PDF (Accepted Manuscript)
- Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Download (189Kb) | Preview
|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||https://doi.org/10.1016/S1369-8486(03)00027-X|
|Google Scholar:||Look up in Google Scholar|
In this article I assess Georges Canguilhem's historical epistemology with both theoretical and historical questions in mind. From a theoretical point of view, I am concerned with the role that history can play in the understanding and evaluation of philosophical concepts. From a historical point of view, I regard historical epistemology, as developed by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, as a conception and practice which came out of the project, elaborated in France from the 1920s to the 1940s, of combining history of science and philosophy. I analyse in particular Canguilhem's epistemology in his theory and practive of history of science. What he called 'normative history' is the focus of my analysis. I evaluate the question of the nature and provenience of the norm employed in normative history, and I compare it with the norm as discussed by Canguilhem in _Le normal et le pathologique_. While I am critical of Canguilhem's treatment of history, I conclude that his philosophical suggestion to analyse the formation of scientific concepts 'from below' represents a useful model for history and philosophy of science, and that it can be very profitably extended to philosophical concepts.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Keywords:||Canguilhem; Bachelard; Koyre; Historiography; Normativity; Historical epistemology.|
|Academic Unit/School:||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Politics, Philosophy, Economics, Development, Geography
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
|Depositing User:||Cristina Chimisso|
|Date Deposited:||23 Jun 2006|
|Last Modified:||01 Feb 2017 14:25|
|Share this page:|
Download history for this item
These details should be considered as only a guide to the number of downloads performed manually. Algorithmic methods have been applied in an attempt to remove automated downloads from the displayed statistics but no guarantee can be made as to the accuracy of the figures.