Beyond prejudice: Are negative evaluations the problem and is getting us to like one another more the solution?

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Abstract: For most of the history of prejudice research, negativity has been treated as its emotional and cognitive signature, a conception that continues to dominate work on the topic. By this definition, prejudice occurs when we dislike or derogate members of other groups. Recent research, however, has highlighted the need for a more nuanced and ‘inclusive’ (Eagly 2004) perspective on the role of intergroup emotions and beliefs in sustaining discrimination. On the one hand, several independent lines of research have shown that unequal intergroup relations are often marked by attitudinal complexity, with positive responses such as affection and admiration mingling with negative responses such as contempt and resentment. Simple antipathy is the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, there is mounting evidence that nurturing bonds of affection between the advantaged and the disadvantaged sometimes entrenches rather than disrupts wider patterns of discrimination. Notably, prejudice reduction interventions may have ironic effects on the political attitudes of the historically disadvantaged, decreasing their perceptions of injustice and willingness to engage in collective action to transform social inequalities. These developments raise a number of important questions. Has the time come to challenge the assumption that negative evaluations are inevitably the cognitive and affective hallmarks of discrimination? Is the orthodox concept of prejudice in danger of side-tracking, if not obstructing, progress towards social justice in a fuller sense? What are the prospects for reconciling a prejudice reduction model of change, designed to get people to like one another more, with a collective action model of change, designed to ignite struggles to achieve intergroup equality?

Keywords: Prejudice; intergroup relations; social change
Over the course of the past century, the concept of prejudice has become increasingly central to scientific thinking about relations between groups, marking a profound moral and political as well as conceptual shift. During late 19th and early 20th centuries, many scholars favoured conceptual frameworks based around notions of group differences, hierarchy and biological inheritance (e.g. see Haller 1971; Goldberg 1993). By rooting the causes of ethnic and racial hostility in the supposed characteristics of its targets, they upheld the traditional doctrine of the ‘well-deserved reputation’ (Zadwadzki 1948). Between the 1920s and 1940s, however, an ‘abrupt reversal’ (Samelson, 1978) occurred in scientific thinking. Rather than the inherited deficiencies of minorities, social disharmony was attributed increasingly to the bigotry of majority group members. In the years following the end the Second World War, the concept of prejudice became central to the explanation of a range of social problems, including problems of discrimination, inequality, ideological extremism, and genocide. By the 1950s, prejudice research had “… spread like a flood both in social psychology and in adjacent social sciences” (Allport 1951, p.4). The deluge continued in subsequent decades, and prejudice rapidly became a fundamental concept within research on intergroup relations.

Yet what is prejudice? The modern roots of the term lie in the enlightenment liberalism of the 18th century, which distinguished opinions based on religious authority and tradition from opinions based on reason and scientific rationality (Billig 1988). The legacy of this ideological heritance has been prominent in modern research, which often treats prejudice as a form of thinking that distorts social reality, leading us to judge “… a specific person on the basis of preconceived notions, without bothering to verify our beliefs or examine the merits of our judgements” (Saenger 1953, p.3).

However, prejudice has seldom been treated purely as a matter of irrational beliefs. It has also been widely characterized as a negative evaluation of others made on the basis of their group membership (see Table 1). The nature of the relationship between the cognitive and affective dimensions of this kind of evaluation has, of course, generated considerable debate. For some researchers, prejudice should be regarded an indissoluble combination of both; for others, emotional antipathy lies at the core of the problem, with concepts such as stereotyping being treated as empirically related but analytically distinct (e.g. see Duckitt 1992, p.11-13). Likewise, although most researchers have conceived prejudice as a generic negative response to members of another group, others have attempted to differentiate emotional sub-categories. Kramer (1949) was an early advocate of this approach. His work prefigured recent developments in research on intergroup emotions, evolutionary psychology and social neuroscience, which has increasingly focused on target-specific reactions such as fear, anger and disgust and on the evolutionary and neurological mechanisms that underpin such
reactions (e.g. see Cottrell & Neuberg 2005; Harris & Fiske 2006; Neuberg, Kendrick & Schaller 2011; Phelps et al. 2000).

The underlying causes of our negative evaluations of others have also been subject to considerable debate and theoretical accounts have shifted over time. Explanations of prejudice have been grounded variously in personality development, socialization, social cognition, evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, as well as sociological theories of normative and instrumental conflict (for overviews see Brown 1995; Dovidio 2001; Dovidio, Glick & Rudman 2005; Duckitt 1992; Quillian 2006; Nelson 2009; Neuberg & Cottrell 2006; Wetherell & Potter 1992). Moreover, whereas earlier theories focused on ‘hot’, direct, and explicit forms of prejudice (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Dollard et al. 1939; Sherif et al. 1961), modern theories often prioritize ‘cool’, indirect, and implicit evaluations (e.g. Dovidio & Gaertner 2004; Kinder & Sears 1981; Pettigrew & Meertens 1995). Notwithstanding this historical and conceptual complexity, at the heart of most prejudice research is a deceptively simple question: Why don’t we like one another?

This question also underlies a closely related body of research on prejudice reduction, which encompasses work on interventions such as reeducation, perspective taking, cooperative learning, common identification, empathy arousal, and intergroup contact (e.g. Aronson & Patnoe 1997; Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006; Stephan & Finlay 1999). Although evidence of their effectiveness has been challenged (Paluck & Green 2009), such interventions are typically portrayed as a shining example – perhaps the shining example -- of how social science research on intergroup relations can promote a better society (e.g. see Brewer 1997). To be sure, in meeting the challenge of prejudice reduction, researchers have adopted varying theoretical perspectives, with varying implications for how processes of change are formulated. Perspectives treating prejudice as the outcome of deep-seated personality dynamics, for example, have constructed the problem of change differently than perspectives treating it as the outcome of more tractable forces such as social norms (e.g. Long 1951). Likewise, perspectives treating prejudice as a consciously held attitude have constructed change differently than perspectives treating it as an automatic and implicit process (e.g. Olson & Fazio 2006; Wheeler & Fiske 2005). By and large, however, advocates of prejudice reduction have united around a central imperative, which has become an interdisciplinary rallying call: How can we get individuals to think more positive thoughts about, and hold more positive feelings towards, members of other groups? In short, how can we get people to like each other?
Table 1 Some definitions of prejudice

… feelings of intergroup hostility (Allport & Kramer 1946, p.9).

… an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. (Allport 1954, p.10).

… an unjustified negative attitude towards an individual based solely on that individual’s membership in a group. (Jones 1972, p.61).

... a negative attitude towards members of a minority group (Levin & Levin 1982, p.66).

... a negative attitude towards members of socially defined groups (Stephan 1983, p.417).

...the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their membership of that group. (Brown 1995, p.8).

...an unjustified, usually negative, attitude directed towards others because of their social category or group membership (Sampson 1999, p.4).

… the human individual’s psychological tendency to make unfavorable evaluations about members of other social groups (Ibanez et al 2009, p.81).

The point of the present paper is not to devalue research on prejudice or to deny its profound historical significance. Rather, we wish to explore the limits of the orthodox conception of prejudice as negative evaluation. What has this conception contributed to knowledge about relations between groups and what has it obscured? How effective or ineffective has it been in guiding attempts to improve such relations? The paper has two sections. The first section presents some critical alternatives to, or substantive elaborations of, the traditional concept of prejudice. We capitalise in particular on developments in research on paternalistic ideology, ambivalent sexism, infra-humanization, common identification, and intergroup helping. The second section interrogates the related process of prejudice reduction, focusing on emerging research on the paradoxical consequences of intergroup contact. We argue that it is especially in the arena of social change that the traditional concept of prejudice falls short, and developing this theme, we discuss the tensions between prejudice reduction and collective action models of change. The paper’s conclusion outlines directions for future research and recommends some ways in which researchers might move ‘beyond prejudice’.
Limits of a concept of prejudice as negative evaluation

The ‘velvet glove’ of benign discrimination

Sherif’s Summer Camp studies are amongst the most influential studies ever conducted on prejudice (Sherif et al. 1961). They are rightly heralded as classics in the psychological and sociological literature. By creating an experimental context in which groups of boys competed for scarce resources, Sherif and his collaborators famously manufactured forms of intergroup hostility that echoed all too starkly the violence of intergroup conflict in the real world. They demonstrated that ordinary children -- with no prior history of animosity or special inclination towards bigotry -- could rapidly develop many of the hallmarks of extreme prejudice if placed under the right structural conditions, including negative stereotyping, voluntary segregation, and verbal and physical aggression.

