Detention, Deportation and Resettlement: British counterinsurgency and Malaya’s rural Chinese (1948 to 1960).

KARL HACK

To understand how empires control ‘hostile’ populations, we need to penetrate below overarching terms such as ‘counter-terror’ and ‘winning hearts and minds’, in order to understand discrete constituent techniques on their own terms. Yet technique lifecycles tend to be inadequately researched. This article examines three key techniques used to control rural Chinese during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-60. Detention, deportation, and to a lesser extent the better-documented technique of resettlement, are tracked across the campaign, individually and for their changing salience in the overall blend of counterinsurgency approaches. This approach demonstrates that the main move for each technique (and for the campaign as a whole) was not so much from counter-terror to ‘winning hearts and minds’, as from collective and poorly targeted to tightly targeted approaches. It also demonstrates how far highly repressive measures, such as large-scale deportation, continued much later into the campaign than previously recognised. Above all, it shows how key elements of even an apparently well-researched campaign are likely to be only partially understood, if not seriously misconstrued, in the absence of a technique lifestyle approach.

A. The rural Chinese the Malayan Emergency

On 16 June 1948 five people were killed in the Federation of Malaya, three by gangs of communists who calmly walked onto isolated rubber estates and shot their European managers. Accounts of the Malayan Emergency generally name the three Europeans, but either leave the two Chinese victims nameless, or fail to mention them at all.¹ Yet the Chinese deaths were more typical. Two of the 16 June victims were Chinese with connections to rural labourers. One kepala (labour contractor) was gunned down and left ‘writhing on the ground’, in front of women who later claimed they were so busy with laundry they had not seen a thing.² Such deaths resulted from Malayan Communist Party (MCP) decisions, at meetings in March and May 1948, to intimidate and kill ‘labour thieves’. The aim was to prepare the ground for full people’s war to commence around September 1948. Both European-owned estates targeted on 16th had had strikes end recently. Two days before, on 14th, another Chinese Labour contractor – Leong Eu Sin – had been shot.³ The killing of Europeans on 16th was thus part of MCP policy, but also premature escalation. The British High Commissioner declared a state of Emergency in specific locations on 16 June, broadening to the whole country by 18th.

The killings of Chinese also reflected the administration’s critical weakness: its tenuous hold over rural Chinese. It was not in a position to effectively administer them, nor to protect allies (‘running dogs’ in communist parlance). Members of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA, formed in February 1949 to assist Chinese affected by the Emergency) were subject to grenade and gun attacks into the early 1950s, often in broad daylight, in public spaces.
The vulnerability of rural Chinese must be understood in historical context. The Federation of Malaya was a protected state, a federation of 9 Malay Sultanates and two Settlements (ports). British presence originally clustered at the ‘Straits Settlements’ of Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (confirmed 1824). Those had economically interpenetrated the peninsular Malay states, 9 of which had their own rulers. From 1874 to 1914 that interpenetration facilitated an inward flood of Chinese and Indians to work on plantations and mines, and resulted in Britain installing Residents in the 9 states. The Residents theoretically offered advice, but came to dominate administration, and five of the states were loosely federated in 1895-6.

Japan’s wartime conquest and occupation in 1941-45 then led Britain to unite these micro-territories into a more defensible ‘Malayan Union’ (1946-48) for which they hoped to mould disparate communities into a ‘Malayan nation’. The latter was to be facilitated by a new, unified citizenship embracing all local-born Chinese and Indians, as well as Malays. The Malayan Union bound all 9 Malay States and Malacca and Penang into one colony, leaving Singapore separate. But Malayan Union plans were met with angry Malay demonstrations over 1946-47, with the citizenship plans put on hold. British officials told themselves this was not so bad, as too generous a grant of Chinese citizenship would have extended it regardless of whether they were genuinely committed to Malaya. On 1 February 1948, the Union was replaced with a Federation, which retained a strong central Executive under a High Commissioner, but restored sovereignty of the Sultans.

The failure to implement the citizenship proposals of the January 1946 White Paper on the Malayan Union and Singapore (Command 6724) was to have a critical influence on the Emergency, and particularly on the use of repatriation. For Federation citizenship remained severely limited for non-Malays. They qualified as of right only if both parents had been born in the Federation and lived there for 15 years. Alternatively, they could apply for citizenship if they had themselves been born in the Federation and resident 8 of 12 prior years; or not born there but resident 15 of 20 years. In the latter cases they also had to be of good character and show proficiency in spoken English or Malay.

This left most Chinese – including those born locally - noncitizens from 1948-52. It has been estimated that only 350,000 Chinese became citizens by law, with another 300,000 naturalised by 1952. This changed with a Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance and 9 State Nationality Enactments, all effective from 15 September 1952. These resulted in about 1.1 million Chinese (50-60% of the Chinese population) being citizens by law, by making anyone who had one parent born in a state automatically a subject of its ruler, and so a federal citizen. Requirements for naturalisation were also eased to 10 years residence out of 12 before application, plus reasonable proficiency in spoken Malay or English, good character, and an oath of loyalty. Finally, 3 years fulltime or 4 years part-time service in the armed forces also qualified a person for naturalisation.

This compromise followed tense inter-communal negotiations in the Communities Liaison Committee of 1949-51, during which Malay leaders cautiously ceded extended citizenship in return for promises of greater state economic assistance for rural Malays. They were not, however, yet prepared to accept the principle of jus soli, or local birth automatically conferring citizenship. In total, about 72% of the overall population were citizens under the new laws.
Thus the basis of British policy from 1948 was that it was a protecting power for a federation of sovereign Malay States, while trying to persuade them to gradually increase integration of Indians and Chinese. This stance, and the legacy of Malay anger and suspicion left by the failed Malayan Union experiment, limited British scope. The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), formed in 1946 to defeat the Union, viewed its central task as defending Malay rights. Rulers and their State Menteri Besars (Chief Ministers), meanwhile, were protective of restored Malay sovereignty, and of the ruler’s role as guarantors of Malay rights. The new constitution entrenched some Malay privileges, such as the protection of Malay Reservations. To make matters worse, when mainly Chinese, MCP-led, anti-Japanese guerrillas had emerged from the jungles in 1945 they had held trials of ‘collaborators’ and public demonstrations, with Malay responses leading to inter-ethnic killings. On the eve of the Malayan Emergency, the communal and political atmosphere remained brittle.

Politically, the British had retreated from a plan to bully and blitz war-shocked Malays into accepting a united Malayan nation and common citizenship, to hoping to gradually persuade UMNO and the Malay elite to adopt those aims. The British were also nervously eyeing Malay nationalist groups to the left of UMNO, some with paramilitary aspects. In early 1948, the Malayan Security Service (MSS – replaced by Police Special Branch by August) was spending as much time watching Malay groups as communists.8

The historic basis of the British advisory position was thus that the Malays remained the native population, whose rulers were sovereign. While non-Malays born in the two Settlements were British subjects, most of those born or residing in the Malay States continued to be regarded as aliens in 1948, and even after 1952 upwards of 40% of Chinese were not citizens. In reality the Chinese population was layered. Some were locally-rooted ‘Straits’ Chinese, speaking Malay and English, often wealthy and linked to the administration or European business. Others were Chinese-speaking but invested in business and aligned to traditional Chinese community associations. In addition, there were pro-Kuomintang Chinese.9 These groups provided reservoirs of anti-communist feeling and leadership. But while some had developed, or were developing, a Malayan consciousness, others still regarded themselves as overseas Chinese. The majority were immigrants or children of immigrants.10

The Chinese were further divided between those who dominated Malaya’s biggest towns, and those on small rural plots, on plantations, or in settlements of a few hundred to under 10,000.11 It was the latter, rural groups who would become the epicentre of the Emergency. Malaya’s population started in 1948 at about 5 million, rising to 6 million by the end of the Emergency in 1960. In 1948 about 49% were Malays or other Southeast Asians, 38% Chinese, 11% Indians, and 2% others. That meant that – in the middle of the Emergency, in 1953 – there were 2.15 million Chinese out of a total of 5.73 million. This for a peninsula about the same size as England without Wales and up to 465 miles long. The 2 million plus were also more concentrated on the better developed West Coast States (especially Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Johor), than the poorer East Coast states (such as Pahang) where Malays dominated.12

The main focus of British counterinsurgency was thus on a rural subset of 2 million plus Chinese. Within that, it further focussed on 500,000 Chinese (farmers, rubber tappers and miners) along the forest frontier. Malaya was bisected by mountains running down its
middle from north to south, with jungle covering them and up to 80% of the country. Where this main range tapered out towards the coast, plains, with their estates, mines and Malay kampons (villages), there was a forest fringe. Many Chinese held land there on Temporary Occupations Licenses (TOLs) or illegally. Pre-war the latter — ‘squatters’ — formed a labour pool for estates and mines, absorbed the unemployed, and provided fresh a supply of vegetables. During the war their numbers swelled, as people fled food shortage and Japanese massacres and intimidation, and many became strong supporters of the communist-led anti-Japanese guerrillas. After the war the government tried to re-establish control with TOLs and evictions in 1946-47, and by early 1948 violent crime was finally falling back to post-war lows. But with the MCP’s decision to progressively increase violence from March 1948, that tenuous reassertion faltered.

