively wealthy paid others to patrol on their behalf (Kakoti 1998: 63). Evidence from elsewhere in Africa suggests that voluntary participation in local policing is difficult to sustain and may be an unrealistic principle upon which to build community policing strategies (Baker 2009b: 80 – 2; Kyed 2010: 22).

Where residents made contributions to employ guards the relatively poor also shouldered a disproportionate burden as variations in required contributions based on proxies for wealth (e.g. car ownership) did not reflect the extent of inequality within the sub-ward. For some, contributions were simply unaffordable in a time of high unemployment and food price volatility, and willingness to contribute was further diminished by a lack of clarity regarding how public funds were used, resulting from the lack of transparency and accountability that typically characterizes sub-ward governance in Tanzania (see Cross 2014: 530–1). Difficulty in raising contributions for community policing programmes has also been reported in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, and Zanzibar (OSFCVPI and OSIEA 2013: 59–60).

In addition to implications for sustainability, reliance on locally provided resources affected perceptions of the quality of service provided. As one survey participant noted, the community police ‘have a large burden, but little uwezo’ (capacity).\(^\text{15}\) There is no institutionalized support for local policing groups and oversight of their activities is minimal. The extent to which local police communicate with the community policing groups within their jurisdictions is largely dependent upon personalized relationships that are subject to disruption due to the frequent transfer of officers within the TPF, and depend upon the willingness of individual officers to bear the costs of transport to sub-wards. The principal way that community police can hope to attract funds from the government is through the occasional patronage of senior police or politicians. In cases of emergency, the

\(^{15}\) Survey participant 90.
community police can telephone the police for support, but shortages of personnel, vehicles, and fuel mean that there are no guarantees timely assistance will arrive, and the community must themselves find resources to purchase a telephone and airtime. Thus, it can appear that ‘it’s not community policing, it’s just the community.’\textsuperscript{16} Suggestions regarding ways to improve local policing frequently referred to ways in which the community police could be materially supported by government, as despite the limited resources available to the TPF, their capacity still exceeds that of most local policing groups in low-middle income areas, notably in terms of their access to automatic weapons. Commonly cited examples of ways in which the police or the government could better support \textit{ulinzi shirikishi} included allocation of an armed police officer to accompany citizen patrols, government-funded allowances for participants, and provision of training in the content of the law.

In addition to desiring greater material support from police, residents suggested ways in which community policing could be formalized, and made more ‘state-like’. \textit{Ulinzi shirikishi} is intended to entail greater cooperation with police than earlier forms of state-sponsored \textit{sungusungu} and adherence to state law. This shift was frequently evoked as a key distinguishing characteristic between the two, whereby \textit{ulinzi shirikishi} was described as a ‘modernized’ version of \textit{sungusungu}, or ‘\textit{sungusungu} plus human rights’. Community police in Mwanza were not reported to systematically use torture to extract confessions as \textit{sungusungu} were. However, in practice community guards retained considerable discretion in deciding what constituted a criminal matter and should thus be referred to police, and what could be dealt with at a local level.

In sub-wards A and B punishments observed by the author and reported by participants included detention of a young woman overnight in the sub-ward office for using ‘abusive language’, overnight detention of a mother and her baby as her husband was absent from the home when required for patrol duty, and forced participation in a patrol overnight following ‘cheekiness’ to the guards. In both A and B community police claimed to have beaten those they apprehended in the past and in sub-ward C the secretary of the security

\textsuperscript{16} Survey participant 10.
committee noted that should the young men on patrol bring somebody to the office who had been beaten they would deliver them to the police immediately to avoid being blamed for the injuries themselves. A recent national survey found that 31 per cent of Tanzanians had heard of a person being threatened, beaten or stoned by community police in their neighbourhood (Taweza 2015: 4). ‘Chukulia sheria mikonomi’ (taking the law into one’s own hands) is relatively common in Tanzania and rarely results in criminal prosecution (LHRC and ZLSC 2014; Plyer 2007). There were 673 reported incidents of loss of life through ‘mob violence’ in Tanzania in 2011, when the majority of this research was conducted (LHRC and ZLSC 2012: 30). Indeed, one way for community police to deal with crime they are not equipped to manage alone is to ‘piga kelele’ (make noise, shout) in order to alert other residents to an ongoing theft so that they can apprehend the suspect. As described by one grateful resident of sub-ward B: ‘Thieves were trying to steal electric wiring from outside my house. The guards stopped it as it was happening and called people out and they killed him there behind the house. The police just came afterwards to take away the body.’ As suggested by this quotation, killing a thief is not necessarily incompatible with dominant local ideas about justice. However, for those who are disadvantaged by existing power relations, this level of ‘informality’ is not welcome. Young residents of the three sub-wards were particularly vulnerable to harassment and detention, and sometimes faced collective punishment when an individual offender could not be identified (Cross 2013: 144 – 55).