In a fascinating thought experiment, however, Mary Jackman (1994) asks us to consider how events might have unfolded in these studies had the following conditions prevailed: (1) relations were protracted in time; (2) one group of boys achieved stable dominance over the other in terms of the commandeering of valued resources; and (3) that this dominance depended on their securing an ongoing transfer of benefits from the subordinate group. Such conditions, of course, mirror real relations of class, race and gender more faithfully than the brief, equal status, zero sum competition engineered by Sherif. Jackman argues that they also yield a very different pattern of intergroup responses than that evidenced by the Summer Camp studies.

The point of her thought experiment is not to discredit Sherif’s contribution. Instead, Jackman wants to highlight the contextual specificity of the Summer Camp findings and to challenge the assumption that negative reactions typify everyday relations in historically unequal societies. To the contrary, she argues, real relations of domination and subordination are marked by emotional complexity and ambivalence, with positive responses such as affection and admiration mingling with negative responses such as contempt and resentment. Sherif’s work constitutes the exception rather than the rule. According to Jackman (1994, 2005), it also captures a wider tendency for researchers to over-emphasize the role of antipathy within discriminatory relations between groups.

Jackman’s (1994) landmark book, The Velvet Glove, addresses this problem, exposing the insidious role of positive intergroup emotions in the reproduction of systems of inequality. Under conditions of long term, stable inequality, she contends, it is neither functional nor feasible for members of dominant groups to maintain uniformly negative attitudes towards subordinates. Given that dominants are dependent on subordinates’ cooperation in order to sustain a smooth transfer of benefits (e.g. in the form of labour and services), the ideal social system is one of paternalism. Within paternalistic systems, role differentiation
allows dominants to define the ideal characteristics of subordinates in ways that sustain the status quo and then to reward those who display these characteristics with affirmation, admiration, and even love. Such systems sugarcoat the harsh realities of inequality by framing social relations in more palatable terms for both dominant and subordinate group members. For dominants, exploitation is transformed into paternalistic regard. For subordinates, exploitation becomes more difficult to recognize and to resist. The bonds of connection fostered by paternalistic institutions encourage them identify with the very roles on which their subordination is founded. They nurture positive feelings for the dominant group and decrease the motivation to challenge the status quo, a point elaborated later in the paper.

Gender relations provide the clearest illustration of paternalistic influences on intergroup attitudes, exposing the limits of a concept of prejudice based solely around negative evaluation. Such relations were largely ignored in early work in the field, when the foundations of prejudice research were laid. Yet few commentators would nowadays dispute that gender discrimination remains pervasive or that men are often its complicit beneficiaries. At the same time, evidence suggests that many men express warm emotional attitudes towards women. Indeed, they tend to like them more than they like other men, a phenomenon that is sometimes labeled, not a little ironically, the ‘women are wonderful effect’ (Eagly & Mladinic 1989, 1993). If men behave in ways that maintain gender inequality and discriminate against women, then it is not because they feel some sort of generic hostility towards them. The traditional concept of prejudice as ‘unalloyed antipathy’ (Glick & Fiske 2001, p.109) does not seem to fit well.

Ambivalent sexism (and racism)

This paradox has been investigated recently by researchers working within the theoretical framework of Ambivalent Sexism developed by Peter Glick and Susan Fiske. According to Glick & Fiske (2001), sexist attitudes come in two forms. Hostile Sexism (HS) refers to attitudes of overt “hostility towards women who challenge male power” (Glick et al. 2004, p.715), and this concept is broadly consistent with an approach that treats prejudice as negative evaluation. Benevolent Sexism (BS), by contrast, refers to attitudes that seem supportive towards women, treating them as “wonderful fragile creatures who ought to be protected and provided for by men” (Glick et al. 2004, p.715), but also as creatures who lack agency and independence. HS and BS are manifest in all cultures and, according to Glick, Fiske and others, their ubiquity expresses a fundamental ambivalence in attitudes towards women. On the one hand, as a subordinate group, women must be kept in their ‘proper place’. This encourages the derogation of those who threaten (the legitimacy of) male advantage. On the other hand, men are dependent on women for, among other benefits, the
provision of emotional support, childcare and sexual gratification. This encourages the veneration of women who ‘know their place’, whose conformity to traditional gender roles inspires admiration, idealization, sacrifice and protectiveness. In everyday situations, of course, the expression of these hostile or benevolent attitudes is highly flexible, varying, for example, according to whether female targets are perceived as undermining (e.g. ‘career woman’) or supporting (e.g. ‘homemaker’) the wider gender hierarchy (see also Eagly 2004).

Ambivalent sexism theory is relevant to our argument here because it directly challenges the assumption that intergroup prejudice – and associated forms of discrimination – operates primarily via attitudinal negativity. The point of the theory is not simply to explain how men express and reconcile their polarized attitudes towards women, but also to highlight the broader ideological role of HS and BS in maintaining gender inequality. A number of issues are worth flagging here. First, BS is associated with a range of discriminatory beliefs, attributions and behaviours (e.g. see Abrams, Viki & Masser 2003; Chapleau, Oswald & Russell 2007; Rye & Meaney 2010). Yet because of its veneer of affectionate regard for (certain types of) women, it is less readily perceived as sexist than HS (Barreto & Ellemers 2005). It is thus a defensible ideology in societies where gender equality is a social ideal. Second and related, as well as shaping men’s gender attitudes, BS plays a powerful role in structuring women’s attitudes towards other women. Longitudinal research indicates, for instance, that women who score high on BS are more likely to express hostile attitudes towards their own gender in the future (Sibley, Overall & Duckitt 2007). They are also more likely to judge women who transgress traditional gender roles harshly and to support female behaviour that affirms these roles, such as the use of beauty products (e.g. Forbes, Jung & Hass 2006). Third, it is important to appreciate how hostile and benevolent attitudes act in tandem to sustain the status quo. Cross-national research suggests that individuals’ scores on measures of BS and HS tend to be positively correlated and that national averages for both forms of sexism are elevated in societies with higher levels of gender inequality (Glick & Fiske 2001).

As this brief review illustrates, emerging research on Ambivalent Sexism has gone some way to answering Jackman’s (2005, p.89) call for researchers to ‘dethrone hostility’ as the affective hallmark of discriminatory relations. To what extent, however, can work on attitudes in the field of gender relations be generalized to other kinds of intergroup relations?

Doubtless, gender relations are in several senses a ‘special case’, involving unusually intense forms of intimacy and interdependency (see also Glick & Fiske 1996). Even so, there is growing evidence that other kinds of intergroup relations may be characterized by a similar blend of positive and negative elements. Recent research on stereotype content demonstrates, for instance, that groups other than women (e.g. the
elderly) evoke paternalistic prejudices, which combine positive attributions of emotional warmth with negative attributions of intellectual incompetence. Conversely, other groups (e.g. Jews) evoke so-called ‘envious’ prejudices, which combine attributions of intellectual competence with attributions of emotional coldness (see Cuddy, Fiske & Glick 2008).

Along similar lines, Jackman (1994, 2005) holds that systems of domination other than patriarchy rely on a combination of negative and paternalistic attitudes, a claim supported by an array of historical evidence. Consider, for instance, the history of slavery in the US. In their monumental study of the mind of Southern US slaveholders, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese (2005) point out that slaves were widely viewed as a sacred trust to whom the owners owed paternal care. As an illustration, they cite one such owner, John Hartwell Cocke, who insisted that dutiful slaves should be treated with "kindness, and even sometimes with indulgence" (p. 370) and condemned the whipping of a slave out of passion or malice as "absolutely mean and unmanly" (p. 370). In stark contrast, however, harsh measures to deal with undutiful slaves – those who malingered, stole or absconded – were deemed not only permissible but also necessary by the slaveholding community. As William Elliot told members of the State Agricultural Society of South Carolina in 1849: "against insubordination alone, we are severe" (p. 368, emphasis in the original).

This ambivalent alliance between paternalistic care and punitive aggression mirrors Glick and Fiske's distinction between benevolent forms of sexism (expressed towards women who accept their dependency) and hostile forms (expressed towards those who challenge it). What Fox-Genovese & Genovese's (2005) analysis also confirms is that benevolence towards slaves was not associated with opposition to slavery. Quite the opposite. By subscribing to a code of chivalry, owners sought to depict slavery as "a system of organic social relations that, unlike the market relations of the free-labor system, created a bond of interest that encouraged Christian behaviour" (p. 368). After all, only if one was nice to one’s chattel could one sustain the legitimizing myth that slavery was "a blessing to both master and slave" (p. 515).

