Culture, government, and spatiality: re-assessing the 'Foucault effect' in cultural-policy studies

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CULTURE, GOVERNMENT, AND SPATIALITY:
Re-assessing the ‘Foucault effect’ in cultural-policy studies

ABSTRACT
This paper critically discusses the re-conceptualization of culture and governmentality in recent Australian ‘cultural-policy studies’. It argues that the further development of this conceptualization requires a more careful consideration of the complex relations between culture, power, and the different spatialities of social practices. The assumptions of this literature regarding social democratic public institutions and the nation-state are critically addressed in the light of contemporary processes of globalization. It is argued that the use made of Foucault in this paradigm privileges a model of disciplinary power which is dependent on a particular spatialization of social subjects and technologies of the self. As a result, an uncritical application of this model to all cultural practices supports a far too coherent image of practices of ‘government’ in producing sought after subject-effects. It is suggested that the different articulations of spatio-temporal presence and absence in cultural technologies requires a less totalizing understanding of the forms of power exercised through governmental practices.

Keywords: Culture Foucault Govermentality Media Policy Spatiality
CULTURE, GOVERNMENT, AND SPATIALITY:
Re-assessing the ‘Foucault effect’ in cultural-policy studies

Space is fundamental to any exercise of power
Michel Foucault

Culture, government, and spatiality
In this paper, I want to critically consider recent re-conceptualizations of culture which have been guided by Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality, discipline, and technologies of the self (Foucault 1991, 1988). The “re-tooling” of cultural studies along Foucauldian lines has been particularly evident in the development of a ‘cultural-policy studies’ paradigm in Australia during the late 1980s and 1990s (Craik 1995, 1994; Washington 1995).¹ According to this understanding, culture is conceptualized in terms of historically specific practices for the transformation of the behavior and conduct of individuals and collective populations.² Tony Bennett, the chief protagonist of the Foucauldian conceptualization of culture and government, has argued that cultural studies needs to accord greater attention to the variable forms of power which characterize particular cultural technologies (1998, p. 71). The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate that this aim requires that greater attention be paid to the variable configurations of power, knowledge, and space than has thus far been the case in this revisionary paradigm. In making this argument, the paper follows work in a variety of disciplines, including human geography, media and communications studies, sociology, and urban studies which has developed a theoretical understanding of the spatiality of social life (see Gregory 1994, Gregory and Urry 1985). Spatiality, along with its conceptual couple temporality, refers not just to the socially produced spatial and temporal configurations of social activity, but to a stronger argument regarding the inherently spatial and temporal constitution of social relations (Carey 1989, Giddens 1984, Harvey 1989, Lefebvre 1991, Massey 1994, Soja 1989).
The general argument of the paper is premised upon the recognition of the degree of attention that Foucault gives in his work to the organization and use of space as a means of exercising power, which is quite integral to the conceptualization of power he develops. The question which arises from the appropriation of Foucault’s work in the cultural-policy studies literature is whether his considerations of disciplinary power can serve as a general model for understanding the relationships between cultural institutions and governmental practices. Rather than thinking of Foucault’s work on disciplinary power as providing a general formula for the operations of power, it should in fact direct attention to the examination of the different ways in which power is exercised in particular sites and institutions (Driver 1994). The exercise of disciplinary power will vary according to the geographical scale over which subjects are subjected to its practices, the levels of technological sophistication characteristic of different modes of power, and according to the degree of spatial confinement characteristic of different practices (Hannah 1998, p. 172). In the light of these preliminary observations, the cultural-policy studies literature can be critically addressed with respect to two related lines of argument: firstly, in relation to the assumptions regarding the nation-state as a viable container for the construction of cultural citizenship mediated by national public institutions; and secondly, in relation to the privileged models of spatial organization which underwrite the conceptualization of ‘culture’ as inherently governmental. The main features of the cultural-policy literature in cultural studies are reviewed in the following section, which is followed by a discussion of how globalization processes are re-scaling the government of culture. This is followed by a detailed consideration of the spatial imaginary underwriting the Foucauldian understanding of power. The paper then considers the relevance of the Foucauldian account for an understanding of electronically mediated cultural technologies such as radio and television.
The policy turn in cultural studies

The re-definition of culture in terms of governamentality converges with a broader field of work in political theory which has elaborated upon Foucault’s discussions on modern political rationalities in order to re-conceptualize liberal and neo-liberal forms of governance (for example Barry et al 1996, Hunt and Wickham 1994, Hindess 1996). Liberal governance is understood as a set of rationalities and technologies for governing conduct through practices of self-regulation (Hindess 1997, Miller and Rose 1990). This literature suggests that various aesthetic and cultural practices might be productively re-thought as normalizing apparatuses central to both the conceptualization and operationalization of modern democratic processes. It is in relation to this broader literature that Bennett’s conceptualization of culture as a set of practices integral to ‘governing at a distance’ can be usefully situated, directing attention to the historical inscription of conceptions of culture in a set of practices deployed as part of political technologies concerned with the limits of state power (1997a). He argues that culture should be thought of “as inherently governmental”, so that ‘culture’ is used to refer to a set of practices for social management deployed to constitute autonomous populations as self-governing (1995b, p. 884).

Bennett defines culture as “a historically specific set of institutionally embedded relations of government in which the forms of thought and conduct of extended populations are targeted for transformation - in part via the extension though the social body of the forms, techniques, and regimens of aesthetic and intellectual culture” (Bennett 1992a, p. 26). ‘Government’ here is understood broadly as “techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour” (Foucault 1997, p. 81). The administration of culture understood in this sense might be carried on through various state agencies, markets, corporations, institutions of ‘civil society’ such as schools, universities, or broadcasters, or more informal but routinized practices of everyday life. In these terms, ‘culture’ is constitutively related to liberalism as a distinctive mode of rule, which rather than subjecting individuals to forced domination, creates frameworks in which individuals will ‘voluntarily’ regulate their own conduct in relation to given norms. It refers to an array of political rationalities and
organizing practices that are concerned with directing the conduct of individuals and groups, and in particular, is concerned with inculcating those specific ethical competencies and styles of conduct which have been considered to be basic attributes of modern democratic citizenship.