By this point, many ‘squatters’, and some more settled villages at the foot of the main range, had had more contact with the MCP than the government. They also came from many dialect groups — Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese and more. The government’s difficulty administering such diversity was made worse by the abolition of the pre-war Chinese Protectorate. It was 1949 before the government belatedly backpedalled, appointing Chinese Advisory officers in the states, and Chinese Advisory committees to inform Emergency Committee decisions. The logic of abolishing the Protectorate had been to move from administering groups separately towards building a united ‘Malayan’ nation, but it meant leaving a mainly English and Malay-speaking Malayan Civil Service (MCS), and overwhelmingly Malay police force. At the elite level the MCS only allowed groups other than Malays and Europeans to join from December 1952 (when non-Malays were allowed up to 1/5 of places), even though subordinate civil posts were open to all races.

A central challenge, therefore, was the need to regain influence over rural Chinese, and to further protect and influence more than 600,000 Chinese, Malay and Indian rural estate and mine workers. That meant that upwards of 1.1 million rural farmers and workers, and more Malay kampong (rural village) dwellers alongside them, were extremely vulnerable.

On the communist side the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had a record as the heroic wartime leaders of resistance to Japanese occupation of 1942-45. Its Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) had been supplied by rural Chinese and some Malays, reaching several thousand and cooperating with British special operations officers in the latter stages of the war. It also developed standard operating procedure of killing ‘running dogs’: anyone giving information to the Japanese. It disarmed postwar, but converted into union organisation and ‘united front’ cooperation with other parties: it helped workers best by inflation to win much-needed improvements in wages and conditions. But by early 1948 it concluded that British anti-union action, and increasing Cold War tensions, necessitated a change. Hence its March and May 1948 decisions to prepare for full revolutionary war.

The premature declaration of the Emergency in June meant that initially the MCP raised only around 2-3,000 insurgents, recalling wartime fighters and encouraging union organisers to flee arrest. Insurgent numbers peaked at up to 8,000 in 1951, while remaining more than 90% Chinese. They also had a significant admixture of Malay nationalists inspired by unions, communism, and stories of heroic anti-British Malay fighters. In the early months insurgent groups of up to 100 or more wandered into squatter areas and rural villages, and collected supplies from estate workers. One group
briefly seized the small Hakka hill town of Gua Musang in Kuantan in July 1948, another took the coal mining town of Batu Arang for a day on 12 July. In both cases security forces (SF) rapidly beat back communists. But such actions meant that the SF came to view some rural settlements more as bandit camps or logistics bases than as disputed civilian areas.\(^\text{18}\)

In short, the British administration quickly identified the struggle for rural Chinese as crucial, alongside the need to break up larger insurgent groups. The Chinese, High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney told officials at the Colonial Office in December, ‘are as you know notoriously inclined to lean towards whichever side frightens them more.’\(^\text{19}\) This echoed Malcolm Macdonald’s sentiments as regional Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia. He saw the Chinese as ‘governed by the propaganda of force’.\(^\text{20}\) Throughout 1948 the emphasis therefore remained on army sweeps, small and large ‘screenings’ of villagers and detentions, and relentless pressure.

Over time, the government adopted a wide panoply of practices in order to regain control of rural Chinese. Understanding these is the prerequisite for understanding the campaign as a whole. Yet they are seldom analysed discretely and for development across the campaign. Instead, existing accounts give partial snapshots, in order to integrate them into larger explanatory narratives.

This narrative subordination can be demonstrated with reference to existing accounts. Stubbs, Short and Kumar emphasise initial government ‘counter-terror’ of 1948-49 which alienated Chinese, followed by the ‘Briggs Plan’ (centred on resettling half a million squatters) of 1950 providing a coercive framework. However, Stubbs and Kumar both suggest this was sufficient only to force stalemate by 1951, before more vigour, better propaganda of deed (including good treatment, and better facilities) and attempts to ‘win hearts and minds’ turned stalemate to victory under General (later Field Marshal) Gerald Templer as joint High Commissioner and Director of Operations (DOO) from 1952-54.\(^\text{21}\) My work presents a slightly different narration, with emphasis on the Briggs Plan and tight control being the essential for breaking the back of the insurgent campaign over 1950-52, before subsequently and consequently being able to improve amenities.\(^\text{22}\) In contrast, writers such as Bayly and Harper focus more on weaving the more violent and negative aspects of counterinsurgency into their narrative thread.\(^\text{23}\)

All such narrative strategies carry the danger of over-simplification, at the expense of understanding technique lifecycles on their own terms. Hence, for example, earlier accounts emphasise massive deportation programmes for 1949, but typically say little about equally massive deportation in 1951, and nothing for 1952-55. This raises the question of how far the most coercive techniques continued alongside positive measures later in the campaign. Bayly and Harper, meanwhile, emphasise rehabilitation flaws, but not the high success rates. This raises the question of just how such programmes were adapted and improved over time.\(^\text{24}\)

This paper counters the dangers of oversimplification and of exaggerating the tail-off in highly coercive measures, by providing a better sense of how three key individual techniques developed. That fills a gap in our knowledge (especially for detention and deportation), and constructs a better understanding of the complex ways these different techniques blended across periods. It should also provide a more solid platform for comparison of techniques across campaigns.\(^\text{25}\)
B. Tools of Control: A Helicopter’s eye view of Regulations and Statistics

The Emergency Ordinance of July 1948 gave the High Commissioner power to issue Emergency Regulations (ER), limited by little more than the need to ensure any death penalty was subject to judicial review. For this reason the approximately 226 insurgents who were hanged, typically for carrying weapons or ammunition, went through Malaya’s normal procedure of trial by a judge and two assessors, followed by an appeal hearing.

One of the first Emergency powers taken was for National Registration and the issuing of identity cards for everyone over 12. This took several months from July 1948 to complete. In addition, the Army was called upon to assist the Police in restoring order, and given powers of arrest and search. Preventive detention without trial was also adopted, as the only way of quickly removing people who might otherwise continue the MCP’s killing of ‘running dogs’, and intimidation of kepals.

Detention

Other than national registration, the key Emergency power was detention without trial, in effect indefinitely. ER24(1) allowed a person to be held for up to 24 days while a longer term detention order (DO) was prepared under ER17(1). ER17(1) DOs allowed detainees to be held for an initial 18 months, later extended to an initial 2 years. Upon an order’s expiry another order could be made and the cycle recommence.

Quasi-judicial review was built into the system. From July 1948 detention rules made provision for Advisory Committees in major towns to hear objections and make recommendations to the High Commissioner, and for periodic review of DOs. Detainees could be represented by an advocate. The Advisory Committees proved unable to keep up, so they were replaced by more decentralised and powerful Committees of Review (CoR) by May 1949. The latter had executive powers to decide, and were headed by someone with judicial experience (sitting with a minimum of one more person). They could refer the most difficult cases to a central Review Commission of three. In theory the CoR were to order continued detention if any reasonable doubt, but the looming end of repatriation resulted in orders to accelerate releases from October 1949, including accelerating the release of collectively detained (ER17D) villagers to resettlements, and of those detained for giving small amounts of money and food to insurgents. This in turn led to complaints that police concerns were inadequately addressed and some troublemakers released. By March 1950 new procedures therefore ordered that every time a CoR ordered a release against police advice, the file should go through the detainee’s home state police force to the Review Commission for final decision. Some police and military unsuccessfully pushed in mid-1950 for final decisions in such cases to revert to the central government itself. The Cabinet Malaya Committee backed the government’s tightened procedures as sufficient, having been told that for April-May 1950’s 1371 cases CoR had ordered just 10 released unconditionally, and 197 with bonds for good behaviour, and that the Review Commission with its 2 British officials and one Malay Mentri Besar would undoubtedly follow central policy.26
The above powers covered individuals. Security Force (SF) reprisals against entire villages eventually led to collective detention powers. In September to October 1948 some ‘bad’ areas were dealt with by local OCPDs (Officer Superintending Police District) and SFs, without legal cover. On 20 September a village near Batu Arang had 80 houses burned down. On 2 November 1948 the OCPD Kajang made good on an earlier threat to burn down Kachau Village in the event of continuing proximate incidents. The Nationalist Chinese Consul-General wrote angrily to the Chief Secretary, pointing out this had the odour of Japanese-style reprisals, was indiscriminate, and given the failure to post police nearby, deeply unfair. The administration’s response to these developments came in three pulses. First, by ER18A and B of November 1948 it gave the SF powers to seize and destroy specific buildings from which insurgents had been assisted or harboured, while warning SFs against indiscriminate, ‘punitive’ area reprisals and burnings. Secondly, it instructed that where ‘bad areas’ were to be cleared, the inhabitants’ reception should be properly prepared. Thirdly, it asked police to start to build case files against selected black areas, with a view to area detention or deportation. It then provided for collective detention of the worst areas by ER17D of 10 January 1949.

