Liminality and affectivity: the case of deceased organ donation

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Abstract

Building on ethnographic work on deceased organ donation in Spain, this paper supplements the concept of affectivity at the core of the emerging field of affect studies with a concept of liminality. The paper begins by focussing on relevant scenes in Pedro Almodóvar’s 1999 film “All about my mother”, using these as a spring-board to discuss the recent ‘turn to affect’ amongst social scientists and humanities scholars. This ‘turn’ is characterized in relation to a move towards the ‘event’ side of a ‘structure / event’ polarity. A case is made for a process approach which better integrates event and structure, and better links ontological and empirical dimensions of research. To these ends, a distinction is drawn between an ontological account of liminality (informed by the process philosophy A.N. Whitehead) and an anthropological account (informed by the process anthropology of V. Turner and A. Szakolczai), both of which give a decisive role to affect or ‘feeling’ qua liminal transition at the joints and other interstices of structural order. The paper ends with a return to ethnographic observations relevant to the characterisation of the deceased organ donation dispositif as a novel form of liminal affective technology.

Keywords: liminality, affect, deceased organ donation, process, psychosocial studies, Whitehead
In these lectures, 'relatedness' is dominant over 'quality'. All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living - that is to say, with 'objective immortality' whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming (Whitehead, Process and Reality, Preface, xiii, 1927–1928/1985)

Transplant mechanics

We begin this paper about organ donation, affectivity and liminality by invoking a scene from Pedro Almodóvar’s 1999 Academy Award winning “All about my mother”, a film in which everything seems to move and in which affectivity is the rule. In an insightful paper, Pedro Poyato (2006) depicts this movie as being “all about transitions”. Exploring the transition from traditional family models to emerging ones, it is rich with themes of personal transformation, transexuality and transplantation, and these transitions intersect in the form of the main character, Manuela. The film revolves around Manuela’s determination, following the death of her son, to tell his father about the child he never knew they had. At the start of the film, Manuela is introduced as a core member of a transplant coordination team based in Madrid, and as the single parent of an intense teenage son, Esteban, eager to learn about his absent father. At his request, Manuela allows Esteban to observe her at work engaged in a pedagogical role-play workshop, supervised by her
psychologist colleague Mamen, in which she plays the wife of a brain-dead potential organ-donor being interviewed by two male physicians responsible for soliciting her signed consent.

The scene we wish to focus on contrasts with this role-play. That same evening, after a visit to the theatre with Manuela to celebrate his 17th birthday, Esteban is hit by a car. Manuela quickly finds herself in her workplace with Mamen, and she clutches to her chest the diary Esteban was carrying before the accident. We are shown the speechless sorrow in Manuela's face, especially when she moves her hand away from her mouth and briefly raises her wet eyes only to read “U.C.I.” (i.e. Intensive Care Unit in Spanish) above the doors which are about to be trespassed by the dreaded news that will transform her life. Meanwhile, in a nearby room a hospital administrator is telephoning the Spanish Transplant Organization to inform them about the likely availability of Esteban’s fresh organs. Brain death having been announced by an EEG diagnosis, all transplant proceedings must wait upon Manuela’s consent as the mother of the deceased. Finally, the two transplant coordination physicians walk into the scene - with deadly serious faces - in what is now a real case of an organ donation interview. There is a stunned silence before the familiar routine unfolds. Coming to a halt before the seated women, the transplant coordinators stand awkwardly and are about to speak when they suddenly turn to pull up two chairs in order to set the stage for what is deemed, following best-practice, to be a more symmetrical, relaxed and intimate conversation. With this movement, Almodóvar invokes a sharp contrast with the role-play that the same four characters had staged earlier that day, a contrast not between the procedures involved, but between the actual occasion and its...
rehearsed simulation (we will call this ‘Almodóvar’s contrast’). In the brief exchange that follows, words falter and fail like a fragile bridge swept away by a torrent of affectivity:

Physician #1: Manuela (2’’) Unfortunately

Manuela: (sobbing) Ah

Manuela’s upper body falls onto her knees while she sobs. Her colleagues look down as silence regains centre stage for some heavy seconds. We are given a close-up shot of the physicians as the conversation is resumed: “The result of the EEG is what we’d feared”. Another few seconds pass as Manuela - still crying and with Mamen’s hand on her back - raises her head, sweeps her hair from her face, and establishes eye contact with the leading coordinator. The latter audibly exhales before continuing to urge for a decision: “we do not have time”. To this, the sobbing Manuela reacts by turning towards Mamen, who is facing the coordinator, still speechless. A Waltz breaks the silence of the donation interview and prompts the speeded up process about to begin: organ transplantation. Immediately, in another room, we see an authorization form bearing Manuela and Esteban’s names and shared surnames on which we can read the Spanish equivalent of: “for humanitarian and solidarity reasons, I authorize the extraction of heart [this being written in a space left in blank] for transplantation on diagnosis of death”. Manuela struggles and fails to sign, and Mamen takes the pen to sign - we suppose – a testimony on her behalf. The heart is now freed up for other transitions, and the stage is set for a completely new phase of Manuela’s life, a phase indelibly marked by this transformative event.
We begin with this filmic representation of a scene of pure organ donation because, fictional though it is, it provides a concrete example with which to introduce and unpack our themes of affectivity and liminality. Building on ethnographic work on deceased organ donation in Spain, we will argue that the concept of affectivity at the core of the emerging field of affect studies can be productively supplemented with a concept of liminality. Theoretically, this will facilitate a more balanced approach to the ‘structure / event’ polarity that, as we shall examine, Massumi (1995) lodges at the core of affect theory. This polarity has roots in the type of event-centred process ontology recently exemplified by Badiou (2005 being/event), under the influence of Deleuze, who in turn traces his own use of this contrast to Whitehead’s distinction between the process of becoming and its concrete actualization (cf. Deleuze, 1993, Chapter 6). A case will be made for a process approach which better integrates event and structure, and better links ontological and empirical dimensions of research, as we hope to illustrate by ending the paper with a return to ethnographic observations relevant to the characterisation of the deceased organ donation dispositif as a novel form of liminal affective technology.