This broadly Foucauldian perspective therefore informs a definition of culture which is closely tied to a particular understanding of policy. If culture is understood as “the institutions, symbol systems, and forms of regulation and training responsible for forming, maintaining and/or changing the mental and behavioural attributes of populations” (Bennett 1989, p. 10), then this is related in turn to an understanding policy as “the organizational principles and objectives governing the activities of those agencies - governmental and private - active in the sphere of culture” (ibid.). These conceptualizations direct inquiry towards an examination into how ‘cultural’ attributes are simultaneously constituted as objects of knowledge and as objects of administration through particular institutions and practices. This sense of the double significance of culture has been most consistently developed in Ian Hunter’s genealogy of the literary humanities (1988a, 1988c, 1990). Hunter traces the simultaneous conceptual expansion of culture during the nineteenth-century to denote the ‘whole way of life’ of different groups, and its institutional restriction to particular aesthetic practices of conduct, judgment, taste, and evaluation. In the course of this process, the transformation of the ‘culture’ of individuals and groups became the object of institutionalized practices in which ‘culture’ in the narrow sense was to be used as the instrument of transformation. It is this distinctive splitting of culture that accounts for what Bennett refers to as “the multiplication of culture’s utility”, as a means of rendering individuals and groups self-regulating, in the course of its conceptual reformulation along the lines of modern notions of aesthetics (1995b).

The conceptualization of culture in terms of ‘government’ is connected to an explicitly revisionary programme for cultural studies, developed in a sustained conceptual critique of the oppositional imagination of canonical cultural studies (Bennett 1992b, 1993, 1997b; Cunningham 1993; Hunter 1988b, 1992; Mercer 1991). This has been connected to a pragmatic re-orientation of cultural studies practitioners in a broader political conjuncture in Australian society, associated with
the decade long ascendancy of a reformist Labour government in the 1980s and 1990s, and in particular with debates over the restructuring of higher education and significant shifts in policy towards audio-visual industries (e.g. Cunningham 1992a; Hunter et al. 1991). The programmatic statements of the cultural-policy studies literature generalize the contingent conditions of this moment in arguing that notions of ‘criticism’ and ‘resistance’ should be replaced as central benchmarks of cultural studies practice, and replaced by a commitment to re-align cultural studies as a privileged mediator between citizens and state bureaucrats.

In principle at least, the concern with issues of policy, far from being a focus simply on narrow issues of state policy or bureaucracy, should indicate an orientation towards culture understood as institutionalized practices aimed at shaping conduct. Accordingly, Mercer (1994, p. 18) suggests that cultural-policy studies “argues for a systematic inclusion and recognition of the necessarily ‘governmental’ role of the management of cultural resources, in historical terms, since at least the mid-eighteenth century as ‘populations’ and ‘citizens’ became new objects of political calculation”. It should be noted that ‘government’ in such formulations is not necessarily equated with the operations of the state. However, there is a tendency in some of the Australian cultural-policy studies literature to conflate governmental practices with the state. This can easily lead to an over-estimation of the effectivity of policy interventions, replacing images of omnipotent cultural critics with images of equally omnipotent cultural-policy ‘wonks’. Morris (1992b, p. 38) has observed that there is the appearance in some of this literature of providing “a totalizing, theory-driven account of the need for ‘specific’ and ‘pragmatic’ critical interventions”. This is an important warning against elevating this account of culture into a new orthodoxy, and directs attention towards further critical elaboration of the conceptualization of the relationships between culture and government. While the cultural-policy studies literature has been subject to extensive critical discussions in Australian academic circles as well as international cultural studies forums (see Cunningham 1992b; Hawkins 1992; Jones 1994; Levy 1992; McGuigan 1995; Morris 1992a; O’Regan 1992; see also Jameson 1993), most of these critical accounts acknowledge the centrality of
the relationships between culture and policy in the formation and continuing vibrancy of cultural studies. However, what emerges from these critical commentaries is, firstly, a sharper distinction between the analysis of the culture-policy nexus on the one hand, and engaging in the practice of policy-making on the other; and secondly, an insistence on guarding against the elision of criticism that comes from a cavalier conflation of the terms of this distinction.

The starting point for the critical consideration of the culture and government literature is the recognition that the polemical interventions on behalf of cultural-policy studies often tend to presume that policy actually works as intended, by overestimating the extent to which culture can be successfully manipulated by the re-tooled cultural-policy studies academic. The Australian cultural-policy studies literature gives relatively little attention in its general conceptual elaborations to the “uncertainty principle” that DiMaggio (1983, p. 67) suggests should guide cultural-policy considerations, based on the recognition that “we can never be sure what is going to work”. Methodologically, this is in turn related to a tendency to align organizations with their policy statements, statements with actions, and actions with actual outcomes (Miller 1998, p. 87). In this respect, recent critiques of the governmentality literature in political theory are relevant for debates in cultural studies. O’Malley et al (1997) suggest that the elision of criticism as a legitimate facet of social theorizing in the governmentality literature is related to representations of governmental programs as univocal, systematic, and highly coherent. As a result, much of this literature has difficulty in acknowledging the agency of the governed in shaping practices of rule (O’Malley 1996). It therefore fails to attend in detail to the contradictions that beset practices of government. The same can be said of the cultural-policy studies literature, which tends to show greater concern for the internal rationalities of policy institutions, at the expense of an examination of the irreducible “antagonism of strategies” which shape different fields of government (Foucault 1983, p. 211).

I want to suggest that the over-totalized model of the effectivity of governmental rationalities that underwrites the polemical arguments made on behalf of cultural-policy studies are intimately linked to a particular appropriation of the work of Foucault. Therefore, a critical issue in assessing
cultural-policy studies is the status of Foucault as the figure of authority appealed to in order to justify the policy-turn in cultural studies. In fact, the embrace of the vocation of cultural technician aligned with state bureaucracies rests on a rather unlikely reiteration of the Foucauldian notion of the productivity of power, as if this implied the essentially benign operation of power. Foucault is sanitized in much of the cultural-policy literature, and the contingency of his formulations of discipline, power, and government are easily transformed into a singular and coherent model of government which serves to justify particular intellectual and political choices: “We should not travesty Foucault’s careful conceptualization of the administrative domain by using it to justify an uncritical embrace of government” (Miller 1996, p. 149). In the rest of this paper, I want to elaborate on the ways in which Foucault’s distinctive understanding of disciplinary power is dependent upon a particular understanding of the spatiality of power, and indicate why this limits its direct applicability to contemporary cultural practices associated with electronically-mediated cultural technologies.

