

Open Research Online

The Open University's repository of research publications and other research outputs

The Closed Promise: The Authoritarian "Grip" of Democracy

Journal Item

How to cite:

Montaño, Emilio Allier and Bloom, Peter (2014). The Closed Promise: The Authoritarian "Grip" of Democracy. *Theory & Event*, 17(3)

For guidance on citations see [FAQs](#).

© 2014 Emilio Allier Montaño and Peter Bloom and The Johns Hopkins University Press

Version: Version of Record

Link(s) to article on publisher's website:

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/theory_and_event/v017/17.3.montano.html

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online's data [policy](#) on reuse of materials please consult the policies page.

oro.open.ac.uk



[Browse](#) > [Philosophy](#) > [Political Philosophy](#) > [Theory & Event](#) > [Volume 17, Issue 3, 2014](#)

The Closed Promise: The Authoritarian "Grip" of Democracy

[Emilio Allier Montaño \(bio\)](#) and [Peter Bloom \(bio\)](#)

Abstract

This work investigates democracy using a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective to understand its role for repressing ideological and political competition. Drawing on the case of the 1999 controversial Mexican election and its long term political consequences, it reveals democracy as a fantasy "gripping" subjects in support of specific regimes and exhibits its potential role for legitimizing particular hegemonies. Democracy, like all politics, appears sustained by a narrative which demands for its survival the creation of a demonized "other" containing in this way the seeds of exclusion. Importantly, this analysis gestures toward the often closed characteristic of contemporary democracy contra more optimistic accounts such as Derrida's "democracy to come." Through exploring the case study of Mexico's ongoing democratization process, this work suggests how democratic aspirations can play a role in sustaining diverse political hegemonies, even those historically characterized as authoritarian.

Introduction

Democracy is perhaps the most cherished and celebrated ideal of the modern age. However, these celebrations commonly ignore the role of democratic discourses for reinforcing oppressive ideologies and regimes. This is especially meaningful given the increasing deployment of democratic narratives to justify a wide range of policies from the War on Terror to economic globalization. Dominant scholarly perspectives commonly fail to address these concerns. Despite differences, these perspectives largely equally embrace a positive vision of democracy rather than adopt a more critical lens. At stake in this paper is to examine how democracy can work paradoxically toward political closure and exclusion as opposed to its espoused principles of openness and plurality.

The psychological and emotional aspects of this phenomenon are particularly relevant to this investigation. Exploring how affective desires for democracy affectively "grip" subjects illuminates the ways these narratives support dominant ideologies and practices. A Lacanian inspired socio-political approach is well suited for this task. Social theorists have increasingly applied Lacan's insights to issues of ideology and socio-political identity. They have shown how fantasy structures subjectivity around the pursuit of emotional fulfillment promised by dominant ideologies.¹ The question therefore is how fantasmatic promises of democracy are currently constituting identity and to what political and ideological ends?

Theoretically this allows a re-thinking of diverse formulations of the "promise" and practice of democracy, distinguishing it especially from mainstream approaches like Fukuyama's² and Huntington's³ as well as more complex accounts like Derrida's "democracy to come"⁴. Derrida's reflections on democracy are especially important in this regard. While he strongly criticizes the "evangelical" and "messianic" character of dominant perspectives⁵ he nonetheless shares with them a critical overlooking of the crucial role of democratic promises for legitimizing and reinforcing hegemonic values and regimes. To this effect, dominant ideologies and practices can be strengthened through a continual appeal to aspirations of democratic perfectibility. They support these structures by an always present promise of further democratization, an aspiration whose continual appeal lies exactly in the fact that it remains eternally unfinished and eternally subject to improvement. In this way, democracy stands as a socio-political fantasy for strengthening oppressive political rule, even those that have nominally achieved democratic transition.

The contemporary case of Mexican democratization illuminates this phenomenon. Beginning with its contested 1988 election for President, in 2000 the 70 years long state-party rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was brought to an end. The National Action Party's (PAN) success in the presidential elections embodied (temporarily) a looming democratic promise. Yet, this promise proved to be strongly connected with the PRI's ruling maladies. The PAN's administration has been subject to continued charges of strong electoral irregularities (both in 2006 and 2012), dogmatic commitment to economic liberalization, widespread corruption, increasing economic exploitation⁶, human rights violation and fierce repression.⁷ While this may be attributed to the growing pains of any burgeoning democracy⁸, such an explanation elides how these democratic promises are deployed to solidify elite rule, economic liberalization and social polarization. Indeed democratic transition and consolidation (this last one mobilized in the name of security)⁹ have been invoked for justifying 30 years (1982–2012) of neo-liberal policies.

By exploring their emergence and development after the 1988 Presidential campaign, this essay reveals the political deployment of exclusionary practices and repressive fantasies centering on desires for democratization. A close analysis of this scenario and some of its consequences shows how this affective democratic promise has helped to neutralize political rivals, close off public debate and reproduce the neo-liberal *status quo*. This case also contributes to a growing literature questioning the relation between democracy and neo-liberalism.¹⁰ A point to emphasize here is that the hegemonic function of a democratic fantasy is not limited to traditionally right wing ideologies or political agendas. Indeed, the particular insights of the Mexican case open the way for more general contributions to understanding the interaction of fantasy, ideology, repression and hegemony to democratic practices. It places these political dynamics within the matrix of a narrative caught up in an emotional and ideological

torrent of democratic fantasies. Hence, this study seeks to examine democratic desires as a potential force for structuring identity and in turn legitimizing closed political regimes. To do so this investigation deploys a critical perspective on the commonly apologetic studies of Mexican democratization.¹¹

The argument is structured as follows. We first critically review Derrida's proffering of democracy as an unfinished "promise." This exploration is followed by a more sustained consideration, drawing on the psychoanalytic work of Jacques Lacan, of how this promise can exist as a type of socio-political fantasy that reinforces prevailing ideologies and practices. We then introduce our case of Mexican democratization, with special attention paid to the 1988 election, to bear out these theoretical insights. This will lead onto a detailed examination of the function of democracy as a fantasmatic discourse for shaping Mexican identity, legitimizing a closed neo-liberal ideology, and reducing political competition beginning in 1988 and extending into the present period. Finally, in our concluding remarks we will provide a general reflection on the often paradoxical relation between ideological and political hegemony, on the one hand, with desires for democracy on the other.

The Closed Promise of Democracy?

A crucial aspect of modern democracy is its existence not only as an empirical reality but as an affective and imaginary promise. Democracy reflects aspirations for the future – associated with a forthcoming horizon of possibilities linked to normative desires for political and ideological openness. Echoing these desires, a dominant motif within political theory and political science is the constant promise of democratic improvement despite present imperfections. This motif constitutes a tension among empirical studies and normative theories of democracy, one revealed in their rather shared constant use of phrases like "transitional phase," "consolidation state," "persistent unconsolidation," "partial democracy," "pseudodemocracy," "disguised dictatorship" and "competitive authoritarianism" among others. These empirical and normative categories structure a teleological academic and social narrative that takes the form of a reiterated promise of democratic solidification and perfectibility.¹² It is based on a belief that while existing democracies may not be perfect, their underlying ideals are unimpeachable and it is thereby inherently and constantly perfectible.

This democratic teleology has not surprisingly been subject to numerous critiques.¹³ Derrida's "democracy to come" is by far one of the strongest and most important of these. For Derrida, these accounts constitute a new "gospel" underpinning a hard core messianic eschatology which ironically runs counter to values of justice, hospitality and democracy itself.¹⁴ Thus, for Derrida democracy should never be filled up by a substantive content and promise. Instead it should constitute a formal and empty structure symbolizing "the opening of this gap between an *infinite promise* [...] and the determined, necessary, but also necessarily inadequate forms of what has to be measured against this promise"¹⁵ Derrida's ideas are explicit in this sense: "democracy to come" is a teleology without telos, messianism without messiah, promise without content. Indeed, for Derrida democracy is by its very nature always incomplete and to an extent undefinable.¹⁶

In this regard, the very institution of democracy or its linking to concrete values is both representative and constitutive of an act of violence and oppression. This means that democracies in practice also reflect the violent and exclusionary foundations of any political regime. Attempts at any definitive instantiation therefore can be considered undemocratic since it contradicts the *democratic force* for the "degeneration of the law, of the violence, the authority, and the power of the law."¹⁷ Derrida proclaims that the "very motif of democracy," its exact "possibility," is found in "the duty of democracy itself to de-limit itself."¹⁸ Hence, Derrida places "democracy to come" as a principle declaring both theoretically and practically that "there is not yet any democracy worthy of this name."¹⁹ It stands eternally as a promise of a future which has yet to be determined and remains potentially different than the present. In this spirit "democracy to come" is not only an inviting vision of what could be but a continuous and never ending radical critique of what is.

