On the Logic of Values

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ABSTRACT: This article argues that Nietzsche’s transvaluation project refers not to a mere inversion or negation of a set of nihilism-prone, Judeo-Christian values but, instead, to a different conception of what a value is and how it functions. Traditional values function within a standard logical framework and claim legitimacy and “bindingness” based on exogenous authority with absolute extension. Nietzsche regards this framework as unnecessarily reductive in its attempted exclusion of contradiction and real opposition among competing values. I propose a nonstandard, dialetheic model of valuation that requires a value to be both true and false as well as neither true nor false.

In our Europe, life is no longer quite so uncertain, contingent, nonsensical. [...] The power man has achieved now allows a reduction of those means of discipline of which the moral interpretation was the strongest.

—KSA 12:5[71]

The logic of our conscious thinking is only a crude and facilitated form of the thinking needed by our organism [...] A simultaneity-thinking [ein Zugleichdenken], for example, is needed of which we have hardly an inkling. [...] We are still growing continually, our sense of time and place, etc., is still developing.

—KSA 11:34[124]

Beliefs, Values, Norms

‘Value,’ as I use it in this article, refers to “stuff”—regardless of its ontological status—that is considered “good.” By ‘norm’ I mean prescriptions of how certain modes of conduct “ought” to be. There is a nonarbitrary relationship between norms that prescribe actions designed to instantiate values and those values themselves. Nietzsche has a number of reservations regarding the values and norms active in Judeo-Christian societies. He believes that practices are linked to a particular selection of values and that these values themselves are selected based on a small set of very basic, but immensely powerful,
“incorporated assumptions” (*einf"ulibte Annahmen*), which I will refer to as meta-valuations: “We stand under the law of the past [the most primitive and longest prehistory of humanity and animality] i.e., *its assumptions and valuations* (KSA 9:11[334]).

If norms are the kinds of action-inducing prescriptions that weave the fabric of human reality, and if norms are geared toward the adjusting of actions with the goal of instantiating values, and values themselves are governed by very powerful meta-valuations, then real change requires a revision of those meta-valuations. With this in mind, I will provisionally circumscribe *Umwerthung* (transvaluation) as Nietzsche’s project to

(i) analyze and change one or several meta-valuations, with the goal to
(ii) affect a set of values that depend on the meta-valuations, in order to
(iii) change the norms within a society.¹

1. Nihilism and Transvaluation

1.1. Nihilism, Meta-valuations, and the Exclusive Disjunction

It is clear from the *Nachlass* that the motivation for Nietzsche’s transvaluation project is the problem of nihilism: if x believes, for example, that there are souls, that is, “some kind of unchanging kernel of a person that continues to exist beyond that same person’s death,” and x comes to believe that there are no such things as “souls” and yet continues to adhere to the belief that if there is anything that makes a person’s life worth living it can only be souls, then nihilism as the “falling into the opposite valuation”—“Everything is false” (KSA 12:2[127])—is a real threat.² This exclusive disjunction allows for only two evaluative outcomes: *either* life is worth living *or* it is not worth living; if there are no souls and souls are the kinds of things human beings require to live a life worth living, then life loses its value. The logic at work here is the same in the most comprehensive, world-negating form of nihilism: “The logical world negation and nihilization follows from our need to oppose being to non-being and the denial of the concept ‘becoming’” (autumn 1887, KSA 12:9[62]).³ To add a third example: if someone believes that absolute metaphysical truth T is a real possibility and then, in striving to attain this, comes to believe that there is no such thing as T with which our beliefs can correspond but instead only local, contextually valid truths, then truth is another one of the “*highest values that devalue themselves* [die obersten Werthe {die} sich entwerthen]” ([1887], KSA 12:9[35]); if someone continues to adhere to the belief that T is of the highest value, the exclusive disjunction takes effect again and T’s unavailability might lead to the conclusion that existence without T has very little, almost no, value.
Nietzsche argues that, ultimately, this problem stems from a set of decisive meta-valuations by which we are bound and which guide most of our dependent values and valuations:

The ephemerality of man may be the effect of erroneous incorporated assumptions.
At the start of all mental activity stand the coarsest assumptions and fictions, e.g., Identity Thing Persistence. They are coeval with the intellect and it is essentially modeled on the latter. —Only the assumptions remained that were compatible with organic life. (KSA 9:11[335])

“Identity Thing Persistence,” this set of conative, evaluating meta-assumptions, is usually not immediately transparent to those who “hold” them; and yet they are active in all of our language, grammar, cognitive beliefs, and evaluations, including those intersubjectively shared beliefs that are significant for a group’s practical decision making. They, too, are interwoven with our meta-valuations.

In order to understand the phenomenon Nietzsche calls nihilism and to appreciate what transvaluation is meant to achieve, we need to grapple with the complexity that governs conative meta-valuations and individual and shared conative and cognitive valuations (Wertschätzungen). Elsewhere I have defined this type of nihilism as a “function of the belief in being.” The more deeply ingrained the conative and cognitive meta-value of being (Sein) understood as perceptual and cognitive-conceptual stability and permanence, the more virulent the experience of nihilism when confronted with “becoming” (Werden), that is, that which escapes any attempt of perceptual and cognitive-conceptual stabilizing rationalization and systematization.

Nietzsche holds that at least since Copernicus, the originally conative and now cognitive meta-belief in being, and dependent beliefs that value the existence of some kind of permanent essence of existence, has been under threat: “Since Copernicus man has been rolling from the centre toward x” (KSA 12:2[127]; cf. GM III:25). While this comes as no surprise to Nietzsche himself, who is convinced that “being” is an abstract construction and often refers to “the whole” (das Ganze) with the equally abstract and problematic term ‘becoming,’ it is nevertheless possible to show how in many different domains of the human lifeworld this meta-belief in being is challenged.