ER17D allowed for collective detention orders to cover an area for which all or a significant part of the inhabitants were deemed to have been aiding insurgents, or withholding information. It denied rights of objection and appeal that existed under ER17C (individual repatriation orders). In addition, ER 17D(4) allowed anyone detained under ER17D to be deported if not Federal citizens or British subjects. As we have seen, up to 60% of Chinese fell outside these protective categories up to 1952, 40% afterwards.

The underlying assumption was that some areas were virtually bandit camps, and that protection of large numbers of forest fringe communities was all but impossible. With SF sweeps likely to be only temporarily effective, the presence of pro-MCP villages was likely to intimidate nearby areas. With such villagers having little fear for or inducement to obey the government, their physical removal was, by late 1948, seen as the only practical expedient. The High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, had prepared the ground by telling the Federal Legislative Council (when talking about protection money on 18 November 1948), that, ‘As the operations of the police develop there are bound to be cases in which hardship is caused to innocent people who do not feel that they have a duty to distinguish themselves from the guilty. I say this in no way as a threat but as a plain statement of fact that it is inevitable.’

Before a 17D operation was launched, a fairly standard case was developed: that a village’s inhabitants had aided bandits not because of intimidation but willingly, that they could not have failed to know about insurgent activity and yet had refrained from informing or moving, and that there had been a litany of nearby incidents. These villages were sometimes referred to as ‘ghost’ villages. The first ER17D operation was launched at 4am on 11 January 1949. Its target was Sungei Jeloh (Jelok) about 15 miles southeast of Kuala Lumpur and close to Kachau’s ruins: ‘Families were given an hour or so to assemble their belongings, dogs were killed, and livestock and agricultural produce valued’ for compensation. The British were as particular about compensation for moveable property and livestock, as they were about destroying all homes in these ‘ghost’ villages. This formalism could not hide the reality that they contained overwhelmingly women, children and the old, who now ended up in detention camps; and that goods auctioned in distressed circumstances sometimes raised
For many Chinese – even Federal Executive Councillors such as Khoo Teik Ee – such collective action looked horribly like the wartime Japanese approach of deliberately ‘involving innocents’.  

From January to October 1949 over 6,300 people were detained under 16 ER17D, as villages were moved into Detention Camps (DCs) prior to screening. ER17D was then not used in 1950 (as large scale resettlement came into play, and deportation to China temporarily slowed from October 1949), and three times in 1951-52. By the latter dates houses were no longer automatically destroyed, so materials could be reused elsewhere. ER17D was revoked in March 1953 after being used on 10,146 people.

In addition, thousands of villagers were ‘screened’ in situ, without invoking ER17D. One example involved lining villagers up in the glare of jeep headlights, from which a hooded informer – ‘ghosthead’ or kuai tao – pointed out alleged insurgent supporters. In another, informers in a van knocked as villagers passed.

ER17D detainees, meanwhile, joined a swelling DC population. By September 1948 there were 3,360 with 50-60 a day arriving. A camp system was hastily assembled, with an early capacity of 7,250 rising to more than 14,000 at peak. The bigger, purpose built camps such as Kluang in Johore, and Ipoh I and II in Perak, secured 1-2,000 prisoners each, and were subdivided into wired-in compounds containing huts for up to 50-80 people. The sexes were segregated and vegetable plots provided within compounds, as were weekly visits by outsiders.

There was a Board of Inspection, mainly of unofficials from outside, for each camp, entitled to visit at any time and required to do so monthly. The Camp Superintendent was, in theory, required to inform the board of any complaints. Canteens eventually allowed purchase of luxuries, and camps started to provide opportunities for paid work – for instance in camp maintenance, or externally – on a voluntary basis. Basketball and badminton were provided, and sometimes film shows. Ipoh DC by 1955 had a canteen, a basketball court and an open space in most compounds, and regular film shows. The sheer variety of detainees, including everyone from squatters rounded up en masse before 1949 and informers, to hardline communists, also fuelled the danger of internal rivalries and violence.

Communist attempts to dominate camps were sometimes effective, for instance in Pulau Jerejak in 1951. In one instance inmates attacked a visitor identified as a hated pro-Kuomintang supporter, resulting in two detainees being shot dead. Jostling between ex-informants and other prisoners also caused a disturbance at Ipoh Camp in June 1955, at which guards rashly opened fire towards huts, killing two. Grading of prisoners was also introduced, with black (unreformed) and grey (suitable for rehabilitation) categories.

There was also a single camp (later becoming a section only) with stricter discipline and compulsory work, where up to about a hundred cases were sent for up to 6 months a time.

Accounts from internees such as Malay nationalist-communist Rashid Maidin suggest conditions could be primitive, especially by Western standards, but in his case not brutal. He instigated short ‘hunger strikes’ in two camps to successfully demand increased rights to parcels from outside, and additional improvements. On the other hand, detainees
repatriated to China in 1950-51 told stories of torture ranging from beatings in police custody, through pouring pepper juice down their nose and inserting nails (possibly pins or bamboo strips) and pulling fingernails off, to attempted rape. It is impossible to be sure how far this lurid picture is accurate. Tales of house destruction are easily corroborated. Tom Driberg reported Klaung DC generally well run, but that two detainees complained of beatings during police interrogation. Stories of repeated dousing in cold water and drying with a fan, meanwhile, echo postcolonial accusations against Singapore authorities. But the most lurid material outstrips even the MCP’s *Freedom News*, and repeats tropes concerning wartime Japanese torture, so begging further investigation. The British refused a March 1951 request by a China ‘Relief Committee’ to send an ‘Investigating’ team, and Malaya indicated that though it would accept a Red Cross mission if pushed, it feared good ‘Asian’ conditions might seem unfavourable by European standards. The Foreign Office ultimately concluded in 1951 that some of the accusations were currying favour with the deportees’ new communist masters, that Chinese propaganda use of such accusations was inevitable and not likely to impede further repatriations, and so was so a price worth paying for repatriation.

### Table 1 – Detention Camps (DC) in Malaya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Location and type</th>
<th>Capacity and Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ipoh</td>
<td>Ipoh DC I I 1</td>
<td>Camp near Ipoh, the sixth to open, on 1 June 1949. By 1953 used for those without strong communist sympathies.</td>
<td>Ipoh DC I 2,000 Ipoh DC II 2,000 (or between 3,500 and 4,000 in total)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ipoh DC II June 1949 onwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kluang</td>
<td>Constructed October 1948 to 17 January 1949</td>
<td>Fifth Camp to open on 17 January 1949, near Johor Bahru. Eventually women sent here.</td>
<td>1,500 by October 1948, later rising to 2700.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malacca</td>
<td>14 December 1948</td>
<td>Camp near Johor Bahru, the third to open. From July 1952 a section was used as the ‘Special Detention Camp’, taking over from Muar Prison.*</td>
<td>1,500 rising to 2,700 in 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majeedi Estate (also spelt Majeedee, Majeedie)</td>
<td>14 December 1948</td>
<td>Camp near Johor Bahru, the third to open. From July 1952 a section was used as the ‘Special Detention Camp’, taking over from Muar Prison.*</td>
<td>1,500 rising to 2,700 in 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentakab Transit Camp, Pahang.</td>
<td>Late 1949</td>
<td>Police controlled transit camp.</td>
<td>c. 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muar Prison</td>
<td>1 July 1950 to 31 July 1952</td>
<td>‘Special Detention Camp’*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulau Jerejak</td>
<td>October 1948 to 31 October 1951</td>
<td>Camp on an island off Penang, a former</td>
<td>1,400 rising to 1,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
screening centre for immigrants to Penang. First to be converted to a dedicated camp. Later reverted to quarantine use. For detainees in transit to ‘repatriation’, plus relieving other camps. Up to 2,000. Corrugated tin roofs initially causing overheating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Swettenham Transit Camp</td>
<td>1 August 1948 to 30 November 1949 only</td>
<td>Old Quarantine station and isolation block. Gaol taken over by police. 650 in 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seremban</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gaol used for Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiping Prison</td>
<td></td>
<td>Camp 9 miles from Malacca. Turned into a Special Constable Training Camp. 1,000 in 1948 2,250 by 1949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. Additional prisons were used from time to time for smaller numbers and for prisoners before transit to camps.
2. ‘Special Detention Camp’ meant stricter discipline for those not amenable to discipline elsewhere (peaking at 116) or who could or would not associate with other detainees. Unlike other inmates they could be ‘required to work’ (paid), and have letter privileges, visits and luxury purchases reduced. Three grades had increasing privileges. There was a 6 month maximum unless the Chief Secretary confirmed the order transferring there. Normal review procedures applied. 47
3. Detainees with 17C orders could have dependent children with them. 17(1) detainees could have children under 5.
4. Statistics vary across sources, but this usually seems to be due to different inclusions and dates, so figures are broadly consistent.

