Protestant-Catholic divisions in Europe and the United States: an historical and comparative perspective

Journal Article

How to cite:

© 2011 Taylor Francis
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1080/21567689.2011.596411

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page.
Protestant-Catholic Divisions in Europe and the United States: An Historical and Comparative Perspective

JOHN WOLFFE

The Open University

Postal Address: Faculty of Arts, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA

Email: j.r.wolffe@open.ac.uk

Telephone 01908-655916

John Wolffe is Professor of Religious History at The Open University. He is the author of The Protestant Crusade in Great Britain 1829-1860 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); God and Greater Britain: Religion and National Life in Britain and Ireland 1843-1945 (London: Routledge, 1994); Great Deaths: Grieving, Religion and Nationhood in Victorian and Edwardian Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000) and The Expansion of Evangelicalism: The Age of Wilberforce, More, Chalmers and Finney (Nottingham: Inter-Varsity Press, 2006) as well as numerous journal articles and book chapters. The present article is part of an ongoing major project on ‘Protestant-Catholic Conflict: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Realities’, jointly funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council under the UK Research Councils’ Global Uncertainties programme, support which is gratefully acknowledged.

Word Length: 9,196 (including abstract and endnotes, but not cover sheet).
Protestant-Catholic Divisions in Europe and the United States: An Historical and Comparative Perspective

Abstract

The article opens by highlighting the parallels between expressions of Protestant feeling in the aftermath of the death of Queen Victoria in 1901 and Islamophobia in the wake of the 9/11 attacks of 2001. The history of Protestant-Catholic conflict is worthy of attention both in its own right because it provides context for understanding enduring tensions in the North Atlantic and European worlds, and because it suggests comparisons with the contemporary perceived ‘clash of civilizations’ between Christianity and Islam. Focusing on the nineteenth century, the diversity of anti-Catholicism is explored, and particular attention given to the development of the Protestant internationalism associated with the Evangelical Alliance, contrasted with the Catholic internationalism of the Papacy. On both sides of the Atlantic, Protestantism has sometimes been nationalistic and confrontational, tendencies which have persisted to the present, albeit normally in secularised forms. At the same time though, Protestantism has also inspired a model of ‘unity in diversity’, mediated by American constitutional practice, which may prove helpful in furthering European acceptance of wider religious pluralism.

Queen Victoria’s death at the age of 81 on 22 January 1901 was hardly surprising, but its aftermath unexpectedly served to highlight the continuing significance of Protestant-Catholic tensions in United Kingdom and European politics at the dawn of the twentieth
century. The Queen’s last illness had been short, but the few days during which the comatose monarch lay dying at Osborne House on the Isle of Wight allowed just sufficient time for her extended family to gather. Among them, most strikingly, was Kaiser Wilhelm II, whose determination to be present at his grandmother’s demise prompted a hasty journey from Berlin in the middle of winter. Privately his British relatives were not over-pleased to see him, but publicly his arrival was presented as a striking manifestation of filial loyalty and family solidarity.¹

The Kaiser, for his part, was motivated in part by genuine affection and admiration for his grandmother, but from a conversation he had with an Anglican bishop the day before the Queen’s funeral it seems that he also had in mind the desirability of affirming ties between the two major Protestant European powers in the face of the passing of their acknowledged matriarch. The Bishop, Boyd Carpenter of Ripon, a friend of the late Queen, began the conversation by affirming his own sense of the need for a ‘cordial feeling’ between Germany, England and America. Carpenter recalled the Kaiser’s response as followed:

He was quite delighted and began in his earnest, energetic way to elaborate the theme. It was his own view: the outlook was now larger: it was European no longer. “I have been pressing this on the King. The fear of war between individual European nations is damned nonsense. It is now a question of race. The Roman Catholic Church was now making and would continue to make desperate efforts to … undermine the ascendancy of the Protestant Powers.”²

Wilhelm went on to affirm his fears of intrigues at the Vatican, citing especially the activities of a prominent American cleric, John Ireland, Archbishop of St Paul Minnesota.³ He praised Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s recently published Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, which in addition to its notorious quasi-intellectual justification for Germanic racism, is also strongly anti-Catholic, or at least anti-Roman, portraying the Papacy as the arch-enemy of Germanicism.⁴
In the United States too, the Queen’s death evoked widespread sympathy and interest, and expressions of solidarity with Britain. Commemorative sermons were preached in many New York churches, and the day of the funeral was also marked with numerous special services. According to the Rector of Trinity Church New York, ‘This event touches us deeply and closely’. He noted that Americans shared a language, literature, history and religion with the British and speculated that ‘Perhaps it may be the will of God that … some day… the English faith in Christ and His Gospel [shall be] the faith of the world.’

