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Local and regional ‘development studies’
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Introduction: What is development?
Discussing local and regional development in the global South necessitates engaging with empire, race and nation. The whole idea and practice of development is marked by imbalances of power about who decides what constitutes development, who its agents are, and what territories it constitutes. It is vital, therefore, to begin by asking how we understand development. My starting point is Hart’s (2001: 650) distinction between ‘D’ and ‘d’ development whereby

“‘big D’ Development (is) defined as a post-second world war project of intervention in the ‘third world’ that emerged in the context of decolonisation and the cold war, and ‘little d’ development or the development of capitalism as a geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory set of historical processes”

Hart follows the Polanyian view that unleashing of markets generates a ‘counter-movement’. Hence, “Far from the counter-movement representing some sort of external intervention in an inexorably unfolding teleology, these opposing tendencies are contained within capitalism” (Hart 2001: 650). This forces us to consider not only how global capitalism must be actively “created and constantly reworked” (ibid.), but in a Gramscian sense how it can be resisted and made otherwise.

Within this counter-movement the relationship between power and knowledge is a form of governmentality (Watts 2003). In practice, this means analysing “the rationalities of rules, the forms of knowledge and expertise they construct, and the specific and contingent assemblages of practices, materials, agents and techniques through which these rationalities operate to produce governable subjects” (Hart 2004: 92). Governmentality has been used to examine international NGOs and multilateral agencies, and the intersection of different spaces of power (e.g. Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Hence, knowledge about development and its practical application in ‘management’ and ‘planning’ is very much about control and discipline.

From its inception in the Enlightenment, development has involved trusteeship, which saw science and state direction coming together to secure the basis of social harmony through a process of national development. Colonial trusteeship was all about the mission to civilize others and to give experience to the ‘child-like’ colonial peoples. While trusteeship was often rejected after 1945, because of its colonial connotations, the idea ‘implicitly reappears’ many times in post-war conceptions of international development (Cowen and Shenton 1996). During this period many former colonial administrators went on to take posts with NGOs like OXFAM or taught university courses on development administration and management (Kothari 2006). This is not to view colonial administration as a homogenous set of practices and ideas but rather to seek to understand the continuities to ‘post-colonial’ times, even as important changes have taken place in the ideology of development.
While the D/d development framework gives us a dialectic for understanding how development functions structurally that is not to say that historical changes do not occur. An important issue for studying development is the ways in which discourses and practices have evolved. McMichael’s (2000) characterization of development having moved from ‘developmentalism’ to ‘globalism’ is instructive here, as is his observation that such moves have been a response to the crises of a previous regime. McMichael argues that developmentalism, essentially a social-democratic welfarism, was a response to the crisis of 19th Century monetary control via the gold standard and the destabilising effects of the World Wars. As we will see this Keynesian developmentalism came during the period of formal decolonization and underpinned state-led, protectionist and redistributive development policy. Globalism, by contrast, is a counter-mobilisation to the constraints of social protectionism, which seeks to engender market rule through institutional coercion which has weakened the power of some states.

But how does the discipline of Development Studies function as part of the governmentality of development? In general there has been a tendency, generated by both those outside development studies and within it, to treat the developing world as so exceptional as to require a different set of analytical concepts or development studies imports concepts into inappropriate situations. This exceptionalism is manifested in a number of ways.

First, is a ‘provincialising’ impetus arguing that globalisation has missed out much of the developing world, so for all intense and purposes we can ignore them. They simply do not matter to the dominant forces that shape the contemporary world. But as my brief discussion of McMichael’s work (ibid.) shows globalization has affected the global South in numerous ways and is significant for the lives of those living there, even if they are relatively powerless. Increasingly, the neo-liberal consensus of McMichael’s globalism informs all development policy, whether in the global North or South, which has seen a convergence of concerns around entrepreneurialism, cost recovery, and devolution and with it an attempt to apply similar institutional economic theories to planning.