But just as mere “ideas” do not turn into full-blown beliefs overnight, it also takes time for a strong meta-valuation, anchored at the level of drives, to revert to being just one among other, related drives and beliefs. Nihilism emerges as an issue precisely during a time when a strong meta-valuation is active but a large number of cognitively held beliefs that are internally linked to the meta-value and were perhaps selected because of the latter have come to be untenable. Meta-valuations, in this equation, are most important because they provided the criteria for selecting and ordering a person’s drives, values, and beliefs. Nihilism is therefore first and foremost the result of incorporated, conative meta-valuations that clash with (sets of) experiences and beliefs that are simply opposed to a strong meta-valuation or that are related to incompatible meta-valuations.
The experience of becoming—the instability and transience that jar with the meta-valuation of being—surfaces in many different guises before “becoming” might eventually reach the status of a new competing meta-belief, which in turn might eventually replace and gradually ex-corporate the strong valuation of being. The various instances in the gradual formation and conceptualization of becoming as competing meta-belief—one might wish to consider, for example, Copernicus, Kant, the French Revolution, Hegel, and Darwin as such instances—do not initially weaken the meta-valuation of being; they first affect the entire web of cognitive beliefs related to that meta-valuation that remains intact. And precisely because that meta-valuation had served as an internal criterion for evaluating other beliefs, theories, and actions, the gradual dissolution that results from its confrontation with “instances of becoming” leads to a state of fluidity, that is, a lack of stability occasioned by the disintegration and necessary reweaving of a web of beliefs and affects. It is only at this point that a nihilism of disorientation and a nihilism of despair arise.

1.2. Nihilism as Meta-Value Incompatibility

In recent attempts to explain religious phenomena from the standpoint of an external observer, Dennett invokes the (highly problematic) concept of “memes,” the name for a “self-replicating idea” first presented by the evolutionary biologist Dawkins. A meme is supposed to refer to any element of culture that is transmitted from person to person, between contemporaries and sometimes between generations by nongenetic means. Such memes are of problematic epistemic standing, to say the least, but they do allow us to model the problem of nihilism as a memetic incompatibility—that is, the diremptive antagonism between one meta-value and another, incompatible meta-value that is gaining ground. At first, such an incompatibility occurs only in isolated instances, until the isolated occurrences find their way into the domain of public consciousness. Gradually, the new meme complex takes on a life of its own, until it turns, perhaps through an event that accelerates its transmission, into a new meta-value that is then used to classify, group, and evaluate other beliefs.

I think we can attribute to Nietzsche the belief in something like memes, although they certainly do not exhaust what he refers to as “inherited” and “incorporated assumptions” (einverleibte Annahmen) in notebook M III 1. He also believes, however, that some incorporated meta-assumptions—values incorporated at a drive level—might no longer be necessary. As Nietzsche suggests, for example, in the Lenzer Heide material titled “European Nihilism”: “[I]n our Europe, life is no longer quite so uncertain, contingent, nonsensical. Such a tremendous potentiation of the value of man, the value of evil, etc., is now less necessary: we can endure a considerable moderation of that value, we can concede much nonsense and contingency. The power man has achieved now allows a reduction of those means of discipline of which the moral interpretation was the strongest. ‘God’ is by far too extreme a hypothesis”
Rather, certain formerly valuable beliefs linked to such early meta-assumptions—Richardson quite rightly argued recently that according to Nietzsche we are “in thrall to our past”—must be actively ex-corporated, in a process of what he calls “unlearning” (Verlernen) and forgetting (Vergessen). Nietzsche thus suggests frequently, for example, in Daybreak, that “we have to learn to think differently [unzulernen]—in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently [unzufühlen]” (D 103). Any complete “reversing of the great already incorporated deceptions” (KSA 11:27[41]) will, however, be impossible.

What, then, is the link between values that “live” in us as drives—it would almost be more correct to speak of values that live us—and the larger set of cognitively held valuations that govern the personal and social world? Nietzsche attempts to bring about a shift in our meta-assumptions in order to avoid what he thinks are problematic existential effects of the current diremption. Until a successful remapping of our web of beliefs manages to incorporate the idea of becoming, the nihilism remains a threat.

I do not propose to take this reductive, memetic model any further, but it is obvious that it has some explanatory value when we consider Nietzsche’s project.

1.3. SIMUL NEGATIO ET AFFIRMATIO: TWO TRANSVALUATION CONDITIONS

When we read the fragment “Critique of Nihilism” the solution seems straightforward. Nietzsche suggests we simply deracinate these few, strong, value-deciding categories such as purpose, unity, and permanent being (KSA 13:11[99].1) from our system: “Assuming we have recognized how the world may no longer be interpreted with these three categories and that upon this recognition the world begins to be without value for us: then we must ask where our belief in these three categories came from—let us see if it isn’t possible to cancel our belief in them. Once we have devaluated these three categories, demonstrating that they cannot be applied to the universe ceases to be a reason to devaluate the universe” (KSA 13:11[99].2; see also KSA 12:6[11])—and then we reach the state where no exclusive disjunction can throw any unfavorable light upon existence (Nietzsche sometimes refers to this state as the “innocence of becoming”). But this, Nietzsche knows, is not straightforward. Values are necessary for life, and the practice of evaluating needs to continue, as life itself is nothing but continuous Werthschätzen: “The value of life lies in the valuations” (KSA 10:5[1].234). If valuation is not optional but necessary, and if all traditional values were related to nihilism-prone meta-values, then “new” values are indeed necessary and must fulfill at least two conditions:

(a) the nonperpetuation condition, that is, not to perpetuate the structural relation to the traditional meta-values (prone to nihilism); and
(b) the affirmation condition, that is, to entertain a creative-constructive relationship within the kind of world that is the case.
The nonperpetuation condition is necessary but not sufficient for Nietzsche’s project. He is aware that new types of problematic attitudes or even different forms of nihilism might emerge, such as value disorientation or value relativism, which undercut successful practices of valuation. The latter are, however, necessary for the human being’s motivational structure and the relationship it entertains with the lifeworld.