Subsequent events provided further evidence of the strength of Protestant attitudes. The royal family originally wanted to include the Russian Kontakion with its implied prayer for the dead in the funeral service, but the new King was dissuaded from doing so by Randall Davidson, the Bishop of Winchester, who was fearful of offending Protestant sentiment. King and prelate were agreed on wanting to avoid damaging controversy on ‘a great national occasion’. Then on 14 February 1901, when first opening Parliament Edward VII was obliged publicly to make the Protestant accession declaration declaring Roman Catholic beliefs to be ‘superstitious and idolatrous … without any evasion, equivocation or mental reservation whatsoever.’ The wording, which was clearly offensive to Catholics but had of course not been used since Victoria’s accession in 1837, appears to surprised many people, not least the King himself. Hence later in 1901 there were parliamentary moves to revise the declaration in good time for next accession. At that point however, there was a vigorous public campaign to oppose any change, and the government, busy with more immediately pressing issues, let the matter drop for the moment. The issue revived in 1910 when Edward VII died and his successor discretely let it be known that he would not be prepared to make the declaration in its existing form. Accordingly change was now
inevitable, but when it was made it still excited considerable controversy. In the meantime the Protestant identity of the monarchy continued to be affirmed, notably by the anti-Catholic agitator Walter Walsh who in 1902 published a book entitled *The Religious Life and Influence of Queen Victoria*, which ordered the somewhat ambiguous evidence to portray the late monarch as a staunch Protestant. Walsh was also careful to point up the wider ties with Protestant Europe secured by her family’s marriages: her own to Prince Albert of Coburg, where Luther had written ‘Ein feste Burg’, and those of her two eldest children, the Princess Royal to the Crown Prince of Prussia, and the Prince of Wales to Princess Alexandra of Denmark.

These responses were symptomatic of a wider climate of pronounced anti-Catholicism at the turn of the twentieth century not only in Britain, but also in continental Europe and North America. Earlier anxieties about the perceived advance of Catholicism had led to the formation of the Protestant League for the Defence of German-Protestant Interests in 1886, the American Protective Association in 1887, the Protestant Truth Society (England) in 1889 and the Protestant Protective Association (Canada) in 1892. Such organizations gave their concerns a prominent public profile during the 1890s. In Germany anti-Catholicism remained a significant political force until the First World War; in the United States although political momentum could not be sustained, the early twentieth century saw massive continuing publication of anti-Catholic literature.

Just over a century after Queen Victoria died, on 11 September 2001, planes hijacked by Al-Qaeda terrorists slammed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York. In the aftermath of 9/11 the rhetoric of ‘war on terror’ and the credibility accorded to Samuel Huntington’s construction of a ‘clash of civilizations’ gave a substantial boost to Islamophobia on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the
sudden and violent deaths of thousands in 2001 had on the face of it little in common with the timely and peaceful death of one old lady in 1901, the two events thus had a similar function in highlighting the characteristic religious divisions and phobias of their respective eras.

The rationale for this article is thus two-fold. It is postulated that awareness of the legacy of historic Protestant-Catholic divisions in the European and North Atlantic world provides relevant context for understanding the depth and breadth of contemporary hostility to Muslims. At the same the Protestant-Catholic divide itself remains, albeit in some respects in secularized form, a significant cultural, social and political fissure in both Europe and North America. There is thus a double potential benefit to be derived from seeking to integrate analysis of the past with that of the contemporary situation.

There is a burgeoning literature on contemporary Islamophobia. By contrast Protestant-Catholic tensions in the present day have received relatively little scholarly attention, except in relation to Northern Ireland. Nevertheless two substantial recent books on the United States have argued that anti-Catholic attitudes there remain an enduring reality, with attitudes commonplace among liberal Americans that would be wholly unacceptable if directed against, say, Jews or blacks. Recent child sex abuse scandals have aggravated the problem but it also should be seen as rooted in a long historical tradition. Limited consideration has also been given to the hypothesis that intra-Christian divisions are a significant factor in shaping attitudes to the European Union, insofar as Protestants and historically Protestant states, notably the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, are more resistant to European integration than are their Catholic counterparts. While the evident Euroscepticism present in, for example, Britain, Denmark and Norway (which remains outside the EU) gives prima
facie support to the argument, the available research does suggest important refinements. In particular the strongest Euroscepticism is to be found not among regular mainstream Protestant churchgoers, who tend indeed to be more pro-European than the rest of the population, but on the one hand among merely nominal Protestants and on the other among smaller hardline Protestant churches and political parties. The latter include the Democratic Unionists in Northern Ireland, the Partei Bibeltreuer Christen in Germany, and the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij in the Netherlands. Accordingly, also taking into account the evidence of Euroscepticism among strongly committed Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic groups, John Madeley has recently argued that the real operative factor is not Protestantism as such but rather belief frameworks of any tradition that highlight a sharp dualism between humankind and a transcendent deity.

