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A new argument for anti-natalism

Belshaw, Christopher (2012). A new argument for anti-natalism. South African Journal of Philosophy, 31(1) pp. 117–137.

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Abstract

Consider the view that coming into existence is bad for us. Can we hold this and yet deny that ceasing to exist would be good for us? I argue that we can. First, many animals have lives such that they would be better off not existing. Second, if persons and babies are distinct things then the same is true of babies. Third, even if persons and babies are not distinct things – rather they are phases that human beings go through – still it is bad for babies that they come into existence. So it was bad for us to come into existence. But most of us now enjoy worthwhile lives. So it would be bad for us, now, to cease to exist.

Item Type: Journal Item
Copyright Holders: 2012 Philosophical Society of South Africa
ISSN: 0258-0136
Keywords: reproduction; childbirth; human reproduction; annihilationism
Academic Unit/School: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
Related URLs:
Item ID: 36038
Depositing User: Christopher Belshaw
Date Deposited: 09 Jan 2013 13:30
Last Modified: 06 Aug 2019 15:12
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/36038
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