Although slavery has long been abolished, Jackman (1994) suggests that there remains a complex set of interrelations between benevolence, hostility and racial inequality in our own times. Using national survey data on race attitudes in the United States, for instance, she has shown that that many white Americans (39%) who express inclusive feelings towards African Americans also express conservative or reactionary attitudes towards policies designed to create racial equality in the domains of housing, employment and education. Positive intergroup emotions, in other words, happily co-exist with rejection of race-targeted interventions, as depicted by the ‘paternalistic’ quadrant of Figure 1 below. Of course, interpreting the implications of such findings is not straightforward and resistance to interventions such as affirmative action in the workplace does not necessarily equate to racial discrimination. Moreover, Jackman’s findings do not refute the claim
that negative evaluations play a key role in maintaining ethnic and racial inequality in many contexts. Indeed, her analysis also shows that only a small percentage of white respondents (7%) who feel emotionally estranged from black people support race-targeted policies (the ‘tolerant’ quadrant in Figure 1), whereas a high percentage (39%) espouse either conservative or reactionary policy attitudes (the ‘conflictive’ quadrant in Figure 1). Nevertheless, her findings do indicate that antipathy is not the whole story of racial and ethnic discrimination, a theme that is being developed in other areas of research.

![Figure 1: Configurations of interracial feelings and attitudes towards race targeted policies](image)

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<th>Policy attitudes</th>
<th>Inclusive</th>
<th>Estranged</th>
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<td><strong>Affirmative Change</strong></td>
<td>REVISIONIST</td>
<td>TOLERANT</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative or Reactionary</strong></td>
<td>PATERNALISTIC</td>
<td>CONFLICTIVE</td>
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*Note: Based on Jackman (1994, p.280). Respondents were classified as having Inclusive Feelings when their attitudes towards the outgroup were similar to, or more positive than, their attitudes towards the ingroup. Estranged Feelings were defined as feelings where the ingroup was favoured over the outgroup. Policy attitudes were classified as Affirmative, when respondents’ ratings suggested they believed the government should be doing more to promote racial equality in the areas of housing, employment and education than they were currently doing. They were classified as Conservative or Reactionary when respondents’ ratings indicated that the government was already doing enough or too much respectively to promote racial equality.*

*The spectrum of dehumanization: From genocidal hatred to loving condescension*

As the term suggests, dehumanization is a process through which other people become perceived as ‘less than human’. This process has been associated historically with some of most degrading expressions of prejudice. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more negative reaction than one that likens others to animals,
Filth or disease, relegates them beyond the scope of justice (Opotow 1990), or targets them for mass extermination (Staub 1992). Such brutal expressions of prejudice concerned researchers in the period following the Second World War and continue to blight relations in many societies. They are undoubtedly linked to powerful negative emotions such as hatred and disgust (e.g. Goff, Eberhardt, Williams & Jackson 2008; Harris & Fiske 2006). As the most recent wave of research illustrates, however, dehumanization also assumes subtler forms that are irreducible to affective and cognitive negativity (see Haslam 2006; Leyens et al. 2007 for overviews). In some circumstances, it expresses the kind of ‘benign’ condescension of which Jackman (1994, 2005) and Glick and Fiske (2001) have written.

Advances in this aspect of our understanding of dehumanization have been inspired by the work of Leyens and his colleagues, who identified a subtype of dehumanization now widely known as infra-humanisation. In their seminal work, this research group demonstrated that individuals attribute ‘secondary emotions’ (e.g. empathy, remorse) more readily to members of the ingroup than to members of the outgroup, but that no such difference occurs for the attribution of primary emotions (e.g. anger, happiness) (Leyens et al. 2001; Leyens et al. 2003). Subsequent research has suggested that this process may occur both within our controlled and conscious judgments of others (Explicit Infra-humanization) and also within our uncontrolled and unconscious associations (Implicit Infra-humanization). Using sequential priming techniques, for instance, Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin and Leyens (2007) found that respondents react more quickly to ingroup/secondary emotion associations than to outgroup/secondary emotion associations, supporting the claim that infra-humanization has an automatic component.

Many commentators have interpreted infra-humanization as a form of prejudice. After all, primary emotions are generally perceived as being shared by human beings and animals, whereas secondary emotions implicate moral, civil and aesthetic qualities that are somehow ‘uniquely human’ (Leyens et al. 2001). To deny that outgroup members experience such emotions to the same degree as ingroup members is thus to diminish their humanity. Infra-humanization and other forms of dehumanisation often occur, however, in the absence of overt conflict between the groups involved (Leyens et al. 2007). Moreover, their expression is relatively independent of the negative evaluations highlighted by the traditional concept of prejudice: it is the nature of the emotional attributions (secondary versus primary) rather than their valence (negative versus positive) that is crucial to processes of infra-humanization.

Indeed, as Haslam and Loughnan (in press) have argued, even forms of dehumanisation that are grounded in direct comparisons between people and animals do not necessarily entail antipathy. Saminaden, Loughnan and Haslam (2010) found that members of so-called ‘primitive’ or ‘traditional’ cultures were implicitly associated with animals but that this association was not accompanied by negative evaluations. To the
contrary, primitives were actually evaluated somewhat more positively than the members of the ingroup. Haslam and Loughnan (in press) have suggested that such responses are congruent with idealised and superficially positive images of ‘the noble savage’ – images in which members of ‘traditional’ cultures are treated as authentic and innocent and thus in need of protection and ‘development’. In other words, they illustrate how dehumanization may sustain relations of benevolent paternalism as much as relations of genocidal hatred, a contradiction that would surprise few historians of Western colonialism (e.g. Said 1993).

Ironies of intergroup helping

Unlike dehumanization, helping is generally conceived as a pro-social phenomenon, involving elevated emotions such as empathy, compassion and consideration. Given that people are generally more inclined to assist ingroup than outgroup members (e.g. Levine & Crowther 2008), helping across intergroup boundaries has been deemed an especially positive activity. As such, intergroup helping is sometimes used as a yardstick for judging the success of prejudice reduction interventions such as common identification. To cite one example: Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, and Ward (2001) reported that White spectators at an American football game were significantly more helpful to a Black confederate when he shared their university affiliation (indicated via clothing displays) than when he had a different university affiliation.

However, helping relations also involve an inherent inequality. The act of giving signifies the power of a donor to confer benefits to a (needy) beneficiary and may thus produce status differences between them. Moreover, at least delivered in certain forms, helping may foster long term relations of dependency and inequality. To use Nalder, Halabi and Harpaz-Gorodeisky’s (2007, p.4) terminology: “…the continuous downward flow of assistance can be conceptualized as a social barter where the higher status group provides caring and assistance to the lower status group, which reciprocates by accepting the social hierarchy and its place in it as legitimate.”

Gender relations again provide the most obvious illustration of the political complexity of helping relationships. The ability to cater to women’s needs (e.g. economic welfare) has served historically as an ideological cornerstone of patriarchal relations and, in so ‘benefitting’, women have sacrificed power and autonomy. Over the past decade or so, however, Arie Nadler and his colleagues have identified analogous processes operating within other kinds of unequal intergroup relations (e.g. between Israeli Arabs and Jews) and have developed a general theoretical model of helping as a ‘status organizing process’ (e.g. see Nadler 2002; Nadler & Halabi 2006; Halabi, Dovidio & Nadler 2008). Their work has shown that intergroup helping relations may service relations of domination in varying ways depending on the prevailing
ideological conditions. In societies with secure and stable status hierarchies, helping relations often serve to justify the status quo. When an advantaged group caters to the needs of a disadvantaged group, and this assistance is treated as desirable and necessary, then power relations become ideologically reconstructed as moral responsibility. In societies marked by insecure and unstable status hierarchies, by contrast, helping may be a mechanism for reestablishing threatened power differentials. Revealingly, under such conditions, research suggests dominants tend to favour the provision of chronic, dependency-oriented help, which allows them to reassert control and shore up the status hierarchy. By contrast, subordinates tend to favour the kind of help that allows them to retain collective autonomy and efficacy. They have misgivings about help that entrenches the status hierarchy by enabling others to intervene in their affairs or break down self-reliance (see Nadler 2010).

Helping relations, in sum, illustrate our broader point that superficially positive behavior can have discriminatory consequences, being implicated in wider power struggles in historically unequal societies. One is reminded here of the words of Albert Camus, who once wrote that “The welfare of the people has always been the alibi of tyrants, and it provides the further advantage of giving the servants of tyranny a good conscience.”

![Figure 2](image)

**Figure 2** The relationship between the social identity displayed by a black confederate and support for assimilationist versus multicultural race-targeted policies (based on Dovidio et al. 2010)

*Common Identification: The darker side of ‘we’*
A similar kind of argument can be applied to processes of common identification. Proposed originally by Samuel Gaertner and Jack Dovidio, the so-called Common Identity Model holds that inducing members of different social groups (e.g. blacks and whites) to view one another as members of a shared ingroup (e.g. Americans) tends to improve their intergroup attitudes, reducing intergroup bias and increasing positive responses such as liking and empathy (see Gaertner & Dovidio 2000, 2009). Research on this model is now extensive and overwhelmingly supportive. Common identification is widely viewed as one of the most promising interventions to improve intergroup relations.