Philip Jenkins’ and Mark Massa’s recent books on the United States both set contemporary anti-Catholicism in an informed long historical perspective, but this dimension is hitherto lacking in research on contemporary Europe. There is, however, an extensive secondary literature on Protestant-Catholic tensions in the nineteenth century, a period which saw significant renewal and evolution of divisions originally rooted in the sixteenth-century Reformation. It is noteworthy, however, that this material frames the problem almost exclusively in terms of anti-Catholicism in predominantly Protestant countries, whereas converse manifestations of anti-Protestantism in majority Catholic states have yet to receive significant focused scholarly attention. It is not possible to redress this imbalance in a single article, which will draw primarily on existing research on anti-Catholicism, both by the current author and by others. However the argument reflects a broad understanding of Protestant-Catholic conflict as a two-sided process, viewed in a pan-European and transatlantic framework. In particular, following an outline of the longer historical
context, three aspects of nineteenth century anti-Catholicism will be explored – first its
diverse and multi-faceted nature; second the informal Protestant internationalism that
developed as a counterweight to the more formal internationalism of the Roman
Catholic Church; and finally the contingent and shifting nature of historic Protestant-
Catholic divisions. If their legacy can be more sympathetically understood, this should
provide an improved basis for the effective and non-divisive representation of
Christianity in contemporary Europe and the North America. 22

Although there is some truth in the conventional wisdom that the Peace of
Westphalia of 1648 brought an end to the immediate post-Reformation era of explicit
‘wars of religion’, religious differences remained profoundly divisive both within and
between European states. In 1685 Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes
allowing Protestants freedom of worship forced hundreds of thousands of them to leave
France; conversely in Britain and Ireland the constitutional settlement that followed the
Revolution of 1688 excluded Catholics from normal civil and political life. Moreover in
the eighteenth century although Enlightenment ideals of reason and toleration acquired
significant cultural influence, they did not necessarily determine state policy or change
attitudes on the ground. In 1731 the prince archbishop of Salzburg expelled all
Protestants over the age of twelve from his territory, forcing a diaspora that, like that of
the French Huguenots half a century before, carried with it both Protestant revivalism
and natural resentment against authoritarian Catholicism both to northern European
countries and across the Atlantic to the North American colonies. 23 Meanwhile, until the
failure of ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’s’ rebellion in 1745, the Catholic Jacobites remained a
credible threat to the Hanoverian monarchy in Britain, and the enduring depth of
residual suspicions of Catholics were revealed by the savagery of the Gordon Riots in
London in 1780. In colonial America, British traditions of anti-popery persisted, and the
toleration granted to Catholics in Canada by the Quebec Act of 1774 was a significant factor in fuelling resentment against British rule in the thirteen colonies that subsequently formed the United States. 24

The most significant hiatus in post-Reformation Protestant-Catholic tensions thus came not with the Enlightenment, but with the revolutionary era of the late eighteenth century. In their war of independence the Americans were pleased to receive support from the Catholic French and Spanish in their conflict with their Protestant British erstwhile masters, and anti-Catholicism became noticeably more muted in the early decades of the new nation. Then in the early 1790s the French revolutionaries turned against the Catholic Church, thus at one and the same time raising the alternative spectre of radical dechristianization and making Roman Catholicism appear much less formidable. When Pope Pius VI died in exile in 1799 as a virtual prisoner of the French, the institution over which he presided looked more an object of pity than of fear. In the Peninsular War the British were happy to support the Catholic Spanish and Portuguese, and the main immediate consequence of the subsequent British and Prussian victory at Waterloo in 1815 was to replace the ambivalently Catholic Napoleon with the much more aggressively Catholic restored Bourbons.

Thereafter, however, a sense of Protestant-Catholic confrontation revived, albeit in somewhat transmuted form. Central to this nineteenth-century phase in the conflict was a sense of competition between two traditions that were both experiencing internal renewal of vision and energy, with the rise of ultramontane Catholic devotion, and the flowering of transatlantic Protestant Evangelicalism. Alongside these specifically religious stimuli were the consequences of the great people migrations of the period, of Irish to Britain; of British, Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians to North America; and of Americans westward into the Mississippi valley, all of which brought Protestants and
Catholics into unexpected and often problematic contact. A third key ingredient was political and nationalistic: prospects for a united Germany, or a United Kingdom that included Ireland were centrally dependent on somehow neutralizing the consequences of historic religious difference, while the United States struggled to come to terms with the inescapable political weight of its rapidly growing Catholic minority.

Anti-Catholicism was pervasive in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it could often be dormant. A useful metaphor is to see it as like the granite underlying the moorlands of southwest England, sometimes breaking through the heather to form conspicuous rugged rocky outcrops, but more often concealed below the surface. The nineteenth century, however, saw repeated stimuli that brought it to the surface, for example the restoration of Catholic episcopal hierarchies in England and Wales in 1850 and in the Netherlands in 1853; and the perceived provocative pronouncements of the Papacy in the Syllabus of Errors of 1864 and the First Vatican Council of 1869-70. National and local specificities meant that feelings were at their most intense at different times in particular countries, around 1850 in Britain, in the mid-1850s in the United States, and in the Kulturkampf of the 1870s in Germany, but many factors were influential across the Protestant world. As we have seen, feelings remained strong at the turn of the twentieth century: indeed in Germany in the 1890s the end of official attacks on Catholicism was followed by extensive unofficial agitation.²⁵