Thus, in addition to the nonperpetuation of nihilism, Nietzsche clearly argues that life must be regarded as endogenously valuable (no longer valuable due to some exogenous structure, i.e., to be “in the image of God,” “the truth of being,” or any purely pragmatic goal; see above, *KSA* 10:5[1].234). The affirmation condition refers not just to the need for the right kinds of values but also to the appropriate—constructive-creative—way of arriving at and regarding these values. Despite Nietzsche’s frequent problematic statements of the kind “all-there-is is becoming,” which apparently contradict any kind of permanence or *Seinssetzungen*, any constructive transvaluation project requires a more complex framework that can accommodate both (i) the skeptical liquefaction of any “false” (simplifying) ontological and epistemological *Gleichsetzungen* and (ii) the creative “fixing” and living with sets of values that yield existential projects to be affirmed. This results in a world no longer taken on faith as “given” but understood, in an important para-consistent sense, as both given to us and constructed-created by us and neither simply given nor simply constructed-created (both conjunction and disjunction are required to capture Nietzsche’s nonreductive position). Only creative-constructive activity in the above sense can lead, Nietzsche believes, to a sustainable nonnihilistic, affirmative attitude: “In the end it is not just the feeling of power [Gefühl der Macht], but the pleasure in creating and the created [die Lust an dem Schaffen und am Geschaffen]: since all activity becomes conscious as the consciousness of a ‘work’” (*KSA* 12:7[2]).

2. The Logic of the Traditional Values

Against the backdrop of the problem of nihilism—the motivation for his value critique—we may now ask what kind of transvaluation Nietzsche requires to satisfy the second condition of a different kind of endogenous affirmation. I will approach this by responding to the following three questions. How did the old values function? Would the “new” values function in the same way? What are candidates for new values?

Notwithstanding my earlier insistence that the transvaluation project requires a change in values, I do not believe that the third question is a very helpful one, since Nietzsche himself insists frequently that he should not be regarded as the giver of new values. With regard to the first question, I will argue that the old values functioned largely because they worked toward the meta-valuations
of permanence in the name of simplicity, security, and survival. Question two demands a difficult response: while old values functioned well and were appropriate for a certain developmental stage, new values will have to function within a different, nonreductive framework since, as we will see below, the need for complexity reduction and security is now no longer as urgent.

2.1. HOW DID THE OLD VALUES FUNCTION?

What makes a value valuable? We sometimes wonder why certain decisions were easy or difficult, and in most cases this is due to the presence or the absence of any deciding value(s) that governs our “ratioincations.” For Nietzsche, the exercise of reason entails cognitive and noncognitive abilities that all contribute to a “great reason of the body [grosse Vernunft des Leibes]” (Z I:4). Values accelerate decision making by both reducing and structuring the complexity of any given situation. As we have already seen, Nietzsche understands values as extensions of

(i) a protocognitive, conative, assimilatory activity that leads very early on to our initial meta-valuations; and

(ii) a kind of protologic due to man’s early need for uncertainty avoidance and complexity reduction.

To a great extent both function within us noncognitively but then become visible in the values we are committed to and that have been selected “by” the protological meta-valuations.

Regarding the protocognitive, assimilatory activity, Nietzsche writes in GS on the “Origin of the logical”: “Those, for example, who did not know how to find often enough what is ‘equal’ as regards both nourishment and hostile animals—those, in other words, who subsumed things too slowly and cautiously—were favored with a lesser probability of survival than those who guessed immediately upon encountering similar instances that they must be equal. The dominant tendency, however, to treat as equal what is merely similar—an illogical tendency, for nothing is really equal—is what first created any basis for logic” (GS 111). If decision-making acceleration, qua complexity reduction and uncertainty avoidance (which leads to a first-personal qualitative state that Nietzsche regards as fundamental, namely, the feeling of freedom as experienced power), is what made many of our first-order values valuable, then the success of a value depends on our level of commitment to it: the more committed, the more successful, the more valuable, it will turn out to be. If a value’s Verbindlichkeit—its binding force or the level of commitment it inspires—measures the success of a value, then it is necessary to understand what kind of commitment was attached to the meta-values and to traditional values, respectively.
As regards the meta-values, I have already mentioned that Nietzsche assumes a very strong, protocognitive commitment that began with the need for complexity reduction, decision-making acceleration, and uncertainty avoidance. Our level of commitment to any subsequently emerging values is less obvious. Also, we need to distinguish more clearly between meta-valuations, active first-order values (e.g., the knightly-aristocratic values Nietzsche discusses in GM I), and reactive second-order values (e.g., Judeo-Christian values). Commitment to these second-order values is less immediate, and yet some commitment is necessary for their success.\textsuperscript{18} As we shall see, Nietzsche believes our commitment to values to follow the protologic that governs the meta-valuations.

I would like to note here that Nietzsche is all too often regarded as a thinker fundamentally opposed to logic, as someone whose explanations are premised on the assumption that all-there-is is unlogisch, illogical and irrational, and that logic is therefore utterly negligible. This, I believe, does not do justice to Nietzsche’s views on logic.\textsuperscript{19}

2.2. THE LOGIC OF OUR COMMITMENT

According to Nietzsche, logic is to an extent fictional. Nietzsche aims to show that traditional logic depends on a protological biological and psychophysiological heritage: “our belief in things is the precondition for the belief in logic” (KSA 12:9[97].67). Logic is, so to speak, “premised” on a protobelief in re-identifiable objects, identische Fälle—“Die Logik ist geknüpft an die Bedingung: gesetzt, es gibt identische Fälle” (KSA 11:40[13])—which is vital for any organism, for example, to re-identify an enemy or the right kind of food. The possibility of any logical operation demands assimilation, and “[b]efore one judges the process of assimilation must have already been carried out” (KSA 11:40[15]).