Consequently for Derrida, democracy stands as a promise worthy of political investment while simultaneously eschewing any commitment to, at least theoretically, concrete substantive norms. "Democracy to come," in this sense, articulates an empty and formal promise which can be neither deconstructed nor criticized. According to Derrida, the promise itself (a structurally empty messianism) is the limit of any deconstruction:

... what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of deconstruction is [...] perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianism without messianism, [...] an idea of democracy which we distinguish from its current concept and from its determined predicates today.²⁰

Derrida, to this end, promotes the constant "perfectibility" of democracy, one which celebrates its successes while seeking to improve upon its failures.²¹ Derrida himself declares accordingly

... the inherited concept of democracy is the only one that welcomes the possibility of being contested, of contesting itself, of criticizing and indefinitely improving itself. If it were still the name of a regime, it would be the name of the only regime that presupposes its own perfectibility and thus its own historicity.²²

Derrida's account, hence, does not preclude a certain normative championing of democracy as it really exists even while philosophically trumpeting its necessarily always incomplete and to an extent repressive character.

This perspective while perhaps attractive is nevertheless profoundly problematic. Philosophically, the existence of such a promise necessarily involves supporting a set of norms, however, temporarily. As Derrida acknowledges "every action and every political decision ought to invent its norm or its rule."²³ This inescapable normativity points to the tension between openness and closedness contained within such a democratic promise. While Derrida categorically rejects the notion of democracy as a "Regulative Idea" he, nonetheless, continues to associate it with a certain historical narrative of democratic progress:

The idea of a promise is inscribed in the idea of a democracy: equality, freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press – all these things are inscribed as promises within democracy. Democracy is a promise. That is why it is a more historical concept of the political – it's

the only concept of a regime or a political organization in which history, that is the endless process of improvement and perfectibility, is inscribed in the concept. So it's a historical concept through and through, and that is why I call it "to-come."²⁴

Thus, whereas Derrida recognizes that democracy must "de-limit" itself, this delimitation is always done alongside, or indeed within, a certain normative horizon. Democracy's historical auto-delimitation inescapably hovers between fullness, emptiness, openness and closure. Ernesto Laclau has noted this point as a necessary dynamic of any social regime:

This relation by which a particular content becomes the signifier of the absent communitarian fullness is exactly what we call a *hegemonic relationship*. The presence of empty signifiers...is the very condition of hegemony."²⁵

Derrida's distinguishing of "empty" and "full" notions of democracy therefore ignores a crucial and unavoidable function of this "promise." Any social discourse is simultaneously both "open" or "empty" in terms of it being ultimately contingent and not pre-determined while also being partially "filled" with a particular set of hegemonic social understandings. In this way, any promise of the future involves a certain strengthening of a dominant normative agenda. As such, even Derrida's supposedly "empty" democracy to come cannot escape the political realities of hegemony.

This tension between openness and closure extends to the construction of identity through the promise of democracy. Indeed the very instantiation of the self-associated with such a "promise" both frees identity to an always "open" future and anchors it to a specific hegemonic agenda. As Derrida acknowledges, all identity linked to such democratic aspirations are founded at a "hauntological" or "quasi-transcendental" level or what he refers to as the "being-promise of a promise (*l'être-promesse d'une promesse*)."²⁶ This "haunting" compels individuals equally to constantly reject the present as imperfect while striving ever more toward a future ideal. In this spirit, identity like democracy itself "remains to come: to engender or to regenerate."

Key, here is that this self is forever linked to a substantive ideological horizon, one which confines identity to its eternal attempts for perfection. Thus, whereas Derrida recognizes that democracy, and as such identity, must "delimit" itself, this delimitation is always done alongside a certain normative limitation. He gestures to this tension throughout his discussion of a "democracy to come," such as when he suggests that a democratic cosmopolitanism may serve as a "democratic horizon."²⁷ Nonetheless, largely absent in these quite optimistic accounts, and therefore central to this analysis, is the legitimizing as opposed to intervening function of this democratic promise. At stake is the degree to which the promise of democracy is representative of an open democratic future or its often closed domineering present. While these are by no means mutually exclusive, they nonetheless symbolize competing visions of how the prospect of a "democracy to come" structures identity and politics. This is especially imperative in light of the overwhelming positive treatment granted to democracy, and its potential achievement, both popularly and scholarly in the modern era.

Therefore it must be examined exactly how the desire for democratic desires is ironically responsible for the reproduction and strengthening of prevailing beliefs and systems of power. How does the notion and hope of a democratic future justify and give support to existing hegemonic ideologies and regimes? What does this reveal about the role of democratic aspirations for anchoring identity and interpellating subjects within a broader set of dominant relations and beliefs? Indeed, is the democratic promise of perfectibility in fact beyond critique and deconstruction? The rest of this paper will attempt to address these questions through critically applying a psychoanalytic, particularly Lacanian, lens to these broader concerns.

Fantasy and the Authoritarian "Grip" of Democracy

The central thrust of this essay is to illuminate and explain the paradoxical role of democratic aspirations and beliefs for the maintenance of closed ideological and political regimes, even those explicitly framed as democracies. This challenges prevailing understandings of democratic "consolidation" and "perfectibility." It, furthermore, questions theoretical accounts trumpeting democracy's positive potential for critiquing and transforming existent beliefs and institutions of sovereignty. Such an investigation requires a more thorough examination of how democracy affectively "grips" subjects shaping identity in conformity to an established "closed" set of ideals and social configurations, often explicitly associated with quite repressive "non-democratic" regimes. The Lacanian theories of subject, desire and fantasy are particularly useful for such an analysis.

For Lacan, subjectivity is formed within and by symbolic discourses. He famously declares "if he [the subject] can appear to be the slave of language is all the more so of a discourse in the universal movement in which his place is already inscribed at birth, if only by virtue of his proper name."²⁸ Importantly for Lacan, the social signifiers shaping identity are empty (i.e., they do not have an intrinsic meaning) and instead are made meaningful in their contingent articulation and positioning within an existent symbolic chain. This insight has important consequences for Lacan's notion of subjectivity. Subjective identity and identification are borne out of the signifier's contingent signification in that "the signifier determines the subjects in their acts, in their destiny, in their refusals, in [...] their innate gifts and social acquisitions [...] without regard for character or sex, and that, willingly or not."²⁹

Notably, the subject for Lacan is paradoxically constituted and reproduced in relation to this inherent emptiness at the center of subjectivity. He contends "It is around this hole, in which the support of the signifying chain is lacking in the subject [...] that the whole struggle [of] the subject [takes] place."³⁰ This permanently lacking state translates into an equally permanent desire for fullness attached to a fetishized signifier. In this regard, Lacan envisions the subject as continually lacking and thus forever in pursuit of a psychic fulfillment attached to a reified desire found in fantasy. It as such grants individuals a tenuous coherency by "covering over the lack in the Other, and consequently; as filling the lack in the subject."³¹ This lifetime desiring process is the cornerstone of the subject's emotional dynamics and also of her identifications (individual, social and political). The subject, hence, acquires an identity by her affective identification with a discourse promising to fill her lack.

The Lacanian concept of fantasy is crucial for such identity construction. Specifically, fantasy represents a culturally provided discourse which allows the subject to deal with and manage her lack. Fantasy, therefore, serves to orient desires, forming subject's aspiration and sense of self. According to Žižek "The first thing to note about fantasy is that it literally teaches us how

to desire."³² More to the point, it structures identity in the constant pursuit of an impossible to satisfy desire, offering the possibility of a future satisfaction that is always just out of reach.³³ Thus, for Lacan fantasy "in its fundamental use [exists as] the means by which [an individual] maintains himself at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing in as much as the very satisfaction of demand deprives him of his object."³⁴

Especially relevant to this analysis, is the existence of fantasy as a promise. More precisely, it stands as an attractive, yet necessarily always unfulfilled, possibility to completely satisfy their desire and accordingly achieve psychic harmony. It offers a scenario (images, narratives, discourses, etc.) where the subjective *Spaltung* (it's inherent lack) is concealed and hidden through the promise of a forever elusive future wholeness. In doing so, it grants individuals and social groups a tenuous coherency by covering their lack through masking the lack in their shared symbolic order (i.e., the signifiers' emptiness and contingency).³⁵ Fantasy, consequently, establishes identity around a forever available but elusive promise of future plenitude. Here a sense of self emerges, and is maintained as coherent, through the continual but eternally elusive promise of wholeness associated with a fetishized fantasy.

This perspective has important implications for understanding the social – particularly regarding the interrelationship of ideology to identity. To this end scholars are increasingly exploring the significance of fantasy for ideological interpellation and identity formation. Glynos proposes what he terms a "fantasmatic approach to ideology" emphasizing "its capacity to account for an ideology's *grip*, its power to transfix subjects."³⁶ This "fantasmatic approach" challenges readings of ideology based principally on processes of value internalization. In this psychoanalytic Lacanian understanding "ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality" instead "in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our "reality" itself."³⁷ Consequently, "An ideology is really "holding us" only when we do not feel any opposition between us and reality – that is when ideology succeeds in determining the mode of our everyday experiences of reality itself."³⁸ Specifically it is the subject's enjoyment from such suturing ideologies that allow for their continued survival and reproduction. In this way it acts as an affective force for binding a community together in a shared political identity.