Although it is important to recognize that “All about my mother” is a film, and hence a carefully crafted and inevitably partial construction, the selective dramatization it offers provides a rather faithful depiction of the Spanish organ transplantation system which one of us (Eduardo Moreno) has studied at first hand in some detail during ethnographic work following a Transplant Coordination

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1 One of the co-authors has elsewhere in this journal addressed the fact that by the time of writing Process and Reality (1927–1928) Whitehead’s “terminology had shifted from ‘event’ to ‘actual occasion/ entities’ with the latter defined as ‘the limiting type of an event with only one member’” (Whitehead, 1927–1928/1985, p. 73)” (for more details see Stenner, 2008, p.98).
Team in an important Spanish hospital. Despite ‘opt-out’ legislation which presumes everyone is a donor, the established procedure in every case is that a donor kin must make a final decision, even in situations where a donor card is carried or, as we see in the movie, even in the unlikely event that the relative on the spot is a transplant coordinator (Matesanz and Dominguez-Gil, 2007). The arrangement just described necessitates the rapid organization of an organ donation interview with the relevant donor kin. This event, depicted so neatly in Almodóvar’s contrast, is a short, usually highly emotional, and carefully engineered interaction for which a specially trained Transplant Coordination Team is responsible. The movie, thanks to the contraction of time, space and perspective its artifice permits, thus allows us to see at a glance how a complete set of discourses, practices, organizational cultures and legal proceedings are ‘funneled’ into this strange, short and high-pressure conversation which aims at positioning a bereaved relative as a donor kin. We might say that the event of the donation interview summons the entire virtual realm of the machinery Lesley Sharp (2006) has called organ transfer. That is to say, the concrete actualisation of everything from the extraction techniques used by the surgeons to the lives of those waiting to receive an organ is made contingent upon, and hence ‘boils down to’, what happens in this very special interaction. Unsurprisingly given the ethical issues involved, naturalistic studies of this interaction have been undertaken very rarely, but a few ethnographic works, supplemented by accounts from donors and members of Transplant Coordination Teams, indicate that Almodóvar’s account is a plausible, if very particular, rendering of the core drama (Turner, 1974) of it in a variety of cultural contexts (e.g. Hogle, 1999; Lock 2002; Sharp, 2006). Drawing
also on the body of data from our own research (Íñiguez et al, 2008), we will situate our reflections on the obviously emotional dimensions of the organ donation interview in the theoretical context of the recent ‘turn’ to affectivity within social science. We will suggest that the emphasis upon ‘affect as event’ found in this literature can complement and enrich - rather than struggle against - discursive approaches concerned with the positioning of subjects within ongoing structural frameworks. We will propose that a concept of liminality can serve to mediate between the rather abstract ontological focus of much affect theory, and the more familiar human level of situated interaction. Through a productive combination of affectivity and liminality, we will endeavour to ground our argument in the empirical example of deceased organ donation (DOD). In so doing, we will characterise DOD as a *liminal affective technology*.

**Turning to affect, for lack of (better) words.**

In drawing attention to the radical difference between Manuela’s ‘performance’ in the two organ donation interviews we have just sketched, Almodóvar’s contrast foregrounds a theme that is the focus of much recent attention amongst social scientists: the relevance of affectivity and its relation to discursive practice (see Wetherell, 2012, for a summary). In the first ‘pedagogical’ performance (the ‘rehearsal’), Manuela produces a plausible and even moving simulation of a stunned and upset relative. She feigns a shock-induced misunderstanding of what is being asked of her (will her loved one be saved by another’s organ, or is he the donor?), but she remains discursively lucid and open to being persuaded that,
given the right choice, an incalculable good might result from her loss (i.e. the saving of an organ-recipient’s life). As soon as the role-playing finishes, Mamen, the expert psychologist, opens up a discussion to analyse it, accounting for the underlying logic of this pedagogical setting, a theme we will return to later. This logic assumes the meticulous negotiation of Manuela’s feelings and her positioning as a donor kin, such that these various elements can be carefully coordinated to fit the structure – including the subjectivity of the donor kin - required for organ transfer.

In the contrast case, Almodóvar leaves Manuela speechless and sobbing throughout the entire scene. As the camera approaches accompanied by a voiceover of Esteban’s diary, we know more about the dead son’s thoughts than we do of his mother’s. Her communicative contribution is reduced to a few glances and gestures: rejecting a painful interaction by breaking eye contact; seeking help and slowing things down through a glance at Mamen. Nothing is said, but we have no difficulty in understanding why. What status ought we to give to this kind of event in which words conspicuously fail in the face of an obtrusive body with its rhythmic waves of affectivity?

This contrast between discourse and affect – as we will argue - can be overstated, but it is crucial to what has been called an ‘affective turn’ within much recent work in the social sciences and humanities (Clough, 2007; Blackman and Venn, 2010; Gregg and Seigworth 2010). Before outlining this so-called ‘turn’, however, we must note that it takes place within, and also against, a more general academic context in which increased attention has been paid to the experience, expression and micro-dynamics of emotions, feelings, passions, affections and so forth.
(see Greco and Stenner, 2009). Much of this interest in the emotional dimensions of affectivity is part of a broadly social constructionist project of deconstructing claims or assumptions that emotions are ‘natural’ experiences expressing universalities of human embodiment, and drawing attention to historically and culturally specific emotional figurations. This ‘denaturalization’ is the principal gesture of criticality offered by those adopting this approach, and is typically treasured as such (Hacking, 1999). The critical gesture is to insist that things (like emotions) previously taken to be natural are in fact human creations, and as such, are open to progressive change (i.e. things ‘could be otherwise’).

From this perspective, recent developments in DOD technology and practice might be seized upon as a fascinating example of an historically new and technologically mediated way of constructing the grieving process of thousands of Western citizens. If we approached “All about my mother” in this way, we might look, for example, at the power dynamics of the subject positions provided by the discursive and technical practices at play, and examine how the emotions at issue are shaped and coded through concrete interaction into distinctive patterns reflecting institutionalised power. The dramatization of Manuela’s grief scene might be approached as an “affective practice” that differs from other forms of discursive practice to the extent that “the body has become more intrusive than it ordinarily is” (Wetherell, 2012, p.97). We might identify the organ donation interview as a soft affective technology informed by psychological expertise and contributing to the exercise of a medical power operating with state-backed juridical endorsement. We might suggest that this organ transfer regime (or dispositif) operates in the economy of a permanent need for transplantable organs delivered
under intense time pressure due to constraints imposed by life support technologies.

