Geroski, P.A. and Mazzucato, M.
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|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-999X.00139|
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The severity of selection mechanisms and the myopia of selection are explored through a duopoly model where one firm tries to move down a learning curve in which costs are initially higher than its rival's but ultimately much lower. A trade-off is found between catch-up time and asymptotic market share: the more severe are selection pressures, the less likely is it that the learning technology will survive; however, if it does survive, the learning technology will in the limit be more competitive the more severe are selection pressures. We explore the dynamics of the model under unit cost and strategic pricing and find that the optimal pricing rule depends on the parameters governing firm learning and market selection.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Extra Information:||The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Politics, Philosophy, Economics, Development, Geography
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
|Depositing User:||Users 13 not found.|
|Date Deposited:||28 Jun 2006|
|Last Modified:||05 Oct 2016 12:56|
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