Second is an ‘exoticising’ tendency, which runs that ‘the other’ in the global South are so different culturally and politically that ‘we’ can never really comprehend them. This lack of comprehension is manifested in mono-causal explanations (Chabal 1996), with policy makers accepting crude takes on politics, which they would never accept in analysing their own situations. Or we see potentially patronizing ‘participatory’ approaches, which I discuss later, that encourage the ‘beneficiaries’ to reveal their needs through child-like, playful techniques that actually conceals the ignorance of the policy researcher.

Third is a spatial and intellectual separation which parcels together inappropriate territories and scales. On the one hand we get a geographical separation with Development Studies focusing on the ‘over there’ regions, which generates a spatial, ethical and epistemological distance between the producers of the knowledge about development and the subjects of this knowledge. As Eyben (2006) argues such distancing absolves elites in the global North from much of the responsibility for poverty in both their own countries and the global South. On the other hand we get an intellectual
separation with economics, politics, etcetera doing their own things, but development studies does all these things, but at a more superficial level (Pieterse 2001). This lack of learning and dialogue undermines all knowledge about the world. However, one of the advantages of development studies is that it has, with varying degrees of success, tried to move beyond the economism that has afflicted local and regional development studies in the global North (Pike et al 2006). Through the work of theorists such as Sen (1999) and political moves of ‘social development’ researchers challenging the economism of institutions like the World Bank (Booth 1994), Development Studies’ apparent eclecticism is better attuned to a world of concrete and complex problems as opposed to the sometimes debilitating disciplinary divisions of academia.

**Colonialism, uneven development and post-colonialism**

The origins of both D/d development lie in the colonial period. Industrialisation in Europe was funded to a great extent from the profits of these overseas activities while the growth of wealth consequent upon the industrial revolution saw increased demand for tropical luxury goods as well as those used in industrial production. This heightened demand saw more formal colonisation from the 1870s as systems were established for intensive production, which in turn led to the emergence of an international division of labour based around states and nationally-centred MNCs (Hirst and Thompson 1996). Ideologically, the colonial mission was justified through a twin movement of protecting the competitiveness of the metropole viz-a-viz other imperial powers, but also as a necessary process of enlightening the peoples of the Tropics. The colonies thus became national property to be nurtured and milked of their surplus yet tied to a discourse of modernity which promised to bring civilization and religion to the ‘savages’.

In terms of the double-movement of D/d development the periphery fulfilled a number of functions. First and foremost it was a source of cheap raw materials as well as a market for manufactured goods. In terms of disciplining labour the prosperity generated by colonialism was a way of placating the working classes in the developed core while the colonies could be a sink for surplus labour, thereby ameliorating the tensions generated by the unemployment. At a politico-cultural level nationalist and racist ideologies created ‘others’ which was a means of cementing working class solidarity at home. Concomitantly this primary affinity to ones fellow countryman or woman undermined international labour solidarity. And despite overbearing economic motives there was undoubtedly a hegemonic role in the acquisition of colonies as a means of cementing global dominion.

Crucially for understanding the origins of development and trusteeship, the colonial state was established in order to facilitate economic exploitation and maintain order. In this sense its role was more functionalist than any state form before or since. As Young (1994: 75) observes of colonialism in Africa “African societies were to encounter a colonial master equipped with doctrines of domination and capacities for the exercise of rule that went far beyond those available in earlier times and other places”. The initial conquest required strong coercion but force had diminishing returns so that other means of promoting hegemony were required.
In terms of territorial boundaries colonial dominions were often built up in piecemeal fashion and both the colonial and post-colonial states were faced with problems of political integrity (Davidson 1992). Not only were state forms imported but also languages and other cultural vestiges that 'colonised the mind' and reinforced the political and economic subordination. Not surprisingly given the economic imperative and lack of legitimacy these political structures were centralised, leading to what Mamdani (1996) labels the 'decentralised despotism' of the colonial state. For Mamdani, this "crystallized a state-enforced separation, of the rural from the urban and of one ethnicity from another...two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority. Urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture" (Mamdani, 1996: 8 & 18). This model was decentralised insofar as it empowered local elites with the colonial district commissioner exercising a high degree of local discretion, while preaching a discourse of local community.