From the perspective of this authoritative organ transfer discourse, it seems rather obvious that once there is no hope for Esteban, a bereaved kin is firmly positioned in relation to a preferred self-understanding. The proposition that “there is no time” pressures Manuela into an accelerated bereavement process in which a novel subjectivity (in which death becomes a source of life and of a potentially positive sense of citizenship) is deliberately and skillfully constructed. In these ways, Manuela’s feelings are softly shaped, negotiated and reinterpreted into a pattern that could not have existed prior to our epoch of organ transfer. This “psychologically modified experience” (Steve Brown, personal communication) is evidently a social construct, tied to social structure.

Whether explicitly or implicitly, a notion of social structure plays a key role in such accounts, even if the radical intent is typically to challenge and change that structure. A subject position, for instance, is a social-structural concept explaining the provision and negotiation of recognized identities, with their more or less formulated rights, responsibilities and expectations. This concept thus helps to rid us of the idea that we have ‘natural’ characteristics or personality traits by framing these as constructed effects of structural positions played out in discourse. More specific constructionist approaches like ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and discursive psychology share this preoccupation with the ways in which micro interactions serve to ongoingly reiterate and reproduce the conventions of macro structure through dynamics of accountability and social recognition. The conclusion thus always seems to be that micro interactions (affective
dimensions included) are *normatively ordered* (Goodwin, 2000), have a *normative coherence* (Katz, 1999), and hence “affect is patterned in normative episodic sequences” and “linked to convention” (Wetherell, 2012). This preoccupation with structure reaches its extreme in Garfinkel’s work which begins with the assumption – explicitly derived from Talcott Parsons’ “wonderful book” *The Structure of Social Action* - that normative accountability is the guiding principle of social life (Garfinkel, 1988, p. 104). Although his famous breaching experiments show an interest in situations in which there is a temporary suspension of structure, it is clear that such occasions of absence matter to Garfinkel only as exceptions that prove the rule of a structure which must necessarily and immediately return. The following well-known quotation is remarkable in its stiflingly authoritarian insistence on nothing but the unquestionable objective fact of perpetual structure and order: “For ethnomethodology the objective reality of social facts, in that, and just how, it is every society’s locally, endogenously produced, naturally organized, reflexively accountable, ongoing, practical achievement, being everywhere, always, only, exactly and entirely, members’ work, with no time out, and with no possibility of evasion, hiding out, passing, postponement, or buyouts, is *thereby* sociology’s fundamental phenomenon” (Garfinkel, 1988, p. 103).

Here, it could be said, we reach the limits of social constructionism, limits which constitute the point of departure for a turn to affect. Is Manuela, in her moment of grief, really to be allowed no “time out”? Can we really broke no “evasion” of her responsibilities, no “hiding” from accountability and no “passing” to some new reality unrecognisable as “objective” and “factual”? Is her sorrow to be interpreted
as always, only, exactly and entirely a social construction expressing cultural norms? Are we not permitted by Garfinkel and his army of curiously serious professional sociologists to follow Almodóvar’s interest in this kind of situation precisely because of what escapes such structure? Must we always follow the Durkheim/Parsons/Garfinkel order and understand whatever is not (yet) captured in a position, and whatever transforms such positions, always and only from the perspective of those positions and structures? Writers of so-called ‘affect theory’ do indeed raise just these concerns, but, as we will argue, they typically do so from a rather limited and reactive perspective. Rather than supplementing a concern with (the ongoing micro-interactional reproduction of) social structure with attention to those paradoxically creative and destructive occasions during which patterns are melted down and newly forged, there is a reactive tendency for a reverse pendulum swing in which structure is negated or avoided in favour of the pure flow of events. We claim, by contrast, that any serious process oriented account requires both aspects (Stenner, 2008).

In the growing literature of the ‘affective turn’, affect is often sharply distinguished from emotion and comes to include issues of mimesis, suggestibility, imitation, contagion and so forth that feed into the wishes, desires, aspirations and other asubjective vectors of becoming that cannot easily be reduced to the self-contained ‘subject’ beloved of liberal humanism, or to existing structural constraints. Social scientists have drawn upon various traditions to work up this sharp distinction, notably a) psychoanalysis (e.g. Day Sclater et al, 2009), b) the work of a number of psychologists and neuroscientists, especially Tomkins (Sedgwick and Frank, 1995) and Damasio (Cromby, 2007), and c) the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari
The somewhat reactive starting point of much of this work is evident in the way in which writers identifying with the turn to affect turn precisely against the discursive orientation of social constructionism and post-structuralism. Deleuzian philosopher Brian Massumi (2002, p. 4), for instance, straightforwardly admits that his project began as an attempt to “part company with the linguistic model at the basis of the most widespread concepts of coding”. Sedgwick and Frank (1995) begin their now classic homage to Silvan Tomkins’ theory of affect with a hostile attack on the limitations of critical discursive approaches, and Craib’s (1997) clarion call for the rebirth of an affect-oriented psychoanalytical sociology was entitled “Social Constructionism as a social psychosis”, no less. Patricia Clough’s quixotic efforts to synthesize some of these influences are consistently structured by a gesture of contrasting ‘good’ bodily affect with ‘bad’ consciously mindful discourse, as when she boasts of “toppling… semiotic chains of signification and identity and linguistic-based structures of meaning making’ from their ‘privileged position” (2010, p. 223).

Each of these traditions works with a rather different understanding of affectivity, but they clearly share a conviction that a concern with affect / intensity / event might overcome the limitations of approaches oriented to discourse / meaning / structure. Paradoxically, as we will show, the chief critical gesture of this literature is identical to that of social constructionism: namely, to open a space for difference and progressive change. Rather than achieving this through denaturalization, however, writers of affect theory tend to invoke precisely nature as what Massumi
Massumi’s reading of Deleuze has been particularly influential in establishing a sharp distinction between affective (or intensive) and emotional (or discursive) dimensions, since he insists that one of his “clearest lessons... is that emotion and affect... follow different logics and pertain to different orders” (1995, p. 88). In Massumi’s dense and abstract prose, affect is equated with intensity, and contrasted with what he calls quality. The two are always co-present in any given situation, but follow different logics and come in different mixtures, the latter perpetually capturing the former, but never quite succeeding, since intensity always escapes its fate of being fixed by qualities. Emotion is thus defined by Massumi in relation to the capture and taming of affect, and is associated with the higher order processes of meaning-making, consciousness and communication that are often grasped with concepts of discourse (and semiosis more generally). Affect, in turn, is defined as an unstructured, unassimilable remainder, associated with the virtual potentialities of the autonomic nervous system, and with an asubjective and pre-personal connective logic that operates outside of consciousness and beyond the normativities of social order. Affect, in short, escapes articulation in discourse.

