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A game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity networks

Yang, Mu; Sassone, Vladimiro and Hamadou, Sardaouna (2012). A game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity networks. In: Principles of Security and Trust: First International Conference, POST 2012, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2012, Tallinn, Estonia, March 24 - April 1, 2012, Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, pp. 269–289.

URL: http://www.etaps.org/2012/
DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_15
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Abstract

Anonymity systems are of paramount and growing importance in communication networks. They rely on users to cooperate to the realisation of an effective anonymity service. Yet, existing systems are marred by the action of ‘selfish’ free-loaders, so that several cooperation incentives are being proposed.
We propose a game-theoretic model of incentives in anonymity networks based on parametric utility functions, which make it flexible, adaptable and realistic. We then use the framework to analyse the cost of cooperation and the performance of the gold-star incentive scheme in the Crowds protocol

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item
Copyright Holders: 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
ISBN: 3-642-28640-2, 978-3-642-28640-7
Academic Unit/School: Faculty of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) > Computing and Communications
Faculty of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM)
Item ID: 40665
Depositing User: Mu Yang
Date Deposited: 06 Aug 2014 07:59
Last Modified: 02 May 2018 14:01
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/40665
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