In addition, logical principles such as the law of noncontradiction are seen not as absolutely binding but merely as an expression of a particular kind of organism’s “crude” (grob) way of dealing with complexity and multiplicity: “Here the crude, sensualist prejudice reigns that sensations teach us truths about things—that I cannot say at the same time of one and the same thing that it is hard and it is soft (the instinctive proof ‘I cannot have 2 opposite sensations at the same time’—quite crude and false)” (KSA 12:9[97]). Yet Nietzsche does not claim that there is any nonlogical sphere prior to the emergence of logic. He merely states that there is always already a kind of protologic at work, well before the emergence of something like modern logic is possible. There is, so to speak, no brute emergence of logic. More developed forms of logic depend on very early, assimilatory, creative-poetic protologics: “Oversimplification [Vergröberung] as basic tool in order to let appear recurrence, identical cases; prior to ‘thinking’ [bevor also ‘gedacht’ wurde] one must have already composed [gedichtet], the creative
sense is more original than that of ‘thinking’ ['denkende']” (KSA 11:40[17]). It would therefore be too easy to claim that logic is outright rejected by Nietzsche. In fact, simply negating logic would show that it is logic itself that is still at work in its own extinguishing.

Nietzsche’s assumptions regarding logic are, I believe, of a different kind. He holds that while, at one time, the protologic was absolutely vital and necessary, the circumstances have now changed. Today one does not require the same amount of complexity reduction in order to survive. We are no longer in such desperate need of food or in such danger that our minds have to function solely with the goal to (a) forge the identical, (b) abbreviate into signs, or (c) remember, in order to (d) re-cognize and (e) select. Logic was one of the necessary means of control, *Zuchtmittel*, but it is today no longer as necessary as it was when our world–mind–brain nexus first took shape.

Nietzsche believes that this protologic of mutually exclusive alternatives is still literally alive in us—we can only be in one experiential state at a time—and that we therefore find it difficult, or are even unable, to portray or understand complexity other than in oppositions that contradict one another. There is plenty of textual evidence that it is Nietzsche’s goal to integrate as much multiplicity as possible into the conscious sphere of the human being, a sphere that will never be able to simply abandon logic altogether: “the *assumption of entities* is necessary in order to think and infer, logic handles only formulae for what remains the same […] the *feigned* world of subject, substance, ‘reason’ is necessary” (KSA 12:9[89]). Nietzsche thinks that abolishing logic would lead to the end of the kind of “interpretation” man is. Instead, man needs to find a logic less simplifying, less reductive, one more adequate to current needs and difficulties. While the principle of noncontradiction is not necessarily binding, it might be very difficult for human beings to think otherwise: “We do not succeed in both affirming and negating one and the same thing: that is a subjective empirical proposition that expresses not a ‘necessity’ *but only a non-ability* [keine ‘Nothwendigkeit’ aus, *sondern nur ein Nicht-vermögen*]” (KSA 12:9[97]). Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s late writings plainly show his conviction in our capacity for other, less reductive modes of thought. In the same way as a new understanding of freedom requires the simultaneity of “free” and “~ free” (“as something one has and has *not*” [TI “Skirmishes” 38]), he demands at the end of *Ecce Homo* that the task of revaluation requires “the art of separating without making inimical, to mix nothing, to ‘reconcile’ nothing; a tremendous variety that is nevertheless the opposite of chaos—this was the precondition, the long secret work and artistry of my instinct” (EH “Clever” 9).

This is of course not to say that Nietzsche globally favors contradiction over consistency. There are many cases where he himself engages in indirect arguments, points his finger at problematic contradictions, and challenges a theory or belief. This in itself is no proof that Nietzsche values
consistency—it might simply be evidence of his awareness that many other people do. But as is well documented, Nietzsche is not interested in abandoning inference rules or proof theory unless, and this I regard as crucial, he believes that reductive constraints hamper rational capacities. As we shall see, in specific cases when a logical field runs up against its own presuppositions, it might be more correct and more rational to regard a contradiction as correct. Explosion or ex contradictione quodlibet is never really an issue for any circumspect user of logic, and neither is it for Nietzsche. Explosion is the result of following syntactical rules within a chosen semantic domain, a blind rule-following that Nietzsche (like most of us) would reject. A variety of constraints follow from how we populate our domain over which the syntactical rules range. In logic as in life we always need rules about rule-following. And just as we consider different types of evidence to establish whether something is true or false, we will consider different types of evidence as to whether a contradiction is true or not. We have abundant evidence that Nietzsche is not a trivialist.

Finally, the acceptance of contradictions allows for a variety of responses. Modifying one’s view and making it consistent is certainly one response, but it is by no means the only rationally acceptable position. Only in the absence of any other relevant reasons might one reject a theory or a belief based simply on inconsistency. In circumstances where there are good reasons for sticking with a contradiction, it might actually be more rational to do so.  

After this short discussion of Nietzsche’s view of logic we can return to the problem of values that function within the logic we have incorporated.

2.3. EXOGENOUS AUTHORITY AND ABSOLUTE EXTENSION
I have so far argued that Nietzsche assumes that we all are always already bound by and committed to a set of meta-valuations on a protoconscious—or rather consciousness-enabling—level. There is only so much we can do about our level of commitment to the latter, and if it were not for these meta-valuations and the protologic we would not have become the kinds of “things” we are.

The “knightly-aristocratic” values treated in On the Genealogy of Morals were a “logical” extension of our incorporated meta-assumptions of an equally binding quality: control over one’s environment, uncertainty avoidance, survival, and the immediate experience and expression of strength and activity, according to Nietzsche, immediately validate the knightly-aristocratic evaluations. I do not intend to go into the details of the value shift (strong/weak to good/evil) that Nietzsche describes in GM. What interests me here is the new kind of commitment or bindingness of the Judeo-Christian values, as they are the target of Nietzsche’s transvaluation. The values Nietzsche targets still depend on the same set of meta-valuations, but they can no longer rely on any immediate validation as they are only indirectly related to our drive-based meta-valuations. Instead,
in order to ensure our commitment, they draw on exogenous authority and claim universal, infinite extension.

What is meant by *exogenous authority*? This authority is guarded by an authority (such as a church) itself based on another authority (such as a deity).

What do I mean by *infinite extension*? The values are not context-dependent and local but, instead, claim ahistorical, universal validity, that is, a validity that knows no bounds and extends ad infinitum.