Anti-Catholicism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, for which it is useful to adopt a fourfold analytical model.²⁶ First, there was constitutional-national anti-Catholicism, in which the identity of nation states was affirmed against Rome or Roman Catholic opponents. In Britain and the Scandinavian countries this was associated with the upholding of a Protestant state church, but paradoxically, in the United States, it was linked to the passionate advocacy of the separation of church and
state. In predominantly Protestant countries its natural political advocates were conservatives maintaining a constitutional status quo that excluded or limited Catholic influence, but in more mixed societies liberals could also adopt Protestant positions in opposition to a perceived authoritarian church. Second, theological anti-Catholicism affirmed continuity with classic Reformation positions, but reshaped them in response to contemporary religious influences, especially the growth during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of the evangelical movement in North Atlantic Protestantism. Evangelicalism inspired zeal not only to confront Catholics, but to seek to convert them to Protestantism. A further feature of theological anti-Catholicism, especially at times of crisis such as the 1848 Revolutions, was a close linkage to eschatological speculation, with the papacy associated with the Antichrist, or the whore of Babylon. Third, popular anti-Catholicism stemmed in part from longstanding oral traditions or communal rituals, such as Guy Fawkes celebrations in England, and received additional intensity from the on-the-ground response to Catholic migration and growth, notably in the flourishing of the Orange Order in Ireland, northwest England and southwest Scotland, and in North America. Finally, social-cultural anti-Catholicism was fuelled by the perception that Roman Catholicism was subversive of ‘normal’ human relationships, and also contributed to poverty and disorder. Thus the celibacy of priests and nuns was portrayed as unnatural, or worse as a hypocritical cover for secret vice. The confessional was perceived as a gross intrusion into marital and family relationships, and also as a means for lascivious priests to seduce suggestible young women. These four categories were very much interlinked, to the extent that a single stimulus could evoke a wide range of different responses. It should also be noted that some aspects of anti-Catholicism, especially social-cultural anti-Catholicism, expressed attitudes shared by anti-clericals in Catholic countries.
While constitutional-national anti-Catholicism could engender isolationist mentalities, it also stimulated international Protestant solidarity, a tendency also encouraged by the sense of spiritual affinities inspired by theological anti-Catholicism. International networks were important in the early spread of the Protestant Reformation, and they revived substantially in the nineteenth century. Such ties were facilitated, when as in the case of Britain and the United States, shared language facilitated the exchange of literature and personnel, but they also transcended language barriers. In 1819 British evangelicals formed the Continental Society as a basis for supporting Protestants and converting Catholics in a Europe they believed to be facing impending divine judgement.\textsuperscript{29} This movement gathered fresh momentum in the 1840s as a result of a sense of Protestant renewal stimulated by the formation of the Free Church of Scotland in 1843 and of heightened hostility to Roman Catholicism arising from the government’s enactment in 1845 of a permanent grant to the seminary at Maynooth. Both factors contributed to a desire to cultivate and affirm interdenominational and international evangelical solidarity.\textsuperscript{30}

This period also saw a growth of American Protestant interest in the religious condition of Europe\textsuperscript{31} which led in 1843 to the formation in New York of the Christian Alliance ‘to promote religious freedom, and to diffuse useful and religious knowledge among the natives of Italy, and other papal countries.’\textsuperscript{32} The emergence of this organization provoked Pope Gregory XVI to issue an encyclical condemning ‘Bible Societies … first instituted in England, and since extended far and wide, [which] we now behold in one united phalanx’,\textsuperscript{33} thereby reinforcing the Protestant sense of direct confrontation with Rome. At the Christian Alliance’s annual meeting in May 1845 Leonard Bacon, a leading Congregationalist minister, equated religious freedom straightforwardly with the essential Protestant principle of private judgement and
argued that the time was ripe to disseminate this vital idea in Europe before there was a further outbreak of ‘the suppressed fires of revolution’. In a sermon in the same month, Bacon also drew an explicit analogy between the diversity of Protestantism and the constitutional arrangements of the United States:

As in the confederacy of these states, each state is sovereign in its proper jurisdiction, and seems to be independent…; so in the great body of Protestant Christendom, each particular community regulates its own affairs in its own way, without reference to the will of any apostolic see or any conclave of cardinals, - and those who, reasoning upon Romanizing principles, and looking only at the surface, can conceive of no unity where there is liberty and consequent diversity of forms, imagine that Protestantism must perish in its own divisions. But in the presence of a foreign and especially of a hostile power, these states are one… So Protestant Christianity, with all its varieties of form, when it arrays itself for action against the common enemy, is one; and in the presence of Pagan, Mohammedan, or persecuting Papist, these distinctions and diversities are merged and forgotten. “One and indivisible,” was the motto of a republic without liberty — a republic of atheism and of massacre. “E Pluribus Unum,” is the motto of that great expanding Union which spreads its protection over our freedom.