This Lacanian reading linking ideology to fantasy opens up the possibility for critically rethinking theories of "democracy to come" and more broadly current values of "democratization" as they relate to modern identity and politics. The understanding of democracy as a fantasy speaks to its presence, as Derrida suggests, not simply as a substantive set of values or procedures but instead an always incomplete aspiration for the future. Whereas Derrida assumes this democratic promise to be primarily an intervening force against dominant practices, the "fantasmatic approach" drawn upon in this work reveals its potential role for legitimizing these existing hegemonies. The promise of democracy currently guides these enjoyable but conscripting processes of identification. In this respect, it is crucial to radically question the ideological and fantasmatic role of the democratic promise, regardless of whether or not it is "formal" or "empty" in nature. This is because "democracy" is a social signifier and as such can be considered neither purely empty nor completely full. Rather it is formed in the contingent and specific ways it is given meaning as a cultural fantasy. Imperative therefore is how this "vanishing desire" for democracy structures modern identities and just as importantly to what ideological and political ends?

Importantly, this Lacanian inspired political approach places political identity and ideological domination always inside of a socially suturing fantasy. Crucial in this regard is the distinguishing of identity from identification. Social and political identity is only possible as a failed but nonetheless paradoxically productive process of identification connected to an over-arching fantasy. As Stavrakarkis mentions: "what we have then, if we want to be precise and accurate, is not identity but identification, a series of failed identifications or rather a play between identification and its failure, a deeply political play."³⁹ In this way individuals remain attached to ideologies as what Lacan terms 'subjects of desire.' Here the subject is "governed by fantasy" as her or his aspirations and sense of self is inexorably bound to its reified desires and socio-political promises of fulfillment. This point is central: the subject's desire is always articulated into a broader socio-political symbolic frame –signifiers like nation, race, class or even democracy are as fundamental as father, mother, man and woman. Social and political subjectivities are "governed" by fantasy as identity is exclusively formed by "being included in a fantasy scene-which gives consistency to the subject's desire."⁴⁰

Relevant to this work therefore are the ways the promise of democracy exists as a fantasy for structuring contemporary identification and reinforcing hegemonic ideologies, including ones ultimately promoting authoritarian practices. To this extent, it can be said that any affective promise, even those associated with principles of political openness such as "democratization," imply a certain degree of ideological closure in that they are attached to and helped to reproduce a culturally specific symbolic order. At a more critical level, this inescapable association of democratic aspirations to hegemonic discourses reveals its potential use for supporting rather closed ideological and political regimes. This is especially pertinent to contemporary discourses of "democratization" given their emphasis on the ability of a future democracy to 'save' society from authoritarianism. Indeed, these present day desires for a democratic future have been linked to a range of ideological and political projects. This paradoxically extends to traditionally "anti-democratic" beliefs and practices attempting to eliminate political opposition in the name of protecting "democracy."

The current case of Mexican democratization, beginning with its contested 1988 election, exemplifies this rather ironic deployment of a democratic fantasy for ultimately authoritarian ideological and political ends. As will be shown, the promise of democracy in this context, while universally governing Mexican identity, was nonetheless strategically used to justify both an ideologically narrow neo-liberal agenda economically and single-party rule politically. Further, it provided a framework for politically marginalizing ideological opponents of these economic policies as "anti-democratic."

The Rise and Fall of the PRI's Promise of Revolutionary Nationalism

This section provides a historical context for a deeper examination of the hegemonic function of the promise of democracy within contemporary Mexico. It sets the historical backdrop for the political events taking place from the 1988 elections onwards. To

this end, we provide a general overview of the political, economic and ideological elements underpinning the PRI's seven decade single-party rule. Specifically, it highlights the Party's employment of and constant appeal to an affective promise of revolutionary nationalism for sustaining its hegemony. It then summarizes the factors contributing to the dislocation and ultimate replacement of this fantasy by rising desires for democracy.

The reign of the PRI has been well documented, with scholarly literature focusing principally on its ability to maintain its rule through discourses and policies of economic nationalism. Emerging out of the cauldron of the Mexican revolution (1910–1920) the PRI came to power promising stability and socio-economic justice. The Party deployed this revolutionary heritage to unite the country for over 70 years around its leadership. Economically, it was the dominant force for administering natural resources, building basic infrastructure nationally, managing the country's financial institutions, and arbitrating employment relations. This state-centric approach, referred to as the 'stabilization Development' model and representing the Mexican version of Import Substitution Industrialization, helped produce the so-called "Mexican miracle" which saw annual average growth rates of 6% between 1940 and 1970.⁴¹

Through such economic control, as well as success, the Party was able to establish a strong political hegemony. Significantly, the PRI had huge material resources to control political power and offset challenges to its rule, represented in the unifying figure of the President. The new regime gave the President extended decision - making power over diverse matters. He heavily influenced the national judiciary system, selected local and state candidates for popular election, and designated the military forces' chief commanders. Furthermore, the president distributed economic resources for the state governors, allocated public investment, controlled strategic national resources like oil, administered industrialization and conciliated confrontations inside and outside the PRI. This strong presidency allowed for, and metaphorically came to embody, a centralized national state that regulated a previously fragmented and conflict ridden society.

Alongside the President, the PRI functioned as the institutional force for mediating, and ultimately neutralizing, the struggles between economic and political elites as well as among the wider population. The party was not a monolithic corpus without internal fractures. It was divided by different groups and tendencies (geographical, economic, political, etc.). Nonetheless, it served as a buffer to contain elites' extreme confrontations.⁴² Simultaneously, it provided these elite groups with a platform to unite, despite their internal differences, for the purpose of organizing and controlling the Mexican population. The PRI, moreover, fostered strong political and administrative ties within the larger citizenry, such as to labor unions along with other peasant and popular groups. These groups, in turn, provided the government with electoral support and helped to structure the electoral and party system in its favor. Additionally, the PRI mastered a sophisticated set of illegal mechanisms to ensure its electoral victory regardless of the circumstances.⁴³ In this way, the PRI was both economically and politically hegemonic over a 70 years period.⁴⁴

Cementing this economic and political hegemony was a dominant discourse centering on aspirations for national progress and socio-economic justice. As the Party proclaimed in its basic manifesto:

The role that historically corresponds to the Institutional Revolutionary Party is to secure and protect the continuity of the revolutionary nationalist current in the exercise of State's power through the cohesion and progress of the fundamental forces of the people.⁴⁵

Indeed, legitimizing this broader and complex rule were affective discourses connected to collective aspirations for "national progress." Through this promise of Party-led national progress, the PRI was able to incorporate a diverse range of actors within its broader hegemony.⁴⁶ Key to this ideological bond was the presentation of a utopian fantasy linked to officially approved notions of "revolutionary nationalism." Specifically, the PRI sought to mobilize support and create a shared socio-political identity deeply intertwined with popular desires for national development associated with the "Revolution."⁴⁷ The PRI's "Declaration of Principles" reflected these aims:

The Party assumes the revolutionary nationalism as the most consistent and conducive path to [...] get full access to the broad masses of people to enjoy the goods that our society produces.⁴⁸

This beatific image of Party led progress coalesced into a cohesive fantasy 'seizing' the diverse Mexican citizenry. The utopian character of this vision was encapsulated in the Party's call for *the struggle for a new society* where

... unemployment must be eradicated, all work must be fair and timely paid; the land must –without exception whatsoever– belong to those who work it, social security should be extended quantitatively and qualitatively [...] education and training, hygiene and welfare, must be fully and effectively guaranteed.⁴⁹

Such utopian sentiments extended to the Party's legitimization of its concrete policy agenda. Yet the measures underpinning the "miracle" were justified in terms of a broader fantasy of "revolutionary nationalism." To this end, the Party's appeal rested on a promise of "a fullness-to come once a named or implied obstacle [was] overcome – the beatific dimension of fantasy – or which foretells of disaster if the obstacle [proved] insurmountable, which might be termed the horrific dimension of fantasy"⁵⁰

This "promise" of "fullness-to come" is evident in the language used by Presidents throughout this period to promote the PRI's continued rule. In 1976, for instance, the then leader proclaimed that "we are not wealthy, we are not strong militarily and materially we are not great. However, we could be, because the resources of our territory are vast and because the possibilities of our people are endless."⁵¹ Existing along this beatific vision was a "horrific" scenario of the catastrophe that would befall the country if the Party and its policies were not upheld. Like its beatific obverse, this horrific dimension was present throughout the entire presidential discourse: "[we must] carry out the development of [Mexican] man and natural resources, [we must] return investment into the country, [and] stop making other countries rich at the expense of ours."⁵² In this way the PRI positioned itself as the exclusive actor capable of safeguarding the country's national interests from these internal and external threats.

Yet by at least the last part of the 1960s this appeal to progress associated with a fantasy of "revolutionary nationalism" began

to be questioned by diverse groups. This process of dislocation had been long gestating as revealed in the failed 1968 student movement for democracy and the spread of guerrilla cells throughout the following decade. However, it gained steamed beginning in the late 1970s and extending into the 1980s as the "Mexican miracle" experienced a sharp and deep seated economic crisis. This prolonged downturn was due to a combination of factors including an increase in interest rates and therefore debt repayment, a drop in international oil prices, as well as ongoing administrative inefficiencies and corruption within the government.⁵³ In response to these problems the PRI government implemented a wide range of policies profoundly at odds with their past protectionist and "socialist" values including the freezing of wages, the scaling back of social programs, the decreasing of union power, and selective privatization of state agencies as part of the IMF and WB restructuring plans.⁵⁴

Politically and economically this signified for much of the population the PRI's abandonment of their social contract with the nation and thus the death of its revolutionary credentials. The fantasy of "revolutionary nationalism" was consequently quickly losing its affective hold over the Mexican populace as a force for delivering progress generally. For the PRI to retain its hegemony, without exclusively resorting to oppression, it would have to articulate a new unifying discourse of national progress and with it a new utopian vision for psychologically "gripping" the popular majority around its continued rule. The following sections investigate how the Party attempted to do so through the proffering of a 'social fantasy' linked to growing popular demands for enhanced democratization.