The early phases of colonialism were concerned with repression and consolidation whereas the mature colonies saw high rates of urbanisation as land was gradually given over to production. These changes were accompanied by a change in colonial ideology centred on development. Britain's 1929 Colonial Development and Welfare Act enshrined the idea of development as way of placating and sanitising (literally) the growing urban populations. The contradictions of colonialism threw up varied political responses. Therefore, the concern with development and other seemingly philanthropic acts was stimulated by an emerging political threat and recognition of the colonial project's weakness. Phillips asserts that the inability to overcome entrenched socio-economic structures and the rise of nationalist opposition was disadvantageous to capitalist accumulation. She notes that,

"widespread acceptance of development as a legitimate objective, and the subsequent acknowledgement of a responsibility on the part of the advanced countries for aiding this process, can be interpreted initially as no more than a response to the political crises of the colonised countries. But this in no way undermines the argument that the development initiative was necessary as a means to overcoming obstacles to the further accumulation of capital" (1977:17)

This contradiction saw numerous forms of resistance ranging from hidden acts of defiance, to guerrilla movements and formalised independence movements. Crucially anti-colonial nationalism concealed other social divisions, particularly the class nature of imperialism. With decolonisation these social divisions became more apparent and once again development emerged as one key discourse attempting to mobilise the nation in order to contain these contradictions.

With the ending of formal colonisation in the period from 1947 to the mid-1960s, control of the world system was achieved via new forms of imperialism which operated, in many respects, at arms length. New forms of US-backed geo-economic governance were put in place through the Bretton Woods Institutions, ideological legitimisation was actively
stoked through the Cold War, and development policy was based around a seemingly benign theory of modernisation and ‘catch up’.

Independence came to Latin America around a century before Asia and Africa, but the region remained tied into imperialist relations. As such it was no coincidence that many of the radical underdevelopment theories should emerge from this region and quickly find resonance among the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia. At independence there was a strong sense of optimism among western-based theoreticians and many leaders of developing countries. This period of what McMichael (2000) terms ‘developmentalism’, from the early 1950s, came on the heels of the relative success of Soviet planning in the inter-war period, the post-war reconstruction of Europe under Marshall Aid and the Bretton Woods conference on international economic co-operation. Learning from these, development economics was founded on the Keynesian rejection of mono-economics and the belief in ‘mutual benefits’ between rich and poor countries, which saw a positive role for aid (Hettne 1995).

In terms of interventions “development necessitated plans, written by economists, and strong, active governments to implement them” (Hettne 1995: 38). This ‘positivist orthodoxy’ hinged on a benevolent state, which acted in the common good and was peopled by impartial, technocratic elites. As Cooke (2003) notes this saw the change from colonial development to a focus on Development Management, with colonial service training centres in the North becoming the new Development Studies departments. Cooke argues that despite this change the essential architecture of intervention did not alter and was still based around notions of trusteeship and ‘knowing best’ what the Third World needed. Crucially the assumption was that proprietary rights would endure after independence so the colonialists were not unduly concerned.

Modernisation theory built on a critique of Keynesianism and focused attention on why development failed to occur given these well conceived theories and supposedly geared up state structures. Modernisation theory was very much an American body of work, richly funded by the US government, reflecting a belief in American superiority and inseparable from the Cold War concerns of the time. It retained teleological models of evolutionary change, but focused on the social and political barriers to self-sustained growth. Given its roots in the classical sociology of Western Europe, where such processes had largely occurred, modernisation theory naturally appeared as a form of Westernisation. The practical ramifications of modernisation theory goes to the heart of the Cold War since it justified concerted investigation of foreign countries and aid budgets targeted at socio-cultural (read ideological) change.