In an elaboration of their own model, however, Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy (2009) have discussed the so-called ‘the darker side of we’, exploring some of the unacknowledged consequences of social inclusion. First, they concede that the ideological terms of inclusion are often a site of intergroup struggle. Members of historically advantaged groups typically favour assimilative forms of inclusion (a ‘one-group’ representation of common identity) that leave intact the existing status hierarchy, whereas members of disadvantaged groups prefer a dual identity model, which tends to better protect their group interests (see also Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy 2008). Second, although it reduces prejudice by encouraging us to like one another more, common identification does not necessarily lead to support for policies designed to produce structural change in historically unequal societies. In a striking demonstration, Dovidio and colleagues exposed white students to a black ‘confederate’ who displayed either a common category membership (University identity), a dual identity (black and a university identity), a black identity, or an individual identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson 2010). In line with the Common Identity Model, they found that levels of racial prejudice – both towards the confederate in particular and black people in general -- were lowest amongst whites in the common category condition and levels of ‘empathic concern’ were highest. However, they also found that this group showed least support for policies designed to encourage multiculturalism on campus and most support for assimilationist policies that effectively disregard ‘race’ (see Figure 2 above). To the extent that multicultural policies challenge the status quo more than assimilationist policies (e.g. by conferring selective benefits to black students) – and we concede that this is a controversial issue in its own right -- then one could argue that perceived common identification had the ironic effect of increasing whites’ resistance to meaningful social change.

Emerging research has also examined effects of common identification on the political attitudes of minority groups. Greenaway, Quinn and Louis’s (2011) study of the consequences of appeals to ‘common humanity’ provides a revealing illustration. Although this kind of appeal may unite the victims and perpetrators of historical atrocities, increasing ‘forgiveness’ of perpetrators, Greenaway et al argue that it may also reduce victims’ intentions to engage in collective action to transform enduring inequalities. Recognizing their shared
humanity with others, in other words, may encourage victims to accept discrimination rather than to do something about it. We develop this theme in the next section of our paper.

Summary and Implications

In sum, several independent strands of research have recently converged to challenge the traditional concept of prejudice as negative evaluation. Research on dehumanization has demonstrated how social perceptions that sustain intergroup hierarchies may operate in ways that are orthogonal to emotional valence. Dehumanization often occurs in absence of rancor. Indeed, we may deprive others of full human status whilst retaining indifference or even a mild, if condescending, affection towards them - as long, that is, as they accept their dependent place. If subordinate group members begin to contest their dependency, then that is often when negativity kicks in.

Research on common identification suggests that even when we are successful in creating more positive intergroup attitudes, encouraging people to evaluate one another more favourably, we may leave unaltered the conservative policy orientations of the historically advantaged. Viewing others as part of a shared ingroup, it seems, does not necessarily promote support change in a structural or institutional sense. Moreover, members of dominant groups lean towards ‘assimilative’ forms of inclusion that preserve rather than challenge social inequalities.

Perhaps most worrying, research on paternalistic social relations has suggested that ‘benevolent’ intergroup attitudes may not only coexist with social inequality, but also serve as a mechanism through which it is reproduced. Men generally express warm and protective, if not loving, attitudes towards women, and reserve antipathy primarily for those who challenge the gender hierarchy. As work on ambivalent sexism (and also on racism) has evinced, however, patriarchal relations are sustained by the warmth as well as the antipathy. It is the former as much as the latter, for example, that encourages many women to ‘buy into’ conventional forms of gender differentiation and indeed to take responsibility for policing their boundaries. In a similar way, attempts by dominant groups to ‘help’ the disadvantaged – arguably the ultimate expression of pro-social sentiment – may carry consequences that entrench rather than challenge social inequalities. Although such interventions may be motivated by positive emotions (e.g. empathy for others) and carry other beneficial consequences, they may equally help to reproduce status differences between the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Helping is thus a double-edged sword.
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<td>Re-education</td>
<td>Decreased salience of group boundaries and identities</td>
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<td>Empathy arousal</td>
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<td>Collective action model</td>
<td>Members of historically disadvantaged groups</td>
<td>Empowerment Consciousness raising</td>
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Table 2: Two models of change in historically unequal societies
The limits of a prejudice reduction model of social change

Two routes to social change in historically unequal societies

If negative evaluation of the disadvantaged is defined as the problem, then the emotional and cognitive rehabilitation of the advantaged becomes the solution. We need, by this logic, to get such people to like others more and to abandon their negative stereotypes. In due course, incidences of discrimination will decline, creating a more equitable society in which the potential for intergroup conflict wanes. The concept of prejudice, in short, implies a ready-made antidote, which is a model of social change grounded in the psychology of prejudice reduction (see Table 2 above, top panel).

The main level of analysis at which this model operates is the individual, the person whose negative feelings and thoughts need to be changed. Of course, if change remained hidden in the recesses of the individual mind, then prejudice reduction interventions would have limited utility. Accordingly, most prejudice researchers presume that what happens inside our heads ultimately carries consequences at other levels of social reality. By changing individuals’ prejudices, we also change how they relate to other people in their lives, and in turn this effect is believed to ripple outwards to shape wider patterns of intergroup conflict and discrimination. To be sure, the intermediate steps and processes through which this occurs are often underspecified. Nevertheless, we concur with Wright and Baray (in press), who claim that most researchers presume that prejudice reduction interventions have positive consequences that flow from a micro (individual) to a meso (interpersonal encounters and relationships) to a macro (institutional and intergroup relationships) level of analysis in order to create a more peaceful and just society.

Over the course of its history, this model of change has been periodically challenged. Some critics have argued that it individualises the historical, structural and political roots of intergroup discrimination (e.g. Blumer 1958; Henriques et al. 1984; Rose 1956; Wetherell & Potter 1992). Others have worried about the implication, embedded in several conceptualizations of prejudice, that social change is inevitably circumscribed by certain universal and intractable features of human psychology (e.g. Hopkins, Reicher & Levine 1994). Still others have questioned the strength of its supporting evidence (e.g. Paluck & Green 2009) or directly challenged its underlying assumptions (Reicher 2007). Nevertheless, prejudice reduction remains the most intensively researched and passionately advocated perspective on how to improve intergroup relations, and it is particularly influential within the discipline of psychology.
It is not, however, the only perspective. Table 2 (bottom panel) depicts a second model of social change that has engaged psychologists (e.g. Dion 2002; Drury & Reicher, 2009; Klandermans 1997; van Zommeren, Postmes & Spears 2008), along with historians (Rude 1981; Thompson 1991; Tilly, Tilly & Tilly, 1975), political scientists (Ackerman & Kruegler 1994; Piven & Cloward, 1979; Roberts & Ash 2009; Ulfelder 2005), and sociologists (Smelser, 1962; Turner & Killian 1987; Tarrow 2011). According to this model, dominant group members rarely (if ever) give away their power and privileges. Rather, these must be wrested from them by members of subordinate groups. The analytic focus therefore shifts away from the goodwill of dominants towards the resistance of subordinates. More specifically, this model highlights the role of collective action in achieving social justice. Its guiding assumption is that social change is predicated upon mass mobilization, a process that typically brings representatives of historically disadvantaged groups (who stand to benefit from change) into conflict with representatives of historically advantaged groups (who stand to lose out from change). Its significance is captured by Frances Fox Piven's contention that the "great moments of equalizing reform in American political history" (2008, p.21) have come about through the exercise of disruptive collective action.

To illustrate this alternative to a prejudice reduction model of social change, let us consider what are arguably the three greatest moments of racial equalization in modern history: the end of Apartheid in South Africa, civil rights reforms in the United States, and the abolition of New World slavery. In the case of Apartheid, there is some controversy over whether or not the violent struggles of the ANC's armed wing Unkhonto we Sizwe or the non-violent struggles of civic organizations and Trade Unions had a greater role in overturning the system (Zunes 1999). Yet there is little disagreement that change was principally down to black collective action. To say this is not to downplay either the role of international solidarity through the boycott movement or the role of white radicals and business organisations in securing the transition to majority rule. (Particularly in the twilight years of apartheid, for example, corporations such as Consolidated Gold Fields played an important part in bringing the State and the ANC together in negotiations and ensuring a peaceful end to the old system.) Nevertheless, as Harvey (2003) relates in his book The Fall of Apartheid: "There can be no doubt that the black majority won South Africa's bitterly fought racial war", even if, equally, there can be no doubt that “white surrender was conditional and took place well before military considerations alone would have dictated..." (p. 2).