From this perspective, to return to our example, we might understand Manuela’s two organ donation interview scenes, not simply in terms of the discursive positions made available in a structured rhetorical matrix of culture (‘subject positions’, ‘interpretive repertoires’ or ‘social representations’), but in relation to a tension between an intense and asubjective logic of affect and a discursively qualified and subjective logic of emotion. The pedagogical scene might
then be understood as being skewed in the direction of the discursive order, whilst the other scene is skewed in the direction of pure intensity: we witness what Massumi might call the relatively autonomous intensities of Manuela's body which appear resistant to a discursive order which temporarily collapses. The semiotic codings and griddings deployed in the psychologised discourse of the Transplant Coordination Team might then be viewed as efforts to ‘capture’ Manuela’s affectivity, stamping her subjectivity with the pattern required by the organ transfer dispositif.

Much might be gained from such an analysis. Certainly for Almodóvar, Manuela’s emotional transition is key to the series of novel becomings that affect her during the course of the film. In attending to whatever escapes structure, we might thereby grasp the processes by which structural positions are challenged and transformed. Certainly, Massumi’s work is a prolonged critique of what he sees as an endemic neglect of affect, and a plea for its decisive relevance for any understanding of the emergence of novelty in evolving systems of all kinds. In The Autonomy of Affect (Massumi 1995, p. 87), for instance, he states that approaches...

are incomplete if they operate only on the semantic or semiotic level, however that level is defined (linguistically, logically, narratologically, ideologically, or all of these in combination, as a Symbolic). What they lose, precisely, is the expression event – in favor of structure. Much could be gained from integrating the dimension of intensity into cultural theory. The stakes are the new.

In this quotation, Massumi modestly and correctly points to the incomplete nature of approaches which limit themselves to structure and neglect event. In practice, however, much affect theory engages ‘event’ at the expense of ‘structure’. Failure to
articulate their relationship can be damaging to social science and promotes a
fashionable but romantic celebration of unstructured ‘becoming’ predicated upon
an implausible notion of ‘pure affect’ existing in a pristine state of primitive
unqualified autonomy (see also Brown and Tucker 2010; Wetherell 2012;
Hemmings, 2005). This tendency is compounded by a decisive ambiguity in
Massumi’s work (see Stenner, 2012a). Crudely, there are two different
propositions at stake in the contrast he draws using the following terms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td>Emotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connective</td>
<td>Discursive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asubjective</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first is the broadly Bergsonian proposition (Massumi’s “clearest lesson”) that
affect and emotion, intensity and quality, belong to completely different orders.
The discursive order of emotion, we might say, presupposes and selectively
appropriates an intensive order of affect, much as a digital sound recording
converts analogue waves into a binary format. Affect would then be a residue left
behind after a process of filtering, but this affective remainder would remain
“virtual” as a potent source of vitality and potentiality (see Brown and Tucker,
The second is the broadly Whiteheadian proposition that affect is precisely the *transition* between different orders. In this case, affect would be, not the first column in the table above, but the *threshold separating the two columns*:

> What is being termed affect in this essay is precisely this two-sidedness, the simultaneous participation of the virtual in the actual and the actual in the virtual, as one arises from and returns to the other. Affect is this two-sidedness *as seen from the side of the actual thing*, as couched in its own perceptions and cognitions. (Massumi, 1995, p. 96)

The second proposition does not commit us to an absolute decision between two different orders (affect and emotion), and hence permits us to avoid positing affect (and event) as a pure intensity existing in a mythical state of pristine autonomy in contrast to another type of condition identified with emotion (and structure). It encourages us to inhabit the impure and mixed space of becoming “betwixt and between” forms of order (Turner, 1969/1995), and to focus on their mutual constitution. We wish to call the Whiteheadian proposition *liminal* since the concept of liminality is about threshold experiences of transition *between* states, structures and patterns. Affect would then be a phenomenon of *transition* or what mathematicians call a ‘vector’. This would fit Whitehead’s ontological definition of actual occasions of experience as events of transition from actuality to actuality (see Stenner, 2011, part 2). Indeed, affect (qua *feeling*), in this way of thinking, would literally be liminal: “Feelings”, writes Whitehead, “are ‘vectors’; for they feel what is *there* and transform it to what is *here*.”

A concept of liminality can therefore help us to articulate a genuinely *process oriented* approach capable of integrating affect and discourse oriented tendencies by addressing structure and event as analytically distinguishable but empirically
always related aspects of process. To this end, in what follows we will distinguish an *ontological* account of liminality from the more familiar *anthropological* account, the better to combine them. The ontological account is pitched at a high level of abstraction since it should be applicable to any physical, biological, psychological or sociological events, whilst the anthropological account gives tighter empirical purchase to recognizable scenes of human existence, such as those depicted in Almodóvar’s movies.

**Dwelling on the verges (of process): liminality**

**i. Anthropological liminality**

Liminality was given clear anthropological meaning by the process anthropologist Victor Turner (see also Szakolczai, 2009 and Thomassen, 2009). In 1977, he was already witnessing an intellectual shift “from a stress on concepts such as structure, equilibrium, function, system to process, indeterminacy, reflexivity - from a ‘being’ to a ‘becoming’ vocabulary”. Turner nevertheless insisted that “The validly new never negates the seriously researched” (1977, p.61), and stressed his continuing appreciation “for the marvellous findings of those who, teachers of the present generation, committed themselves to the discoveries of "systems" of social relations”. Turner’s resolute openness serves as a valuable reminder to those who are once again engaging with process thinking:

> It has sometimes been forgotten by those caught up in the first enthusiasm for processualism that process is intimately bound up with structure and that an adequate analysis of social life necessitates a rigorous consideration of the relation between them. (1977, p.65)
Turner thus warns against the oppositional contrast between structure and event that we now see in the constructionist and affect theory literature, and points towards a complementary account in which social life is marked by a rhythm of break and restoration (Dewey, 2005). In borrowing the term ‘liminality’ from Arnold van Gennep’s 1909 book *Rites de Passage*, he turned to the “first scholar who perceived that the processual form of ritual epitomized the general experience in traditional society that social life was a sequence of movements in space-time, involving a series of changes of pragmatic activity and a succession of transitions in state and status for individuals and culturally recognized groups and categories” (1977, p.66).