The Reemerging Fantasy of "Democracy" in the 1988 Election

After the 1980s crisis, general unease regarding the Mexican economy and PRI's governance cohered into wide ranging calls for greater democracy, especially focused on the upcoming 1988 election. In this respect, the election is considered both scholarly and popularly as a "turning point" for Mexican politics. Significantly, as a result of the economic crisis and the population's anger over the Party's neo-liberal response, the PRI was set to face strong electoral opposition for the first time in its history. Particularly, this challenge rested on the resurrection of an affective democratic fantasy by groups from across the ideological spectrum. The espoused need for democratization existed, in this regard, as an emotional narrative promising to overcome the country's political and economic crisis. In order to retain its power and neo-liberal ideological agenda, the PRI was forced to transform this fantasy into a justification for its continued rule.

Notably, this appeal to democracy was by no means a new phenomenon. Indeed both the Party and opposition groups alike would regularly reference it as an animating principle of their politics. However, as the authoritarianism underpinning the PRI's fantasy of "revolutionary nationalism" became more intractable and apparent, the demand for "democratization" was increasingly a rallying cry for resisting the Party's over-arching hegemony. Perhaps the most famous instance of such "democratic" resistance was the failed 1968 student movement. The university protestors called for the complete democratic transformation of the political system as a whole; therefore directly challenging both the autocracy of the PRI and its credentials as a truly "popular" revolutionary body. Ultimately, the Party dealt with this movement by violently massacring protestors during a public rally in Tlatelolco. In the decades following this event, the Party confronted opposition, democratic or otherwise, through a diverse set of methods including direct violence (e.g. assassinations, torture, illegal imprisonment and kidnapping), the selective cooptation of resistance leaders, and the sabotaging of rival political parties.⁵⁵

Yet these methods were progressively futile in the face of the broader socio-economic unease and the resultant weakening of its fantasy of "revolutionary nationalism." This democratic upsurge was reflected in the growing popular support for left wing FDN (National Democratic Front) candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. The rise of the FDN, moreover, grew out of deeper schism within the PRI by high ranking Party members demanding the Party's internal democratization. Beginning in November 1987 with the announcement of his candidacy, support for Cárdenas grew exponentially drawing from a diverse stratum of the population.⁵⁶ Animating this popular support was the reemergence and reinvigoration of a fantasy of "democracy." Meaningfully, historical leaders of the 1968 student movement, like Heriberto Castillo and Pablo Gomez, eventually publically supported the Cárdenas candidacy.

This shift was evident in the FDN's ideological prioritization of democracy in relation to traditional ideals of "revolutionary nationalism." Here traditional goals of social and economic justice associated with the past regime, were not wholly jettisoned. Rather they were reconfigured into a broader narrative of democratization. To this effect, Cárdenas proclaimed that,

We have gathered together to contribute to the formulation of viable alternatives to the national progress, [alternatives] capable to safeguard our independence and sovereignty [...] to promote the integral democratization of society and to impulse the equal development of the Mexicans⁵⁷

This emphasis on democratic change continued throughout the Cárdenas campaign, driven by the need to challenge the PRI's authoritarianism and even "fascist" character. As he proclaimed, the "[FDN fought] this modern fascism Mexico is rising up."⁵⁸

Significantly, the promise of democracy was a common feature of Mexican politics regardless of political ideology or affiliation. For example, the right wing pro-market PAN (National Action Party), led by Manuel J. Clouthier, similar to the FDN championed its break with the PRI and the "old system." Moreover, this democratic focus extended to smaller parties. The head of the *Mexican Socialist Party* (PSM) Heriberto Castillo, who days before the election had declined his candidacy in favor of supporting Cárdenas, declared "In this time of profound change, Mexico needs to advance towards its full democratization [...]. The progressive forces must commit to uproot the authoritarian aspects of the Mexican State."⁵⁹ Likewise, the far-left parties such as the Revolutionary Party of the Workers (PRT) voiced similar positions, rejecting Mexican presidentialism wholesale in favour of "a new representation of national power organized from the bottom up."⁶⁰ This shared call for greater democracy across the ideological spectrum reflects both its increasing existence as a common desire structuring Mexican politics generally and its overall "emptiness" in terms of its accepted cultural meaning.

Essential to its appeal then was its affective promise of future national prosperity rather than a concrete ideology or policy

agenda. These demands, nonetheless, redefined traditional PRI approved definitions of national progress. Resulting from this fundamental ideological critique was a concrete political challenge to the Party's authority and exclusive right to rule. The country's prolonged economic downturn and wide ranging dissatisfaction with the government's response to this crisis weakened and ultimately threatened the PRI's fantasy of "revolutionary nationalism." The Party was thus forced to rearticulate its ideals in conformity with this shifting political terrain. Specifically, its future legitimacy rested on its ability to legitimize its rule linked to this resurrected fantasy of "democracy." Revealed in this strategy, moreover, was the malleable ways in which the "promise" of democracy could be appropriated for diverse political and ideological ends, even those which from the outside could be considered explicitly "anti-democratic" according to established definitions of the term.

This final point is essential as it helps illuminate the dynamic, though often unexplored, relationship between fantasy and hegemony. Fantasy is in principle an agentless process. It is not a *creatio ex nihilo* by a particular group or force but a narrative that takes place due to a complex socio-symbolic interaction beyond subjective will. However it can be appropriated and strategically mobilized by specific groups. Hegemonic control and power relies precisely on this appropriation. Clarifying the nature, stages and characteristics of this appropriation is pivotal to make our point. We understand this process involving several moments and maneuvers: differentiation and disconnection of political demands composing an already existent social fantasy, isolated managing of these demands, alignment (i.e., remodeling) of these demands to favor the regime's continuity via a rearticulated social fantasy, finally strict control and delimitation of the conditions, spaces and terms where this fantasy is processed.⁶¹ This explains why both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic groups are gripped by a fantasmatic promise. Thus the political question is who will successfully appropriate this promise and to what hegemonic ends.

Emblematic of this attempt at co-optation was the changing manner in which the PRI publicly dealt with democratic values. Previously, it linked themes of democratization solely to its larger aims of socio-economic justice associated with its fantasy of "revolutionary nationalism." Democracy was situated therefore as an ancillary principle to these wider social and economic goals, politically legitimizing PRI rule for leading the country's national renewal. By contrast, in the lead up to the 1988 election the Party, tellingly recognized the democrat deficit within their ruling discourse. This task relied on the PRI's electoral campaign group and candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari.⁶² They included "democracy" along with 'social,' "economic" and 'sovereignty' in what they termed the country's "four big challenges."⁶³ Importantly, this need for democratization was very quickly attached to the PRI's desire to continue its one party rule for the larger purpose of furthering the country's economic "modernization." Salinas de Gortari, accordingly, stated that it was necessary for the nation as a whole to work toward "practicing democratic methods and not authoritarianism [because] if politics does not modernize its everyday actions [...] the great cultural and economic transformation of the country can become in anarchy or repression."⁶⁴

Key here was the continuing demand of the PRI's electoral discourse for employing democracy to ensure order and consequently prosperity. The saliency of the democratic discourse was such however that the justification for this exclusive authority evolved away from the simple achievement of socio-economic justice and toward the actual democratic character of the PRI itself. This democratic fantasy ironically allowed the Party to neutralize resistance to their rule and more fundamental challenges to their approved social and economic values. The following parts of this paper will examine how the PRI sought to deploy this fantasy of "democratization" to respectively marginalize political rivals and alternative economic ideologies to neo-liberalism.

Creating an "Anti-Democratic Other" through a Promise of Democracy

The 1988 election was a watershed event for Mexican politics. It marked the first serious electoral challenge to PRI rule since coming to power. Yet just as this event opened the way for further democratization it also set the framework for future leaders to outmaneuver and eliminate opponents in the name of "preserving democracy." Those accused of being "anti-democratic" were politically ostracized, in the process creating a new precedent for waging and procuring national hegemony. Indeed the struggle between a "horrific anti-democratic other" against a "beatific figure committed to democratic perfectibility" extended into the 1994, 2000, 2006 and 2012 federal elections. In this respect, this strategic deployment of a democratic fantasy to create an "anti-democratic" other continues to largely define Mexican politics up to the present.