The achievement of US civil rights followed a similar trajectory. Of course, white politicians and white radicals played an important role. Yet, as Oppenheimer (1994-5) asks, what happened between April 1st 1963 when Kennedy opposed the introduction of a Civil Rights Act and May 20th when he directed the Department of Justice to draft just such an Act (which was signed into law on July 2, 1964 by Lyndon Johnson)? His answer is admirably terse: "In a word - Birmingham" (p. 646). He is referring, of course, to
the massive desegregation campaign led by Martin Luther King who arrived in Birmingham Alabama on April 2nd, 1963. The resulting legislative changes had profound effects in all areas of American life, not least in the political domain. In 1965, only 193 black people held elected office in the entire USA. By 1985 - when Barak Obama began working as a political organizer in Chicago - the figure stood at 6,016 (Sugrue 2010). And, of course, on November 4th 2008, Obama himself was elected as President. A popular slogan in the last days of his election campaign was "Rosa sat so Martin could walk/Martin walked so Obama could run/Obama is running so our children can fly" (cited in Sugrue 2010). Or, as Obama himself acknowledged in his Selma speech of March 4th 2007: "I'm here because somebody marched" (full text available at http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2007/03/obamas_selma_speech_text_as_de.html).

Lastly, let us consider how slavery was abolished. This is an area of furious controversy (see, for instance, the debate in Drescher & Emmer 2010), and the controversy is complicated by the fact that different dynamics were at play in the British, French, Spanish and American instances of abolition (Blackburn 2011). However, it is significant that the debate concerns the relative contribution of two different forms of collective action: on the one hand, the resistance of slaves themselves, and on the other, the agitation of the largely white-led abolitionist movement. In other words, it concerns the contribution of collective struggles both between and within the slave and 'master' communities. What is not in question is: (a) that abolitionist movements were critical in rallying popular sentiment against slaveholding interests (Marques 2006, 2010b); (b) that the success of such movements was facilitated by crises or divisions in the slaveholding State (see Blackburn 2011); and (c) above all, that slave revolts - or the threat of slave revolts - were critical in inspiring abolitionist movements and in ensuring their ultimate success (Marques 2010a).

In all three examples, then, equality was won rather than given away. In all three, change was the result of sustained collective resistance rather than some kind of general improvement, whether incremental or dramatic, in intergroup attitudes. What is more, the examples illustrate that such collective resistance can occur at many levels. The struggle of the subordinate group against the dominant group - and hence the struggle to mobilise subordinate group members - often has a determining weight. However, the struggle within the dominant group should not be forgotten, a point to which we shall return in the final section of our paper. For the rest of this section, though, we address the question of how the two traditions of research on social change depicted in Table 2 are interrelated.

Although these models have developed largely in isolation, in our experience most researchers presume that they are complementary to the broader project of improving relations between groups. Prejudice researchers concentrate on changing the hearts and minds of the advantaged; collective action researchers study how, when and why the disadvantaged take political action to create more just societies. The models seem to fit
together as different parts of the overall puzzle of social change. Recent research indicates, however, that their interrelationship may be more complicated and more vexed.

According to Steve Wright and colleagues, the two models of social change entail psychological processes that actually work in opposing directions (Wright 2001; Wright & Lubensky 2009; Wright & Baray in press). On the one hand, prejudice reduction diminishes our tendency to view the world in ‘us’ versus ‘them’ terms, encouraging us to view others either as individuals (e.g. Brewer & Miller, 1984), as part of a common ingroup (e.g. Gaertner & Dovidio 2009), or at least as people who share ‘crossed’ category memberships (e.g. Crisp & Hewstone 1999). Such interventions foster positive emotional responses towards others, such as empathy and trust, whilst decreasing negative responses such as anxiety and anger (e.g. Esses & Dovidio 2002; Stephan & Finlay 1999; Pettigrew & Tropp 2008; Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns & Voci 2004). For the most part, they also encourage participants to view one another as equal in status and sometimes involve active attempts to establish such equality, at least within the immediate context of intervention (e.g. see Riordan 1978). The overarching objective of this model of social change is to reduce intergroup conflict in historically divided societies, producing more stable and peaceful societies.

On the other hand, collective action interventions are based on the assumption that group identification is a powerful motor of social change. Within this model of change, an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality is generally construed as functional and strategic: it encourages members of disadvantaged groups to display ingroup loyalty and commitment to the cause of changing society, to form coalitions with similar groups, and, crucially, to act together in their common interest (Klandermans 1997, 2002; Tajfel & Turner 1986; Wright & Baray, in press; Craig & Richeson, forthcoming). Collective action also generally requires the emergence of ‘negative’ intergroup emotions and perceptions, including anger and a sense of relative deprivation (e.g. Barlow, Sibley & Hornsey, in press; Grant & Brown 1995; Van Zommeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach 2004), which encourage group members to recognise injustice and status disparities and thus strive to change the status quo. Its main goal is not to reduce but to instigate intergroup conflict in order to challenge institutional inequality. Conflict is viewed as the fire that fuels social change rather than a threat to extinguish at the point of conflagration.

Paradoxical effects of intergroup contact

Recognition of the potentially contradictory relationship between these two models of social change has inspired research on the ‘ironic’ effects of prejudice reduction on the psychology of the disadvantaged. This idea was originally mooted by Wright (2001), and some of his insights are now being developed by other researchers.
Emerging research has focused mainly on the impact of interventions to promote intergroup contact, extending work on the so-called contact hypothesis (Allport 1954). The contact hypothesis is the most important tradition of research on prejudice reduction, and it has generated a vast research literature that spans a wide spectrum of disciplines, including sociology, psychology and political science (e.g. see Allport 1954; Brown & Hewstone 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006; Forbes 1997; Sigelman & Welsh 1993). Its basic premise is simple. Interaction between members of different groups reduces intergroup prejudice, particularly when it occurs under favourable conditions (e.g. equality of status between participants). Evidence supporting this idea is extensive and, many believe, conclusive. Pettigrew & Tropp’s (2006) widely cited meta-analysis found that contact decreased prejudice in 94% of 515 studies reviewed. A follow up analysis (Pettigrew & Tropp 2008) suggested that this effect was largely explained by reductions in intergroup anxiety and increases in intergroup empathy, as well as by improvements in participants’ knowledge about members of other groups.

Like most traditions of research on prejudice, research on the contact hypothesis has focused mainly on the reactions of members of historically advantaged groups. In some recent studies, however, the impact of contact on the psychology of the historically disadvantaged has been prioritized, with some provocative results.

Dixon, Durrheim and colleagues conducted two national surveys of racial attitudes in South Africa (Dixon, Durrheim & Tredoux 2007; Dixon et al. 2010b). Their first survey explored the relationship between interracial contact and South Africans’ support for race-targeted policies being implemented by the ANC government to redress the legacy of apartheid, including policies of land redistribution and affirmative action (Dixon et al. 2007). They identified a divergence in the results for white and black respondents. For whites, positive contact with blacks was positively correlated with support for government policies of redress; for blacks positive contact with whites was negatively correlated with support for such policies. In other words, contact was associated with increases in whites’ and decreases in blacks’ support for social change. In their second survey, Dixon et al. (2010b) investigated the relationship between interracial contact and black South African’s perceptions of racial discrimination in the post-apartheid era. They found that respondents who reported having favourable contact experiences with whites also perceived the racial discrimination faced by their group to be less severe. As Figure 3 conveys, this effect was mediated both by perceived personal discrimination and by blacks’ racial attitudes. That is, the inverse relationship between contact and judgments of collective discrimination was partly explained by reductions in respondents’ sense of being personally targeted for racial discrimination, as well as increases in their positive emotions towards whites.
These effects are not unique to the South African situation. Wright and Lubensky (2009) reported that contact with White Americans reduced African and Latino Americans’ willingness to endorse group efforts to accomplish racial equality. Revealingly, as a collective action perspective would predict, this effect was mediated by shifts in their sense of identification with their respective ethnic groups. Similarly, in a longitudinal study conducted on a university campus in the United States, Tropp and colleagues found that making white friends tended to lower perceptions of racial discrimination and decrease support for ethnic activism amongst members of three minority groups (African American, Latino and Asian American) (Tropp, Hawi, van Laar & Levin, 2011). The effects were strongest for African Americans, the group who otherwise reported the highest levels of experienced discrimination and the greatest willingness to challenge such discrimination (e.g. through political demonstrations). Surveys conducted in Israel by Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio and Pratto (2009, study 2) and in India by Tausch, Saguy and Singh (2009) have confirmed these ‘ironic’ consequences of intergroup contact. In both studies, positive contact was associated with reduced perceptions of social injustice and lowered support for social change amongst members of disadvantaged groups (Arab Israelis and Muslims). In both studies, too, such effects were indirect, being mediated by respondents’ attitudes towards the outgroup in question (Jewish Israelis and Hindus).