**Reconfiguring the territory of ‘culture’**

The polemical thrust of the cultural-policy studies position assumes the existence of the characteristic institutional arrangements of liberal, representative democracy, and the existence of an elaborate public sphere of cultural institutions mediating the relationship between nation-state and citizenry. This same assumption underwrites the theoretical understanding of culture as a product of governmental practices and technologies which aim to endow citizens with specific ‘nationalized’ attributes. The cultural-policy studies literature stakes the political relevance of cultural studies on its putative role in contributing to the cultivation of the conditions of national citizenship. The claims made with respect to the proper balance between criticism and policy are therefore open to question on the dual grounds that, firstly, the assumed conditions for intervention in cultural modes of government are not everywhere identical, and secondly, that they are undergoing significant processes of institutional and spatial restructuring in the contemporary period. I shall deal briefly with each of these points in turn below.
It is highly questionable whether the same institutional conditions for the government of culture which are characteristic of social-democratic capitalist societies, such as Australia, pertain to the government of culture in all geographical contexts. For example, Elmer (1996) argues that the model of social-democratic cultural policies is not immediately applicable to the United States, which lacks the same sort of extensive infrastructure of public institutions functioning as sites of national cultural-policy aimed at inculcating a particular model of cultural citizenship. In a different context, post-apartheid South Africa provides another counterpoint to the assumptions of cultural-policy studies. Here, the 1990s is witnessing attempts to constitute an infrastructure of democratic cultural institutions (in areas such as museums, arts policies, public broadcasting) for the first time. In the process, the formulae of Australian cultural-policy studies have been appropriated and transformed according to the particular pressures that come from trying to institutionalize a cultural public sphere in a period of democratic transition and economic internationalization in what remains a highly unequal as well as a culturally diverse society (see Chrisman 1996; Shepperson 1996; Tomaselli and Shepperson 1996). Taken together, the examples of the different historical trajectories of modern modes of governing culture in United States and South Africa indicate the need for a more flexible conceptualization of the relationships between ‘culture’ and ‘government’ than is suggested by the sweeping and univocal conclusions of the cultural-policy studies literature under discussion here.

If the geographical variability of strategies for governing culture might limit the immediate applicability of the cultural-policy studies literature, then there are also reasons to doubt its adequacy with regard to the changes heralded by contemporary processes of globalization. To a degree, one can read Australian cultural-policy studies as harboring a certain nostalgia for a particular configuration of state, culture, and intellectual authority that is in the process of being restructured (see Wiseman 1998). The normative assumptions of modern democratic institutions concerning citizenship, participation, and representation depend conceptually and practically on the existence of a functioning political community fixed within the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of national-state (Walker 1991). However, the territorial congruence of economic, political, and cultural practices
within the nation-state is increasingly open to processes of “de-linking” and “re-scaling” (Collins 1990; Swyngedouw 1997). Processes of economic production and distribution, political participation, social integration, and identity-formation, are now stretched across various networks and spatial scales (Apparadurai 1990). As a consequence, issues of representation and participation, social regulation, and economic management, now extend “below, through, and above” the scale of the nation-state (Connolly 1995, p. 161). While nation-states remain pivotal agents in globalization processes (Weiss 1997), contemporary restructuring processes mean that social democratic models of citizenship premised upon the nation-state cannot be considered the only model upon which to premise an understanding of cultural modes of governmentality, nor by extension the practical relevance of cultural studies.

The re-scaling of economic processes and regulatory regimes is associated with the fragmentation of both national public spheres and the singular liberal subjectivities with which they have been normatively associated. The multiplication of cultural public spheres therefore means that “there is no longer a general subject of culture” (Readings 1996, p. 141). The internationalization of economic processes, and the fragmentation and multiplication of public spheres, re-territorializes the normative individual subject of the nation into a series of differently scaled networks of representation and participation. Mass mediated public spheres increasingly address individuals not as members of a whole nation, but as a series of multiple, minoritized subjects (Warner 1992). The current pluralization of spaces of democratic problematization (see Connolly 1995) associated with these processes is an index of a fundamental transformation of the spatialities of subject-formation in the contemporary world. The government of culture, in short, is no longer institutionally or spatially contained within the nation-state. The argument in Foucauldian cultural-policy studies about being more pragmatic and modest about the political significance of cultural studies therefore cuts both ways, in so far as it requires a more pragmatic and modest consideration about the importance of formal cultural policies in actually shaping cultural practices. The model of academic vocation as
The cultural-policy administrator might not be so persuasive if the institutional and spatial conditions which it assumes are in the process of being thoroughly reconfigured.

The restructuring of modes of government beyond the realms of the nation-state involves not just an institutional shift in the locus of government of and by culture from state to market, but an actual spatial restructuring as well. The processes which are currently re-figuring the ‘territory of government’ (Rose 1996), exemplified by shifts away from attempts to govern through a nationally constituted ‘social’ sphere to myriad modes of government through ‘community’, are not simply a matter of the emergence of a new ‘imaginary territory’ of government. They involve a complex set of processes rearranging the material spaces and scales of governmental practices. The ‘de-socialization’ of public policy characteristic of neo-liberal governmentality indicates a shift away from a single unified national territory and a unified citizenry as the object of governmental regulation. This in turn suggests the need to think through the dimensions of the re-spatialization of the government of culture across heterogeneous scales and through a variety of spaces. The next two sections will consider whether Foucault can provide adequate conceptual tools with which to understand contemporary processes of subject-formation inscribed in cultural technologies.

**Discipline and the spaces of power/knowledge**

The cultural-policy studies literature tends to assume a high degree of fit between the political rationalities of institutions and actual processes of subject-formation, if only by virtue of the omission of any sustained consideration of how governmental rationalities actually play themselves out in ‘practice’. James Donald suggests that there is a tendency in work on governmentality more generally to present an image of the ‘souls’ of citizens being completely controlled and regulated by governmental practices by positing “a pre-formed self as the necessary target on which the machinery [of government] works” (1992, p. 93). This assumption helps to present culture as a realm that is capable of being effectively managed and regulated in detail, an image that underwrites the political imaginary of a refashioned cultural studies able to successfully regulate cultural practices for
progressive political ends through policy interventions. While Foucault is a general reference point for much of this work, to date that there has been a lack of critical discussion in the cultural-policy studies paradigm of the precise understandings of power implied by the ritual invocation of Foucault’s authority. This is related to a lack of attention to the conceptual implications of the contemporary spatial restructuring of cultural practices for the general applicability to all cultural technologies of Foucault’s ‘diagrammatic’ conception of disciplinary power. As part of a broader literature on governmentality, the re-conceptualization of culture in relation to practices of government and the management of conduct is underwritten by a generic understanding of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power is taken to refer to the practices through which actions are cultivated “in a distinctive milieu or habitus”, one which “presupposes supervision, instruction, sanctions and judgement” (Smith and Minson 1997, p. 193-194). If the emergence of modern practices of ‘culture’ is conceptually located within understandings of the historical emergence of liberal forms of political rule which depend upon ‘governing at a distance’, then it can be observed that the authoritative analysis of this process, such as Hunter’s account of the humanities and ‘the school’ (1994), or Bennett’s work on museums (1994, 1995a, 1997a), tend to construct the deployment of culture in terms of a monitorial disciplinary regime which inculcates new ethical practices of self-formation in distinctive spatio-temporal locales.