The resurrection of a fantasy of "democracy" ironically opened the space for reorganizing politics around the presence of a threatening "anti-democratic" enemy. During the election, this was evident in the FDN's telling condemnation of the PRI for their "fascism." This charge revealed the centrality of democratic criteria for a party or political actor to identify themselves as "progressive" or "revolutionary" in order to rally popular support. Yet it also highlighted the ability to marginalize opponents due to their lack of democratic credentials. As such Cárdenas increasingly concentrated his campaign on the importance of overcoming the regime's "democratic deficit" and the need to protect the "popular will" against possible electoral fraud by the authoritarian *priista* machinery. Cárdenas continuously argued that "the government pretends to modify the electoral results in its favor and to close the roads for democratic participation."⁶⁵

This dynamic was readily apparent in the immediate aftermath of the 1988 election. The victory of Salinas de Gortari and the PRI was almost instantaneously challenged. Notwithstanding the contentious politics, there were clear indications that the Party's re-election was less a reflection of popular support and more the result of illegal electoral practices and maneuvering.⁶⁶ Not surprisingly, all the major party candidates joined together in condemning the 1988 election results as fraudulent. This condemnation catalyzed the rise of an opposition movement demanding electoral justice across the ideological and political spectrum. The *Commitment to Democracy* – a public manifest by public opinion leaders, civil society members and intellectuals – exemplified the growing strength of these emerging aspirations:

... the citizens' mandate for the democratization of the country demands, as a starting point, the most strict respect of the effective suffrage and greater responsibility in the post-electoral qualifying dispute [...] The Federal Electoral Commission and the Electoral Dispute Tribunal constitute the only legitimate fundament to qualify the elections: finding another one can only lead to the dispurpose of claiming the annulment of the elections.⁶⁷

Central to this emergent resistance politics, hence, was the beatific vision of a democratic future. Present was a romantic image of a new Mexican society revolving around democratic transition and legalized forms of popular governance. Essential to understanding these growing protests and public statements is the fantasmatic promise invested in democracy prior to the election. The possibility of electoral fraud by the PRI represented not simply the stealing of a single election but the theft of an entire idealized future based upon the positive and stabilizing prospect of a democratic Mexico.

Theoretically this points to what Lacanian scholars refer to as "theft of enjoyment" and politically as the "theft of society" by a negative other.⁶⁸ Fantasies situate subjects within a shared narrative linked to the struggle of good against evil, chaos versus order, harmony against violence. Fantasy, in this respect, is dually composed of a positive or stabilizing element and a negative or de-stabilizing component. This morality play serves to structure emotional subjectivity linked to this ongoing public narrative. Quoting Bloom and Cederstrom "importantly, it directs subjects to view the world in terms of the larger struggle between a stabilizing fantasy, promising wholeness, and a destabilizing fantasy, threatening to prevent this beatific possibility from occurring."⁶⁹ Thus fantasy requires the continuous presence of a negative critical other for its affective functioning. Within this framework, the horrific other strengthens the subject's affective investment in an existing fantasmatic promise.

The positing of the PRI as this negative, destabilizing other, toward the dreams of democracy was, accordingly, quickly taken up by the FDN. Here the entire survival of the nation hinged on the achievement of a fair electoral result. Three days after the elections Cárdenas declared that the PRI's "insisting on fraud, after an enthusiastic and elevated citizen participation in the election, would be equivalent to a Coup d'état."⁷⁰ At stake was the positioning of the PRI not as a traditional leader of the revolution but an insidious force whose actions would prevent the country's proper enjoyment of a democratic future. Highlighted, in such demonization was the centrality of an "enemy" other with this "democratic" promise despite its overt championing of values of political openness and tolerance.

The importance, and reach, of such "enemy" creation was witnessed in the PRI's own efforts to frame the election exactly in these terms. They cast themselves as the defenders of democracy waging battle against the ever lurking dangers of authoritarian usurpers. The regime's proffering of its own stabilizing function for assuring the promise of democracy was illustrated quite literally in its emphasis on maintaining electoral legality in dealing with the contested vote. In this regard, the PRI stated after the elections that "there is no justice without observing the law, just like there is no possible defense outside the resources that the law establishes."⁷¹ This affective appeal to a democratic fantasy was also apparent even before the election in the Minister of the Interior Manuel Bartlett's condemnation of Cárdenas' criticisms as "anti-democratic." According to the Minister's declarations "the FDN's ex-candidate reveals its true political nature: authoritarianism and its obvious detachment from popular mandate."⁷² As such it was the FDN not the government who was endangering Mexico's burgeoning democratization.

Reflected in these attacks was the new politics surrounding this arising fantasy of "democracy." It was upon these foundations that the PRI and its allies⁷³ acted to reconstruct these beatific desires for democratization around an authoritarian politics of single-party rule and narrow ideological agenda of neo-liberalism. Moreover, it foreshadowed a growing politics of deploying fantasies of democracy linked to the threat of an "anti-democratic" other for reinforcing rather closed ideological agendas. In this way, the specter of a "horrific anti-democratic other" and a "beatific national democracy" reorganized political relations, serving as a framework for parties to exclusively advance their own beliefs and right to rule. In particular, the protection of this "democratic promise" from its "enemies" was deployed to legitimate free market values not only as will be shown in the 1988 elections but also in the 1994, 2000, 2006 and 2012 federal elections as well. The next section will investigate this paradoxical creation of an ideologically "closed" democratic fantasy.

The Ideologically "Closed" Promise of Democracy

Thus far this paper reveals the existence of democracy as an affective fantasy for structuring Mexican politics reemerging in the late 1980s. Specifically, the government attempted to demonize rivals as "anti-democratic" and create a narrative casting themselves as the pre-dominant actor for protecting the country's nascent democratization. It was over this symbolic terrain that PRI sought to link these popular democratic aspirations to a concrete politics of its own continued single – Party rule. Just as significant was the use of this fantasy to legitimize the regime's ideology of economic liberalization contra calls for a less market driven solution. Consequently, it attempted to deploy this idea for unifying the country once again around its exclusive rule and closed ideological agenda.

Imperative to this aim was the fashioning of its own actions as fully conforming to electoral legality. The justification for this could be found, in the PRI's offers to establish proper and "transparent" electoral institutions and norms (a Federal Electoral Code and an Electoral Dispute Tribunal) providing "further transparency to every stage of the process and greater guarantee of cleanliness, adherence to legality and certainty to suffrage."⁷⁴ Present was the making by the Party of a new official history whereby they existed as the primary and sole guardian for ushering in authentic Mexican democracy. It also stood as the basis for charging their political and ideological opponents as the "enemies" of such national democratic aspirations.

The PRI's evolving embrace of democracy, then, was indicative of its efforts to build popular support while minimizing existing discontent with its rules and ideological agenda. This speaks to the fundamental but often overlooked importance of fantasy for processes of co-option and transformism. Fantasy serves, to this effect, to neutralize political cleavages by transforming differences into a shared desire for the achievement of a common end. According to Žižek a fantasy "is that *narrative* [that] emerges in order to resolve some fundamental antagonism by rearranging its terms into a temporal succession."⁷⁵ Put differently, it transforms antagonisms into a shared story of progress – in this case the attainment of national renewal and the completion of the revolution via democratization. The affective promise of democracy, as is being shown, does not differ in this respect from other such cultural fantasies.

The hegemonic rule of the PRI provided, as President Miguel de la Madrid argued, the "peace and tranquility" necessary for a

"legal" and legitimate transition to democracy, a prospect eternally undermined by opponents who would seek to use democratic rhetoric for their own authoritarian ends.⁷⁶ Essential was the presentation of the PRI as the only party capable of ensuring the country's democratization. Without their exclusive leadership, the country would devolve into anarchy and illegality endangering the entire democratic hopes of the country. Here the revolutionary promise of the past, manifested in the sole leadership of the PRI, was a prerequisite for the coming of a bright democracy in the future. Fundamental to this appeal was the need to recover and transform antagonistic demands of democracy to secure national unity rather than breed destructive internal divisions.

Hence, the depiction of their rivals as an "anti-democratic other" played perfectly into this rewriting of history. Here it was the PRI, not the opposition, who fought on the side of democracy. By contrast those contesting the results were interested only in political gain and the return to an anarchic and authoritarian Mexico. In this sense the PRI warned the population not to be fooled by the democratic language employed by these anti-democratic forces premised on "a subculture of fraud." In this way, the PRI's electoral group framed Cárdenas' early concerns over the possibility of voter fraud as symbolizing the potential for social unrest. Furthermore the PRI's electoral group placed the FDN accusations as a threat the country's development. A priori support for the integrity of the election was therefore considered a "vote for Mexico." Then President Miguel de Madrid declared in this regard that Mexicans "do not want to lose these values [peace and tranquility], hence the importance of vote."⁷⁷

Highlighted in these discourses was the strategic use of democratic aspirations to not only support existing political authoritarianisms, in the name of preserving "democracy," but also a rather narrow ideological agenda as well. Specifically, in attaching the preservation of their own rule to the larger principles of furthering democracy, they were covertly associating their economic values of liberalization with aspirations for democratization. Following the contested election the PRI's elite members (the *equipo*, the CEN, the IEPES and the CEEPES) maintained that real Mexicans who support democracy, unlike the undemocratic malcontents, "demonstrate that it is through law that they want the changes and transformations in the country to be done maintaining the national sovereignty above all political and ideological differences."⁷⁸ This reference to "ideological differences" is especially telling. Prioritized thus was the need to maintain legal order, symbolized in the upholding of the election results and the hegemony of the PRI regime, to ironically guarantee these shared goals.