Others who were not directly affected by arbitrary punishment also expressed concern that community police were not sufficiently familiar with the law and that they exercised excessive discretion. In the words of one resident of sub-ward A, the system might better be characterized as ‘community nuisance’ (jamii kero) than community policing.18

Residents suggested other ways in which the community police could be made symbolically more like their state counterparts, even whilst criticizing how TPF officers perform in practice. As Cooper-Knock and Owen (2015: 369) observe of state policing in

17 Survey participant 62.
18 Survey participant 10.
Nigeria and South Africa, the centrality of the state in popular understandings of legitimate security provision may persist despite the limitations of this ideal in practice, and thus ‘the idea of the Police proves pervasive even when its reality has been highly uneven and problematic.’ Residents of sub-wards A, B, and C suggested that community police could take oaths of service like the police, should carry identification cards, and should be equipped with uniforms. Leaders of *ulinzi shirikishi* initiatives also pursued the accoutrements of state policing. In sub-ward A, for example, leaders had acquired uniforms of the same khaki colour as the police, paid for through community contributions, and elsewhere in Mwanza retired police officers trained community police to perform the drills conducted by police outside their barracks. Thus whilst the rationale underpinning promotion of hybrid forms of policing rests upon the assumption that non-state policing is closer to what communities desire and has greater local legitimacy, the pursuit of additional state support and state-like characteristics by community police in Mwanza suggests that this should not be taken for granted. Hybridity may equally imply a pragmatic compromise that formalizes ‘second-best’ solutions to fill gaps in service delivery.

**Community or commercial security?**

The previous section outlined the unequally distributed costs that initiating a community policing service imposed on communities. However, policies that encourage hybrid institutional orders also present opportunities, which individuals are differentially placed to access. Assumptions about community-based development, including policing, often rest on a somewhat romanticized view of the collective nature of communities. However, as Green (2014: 13) argues regarding ‘development’ more broadly in Tanzania, donor assumptions regarding the shared gains to be achieved through ‘development’ coexist with ‘widespread understandings of development as a personal project of self-improvement.’ The leaders of community policing groups typically described their motivation as being ‘kusaidia jamii’ (to help the community), and it is not intended here to undermine the considerable sacrifices in terms of time and labour made by unsalaried members of sub-ward governments and other committees and their commitment to improving their neighbourhoods. However, it should also be recognized that there are individualized
incentives to engage in local development institutions, and that participation may often be better understood not as an endeavour to generate collective goods, but as ‘an individual strategy for gaining access to social status and material resources’ (Mercer 2002: 104).

Firstly, bringing ‘development’, or in this case security, to one’s constituency is a means for local leaders to further their own political ambitions both within and beyond the sub-ward (Cross 2014). Secondly, more immediate material gains are also available, incentivizing the evolution of community policing towards commercial security. Some community police in Mwanza, for example, extended activities beyond a nightly patrol to include fee-charging services such as locating suspected offenders and escorting them to a police station, investigating reported crime and recovering stolen property. In sub-ward A, deemed by local police to be one of the most successful examples of ulinzi shirikishi in the city, the community police generated income by hiring out guards for private events, protecting parked vehicles, and monitoring business properties overnight, including at sites outside of the sub-ward in which the community they were supposed to protect resided.

Community police also generated income by extending their governance activities into other sectors. In sub-ward A, leaders introduced a weekly daytime patrol to monitor infringements of by-laws pertaining to sanitation. The Ward Health Officer (a salaried executive position at the next tier of local government) had agreed that the community police could take half of the money they collected from fines levied. Community security groups in Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar have also reportedly tried to extend their remit to include additional public services. In Zanzibar’s Stone Town, for example, community police have pursued additional income through waste collection, and are considering further business opportunities including keeping poultry and brick-making. The municipal council permits them to collect parking and other fees, from which they retain forty per cent, and some guards have reportedly been asked to work as private security guards alongside their ‘public’ function (OSFCVPI and OSIEA 2013: 60).