Disciplinary power, in Foucault’s formulations, refers to multiple and diffuse strategic exercises of power which do not possess any necessary overarching dynamic, sovereign will, or single rationality which draws them into a unified relation. Compared to the modalities of power characteristic of sovereign, juridical systems of power, disciplinary forms of rule and contestation are heterogeneous and do not derive from a single centre of power. The importance of this shift is captured by Anthony Giddens, who suggests that the historical emergence of disciplinary forms of power marks an important shift in relations between the scope and the intensity of rule (1985, p. 10). The scope of rule is extended by the diffusion of disciplinary power through multiple institutions and locales, in so far as superordinate actors are able to shape larger areas of the lives of those subject to
their rule. However, in the process, the intensity of rule is decisively altered, in so far as the sanctions exercised to secure compliance do not involve the direct application of repressive legal sanctions or physical force. Disciplinary power refers behaviour to norms, and it is exercised by positively governing conduct rather than constraining an essentially free individuality.

Foucault describes new forms of discipline that are precisely calculated to regulate the movements, gestures, and attitudes of the bodies of its subjects. As a means of ‘laying hold of the soul’, disciplinary power is exercised through the spatial distribution of individuals in order to subject them to various modes of surveillance and monitoring. As already suggested, the spatiality of the institutions and organizations which Foucault discusses are quite central to the forms of power/knowledge that he ascribes to modern regimes of rule. The distinctive spatial figures of disciplinary power in Foucault’s account (the asylum, the prison, the school, the prison, the barracks) are not contingent to the conceptualization of disciplinary power (Driver 1985, 1992; Philo 1992). On the contrary, the presumed efficacy of disciplinary power is integrally related to particular configurations of human bodies in space and time. The distinctive qualities ascribed to disciplinary power lay in specific modes of spatialization, typified by a shift from the public display of power to the anonymous, privatized, sequestered exercise of power. Disciplinary power depends upon the creation of novel physical arrangements in which people can be monitored in the minutest details of their activities. It works by partitioning, enclosing, and codifying space, enabling the detailed management and training of conduct by organizing the movement of bodies in space and through time (see Marsden 1998, pp. 112-116). Disciplinary power involves the regulated distribution of bodies in space and time, combined with the constant potential of surveillance.

Foucault’s exemplary figure for the proliferation of disciplinary forms of power through the multiplication of myriad spaces of enclosure is Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon (Foucault 1977, pp. 195-228), a precise arrangement of physical space to secure the automatic, de-personalized, and anonymous operation of power-relations through the structured arrangement of vision. It provides a model or ‘diagram’ of practices for the training of individuals through various ‘moral geographies’
which partition space and time to create generalized forms of surveillance and monitoring and thus facilitate the development of forms of self-regulating conduct. The application by analogy of ‘panopticism’ to a wide array of institutions has been the means by which Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power has had so much influence (see Dandekar 1990). It is important to note that, if the panopticon as a figure for disciplinary power suggests forms of ‘governing at a distance’, of power-relations operating through self-regulation rather than the direct application of force or coercion to the body, this ‘governing at a distance’ actually depends upon the careful organization and monitoring of relations of spatial proximity between subjects. As an abstract formula for the imposition of specific forms of conduct on a multiplicity of human subjects, panopticism is marked by the fact that “the multiplicity is reduced and confined to a tight space and that the imposition of a form of conduct is done by distributing in space, laying out and serializing in time, composing in space-time” (Deleuze 1988, p. 34). The disciplining or training of the body as a means of ‘laying hold of the soul’ is modeled on the continuous and seamless supervision, monitoring, and surveillance of subjects in circumstances of spatial and temporal co-presence (Giddens 1985, p. 47).

Foucault’s diagrammatic conception of power, if hypostatized into a general model for all forms of disciplinary power, tends to present a far too simple picture of the seamless operation of disciplinary effects. There are two critical points to be made about the standard account of disciplinary power. Firstly, outside of locales of sequestration, the activities of individuals are less prone to detailed regulation and monitoring. ‘Total institutions’ like prisons and asylums epitomize disciplinary power for Foucault. However, schools, factories, or offices hardly operate exactly like prisons and asylums. Disciplinary power is likely to be less all embracing in these sorts of sites. Giddens (1984, pp. 153-8) suggests that ‘complete and austere institutions’ such as prisons, rather than being considered as expressions of the essence of disciplinary power, might be best thought of as maximizing disciplinary power. This opens up the possibility of considering disciplinary power in other locales as less secure and effective, and of considering the possibility of contradictions between the forms of power exercised in different locales. At this point, it is enough to note that while writers
such as Bennett and Hunter certainly admit that galleries, libraries, museums, or schools, are significantly more ‘open’ than the enclosed spaces of containment that Foucault discusses in such detail, their work still tends to privilege areal locales of spatial and temporal co-presence and regimes of monitorial observation in working up general accounts of the governmentalization of culture.

Secondly, the multiplicity of disciplinary locales through which individuals move also raises the question of how different spaces and locales are connected to each other, and how conduct is regulated as individuals move from different locales in the course of their everyday lives. This issue is not adequately addressed in the culture and government literature, with its emphasis on the specificity of particular practices with their own specific regulatory regimes and specific distribution of effects. How are all these specific institutions, regimes, and effects articulated together? One need not presume some single underlying logic linking all possible sites of subject-formation to raise as a legitimate question the issue of just how the effectivity of particular disciplinary regimes in specific institutions is supported, subverted, or transformed by the movement of ‘subjects’ into other locales and other institutions subject to other modes of discipline. The effectivity of any particular programme of governing culture is likely to be ‘over-determined’ in significant ways by the operations of other institutions and processes: “the forms of subjectivity escape from the powers and forms of knowledge of one social apparatus in order to be reinserted in another, in forms which are yet to come into being” (Deleuze 1992b, p. 162).

