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Introduction

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The chapters in the present volume discuss important aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy in connection with two major themes, namely mind and nature. Among the various aspects addressed are the following. What is Nietzsche’s conception of mind? How does mind relate with the (rest of) nature? And what is his conception of nature, anyway? The contributions to this volume all express the thought that Nietzsche’s views on these matters are of great philosophical value, either because those views are consonant with contemporary thinking to a greater or less extent or because they represent a rich alternative to contemporary attitudes.

Galen Strawson’s chapter ‘Nietzsche’s Metaphysics?’ (this volume) expresses the second of these alternatives and is focused on Nietzsche’s conception of nature, construed in terms of Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Strawson translates Nietzsche’s positions into the language of modern-day metaphysics and mounts a careful explanation and defence of Nietzsche’s views as he sees them. Eleven claims, he argues, make up the core of Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Ten of these are ‘negations’. Nietzsche abolishes [1] the idea of a persisting unitary self, [2–4] any real distinctions between objects and properties and objects and processes, [5] the divisibility of reality into causes and effects, [6] the distinctness of the laws of nature and their objects, [7] free will, [8] indeterminism, [9] dualism, and [10] any strict division between the mental and the physical. Evidently many of these ‘negations’ have analogues in contemporary Anglophone philosophy, but what makes Nietzsche’s views different is the positive thesis that underwrites them. This is [11] Nietzsche’s notorious claim that everything is ‘will to power’. This doctrine informs the other ten since it is this that underwrites what Strawson calls an ‘identity metaphysics’. While he acknowledges that Nietzsche ‘lays great stress on differences of force or power (or rank)’, Strawson places him in a long line of metaphysicians who find unity, continuity, and identity, ‘[w]here ordinary thought and vast tracts of metaphysics find distinctness, discreteness, (numerical) difference’. Strawson attributes to Nietzsche the idea of a ‘reality-continuum’, a ‘becoming-reality’ that cannot be divided metaphysically. Nietzsche’s metaphysics is opposed to what Strawson sees as the staticism and
separatism dominant in natural language, which encapsulate the claims Nietzsche
negates and which become erroneously reflected in certain metaphysical pictures.
Such claims are better understood as claims about ‘language, not metaphysics,
I answer, with Nietzsche’. The fundamental metaphysic of the will to power
embodies in Strawson the insight that the distinction between basal and power
properties is only conceptual, he argues, and if basal and power properties are
metaphysically identical, then ‘all being is power being’. The ‘only way to exist
without being potent, without being disposed to have an effect on other existing
things, is not to exist’.

The idea that all is ‘will to power’ can suggest a certain form of panpsychism. Very
roughly put, panpsychism holds that mind is fundamental to all of nature. Strawson
himself is an advocate of a particular for panpsychism, but his contribution does not
touch upon the issue. Günter Abel’s chapter, ‘Consciousness, Language, and Nature’
(this volume) expresses a view he has been developing for decades he calls ‘interpretationism’ that links insights from Nietzsche with results and methods from the
analytical tradition. It also hints at panpsychism. Abel, drawing on Nagel, Kripke,
Putnam, and Wittgenstein, shares Strawson’s anti-­‐staticist and anti-­‐separatist inclin-
ations. He sees Nietzsche’s ‘non-­‐dualistic viewpoint’ as a first step towards a better
theory. Rather than establishing separate realms that are not easily reconciled, the
non-­‐dualist standpoint starts from the assumption of a continuous spectrum that
comprises inorganic, organic, as well as higher-­‐level intelligent and mental activities.
For Abel, consciousness is seen as emerging out of already existing ‘intelligent’
activities (in the broadest sense of the term). He nowhere mentions panpsychism,
but seems to circumvent the idea of a ‘brute emergence’ of consciousness. Abel finds
in Nietzsche a particular version of naturalism that would be distinct from both
‘transcendent metaphysics as well as biologistic and merely scientific naturalism’.
A second important aspect for Abel is the move towards a metaphysic of events and
processes. With reference to Davidson and Reichenbach, Abel argues that such a
continuum would have to be conceived of ‘highly complex, dynamic, reciprocal
effects of numerous “living” and “intelligent” organizations of force’. Viewed as
such, the conscious self or ego could no longer be understood as anything fixed or
stable. Also, large parts of life depend rather on subjectless processes. In the same way
as grammatical subjects of process sentences such as ‘it rains’ express nothing over
and above the process itself, consciousness and the ego appear simultaneously.
A further ingredient is what Abel sees as Nietzsche’s functionalism. Higher-level
processes (such as consciousness or self-consciousness) are no longer viewed as
occurring in one specific place. As for example in Dennett’s ‘multiple drafts’
model, they emerge from ‘complex interactions of the system’s components that
guarantee the organization’s functionality’. That which enters consciousness (very
little does) depends on, and is structured by, a wealth of non-conscious, non-
exogenously caused, processes that make up large parts of the endogenous function-
ality and regularity of the entire embodied and situated system. All of this raises the
question for Abel, as it did for Nietzsche, why consciousness evolved in the first place? Abel addresses this question in his final thesis on the function of signs and language. He agrees with the central tenet of Nietzsche that consciousness is ‘really just a net connecting one person with another’. Consciousness developed for purposes of socialization, and, far from being private, functions by means of a public system of signs. Consciousness and language emerge from non-linguistic signs (such as gestures, glances, and touch), and being fundamentally social, historical, and cultural, are not reducible to organic and neurobiological processes. Abel expects promising results for a philosophy of mind that explores the semiotic-interpretive and embodied character of the phenomena of consciousness.

