Rahman, R.; Hales, D.; Vinkó, T.; Pouwelse, J. and Sips, H.
(2010).
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| DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: | http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1109/HPCS.2010.5547112 |
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| Google Scholar: | Look up in Google Scholar |
Abstract
Many peer-to-peer file sharing communities implement credit policies to incentivise users to contribute upload resources. Such policies implicitly assume a user model - how the user controlling each peer behaves. We show using an agent-based model that credit policies, based on bandwidth contribution, and a selfish user model, can lead to both “crunches” and “crashes” where the system seizes completely due to too little credit or too much credit. We explore the conditions that lead to these system pathologies and present a theoretical analysis that allows us to determine if a community is sustainable or will eventually crunch or crash. Finally we apply the analysis to produce a novel adaptive credit system that automatically adjusts credit policies to maintain sustainability.
| Item Type: | Conference Item |
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| Copyright Holders: | 2010 IEEE |
| Funders: | Future and Emerging Technologies programme FP7-COSI-ICT of the European Commission through project QLectives (grant no.: 231200) |
| Extra Information: | Conference held in conjunction with the 6th International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC ) |
| Keywords: | P2P; economics; agent-based simulation; credits; incentives |
| Academic Unit/Department: | Mathematics, Computing and Technology > Design, Development, Environment and Materials |
| Item ID: | 32891 |
| Depositing User: | David Hales |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Mar 2012 16:55 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2012 05:33 |
| URI: | http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/32891 |
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