Morris, Timothy J. and Fenton-O'Creevy, Mark
(1996).
| DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: | https://doi.org/10.1080/09585199600000151 |
|---|---|
| Google Scholar: | Look up in Google Scholar |
Abstract
This paper examines the attitudes of the top managers within one large financial services organization in the UK to fixed and variable components of their compensation package. The rationale for performance-related pay for senior managers is to align their interests with those of the shareholders, but little is known about the views of top managers on the effectiveness of such incentives. The results suggest that the design of effective bonus systems is not just a technical issue: perceptions of market fairness with respect to the compensation package and the clear communication of goals are important in getting senior managers to focus on shareholder interests.
| Item Type: | Journal Item |
|---|---|
| Copyright Holders: | 1996 Chapman & Hall |
| ISSN: | 1466-4399 |
| Keywords: | PRP; executive remuneration; agency theory; financial services |
| Academic Unit/School: | Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business > Department for People and Organisations Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) |
| Item ID: | 47137 |
| Depositing User: | Mark Fenton-O'Creevy |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Sep 2016 09:49 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Dec 2018 13:26 |
| URI: | http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/47137 |
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