Compiled from (all sources The National Archives (TNA), Kew Gardens, UK, unless otherwise stated):

1. CO537/3688, Local Defence Committee, ‘Paper on Strategical and Tactical Measures required to deal with Internal Security’, 8 October 1948; and

There were smaller camps for rehabilitation, on the premise that many supporters had been misled or were innocent, and had missed adult direction and education in the war. The biggest, Taiping Rehabilitation Camp, opened on 27 December 1949 at an old Turf...
course, initially taking insurgent supporters - food suppliers, spies, and couriers - not MCP members or hardcore insurgents. It offered basic education (reading in Chinese and English, geography and arithmetic) and 4-6 months of training in vocational skills (from bus mechanics and carpentry to cobbling). The MCA assisted, providing day-old chicks for rearing to go alongside flower and vegetable gardening, and helping to find the job which was a prerequisite for release. 48 Rehabilitation sections were later set up at Majeedi and Morib, for Malay men and for women of any race respectively. Kemendore Agricultural Settlement opened 1953-56 for less than 100, though demand for farming-led rehabilitation remained low. Rehabilitation camps and sections generally worked well, because of careful screening, combined with relatively easy relations between staff and inmates, an open atmosphere, and the potential sanction of return to normal camps. Reoffending for Taiping was extremely low, and a few inmates returned to visit or offer assistance.

Table 2: Rehabilitation Camps (RCs) up to 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (capacity)</th>
<th>Date opened</th>
<th>Course lengths and comments</th>
<th>No restrictions on public and family visits. Unconditional release at the end.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiping, Perak (600 Chinese males aged 18-40)</td>
<td>15 November 1949 to April 1957</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>1,280 passed out by 1 March 1953, 8 returning to communism by that date. 103 returned to DC as unresponsive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morib, Selangor (120 Malay males – increased to 180 later in 1952)</td>
<td>5 May 1952</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>750 Malay males in detention at commencement so a low intake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majeedi, near Johore Bahru</td>
<td>15 August 1952</td>
<td>Intended for 75 females of any race</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. No Indian Rehabilitation Camp (average around 250 general Indian detainees). Labour Department officers with Police Interrogation Units interviewed for release to safe areas. 73 released by 1953.
2. Under 18s went to Advanced Approved School, Telok Mas, Malacca, not RCs.
3. Over 40s generally given selective release to safe areas rather than RCs.
4. Where possible family members underwent rehabilitation simultaneously.
5. Curriculum stressed education, self-respect through education including vocational, reestablishment of family links, and progressively more freedom, e.g. Taiping RC members on probation in the town for hairdressing and other jobs.
6. Aftercare: no release until employment has been found and likely local reception checked. The MCA sometimes helped locally, and there were committees in each
From late 1949 there was pressure to increase releases, with the initial Advisory Boards having proved far too slow. Releases might be arranged due to Committee of Review reports, which could recommend continuation, release on bond, or unconditional release. They could also be ordered under ER17(7)) by the Chief Secretary, so in effect interventions from the MCA or an official body could secure release through his support. The bond system (1948-50) involved payment of a moderate cash deposit, and guarantors for the balance. Alternatively, a person might be released with or without bond on ER17F, to reside in a prescribed place such as a protected resettlement. Dependents (male to 16, female to 18) could also be restricted under ER17F. Around mid-1950 the use of bonds was dropped, in favour of avoiding release if there were doubts (as this carried higher dangers of reducing the flow of information locally), or releasing unconditionally.

Table 3 – Detainee Numbers and Releases for ER 17(1) up to January 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number Detained (at month)</th>
<th>Detention Orders Issued for entire year</th>
<th>Released for year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>5958</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>7,348 (March)</td>
<td>9777</td>
<td>2845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>9,760 (January)</td>
<td>6261</td>
<td>2141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>9,782 (January)</td>
<td>4755</td>
<td>2383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the above efforts, and deportations, the number detained under ER17(1) peaked in 1950, with up to 11,264 in November. The number of DOs issued only began a sustained fall from 1951, down from 6,261 the previous year to 4,755.

More needed to be done to avoid the DC system being overstretched, and to sift out those who could be safely released, with two of the last ER17D operations boosting detainee numbers in 1951-52. From March 1951 to February 1952 multilingual Police Interrogation Units were used periodically (first by collecting people believed to be less strongly communist at Tanjong Bruas, then at other camps). These accelerated processing and were primarily for security, but also screened people for release or rehabilitation. Finally, from 1953 additional 9-monthly reviews were introduced, at which information from the DC, the Chairman of the Committee of Review, and the OCPD for the person’s place of origin, was collated and considered by one senior officer. Later such reviews were held at 6-monthly intervals. The approach was one of trying to deport ‘hard’ cases, while preparing soft supporters or those who renounced violence for eventual release.
Taiping added intensity in vocational and general preparation from 1949, with the same principles echoed within other camps afterwards. As Table 3 below shows, releases rose to 2,845 for 1949 and stayed at a similar level for several years. With DOs falling sharply over the same period, DOs and releases were broadly in balance by 1952. From 1953, even people with stronger communist connections might stand more chance of being released providing they renounced violence, and the area they were to be released to had become relatively free of insurgency.

Table 4 – Overall Detainee Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number Detained (at month)</th>
<th>Detention Orders Issued for entire year</th>
<th>Released for year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>5958</td>
<td>645</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>9777</td>
<td>2845</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>6261</td>
<td>2141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4755</td>
<td>2383</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2801</td>
<td>2793</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 January</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>not known</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3:2 Total Detained under 19 17D Operations until abolition in 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>16 17D operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>No 17D operations. By end of 1950 17D outcomes for 1949 detainees were: deported 817, retained 2,263, the balance resettled or released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 February 1951</td>
<td>Jenderam 1,585.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 November 1951</td>
<td>Tras 2,156. All released before August 195255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 August 1952</td>
<td>Permatang Tinggi 62-66 (sources disagree)56 of 79 found in the village (the rest let go as non-residents). Most were released to the nearby New Village of the same name by January 1953.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Combined Detention Totals for ER17(1) and ER17D

Actual combined totals must be fractionally smaller, because some 17D detainees were subsequently given 17(1) individual DOs, and so might come under both categories.

By December 1951

Approximately 35,759 detained more than 28 days, consisting of: 25,641 ER17(1); and 10,118 ER17D.

By February 1953

Approximately 39,974 detained for more than 28 days, consisting of:
29,828 ER17 (1); and 10,146 ER17D

Total Released to Feb 1953: 10,807

Balance in detention (January) 3,990.

By January 1955

Approximately 42,000, suggesting ER17(1) DOs issued halved yearly from 1952-54.  

Note 1: Detention figures exclude Kemendore Agricultural Settlement

Compiled from:

2. CO1022/132.
3. ISEAS: H.S. Lee Papers Folio 87.

The first big fall in detainee numbers happened over 1952-53, after resettlement peaked, and as SF operations around New Villages were being refined. The physical resettlement of half a million squatters in 1950-52, and thereafter the refining of techniques, was allowing both fewer and more targeted arrests.

There were, however, additional reasons for detainee numbers falling. One was that deportation (detailed below) reached a second high in 1951-52. A second was that ER17 was rarely used after 1949. It remained on the books until March 1953, but was used only three times from 1950: Jendaram in February 1951; Tras in November 1951; and for around 62 villagers of Permatang Tinggi in August 1952.

This later reluctance to use 17D can be ascribed partly to programmatic resettlement from 1950, meaning a ‘bad’ village could be relocated nearby behind wire and with a police post, without the interim stage of detention. But Gurney first suspended most 17D operations around June 1949. This was partly to pressure States into accelerating squatter resettlement planning, and partly because of growing pressure from senior administrators. Edgeworth David, (then Deputy Chief Secretary) had argued that forced assets sales rendered supposed compensation nugatory, that mainly women and children were involved, that in the chaotic conditions families might be separated, and that ‘a more constructive approach’ was needed ‘without further delay’. A further reason for suspending, and ultimately ceasing, these operations was that after the communists came to power in China in October 1949 deportation to China virtually ceased for several months. So the DC system could have been overwhelmed had 17D operations returned to early 1949 rates. Less draconian powers to force communities (ER17E of May) and individual families (ER17F of August) to settle in a specified place were put in place.