It is their presumed metaphysical *absolute authority* and their ahistorical, *infinite extension* that explain the kinds of actions committed in the name of traditional value systems: the world considered worthy ends precisely where the values not yet accepted begin. For systems of *exogenously authorized, universal and thus infinitely extending values*, the space that is not already part of the values’ influence becomes a no-man’s-land that will be assimilated. There is simply “no space” for any other system of valuation.

It is here that the Judeo-Christian values function according to the logic that sprung from the initial, preconscious, incorporated meta-assumptions: the space they govern is bivalent, and they function according to the exclusive disjunction. This leads to both internal and external problems for a transvaluation.

*Internally*, for example, within one and the same group, any value change is difficult: those committed to a value are required to act upon their absolute commitment and defend the value’s absolute authority. Those who wish to propose new values can only do so by also claiming a similar kind of exogenous authority. This results in an internal opposition that is treated like a contradiction. It demands a resolution that restores absolute authority, universal validity, and absolute extension of one or the other value.

*Externally*, for example, among different groups, a similar opposition arises, again in the guise of a contradiction that demands a resolution. The other group either is committed to the same system of values or is not, but then in this case, it is not (on the map). The external contradiction will demand a resolution that again restores the absolute authority, universal validity, and absolute extension of either the one or the other set of values.

Values that function in this way perpetuate the nihilistic structure, as they are still firmly committed to the nihilism-prone meta-values. They also fail with regard to endogenous affirmation. In order to successfully “transvalue” values, the internal logic according to which values and valuation function needs changing.

3. New Values: Contradictory and Oppositional

3.1. REEVALUATING CONTRADICTION AND OPPOSITION
As I said earlier, the first step toward different values is to loosen some of the logical restrictions Nietzsche thinks were once necessary but now need to be
“unlearned.” Unlearning the fear of complexity, contradiction, and opposition is a first step. As I will argue—extending Nadeem J. Z. Hussain’s recent proposal for a fictionalist value practice of “regarding things as valuable even when we know that they are not” beyond the bounds of moral fictionalism—new values are constitutively contradictory (both binding and not-binding) and thus open to real opposition, thereby ensuring their nonnihilistic and affirmative continuity.23 I will first look at Nietzsche’s reevaluation of contradiction and opposition.

(i) Contradictions (Widersprüche) are no longer to be seen as purely negative, requiring any resolution governed by a logic of mutually exclusive alternatives.

When it comes to contradictions, Nietzsche is a dialethic thinker who accepts, like Hegel before him and Graham Priest today, that some contradictions can be true. Nietzsche thinks, for example, that any locally valid truths lead, at their limits, to ineradicable contradictions.24 See, for example, this early passage critical of inductive universalism taken from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks:

All our conceptions, as soon as their empirically given content, drawn from our perceivable world, is taken as veritas aeterna lead to contradictions [Widersprüche]. If there is absolute motion, then there is no space: if there is absolute space, then there is no motion; if is there is absolute being, then there is no multiplicity. It should become clear how little we touch the heart of things or undo the tangle of reality [den Knoten der Realität aufknüpfen]: […] these concepts are not intended to stand the test of actuality and be corrected by it, as they are actually derived from it, on the contrary they are supposed to measure and judge actuality and, in case of a logical contradiction, even condemn it. (PTAG 12)

Nietzsche holds that contradictions are necessary because they are creative:

Necessary contradictions in thought [Nothwendige Widersprüche im Denken], in order to be able to live. Logical thinking with the yearning for science creates a new type of existence [neue Daseinsform].
Pure thinking seeks to explain everything to itself and functions not in an active and transformative way [nicht aktiv und umgestaltend]. (KSA 7:7[58])

And in his late note (June–July 1885) on the “new world-conception” Nietzsche insists that “all there is” functions precisely because of its benevolent, creative, inconsistent tension. The “world” (Nietzsche’s quotation marks) is in states of change, it can only have inconsistent state descriptions, and any attempt to describe it fully and without contradictions will fail: “force everywhere, as a play of forces and force-waves [als Spiel von Kräften und Kraftwellen] simultaneously one and ‘many’ […] self-contradictory [Sich-selber-widersprechendste], and then coming home from abundance to simplicity, from the play of contradiction [dem Spiel der Widersprüche] back to the pleasure of harmony” (KSA 11:38[12]).
Oppositions (Gegensätze) are no longer to be misconceived as particular kinds of contradictions, treated according to the principle of noncontradiction and demanding mutually exclusive, annihilatory resolution. For Nietzsche, mutually exclusive oppositions do not really exist. Instead, they are to be conceived as Gradverschiedenheiten, differences in degree, and it is only our particular way of seeing, our incorporated, crude meta-optic, that makes it difficult to no longer consider them as either/or alternatives:

Duration, conformity with itself, being, inhere neither in what is called the subject nor in what is called object. They are complexes of what happens which appear to have duration in relation to other complexes—for example due to a difference in tempo (rest–motion, fixed–slack: all these are oppositions which don’t exist in themselves and in fact only express differences in degree [Gradverschiedenheiten] that look like oppositions when viewed through a particular prism.

There are no oppositions: we have only acquired the concept of opposition from those of logic, and from there wrongly transferred it to things. (KSA 12:9[91]; see also the famous earlier passage in WS 67)

Like contradictions, oppositions are positive and creative unless they demand any simple either/or resolution: “I believe that from the presence of oppositions, and from their awareness, emerges the great man, the arch with a great tension [der Bogen mit der großen Spannung]” (KSA 11:35[18]). Against the leveling of the levelers, the Nivellierer, Nietzsche wants a new antithetic–synthetic practice: “I wish, also in matters of the mind, war and oppositions; and more war than ever, more oppositions than ever before” (KSA 11:36[17]).

Finally, after our discussion of nihilism, incorporated meta-valuations, a specific (species-typical) logic of mutual exclusiveness, and the traditional values that function exclusively within the latter, we can return to the transvaluation project. My goal is to show that any new value will have to break with this species-specific logic of mutual exclusivity, in order to avoid traditional nihilism-prone value composition, and to lead to what I wish to call an endogenously affirmable, creative value praxis that is no longer dependent on traditional exogenous, metaphysical affirmation.