In a perverse way the cold war permitted ruling regimes in the South a degree of autonomy as they could play the superpowers off against one another. However, a country's ability "to exploit such a relationship, or to be damaged by it, depends on various conjunctural factors and agendas which are rarely under their control" (Corbridge 1993:188). For example, India's import substitution industrialisation programme of the 1950s and 1960s was made possible through American food aid subsidising agricultural production, but tied India into a pro-American stance.
Many post-independence regimes espoused a brand of state socialism which had its roots in the centralised nationalist struggles which prevailed especially in English colonies (Davidson 1992). As 'non-alignment' became increasingly impossible as a result of the cold war, anti-imperial political ideologies centred on Marxist-Leninism emerged (Corbridge 1993). With them came discourses of centrality and modernist rational planning which were distilled in import-substitution policies and/or Soviet-style 5-year plans (Conyers and Hills 1984).

Another key discourse inherent in this brand of socialism was development. Following independence the social tensions in many countries became more apparent so national development became one means of attempting to contain them. As legitimacy becomes increasingly threatened,

"the government of a developmentalist state authorises its rule over the association of people who form the state, according to a principle of legitimacy which leads the government to claim that it represents the common interest of the people and is thus concerned with 'national development'" (Rakodi 1986: 435).

Hence, in the early days of independence "the national plan appears to have joined the national anthem and the national flag as a symbol of sovereignty and modernity" (Conyers and Hill 1984: 42). The drawing of a national plan allowed the state to fall back on an authoritative document as a defence against clan-based pressures, it promised future prospects thereby securing compliance in the present, and presented a competent analysis for donors to work around.

However, all such interventions were at the expense of the rural areas and decentralised political administration. While many states were centralised, this centralisation lay in tension with sub-national planning and decision-making. The legacy of Mamdani’s ‘decentralised despotism’, discussed above, conditioned the structure and possibilities of post-colonial planning. For various reasons centralization has been exacerbated by the dependent nature of post-colonial states and the internal logic of their bureaucratic development. In this way spatial planning interventions may, as Samoff (1979) notes with respect to Tanzania, “be understood as the self-protective reaction of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to challenges to its power and economic base" (p.55). Hence, Slater (1989) shows how decentralisation within post-colonial states functions as a form of rule. First, where territorial disaggregation threatens national integration the response very often was to "control local government by strict legislation and through the new politicized structure of the district administration" (Subramaniam, 1980, p.586), since it factionalizes and fragments political opposition. This usually involved placing political appointees in key positions in local government and ensuring elected members complied with party policy. Second, as Boone (2003) shows regimes often promoted development programs that notionally built upon local energies because this absolves them of responsibility for welfare provision while earning political capital by apparently being sensitive to local issues. Longer standing ministerial hierarchies have also contested devolution of power.
and sought to maintain control of key resources, which as will see has been a key feature of the attempts under structural adjustment to by-pass the central state.

But despite this centralised manipulation of decentralised planning, it failed as a development strategy for more local reasons. One is due to local patronage and elite structures. For example, in Uganda’s decentralization program Francis and James (2003) identify the patronage outcomes of decentralization in which the limited fiscal resources passing through local government are contested by the locally powerful. Such ‘elite capture’ (Crook and Manor 1998) strengthens local governance in their favor. A further factor in the failure of decentralized planning, and one that the participatory approaches discussed below ostensibly address, is that the impoverished who are the intended targets of interventions have little time and energy for becoming involved in local politics and are skeptical anyway given the legacies of colonial divide and rule. Finally, there is the weak capacity of much sub-national government, although this speaks of the political mis-use of decentralization which promises much, yet never really devolves resources to localities (Crook and Sverrisson 2001).

The Second World War marked the triumph of US hegemony and with it a set of institutions for managing global relations. The Bretton Woods System was established at an international summit in 1944 and sought to build a system for managing the global economy following the rivalries which had, in part, precipitated the Second World War. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up as a central fund which member countries paid into and could then draw upon in times of balance of payment disequilibria. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), more commonly known as the World Bank, was also established to assist in post-War reconstruction and financed sectoral programmes or discrete infrastructure projects.

The Bretton Woods system worked reasonably well throughout 1950s and 1960s, but began to break down in the 1970s when the international regulation of exchange rates was abandoned for flexible, market rates which coincided with the deregulation of international banking and the oil boom of the 1970s (Hirst and Thompson 1996). This meant that creditworthy countries could borrow money privately to finance their deficits and fund development projects. During this period the Bretton Woods Institutions, especially the IMF, lost much of their raison d'être and were restructured and re-oriented towards being 'development' institutions (Mohan et al 2000).