Why then were there three late 17D cases in 1951-52? In each case it was used for a combination of punitive and demonstrative effect, in response to two conditions. First, an unarmed and locally based civilian official had been murdered in public view. Secondly, local inhabitants had not provided information, despite high insurgent activity nearby. The press dubbed these ‘sealed lips’ villages. At Permatang Tinggi the Chinese Assistant Resettlement Officer was gunned down broad daylight in a coffeeshop in August 1952,
with police discovering the half burned cigarettes and unfinished drinks of around a
dozen people. The village was fined $4,650 under ER17DA (introduced in December
1950 to allow collective punishment), demolished under 17D, and at least 62 residents
detained. Subsequently, General Sir Gerald Templer (High Commissioner 1952-54)
redoubled reassurances that people who had been pressured by the communists could
give information without fear of being charged.\textsuperscript{61} In addition, for similar cases the
government now more usually restricted itself to using collective ER17DA collective
punishment in situ, which is further discussed below.

By 1951-52 the pattern had shifted from the mass sweeps and screenings of 1948,
through mass detentions and bureaucratised counter-terror of 1949, towards using
resettlement combined with increasingly targeted and intelligence-led arrests of smaller
numbers. Despite this swing of the centre of gravity of the campaign towards
resettlement, something odd happened. Having dipped precipitously in 1950, deportations
soared back towards peak numbers for 1951-52.

\begin{em}
Deportation or ‘Repatriation’
\end{em}

The desire to continue large-scale deportation, even as resettlement accelerated from
1950, demands additional explanation. The roots of deportation go back to 1948-49,
when the administration feared DCs could be overwhelmed by a rising tide of DOs
(possibly leading to escapes or MNLA assisted breakouts). It also worried that non-
communist villagers and ‘fence-sitters’ would be too terrified to offer information so long
as they feared detained local insurgents would one day be released. The administration’s
solution was new powers, modelled on pre-war banishment. The latter had been used to
allow ‘aliens’ convicted of crimes to be returned from the Straits Settlements and Malay
States to their ‘home’ country (usually China). It originally targeted people responsible
for intimidation and secret society crimes, for which it was believed witnesses might be
too frightened to come forward. In 1945-47, however, it was also used on some
communists convicted of public order crimes, though the Colonial Office was reluctant to
see these powers exercised, and demanded reference back to London in each case. With
rising crime in June 1948 the Colonial Office released Malaya from the need to refer
cases to London just before the Emergency was declared. But it continued to insist that
banishment cases, unless criminal, had to be reviewed by a senior judge as well as by the
Federal Executive Council.\textsuperscript{62}

By mid-June the Colonial Office was also was also reconsidering requests that Malaya to
be allowed to banish Indians who were British subjects as well as ‘aliens’. Malayan
authorities had been arguing since 1947 that the MCP was using these Indians to
spearhead labour violence, knowing they could not be deported.\textsuperscript{63} Permission to deport
British subjects was not granted. But for most Chinese there was no such protection. The
turn to mass ‘repatriation’ under Emergency Regulations from October 1948 was
presented as simply using an old small-scale remedy on a magnified scale.

The catch was that though technically ‘alien’ most Chinese were de facto domiciled in
the Federation. Even for those Chinese born in China, many had been brought up in
Malaya. Had the 1945-46 plans to grant citizenship based on local birth been
implemented, many of those eventually deported would have been protected. A further
complication was that deportees were initially encouraged to take dependants, and from January 1949 expellee’s dependents could be required to leave.

The regulations that covered repatriation were ER17C (25 November 1948) and ER17D (10 January 1949). The former allowed for someone to be detained with a view to repatriation, subject to the right to have an objection heard by a committee of review, and the necessity of the High Commissioner in Council confirming the order. The requirement for review by a senior judge was replaced by the requirement for the Appeal Committee (later a CoR) to hear any objection beforehand. The first shipment, including 52 detainees, left for nationalist-held Swatow on 3 December 1948, a second December shipment despatching repatriees for Swatow, Hoihow on Hainan Island, and Amoy. Throughout 1949, lists of up to 100 a time came before the Executive Council, with the barest fraction withdrawn on advice, and around 900 a month deported.

ER17D of 10 January 1949, by contrast, allowed the High Commissioner to authorise collective detention of specified areas, a significant portion of whose inhabitants were believed to have ‘aided or abetted’ terrorists, or failed to provide information. It empowered the High Commissioner in Council to further order the ‘repatriation’ of any such detainees under ER17D(4). In the latter respect, the key point is that it denied the right of objection or appeal. Even the European-owned Straits Times found the latter restriction hard to stomach.

The deportation component of ER17D was introduced partly because ER17C procedure (especially for objections to be heard) was slow, partly because the security forces wanted accelerated clearance of entire ‘bad areas’. With just 262 repatriations by January 1949, Gurney argued that that mass deportations would strengthen the hands of Chinese who wanted to cooperate. Creech Jones as Colonial Secretary told the Foreign Office that though resettlement to new areas could be contemplated for some, for the ‘hard core of intractable communities’ they could only be dealt with ‘by repatriation of all their inhabitants to their home country’.

In March 1949 Gurney told the Colonial Secretary that ‘without repatriation to China […] ‘this weapon’ […] we cannot win our present conflict in Malaya’, and would face Malay reaction. The Malays were portrayed as angry about ‘alien’ Chinese taking land and fomenting violence, and set against ‘rewarding’ such behaviour by resettling many of them. So Gurney sought repatriation of targeted communities identified as interpenetrated with insurgents for multiple reasons: to undermine communist organisation; to remove a cause of intimidation to other communities and so increase cooperation, and to show Malays the government was being firm with those who sowed terror and broke the law, and therefore might justifiably resettle the more cooperative.

The process began fairly slowly in December 1948, but soon the administration was seeking to deport thousands. As far back as September 1948 Malcolm Macdonald – son of Labour Prime Minister Ramsay and an ex Minister for Dominions – had argued that getting rid of 25-50,000 within a year might also ease ‘the racial problem’. By April 1949 Gurney was claiming that the DCs were all but full despite some deportation, making accelerated repatriation was more essential than ever. Gurney was by then still hoping to achieve up to 2,000 repatriations a month, to make the most of the time before the China’s KMT government might fall to communists.
A strange footnote to ER17D is that, though it was used extensively for mass detentions (16 uses in 1949, 3 in 1951-2), and though several hundred a month were deported throughout 1949, most deportations took place under ER17C, on an individual basis. The only mass deportations under ER17D came in February 1949, when 748 of 1,079 deportees were ER17D cases. This was despite Executive Council being asked to approve orders of repatriation for entire villages detained under ER17D in the early part of 1949, with justifications drawn up for each one. Clearly the initial intention was that many ER17D internees should be deported as villages, and the communist successes in China may have avoided still more deportations. In addition, the MCA amongst others quickly applied pressure for an alternative for what were mostly women and children (young men often having fled), suggesting trial resettlements in new areas. The first such experimental resettlement, of around 200, was authorised in August 1949, and soon after orders were given to accelerate the controlled release of 17D detainees. The majority of people rounded up under ER17D therefore spent from a few months in detention camp, were screened, and then released or sent to early resettlement areas from late 1949 to 1950.

Deportees were thus mainly 17C detainees and dependants. The latter could be ordered to leave by an amendment of 17C made on 22 January 1949. Around 8,000 detainees and more than 2,000 dependants were deported on commercial shipping to Hainan, Swatow and Amoy between December 1948 and October 1949, by when the imminent communist takeover of all southern ports brought deportation to a virtual (if temporary) standstill. For the next twelve months there would be just two tiny shipments of willing repatriates, to Hoihow port on Hainan, of 33 (July 1950) and 103 (September 1950) souls. The latter was a trial run, and backfired, with the ship’s captain briefly held in prison and Hainan barring repatriates: Hainan, the last option, was now closed.

Table 5 – Repatriations by Year up to 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of repatriations (compulsory, voluntary and dependants)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>10,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2,804 (all but 136 from November onwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>8,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>5,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>31,249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Break-Down by Race
- Chinese: 29,287
- Indians: 1,786
- Ceylonese: 12
- Indonesians: 164

Notes: figures include voluntary and dependents as well as 17C and 17D repatriations. Hence only 262 17C orders were approved up to January 1949, but more seem to have been repatriated.
Table 6 – Repatriations by ER and whether voluntary or dependent for 1948 to 10 March 1953

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,569</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>2,616</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>14,946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependants</td>
<td>9,090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,036</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2. ISEAS: H.S. Lee Papers Folio 87 and CO1022/132.

Stripping out the dependents, the two tables above imply around 40% (excluding voluntary repatriations) of those detained up to March 1953 were compulsorily deported. They also show a double peak of repatriations, in 1949 at about 10,000, and in 1951 at almost 9,000, falling to 5,575 in 1952. They tapered off rapidly after 1952, the year when citizenship was extended to include at least half Malaya’s Chinese. Around 80 per cent of repatriees (25,879 including 24,036 Chinese) had been despatched by March 1953.