3.2. “Living” Values with Inconsistent Commitment

The value of life lies in the evaluations: evaluations are created [Werthschätzungen sind Geschaffenes], not taken up, learned, experienced. The created must be annihilated [vernichtet], in order to make room for the newly created: the evaluations’ ability to live requires their ability to be annihilated. The creator must always be an annihilator [Vernichter]. Valuing itself, however, cannot annihilate itself: this, however, is life. (KSA 10:5[1].234)

We saw earlier that the universal validity, absolute bindingness, and infinite extension of the old values, based on exogenous authority, undermine the creation of
new values and make Nietzsche’s own transvaluation project difficult, since any different and locally selected values will always be conceived as merely relative and unable to compete with values of absolute standing. We also saw that within the old framework, the success of any new value depends on this claim to exogenous authority and absolute extension, thereby perpetuating a violent circularity aimed at minimizing uncertainty and eradicating any real value tension.

The transvaluation Nietzsche requires cannot take place within this framework and can no longer operate with values of the above kind. And although Nietzsche agrees in *TI* that in earlier times, “they had just one choice: either perish or—be absurdly rational” (*TI* “Socrates” 10), he believes that this is no longer the case (see above, *KSA 12*:5[71]). More important for Nietzsche, the extension of the either/or logic that has helped us in the past ultimately culminates in the nihilism scenario: “It remains to either abolish our adorations [Verehrungen] or ourselves. The latter is nihilism” (*KSA 12*:2[131]). I will now propose the dialetheic framework required for new values. As Nietzsche himself writes in his 1885 plan of the transvaluation, the mutually exclusive contradictions among competing valuations must be replaced by a new framework, within which they no longer annihilate one another:

Prodigious forces are unleashed; but contradicting each another the unleashed forces annihilating each other
to bind the unleashed forces anew, so they no longer annihilate each other and to open one’s eyes for the real increase of force!

[Ungeheure Gewalten sind entfesselt; aber sich widersprechend
die entfesselten Kräfte sich gegenseitig vernichtend
die entfesselten Kräfte neu zu binden, daß sie sich nicht gegenseitig vernichten und
Augen aufmachen für die wirkliche Vermehrung an Kraft!] (*KSA 12*:2[100])

Values, too, have to be accepted as what they are, namely, to an important extent something “fabricated,” “created”;26 as Nietzsche insists in the important early passage in his 1882 notes on *Zarathustra*, “[E]valuations are created, not taken up, learned, experienced” (*KSA 10*:5[1].234). Values can no longer claim any absolute authority. The context that leads to their creation is key. In the same passage he further demands that (like all “living creatures”) values must remain theoretically and practically reversible: “the evaluations’ ability to live requires their ability to be annihilated.” After his description of valuation, he envisages the authors of such new valuations: “The creator must always be an annihilator.” These claims seem particularly puzzling as Nietzsche demands that new values are binding, have a real effect, and give real guidance. A value thus needs to be both binding and not-binding. It needs to be understood as created, as binding, and as reversible. The fragment ends with a rhetorical maneuver that is very common throughout Nietzsche’s works, namely, the equivocation
of the very limit of his analysis with “life”: “Valuing itself, however, cannot annihilate itself: this, however, is life” (KSA 10:5[1].234).

In what sense are the new values binding? Any new valuation both must be binding and yet can no longer claim any exogenous universality. Any new valuation both must be binding and must be understood as a contextual, creative act. Any new valuation must be both binding and revisable; and its revisability must remain transparent if its effectiveness and its “vitality” are to be guaranteed. As I will argue, it is crucial to comprehend Nietzsche’s call to “understand a hypothesis as hypothesis and yet accept it as regulative [eine Hypothese als Hypothese zu fassen und doch als regulativisch zu nehmen]” (KSA 11:26[263]).

3.3. THE DIALETHEIC LOGIC OF TRANSVALUATION
Let us compare the two frameworks. In the traditional absolutist or universalist framework, all values (that matter) are ahistorical and static, of unquestionable authority and unlimited applicability: exogenous authority and infinite extension, within the traditional logical framework of mutually exclusive alternatives, are geared toward the annihilation of one of two competing (sets of) values.

As we have seen, according to Nietzsche, new nonnihilistic values must function differently and need to be inserted into an adualistic sphere in which they are neither together nor separate, both separate and together, to ensure that oppositions are in a living relation, bound together, but without annihilating one another. A passage from the Nachlass of summer–autumn 1884 is crucial to grasping Nietzsche’s different understanding of what a nonnihilistic value system must live up to: “All former moralities I regard as built up based on hypotheses regarding the means of preservation of a type [Erhaltungs-Mittel eines Typus]—but up to now the kind of mind was still too weak and too uncertain of itself to understand a hypothesis as hypothesis and yet [my emphasis—M.D.] accept it as regulative—it required faith” (KSA 11:26[263]). New values can no longer be ahistorical, absolute, and universal. Instead, they are constructed and therefore in principle always revisable. And yet, simultaneously, they must be binding in order to serve as value, to be of value. As I said earlier, they must be more than (and here I agree with Richardson and Katsafanas) any fictionalist “simulacrum,” but in order not to relapse into a nihilism-prone traditional value, they must not simply be conceived as functioning differently as values “generated by a superior method for valuing, and (in that sense) are ‘truer’ than other values.” While they are “truer” to the extent that they are less partial, they always remain prone to relapsing into what Nietzsche describes in Human, All Too Human as our inherited tendency to blindly “take itself as the goal and measure of things” (HHI P:6). Such truer values cannot function in the traditional way.
In order to guard against any such relapse into the old value practice, a new value’s authority and extension must be conceived dialetheically, as fragment 21[263] of notebook W12, HHPP:6, and many other passages show, as absolutely relative and relatively absolute. They no longer operate within a framework in which opposition is mutually exclusive and demands necessarily resolution. Instead, the adualistic–dialetheic status enables a contest among coequals: both valid and not valid, neither valid nor not valid. The conjunction will guarantee a living exchange, a value praxis that remains creative and “alive.” The disjunction (which is no longer geared toward mutual exclusivity) guarantees that (a) no simple annihilation can take place and (b) no simple relativism allows the unreflective coexistence of traditionally conceived universalist values. Instead, this complex logical relationship allows for values (or sets of values) to interact, to reach each other, to reach into the other value sphere, testing it, contesting it, but without taking over the other’s space or annihilating the other. This is what a new value practice would have to look like once the traditional, universalistic value practices have been abandoned.