The topic of panpsychism is raised explicitly in Paul Loeb’s contribution. In ‘Will to Power and Panpsychism’ (this volume), Loeb offers a new reading of BGE 36, one of BGE’s most contentious aphorisms. Loeb’s main question is whether Nietzsche’s theory of cosmological will to power, as advanced in BGE 36, commits him to panpsychism. His interest lies in the argument that Nietzsche puts forward in this aphorism and he takes issue with recent interpretations by Clark, Stack, Hill, Richardson, Young, and Poellner. Loeb shows that there are four different kinds of claims at issue in Nietzsche’s argument: drive psychology, drive physics, power psychology, and power physics. What strikes Loeb as problematic is that the argument’s inclusion of drive physics, ‘explicitly injects panpsychism into Nietzsche’s theory of cosmological will to power’. In Clark’s view, Nietzsche’s guarded language shows that he does not endorse the conclusion or the premises in BGE 36. He merely wants to show how philosophers cannot help but project their own values into the world. Nietzsche, who values power, finds power everywhere.

But Loeb points out that Clark’s interpretation fails to account for the move that occupies Loeb most, namely from drive psychology to drive physics. Since this move has nothing to do with Nietzsche’s valuation of power, Clark fails to explain why Nietzsche structures the argument the way he does. By contrast, Loeb argues, Poellner ignores Nietzsche’s guarded language and takes his panpsychist assumption at face value. But according to Loeb Nietzsche could not possibly have accepted panpsychism because his naturalistic approach, as applied in the passages preceding BGE 36, ‘commits him to rejecting panpsychism as an anthropomorphic falsification of nature and reality’. Loeb thinks that Nietzsche intended something

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1 We cite Nietzsche using the standard acronyms for his works, followed by a Roman numeral for a part or chapter (if any), with separately numbered sections. For Nietzsche’s Nachlass (NL), we provide the year, KSA volume number (Nietzsche 1988), followed by notebook number, and in brackets the note number, e.g. NL 1887, KSA 12, 9[91].
very different in BGE 36. The move from drive psychology to drive physics is a thought experiment that helps us to see nature in a non-deified way, as inconsiderately and relentlessly enforcing nothing but power claims. In BGE 36, Nietzsche invites us to imagine, counterfactually, what the world would look like if it were constituted of nothing but the power struggle that we observe among our own psychological drives. Thus, on Loeb’s reading of BGE 36, Nietzsche does not endorse panpsychism and does not contradict his own post-theological naturalism. Rather, he uses panpsychism merely as a ‘heuristic device’ that grants us a purely explanatory and analogical perspective on the radically de-anthropomorphic features of cosmological will to power.