At stake in this co-option of a democratic fantasy by the PRI was the explicit consolidation and strengthening of its economically neo-liberal agenda. This officially sanctioned democratic fantasy championed similar values of party-led national progress as its "revolutionary nationalism" forerunner. Specifically, the Party discursively linked democratization to established tropes of Mexican independence and broader objectives of economic modernization in the form greater liberalization. At the most basic level, the PRI worked to portray these changes as enacted democratically. During the campaign, Salinas praised the liberalization policies of his predecessor in exactly these democratic terms, arguing that he was "the leader that, democratically, has made possible the structural changes that Mexico needs."⁷⁹ As noted previously the regime underwent sustained and wide-ranging criticism of its recent privatization measures and marketization policies. The election was a referendum not only of the PRI's continued single-Party rule but also its program of privatization. Accordingly, its attempt to unite the country around its democratically "legal" leadership was additionally a means for reinforcing its new found embrace of capitalism economically.⁸⁰

While early on in the campaign the PRI could posit democracy as an important but ultimately ancillary value to the aims of socio-economic development via marketization reforms, as the campaign waged on and the election crisis loomed the emphasis on democracy took on an increasing significance for legitimizing these policies. The leftist opposition to these reforms, who also happened to be the PRI's most sustained democratic critics, was labeled to this effect as a "populist Frankenstein." This linking of market critics to an anti-democratic politics and indeed explicit authoritarianism was intensified by elite entrepreneurial associations, most prominently Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX). They continually connected anti-liberalization and anti-fraud protests to a type of Marxist populism that, during the PRI's welfare administrations "undermined the progress of the country" and represented a "democratic disguise that restricted economic, political and educative freedom"⁸¹ The inference was clear; liberalization represented the Mexico of tomorrow – democratic, free, and prosperous. In this sense Mexican business associations constantly announced that social unity and national renewal could only be assured through avoiding undue political challenges and economic upheavals (i.e., continuity of the neo-liberal agenda and the PRI's rule).

In the end the PRI and its liberalization program were victorious. The election challenge was stymied and the Party continued to rule for another 12 years until their electoral defeat by the right wing Party PAN in 2000. Yet, as we mentioned, the effect of these events should not be underestimated. While it is clear that the 1988 election opened the space for more competitive democratic contests and indeed arguably a more open political system, its role for reframing Mexican politics linked to a democratic fantasy should not be overlooked. More precisely, it set a precedent for the expansion of democracy as a fantasmatic and hegemonic force for legitimizing ideologically narrow prerogatives. Specifically, it illuminates the potential for democratic aspirations to reinforce concrete politics often at odds with its espoused values of political and ideological openness.

The Critical Legacy of the 1988 Mexican Democratic Promise

The case of Mexican democratization reveals how democratic fantasies could be modeled and transformed for the purpose of affectively "gripping" subjects in support of specific regimes. The legacy of this democratic fantasy on present Mexican politics bears out these insights. Whereas it would be impossible to fully chronicle its effects given the space available nonetheless even a cursory exploration demonstrates its continued potency. Fantasmatic promises, whether espousing democracy or revolutionary nationalism, have delivered a social life plagued by undemocratic and illiberal maladies over the last thirty years. Indeed since "democratization" has begun there has been concurrently a continual and growing extreme poverty and inequality, the raising of radical manifestations of social violence like organized crime, the militarization of the public space, the monopolization of mass media, an invariant increase of human right violations, and a menacing radicalization of political groups and demands. Indeed, far from regulating and lessening confrontation, poverty, human rights violations, insecurity, mass media bias, and political antagonism, ideological constructions of democratic practices intensified these phenomena.

Essential for explaining this seeming contradiction of official democratic values with worsening democratic conditions in practice, is a better understanding of the function of fantasy for promoting ideological and political closure. The espousing of democracy, by all sides, represented a desire to overcome a deep social crisis and in doing so re-impose and cement a new social order against potential rivals. In this way, political actors of all stripes tried to cover up the emergence of social dislocation and contingency while attempting to naturalize their own political discourses. To realize these goals, they had to present their beliefs as the only "path" for ensuring the country's successful democratization. The promotion of ideology linked to these democratic aspirations, in this regard, served to "cover over" the impossibility of the country ever achieving complete national unity and prosperity and as such the ability of such nationalist discourses for providing subjects with psychic wholeness.⁸² Thus, the fantasy of democracy provided a compelling illusion of political necessity and social closure, allowing equally for resisting greater ideological or political pluralism.

The force of this fantasmatic promise was arguably most clearly on display in the 2000 campaign of the right wing PAN candidate, and eventual winner, Vicente Fox. Responding to a political climate dominated by values and promises of democratization, the then presidential candidate sought to downplay his market based economic agenda in favour of championing his democratic credentials.⁸³ This is well recognized by the academic literature and the actors involved in the process. As Fox mentioned "I spoke straight to the people's hearts in a way every Mexican could understand, summing up the campaign as a crusade for democracy [...] the Mexican people wanted democracy. On the 2nd of July they got it."⁸⁴ Interestingly, Mexican voters clamored for democracy when social inequality registered its highest historical record at this point. Indeed, the GINI index growth from 4.60 in 1984 to 5.19 in the year 2000.⁸⁵

Furthermore in 2006, and despite the freshly achieved alternation in the presidency, democratic discourses have retained their ability to marginalize potential rivals and protests against governing elites. Tellingly the election crisis which followed the 2006 and also the 2012 results mirrored its 1988 predecessor – as the PAN charged protesters and leftist PRD (Democratic Revolution Party) challengers as part of a populist "authoritarian" upsurge. During the 2006 campaigning itself the PAN candidate Felipe Calderón Hinojosa warned the populace that a vote for his opponents would mean a return to the country's authoritarian past. He further linked this danger to his opponents' leftist economic policies:

Today [...] we have a better country than he had in 2000. A country that lives a true democracy [...] with economic stability and very solid social politics [Mexico] is now immerse in a transformation process that should not be stopped but rather consolidated⁸⁶.

In the 2006 elections, ideological values of democracy were fundamental to ongoing elite legitimization of economic liberalization policies. After several months of a polarizing post-electoral conflict, Carlos Abascal (the then Secretary of the Interior) explicitly addressed the issue. He largely summarized the great cost and sacrifices (death and violence) that Mexicans has paid for building fair and democratic institutions. Then he concluded that "even when there are differences stemmed from a very competed electoral process like the one we just experienced [...] the Republic and the future of our democracy is one and indivisible."⁸⁷

The 2012 elections followed this same pattern. Enrique Peña Nieto, the PRI's candidate, and now elected President have raised the democratic promise in these terms: "I am convinced that the time has come to transform an essentially electoral democracy into a democracy of results."⁸⁸ The nature of these "democracy of results" requires the privatization of the Oil Mexican Company (PEMEX) and the labor market flexibilization among other neo-liberal policies. This critical legacy of Mexico post – 1988 democratization illuminates the importance of the fantasy of democracy for structuring its politics and for supporting particular regimes and sets of values. In the final section we discuss the more general possible implications of these insights for contemporary understandings of democracy.

Concluding Remarks

This work examined values of democracy with a critical psychoanalytic perspective to better assess its ironic present day role as a force for strengthening prevailing hegemonies, especially those associated with repressing political and ideological competition. Drawing on the case of the 1988 Mexican election it revealed how democracy exists as a fantasy for affectively "gripping" subjects in support of specific regimes, political structures and belief systems at the expense of others. Furthermore it opens the space for critically challenging existing readings of the "promise" of democracy. In particular, it puts into question optimistic accounts of this promise linked to Derrida's idea of a "democracy to come." Whereas Derrida and those who have followed in his wake stress the intervening character of this democratic aspiration, one which forever keeps open a politics and makes it available to transformation, this analysis points instead to its legitimizing and ultimately hegemonic ideological function. Namely, the presence of a "democracy to come" within Mexican politics was deployed by political actors on all sides to advance their specific values as well as exclusive right to sovereignty. Importantly, it stood as a crucial means for justifying the explicitly non-democratic rule of the PRI and the strengthening of a neo-liberal regime.

This case thus gestures toward the broader theoretical relation of democracy to political and ideological closure. The "promise of democracy" does not simply challenge existing orders but also represents a concrete political and ideological agenda. It therefore necessarily implies the reinforcing of a hegemonic belief system and set of desired socio-political relations. In the case of Mexico aspirations for democratization symbolized at its most basic level an embrace of a particular form of democracy – that of liberal and electoral democracy, a broad based desire which was used ironically to marginalize political actors, alternative ideas of political ordering, and competing ideologies challenging its increasing deep-seated association with a capitalist ideology economically. This is of course not to deny its radical potential. Instead it is to highlight the ways that social fantasies, democratic or otherwise, inherently entail a degree of ideological and political closure and accordingly can ironically strengthen authoritarian regimes as well as objectified socio-economic values.

Within the contemporary world, fantasies linked to democratic desires progressively are used to draw support to and publicly justify a range of rather dubious democratic agendas and political projects. Specifically, this process of legitimization revolves

around a fantasmatic narrative. Indeed significant to any project of democratization is the creation of a critical other. Empirically this construction of an "anti-democratic" enemy is presently witnessed in the War on Terror, the proliferation of right and left wing resistance groups, third world despots and even charges of citizen apathy in mature democracies. The real threat of these groups notwithstanding, this common reliance on a democratic threat critically reflects the importance of such figures for legitimizing democracy as well as its fundamentally exclusionary nature. In this way the "promise" of democracy is always coupled with a critical other working against its realization and seeking its destruction.