The oil crises, debt and disciplinary neo-liberalism
The neo-liberal counter-revolution of the late 1970s and 1980s was based intellectually on a refutation of Keynesian theory and a hard-to-deny realpolitik about the venal nature of political regimes in the global south. In analyzing the spread of neo-liberalism Peck and Tickell (2002) make the case for a process–based analysis of “neoliberalization”, arguing that the transformative and adaptive capacity of this political–economic project has been repeatedly underestimated. Amongst other things, this calls for a close reading of the historical and geographical (re)constitution of the process of neoliberalization and of the variable ways in which different "local neoliberalisms" are embedded within wider networks and structures of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism operates at multiple scales and
more attention needs to be paid to the different variants of neoliberalism, to the hybrid nature of contemporary policies and programmes and to the multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques and subjects.

While the Cold War lasted until the late 1980s changes were already afoot which signalled its demise and the apparent ‘triumph’ of liberal capitalism. In the early 1970s labour unrest in the core capitalist countries was rife and the power of the unions was seen as excessive. At the same time the oil-producing states in the Middle-East formed OPEC, whose oil price rises precipitated a period of recession that fuelled the labour unrest. The price rises and recession hit the developing world hard as the markets for their raw materials declined and their oil bills increased. What was an oil crisis for many was a wind-fall for the oil producers who had excess revenue. These so-called ‘petrodollars’ needed to be put to use and so at a time when the Bretton Woods System began to break down there was a great deal of cheap credit available to developing countries which needed to shore themselves up against their own recessions and to stave of legitimacy crises. Debate exists about the efficacy of this lending, but it turned even sourer when interest rates rose sharply in the late 1970s and ushered in the debt crisis for most developing countries.

Hence, from the late-1970s, a period of restructuring began which was premised upon the state strategies of Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganomics in the USA. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc a decade later, the way was open for a new form of political and economic hegemony, based around a logic of capitalism, a discourse of neo-liberalism and a politics of thin multilateralism among a handful of powerful liberal states (Agnew and Corbridge 1995). This was known as the ‘Washington Consensus’. For its architects, the key was not the oil crisis itself, but the erroneous way that most developing countries had responded. Rather than opening up to world market competition, they looked inward via various import-substituting mechanisms, heavy borrowing and a swathe of inflation-inducing measures. From this analysis, the conclusion ran that developing economies must become more externally-oriented and, concomitantly, freed from malevolent dirigisme.

The Structural Adjustment Programmes which followed sought to correct these 'market distorting' problems by seeking to remove the state from as many areas of economic life as possible. The pressing need to stem the balance of payments problem and begin debt repayment meant that revenue generation and cutting expenditure were paramount. The policies which flowed from this involved the privatisation of State Owned Enterprises, the introduction of user charges for state services, and a variety of civil service reforms.

In the process of adjustment the state was restructured since de-regulation of markets entails the re-regulation of political space which leans towards authoritarianism. Contrary to the zero-sum 'state or market' model some parts of the state were strengthened while others were trimmed. In general during adjustment the presidential and executive branches of the state took over much of the decision-making which was bolstered by the repressive power of the military. In such cases conservative-technocratic politicians became leaders with the business class and the middle classes providing political support.
For example, in Cote d'Ivoire President Houphouet Boigny clamped down so heavily on opposition parties that a situation arose of "multi-partyism without opposition" (Aribisala 1994: 140).

In addition there was the problem of institutional capacity in terms of implementing development initiatives. Under neoliberal regimes we saw a small, technocratic clique generally placed in the finance ministries that 'formulated' policy in collaboration with World Bank and IMF officials. Hutchful's analysis of Ghana concluded "What has emerged in Accra is a parallel government controlled (if not created) by the lender agencies" (1989: 122). This lack of accountability contradicted the calls for transparency and democracy in the liberalisation process and persists today under the second generation structural adjustment programmes (Hickey and Mohan 2008).