Taken together, these two points suggest that an adequate understanding of the relationships between culture and government should integrate a concern with the array of everyday strategies through which practices of normalization, disciplinization, and government are deployed and subverted. The ‘agency’ of subjects is a critical consideration in examining the actual operations of governmental practices: “the imposition of disciplinary power outside contexts of enforced sequestration tends to be blunted by the very real and consequential countervailing power which those subject to it can, and do, develop” (Giddens 1985, p. 186). This section has argued that, if Foucault’s work points towards a positive account of the production of subjectivity, then in so far as
this rests on an inherently spatial model of power, a further set of issues are raised which are not adequately addressed in the cultural-policy studies paradigm. If conduct is shaped by positioning subjects in particular locales, then the dual questions of the degree of containment characteristic of particular sites and of the regulation of mobility between sites imply a need for greater attention to issues of agency than has been displayed by this range of work to date. In the following section, I will argue that this return to agency is in fact anticipated by Foucault’s own revisions to the notion of disciplinary power-knowledge.

**Which Foucault effect?**

I have so far suggested that the cultural-policy studies literature, by virtue of the historical contexts from which the understandings of the constitutively governmental nature of culture is derived, tends to rely implicitly on the understanding of power derived from Foucault’s analysis of various enclosed, areal spaces of discipline. I want to suggest further that cultural-policy studies has largely failed to adequately distinguish between the theme of disciplinary power in Foucault’s work and his subsequent revisions of this notion in discussions of the theme of governmentality. As a consequence, ‘discipline’ and ‘government’ are often conflated. One reason for this is because the authority ascribed to Foucault in the cultural-policy studies literature tends to be derived from a binary staging of two different approaches in cultural studies: ideology versus power/knowledge, consciousness versus practices, Gramsci versus Foucault. One of the effects of this oppositional staging is to elide significant differences within Foucault’s own work, differences which bear upon the relevance of the governmentality theme for understanding contemporary cultural practices.

Foucault’s later discussions of governmentality present a far less totalized vision of the exercise of rule than that often derived from a reading of *Discipline and Punish*. Government, in the broad Foucauldian sense of the term, does not involve acting directly on the moral character of subjects in specialized locales through the detailed training of their habits and activities. It involves the shaping of the general conditions of daily life of a population; not the intensive management of
bodies in time and space, but the general regulation of dispositions at an actual distance (Scott 1995). The emergence of the theme of governmentality in Foucault’s work after *Discipline and Punish* is associated with a broadening of focus regarding questions of power, one which sees disciplinary modes of power re-defined as particular modes amongst other forms. It therefore heralds a greater concern for the problematic relationships between the operations of disciplinary micro-powers and the more extensive administration of whole populations.

In the first volume of the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault subsequently distinguished between two ‘poles’ through which ‘power over life’ is deployed (1979, p. 139). On the one hand, *disciplines*, which would include schools, barracks, and workshops as well as prisons and asylums, exercise the precise, localized, and detailed management of individualized bodies. They are the means for the deployment of an “anatamo-politics of the human body”. On the other hand, *regulatory controls* are more extensive means for the exercise of a “bio-politics of the population”. As the primary technology of regulatory power, statistics take a collective entity as its object, rather than the individualized bodies who are the objects of disciplinary power. The modern discourse of sexuality combines both modes in complex ways: “giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, indeterminate medical or psychological examinations, to an entire micro-power concerned with the body. But it gave rise as well to comprehensive measures, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups taken as a whole” (*ibid.*, 145). The distinction between these two modes of power is a difference of spatial and numerical scale, as well as the intensity and scope of rule, suggesting that regulatory controls cannot be properly considered simply as extensions of disciplinary power. This point is well made by Gilles Deleuze. Anatamo-politics addresses particular multiplicities of bodies to impose conduct, and is distinguished by virtue of the fact that this multiplicity “is small in number and the space limited and confined” (Deleuze 1988, p. 72). In contrast, bio-politics aims not to impose conduct, but to administer life (*ibid.*, p. 137), and as a mode of power it is distinguished by virtue of taking as its object a large and diffuse population dispersed in a space which is “spread out
and open” (ibid., p. 72). Therefore, if one effect of Foucault’s work is a heightened sensitivity to the variable ways in which power is practiced, then Deleuze’s commentary underscores the point that any such consideration must pay detailed attention to the different configurations of socially produced space characteristic of different institutions, practices, and technologies of subject-formation.

The introduction of the broad distinction between disciplinary and regulatory power indicates that the diagrammatic conception of power present in *Discipline and Punish*, which tied the definitive exercise of disciplinary power to very precise organizations of space and visibility, is not Foucault’s final formulation of the issue of power. It is the sense of power as regulatory controls that is emphasized in Foucault’s discussions of the modern problematics of government. Disciplinary power is placed within a broader framework, in which it is government that is considered the preeminent form of power characteristic of the political rationalities of modern societies (1991, pp. 101-103). The governmentality theme marks a significant revision of the image of the self-policing subject wholly defined by the operations of a superordinate disciplinary apparatus (Hall 1997b). This is evident in the greater consideration given to issues of ‘freedom’ and its relation to power. In Foucault’s late work, power addresses individuals as autonomous agents “and defines itself wholly in relation to them and to their freedom” (Halperin 1995, p. 18). This is reflected in the attention given to the historical formation of various ‘technologies of the self’, the array of “techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this is a manner so as to transform themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on” (Foucault 1993, p. 203). It does not seem accurate to simply read this focus upon technologies of the self as a continuation of the focus upon disciplinary practices of subjectification as these are described in earlier work. The excavation of ‘modalities of the relation to the self’ in Foucault’s genealogies of discourses of sexuality is explicitly distinguished from the earlier concern with punitive rationalities and the formation of domains of knowledge (Foucault 1985, pp. 3-13), and can be read as an index of an attempt to sketch a post-humanist account of what one might still call
‘agency’. The theme of governmental power is predicated upon the same concern with rehabilitating agency, now understood as a historically specific attribute of particular ensembles of subjectivity, knowledge, and power, rather than as an abstract predicate of an ahistorical human Subject: “governmentality’ implies the relationship of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of ‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other” (Foucault 1997, p. 300).

