Hales, David; Rahman, Rameez; Zhang, Boxun; Meulpolder, Michel and Pouwelse, Johan
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|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1109/WETICE.2009.22|
|Google Scholar:||Look up in Google Scholar|
BitTorrent is a highly popular peer-to-peer file sharing protocol. Much BitTorrent activity takes place within private virtual communities called "private trackers" - a server that allows only community members to share files. Many private trackers implement "ratio enforcement" where the tracker monitors the upload and download behavior of peers. If a peer downloads substantially more than it uploads then service is terminated. Tracker policies related to credit effect the performance of the community as a whole. We identify the possibility of a "credit squeeze" in which performance is reduced due to lack of credit for some peers. We consider statistics from a popular private tracker and results from a simple model (called "BitCrunch").
|Item Type:||Conference Item|
|Copyright Holders:||2009 IEEE|
|Extra Information:||18th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructures for Collaborative Enterprises, 2009. WETICE '09.
June 29 2009-July 1 2009 Groningen
pp.99 - 104
|Keywords:||BitCrunch; BitTorrent; credit squeeze; peer-to-peer file sharing protocol; private trackers; private virtual communities; ratio enforcement; incentives; sharing ratio; peer-to-peer computing; protocols|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Mathematics, Computing and Technology > Design, Development, Environment and Materials|
|Depositing User:||David Hales|
|Date Deposited:||08 Mar 2012 11:47|
|Last Modified:||19 Dec 2012 09:57|
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