Perhaps ironically Derrida's notion of "auto-immunity" speaks to this issue – considering the ways a democratic regime must continually defend its "health" against dangers of its own making, even if this means resorting to patently undemocratic methods. This enemy, according to Derrida, is both tangible and existential, representing at once the peril posed by rogue groups marginalized by these ostensibly inclusionary regimes and the feeling of remove between the promise of democracy in its ideal and its realities.⁸⁹ Interestingly Derrida himself links "auto-immunity" to ideas of a "democracy to come." This directly contrasts with his use of the term at different times to describe explicitly "non-democratic" movements and regimes such as those associated with Islamic terrorism. At stake however is how the very promise of "democracy" itself is often a force for ideological domination and authoritarian rule.

This paper adds to this analysis by introducing a more general psychoanalytic reading of democracy. More precisely, it exists as a beatific vision affectively gripping subjects seeking an ever unattainable fulfillment through its realization. Counter-posing this positive, stabilizing, element of democratic desires is a malicious other constantly undermining the achievement of these aspirations. To this end, democracy is a product of the fantasmatic narrative upon which it is structured. It is thus, akin to all socio-political fantasies, in equal measure inclusive and exclusionary as it is built simultaneously around the symbiotic striving for wholeness in its idealized future and the eternally lurking menace to these hopes. The very impossibility of democracy in its perfection thus demands an enemy for explaining its failings in its reality.

A crucial implication of these insights is the strategic element of this demonization process. While this construction of a fantasy shapes the deeper relations and identities within communities, within this framework actors may work tactically to shape this narrative to their advantage. As the Mexican examples illustrates, dominant individuals and parties may utilize this "anti-democratic" other to garner support and reinforce their values. It is necessary therefore not simply to celebrate democracy but to critically investigate what regimes and which ideologies are being promoted and legitimized through its rise. Indeed in the modern age it is often those democratic fantasies most passionately championing the promise of an open society that are most responsible for its continual closure.

Emilio Allier Montaño

Emilio Allier Montaño is a post-doctorate fellow at the Latino American Postgraduate Studies College at the Autonomous University of Mexico. His work explores the installation, expansion and deepening of neo-liberal capitalism in Mexico. He investigates the ideological and discursive practices that provide con-sentiment and legitimization for this economic system. At the moment he works on a monograph analyzing Mexican political economy over the last 30 years. Emilio can be reached at emilio.allier73@gmail.com

Peter Bloom

Peter Bloom, PhD, is a lecturer in the Department of People and Organisations at the Open University. His primary research interests include ideology, subjectivity and power, specifically as they relate to broader discourses and everyday practices of capitalism and democracy. He is currently completing a manuscript entitled "Political Authoritarianism in the Age of Globalization" to be published by Edward Elgar Press. His scholarly work has been published in the *Journal of Political Ideologies*, *Journal of Political Power*, *Research on the Sociology of Organization*, *Culture and Ephemera*, *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, *Organization* and *International Journal of Žižek Studies* among others. Peter can be reached at peter.bloom@open.ac.uk

Notes

1. See in this regard Jason Glynos, "The grip of ideology: a Lacanian approach to the theory of ideology," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 6, no. 2 (2001): 191–214., Yannis Stavrakakis, *Lacan and the Political* (London: Routledge, 1999); Slavov Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989).
2. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
3. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
4. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International* (London: Routledge, 1994).
5. *Ibid.*, 70.
6. Poverty and inequality have constantly increased all through the 1982–2012 period. In this regard see The World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (September 2012), <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>
7. Amnesty International, Annual Report: Mexico 2011 (May 2010), <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-mexico-2011>
8. This is a common perspective among the specialized literature on the Mexican case. See in this regard Emily Edmonds-Poli and David A. Shirk, *Contemporary Mexican Politics* (Maryland: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009), Stephen Haber, Herbert S. Klein, Noel Maurer and Kevin J. Middlebrook, *Mexico since 1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
9. President Calderon's "war against organized delinquency" (2006–2012) has been justified as necessary process of democratic consolidation and enforcement of the Rule of Law.
10. See in this regard Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), Jodi Dean, *Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics* (Duke University Press, 2009), Francisco Panizza, *Contemporary Latin America development and democracy beyond the Washington Consensus* (New York: Zed Books, 2009).
11. See for example César Cansino, *La transición mexicana, 1997–2000* (México: Centro de Estudios de Política Comparada, 2000), Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappel C. Lawson, eds., *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Candidates, Voters and the Presidential Campaign of 2000* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), Mónica Serrano, ed., *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections* (London, Institute of Latin American Studies: 1998).
12. See in this regard Andreas Schedler, "What is Democratic Consolidation?," *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998): 95.

13. For a comprehensive study of these critiques see Jean Grugel, *Democratization: a Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
14. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 70.
15. *Ibid.*, 65. Emphasis added.
16. Jacques Derrida, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 37.
17. *Ibid.*, 82.
18. Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso Books, 1997), 105.
19. Derrida, *Rogues*, 82.
20. Derrida, *Specters*, 76.
21. See in this regard Samir Haddad, “Derrida and Democracy at Risk”. *Contretemps* 4, (2004)., Alzo David-West, “Derrida, Terrorism, and Communism: A Comment on “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides”. *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy* 5, no. 2 (2009).
22. Jacques Derrida, “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicide,” in *Philosophy in a Time of Terror Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, ed. Giovanna Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 121.
23. Jacques Derrida, “Ich mißtraue der Utopie – ich will das Un-Mögliche,” *Die Zeit* 5, (1998): 49. Quoted in Matthias Fritsch, “Derrida’s Democracy To Come,” *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory* 9, no. 4 (2002): 24.
24. Derrida, *Politics*, 1997.
25. Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)* (London: Verso Books, 2007), 43.
26. Derrida, *Specters*, 105–173.
27. Derrida, *Rogues*, 81.
28. Jacques Lacan, *Écrits. A selection* (London: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 113
29. Jacques Lacan and Jeffrey Mehlman, ‘seminar on The Purloined Letter,’ “ *Yale French Studies*, no. 48, *French Freud: Structural Studies in Psychoanalysis* (1972): 60.
30. Lacan, *Écrits*, 156.
31. Stavrakakis, *Lacan*, 46.
32. Slavov Žižek, *How to Read Lacan* (London: Granta Books, 2006), 7.
33. Jacques Lacan, “The Four fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,” in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI*, ed, Jacques-Alain Miller (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 185.
34. *Ibid.*, 273.
35. See in this regard Stavrakakis, *Lacan*, 46.
36. Glynos, “The grip of ideology,” 192.
37. Žižek, *The Sublime*, 45.
38. *Ibid.*, 49.
39. *Ibid.*, 29.
40. Žižek, *The Sublime*, 119.
41. Kevin Middlebrook, ed., *Confronting Development. Assessing Mexico’s Economic and Social Policy Changes* (San Diego: Stanford University Press, 2003)., Center U.S.-Mexican Studies., Adam Morton, *Revolution and State in Modern Mexico: The Political Economy of Uneven Development* (United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011)., George Philip, “The Lawless Presidency: Economic Crisis and Democratic Accountability in Mexico 1970–94”. *Democratization* 5, no. 1 (1988): 23–41.
42. See in this regard Luis E. Concepción Montiel, *El discurso presidencial en México. El sexenio de Carlos Salinas de Gortari* (México: Universidad Autónoma de Baja California and Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2005)., Laurence A. Whitehead, “An elusive transition: The slow motion demise of authoritarian dominant party rule in Mexico.” *Democratization* 2, no. 3 (1995): 246–269.
43. See Otavio Rodríguez Araujo and Carlos Sirvent, *Instituciones electorales y partidos políticos en México* (México: Jorale Editores, 2005)., Juan F. Molinar Horcasitas, *El tiempo de la legitimidad. Elecciones, autoritarismo y democracia en México* (México: Cal y Arena, 1993).
44. It is very important to notice the great diversity of means deployed by the PRI to achieve this hegemony. Besides ideological interpellation, the Party brought into play direct forms of violence (e.g. murders, torture, illegal imprisonment, kidnapping), co-optation and selective incorporation of popular movement’s leaders, sabotage of opposition parties and extensive forms of corporatism. Yet, this paper does not analyze these practices because they are beyond its scope.
45. Partido Revolucionario Institucional, *La ideología del partido de la revolución* (México: Comisión Nacional para la Conmemoración del Cincuentenario de la Fundación del Partido Revolucionario Institucional, 1979), 112–115.
46. Arnaldo Córdova, *La formación del poder político en México* (México: Era, 1979).
47. Héctor Aguilar Camín and Lorenzo Meyer, *A la sombra de la Revolución Mexicana* (México: Cal y Arena, 1998).
48. Partido Revolucionario Institucional, *La ideología*, 115.
49. Partido Revolucionario Institucional, *La ideología*, 178.
50. Jason Glynos, and David Howarth, *Logics of critical explanation in social and political theory* (London: Routledge, 2007), 147.
51. Secretaría de la Presidencia, *México a través de los informes presidenciales. Los mensajes políticos* (México: Secretaría de la Presidencia de la

República, 1976), 276.