The one-size-fits-all neo-liberal approach tends to underestimate the variations within and between states and regimes in less developed countries. At a theoretical level this led the neo-liberals to re-state their argument, but added insights which complicated their position without radically altering it. For example, social capital theories brought questions of political culture to the fore, but only insofar as it contributes to capitalist democracy (Fine 2001). More problematically, the actual implementation of adjustment programmes ran head-long into the political realities of diverse countries. The state institutions through which de-regulation was taking place were also part of the political apparatus which stood to lose power to markets and therefore fought to protect their position. Some institutional 'weaknesses' were therefore more like filibusterism. It was these broad movements which drove the good governance agenda of the 1990s.

The publication of *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (World Bank 1989) marked a watershed in thinking about governance, both on the African continent and beyond. In the document, the World Bank argued that "political legitimacy and consensus are a precondition for sustainable development" (World Bank 1989: 60). The new governance agenda saw "democracy is a necessary prior or parallel condition of development, not an outcome of it" (Leftwich 1993: 605, original emphasis). This opens the way for a whole range of institutional and democratic reform programmes aimed at getting the politics right in order to bring about economic development. This was a significant change from the early days of the adjustment era where politics and the state were seen as a hindrance.

Neo-liberalism impacted upon sub-national planning in a number of ways. The good governance agenda of the donors included a measure of decentralisation. In the 1970s, decentralization was centered on the public and, to a lesser extent, the voluntary sector. Almost a decade later, and well into the ‘adjustment era’, Rondinelli *et al* (1989) included privatization and deregulation as forms of decentralization. The World Bank’s own policies reflect these trends in which decentralization “should be seen as part of a broader market-surrogate strategy” (World Bank 1983: 23). Since the mid-1980s, then, decentralization became one of the mainstays of the localizing good governance agenda and promoted in a wide range of countries (Crook and Sverrisson 2001, Mohan 1996).
However, neo-liberal policies have for many increased social hardships (Easterley 2006) which led to political tensions; the so-called ‘IMF riots’ of the 1980s and ‘90s being the most visible examples (Walton and Seddon 1994), although the civil war in Sierra Leone in the 1990s has also been blamed in part on the austerity of the economic reforms. In such cases decentralisation can be a means to placate sub-national political tensions by apparently devolving power downwards, but without really liberating resources that might help ameliorate the uneven development which neo-liberalism tended to exacerbate. In Sierra Leone, following the cessation of hostilities, the donors supported a programme to empower local chiefs in an attempt to re-establish political legitimacy, while totally missing the point that the civil war had been a complex response to a social system in which the privilege of the chiefs marginalised young people who went on to become the protagonists in the civil war. In this sense strengthening of local government and increasing fiscal accountability is used as a means of deflecting attention from the fact that these debilitating policy measures were devised and implemented centrally and undemocratically (Slater 1989).

The chieftaincy case in Sierra Leone demonstrates that one upshot of trying to reform the state or by-pass it altogether as obstructing the market was to champion ‘non-state’ actors, most notably civil society organisations in the form of business associations and international NGOs. The motivations for donors and lenders using NGOs was twofold, both revolving around a cynical view of the state and a rather naïve, apolitical view of civil society. The first concerns delivery and efficiency in service provision, the so-called ‘service delivery gap’. Major lenders and donors were wary of using inefficient states to deliver programme funds so they channelled them through the supposedly less corrupt, more efficient and locally-sensitive NGOs. In a parallel to their market philosophy it is better to have inefficient NGOs than inefficient states. The second reason relates to the governance philosophy that strengthening civil society will automatically lead to deepened democracy. However, the idea that the 'local' can become a site for empowerment ignores the ways that the state is able to manipulate and control local politics as we have already seen.

Related to the rise of NGOs is that despite a *de facto* centralisation the donors’ vision of the state included a measure of decentralisation and participation in the building up of civil society. Participation in development became orthodoxy from the mid-1990s onwards, when all the main development agencies had guidelines on how to make development more participatory (e.g. World Bank 1994). The move to Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) at the start of the millennium, based on popular participation and country ‘ownership’ as the major vehicle for development aid and planning, signalled a scaling up of participation from localised projects (Hickey and Mohan 2008).