The essential quality of Protestant unity must be ‘unity in diversity’. The founding conference of the Evangelical Alliance gathered in London in mid-August 1846, and drew a substantial contingent of participants from continental Europe as well as from across the Atlantic. The opening speeches manifested a euphoric mood, as in the words of William Patton, of New York, who regarded the Alliance ‘as a grand alliance for the peace of the world; and in the peace of the world, the conquest of the world by the preaching of the everlasting Gospel of Jesus Christ.’ The Alliance was concerned to define itself in terms of positive Protestantism rather than negative anti-Popery, but a sense of confrontation with Roman Catholicism was seldom far below the surface, especially in the contributions of speakers who represented the minority Protestant communities in France, Ireland and Quebec. It remained strongly apparent in papers presented to a further well-attended international gathering in London in the summer of 1851, timed to coincide with the Great Exhibition.
In the early years of the Evangelical Alliance there was a rapid cooling of relations with the United States due to the perception that the British by trying to insist on the exclusion of slaveholders from membership were both dividing Americans from each other and assuming an offensive air of moral superiority. Meanwhile however ties with continental Europe were strengthened by subsequent Evangelical Alliance conferences in Paris in 1855, Berlin in 1857 and Geneva in 1861. The Berlin conference was especially well supported by British evangelicals. The active support of King Frederick William IV helped to facilitate substantial Lutheran participation and was a further significant example of Prussian royal sympathy for international Protestantism. Meanwhile during the 1850s British hostility for the Papacy and sympathy for the small Protestant minorities in Italy and hostility to the Papacy were significant factors in stirring public support for the cause of Italian unification.

American interest in international Protestantism revived after the Civil War, building up to the convening of a major Evangelical Alliance conference in New York in October 1873, a significant Protestant counterpart to the Vatican Council which had been held three years before. While 294 participants from the United States made up the majority of the attendance, there were 75 delegates from Britain, 56 from British North America and 37 from continental Europe. A key architect of the conference was Philip Schaff, a Swiss German theologian and church historian who had settled in the United States in the 1840s. Amidst a wide range of subjects addressed, including Christian union, infidelity, the Christian life, Christianity and civil government, missions and social reform, the rivalry of ‘Romanism and Protestantism’ loomed large. It was the particular focus of one of the seven working days of the conference, and in the background of papers on many other topics. The proceedings were endorsed at the highest levels. Schaff secured a warm expression of support from Kaiser William I,
currently engaged in the Kulturkampf against the Roman Catholic Church in Germany, who expressed his ‘fervent wish and prayer’ that the conference might ‘lead to a closer union among Christians of all denominations and countries, which his Majesty felt to be of the utmost importance, especially in these times of growing conflict with infidelity on the one hand and superstition on the other.’ Then, after the proceedings in New York were over, the foreign delegates and some of the Americans travelled to Philadelphia and Washington, where they were received at the White House by President Grant.

In the 1880s Philip Schaff began to envision a Protestant internationalism that could be sufficiently comprehensive for it to be possible to contemplate reunion even with the Roman and Orthodox churches, albeit on the basis of ‘unity in diversity’ rather than the Roman model of a single comprehensive authoritative church. In Chicago in 1893 he put forward the idea of an ecclesiastical confederation that ‘would resemble the political confederations of Switzerland, the United States, and the modern German empire’, which he perceived as combining ‘general sovereignty with the intrinsic independence’ of the component parts. Schaff’s vision needs, however, to be set against the more nationalist Protestantism of his much younger contemporary Josiah Strong, who in the mid-1880s both became general secretary of the American Evangelical Alliance and published Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, a highly influential work which sold 175,000 copies by 1916. Strong highlighted ‘Romanism’ as a major peril currently facing America, and saw national salvation as lying in the advance of a countervailing Protestant ‘Anglo-Saxonism’. He was, however, contemptuous of contemporary German religious life and foresaw that Britain would become the junior partner in a Protestant world increasingly led by the United States.
Consciousness of international Protestantism was sustained in further conferences, notably at Copenhagen in 1884, Chicago in 1893 (in conjunction with World Parliament of Religions) and London in 1896 and 1907. The 1896 conference drew 109 delegates from continental Europe, and although the North American contingent, with 22 from the United States and 10 from Canada, was smaller than the European one had been at New York in 1873, it was still substantial.\textsuperscript{49} In 1907, following another recession in the Evangelical Alliance’s fortunes in the United States, there was only token representation from North America, but there was still a strong continental European presence.\textsuperscript{50} Henry Wace, the Dean of Canterbury, responding in particular to a recent address by Arnold von Harnack at the Kaiser’s birthday celebrations on ‘Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany’ acknowledged that some recent developments, especially the rise of scientific history, were helping to mitigate antagonisms, but had affirmed that fundamental theological differences from Rome remained.\textsuperscript{51}

