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Evolving networks for social optima in the “weakest link game”

Rossi, Giovanni; Arteconi, Stefano and Hales, David (2009). Evolving networks for social optima in the “weakest link game”. Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory (CMOT) , 15(2) pp. 95–108.

DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10588-008-9051-1
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Abstract

Previous models have applied evolving networks based on node-level “copy and rewire” rules to simple two player games (e.g. the Prisoner’s Dilemma). It was found that such models tended to evolve toward socially optimal behavior. Here we apply a similar technique to a more tricky co-ordination game (the weakest link game) requiring interactions from several players (nodes) that may play several strategies. We define a variant of the game with several equilibria—each offering increasing social benefit. We found that the evolving network functions to select and spread more optimal equilibria while resisting invasion by lower ones. Hence the network acts as a kind of “social ratchet” selecting for increasing social benefit. Such networks have applications in peer-to-peer computing and may have implications for understanding social systems.

Item Type: Journal Article
Copyright Holders: 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
ISSN: 1572-9346
Extra Information: The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Keywords: coordination game; weakest link game; potential game; Pareto-optimality; P2P strategic interaction; game theory; equilibrium selection; evolution of cooperation
Academic Unit/Department: Mathematics, Computing and Technology > Engineering & Innovation
Item ID: 32894
Depositing User: David Hales
Date Deposited: 27 Feb 2012 16:58
Last Modified: 13 Jun 2014 21:50
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/32894
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