The definition which is critical for understanding the notion of governmentality presents power as “a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions” (Foucault 1983, p. 220). This implies a significantly less totalized vision than that suggested by the diagrammatic conception of disciplinary power. Power is predicated on freedom: “Power relations are only possible in so far as the subject is free” (Foucault 1997, p. 292). Freedom is in turn re-figured not as an innate capacity of an essential subjectivity or consciousness, but as an array of competencies that are ascribed to different agents and can only be realized in relation to specific conditions of possibility. On this understanding, power is conceptually distinguished from domination, since power-relations do not totally foreclose the field of action: “A man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him. Not power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to government. If an individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject him to government. There is no power without potential refusal or revolt” (Foucault 1981, p. 253). Foucault’s work on governmentality, when read in tandem with his later work on sexuality and the ‘aesthetics of the self’, therefore suggests a greater concern with integrating the contradictions between discourses of the subject, practices of individual self-regulation, and practices disciplining the conduct of bodies into a broader analytics of social power. If it is not to reproduce the impasses of earlier theories of the constitution of subjectivity in cultural
studies which reproduced images of the seamless operations of cultural institutions bringing about subject-effects exactly as intended, then the further development of the conceptualization of culture and governmentality needs to acknowledge this concern for the heterogeneity of the discourses and practices that shape any particular strategy or apparatus of government.

**Reconfiguring the spaces of ‘culture’**

In the previous section, I identified two broad senses of power in Foucault’s later work. As Flew (1996, pp. 49-51) has argued, the somewhat rigid interpretation of Foucault that has informed revisionist histories of cultural institutions such as schools and museums in cultural-policy studies might require rethinking when it comes to addressing less formalized, more dispersed cultural institutions. Following this lead, the example I want to discuss is electronically-mediated cultural technologies such as radio or television. I do not want to suggest that the Foucauldian literature on culture and governmentality is not useful in analyzing these sorts of cultural technologies, but rather that what is required is a revision of the image of the total efficacy of governmental strategies that is presented in the cultural-policy studies literature. I want to suggest that a regulatory, rather than disciplinary, understanding of the practices and methods of power is more appropriate, not least because it opens up a reconsideration of issues of agency that is largely absent from the cultural-policy studies literature. In the concluding section of the paper, it will be argued that this revision might require in turn a much more modest estimation of importance of ‘policy’ as a means of governing contemporary processes of cultural subject-formation.

Considerations of the specificities of radio and television require a shift from thinking of governmental power in relation to an areal conceptualization of the spaces of subjectification, towards a notion of the articulation of dispersed spaces through networks of communication, implying a non-territorialized conceptualization of space. Recent work by John Thompson and Paddy Scannell helps to clarify the distinctive ways in which mass media institutions re-constitute the spatial and temporal conditions for social interaction and communication. The process that
Thompson calls the “mediazation of culture” (1995, p. 46) necessitates a rethinking of the forms of power that can be exercised through cultural technologies such as radio and television. The organization of visibility and surveillance enabled by electronically mediated forms of communication implies different distributions of power from Foucault’s enclosed disciplinary spaces (ibid., pp. 132-148). Mass mediated electronic communication technologies enable new forms of action and social relationships which are not simple extensions of previous forms based on print technology, literary pedagogy, or the exhibitionary complexes of museum spaces. The distinctive spatialities and temporalities of electronic mass media might be interpreted as extending forms of power premised on visibility, but they also introduce a significant factor of indeterminacy not provided for in those theorizations of culture that continue to take the areal locales as their models of disciplinary power. Radio and television are characterized by an institutionalized break between sites of address or production and sites of reception of cultural forms, and this has implications for the sorts of power exercised through these communications networks. Above all, mass mediated cultural technologies also provide the conditions for forms of social interaction which are not regulated by the condition of co-presence of subjects contained within a field of the gaze, but are instead characterized by the spatial and temporal absence of subjects to one another. Electronic media therefore transform the conditions for communication, and in so doing they alter the spatial and temporal conditions through which individuals interact and exercise power. They are, in Giddens’ terms, mediums for the temporal and spatial distanciation of social relations, the ‘stretching’ and ‘embedding’ of social practices in time and space (Giddens 1981, p. 4-5). They enable various forms of ‘action at a distance’, not just metaphorically but actually, since they provide a medium for people to intervene and influence events which occur in places that are temporally and spatially distant from the locales of everyday life (see Silk 1998).

Scannell (1996, p. 12) likewise identities the “gap between the place of transmission and the place of reception” as a fundamental characteristic of radio and television, and also argues that this has implications for understanding power in relation to mass media. There is a constitutive lack of fit
between the strategies of public institutional spaces of programme production and dissemination and the multiple private spaces of reception. Radio and television articulate a series of dispersed locales. Broadcasting cannot impose itself on absent listeners and viewers, who are free to listen or watch in a variety of settings and can adopt a multitude of dispositions. As a consequence of this, the relationship between broadcasters and listeners/viewers is ‘unforced’ because it is ‘unenforceable’ (ibid., p. 76). Precisely because of this constitutive ‘gap’, broadcasters are not in position to totally dictate the normative dispositions of their audiences. For broadcasting to ‘work’ as a cultural form, programming must therefore be oriented to the normative horizons of audiences, whose constitution broadcasters cannot wholly dictate. Broadcasters adjust to the dispositions of audiences, and audiences are also required to adjust to the dispositions of radio and television as both a technological and cultural form. As a result, Scannell concludes that “what can no longer be managed are the behavior of the wider listening or viewing public” (ibid., p. 76). While mass-mediated cultural practices enable symbolic resources to be circulated over expanded spatial scales, and therefore contribute to regulating the conditions for the emergence of characteristically modern forms of self-reflexive conduct, the critical feature of these cultural technologies is the spatially and temporally distanciated nature of this process (Giddens 1991, pp. 4-5). These communications networks, while certainly open to interpretation as ‘technologies of the self’, do not constitute the conditions for the tight discipline of conduct under conditions of direct institutional supervision, but require that the government of conduct through culture be re-conceptualized as a thoroughly mediated process. To return again to Giddens’ distinction, electronically-media cultural technologies, while further extending the potential scope of rule, also represent a dilution of the intensity of forms of rule that can be exercised through these networks.