It is necessary, Nietzsche thinks, to make transparent the constructivist aspect in each value and value system. Seeing a value as constructed must not, however, devalue the value or make it less real. This would be to misunderstand what values are. On the contrary, he believes that it will make a value more real because it is no longer accepted on faith but instead on the basis of creativity, continuous testing and transformation, which in turn will lead to an affirmative relation to a value or (sets of) values. A working value practice, Nietzsche held, is essential for any successful species. A value that is made (more) transparent, using genealogy as a tool to reveal the function it has been selected for by nature or by custom, will no longer be accepted simply as given, as true and unconditionally valid. Instead, it will be regarded as partial and hypothetical, as a once creative event. Under genealogical scrutiny all values lose their certainty and acquire a status that is simultaneously certain and uncertain, binding and nonbinding. Conceiving of our values within a dialetheic framework—as both true and not true, neither true nor not true—might in the long run incorporate a minimal distance toward them and enable us “to feel differently” (D 103). As a result, one is no longer more or less “lived” by one’s values but is instead able to take what Richardson calls a “selective stance”: “the continuously creative, instead of the once upon a time, the past” (KSA 11:26[288]).

Where traditional values provided a sense of certainty and knowledge about action, a dialetheic value requires a new attitude toward uncertainty (Ungewißheit) and nescience (Unwissenheit). Traditional systems of values sought to avoid uncertainty. For Nietzsche, a different positive notion of uncertainty and ignorance or nescience needs to be “learned”: “to have and learn the will to nescience [den Willen zur Unwissenheit haben und hinzulehren]” (KSA 11:26[294]). Life itself positively depends on uncertainty, even though natural
selection at an early stage selected drives and values that opposed it. We must become aware that “without this kind of nescience life itself would be impossible, that it is a condition for life alone to preserve itself and to flourish [ohne diese Art Unwissenheit das Leben selber unmöglich wäre, daß sie eine Bedingung ist, unter welcher das Leben allein sich erhält und gedeiht]” (KSA 11:26[294]). But again, not-knowing also has a dialetheic status, and is thus something to be affirmed and avoided simultaneously. Decision making in the face of uncertainty is a decision making that constantly faces up to and reckons with uncertainty. All previous value systems were built—are still being built—to shield from uncertainty and to give the impression of certainty (in Nietzsche’s eyes, a false, nihilism-prone sense of certainty: if the value of a value lies in its uncertainty avoidance, it will devalue itself when faced with continued uncertainty). Instead, the known unknowns and the unknown unknowns that together affect our plans and actions need to be kept in sight, must remain part of new “systems” within which nonabsolute values have normative force despite the need for revisability: “a great, solid cover of uncertainty must encase you” (KSA 11:26[294]). The task, therefore, is to create values rather than to pretend to discover them: “One wanted a God or a pure conscience [reines Gewissen] in order to shy away from the task that demands of man creativity [Schaffen]” (KSA 11:26[347]).

And the task of constructing new dialetheic, binding and not-binding values, in principle revisable under non-eliminable uncertainty, is key to the project of value transvaluation.

Conclusion

We can finally return to our initial value test, the nonperpetuating condition, and the affirmation condition. This new kind of permeable value no longer perpetuates the nihilism scenario. In its more transparent epistemic status, in its absolute-relative stability, it creates a vital distance from the strong, absolutist, nihilism-prone values that were supported by conative meta-valuations.

But what about the affirmation condition? As this new kind of value can no longer claim absolute authority and must instead remain uncertain and therefore “alive”—dynamic both internally within a rank order of drives (HH P:6) and externally against other, competing values—it must be affirmed and tested in order to establish, question, and reaffirm its validity. The link between the creativity and sustainability of this practice is difficult. A few hints must suffice here. Nietzsche’s view on values as creative acts requires the careful rereading and revaluation of the passages on the phenomenology of free will, such as the famous passage of TI: “How is freedom measured, in individuals as well as nations? By the resistance which must be overcome, the effort it costs to stay on top. The highest type of free men would need to be sought in the place where
the greatest resistance is constantly being overcome: a short step away from tyranny, right on the threshold of the danger of servitude” (TI “Reconnaissance Raids” 38). In a nutshell, Nietzsche’s argument for creative (value) practices no longer based on blind faith goes as follows: (1) creativity involves a transformation; (2) a transformation involves the successful overcoming of a resistance; (3) the successful creative overcoming of a resistance leads to the feeling of self-efficacy; (4) organisms (such as human beings) register the result of successful resistance as a first-personal feeling of freedom. It follows, given Nietzsche’s assumption that (5) being aware of efficacy, that is, feeling free, is a condition for a form of life to be self-sustaining, (6) only a creative-transformative value practice can guarantee the affirmative and self-sustaining resilience of a practice.

For a new value practice to function and sustain itself it must then become a creative (schöpferische) practice. Understood as creative and no longer as blindly coercive, Nietzsche believes, values can become and remain of value to those who live them, select them, and are lived by them. As Nietzsche advises in an earlier (summer–autumn 1884) plan of the transvaluation that underlines his belief in “the creative force (binding oppositions, synthetically)” (KSA 11:26[204]) of a “continuously creative” (KSA 11:26[288]), transformative value practice: “no longer the meek phrase ‘all is only subjective,’ but instead ‘it is also our work!’ of which let us be proud!” (KSA 11:26[284]).