Van Gennep (2008) suggested that all the cultures then studied by anthropologists have Rites of Passage, which are rituals that mark and celebrate those moments where people or groups transit from one recognized social state or position to another. When children become adults, for example, or when someone becomes a queen or chief, they will be put through a Rite of Passage. These are composed of three phases, and Van Gennep first used the term *liminality* to name the middle phase of *passage* or *transition* between two ‘states’:

- First there are rites of separation in which the previous state or social position is, as it were, broken down.

- Then there is a middle phase of passage, which might often involve a trial or test that must be successfully completed.

- The passage then ends with the rites of incorporation during which the new
status, position or identity is established and recognized.

Turner, Szakolczai and others have extended the concept of liminality to the large-scale situations and institutions of the modern world. As Turner (e.g. 1969/1995) develops it, a liminal situation is a quite particular and peculiar situation in which the usual limits that apply to recognizable social identities, positions and offices - including rights and responsibilities – are temporarily removed. The suspension of these limits, when all goes well, allows those involved to ‘pass-through’ a transition to a new set of limits.

Turner’s extended anthropological concept of liminality sheds interesting light on Massumi’s fascination with two types of order corresponding to structure and event. Turner was struck by the recognition that liminal phases involve the temporary and ritual suspension of social structure. Soon-to-be kings are treated like servants; males and females are treated indiscriminately, and so forth. Like Massumi, he observed that most social scientists pay almost exclusive attention to social structure. For Turner, however, this focus ignores the vitally important contribution made to wider society by the formative experiences that occur during these liminal, transitional moments in which social structure is suspended. To mark the importance of liminality he used the phrase anti-structure, and indeed gave his book *The Ritual Process* the subtitle *structure and anti-structure*. During a liminal passage, the ‘passengers’ are directly exposed to the transient nature of the social differentiations that make up social structure. Differences of status, of gender, of family rank and so forth are, for a short but intense time, de-differentiated into a relatively unstructured limbo.
Liminal situations therefore create the conditions for an experiential confrontation with what it means to be a human being outside of and beyond a structurally given social position or state. Such moments or episodes tend to be highly affectively charged, and for Turner, they are enormously valuable formative experiences. Liminal experiences can give rise, for example, to a “sentiment of humankindness”. They can help to generate a sense of equality and of the common purpose of the society taken as a whole, rather than as a collection of structural positions. Liminal ‘anti-structure’, in short, is for Turner the source of those experiences that allow people to recognize the generic human bonds that make social structure possible and sustainable. As Turner (1969/1995, p. 97) puts it, “Something of the sacredness of that transient humility and modelessness goes over and tempers the pride of the incumbent of a higher position or office”. In liminal experiences, people are temporarily released from social structure “only to return to structure revitalized”.

Turner uses the word communitas to capture this combination of valuable features. We thus have an account of social order that juxtaposes two “alternating ‘models’ of human inter-relatedness”. The first is structured, differentiated and hierarchical, and the second is a “relatively unstructured communion of equal individuals submitting to the authority of the elders.” What is decisive, however, is the dialectic involving the alternation and interweaving of both. Communitas emerges where structure is not. Without communitas social structure will become inflexible and corrupt. Without social structure, communitas would be chaotic. These positive qualities Turner associates with liminality directly evoke the way in which affect is celebrated by Massumi. It is:
• about ‘event’ or transition rather than ‘structure’.

• It is about residual potential that has not yet been captured and externalized in concrete social structure.

• As potential, it evokes a potency that can revitalize or disrupt existing structural arrangements.

• It is about the vivid immediacy of the now, with all of its spontaneity.

• It is pre-personal or asubjective to the extent that it cannot be reduced to existing social identities with their allocated rights and duties.

• It is a gift that cannot be owned but, by contrast, engenders a general sense of anonymous and shared participation in a broader unity.

• It allows a glimpse at the kind of generalized egalitarian social bond.

• It points towards an open future with no borders.

• It is about community rather than society. That is to say, community, not as something that is, but as something that happens: “Community is the being no longer side by side (and, one might add, above and below) but with one another of a multitude of persons. And this multitude, though it moves towards one goal, yet experiences everywhere a turning to, a dynamic facing of, the others, a flowing from I to Thou. Community is where community happens” (Martin Buber (1961), cited by Turner, 1969/1995).

ii. Affectivity and liminality as two sides of an anthropological (psychosocial) unity
Putting these two concepts together in this way suggests a broadly ‘psychosocial’ synthesis wherein the concept of liminality can supplement affectivity and hence draw attention a) to the social occasioning of certain intense experiences (or experiences of intensity), and b) to the important (paradoxical) relation of these experiences with social structure. There is an obvious intuitive link between affectivity (including emotionality) and this anthropological definition of liminality as an ‘anti-structural’ phase of transition. Manuela’s grief when confronted with Esteban’s death, for instance, is a profoundly affective experience, but it is also a liminal moment of transition. Esteban’s death heralds a decisive transformation in Manuela’s life. She is no longer the mother of a living son. As her structural ‘position’ as a mother breaks down, she enters a highly mobile, volatile and affective space and phase of transition which she must live through before she is able to cobble together and incorporate a new identity status. Rom Harré (Harre 1986, p. 4) long ago warned psychologists not to imagine that words like ‘anger’, ‘love’, ‘grief’ or ‘anxiety’ refer to some entity that can be abstracted from the flux of situated interaction and studied. Rather, when dealing with emotions we are in fact always dealing with experiences of concrete unfolding situations: “grieving families at funerals, anxious parents pacing at midnight, and so on”. When we insist upon the dynamic and situated nature of emotions in this way, we recognise that, whilst not all of these concrete situations are classically liminal (i.e. not all entail Van Gennep’s three sorts of rites), affectivity is nevertheless always implicated in moments of transition, and vice versa.