The spatial and temporal disjunctures characteristic of electronic media practices suggests that the configuration of cultural practices through these mediums involves a greater degree of indeterminacy than is characteristic of formalised cultural institutions. If media technologies are important in shaping the conditions for the cultivation of identities, this cannot be adequately
conceptualized on the analogy of monitory practices of direct surveillance of individualized subjects in conditions of spatial and temporal proximity. These cultural technologies require a qualitatively different understanding of the degree of effectivity of governmental practices than that suggested by the model of enclosed disciplinary spaces. A consideration of the multiplicity of institutional locales, and especially of their spatial dispersion, suggests that the “co-ordination of particular disciplinary techniques within and across sites [...] and the ability to secure the kinds of conduct required at a distance is a more complex task than that delivered by surveillance and self-regulation” (Allen 1997, p. 67). Two observations follow from this recognition of the complexity of exercising power at a distance. Firstly, it should be recognized that the consumption of mass media forms such as radio and television is not dependent on the prior inculcation of habits or conduct in cultural institutions such as schools or universities in the way that the expansion of mass mediated print-based popular culture has been (cf. Hunter 1991). It is a process that draws on other, less formalized competencies, which are in turn subject to different forms of regulation. Secondly, the doubling of space and time characteristic of broadcasting (the potential it provides for being in two places at a time, the space from which programmes are ‘spoken’ as well as the spaces in which they are heard/watched), means that modes of government characteristic of radio and television can no longer be adequately conceptualized along the lines sketched by a critical account of culture and government that continues to take literary institutions and aesthetic pedagogies as their normative model. These electronically-mediated cultural practices de-territorialize and re-territorialize the subject of culture, shattering the stable relationship between subjects and symbolic forms in a shared space of proximity and surveillance which is presumed by the traditional aesthetic discourses and practices which serve as the model of culture and governmentality in the cultural-policy studies paradigm (Weber 1996).

The distinctive spatial and temporal co-ordinates of modern mass communications indicate that the conceptualization of culture in terms of governmentality needs to address in greater detail the different articulations of spaces of transmission and consumption that characterize cultural technologies. Of course, the separation of production and reception characteristic of mass media does
not imply a complete autonomy for consumption. As Berland observes (1992), while media audiences are spatially dispersed, they remain spatially defined by reference to particular sites such as the ‘home’, the ‘car’, or the ‘office’, sites which are themselves the object of various technologies of administration. There are numerous strategies by which the dispositions of audiences in domestic spaces are shaped and managed. The ‘family’ is itself the object of a whole array of medical, juridical, educational, and popular cultural discourses (Donzelot 1979). Modern communications technologies, as mediums of ‘mobile privatization’, have been instrumental in shaping ‘domestic space’ as a distinctively private sphere while at the same time expanding the horizons and identifications and forms of actions beyond the local scale (Williams 1974; Moores 1993). Media technologies re-articulate the public and private in new ways, serving as a point of intersection for the articulation of the social relations of gendered domesticity with imaginary forms of national communion (Morley and Robbins 1995, pp. 64-69). This requires thinking of the culture of government in terms of the precise means by which knowledge of dispersed and fragmented subjects is produced and deployed in the effort to negotiate and manage constitutive relations of absence and distance. In the interstices of the dispersed and fragmented geographies of mass media practices, a space is opened up for the proliferation of a whole set of new fields of knowledge and expertise which are oriented at governing conduct through new mediums and technologies of representation.  

The focus upon the specific knowledge practices by which the sites of media transmission and of media reception are negotiated, and upon the social production of the material spaces that connect and separate them, underscores a concern with regulatory technologies relative to the tightly controlled technologies of discipline. The primary means by which populations are made the objects of strategies of governmental power through the mediums of radio and television is through extensive apparatuses such as statistics and ratings for recursively monitoring collective conduct and behavior. ‘Audiences’, as objects of ‘policy’ in public and private media institutions, provide a good example of the different forms of power implied by the distinction between discipline and government. The behavior and conduct represented by the various figures of the audience is not equivalent to the actual
behavior and conduct of individualized subjects. It is the product of selective decisions by different agencies who mobilize a series of technologies of representation through which they aim to exercise power by being able to authoritatively represent audience preferences, wants, and interests (Hartley 1996, pp. 64-65). The actual detailed disciplining of subjects in space and time is a qualitatively different practice from regulatory technologies of government such as statistics, opinion polls, censuses, or audience-ratings. As forms of action upon action, the latter are not means for directly inducing a particular conduct, but are distinguished by virtue of being mediums which aim to make something more or less probable. They are prime examples of the ‘methods of probability’ which Deleuze identifies as distinguishing bio-politics, or regulatory forms of power, from disciplinary forms (1988, pp. 71-73). They do not involve the training of subjects or their total immersion in an institutional locale. They address individuals not so much as subjects at all, but as abstract singularities: a viewer, a voter, a consumer and so on. As technologies for the regulation of conduct outside of structured relations of proximity and co-presence, they imply highly mediated and indirect forms of ‘surveillance’ in which the relationship of the subject of government to norms of conduct is significantly more attenuated, or even, as Scannell and Thompson both suggest, actually reversed. They operate as mediums for shaping the general contexts of conduct, but are not directly analogous to modes of social control through the direct supervision within a spatially structured organization of the gaze. Therefore, the very methodologies and technologies that render the audience-subject of radio or television capable of being the object of various strategies of government (statistics, numbers, ratings, focus-groups) also indicate the extent to which there is a constitutive lack of exact fit between the policy rationalities of public and private media institutions and actual outcomes of normalization. This implies that a full consideration of cultural modes of government must move beyond the statements and aims of ‘policy’ institutions, and integrate a concern for the actual practices and agency of the ‘governed’ into understandings of modern governmentality. Government of and through culture needs to be understood as a significantly less coherent process than is often implied in the cultural-policy studies literature.
Conclusion

The recent emergence of a cultural-policy studies paradigm in cultural studies has led to important questions being raised about the utility of highly general notions of culture, and about the heroic conceptions of academic vocation these often support, and it has re-asserted the centrality of issues of policy to an understanding of cultural practices. However, as Miller (1998, pp. 64-97) suggests, in so far as the emergence of this line of work represents a polemical move within the specific field of academic cultural studies, it is marked by its own defining closures. In this paper, I have argued that one of these closures is evident in the particular appeal made to the work of Foucault as a counter-point to other canonical theoretical strains in cultural studies. I have not simply wanted to engage in a debate about the proper interpretation of a master-theorist, but rather, by teasing out a more differentiated understanding of the variable spatiality of power/knowledge apparatuses, I have wanted to suggest that a more detailed consideration of Foucault’s work might call into question the particular claims made in the cultural-policy studies literature regarding the proper relations between criticism and pragmatism. The implicit privilege accorded to disciplinary understandings of power in the cultural-policy studies literature needs to be displaced, because it provides a far too coherent image of governmental practices seamlessly constructing subjects. In turn, it supports an over-optimist image of the extent to which ‘policy’ can serve as a practicable entry-point for the transformation of conduct.