The quasi-commercialization of ostensibly ‘community-based’ security provision is not
unique to Tanzania,\textsuperscript{19} or to the present day. Heald (2002: 24) notes, for example, that in the early 2000s \textit{sungusungu} in parts of Mwanza Region had become ‘little more than private investigative agencies’ (see also Mwaikusa 1995: 175). In sectors other than security, community-based organizations (CBOs) and sub-ward governments also operate in a way that can make them difficult to distinguish from commercial concerns. Indeed, in Tanzania it can be argued that, ‘market relations and enterprise models, through competitive tendering and the sale of services, structure the organisation of local and national civil society where organisations compete to become development contractors’ (Green 2014: 119). Processes of decentralization, donor support for civil society and non-governmental organizations, privatization of formerly state-provided services, and the pervasive rhetoric of participatory development, often institutionalized in the CBO, have contributed to a thriving development market in which a range of actors compete, and the boundaries between them and their organizing logics become increasingly blurred (Green 2014). Whilst in relatively wealthy areas, residents turn to commercial operations, in low-middle income areas alternative ‘community’-based actors may compete for potentially lucrative opportunities to control service provision. In this context, the parallels that Meagher (2012: 1079) highlights between advocacy for recognition of the role of non-state security providers as an alternative to ‘statebuilding’ and neoliberal trends towards ‘contracting out’ services to private actors are highly apparent. Community police in Mwanza thus evolved to occupy a hybrid space between community, the state, and the private sector similar to that occupied by other local development institutions in Tanzania.

The immediate material gains from commercializing policing activities largely benefited those selected as leaders, a group which often overlapped with those elected to participate in the sub-ward government and its other committees and was shaped by similar selection criteria. Legally, members of the sub-ward government must be sponsored by a political party and be literate in Kiswahili or English. In practice they must also be financially secure enough to dedicate time to the unpaid role and typically be of a sufficiently senior age to

be deemed worthy of a leadership position. The dominance of community policing institutions by senior local elites is not unusual in Africa or elsewhere (Baker 2009b: 82; Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 161; Ruteere and Pommerolle 2002).

Rank and file participants, however, sometimes also anticipated certain longer term potential advantages from *ulinzi shirikishi*, although the likelihood that these will be realized may be limited. Whilst ‘security’ or *ulinzi* might connote a public good, *ulinzi* also refers to a significant sector of the Tanzanian economy and is something in which one can gain expertise and pursue a livelihood, whether in the public or private sector. The young men who received small salaries to guard sub-ward B, for example, hoped their work would eventually be recognized as a qualification for preferential access to the *Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa* (JKT), the national service, which serves as a recruitment pool for the TPF and the army,20 or enable them to obtain ‘*kazi ya ulinzi*’ (security work) with a job as a private security guard (see also Kyed 2010: 14 on Mozambique).21 Tanzania’s security sector was liberalized in the 1980s, and demand for private security has since been boosted by the expansion of large-scale mining and discoveries of natural gas reserves. In late 2014, the chairman of the Tanzania Security Industry Association reported that there were approximately 800 private security companies operating nationally, employing an estimated two million people (Yankami 2014), dwarfing the TPF’s 41,560 active police officers (OSFCVPI and OSIEA 2014: 20). In 2011 there were over eighty registered security firms operating in Mwanza, including large multinational companies and many small concerns run by former police officers or soldiers.22 Although the guards of sub-ward B received promises of patronage and employment from senior police and Mwanza’s Regional Commissioner, these were not fulfilled.

20 Since this research was conducted compulsory participation in JKT for school-leavers, has been reintroduced.
21 Indeed, it is not only ostensibly community-based security organisations that may evolve towards more commercial modes of operation. The commercial wing of the national service (*Shirika la Uzalishaji mali la Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa*) announced in 2014 that its state-funded recruits will compete in the private security market (Wa Simbeye 2014).
22 Interviews Private security company (PSC) manager 1, 19 February 2011; PSC manger 2 15 July 2011.
The commercialization of some community policing activities may offer a means to mitigate the costs of providing community-based services and enhance sustainability. Indeed, residents commonly cited paying those who patrolled their neighbourhoods as a means by which the service could be improved. However, it is important to recognize that this has implications for the equity, effectiveness and legitimacy of community policing, which can undermine any short-term improvements in sustainability.