In short, if we define liminality as the experience of being on, or crossing over, a threshold, then we begin to understand why affects and emotions are liminal
phenomena of transition, and why liminal situations are affective and emotional. It is in fact paradoxical to talk of liminal circumstances as *concrete* situations, since their defining feature is their relative transient liquidity. Harré’s “anxious parent pacing at midnight” may not be in a situation where that liquidity is supported by a formal ceremony complete with rites, but they do face a moment when the usual dictates of social structure - the usual rules that govern their lives - are suspended: their child has gone missing. When subjectivities are structured by clearly applicable norms and rules they acquire a relatively 'objective' character (the nature of outer and inner reality is not in question, for instance) but when taken-for-granted certainties are swept away, for whatever reason, we can easily lose our grasp of external reality and our sense of inner self-coherence. Manuela, for instance, temporarily lost not just her map, but also the road on which she previously travelled. Our subjectivity, on such occasions, can acquire a 'subjective' character and it is commonsensical that people might then be more open, not just to 'emotion', but also to those experiences of suggestibility, mimesis, social influence, imitation, contagion and so forth that are so controversial in the social sciences (see Motzkau 2007, 2009 and 2011 and Blackman 2007, 2010). One can hardly act as a rational self-interested agent when it is no longer clear what one’s interests are (Szakolczai, 2009). The very rhythmicity of Manuela’s visceral sobbing can be seen, in this light, as an embodied proto-structure: the experience of one’s own sobbing body provides a rhythmic structure that bridges what would otherwise be an existential chasm.

Given this volatility, it should be clear that the positive qualities of liminal affectivity (i.e. the positive qualities Massumi attributes to affect and Turner
attributes to liminal communitas) need not materialize. The rites of passage of traditional societies were carefully structured and always supervised by an experienced master of ceremonies. They were kept in the margins of public life and carefully hedged around by taboos (Szakolczai, 2009). Even in the context of a carefully structured rite of passage, however, the experiences people go through in the liminal phase have the risky and undetermined quality of a test or trial: something might go wrong. It is as if the affectivity summoned during a liminal transition calls for a highly ritualized and ceremonial framing such that a hard crust of ritual might protect the liquid sensitivity of moments of becoming, the better to pattern them into a socially authorized form.

This is perhaps more than a metaphor. Moments of ‘becoming’ are literally formative experiences in which subjectivity itself acquires a new pattern, a pattern typically suited to the externalities of pre-existing social structures (and hence to the lives people are actually going to lead). During genuinely formative experiences of transition we are often all too aware that we might be changing fundamentally, and that there is no going back. This is why, in Szakolczai’s (2009) terms, “a liminal situation should only be provoked [or enhanced] if one has a proper ‘form’ in hand to impose on the soul of those whose emotions are stimulated by being put on the ‘limit’”. That form is not something that can be expected to somehow automatically follow from inner dispositions, since it is the pattern expected by the collective the ‘passengers’ are part of. Here, any social artifice of staging does not contradict the authenticity of experience: the more important and emotionally real the event, the greater the need for a carefully staged structure to ‘occasion’ the experiences. In the absence of such patterning
devices, liminality can be chaotic, messy, dangerous and destructive. Instead of being a formative experience, emotional transitions can be de-forming.

It is the negative side of affectivity/liminality that Massumi and his followers neglect at their peril when they ignore structure in favour of a pure becoming identified with affect. This neglect is compounded by the fact that in modern societies there are few remaining explicit rites of passage. This is a theme also taken up by Arpad Szakolczai who diagnoses modernity itself as a period of “permanent liminality”. Rather than a passage from state to state, liminality increasingly gives rise only to more liminality. The turn to affect and emotions in social sciences appears to reflect and respond to this broader ‘neo-liberal’ societal development in which the affective weight once borne and patterned by social structures is increasingly packaged into an economic rhetoric of ‘individual choice’. Those whose socially de-structured lives resemble a chaos of mania, anxiety and depression are effectively told that - since the fault lies with the individual - guilt should be added to this mix (Greco and Stenner 2008).

iii. Ontological liminality

A clue to an ontological account of liminality and affectivity is provided by Szakolczai (2009, p.148) when he draws attention to the relationship between liminality and experience in general. To have “an experience”, he suggests, “means that once previous certainties are removed and one enters a delicate, uncertain, malleable state; something might happen to one that alters the very core of one’s being”. On one level, this merely re-iterates what we have discussed above in terms of thinking the psychological and the social together, but if we combine this
interest with Whiteheadian process philosophy, we encounter an ontology in which experience as such is fundamental to all forms of reality.

We have touched upon Whitehead’s definition of actual occasions of experience as events of transition from actuality to actuality. The actual occasion is, in effect, the atomic unit in Whitehead’s philosophy, meaning that all reality is ultimately composed, not of brute matter, but of events or occasions in which the potentialities of the world are recurrently actualized. Actual occasions are the experiences (subjective moments of patterning) which give rise, through their infinite iterations, to the patterned expressions of the external world: event and structure. Whitehead aimed for an ontology of immanent unity in which the universe is not fundamentally bifurcated into ‘social’ and ‘natural’ portions corresponding to ‘subject’ and ‘object or ‘agent’ and ‘structure’. The immanent principle of unity expressed in “Process and reality” is that all existent reality is “composed of organisms enduring through the flux of things” (Whitehead, 1927–1928/1985, p. 251). For Whitehead, rocks no less than rabbits are composed of a complex manifold of contemporary and ongoing actual occasions, such that, comparatively speaking, rocks may be considered lower types and rabbits higher types of organism. The concept of organism (whether rock or rabbit) implies an enduring structure or pattern, but that pattern is grasped as the effect of multiple unfolding occasions of patterning (Stenner, 2012b). The difference is that rocks are comparatively stable and long-lasting because the atomic events that compose them are repetitive and conformal, linking up into enduring spatio-temporal assemblages. The higher types are more precarious and they both presuppose and, to some extent, include the lower types within their structures. A living rabbit cell,
for example, is a structured society of occasions that includes within it a multiplicity of subordinate societies composed of non-living molecules arranged in more or less intricate structural patterns.

