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Morris, Timothy J. and Fenton-O'Creevy, Mark
(1996).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09585199600000151
Abstract
This paper examines the attitudes of the top managers within one large financial services organization in the UK to fixed and variable components of their compensation package. The rationale for performance-related pay for senior managers is to align their interests with those of the shareholders, but little is known about the views of top managers on the effectiveness of such incentives. The results suggest that the design of effective bonus systems is not just a technical issue: perceptions of market fairness with respect to the compensation package and the clear communication of goals are important in getting senior managers to focus on shareholder interests.
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 47137
- Item Type
- Journal Item
- ISSN
- 1466-4399
- Keywords
- PRP; executive remuneration; agency theory; financial services
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business > Department for People and Organisations
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) - Copyright Holders
- © 1996 Chapman & Hall
- Depositing User
- Mark Fenton-O'Creevy