To a considerable, yet largely unacknowledged extent, literature, aesthetics, and literary pedagogy continue to be the privileged normative models for conceptualizing the relationship between culture and government in Australian cultural-policy studies. They remain the objects of the critical genealogies through which notions of culture’s inherent governmental status have been worked-up (Wark 1992). I have argued that the historical accounts of cultural institutions which have underwritten the conceptualization of culture and government in ‘Foucauldian’ cultural-policy studies might not be adequate for understanding electronically-mediated cultural practices, because of the distinctive spatialities and temporalities of these practices. The appeal to Foucault in much of this
work involves an implicit and uncritical appeal to a conception of disciplinary power that is conceptually dependent upon a particular spatialization of power. The spatiality of disciplinary power as it emerged in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries was associated with a series of spaces of enclosure, the array of institutional sites including the school, the hospital, the factory and the prison discussed by Foucault and further elaborated by various others (e.g. Mitchell 1988, Rabinow 1989). This model of disciplinary power does not suit cultural technologies such as radio and television. They require a networked conception of social-spatial power: these cultural technologies practice power not just through predictable effects of normalization and prescription, but also involve a greatly expanded scope for the divergence, variation, and negotiation of effects (see Murdoch 1998).

This paper has suggested that ‘cultural’ modes of social regulation have been re-scaled by the ‘mediazation of culture’, and that they have been displaced more fully beyond the realms of the state (Hall 1997a; Rose and Miller 1992), partly due to processes of globalization. In concluding, I want to briefly consider the range of questions opened by the first of these claims, and then suggest that the second implies that any investigation of these questions will require a different estimation of the significance of policy-pragmatism and criticism from the one proposed by the cultural-policy studies paradigm. With respect to the first of these points, then, the culture and governmentality literature needs to be further developed with respect to the forms of authority and regulatory power characteristic of electronically-mediated, spatially and temporally distanced forms of cultural practice. Contemporary changes in the modes of production, distribution, consumption, and regulation of culture related to changes in organization of media and communication systems are re-configuring the scales, spatialities, and territorialities of ‘the cultural’, and impacting in ways which remain to be specified upon the forms of effective ‘action upon action’ that can be exercised through these networks. In fact, the general relevance of the image of a ‘disciplinary society’ arranged through a series of spaces of enclosure through which individuals pass successively, with the prison serving as the implicit analogical model for the operations of control, surveillance, and monitoring of a whole coherent apparatus of social power, might be eclipsed by these contemporary
transformations. Deleuze (1992a) suggests that these disciplinary institutions are now in crisis as they are displaced by a network of dispersed, open circuits of control (see also Hardt 1995). The central governmental problematic in the emerging ‘society of control’ is not that of maintaining discipline over clearly circumscribed subjects within territorial space, but one of regulating a whole network of flows, connections, and re-presentations (Mulgan 1991). This implies attending to the ways in which practices in diverse and dispersed locations are mediated through various agents and technologies of regulation, rather than thinking of the mediazation of culture as merely an extension of tightly controlled modes of conduct carefully managed in enclosed locales.

With respect to the second of the points noted above, the historical role of culture in mediating the relationships between individual citizens and the state is now in crisis, as culture no longer can nor is asked to perform its traditional role for the nation-state (see Readings 1996). The multiplication of sites and scales at which symbolic forms are institutionally produced and consumed implies that individuals are not subject to coherent interpellation as national subjects, but are addressed as members of minoritized communities existing at a number of scales and organized through both areal and networked spaces. The assumption of the existence of a coherent public sphere of national public institutions cultivating cultural citizenship, which underwrites the polemical claims made on behalf of a whole-hearted embrace of “policy” as a vocation at the cost of “criticism”, is open to considerable question not only on normative political grounds but also empirically. Processes of global economic and political re-scaling are literally re-locating the sites of institutionalized decision-making over cultural practices to which transformative political projects need to be addressed. While this might imply a multiplication of possible sites and forms of intervening positively in the government of culture, it is also associated with a widening gap between the institutionalized scope of political representation and the diverse pressures to which representative institutions are asked to respond. And this suggests that the contemporary reconfiguration of ‘culture’, far from diminishing the need for ‘criticism’, multiplies the range of issues and practices in need of principled critical interrogation.
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Notes

1. In this paper, ‘cultural-policy studies’ will be used to refer only to this Australian ‘paradigm’ within contemporary cultural studies. Other traditions of cultural policy analysis are not the topic of the discussion here. See Trotter (1998) for a recent review of the range and diversity of contemporary work on cultural policy issues.

2. The development of the culture and government theme in cultural studies is one example of a broader range of work which interrogates highly general and categorical conceptualizations of culture by re-assessing the historical constitution of ‘culture’ as an autonomous institutional field for the ethical self-regulation of individuals in the interests of the state, political order and formal democracy. See Grossberg (1993), Lloyd and Thomas (1995), Viswanathan (1989, 1991), Young (1995).

3. See Frankel (1997a, 1997b) for critical discussions of the relationships between academic institutions and this broader political context.

4. Giddens’ work provides an interesting potential supplement to the Foucauldian re-conceptualization of culture as inherently governmental, in so far as it focuses upon the institutional conditions (including processes of state-formation, capitalism and the market, and structures of personal relationships such as the family) for the emergence of distinctive forms of self-reflexive subjectivity. It therefore converges with the emphasis upon practices for cultivating self-regulating conduct in the more conceptually oriented examples of the cultural-policy studies literature. Although the terms for the possible articulation of these two theoretical problematics is not the main concern of this paper, my discussion is informed by the sense that Giddens provides a fruitful source for integrating the inherent ‘messiness’ of social practices into an understanding the relationships between ‘culture’ and ‘government’.

5. ‘The Foucault effect’ is Bennett’s (1998, pp. 60-84) summary formulation for the set of revisions to cultural studies lore that, he argues, follow from an engagement with Foucault’s work.

7. For example, see Low (1997) for a discussion of the relationships between areal and networked conceptions of space, and Grossberg (1996) for a discussion of cultural practices understood as ‘territorializing machines’.

8. See Rose (1994) for a detailed consideration of the importance of expertise in practices of governing conduct.