One obvious theme that emerges from what has been so far discussed is the rejection of forms of dualism. John Richardson’s contribution, ‘Nietzsche’s Value Monism: Saying Yes to Everything’ (this volume), attempts to show just how radical this rejection is. For him, the radicalism lies in a value monism, but not the familiar view that there is one kind of value (e.g. pleasure or happiness). It is the claim that everything has the same value. This may not seem a coherent position, but Richardson sees it embodied in the combination of some of Nietzsche’s most famous claims, his injunction to affirm everything, in *amor fati*, the eternal return and the Dionysian. Richardson discusses some obvious objections to this radical view and then turns to Nietzsche’s famous attack on the faith in opposite values. Richardson distinguishes a number of senses of this opposition and its relation to value monism. The most radical version holds that what is regarded as bad is really a kind or degree of the good. The drives that constitute ‘life’ are valuations and valuations of those valuing drives. Even forms of negation are themselves expressive of the will to power. Again questions of coherence emerge, and Richardson discusses how on this picture Nietzsche can ‘say Yes’ to everything, not merely construed as the whole but every part, and at the same time ‘say No’. One answer is to relativize to perspectives, so viewed from the God’s eye view all is good, and the bad is a perspectival notion. Alternatively, ‘life’ is essentially will to power and it is this that grounds Nietzsche’s yeses and nos. All such willing is good. But Richardson sees a final problem in Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome dualisms in his view that some willings can be ‘against’ life, his notorious doctrine of ‘life against life’. Richardson is far from confident that this problem for his monism can be solved or evaded.

When talking of mind and nature a question arises about what it would be to ‘naturalize’ the mind. That is something already treated in Abel’s chapter, and it is a prominent theme in Rex Welshon’s ‘Nietzsche, Consciousness, and Dynamic Cognitive Neuroscience’ (this volume). Welshon sees in Nietzsche’s later work some considerable anticipations of contemporary consciousness neuroscience. These comprise (a) that Nietzsche’s view of conscious activity is a form of reductive monism, (b) that his views cohere with contemporary views that fly under the banner
of embodied embedded cognitive neuroscience, and (c) is dynamic rather than computational. All of this is underwritten by Nietzsche’s appeal to drives, as the fundamental explanatory category, which, Welshon argues, is consistent with contemporary views. With respect to monism, Nietzsche’s view is not physicalism because Welshon sees physicalism as too firmly tied to mechanism that Nietzsche rejects. Instead there the ‘mental’ and the ‘bodily’ fall under a dynamic physiology, which is understood in terms of quanta of force. Though Nietzsche does not apply this view explicitly to neurophysiology or consciousness in general, Welshon argues that its application in Nietzsche is not unwarranted. He begins by sketching the contemporary landscape, contrasting computational models of cognition from dynamicist models. The former view mental processes as involving computing symbol types according to an algorithm. The brain is a physical system that implements a symbol system, which is divided into distinct modules running linear processes. Dynamicist models do not see consciousness and cognition as a matter of the linear computation of symbols or as involving discrete modules. Its operation is not a matter of inputs triggering linear causal processes but a set of related non-linear processes, non-linear because causal processes are conditioned by feedback from other such processes. The particular version that interests Welshon does not restrict cognitive processes to what occurs inside the skull. Cognitive processes do not simply interact with bodily processes but instead bodily processes enter into their constitution. He goes on to detail this view further before returning to Nietzsche. After noting that Nietzsche is sceptical of higher-order forms of consciousness, Welshon nevertheless identifies a more basic form of consciousness running throughout Nietzsche’s later writings. This is a form of awareness involved in sensory and perceptual processes that does not involve high-order states of awareness. Welshon then pieces together some of Nietzsche’s pronouncements to show how good a fit they are with contemporary embodied dynamicist views. One thing Welshon draws attention to is the fact that Nietzsche recognizes that the project of naturalizing humanity can have unsettling implications for our self-conception. One of the places where this cuts most deeply is our view of ourselves as free agents.