Alongside the now somewhat faltering Protestant internationalism of the Evangelical Alliance was the expansive vision of the transatlantic missionary movement which culminated in the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910. The Edinburgh conference itself was an essentially Protestant event, but in order to accommodate Anglicans it eschewed negative anti-Catholicism by avoiding discussion of Protestant missions working in Catholic countries. Hence, like Philip Schaff a generation earlier, it helped to sow the seeds of a broader ecumenism that could eventually engage with Roman Catholicism rather than merely confront it.\textsuperscript{52} Such inclusiveness was, however, troubling to more conservative Protestant-minded evangelicals.\textsuperscript{53}
Earlier divergences between entrenched and eirenical Protestantism were reflected in differing twentieth-century European Protestant perspectives on both ecumenism and closer political integration. Nineteenth-century views of international Protestantism as ‘unity in diversity’ were echoed, perhaps unwittingly, in the interwar period by Robert de Traz, editor of the influential *Revue de Genève*, who argued that the only viable response to the reality of a fragmented Europe, was a ‘Protestant’ acceptance of diversity and pluralism rather than a ‘Catholic’ attempt to impose unity and uniformity. While paying tribute to the Holy See’s peacemaking endeavours, de Traz saw its emphasis on ‘unity, unity of doctrine, and unity of discipline’ as ‘antagonistic to a method of collaboration, based on equality’ and ‘the federation of varieties’. De Traz was a strong advocate of the League of Nations, which he saw as rooted in a ‘Spirit of Geneva’, affirming diversity, and deriving ultimately from Calvin. For others though the very Protestant traditions that de Traz used to legitimate internationalism could be turned in narrowly nationalist directions. As late as the 1990s, C.A.M. Noble, Director of Studies at Ian Paisley’s European Institute of Protestant Studies in Belfast, was characterizing British history since the Reformation as ‘a continual struggle against Vatican aggression’ and ‘the Europe envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty as a modern Romanist plot against Britain and other Protestant nations’. Such divergences of Protestant views were in part of a product of differing theologies, but they also reflect contrasting perceptions of Europe and the role of Catholicism within it.

It is true that shared Protestantism often seemed to cut little ice at the level of larger geopolitical conflicts. In the Crimean War of the mid-1850s Protestant Britain found herself in alliance with a Catholic power, France, and a Muslim one, Turkey. Most strikingly in 1914, Britain went to war with Protestant-dominated Germany in
defence of Catholic Belgium and in alliance with Catholic France and, subsequently, Italy. Nevertheless, the recognition that common Protestantism ultimately did not trump other calculations of national interest and responsibility, should not lead one to discount its influence. Even in relation to Britain and Germany, it is apparent that the two major conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century obscured but did not destroy abiding religious affinities between the two countries. Common Protestantism was especially significant where it did operate in tandem with other strategic interests, as in the abiding ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States. Indeed the essential point about Protestant internationalism is that its full force can only be appreciated in a North Atlantic or even global context, rather than in a narrowly European one.  

In the twentieth century on the face of it anti-Catholicism appeared in some respects a more persistent political force in the United States than in Europe. In the 1928 presidential election the Democratic nomination went to the Catholic Governor of New York, Al Smith. This seeming victory for tolerance rapidly turned sour when, in the face of a sustained anti-Catholic campaign, Smith lost badly in the national election to the Republican, Herbert Hoover. While Smith’s religion was not the only factor contributing to his defeat it was certainly a major one. Certainly the experience of 1928 left a persistent consensus that the nomination of a Catholic for the presidency was likely to be electorally suicidal, a taboo that was not challenged successfully until John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960. Even then, however, Kennedy had had to take great care to present himself as a secular rather than devout Catholic, and certainly one independent of clerical influence. Half a century later he remains the only Catholic ever to have been elected to the presidency, and only once has a Catholic even been nominated by one of the two major parties: John Kerry by the Democrats in 2004.
However the contrast with Europe should not be overdrawn. It may well be that there were fewer outcrops of anti-Catholicism there, except on a localised level, but this does not mean that underlying attitudes disappeared. Indeed if Catholic candidates for the American presidency have been controversial, no Catholic has yet emerged as a leader of either of the two largest British political parties and hence as a serious contender for the premiership. In Germany the catastrophe of the Third Reich obscured for a time the Protestant-Catholic polarities of the Second, but did not necessarily remove them. In Scandinavia suspicion of Catholic minorities proved persistent – for example in Norway the exclusion of Jesuits contained in the country’s original 1814 constitution was not repealed until the 1960s. There was hence still fertile soil for suspicion of a Catholic-dominated Europe.

Moreover, from a Protestant perspective, the policies and pronouncements of the Papacy continued to give grounds for concern. For example, in the First World War, Benedict XV’s endeavours to mediate between the warring powers were subjected to distortion and misrepresentation by all parties. Since the Second World War the papacy has developed an increasingly spiritual conception of Europe, culminating at the end of the twentieth century with John Paul II’s vision of a rechristianized Europe becoming a vehicle of salvation for humanity. Benedict XVI’s similar advocacy of a return to the Christian roots of European civilization is apt to look suspect from a Protestant point of view because that call is framed in distinctively Catholic terms. Indeed, in the Pope’s eyes it was precisely the Protestant Reformation, and the liberal theology of the nineteenth century, that progressively undermined the earlier synthesis of European culture and Christian faith. Meanwhile the Papacy’s proclamation of patron saints for Europe, beginning with Paul VI’s choice of Benedict in 1964 and continuing with John Paul II’s proclamation of Cyril and Methodius in 1980 and
Catherine of Siena, Bridget of Sweden and Teresa Benedetta della Croce (Edith Stein) in 1999, served to stimulate Catholic internationalism, but was hardly likely to mobilise Protestant enthusiasm. Meanwhile in European politics, it was only the eventual attenuation of the originally distinctively Catholic basis of most Christian Democratic parties that enabled collaboration with right of centre parties from historically Protestant countries.

