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|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||http://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.00042.x|
|Google Scholar:||Look up in Google Scholar|
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. This pre-identification is typically based on biological features. Except in some interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals that we identify as persons.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Copyright Holders:||2011The Southern Journal of Philosophy|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Arts > Philosophy
|Depositing User:||Sophie Grace Chappell|
|Date Deposited:||27 Feb 2012 09:45|
|Last Modified:||23 Feb 2016 19:31|
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