In ‘Freedom, Resistance, Agency’, Manuel Dries (this volume) revisits Nietzsche’s position on freedom by linking it to Nietzsche’s drive psychology. According to Dries’ main thesis, Nietzsche’s contribution lies not so much in his well-known rejection of metaphysical free will but rather in his drive-psychological explanation for the belief in freedom. Nietzsche links the idea of freedom to first person, experiential mental states that he sees as by-products of ‘resistance scenarios’. Feelings of freedom (and of unfreedom) arise when an agent experiences and interprets affects that track/register ‘successful and unsuccessful resistances’. Metaphysical freedom is merely an abstract notion, effect rather than cause of activity. As Dries shows, Nietzsche first outlines and revises this analysis in his notebooks, e.g. in notebook N VII 1 (NL 1885, KSA 11, 34[250]), and later develops it further in such
works as TI, BGE, and GM, in particular in ‘My conception of freedom’ (TI IX 38). Dries then emphasizes the underappreciated link between Nietzsche’s analysis of freedom and his later philosophy of power. In GM II 17, for example, Nietzsche diagnoses a drive or ‘instinct for freedom’ that has been made latent by the ascetic ideal, only to reveal in GM II 18 that his own formula of a ‘will to power’ refers to nothing other than ‘this instinct of freedom’. Dries suspects that it is the experiential phenomenon of freedom and not simply ‘power’ that constitutes the meta-value driving Nietzsche’s later thought. Dries then turns to questions of agency. Drawing on recent scholarship—among others by Clark, Dudrick, Gardner, Gemes, Janaway, Katsafanas, Leiter, Reginster, Richardson, and Welshon—Dries starts out from the assumption that the self for Nietzsche is composed of competing and cooperating drives. This drive self, because it is a resistance scenario in nuce, composes itself and emerges from first-personal affective experiences that track, express, and feedback experiences, forming and informing the drive self of its internal and external (resistance) relationships. Dries sees what he calls two resistance axioms at work in Nietzsche’s design: (1) feeling of freedom, or self-efficacy, is directly proportional to resistance; and (2) value is directly proportional to effort. Based on the above, the final part of the chapter examines a Nietzschean hypothesis of a sophisticated, non-reductive motivational theory: due to an embodied, standing sense of self-efficacy, and a drive for self-efficacy (what Nietzsche, rather obscurely, called ‘will to power’) agents generate, in unconscious and conscious mental simulations, the affective states that motivate action. While Nietzsche assumes that this motivational mechanism usually operates largely unreflectively in both agents that he criticizes, e.g. the ascetic, and agents that he esteems, e.g. the ‘higher types’, it is argued that reflective judgements and conscious reasons may also motivate via this embodied sense of self-efficacy.

The notion of a drive is of course central to Nietzsche’s naturalized psychology. This notion is discussed in Paul Katsafanas’s ‘Value, Affect, and Drive’ (this volume). Here Katsafanas discusses the relation between drives and values. Matters are far from straightforward since Nietzsche appears to hold that (a) pre-reflective drives are associated with values and (b) one’s reflective values are explained by drives. However, one’s reflective values are often in conflict with one’s drives. So what then is the relation between them? Katsafanas begins his discussion by examining the notion of drive. According to Katsafanas, drives have four features. They are dispositions that generate affective orientations, structuring perception, saliencies, and sometimes the course of the agent’s reflective thought. They admit of an aim/object distinction, where the aim is that of an ongoing activity (say aggressive activity) and particular objects of that aim (e.g. playing a violent video game). Third, drives express this aim. Fourth, drives are constant, not ceasing when some object is attained. Katsafanas then discusses the views of John Richardson, Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, and Peter Poellner to arrive at his own refined position about the relation between drives and values. This is captured by saying ‘an agent values X iff (i) the agent has a
drive-induced affective orientation toward X and (ii) the agent does not disapprove of this affective orientation’. This captures the idea that one values more than mere objects, does not make values necessarily based on reasons, and allows for us to distinguish between merely having a disposition towards something and valuing it. He then turns to examine how drives explain values by examining Schopenhauer’s account of how the will to reproduce produces a delusion, which Nietzsche terms variously a ‘staining’ or ‘colouring’, before considering some objections to this account.