Night patrols produced improvements in perceived safety in public and private spaces that benefited all residents. However, commercial incentives encouraged community police to place greater emphasis on more easily excludable services. Many residents could not afford services for which they had to pay an additional fee, and some cited this as a reason why they would not report crimes to the community police, much as anticipated costs deterred residents from reporting crimes to the police or hiring a private guard.

Responding to financial incentives may also affect the efficacy of policing services. In subward A, for example, residents observed that the groups patrolling were diminishing in size, as leaders encouraged people to give money in lieu of participation, meaning that the size of patrols and their geographical coverage was reduced and only the poorest residents were obliged to incur the risks of participating.

Charging for services also has implications for the extent to which community policing services are legitimate, and are seen as being something that is indeed rooted within the ‘community’. As Buur and Jensen (2004: 146) argue with regard to vigilantism in South Africa, ‘accusations, of “being in it for the money” play an intimate role in negotiations over the exercise of legitimate authority’, and can undermine claims to represent the community. Community policing was thus frequently described not in terms of a project that emanated from and benefited the community, but rather as an activity carried out by a distinct group of people, that for some was perceived to ‘only help the leaders’.23 In this sense local security institutions may be little different from CBOs in other sectors, which are often perceived as vehicles for individuals to pursue donor funding (Dill 2013: 94).

23 Survey participant 10.
Residents had little information regarding how much money was being collected for community policing, how it was being used or of an agreed fee structure for services provided. When payments were requested by community police this was sometimes described as ‘rushwa’ (corruption), rather than a legitimate fee. In sub-ward A, suspicion surrounding the activities of the community police was such that some residents were convinced that they were themselves thieves using their nocturnal activities as an opportunity to steal from residents’ houses.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that community policing in Tanzania offers certain advantages to citizens in terms of compensating for limited state police capacity, and capitalizing upon local expertise that improves the effectiveness of neighbourhood policing. However, the costs of maintaining participation are significant, and their distribution across and between communities is shaped by existing inequalities. The evolution of community policing in some cases towards a more commercial operation calls into question some of the assumed advantages of ‘community-based’ models as opposed to state or private security provision.

These ambiguous outcomes reflect in part the specificities of local governance in Tanzania, histories of local policing, and the community policing model adopted by the TPF. However, they are also suggestive of two broader challenges entailed in institutionalising community involvement in security governance, with relevance to both state-sponsored community policing programmes and attempts to engage alternative security providers in SSR or justice reform. These dilemmas are not unique to the security sector, but have been extensively explored in the large literature on hybrid forms of governance brought about through ‘participatory’ approaches to development, which may provide further valuable insights as scholars and policymakers continue to debate the modalities of incorporating organised citizens into security governance.

Firstly, the pragmatic benefits ascribed to working with communities or existing local institutions as opposed to building state capacity should not be overstated. Effective local
security provision requires resources and there is a risk that community-based forms of governance may entail acceptance of a second-best solution, whereby state institutions become more efficient through delegation, whilst imposing greater costs on communities, and particularly the most vulnerable, with implications for the quality of the service provided. Thus capitalising upon the apparent advantages offered by local actors is not a shortcut to effective policing. As Mansuri and Rao (2012) find in their overview of evidence regarding ‘localizing development’ through participatory techniques and decentralization, popular participation increases, rather than decreases, the need for strong functioning central state institutions, particularly where accountability at the local level is weak.

Secondly, whilst people may participate in local governance to improve collective wellbeing, it should be recognised that there are also often individual incentives to do so. Difficulties in reconciling providing a public service with the private gains that can accrue from doing so have implications for how services evolve over time and the equity and legitimacy of the service provided. Celebrated examples of positive hybrid governance in practice are often based on ‘snapshots’ of a particular time and place, which tends to occlude the highly contingent nature of such ‘successes’ and the extent to which state or donor engagement with ‘informal’ actors and practices might change incentive structures over time. This paper thus concludes by echoing warnings against essentializing forms of ‘hybrid’ service delivery (Meagher 2012) and the importance of empirical investigation of hybrid governance configurations, which should be explored and evaluated within a specific context (Joshi and Moore 2004; Unsworth 2010).


