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Rees, James; Whitworth, Adam and Carter, Elle
(2014).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12058
Abstract
The UK has been a high profile policy innovator in welfare-to-work provision which has led in the Coalition government's Work Programme to a fully outsourced, ‘black box’ model with payments based overwhelmingly on job outcome results. A perennial fear in such programmes is providers' incentives to ‘cream’ and ‘park’ claimants, and the Department for Work and Pensions has sought to mitigate such provider behaviours through Work Programme design, particularly via the use of claimant groups and differential pricing. In this article, we draw on a qualitative study of providers in the programme alongside quantitative analysis of published performance data to explore evidence around creaming and parking. The combination of the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that creaming and parking are widespread, seem systematically embedded within the Work Programme, and are driven by a combination of intense cost-pressures and extremely ambitious performance targets alongside overly diverse claimant groups and inadequately calibrated differentiated payment levels.
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 45524
- Item Type
- Journal Item
- ISSN
- 0144-5596
- Project Funding Details
-
Funded Project Name Project ID Funding Body Third Sector Research Centre Not Set ESRC - Keywords
- Welfare-to-work; Employment services; Creaming and parking; Conditionality; Work Programme; Payment by results
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business > Department for Public Leadership and Social Enterprise
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) - Copyright Holders
- © 2014 The Authors
- Depositing User
- James Rees