Nietzsche famously claims to be the ‘first psychologist’ and one way in which this claim is manifested is in his psychological approach to morality. Peter Poellner examines Nietzsche’s psychology of *ressentiment* and its role in the critical project of the *Genealogy*. Nietzsche argues that what we take to be the problematic morality of the ‘slaves’ emerges because of the operation of *ressentiment*. But just because it emerges in that psychology does not by itself constitute an objection to it (otherwise Nietzsche would be guilty of the genetic fallacy). There are a number of possible responses to this charge. Poellner’s ‘*Ressentiment* and the Possibility of Intentional Self-Deception’ (this volume) examines two of them. The first of these is to see *ressentiment* not merely as causally operative but partly constitutive of the problematic morality. A second is to view the role of *ressentiment* as a very frequent attendant of the problematic morality. Poellner begins by probing the concept of *ressentiment*. At its core it is a psychological condition that involves pain or discomfort at frustration caused by something other than one’s self. This motivates a desire for mastery, which expresses itself in a new evaluative orientation. Poellner amplifies this notion of expression, partly by criticizing R. Jay Wallace’s (2007) recent interpretation and then offering his own. He understands the evaluations as involving what he calls ‘object-mastery’, which involves not merely the contents of the new valuation but their special relation of mastery of those against whom they were originally formed. *Ressentiment* therefore figures in a way that involves an intentional but unconscious diminution of the ‘masters’. Poellner then lays out some conditions that Nietzsche’s account must meet if it is to be successful, before turning to make precise the sense in which the relevant moralizers are *self-deceived*. With respect to the critical edge to Nietzsche’s *Genealogy*, Poellner’s account makes *ressentiment* operative not merely causally but in conceptual contents that relate to different patterns of motivation. But what is objectionable in this? Poellner argues that *ressentiment* is an intrinsically undesirable state and that morality both expresses and masks.

The project that Nietzsche engages discussed in Poellner’s chapter can be said to be a naturalistic one but one that is relatively innocent of any substantive commitments about nature *per se*. Many of the chapters in this volume read Nietzsche taking a stance on the nature of ‘nature’, but Nietzsche’s published writings steer clear of articulating a substantive conception of the metaphysics of nature. But if they do so steer clear, can we read Nietzsche as expressing any kind of naturalistic attitude in his writings? The question of the nature of Nietzsche’s naturalism is taken up in
P. J. E. Kail’s chapter, ‘Nietzsche and Naturalism’ (this volume). Kail’s chapter discusses the sense in which it is correct to call Nietzsche a naturalist without seeing Nietzsche engaged in a metaphysical project of articulating the nature of nature. One key aspect of Nietzsche’s naturalism shows up in Nietzsche’s explanatory aspirations. Nietzsche thinks that we can understand human beings as intelligibly continuous with animal nature. This yields a relatively untendentious conception of the ‘natural’ in naturalism, one similar to another great naturalist, namely David Hume. Kail then turns to consider some recent challenges to understanding Nietzsche as a naturalist. One such challenge, from Richard Schacht (2012a, 2012b), is directed to Brian Leiter’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s naturalism. Schacht claims that the centrality of causation to Leiter’s characterization of naturalism is at odds both with Nietzsche’s own attitude to causation and the ‘developmental character’ of Nietzsche’s naturalism. A second challenge, laid down in recent work by Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick (2007, 2012), holds that Nietzsche believes that the normativity that is both crucial and distinctive of humanity and philosophy is beyond the reach of naturalism. Kail argues that Schacht’s objections mistake causation for a particular reductive conception of causation (mechanism) and, like Welshon, sees drives as fundamentally explanatory and causal to boot. Shorn of conflation of the causal with the mechanical Nietzsche’s naturalism can be understood as causal in character, and that there is nothing in the developmental character of Nietzsche’s naturalism that precludes appeal to causation. This point carries over to Clark and Dudrick’s resistance to a fully naturalized reading of Nietzsche, where Kail points to evidence to suggest that Nietzsche must be committed to the idea that the normative must be ultimately intelligible in terms of the natural, even if it cannot be reduced to it.

**Bibliography**