Saguy et al. (2009, study 1) and Glasford and Calcagno (2011) have provided laboratory confirmation of these survey-based data, laying the foundations for a program of experimental work that warrants further development. Saguy et al. created an experimental paradigm in which higher and lower power groups interacted under conditions that emphasized either their differences (less positive contact) or their
commonality (more positive contact). Higher power group members were then asked to distribute a series of rewards across the two groups, whilst lower power group members estimated the nature of the resulting distribution. The results provided a stark demonstration of the ‘darker side’ of both common identification and positive contact -- two pre-eminent techniques of prejudice reduction. Participants in the low power/common identity/positive contact cell consistently over-estimated the extent to which higher power participants would distribute rewards equitably. (In reality, the powerful group displayed a predictable pattern of ingroup favouritism.) This study thus highlights the potential problem of nurturing positive intergroup evaluations whilst creating false expectations of equality amongst the disadvantaged.

Glasford and Calcagno (2011) investigated the interrelations between commonality, intergroup contact, and political solidarity amongst members of historically disadvantaged groups. As research on both collective action and common identification would predict, their study showed that cueing a sense of common identity amongst members of black and Latino communities in the US increased their political solidarity; that is, their readiness to work together to improve the status of both groups. However, this effect was moderated by contact with members of the historically advantaged white community. Specifically, the more intergroup contact Latinos had with whites, the less effective the commonality intervention was in fostering their sense of political solidarity with blacks. Once again, notwithstanding its beneficial effects on intergroup attitudes and stereotypes, contact exercised a potentially counter-productive impact on the political consciousness of the disadvantaged. As Glasford and Calcagno (2011) elaborated:

These findings extend and complement recent work that finds that intergroup contact may have the unintended consequence of leading disadvantaged group members to attend less to inequality. Indeed, whereas intergroup contact with advantaged groups has been shown to lead disadvantaged group members to have false expectations for equality, as well as to decrease individual group members’ willingness to engage in collective action, the present research suggests that intergroup contact can decrease political solidarity, and importantly, it may undermine the efficacy of commonality-based interventions designed to increase political solidarity.

Summary and Implications

In this section, we have contrasted a prejudice reduction model of social change (based around getting dominant group members to like subordinate group members) with a collective action model (based around getting subordinate groups members to challenge dominant group advantage). Building on the work of Wright and colleagues, we have suggested that these models of change entail different, and potentially
contradictory, psychological processes, as illustrated by recent research on the consequences of intergroup contact.

Such research indicates that contact with members of historically advantaged groups may improve the intergroup attitudes of the historically disadvantaged, but also, paradoxically, reduce the extent to which they acknowledge and challenge wider forms of social injustice or display solidarity with other disadvantaged communities. From a prejudice reduction perspective we have a resounding success: from a collective action perspective a dismal failure. Further, this work shows that the very processes that underpin prejudice reduction also help to explain the ‘ironic’ impacts of intergroup contact on political attitudes. Perhaps most significant, several studies suggest that it is precisely because contact improves intergroup attitudes (prejudice reduction) that it also decreases perceptions of discrimination, support for race-targeted policies, and readiness to engage in collective action. When the disadvantaged come to like the advantaged, when they assume they are trustworthy and good human beings, when their personal experiences suggest that the collective discrimination might not be so bad after all, then they become more likely to abandon the project of collective action to change inequitable societies. Jackman’s (1994, 2005) warning reverberates here. Inequality is maintained not only through emotional negativity and the exercise of repressive force, but also through the ‘coercive embrace’ of an affectionate but conditional sense of inclusion.

Conclusions and future directions

For most of the history of prejudice research, negativity has been treated as its emotional and cognitive signature, a conception that continues to dominate work on the topic. By this definition, prejudice occurs when we dislike or derogate members of other groups. We do not dispute that research in this tradition has focused attention on processes that are essential to understanding the nature of intergroup discrimination. Recent work, however, has complicated the idea that prejudice consists exclusively of negative evaluations, highlighting the need to develop what Eagly (2004) calls an ‘inclusive’ conception of the role of intergroup emotions and beliefs in sustaining discrimination. A common theme in this research is its functionalist emphasis upon the social and psychological processes that serve to reproduce unequal social relations, an emphasis that resonates with Rose’s (1956, p.5) early definition of prejudice as a “…set of attitudes which causes, supports or justifies discrimination.” What is clear from evidence on topics such as paternalism, ambivalent sexism, common identification, intergroup contact and intergroup helping is that ‘positive’ evaluations of others may play as a central role within such processes as negative evaluations.
By necessity, our coverage of relevant literature has been selective. We have not had space to review, for example, emerging research on the ‘differentiated’ nature of intergroup emotions (e.g. Mackie & Smith 2002) and stereotype content (Cuddy et al. 2008) or on the broader factors that foster acceptance of unjust social systems amongst the historically disadvantaged (Jost, Banaji & Nosek 2004). Nevertheless, taken collectively, the research discussed in this paper offers a compelling challenge both to the orthodox conception of prejudice as negative evaluation and to the assumption that getting us to like one another more is some kind of sine qua non for promoting social change. Although evidence has accumulated steadily for several years, it is perhaps only in the domain of gender research that this emerging perspective has had a substantial impact, notably through work on ambivalent sexism. However, the significance of the subtler forms of discrimination discussed in this paper extends beyond gender relations. Paternalistic ideology pervades other forms of intergroup relations. It is perhaps in the arena of social change that the limitations of the traditional concept of prejudice as negative evaluation become most apparent.

Prejudice reduction and social change revisited: Some suggested parameters and future directions

The question of change has troubled us most whilst preparing this article. An enduring strength of work on prejudice, as noted in our introduction, is that it shifted the target of social science research on intergroup relations. The study of immutable and hierarchical differences between groups became recast as the study of dominant group bigotry, and in the wake of this paradigmatic ‘reversal’ (Samelson 1978), a rich tradition of research on prejudice reduction was born. The latter stages of our paper, however, have complicated this optimistic view of the contribution of prejudice reduction interventions. As it turns out, there is mounting evidence that nurturing bonds of affection between the advantaged and the disadvantaged sometimes entrenches rather than disrupts wider patterns of discrimination.

In this closing section, we offer some general reflections on possible routes forward. To begin with, we advocate three ways in which research on the consequences of prejudice reduction should be extended, which concern the importance of acknowledging: a) the relational nature of intergroup attitudes and perceptions, b) the political as well as the emotional and cognitive effects of prejudice reduction, and c) the complex relationship between harmony and conflict in the transformation of historically unequal societies. To conclude, we then revisit the question of how, if at all, prejudice reduction and collective action models of social change might be reconciled.

a) Recovering the relational character of intergroup attitudes
Research on prejudice has generally focused on the attitudes of the historically advantaged. This pattern was established by formative work on the topic, which sought to redress the problems of racism and anti-Semitism in the United States. It shone a harsh spotlight on the bigotry of the white protestant majority. Yet it often left the reactions of blacks, Jews and other minority groups in the shadows, implicitly casting them as passive targets of bigotry. Of course, this early work had admirable objectives. As an unintended consequence, however, it established a lacuna that has persisted to the present day: a failure to acknowledge, sufficiently, how intergroup attitudes emerge in and through the relational dynamics of interaction between groups, with the actions of members of one group (e.g. blacks) forming the context in which the reactions of the other (e.g. whites) take shape and find expression, and vice versa (see also Shelton 2000; Shelton & Richeson 2006).

This neglect must be borne in mind when evaluating research on the consequences of prejudice reduction interventions. Typically, such interventions shape the experiences of members of both historically advantaged and disadvantaged groups (e.g. by fostering more frequent intergroup contact). Moreover, they shape not only the intergroup attitudes of each group independently, but also the overall nature of the relationship between them (e.g. by encouraging re-categorization so that ‘us’ and ‘them’ become ‘we’). For much of the history of research on prejudice reduction, however, scholars have prioritized its effects on the responses of the historically advantaged and have left its effects on the psychology of the disadvantaged comparatively under specified.