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NOTES
The epigraph from KSA 12:5[71] is referred to as the “Lenzer Heide” material of June 10, 1887. All translations of citations from Nietzsche’s unpublished writings are my own. Other translations have been consulted whenever possible, notably the Nachlass selections contained in Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Writings from the Early Notebooks, ed. Raymond Geuss and
1. The English ‘revaluation’ would be an accurate translation of the German ‘Neubewertung,’ ‘Nachbewertung,’ or ‘Aufwertung,’ i.e., to evaluate something for a second time (primarily in a financial context). It does not, however, capture the sense of penetrating and transforming traditional value practices, for which Nietzsche coined the term ‘Umwerthung.’ I believe, pace Large and Brobjer, that the Latin prefix *trans-* meaning “pass through, penetrate” as well as “surpassing, transcending” (Oxford English Dictionary), captures this quite well.

2. The full context of the passage from the period of autumn 1885–autumn 1886 is “Rückschlag von ‘Gott ist die Wahrheit’ in den fanatischen Glauben ‘Alles ist falsch.’”


5. As I have argued elsewhere, the term ‘becoming’ is neither simply opposed to nor denotes the negation of “being” (“Towards Adualism,” 133).


7. Bernard Reginster, in *Nihilism and the Affirmation of Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), distinguishes two main forms of nihilism, nihilism of disorientation and nihilism of despair. The assumptions of value realism and normative objectivism lead to nihilistic disorientation in the face of a value antirealism. The fact that a person’s highest values cannot be realized, are necessarily unattainable, leads to the conviction that life in its entirety is devoid of meaning—the need for meaning being an anthropological constant. Ken Gemes, in “Nihilism and the Affirmation of Life: A Review of and Dialogue with Bernard Reginster” (European Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 3 [2008]: 459–66), has pointed out that nihilism needs to be understood also as an incompatibility of drives, i.e., on a level that gives rise to the higher-order beliefs upon which nihilisms of disorientation and despair are based. Nihilism, as I have argued in “Towards Adualism,” is rooted in the incorporated, drive-based meta-belief in a stable, predictable world of self-identical things (what Nietzsche means by the concept “being”) that is incompatible with the increasing awareness and confrontation with “becoming,” the realization and experience of the provisionality of any such stability, unity, permanence, and systematicity.


9. Simon May’s recent emphasis on a “full-blooded nihilism” that is “to will—often passionately—what is nothing […] wills what is not human life, not the world of transience, chance, fate, and time in which we are actually situated” (“Nihilism and the Free Self,” in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009], 89) is the result of—being lived by—one’s incorporated meta-assumption of being.

10. Richard Dawkins coined the term ‘meme’ from Greek ‘mimema,’ “that which is imitated,” on the pattern of ‘gene.’ In *The Selfish Gene* he quotes the example by his colleague Humphrey, who suggested that “the meme for, say, ‘belief in life after death’ is actually realized physically millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous systems of individual men the world over” (*The Selfish Gene* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], 192).

11. I have argued elsewhere that Nietzsche’s problematic idea of an *ewige Wiederkehr* is intended to initiate such an event (“Towards Adualism,” 119).

13. See John Richardson’s analysis of drives as dispositions to behavior that tend to issue in some usual outcome—“a drive is a plastic disposition to this outcome” (*Nietzsche’s New Darwinism* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 74–75). On the selective process that leads to drives that serve—or served—“life” by “looking ahead” toward a goal and simultaneously “bring about power,” see Richardson, “Nietzsche’s Problem of the Past,” 92–96.

14. It is important to emphasize that Nietzsche would have thought that man cannot live by “memes” alone. Explanations provided by natural science are also insufficient. Somehow, man’s beliefs and self-image must leave room for agency and allow for a creativity that provides meaning—no longer from the outside but from within, in quasi-poetic acts of creation. Such creative acts might in turn establish and account for certain “meme mutations.”

15. Against any exclusive pragmatism, Nietzsche writes in 1883: “Mit einem ‘um zu’ bringt man die Handlung um ihren Werth” (*KSA* 10:7[271]).


17. Natural science is a good example for a problematic case. Nietzsche sees its potential to weaken the traditional structure as “grosse Schmerzbringerin” (*GS* 12) in destroying traditional beliefs and values, i.e., to fulfill at least condition (a) and perhaps even condition (b). But he is also acutely aware of natural sciences’ potential to do the very opposite, i.e., promising access to new, absolute truths, thereby perpetuating the relation to the old, nihilism-prone meta-values and concomitantly offering a new version of the old exogenous affirmation.

18. *GM* is an attempt to make explicit some of the processes of selection of values that then come to “govern” the norms of the Judeo-Christian worldview.


22. “Die ritterlich-aristokratischen Werthurtheile haben zu ihrer Voraussetzung eine mächtige Leiblichkeit, eine blühende, reiche, selbst überschäumende Gesundheit, sammt dem, was deren Erhaltung bedingt, Krieg, Abenteuer, Jagd, Tanz, Kampfspiele und Alles überhaupt, was starkes, freies, frohgemuthes Handeln in sich schliesst” (*GM* I:7).


24. I am not attempting any defense of dialetheism. Dialetheism can be affirmed or rejected, and it has been defended by some and dismissed by others—see in particular Graham Priest’s *In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and *Beyond the Limits of Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). It suffices to say that Nietzsche can be seen as a thinker with dialetheic intuitions and that his views and use of contradiction need to be taken seriously when dealing with his idea of transvaluation.

26. Values are of the same status as the self: “The genesis of ‘things’ is wholly the work of the imaginers, thinkers, willers, inventors—the very concept of ‘thing’ as well as all qualities. —Even the ‘subject’ is something created in this way, is a ‘thing’ like all the others: a simplification to designate as such the force which posits, invents, thinks, as distinct from all individual positing, inventing, thinking. Thus, the capacity is designated, as distinct from all individual cases: at bottom, it is action summarized with regard to all the action anticipated for the future (action and the likelihood of similar action)” (KSA 12:2[152]).


29. Ibid., 131.

30. And see the subsequent note against the objectivists and positivists: “To mock the school of the ‘objectivists’ and ‘positivists.’ They tried to get around valuations, and only discover and present facts” (KSA 11:26[348]).