Nevertheless, the dynamics of anti-Catholicism were changing. Calling back to mind the four categories outlined above it is apparent that the theological was becoming much weaker and the popular much more localised. For major Protestant denominations the reforms initiated by the Second Vatican Council were perceived as evidence that Roman Catholicism was changing substantively and that it was unnecessarily offensive to continue to advance classic Reformation polemics. While smaller conservative hardline groups, such as Free Presbyterians, were not so convinced, and perceived the Council as evidence of Rome’s deviousness rather than its transformation, their influence was marginal at a national level. Theological anti-Catholicism persisted however in remote areas such as the Western Isles of Scotland and in divided localities such as Clydeside and Northern Ireland where Protestant-Catholic communal conflicts remained a reality on the ground, and preachers such as Jack Glass in Glasgow and Ian Paisley in Belfast could tap into strong veins of popular sentiment. Moreover Paisley’s close links with American fundamentalists were indicative of a persistent militant Protestant internationalism.

In the meantime, constitutional-national and social-cultural anti-Catholicism have loosened their historic links to theology and become essentially secular rather than Protestant in ethos. This trend is consistent with the evidence that nominal self-identified Protestants are more anti-Catholic and anti-European than are regular
churchgoers. The point is well illustrated by the predominantly secular ethos of the ‘Protest the Pope’ campaign against the visit of Benedict XVI to Britain in September 2010. It is intriguing, however, to note the continuities with much earlier social-cultural polemics, for example in making the recognition that a small minority of priests have been guilty of gross sexual perversions grounds for a general attack on the whole institution and structure of Roman Catholicism. Also, whether wittingly or otherwise, secularists who argued that the Pope should not be recognized a Head of State, nor received as such by the Queen, stood in a long tradition of Protestant opposition to the temporal power of the Papacy.

This tradition has been especially strong in the United States, where a major driver of continuing anti-Catholic attitudes was the perception that the political, social and educational aspirations of the Roman Catholic Church threatened the constitutional separation of church and state and hence American democracy itself. Such views were vigorously articulated in Paul Blanshard’s influential book, *American Freedom and Catholic Power*, first published in 1949. An anti-Catholic agenda was also initially strongly apparent in the organization Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, founded in 1947. Significantly however although this body remained active and influential in the early twenty-first century, it had by then developed a secular ethos, dropping the reference to Protestantism in its name, and directing its energies as much against the evangelical and fundamentalist ‘Religious Right’ as against the Roman Catholic Church. It has been well observed that, in a trend traceable back to the Enlightenment but only fully coming to the fore in the later twentieth century, ‘It was not … necessary to be Protestant in order to be anti-Catholic.’
What then are the implications for the representation of religion in contemporary Europe? The central argument has highlighted the historic strength of Protestant as well as Catholic Christian internationalism, and to suggest that its legacy, albeit largely secularized, still needs to be taken very seriously. Attempts to construct a European religious identity on a specifically Catholic basis, as promoted by the Papacy, however much hedged with ‘mutual respect and tolerance’, remain therefore liable ultimately to prove more divisive than cohesive. On the other hand, it is misleading simplistically to characterize Protestants as anti-European. Indeed the Protestant tradition affords significant continuing potential for inspiring alternative Christian internationalisms. In this respect the American parallel is especially instructive, given the extent to which the constitutional culture of the United States is rooted in the characteristic Protestant vision of pluralism rather than uniformity, in religion as in politics. The American tradition has had its own difficulties, notably in engendering disproportionate suspicion of Catholics and others who are perceived to be challenging the separation of church and state, fears that have historically translated both into protracted litigation and substantial manifestations of popular prejudice. Nevertheless, the decline of traditional Protestant-Catholic antagonisms in the United States in recent decades suggests that given time and effective dialogue such problems can be mitigated or even removed.

For mid-nineteenth century advocates of Protestant unity, the maintenance of diversity was an essential corollary. They presented a vision of ‘unity in diversity’ as at odds with on the one hand the perceived ‘unity in uniformity’ of the Roman Catholic Church. They thus saw any all-encompassing religio-political structure as inherently not only unattainable but also as thoroughly undesirable. The realization of their vision would be inherently untidy and frustrating for legislators and policy makers predisposed to try to create orderly and consistent solutions, but it remains a very plausible approach
to the future representation of religion in Europe. In the meantime, in seeking to understand the variety of Protestant attitudes towards Europe, it may be quite as useful to investigate what kind of Europe people think they are opposing or supporting as to categorize what kinds of Protestants they are.