The big dip in 1950 has previously been narrated as if it was the end of mass deportation, despite desperate attempts by the Malayan authorities from mid-1950 to resume China deportation, or find alternative overseas areas to temporarily hold detainees. The Malayan government remained adamant throughout 1950-51 that it was essential to remove hardliners at least temporarily, in order to increase confidence of people the government needed information from, and to avoid the danger of mass breakouts. They also felt strongly in 1948-50 that it would be politically easier to keep Malays onside about land and funds going into Chinese resettlement, if they saw recalcitrant Chinese elements being removed. Finally, they feared the deteriorating situation in French Indochina in 1950, as well as the British recognition of the Peoples Republic of China on 6 January 1950, could affect morale in Malaya.

Between June and October 1950 British regional authorities investigated multiple possible overseas sites. Gurney, backed by Malcolm MacDonald, mooted sending detainees temporarily to North Borneo (the Governor was horrified, but Malaya became more insistent later in the year), to the New Zealand and Australian-controlled Solomon Islands (30,000 Japanese had been interned on Fauro Island in the war, but it proved too distant and its trustee powers sceptical), to Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean or the Cocos Keeling group (both proving impracticable on grounds of water, supplies or accessibility), or to Langkawi (too close to home to be ideal). Ultimately Gurney also backed the Commanders-in-Chief Far East’s suggestion that, should relations with China...
deteriorate drastically, one dramatic ‘dump’ of several thousand could be made by landing craft on the south China coast.79

Malayan authorities even asked about Kenya by August 1950, to be told that colony was still licking its wounds after it had taken wartime Polish refugees, only to still have the last of these lingering into 1950.80 With almost all alternative locations ruled out, MacDonald warned the Governor of North Borneo in November 1950 that, if the option of a large dump of detainees at Chinese beaches or ports stalled, he might be compelled to ‘issue a direction’ to North Borneo.81 By this point Malaya wanted to ship around 4,000 detainees and 8,000 dependants, with the number increasing by about 200 a month. That included ‘a Communist hard core’ of around 600 who could not be allowed to go to China, from where they might be used against Malaya.82

When Gurney met the Colonial Secretary and Colonial Office (CO) officials in London on 27 October 1950, he told them that ‘if detainees and their dependants could be removed to China, the Communist campaign in Malaya would collapse in months’. It was ‘the most important single step’. This was playing to the gallery, as London officials and ministers were worried that the Briggs Plan for resettlement had not generated quicker success, which they had hoped might release troops amidst conflict in Korea and the heightened Cold War tensions. The Minister of Defence had already requested a memorandum on the Malayan situation.83

The ‘dump’ idea therefore seemed, by late November 1950, possibly the only way of avoiding forcing North Borneo to host up to 12-15,000 detainees and dependants on one of its islands, with attendant risks of worsening its communist issue, and alienating local opinion. The idea of a China dump originated with the Federation Secretariat in August 1950. The Commanders-in-Chief Far East were asked for their opinion, and suggested ‘dumping’ repatriees on South China Coast beaches or ports en masse by landing craft would be required. In October, John Higham in the CO suggested a variant, of confronting the Chinese government with several shiploads and daring them not to take the detainees. Lt. General Briggs raised the ‘dump’ issue directly with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Colonial Secretary in London on 24 November. He thought the earliest date would be after the northeast monsoon waned, around February 1951. Asked to report back, the Foreign Office said the operation would be conceivable only if China relations had broken down, and the Vice Chiefs of Staff that landing craft could probably not be spared. They needed to be preserved for a preemptive seizure of the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand to screen Malaya in case of regional war, or in case they were needed in Korea. Besides which, driving women and children off landing craft with water hoses, against possible Chinese opposition, was not palatable. Consequently, the Colonial Secretary was inclined to recommend that Malaya look for alternative ways of ‘dumping’, or reinvestigate alternative overseas destinations.84

Just as these fantastical deportation discussions were taking place, repatriations to China on commercial shipping started to flow again. From the arrival of the Norwegian officered Muinan at Swatow on the evening of 25 November, they continued at roughly 1 to 2 shiploads a month.85 The key to this November 1950 resumption was twofold. Firstly, on 9 October a shipload of 1,291 ordinary Chinese travellers from Malaya had landed in Swatow without repercussions, despite the Chinese press wrongly representing these as deportees. Secondly, the Wah Seng Shipping company used connections to persuade the Swatow local authorities to cooperate (possibly involving
Canton/Guangzhou’s agreement), and so offered to provide a ship. British authorities assumed the approach had mixed bribery with an appeal to compassionate grounds.86

With Foreign Office nervousness assuaged, on 4 November the Colonial Office authorised a trial despatch of deportees to Swatow. The first new batch of 693 repatriees left Port Swettenham on 16 November on the Muinan and, following a brief stop at Hong Kong (which insisted they stay on board) most arrived at Swatow on 23 November 1950. Two less arrived than departed. The deportees tried 10 of their number as British spies. Two ‘had their brains beaten out with wooden cudgels’ after failing to ‘confess’, the others being handed over to the communist Chinese authorities by the deportees. The Swatow authorities then charged the shipping agents for onward travel to final destinations (only around 40% being bound for Swatow).87 From now on those detained and linked to the Swatow to Canton region could be sent, excluding therefore most Hainanese and Hokkiens. A year later almost 9,000 more had been repatriated, at up to 1,200 a month.88 The surprise, therefore, is that repatriation not only recommenced but became almost as high as in 1949.

By this point, with Chinese authorities taking over onward passage and charging the Malayan authorities via the shipping company, a degree of order descended over the process. But earlier arrangements reeked of callousness. In 1948 to April 1949 repatriees had gone by chartered ship to junk to shore. There had been problems with delays, and with some reaching their onward destinations, with Malaya only supposed to be sending people who originated from around the destination port. A consul was appointed for Swatow and soon repatriees were being received by the likes of the Swatow Charitable Guild.89 In theory deportees were supposed to have compensation paid for any property seized upon detention, and could take personal goods, but in early 1949 Swatow authorities complained many arrived destitute. Policy became to provide $25 Straits per adult and $10 per child, and offer ‘a blanket, a pair of trousers and a pullover’, plus a pair of rubber shoes per child, and to fund passage to eventual destination via refunding agents.90

In 1951 the authorities continued ‘to leave no stone unturned’ in investigating alternatives in case China again refused deportees: dismissing deportation to Formosa (Taiwan) as akin to a death sentence.91 But the move away from wanting to deport large numbers started from 1952, by the end of which resettlement of rural Chinese was mostly complete, and citizenship changes meant fewer Chinese were deportable aliens. From that year numbers declined drastically. By 1954 they were under 1,000 for the year, and the government was determined to maximise the effect of this shrinking number.

The Government sought this by instituting selective, rapidfire deportation. The pre-existing average time for deporting the last few thousand had been 374 days. Now a procedure was devised for demonstrative deportation of ‘selected Chinese’ in target villages. State War Executive Committees (SWECs) were told they would be informed of a pending repatriation ship, and should then issue DOs under ER24 to ‘Priority Ds’. These should be quickly moved to Port Swettenham DC, where final reviews (with a 7 day deadline), appeals, advice to dependants (14 days to join), and processing would be accelerated to achieve ER 17(C) deportation in under 60 days from arrest. Cases should be that there was Special Branch information insurgents were gaining supplies from a place their relatives were living in, creating ‘a reasonable presumption that these relatives are assisting terrorists, or are in a position to do so’. The subject should ideally not be so
young or infirm as to invite sympathy. The idea was to maximise impact on villagers near the deportee’s residence, who would be told 60 days after arrest that ‘these men are on their way to China, are there any other takers’. This reflected a trend from 1953-4 towards more targeted use of controls, combined with continuing willingness to use the drastic step of deportation against people for whom China might be a distant memory, if that.92

By 1955, however, deportations could no longer happen against the detainee’s will, as China was only accepting those travelling voluntarily. The days of significant deportation were over.93

Resettlement and Regrouping.

This paper is mainly concerned with the under-studied campaign lifecycles of detention and deportation. They cannot be fully understood, however, without outlining the way resettlement interacted with these more draconian options.