We recommend, then, that the relational implications of prejudice reduction be brought to the forefront of future research. If this is done, then we anticipate that the ironic consequences highlighted in the present article will become increasingly apparent. We also recommend that researchers move beyond a simple, dualistic, ‘dominant’ versus ‘subordinate’ group model in order to explore other kinds of relatedness. Building on Glasford and Calcagno’s (2011) study, for instance, one might hypothesize that interventions designed to improve a subordinate group’s attitudes towards a dominant group (e.g. by creating new forms of inclusion) may have unintended effects on its members’ attitudes towards other subordinate groups. Not only may such interventions increase horizontal hostility (White & Langer 1999), but also they may decrease the willingness of members of different subordinate groups to act collectively in their shared interest. This attitudinal pattern is prevalent in post-colonial societies in Africa and the near East, where the ‘divide and rule’ strategies of colonial authorities were designed precisely to prevent the formation of rebellious alliances that might challenge the status quo.
b) Broadening the conception of a successful intervention ‘outcome’

Researchers have employed varying indices when evaluating the success of prejudice reduction interventions, which have become more sophisticated over time. Indices of blatant and controlled intergroup attitudes have been complemented by indices of indirect and automatic attitudes. Self-report indices have been complemented by behavioral and physiological indices. Scales measuring generic antipathy have been complemented by scales measuring specific intergroup emotions and associated action tendencies. By and large, however, the definition of a successful intervention outcome has remained within the boundaries of a concept of prejudice as negative evaluation. As its benchmark, prejudice reduction research continues to track shifts in emotional antipathy and pejorative stereotyping (or close proxies).

This emphasis on the cognitive and emotional rehabilitation of the bigoted individual has led to an under-utilization of other, equally important, measures of outcome. For one thing, it has downplayed the role of positive (or ambivalent) emotions in sustaining relations of discrimination and inequality, a possibility raised by the work reviewed in our paper as well as by other functionalist research on how intergroup attitudes and beliefs serve to reproduce status and power relations\(^5\). For another thing, it has submerged the political dimension of intergroup attitudes and perceptions of social reality. As Wright and Lubensky (2009, p.18) have remarked, “…when efforts to reduce prejudice focus exclusively on getting dominant group members to think nicer thoughts and feel positive emotions about the disadvantaged group, they may not necessarily increase support for broader structural and institutional changes”.

Consider, as an instructive example, research on whites’ support for policies designed to promote racial equality. Several researchers have argued that such support declines as policies come to threaten the racial hierarchy more directly (e.g. see Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Dixon et al. 2007; Schumann, Steeh, Bobo & Krysan 1997; Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman 1997; Tuch & Hughes 1996). Along these lines, for example, proponents of the Blumerian tradition of sociological research on prejudice have highlighted the evolution of what Bobo, Klugel and Smith (1996) have called a ‘kinder, gentler, anti-black ideology’ in the US, a set of political beliefs that justify racial inequality not in terms of the overt bigotry of ‘Jim Crow’ racism but in terms that are more defensible in the modern era. A key, and seemingly paradoxical, feature of this emerging ideology is that widespread acceptance of the principles of equality, integration and anti-discrimination is offset by widespread resistance to their concrete implementation.

According to Jackman and Crane (1986), this kind of attitudinal pattern is unlikely to be eradicated by traditional techniques of prejudice reduction, which put ‘parochial negativism’ rather than political attitudes at the heart of the problem of social change. In their analysis of national survey data gathered in America, for
example, they reported that interracial contact led whites to espouse greater emotional warmth towards blacks, but had little impact on their acceptance of government interventions to address racial injustice. Likewise, as we have discussed, common identification – another prominent technique of prejudice reduction -- may increase dominant group members’ emotional acceptance of minorities without increasing their willingness to embrace institutional change (Dovidio et al. 2010).

Our general point here is not that support for structural change is unaffected by prejudice reduction. It is that prejudice researchers need to adopt a broader conception of the ideal outcomes of intervention. In particular, we need to know more about the relationship between prejudice reduction and the political attitudes that sustain the institutional core of disadvantage in historically unequal societies, justifying an unequal distribution of wealth, opportunity and political power. How, for example, does prejudice reduction shape dominant and subordinate group members’ attributions about the causes of group differences in wealth and opportunity? How does it affect acceptance of ideological belief systems that either justify or challenge the status quo (see also Jost et al 2004)? Over the history of prejudice research, the goal of getting individuals to like one another has drawn attention away from these equally, if not more, important outcomes.

c) Acknowledging the complexities of harmony and conflict

The promotion of intergroup harmony has always been a cardinal objective of research on prejudice, and understandably so. Research on prejudice gathered impetus as a way of explaining the mass violence of the Second World War, and subsequent bloodshed throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries did little to allay social scientists’ concerns about “the toll in death, suffering and displacement caused by large-scale conflicts caused by groups defined by ethnicity, nationality, religion or other social identities…” (Eidelson & Eidelson 2003, p.183). In the face of such events, the promotion of harmonious relations became an unquestioned moral imperative for many researchers.

However, the relationship between intergroup harmony, conflict and social change is more complex than it first appears. On the one hand, harmony has a negative face, which our paper has revealed. To borrow Jost et al.’s (2004) terminology, it carries insidious, often unacknowledged, ‘system-justifying’ consequences. Seemingly tolerant and inclusive intergroup attitudes not only coexist with gross injustices, but also they can serve as a mechanism through which they are reproduced. On the other hand, if the unquestioned acceptance of intergroup harmony as an ‘absolute good’ is simplistic, then so is the unquestioned rejection of intergroup conflict as an ‘absolute bad’. Unlike harmony, whose meaning is often taken for granted by social scientists, conflict has been intensely scrutinized and condemned as a social problem. By implication, the diffusion of intergroup tensions has become the cardinal principle of prejudice reduction interventions. Whatever other
contributions it has made, this approach has entrenched the assumption that conflict between groups is inherently pathological, disconnected from human rationality, and without social value. It has quietly obscured the possibility that such conflict is also “... a normal and perfectly healthy aspect of the political process that is social life.” (Oakes 2001, p.16). Its psychological correlates of anger, strong social identification, recognition of status disparities, and sense of injustice do not sit easily with a prejudice reduction model of social change; however, in fuelling collective resistance, conflict may improve intergroup relations in a structural and institutional sense.

The latter point raises several challenging, and perhaps troubling, questions for proponents of a prejudice reduction model of social change. What are the dangers of employing interventions that seek, above all else, to quell, contain and dissipate intergroup tensions? In addition to combating negative stereotypes and emotions, should we be seeking to promote ‘positive’ conflict; that is, conflict designed to confront not only the direct violence of overt discrimination, but also the indirect violence of structural inequality? How might such interventions fit with the broader project of reducing prejudice? What form might they take?

Our argument here is similar to that made by Georg Sorensen (1992) in his discussion of the field of international peace studies. Sorenson criticized researchers’ tendency to extol the core value of ‘peace’ whilst leaving its fundamental contradictions unexamined. More specifically, he railed against a utopian perspective in which inconvenient questions are ignored – questions, for example, about the apparent ineffectiveness of exclusively non-violent solutions to problems of structural oppression in some societies and, conversely, about the apparent effectiveness of short term ‘developmental violence’ in establishing longer term peace in others (c.f. Fanon 1965). We believe a comparable problem afflicts much research on prejudice reduction. Social harmony has become an unquestioned ideal to be promoted, social conflict an unquestioned evil to be vanquished. Breaking with this approach, we advocate greater openness amongst prejudice researchers to interrogating the complex relationship between conflict and harmony as it unfolds within processes of social change in historically unequal societies.

d) Reconciling prejudice reduction and collective action models of social change?

The most important question that our paper has left hanging is this: What are the prospects of reconciling a prejudice reduction model of social change, designed to help people get along better, with a collective action model of change, designed to ignite struggles to achieve social justice? There are a number of possible positions in this debate. One pole of the argument might assert that the two forms of social change are fundamentally complementary, i.e. that getting people to like one another more will ultimately lead to social
justice in a deeper sense. The other pole might assert that the two forms of social change are fundamentally incommensurable and that the drive for prejudice reduction has for too long marginalized, if not obstructed, more pressing concerns about core distributive justice (e.g. justice based on the fair distribution of resources such as wealth, jobs, and health). As readers will have gathered, we sympathize with the latter position, particularly when applied to the problem of improving intergroup relations in societies characterized by longstanding, systemic discrimination. To conclude, we revisit the question of whether or not the two models of social change can be reconciled with the goal of opening up a wider dialogue.