In conclusion it is instructive to revisit the comparison between historic Protestant-Catholic tensions contemporary Islamophobia. This article has highlighted some of the complexities of historic anti-Catholicism, a diverse phenomenon, which both shows significant continuities across time and adaptations to changing contexts. It therefore, despite obvious ideological differences, had much in common with Islamophobia, as it is characterised by the best recent scholarship. Simplistic labelling of either antagonism as crude prejudice or violence is liable to lead to underestimation and misunderstanding of its social and cultural pervasiveness. Moreover the very affinities suggest underlying continuities in patterns of thought and action towards the perceived ‘other’ that merit closer attention. The comparison is particularly valuable in suggesting a sense of proportion for the concerns of those who represent the élite and professedly rational Islamophobia of the early twenty-first century, just as the Kaiser has been highlighted as representative of the élite anti-Catholicism of the early twentieth. With the advantage of a century’s hindsight, his fears appear seriously exaggerated. Moreover arguably they were a significant distraction from engagement with the actual international and domestic tensions that were to explode with such ferocity in the ensuing decades. In a similar way it might be suggested that early twenty-first century Americans and Europeans who become over-preoccupied with the perceived threat from Islam would do well to scan the horizon for other issues that are likely to loom large in the coming years.
There is also a revealing irony in the mismatch between an Islamophobic stereotype that has much in common with the hostile stereotype of Roman Catholicism – as monolithic and authoritarian – and the ‘Protestant’ reality of enormous internal diversity among Muslims. Of course the Roman Catholic Church itself, with all its internal tensions, was never the united phalanx perceived by its opponents, but nevertheless its hierarchical structure and ultimate centralization in Rome suggested some outward consistency with the image. Muslims though lack any central authority, and are divided not only by the ancient separation of Shi’a and Sunni, and by their manifold ethnic differences, but also by much more recent movements of South Asian and Middle Eastern origin. The concept of the *ummah*, the universal community of all Muslims, and the annual *hajj* to Mecca uphold an underlying vision of unity but this is much more analogous to the ‘unity in diversity’ of Protestantism than the structural institutional unity of Catholicism. Hence the pervasiveness of contrary stereotypes is indicative either of the unconscious transposition of earlier Protestant constructions of Catholicism, or the rooting of both in similar psychological processes. In either case further exploration of the parallel would seem likely to offer constructive insights towards the mitigation of contemporary prejudices. Meanwhile the Protestant model of ‘unity in diversity’ would seem to offer a promising strategy for the integration of Muslims into European society in a manner that respects their differences from each other as well as from culturally Christian Europeans.

Finally, one of the remarkable features of nineteenth and early twentieth-century Protestant-Catholic tensions was the extent to which in an age before radio and television, let alone the internet, developments in different countries and continents showed close parallels and interconnections. In recent years such interconnectedness has acquired greater intensity and immediacy in an age when horrified television
viewers around the world could watch the unfolding of events on 9/11, or the plan of a hitherto obscure pastor in Florida to burn the Qu'rān could be deemed immediately to endanger the lives of soldiers in Afghanistan. There has indeed been a qualitative shift from internationalism to globalization. Nevertheless, the evidence of the strength of international links and networks in much earlier periods points to the fundamental importance of developing a transatlantic historical perspective if the nature and significance of religious tensions in contemporary Europe are to be effectively understood. Although he got many things wrong the Kaiser was at least right about that.


2 British Library, Additional Manuscript 46742, fol. 55.

3 Ireland was a leading advocate of ‘Americanism’ in the United States church, so at first sight a rather curious focus for Wilhelm’s fears. However he was also a strong Francophile, and recent (in August 1900) public advocate of the restoration of a civil papal principality, both tendencies liable to alarm the Kaiser, who feared he might be a candidate to succeed the elderly Leo XIII (Marvin R. O’Connell, John Ireland and the American Catholic Church (St Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press), pp. 470-1).


6 Services Held in the Parish of the Trinity Church in the City of New York on 2 February 1901 in Memory of Queen Victoria with the Sermon Preached in Trinity


8 *The Times*, 15 Feb. 1901.


13 See for example, respectively on Britain, the United States and continental Europe, Chris Allen, Islamophobia (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010); Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Liz Fekete, A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe (London: Pluto, 2009).

14 For an excellent recent overview and bibliography of the extensive literature on Northern Ireland see Claire Mitchell, Religion, Politics and Identity in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).


For more extended discussion and documentation of these categories see John Wolffe, ‘North Atlantic Anti-Catholicism in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparative Overview’, unpublished paper.

As had recently been argued by Michael Gross in relation to mid-nineteenth-century Germany (Gross, War Against Catholicism).


33 Ibid., p. 38.

34 Ibid., pp. 13-18.


40 For more detailed accounts see John Wolffe, ‘British Protestants and Europe’ and Nicholas M. Railton, No North Sea: The Anglo-German Evangelical Network in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2000).


44 Ibid., p. 721.


51 Ibid., pp. 161-71.


53 Randall and Hilborn, op. cit., p. 153.


62 Chelini-Pont, op. cit., pp. 130-7.


Nelsen, Guth and Fraser, op.cit, p. 200.


For further illustration of this general point see Philip M. Coupland, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom: British Christians and European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

Cf Massa, op.cit., p. 194.


Wolffe, ‘North Atlantic Evangelical Thought’.

Notably in Allen, *Islamophobia*.

For example Niall Ferguson, ‘Decline and Fall of the Christian Empire’, *The Sunday Times*, 11 April 2004. See also the critique of such arguments in Philip Jenkins, *God’s

79 Bassam Tibi, ‘Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: political democracy vs. cultural difference’, in Byrnes and Katzenstein, Religion in an Expanding Europe, pp. 210-11.