Even though resettlement only took off after March 1950, it had been identified as crucial much earlier. By October 1948 a quadripartite thrust had developed, which emphasised: opening up some areas with police posts and roads; using SF to break up bandit concentrations in some; letting a few areas ‘boil up until we can arrest and detain’ the inhabitants en masse (later under ER17D); and, finally, resettling select areas. Gurney had warned the police after Kachau was destroyed in November 1948 that burning out areas without proper provision for inhabitants could not be tolerated, and that government must be able to offer squatters positive alternatives.94 Gurney therefore accelerated the formation and work of the Squatter Committee, which sat from December 1948 and reported in January 1949. Its report concluded that ‘the only solution is to settle the squatters, wherever possible in the area which they already occupy’.95

So resettlement was seen as part of a multi-pronged approach early on, and there were experiments in 1948-49. So why did it take so long to switch from primary reliance on army sweeps and screenings, supplemented by 17D clearances and deportation in 1949, to resettlement? Up to March 1950, just before the Briggs Plan commenced, just 18,500 had been resettled. In addition, early experiments had indifferent results. About 2,000 villagers from Sungei Siput were relocated, variously to town edges and over 1,000 to Sungei Batu. But the latter failed, the ground being poorly prepared, and many drifting back from the tents set up for them for the 6 months period needed to establish new crops.96 Another attempt in 1949, to resettle detainees from Kluang DC to Mawai in Johore, initially worked, though poor land, lack of perimeter wire (it was seen as a model free community), and a successful communist attack which recruited 26 youths, led to its closing in 1951.

The Squatter Committee report addressed failures by insisting most resettlement should be close to existing homes. Gurney kept the pressure on the States to complete their own reports throughout 1949. Unfortunately he did not initially promise the scale of federal financing that might have overcome their reluctance, especially as incident rates fell during much of 1949. On 17 May 1949 he berated Menteri Besars, telling them they needed to identify resettlement land, and should look to the MCA for some funds.97 He added ER17E on 29 May 1949, which gave States power to force people to move to specified areas, avoiding the danger of Sungei Siput style reflux. On 31 May he warned
that States needed ‘to at once show the potentially loyal squatters what we can offer them in the way of peaceful livelihood, free from intimidation’, and that he might call off some operations if resettlement did not pick up.\(^8\) He temporarily suspended 17D orders everywhere except in Pahang in June, but State discussions ground on slowly, as did 17D operations, until October.\(^9\)

By September Johore, Perak and Negeri Sembilan had either started small experiments with resettling detained squatters, or were about to do so. By December Perak and Johore’s State Squatter Committees had endorsed wide scale resettlement. The States also formed Chinese Advisory Committees during 1949, to articulate specifically Chinese needs. Beyond the question of how to resettle people, however, States controlled land, and in 1949-50 some were still reluctant to allow permanent squatting settlement on land that would then be denied to Malays, mines, estates, or forest.

### Table 7 – Resettlement (cumulative totals)

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<tr>
<td>1950 – March 10</td>
<td>18,500 (then estimated 300,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950 – end</td>
<td>117,198</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1951 – September</td>
<td>333,712</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 – end</td>
<td>401,698 in 353 New Villages</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952 – March</td>
<td>423,000 in 410 New Villages</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952 – end</td>
<td>461,822 in 509 New Villages</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>573,000 in 480 New Villages(^100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>450 New Villages remaining</td>
<td></td>
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Source: CO1022/29 Resettlement; and ISEAS, Tan Cheng Lock Papers 24, for Federation of Malaya 33 of 1952, ‘Resettlement and the Development of New Villages’\(^101\)

Resettlement only gathered real pace from mid-1950, after a resurgence of incidents led to a sense of crisis, the appointment of Lt-General Sir Harold Briggs to the new post of Director of Operations (DOO), and his comprehensive ‘Briggs Plan’ was launched in June. The vast majority – about 380,000 people in around 400 New Villages – happened in 21 months from mid-1950 to December 1951. More than 10% of the Chinese population was resettled during this period. A further 600,000 rural labourers were regrouped: their housing concentrated behind defended wire near workplaces. From June 1950 population movement far outstripped detention and deportation combined despite the latter reaching a second peak during 1951: population movement had become the centre of gravity of the campaign.

By 1951, therefore, rural Chinese most likely to be resettled into areas that would be rebranded ‘New Villages’ in 1952. These were both highly restricted, with a police post, Home Guard, barbed wire, curfews, and searches at the gates, but also budding communities which by 1952 had started to receive schools, community centres and local elections. Their origins were very varied (some had been resettled at gunpoint with no warning, others had transported materials after prior warning and preparation).

New Village experiences at any one time also varied dramatically. During normal periods a New Village experienced food restrictions (rice rations and limits on taking food out of
the village) and curfews. Select villages deemed to have withheld information after murders of unarmed officials (especially resettlement officials) might have these increased to collective punishment levels under ER17DA, typically with a few days to two weeks of shops opening only a few hours, almost total curfew, and in some cases a collective fine. Over 1952-53 these atypical actions were increasingly blended with ‘Operation Question’ (questionnaires going direct from villager to the High Commissioner, and later individual interviews too), and then ‘Ginger’ treatment. The latter was to ‘reward’ information given under ‘Questionnaire’, for instance by improving pig breeding stock, or additional amenities. More typically, however, a New Village either had most restrictions relaxed when the wider area they belonged to became ‘White’ due to falling incidents, or suffered weeks of more intense ‘operational’ restrictions when local MNLA groups and MCP committees were targeted by SF. The idea was to deprive the MNLA of supplies, and so force it to rely on less reliable suppliers who could be turned, providing information which would generate further kills or surrenders, and so on in a virtual cycle. Each operation was intended to smash a particular group or committee, ultimately facilitating another White Area being established. In 1953 ER17D and then ER17DA were both rescinded.\textsuperscript{102}

Hence by late 1953 to 1954 there was a diversity of conditions in which rural Chinese might be, ranging from ‘White’ area status, through normal to operational restrictions. But this no longer included collective detention, and the rate of deportation had slowed to a trickle, largely comprising voluntary repatriees only by 1955. Villagers were increasingly ‘between two terrors’ as they had been up to 1950 at least, as government protection became more effective, and the benefits of development more evident. They were also increasingly likely to qualify for leases on land – however little this was initially taken up – citizenship, and local elections. By 1956-58, as restrictions eased, some New Villagers would return to their old homes (even to some destroyed 17D sites), but the vast majority survived, many being absorbed into the suburbs of nearby towns.

\textit{Conclusions}

This paper has sketched the trajectories of three main tools used to frighten, coerce, control and cajole rural Chinese. These trajectories sometimes challenge expectations derived from existing historiographies. Above all, the main move within each was not so much from counter-terror to ‘winning hearts and minds’, as from collective and poorly targeted to tightly targeted. Hence mass deportation continued alongside more constructive resettlement in 1951-52, moving towards the highly selective and demonstrative ‘accelerated; deportation procedure proposed in 1954, to becoming insignificant by 1955. Throughout the campaign, in addition, there was an emphasis on contrasting the consequences of cooperation with those of silence or opposition. The difference was that early retribution (such as collective detention under ER17D, and mass screenings) tended to be poorly focussed and later action more fine-tuned (such as Templer’s blended use of collective punishment and then reward for information under ER17DA-‘Ginger’ one-tos of 1952-53). The ‘New Villages’ also continued to have a varied experience right up to independence, ranging from being in ‘White Areas’ with few or no controls, through having normal level night curfews and gate checks, to tightened rations and curfews and patrols during ‘operational’ periods when the SF aimed to crush nearby MNLA and MCP committees.
Nevertheless, this analysis of the techniques and their interaction does broadly confirm a ‘counter-terror’ period when British soldiers and administrators thought in terms of needing to pressure squatters into withdrawing communist support, and in terms of deporting those who did not respond. The combination of large-scale repatriation, detention, army sweeps, and episodic killings of civilians of 1948-1949 imposed a huge cost in human suffering, coldly justified as necessary to prevent even more suffering should squatters not be brought into line. It should also be subdivided into the more chaotic counter-terror mark 1 of 1948, and the more bureaucratised and controlled, 17D-driven counter-terror mark 2 of 1949. MCA President Tan Cheng Lock and writer Han Su Yin’s picture of the rural Chinese as crushed between two terrors, or two millstones, in these two counter-terror periods expresses the dilemmas created by what was at heart a ‘civil war’ over what decolonisation would look like. As one New Village interviewee put it in 2008, ‘You must keep silent, away from both sides, the local Min Yuen and government informants, otherwise you will get into trouble one day’.\(^{103}\) Partly as a consequence, the MNLA continued to increase recruitment until it peaked in 1951.

By 1950, however, a shift away from poorly targeted and intimidatory tactics was underway, towards ‘coercive protection’. Villagers were resettled en masse, and increasingly tightly controlled, with controls becoming vice-like as operations in any area climaxed. Even those elements of collective punishment that remained became intermeshed with protection, offers to help villagers with defence and development, and a desire to foster living and democratic communities.

This could be read two ways. On one level it is surprising if not shocking, for instance, that large-scale deportation of Malayan-domiciled Chinese reached a second peak in 1951-52. On another, it is clear that no one tactic defined the essence of the British approach across 1950-54. Rather, there was a shift towards a strategy which combined highly coercive elements such as repatriation, tight food controls, and spatial control, with more developmental aims. Furthermore, the crux of British operations was the integration of army operations, through a system of War Executive Committee at Federal, State and District level, into combined food-intelligence-security force operations around clusters of New Villages, aimed to pressure particular communist committees and leaders into surrender or ambush and death.

