On the very idea of criteria for personhood

Chappell, Timothy (2011). On the very idea of criteria for personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49(1), pp. 1–27.

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DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:	http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.00042.x
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Abstract

I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. This pre-identification is typically based on biological features. Except in some interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals that we identify as persons.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Copyright Holders:	2011The Southern Journal of Philosophy
ISSN:	2041-6962
Academic Unit/Department:	Arts > Philosophy
Item ID:	31312
Depositing User:	Tim Chappell
Date Deposited:	27 Feb 2012 09:45
Last Modified:	26 Oct 2012 14:15
URI:	http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/31312

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