Thomas Pettigrew and his colleagues have presented the outline of a case for reconciliation, as part of a discussion of recent criticisms of research on the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew 2010; Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner & Crisp 2011). Their case rests on two broad claims. First, they argue that intergroup contact has beneficial effects beyond the reduction of negative emotions and beliefs. Not only does it improve relations on moral and social indices such as trust and forgiveness, but also it can motivate political activism amongst members of historically advantaged groups and this may in turn facilitate change at a structural as well as psychological level. For example, Surace and Seeman (1968) studied Americans’ engagement in civil rights activities in the 1960s and found that equal status contact was a better predictor of white activism than factors such as political liberalism and status concern. We might infer from such evidence that prejudice reduction can serve as a psychological mechanism through which members of privileged groups become enlisted within oppositional struggles to improve the situation of the disadvantaged, a process about which we still know comparatively little (though see Nepstad 2007; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair & Swim 2008). Second, Pettigrew and colleagues contend that the argument that contact -- and by implication other prejudice reduction interventions -- inevitably diminishes the collective action orientation of members of historically disadvantaged groups is simplistic. Some research has shown, for instance, that intergroup contact may sometimes heighten perceptions of injustice amongst the disadvantaged, encouraging them to make the kinds of ‘upwards’ intergroup comparisons that foster a sense of relative deprivation (e.g. Poore et al. 2002). Similarly, it is possible to find evidence that common identification increases rather than decreases subordinate groups’ concerns over injustice. Wenzel’s (2001) longitudinal study of perceptions of entitlement and social injustice amongst East Germans in the post-unification era provides an interesting case in point. In light of this sort of evidence, Pettigrew and colleagues have insisted that although contact can sometimes reduce a minority’s motivation for protest, this is an

… incomplete description of the complex relationship between intergroup contact and efforts for social change ... As with most social phenomena, the two approaches are intricately entwined. Some contact outcomes further mobilization, others counter it. And mobilization itself will in
turn influence intergroup contact – increasing it with outgroup allies and decreasing it with outgroup opponents (2011, p.278).

At one level, we see this general line of argument as an important development. Indeed, it takes us back to a point we left hanging earlier in our discussion of slavery and other historical instances of change in unequal intergroup relations, where we argued that processes of change involve not only struggles between dominant and subordinate groups but also struggles within each group. Certainly, we accept that it is important to examine the processes that lead some dominant group members to oppose the ingroup’s repression of others, to pave the way for subordinate group resistance, or even to agitate for an end to dominance themselves. We also accept, as Pettigrew and colleagues argue, that contact and similar interventions may play a role in these processes (see also e.g. Dixon et al., 2011, Mallett et al. 2008).

At another level, however, we believe that it is vital not to diminish the challenge posed by the collective action critique of contact research (Dixon et al., 2010a; Wright & Lubensky, 2009), which is addressed at its underlying model of social change. In our view, we cannot simply tack together a prejudice reduction with a collective action perspective whilst ignoring their incommensurable assumptions about the mechanisms through which change occurs (or is inhibited). In saying this, we are not dismissing studies that report a positive relationship between contact and political activism. However, we are broadening the terms of the debate and prioritizing a set of questions that have not featured prominently either in contact research or in prejudice reduction research more generally. How, when and why do particular kinds of interventions lead to collective mobilization to challenge institutional discrimination? Crucially, what are the underlying mechanisms involved? Do they involve the creation of positive thoughts/feelings about others or alternative mechanisms such as, for instance, the recognition of the illegitimacy of dominant group advantages or the realization that the oppression of others is a violation of core ingroup norms (e.g. ‘it is unChristian to oppress as we do’ - see Brown, 2006)? Do they involve encouraging subordinate group members to view the dominant group in more positive terms or opening their eyes to everyday inequities between groups and motivating them do something about them?

Viewed from this broader perspective, we believe that confidence in the long term efficacy of contact and similar prejudice reduction interventions must be qualified in a number of ways. First, as we have seen, when power relations are bound up with paternalistic ideologies and associated institutional structures, then the promotion of positive evaluations of others is by no means antithetical with conservative political orientations. Witness the gulf between men’s feelings towards women and their willingness to support militant feminism. Second, the extent to which reducing dominant group member’s prejudice translates into effective political action remains open to question. Not only has research revealed a predictably modest
relationship between prejudice and discriminatory behavior (e.g. Talaska, Fiske & Chaiken 2008), but also it has suggested that reducing prejudice may not result in transformation at an institutional level. Kalev, Dobbin and Kelley’s (2006) recent study of the shifting racial composition of 708 American organizations, for example, found that interventions to reduce managers’ racial biases were comparatively ineffective as a means of implementing racial diversity. (A more effective strategy was to create institutional structures that delineated clear lines of responsibility and accountability for change in the workplace.)

Third, and most important, historical evidence suggests that social inequality is eradicated more through the collective will of the disadvantaged than through the well-intentioned reforms of the advantaged, a point that returns us to the key question of how prejudice reduction affects the responses of subordinate group members. Again, we accept Pettigrew et al.’s (2011) claim that it is possible to find studies where intergroup contact has increased rather decreased the collective action orientation of subordinate groups members. In the majority of recent research, however, contact has been found to correlate negatively with members’ perceptions of discrimination, sense of solidarity with other disadvantaged groups, support for policies designed to promote social change, and willingness to engage in collective protest (see Dixon et al. 2007, 2010; Glasford & Calcagno 2011; Tausch et al. 2009; Saguy et al. 2009; Wright & Lubensky 2009).

Moreover, although this line of research remains in its infancy, the data produced so far support Wright and Lubensky’s (2009) claim that the prejudice reduction and collective action involve opposing psychological processes. That is, prejudice reduction decreases the likelihood of collective action precisely because it reduces subordinate group members’ sense of collective identity and sense of being targeted for discrimination, whilst increasing their positive evaluation of the dominant group.

Our bottom line, then, is this. An array of evidence indicates that sociopolitical change often requires the disadvantaged to take action. However, such action is a rare occurrence in many societies. Numerous contextual, material and psychological factors militate against its emergence (e.g. see Klandermans 1997, 2002) and, for this reason, the disadvantaged all too often acquiesce in their own subordination, whether existing in a state of serene acceptance or one of resigned tolerance. As Wright (2001) notes, once entrenched, the ‘tranquility’ of inequitable relations between groups is notoriously difficult to disturb. In so far as prejudice reduction undermines the already tenuous possibility that subordinate group members will develop the kind of insurgent consciousness that fuels resistance to inequality, it may ultimately reproduce rather than disrupt the status quo. We believe that it is time to reevaluate this model of social change. We need to ask ourselves if prejudice reduction deserves its status as the preeminent framework through which we approach the problem of ‘improving’ relations between groups within historically unequal societies. What might we see if we did not look at intergroup relations through a lens colored so strongly by the concept of prejudice as negative evaluation? In particular, how might we rethink the problem of change?
Notes

1. As Montagu remarked in his 1949 paper on the “pathognomic mythology” of race, “It is the discriminators, not the discriminated, the prejudiced, not those against whom prejudice is exhibited, who are the problem” (p.176).

2. Thus, setting out the concept of prejudice that guided his influential overview of the field, Rupert Brown (1995, p.7) remarked that:

   Of course, logically, prejudice can take both positive and negative forms. I, for example, am particularly favourably disposed towards all things Italian: I love Italian food, Italian cinema, and lose no opportunity to try out my execrable Italian on anyone who will listen (much to the embarrassment of my friends and family). However, such harmless infatuations hardly constitute a major social problem worthy of our attention as social scientists. Rather, the kind of prejudice that besets so many societies in the world today and which so urgently requires our understanding is the negative variety: the wary, fearful, suspicious, derogatory, hostile or ultimately murderous treatment of one group of people by another.

3. The emotional underpinnings of collective protest movements are, of course, far more complex than this brief discussion conveys and involve reactions other than anger and outrage (see Jasper 2011 for a detailed discussion). However, our argument here is simply that such ‘negative’ emotional reactions are often crucial in motivating individuals to participate in collective action.

4. As Quillian (2006, p.300) notes in a recent review, “Despite the changing nature of prejudice in modern society, most contemporary social science use of the term is highly consistent with Allport’s (1954) early definition of prejudice as “antipathy based on a faulty or inflexible generalization.”

5. This research includes the work of Eagly (2004) on the relationship between intergroup attitudes, structural role differentiation and power relations, and Jost et al. (2004) on the role of intergroup emotions and beliefs in systems justification processes.

6. Maoz (2011) has illustrated one such danger in her recent review of research on the consequences of reconciliation encounters between Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis. The primary model for such encounters is the so-called Coexistence Model (which critics have also disparagingly branded the ‘Hummus and Falafel Model’). Drawing its rationale from work on the contact hypothesis, this model is based around the goal of creating dialogue that emphasizes intergroup commonalities and similarities,
while downplaying intergroup differences and points of dissension. Although it has been successful in building more positive attitudes, particularly amongst members of the advantaged Israeli Jewish group, it has also arguably neglected the political dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Maoz warns, such reconciliation encounters thus tend to “... perpetuate existing asymmetrical power relations by focusing on changing individual-level prejudices while ignoring the need to address collective and institutionalized bases of discrimination.” (p.118).

7. We accept fully that, under conditions of social equality and justice, prejudice reduction remains an important ideal in its own right. Our focus in this conclusion, and in the rest of the paper, is on social relations defined by long-standing inequality and discrimination.
References