If British approaches and policy blends shifted rather than lurched across periods, and continued to blend sharply contrasting tactics, the legacy for rural Chinese was also mixed. For the families of victims of government shootings in 1948, or for involuntary deportees, or people who were detained and lost much of what they had built up, the results could be shattering. For the 570,000 left in New Villages after 1960, they nevertheless found themselves in communities which had a range of basic facilities and rights to lease land: the vast majority of New Villages were still in existence in 1970, by when they hosted over a million inhabitants.\(^{104}\)

The other thing the Malayan example suggests is just how differently particular techniques, such as detention, could be executed in different conflicts. The work of Elkins and Anderson has established the extensive use of brutality in Kenyan detention camps of the 1950s, alongside a deliberate policy of using dilution and physical shock to break Mau Mau prisoners. In Malaya, by contrast, DCs look more like a blend of prison and regular prisoner of war camp, with the most violent episodes stemming from
detainees attacking each other or visitors. Deportees were left sufficiently to themselves to manage a trial and brutal execution of two of their number on a November 1950 shipment. Its worst features may in part have stemmed from geography and haste, with corrugated roofs at Port Swettenham transit camp, for instance, leaving inmates broiling, while other features primitive (attap, or palm roofed, huts at Taiping RC), but reflecting common practice in villages across Malaya.

There are many possible reasons for the contrasts between Malaya and Kenya in particular. These include different perceptions of the ‘enemy’ (the Mau Mau as an oath-bound almost semi-magical or antimodern force, MNLA and supporters as rational actors who could be persuaded to renounce violence and seek independence and fortune peacefully). At the same time, the sheer scale and length of the deportation programme, with mass shipments into 1951-52, may have removed many of the ‘hard’ cases that were the subject of such ferocity in Kenya.105

By contrast to the relatively limited accusations made against the DCs, deported Chinese made easily verifiable accusations that their villages had been burned in 1948 and 1949 that promised compensation had often not materialised, and more lurid allegations of police brutality in questioning in the days after arrest. More research on the latter is needed (some of it by oral history amongst deportees and in archives in China), but equally clearly the opportunity for that research is dying off with every passing year.

Above all else, this article shows how each of the techniques employed against ‘hostile populations’ and in ‘counterinsurgency’ demand their own, detailed, lifecycle studies, to establish each one’s unique nature and trajectory. These studies are essential prerequisites both for understanding how such techniques blended across different periods in each territory, and for comparing such techniques and blends across colonies and empires.

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2 *Straits Times*, 17 June 1948.
3 *Straits Times*, 15 June 1948.
5 Parnell, ‘Malayan citizenship legislation’, 504-18.
6 Purcell, *Malaya: Communist or Free?*, 56 suggests 385,000; Mills, *Malaya*, 83 gives the figures used.
7 *Straits Times*, 15 Sept. 1952, p. 6 editorial ‘Citizenship Day’.
9 The National Archives (henceforth TNA): CO537/3758, Gurney to Lloyd, 8 Oct. 1948.
10 Most pre-1930s immigrants (until immigration restrictions and greater local family formation), were single males who aimed to return ‘home’.
12 Malay spellings are given in the modern form, which varies slightly from that used in the 1950s, eg Johor now and Johore then, Menteri rather than Mentri, etc.
13 Blackburn and Hack, *War Memory and the Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore*.
15 Tan, ‘Oral History and Traumatic Memory’: Pulai as a Case Study’.
16 Hack, ‘The origins of the Cold War in Asia: Malaya’.
18 Hack, ‘The art of counterinsurgency analysis’.
20 TNA: CO537/3688, BDDC (FE) 12 meeting of 27 September 1948, minutes.


Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Wars*.


There is an excellent overview on a technique by technique basis. But it still suffers from a lack of country studies for each technique, for instance not quite communicating just how very different, say, resettlement, camps, and rehabilitation were, in Malaya and Kenya. David French, *The British Way in Counterinsurgency, 1945-1967* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Co717/199/1, Cabinet Malaya Committee Mal C(50)24, Minute by Colonial Secretary, ‘Detention Procedure’, 10 July 1950, passim.

Straits Times, 24 Sept. 1948, 5.

TNA: CO537/4750, Gurney to Colonial Secretary, 3 Jan. 1949 [mislabelled 1948], passim. The OCPD had issued the warning to all adults on 11 Oct. after a Malay barber at work in the village was killed.

For a Sept.-Oct. 1948 explanation of the various needs for more draconian action (including the suggestion of posting punitive police posts at local cost), see TNA: CO537/3688, Local Defence Committee, Federation of Malaya, ‘Paper on the strategical and tactical measures to deal with the internal security problem . . .’, October 1948 version.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (henceforth ISEAS): HS Lee Papers Folio 55.

ISEAS: H.S. Lee Papers 54.21, Ex.Co No 2/20/49, Reference to Exec. Council for an Order of Repatriation under ER 17(D) for Sungei Jeloh/Sungei Siput, passim.


ISEAS: H.S. Lee 54, Minutes of Executive Council, 15 September 1948, responding to Mr Wallich proposing 50 be deported after a warning that this would happen if there were further proximate ‘shooting incidents’ in an area.

Federation of Malaya No 24 of 1953, 17.

TNA: CO537/7280, Collective Punishment, Gurney to Secretary of State, no. 168, 25 Feb. 1951.

Arkib Negara Malaysia (henceforth ANM): 1957/6471255 covers rehabilitation courses of 4-6 months in Ipoh DC in 1955, after which releases were set free ‘unconditionally’.

TNA CO1022/132, Federation of Malaya No 24 of 1953, ‘Detention and Deportation During the Emergency in the Federation of Malaya, and related papers, 4-5. In cases of doubt the review committee could refer (ER17(4a)) to the Central Review Commission, which in 1953 was chaired by the Attorney-General, with the Secretary of Chinese Affairs and Menteri Besar Selangor also on it. Decisions were by majority vote.

ISEAS: H.S.Lee Papers 54.33, Federal Executive Council, 4 July 1950, Mr Watherston as Secretary for Defence.

A 10 October 1949 ER17D amendment allowed for selective as well as collective and comprehensive detention orders versus an area, the former seeming to happen at Permatang Tinggi. It also allowed for selective release on bond.


TNA: CO1022/56; Kumar, 137-8.

TNA: CO717/177/4, Minutes of Commissioner-General’s Conference (Bukit Serene), Sunday 12 Sept. 1948: to be fair he also envisaged others being settled on land with some sort of title to it.

TNA: CO717/210/1.

CO1022/132, Extract from F.M Sav. 1601, 19 Aug. 1953, shows just 66 17D detainees out of 5,415 (including 925 dependants) on 29 Aug. 1952, and 0 (zero) out of 2,647 (278 dependants) on 23 Aug. 1953.

TNA: CO537/5992, Extract from Federation Monthly Newsletter No. 20, 16 Aug. to 15 Sept. 1950.

TNA: DOO 1957, gives 12,000, possibly only counting compulsory Chinese detainees, and voluntary or dependents.

Hence even the reliable French, The British Way in counterinsurgency, 110, suggests only ‘some’ deportations after 1949.

TNA: CO537/4240, ‘Note on the Problem of the Chinese’, Joan A. Gaved, no date but late 1950. CO537/5993, Trop Secret ‘Appreciation by the North Borneo Local Defence Committee’.

An excellent account of the policy from origins up to 1950, which nevertheless has little to say about 1951 and afterwards, is Low, ‘The repatriation of the Chinese as a counter-insurgency policy’, 363-92.

TNA: CO537/5992.

TNA: CO537/5992, Letter from MacDonald to Gov. of North Borneo, 1 Nov. 1950.


TNA: CO537/5992, ‘Note of a Meeting held on Friday October 27th’; Draft Minute by Secretary of State for Prime Minister, no date but around December 1950.
TNA: CO537/5992, Deportation of Chinese (1950). East Africa was ruled out due to previous delays removing ‘temporary’ Polish refugees, Tanganyika as its trustee status would give the UN a role.


TNA: CO537/5993, MacDonald to FO, No. 136, 20 Oct. 1950. Amoy was considered unsafe, Hoihow had refused in September, and Swatow had insisted on Beijing’s consent.

Low, ‘The Repatriation of the Chinese’, 381 for this one shipment.


ANM: 1957/0537490. Templer Papers (courtesy of Miles Templer): Templer to Lyttelton, 4 March 1954, including for the quotation. The sources variously give 52 and 56 days as the procedure time.


TNA: CO537/4761, ‘Notes of a Meeting held between Gurney and the Mentri Mentri Besar’.

TNA: CO537/4761, Minute by Gurney, 31 May 1949.


Hacker, 2009 and Exteter and pp for op model and NV.

Tan, ‘Like a concentration camp, lah’, 226.
