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Towards adualism: becoming and nihilism in Nietzsche’s philosophy

Dries, Manuel (2008). Towards adualism: becoming and nihilism in Nietzsche’s philosophy. In: Dries, Manuel ed. Nietzsche on Time and History. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 113–145.

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Abstract

For Nietzsche’s hypothesis of a threat of nihilism to be intelligible, this chapter attributes to him at least three assumptions that underpin his philosophical project: (1) what there is, is becoming (and not being), (2) most (if not all) strongly believe in being, and (3) nihilism is a function of the belief in being. This chapter argues that Nietzsche held two doctrines of becoming: one more radical, which he believes is required to fend off nihilism, and one much more moderate—the ontology of relations he develops under the label ‘will to power’. Based on the latter he attempts (but ultimately fails) to develop an ‘adualistic’—neither monistic nor dualistic—practice of thought, a ‘simultaneity-thinking’ ("Zugleich-Denken") that would no longer be subject to nihilism.

Item Type: Book Section
Copyright Holders: 2008 Walter de Gruyter
ISBN: 3-11-019009-5, 978-3-11-019009-0
Keywords: philosophy of history; history
Academic Unit/School: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Politics, Philosophy, Economics, Development, Geography > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Politics, Philosophy, Economics, Development, Geography
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
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Item ID: 38216
Depositing User: Manuel Dries
Date Deposited: 22 Aug 2013 12:18
Last Modified: 07 Dec 2018 20:01
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/38216
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