53. Cansino, *La transición*, 2000.

52. Partido Revolucionario Institucional, *La ideología*, 29. This utopianism was deployed particularly to garner popular support for the 1938 nationalization of the oil industry and its land reforms. Regarding the former President Miguel Alemán Valdéz (president 1946–1952) stated that "The prosperity of the oil industry is one of the sources for strengthening the economy and national finances [...] The future of our country is at the heart of all its children" and therefore that he was "confident that national unity will face any problems that come our way and that we will know, with all patriotism, seek for solutions that meet the collective interests, anticipate the principles of the revolution, our freedoms and the country's progress." Similarly the latter was continually framed in terms of its "greatness" and importance to "bettering living conditions." Secretaría de la Presidencia, *México*, 2000).

54. José Romero; "Crecimiento y comercio" In Ilan Bizberg and Lorenzo Meyer, eds., *Una historia contemporánea de México: Transformaciones y permanencias*. (México: Editorial Océano de México, 2003).

55. See Carlos Montemayor, *Guerra en el paraíso* (Mexico: Debolsillo, 2009), Donald Clark Hodges, Daniel Ross Gandy and Ross Gandy, *Mexico Under Siege: Popular Resistance to Presidential Despotism* (London: Zed Books, 2002), Elena Poniadowska, *La noche de Tlatelolco: Testimonios de historia oral* (México: Ediciones Era, 1998).

56. Besides Cárdenas, other PRI's members were Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, Rodolfo González Guevara, Ifigenia Martínez, and Carlos Tello among others. Once separated from the Party, a long chain of alliances appeared around the CD members. These alliances brought together groups ranging from centre-left to far left. Some of these groups were left wing parties like the Mexican Socialist Party (PSM). Independent work unions, like the Unique Labour Front (FAT), Social and Labour Unity Pact (PAUSS), Union Labour Agreement Round-table (MSC), National Union Labour Coordinator (COSINA) were also involved. Other groups included: urban popular movements like The Earthquake Victims Main Coordinator (CUD) and Neighbours Assembly (AB); peasants and indigenous groups like The Revolutionary Left Masses organization (OIR-LM), Companion Group (GC), People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP), National Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR); students' groups like the University Student Council (CEU); and independent intellectuals. See López Leyva, *La Encrucijada*, 2007.

57. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, "Documento de Trabajo número 2" in Juan Fonseca, ed., *Corriente Democrática. Alternativa frente a la crisis* (México: Costa-Amic Editores, 1987), 11

58. Raul Alvarez, "Defensa de la legalidad y el diálogo, propuso Cárdenas en el Zócalo," *La Jornada*, 15 July, 8. 1988.

59. Castillo, H., 1988. Discurso de Heberto Castillo en el Zócalo. *El Universal*, 25 June, 29.

60. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, "Documento de Trabajo número 2" in Juan Fonseca, ed., *Corriente Democrática. Alternativa frente a la crisis* (México: Costa-Amic Editores, 1987), 11.

61. In this regard see Joe Foweraker, "Transformism Transformed: The Nature of Mexico's Political Crisis," *Essex Papers in Politics and Government* 46, (1988), Antonio Gramsci, *The Antonio Gramsci Reader. Selected Writings 1916–1935* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London, New York: Verso, 2005).

62. The PRI's presidential campaign was formed by a equipo (team) selected by the candidate. The Salinas" equipo recruited young technocrats educated abroad like Manuel Camacho Solís, Ernesto Zedillo, José Córdova Montoya y Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta. Yet this group was subordinated to several mechanisms and institutions like the PRI's National Executive Committee (CEN), the Institute of Social and Political Studies (IEPES) and the Center for Political and Social Studies (CEEPES). The electoral strategy emerged from regular meetings of the equipo with these institutes. See Adler Lomnitz, Larissa Lomnitz, Claudio Lomnitz, "El fondo de la forma: la campaña presidencial del PRI en México en 1988," *Nueva Antropología*, no 10, (1990) 45–82.

63. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, *Juntos enfrentaremos los retos* (México: Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, Secretaría de Información y Propaganda, 1988), 11.

64. *Ibid.*, 12.

65. Hernán Castro, "Llama Cárdenas a defender el voto y llegar hasta donde el pueblo quiera," *La Jornada*, 22 July, 10. 1988.

66. There is an academic consensus on the existence of large electoral fraud in 1988. In this regard see Araujo and Sirvent, *Instituciones electorales*, 2005., Bruhn, *Taking on Goliath*, 1997., Foweraker, *Transformism Transformed*, 1988., Martha Anaya, 1988: *El año que se calló el sistema* (México: Editorial Debate, 2008). Molinar, *El tiempo*, 1993.

67. Arturo Azuela et al., "El compromiso por la democratización," *La Jornada*, 15 August, 9. 1988.

68. Žižek, *The Sublime*, 1989.

69. Peter Bloom, and Carl Cederstrom, "The Sky is the Limit: Fantasy in the Age of Market Rationality," *Journal of Organizational Change Management* 22, no. 2 (2009):164.

70. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, "Declaración de Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas al pueblo de México," *La Jornada*, 10 July, 15. 1988.

71. Partido Revolucionario Institucional, "Julio 88. Lo que verdaderamente pasó en las elecciones VI," *La Jornada*, 14 August, 9. 1988.

72. Pablo Hiriart, and Raul Alvarez, "La oposición debe de fundamentar sus quejas, demanda Bartlett," *La Jornada*, 07 July, 3. 1988.

73. Some of the central groups supporting Salinas" campaign were private businessmen associations like Business Co-ordinating Council (CCE), the Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico (CONCAMIN), the National Chamber of Transformation Industries (CANACINTRA), and the Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX). Likewise entrepreneurs supported financially the PRI's fantasmatic deployment: Israel and Pablo Brener, Carlos Slim Helú, Germán Larrea, Ricardo Salinas Pliego, Issac Sab Roberto Hernández, Emilio Azcárraga, Alfredo Harp y Lorenzo Zambrano are some of them. See in this regard Rafael Montesinos, *El Discurso Político de las Organizaciones Empresariales. La Transición Mexicana desde la Teoría de los Sistemas* (México: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad Iztapalapa. 2007)

74. Partido Revolucionario Institucional, "Julio 88. Lo que verdaderamente pasó en las elecciones IV" *La Jornada*, 12 August, 9. 1988.

75. Slavov Žižek, *The Plague of Fantasies* (London: Verso, 2008), 11. Original emphasis.

76. Jorge Ureña and Pablo Hiriart, "Llama De la Madrid a un proceso electoral limpio, legal y pacífico," *La Jornada*, 25 June, 6. 1988.

77. Valeria González, "Compromiso, una elección limpia, legal y pacífica, dice De la Madrid," *El Universal*, 05 July, 1988.

78. Laura Rodríguez and Paola Tejada, "La oposición no debe alterar la paz social, señalan gobernadores" *La Jornada*, 08 August, 7. 1988.

79. Salinas de Gortari, *Juntos*, 7.

80. Rafael Montesinos, *El Discurso*, 2007.
81. Paredes, "Existe falta de credibilidad en el proceso electoral, dice Coparmex," *El Universal*, 21 July, 21. 1988.
82. On the impossibility of society see Ernesto Laclau, "The Impossibility of Society," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Science* 15, no. 3 (1991): 24–27.
83. Joseph Klesner, The Structure of the Mexican Electorate: Social, Attitudinal, and Partisan Bases of Vicente Fox's Victory, in Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell H. Lawson, eds, *Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election: Candidates, Voters, and the Presidential Campaign of 2000* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 10.
84. Vicente Fox and Rob Allyn, *Revolution of Hope* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2007), 183,185,191.
85. Index Mundi, Indicators of GINI Index, *Mexico* (March 2011), <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/compare#country=mx>
86. Partido Acción Nacional, Plataforma Electoral 2006. Los Avances del Cambio, http://www.ife.org.mx/portal/site/ifev2/Plataformas_electorales.
87. Fernando Martínez and Jorge Aranda, "Abascal "invita" a López Obrador a no marginarse de las instituciones" *La Jornada en línea*, 17 September. 2006. <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/09/17/index.php?section=politica&article=012n1pol>>.
88. Enrique Peña Nieto, *Detrás de la Transición. El liderazgo que México requiere* (September 2012), <http://www.enriquepenanieto.com/detras-de-la-transicion/entrada/el-liderazgo-que-mexico-requiere>
89. Derrida, *Rogues*, 2005.

Copyright © 2014 Emilio Allier Montaño and Peter Bloom and The Johns Hopkins University Press

Welcome to Project MUSE

Use the Search box at the top of the page to find book and journal content. Refine results with the filtering options on the left side of the results page. Use the Browse box to browse a selection of books and journals.

Connect with Project MUSE

[Join our Facebook Page](#)

[Follow us on Twitter](#)

Project MUSE | 2715 North Charles Street | Baltimore, Maryland USA 21218 | (410) 516-6989 | [About](#) | [Contact](#) | [Help](#) | [Tools](#) | [Order](#)

©2015 Project MUSE. Produced by [The Johns Hopkins University Press](#) in collaboration with [The Milton S. Eisenhower Library](#).