As we have hinted, affectivity (in the form of feeling) plays a decisive role here, but only when grasped ontologically as liminality. Structural patterns are the result of multiple, various and recurrent events of patterning (actual occasions of experience) in the course of which the ‘data’ of the world is lent pattern through a process of feeling. Feeling is not just an accompanying ‘quality’ but literally a process of grasping (prehension) whereby an actual occasion/entity patterns the heterogeneous data of its actual world into a unity. This account echoes the anthropological account of liminality as a dynamic relation between moments of stasis (or states) and moments of transition (or passages). Experience is not merely the “perception of an object”, but something that we (as assemblages of occasions) go through (see also Szakolczai, 2009): it is transition from actuality to actuality. Whether we call these experiences of transition affect, emotion, feeling or something else is, on the ontological level, a secondary matter of emphasis which depends upon which side of the threshold we happen to be looking from (experience or expression). In other words, rather than polarizing affect and emotion like Massumi, both should be seen as processes of transition between states or orders of various kinds. However, it is important to recognize here that, unlike anthropological liminality (which concerns specifically human interactions), Whitehead had in mind a metaphysics applicable to every possible kind of event. As Whitehead (1927–1928/1985) puts it:

> Each actual entity is conceived as an act of experience arising out of data. It is a process of
‘feeling’ the many data... Here ‘feeling’ is the term used for the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question.

Feelings... effect... a transition into subjectivity. (p.41).

From this perspective, it is entirely consistent for Whitehead to affirm that there is “nothing in the world which is merely an inert fact. Every reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt”. These feelings, however, are intensive, subjective, transitive affairs which can be experienced by others only once they have actualized into concrete expressions, and hence become part of the data of the universe. This is why, in our opening quotation, Whitehead writes of the appropriation of the dead by the living. The inert facts of structure, like bones, teeth and even Esteban’s heart, are simultaneously the dead products of previously living immediacies of becoming, and the data that make possible the living events of the now.

**The affective practice of transplanting emotions**

Our distinction between ontological and anthropological liminality enables us to handle an inevitable tension: on the one hand, we have the ontological affirmation that, since all is ultimately process, every actuality can be construed as liminal; on the other hand, we have the anthropological common-sense that some situations (birth, death, crisis, initiation, etc.) are more liminal than others. Empirically, what is and what is not a liminal situation must ultimately remain a matter of perspective, and the anthropological limitation (the anthropological being a subset of the ontological) takes the human perspective of ordinary social activity.
Ontologically, for instance, a rock is a temporary arrangement of a raging torrent of atomic activity in constant transition, but anthropologically it is one of the more stable features of the experienced world.

The value of an ontological account is that it shows the possibility of a coherent cosmology of process in which liminal occasions of experience (definable affectively as feelings) assume a pivotal role as atemporal occasions of transition that give rise to temporary states. Problems arise, however, when theorists remain at a purely metaphysical level, as when Massumi and his followers articulate a pristine ontological concept of affect jealously guarded from contact with any anthropological notion of affectivity (i.e. “emotion”). It is essential, therefore, to articulate an anthropological account that is consistent with the ontological, but also focused intelligibly on a smaller subset of (human) experience.

The reflexively liminal and Janus-faced character of the concept of liminality helps here, not just because it faces both to structure and to event, but also because it is a transdisciplinary concept whose potential relevance to all disciplines permits a much needed translation between the philosophical work of understanding experience beyond self-contained subjectivity, and more grounded explications of the complexities of experience threaded through contemporary socio-cultural settings, such as our opening scene (Brown and Tucker, 2010). The link between ontological and anthropological liminality is the shared centrality of the dual notion of the occasioning of experience (i.e. the situated, staged, structured and patterned nature of experience) and the experience of occasions (i.e. the relevance of the actual world to any experience). This dual notion appears paradoxical if one assumes a representational ontology which de-couples subjective experience
from objective reality and hence ignores the relevance of the occasion (including the structural aspects of its staging) to the event of experience. Anthropological liminality, on the contrary, makes clear that when important and emotional events happen to people, what is made of those events, and its future relevance to the collective, will depend crucially on the careful staging of the occasion of transition.

Liminality can thus act as a theoretical / methodological hinge articulating the abstract complexities of thought opened by affect theorists with the ethnomethodological dictate of attending to the participant’s concerns emerging from, for instance, ethnographic work. We therefore end this paper by briefly and selectively drawing upon our participant observation - undertaken in Barcelona during October 2008 - of a workshop presented by two nurses with long experience of dealing with bereaved relatives in the context of organ donation requests. The workshop is a “real” device - much like the ‘rehearsal’ depicted by Almodóvar - called EDHEP (European Donor Hospital Education Programme) developed “to sensitize doctors and nurses to the issue of donation and to enhance their awareness of the communication skills needed when breaking bad news, caring for grieving relatives and requesting donation” (Blok et al, 1999). The contents of the workshop were presented as emergent from bereavement experiences and are directed towards obtaining consent (extracting a “yes”) from a donor kin, and thus authorizing the procurement of the living cadaver’s organs and tissues (Lock, 2004).

We wish simply to draw attention to what could be seen as the process thinking expressed in transplant coordinators’ ways of handling, negotiating and applying the ambiguous and shifting knowledge about affectivity and liminality
encountered in their practice (Motzkau, 2009; 2011). That is, if we attend to the concerns of our participants we quickly witness a preoccupation with affectivity and liminality in juxtaposition with a ‘structural’ concern with extracting a “yes”. From this perspective, such workshops can be considered as components of an affective technology, mediated by psychological knowledge, that enacts a contemporary rite of passage of sorts. Although the differences from traditional rites are obvious and not to be avoided (by definition, for instance, an accidental death occurs as an unanticipated shock whose staging cannot be prepared in advance), like more traditional mortuary rituals which deal with the liminality and affectivity that arise when a member of society dies (Hogle, 1999, p. 25), the donation interview is designed to coordinate and diminish the harmful effects of this perturbation, whilst shaping the subjective and objective (experienced and expressed) outcomes (Van Gennep, 2008, p. 28).

The first notable point in this respect is that “reducing tension” is one of the three objectives that transplant coordinators must keep in mind during donation interviews according to this workshop. Indeed, the threefold objective of “facilitating donation”, “being helpful”, and “reducing tension” is frequently repeated throughout the workshop as the transplant coordinators leitmotif during the donation interview. Perhaps unsurprisingly, significant workshop attention is given to defining and understanding the “grieving process”, a concept which expresses the ambiguity and intertwinment of affectivity and liminality.

A booklet provided as a workshop handout, for instance, begins by referring to this process as a period of affliction following a loss that is constituted by two distinguishable elements: grief and mourning. The latter refers to the
particular behaviors strongly influenced by social habits (i.e. funerary rituals, cremation, etc.) whereas the former encompasses more purportedly universal personal reactions to death (mostly physiological and psychological reactions). Despite their presentation as “separate and independent processes”, these are also said to interact and thus often to appear jointly. This shows an orientation not just to the affective dimension, but also to a rough equivalent of the slippery affect / emotion division that pervades affect theory, a division that is here precariously managed by the concept of a unified grieving process with relatively clear and established phases, always open to individual actualizations and social/medical/professional interventions. Thus, affect seems to follow an a-subjective pattern open to being grasped and reworked. According to an interweaving of psychological knowledge and practitioner experience, this pattern\textsuperscript{5} is sketched in the handout as follows:

1. Shock
2. Confusion
3. Hunt

Emotional state:

Devastation
Desperation
Guilt
Fear
Jealousy
Shame
Rage

4. Acceptance
5. Reintegration

The first phase of “shock” resonates with the first stage of a rite of passage, which
is seen by Van Gennep and Turner as “a metaphorical – but not ‘only’ metaphorical – death” (Szakolczai, 2009, p.147). If we focus on the second and third points, we can see the characteristic features of the liminal phase which, as noted above, can be emotionally laden, and extremely ambiguous and confusing. Manuela, for example, entered into a paradoxical zone of being simultaneously (both/and) mother / not mother, someone who must act / someone who cannot act, responsible / incapable of responsibility, member of an organ coordination team / not member, and so on. The myriad “possible emotional responses when confronted with death” echoes the ambiguity, uncertainty and indeterminacy characteristic of liminal phases of transition. The affectivity, suggestibility and paradox summoned when taken-for-granted certainties are swept away cannot be “ignored or wished away” and hence “dares the representatives of order to grapple with it” (Turner 1974, p. 39). Here, “the representative of order” (and possibly the Master or Mistress ‘of ceremonies’) are the transplant coordinators who are trained to repeatedly solicit and manage emotions, the better to steer the direction these take (Szakolczai, 2009, p. 157). According to the instructions that these professionals receive in the workshop, for example, donor kin should be actively encouraged to talk about their feelings through a technique called “mirroring emotions”. The ritualized rhythm of the communicative skills worked upon in the workshop can serve to bind people emotionally and to reconfigure bereaved subjectivities (Sennett, 2012).

Coordinators are further encouraged to extend the usage of the mirroring technique to introduce a stage called “discussing the future” (e.g. asking the bereaved relative whether he or she is wondering what should be done next). By
strategically playing with an open search for meaning amidst the meaningless death, this phase is designed to more or less abruptly open a path to the so-called reintegration stage in this particular rite of passage. A possible future is ‘discussed’ with the transplant coordinator who conspicuously introduces the ingredient of organ donation, referring not only to time constraints (as in Almodóvar’s scene), but also suggesting that becoming a donor kin may effectively reduce tension in the mid-to-long term. Evidence for this is provided in the form of reflections from previous donor kin, whose comments might be presented either anecdotally (it might be suggested that previous donor kin have found the knowledge that their kin’s organs have helped another to be an emotional ‘balsam’), or via a recorded interview shown during the workshop (Herrera, 2006). Naturally, it is stressed that the rhythm and timing of this phase is extremely delicate.

This brief analysis points to some of the ways in which the pattern of a rite of passage is adopted as part of an affective technology at transplant coordinators’ disposal. Describing it as a rite has the advantage of drawing attention to the sense in which this affective practice is not only functional (and dictated by a highly rational techno-scientific medical imperative) but also expressive, concerning the performative enactment of subjectivities and their integration into, or diversion from, societal structures (Langer, 1957 and Mahmood, 2001). Key to this expressive dimension is the possibility for the creation of precisely that sentiment of humankindness which Turner associates with Communitas and which pervades Almodóvar’s film: namely the possibility of being a ‘good citizen’ who donates organs. From this perspective, the ‘rehearsal’ of Almodóvar’s contrast is no mere representation of some external reality supposedly constituted by the ‘actual
occasion’, but a key ingredient in the crafting of the pattern deployed in the becoming of novel forms of social order and personhood. However, to the extent that this expressive dimension is eclipsed by the means-ends rationality of the instrumental function (i.e. to the extent that the passenger in the transition is given no real option but to say “yes”), this becoming may back-fire and take the bodged form of self-parody. The concept of liminality helps us to grasp that the affective event must be staged, not in order to prescribe the end-result (such that the dead hand of determinism appropriates the living), but in order that dead structure might facilitate the living immediacy of becoming.

Notes

1. This is an ethnographic study exploring the organ donation process in a Hospital. It was carried out by a research team from the University consisting of Prof. , Dr. , and .

2. We note that passage, like transition, is a key concept in Massumi’s writing but, perhaps as part of his movement away from traditional forms of social sciences (Brown 2009), he seems to prefer philosophical references such as Bergson over Turner or Van Gennep. It is doubly striking in this context that academics such as Massumi disregard the work of Turner because, like Bateson, he was seen by Deleuze and Guattari as an exceptionally creative ‘smooth’ thinker.
capable of analysing rhizomatic multiplicities (i.e. mutually constitutive relations between seemingly separated domains), such as language, symbolism, material culture and social organization (Jensen and Rödje 2009, p. 26).

To give an extreme example, Shakespeare’s Macbeth, inspired by the hubris of power, illegitimately forced his way to the status of King by killing Duncan. In this disastrously botched rite of passage, Shakespeare brilliantly draws attention to the disjuncture between Macbeth’s pattern of subjectivity and that required for the external status of King by developing the metaphor of clothes (pattern of external structure) which fit poorly upon a body (pattern of subjectivity). Occupying a new status or position is thus likened to occupying strange garments which “cleave not to their mould, but with the aid of use”. The best example is in Act V, Scene II when Angus describes how Macbeth’s murderous usurpation has yielded minute subjective revolts such that:

Those he commands, move only in command,
Nothing in love: Now does he feel his title
Hang loose about him, like a giant’s robe
Upon a dwarfish thief.

Arpad Szakolczai (2009) provides an excellent and inspiring summary that links Turner’s work to the philosophical tradition of Plato and to a tradition of social theory associated with Dilthey, Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and a number of others. Szakolczai is a little less clear about linking liminality to affective experience, and here we have attempted to extend his insights by introducing a tradition he does not appear to be familiar with, namely Whiteheadian process
philosophy.

5 This model is based mainly on a chapter on “Grief Therapy” in a Dutch “Handbook of Behavioral Therapy” edited by JWG Orlemans in 1984

References


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