One of the key messages of participation in development has been that power relations need to be reversed with the development practitioner ‘handing over the stick’ to the participating beneficiaries (Chambers 1997), whereby the former gives control to the latter over the representation of their lifeworlds. At the heart of this epistemological and political reversal is a belief that scientific approaches to finding out the needs of marginalised people are biased against them as they rely on western forms of cognition
and rationality. Practically this means that rather than rely on formal literacy and/or quantitative understandings of the world, preference is given to visual techniques and alternative literacies.

Although the past three decades have seen a neo-liberal attack on statist approaches, there has been an increasing tendency within contemporary development studies to focus on D-development rather than d-development processes of development, in ways that often obscure the underlying politics of development. Following Polanyi (1960) the development of capitalism always disembeds people from their social relations with policy seeking to prevent social break down by the state assuming trusteeship over subject populations in order to contain, maintain, and reembed them around discourses of organic community (Cowen and Shenton 1996). It is here that participation is promoted as a way to reconnect citizens with the much more complex and fragmented political field created by neo-liberal globalisation. Thus participation becomes a populist response to neo-liberalism, which functions ideologically in two ways. First, is the agency versus structure argument in which the promise of agency centred development diverts attention from the structural causes of inequality and marginalisation. Second, discourses of localism, civil society and decentralisation (Schuurman 1997) are part of a neo-liberal move to delegitimise the state as a development actor and concomitantly to engender the freedom-seeking individual, ideally pursuing his/her freedoms through the market.

**Conclusion: South-South development or neo-liberalism without (obvious) imperialism**

So far I have argued that all development studies has been implicated in imperial relations and that much of what appears humanitarian intervention is driven by a need to contain the contradictions of capitalist incorporation for countries and peoples of the global South. In this way much knowledge about development has functioned to legitimise the need for and scope of these D-development interventions while all the time obscuring the causes of these contradictions emanating from d-development. I then periodised these from the colonial to neo-liberal regimes and finished by arguing that recent attempts to ‘devolve’ development are part and parcel of these longer moves to obfuscate the effects of global capitalism.

In the transition from developmentalism to globalism we saw a step-change in the discourses and practices of development policy, even if the over-arching dialectic between D/d development remained valid. In this the central state had been key, but now paradoxically by-passed through Civil Society Organisations and private firms while also being strengthened in some ways. This shows that rather than a zero-sum relationship between state and markets, as some neo-liberals would argue, political power is central to the creation and maintenance of markets. In the global South the donors have been the major vehicle for this institutional process which has created what Harrison (2004) terms ‘governance states’ where donors are embedded at the heart of government through things like direct budget support while all the time espousing a discourse that they are passing the ‘ownership’ of development to the sovereign states they deal with. So, we see decentralisation as part of a strategy seeking to weaken states and normalise the market.
But as Polanyi argued the creation of markets generates a counter-movement which needs to be contained, and here a discourse of localism, community and participation has arisen over the past two decades to help contain some of these negative consequences. Such discourses promise sensitive empowering local decision-making, responsive to revealed ‘needs’. But given that many of the structural causes of poverty remain off the radar and certainly not addressed at a global or national level, then such localism becomes functional to the marketisation agenda as it further fragments and disempowers the poor, again all the time claiming to give them ownership and voice.

In this localising agenda Development Studies is not alone since we see a revived localism in policy discourses in the global North (e.g. Stoker 2004). However, if localism it is to avoid being defensive and ignorant of structural constraints then it needs to be politicised in different ways as argued elsewhere (Hickey and Mohan 2005). First, where participatory planning has had transformative outcomes, it has been promoted as part of a broader project that is at once political and radical, such as in Porto Alegre. Second, such participatory approaches have sought to engage with underlying processes of development rather than remain constrained within the frame of specific interventions. For example, in the case of Kerala participation is tied to a state level programme of social justice that privileges social development. Third, each approach is characterised by an explicit focus on participation as citizenship, aiming to transform politics in ways that progressively alter the processes of inclusion that operate within particular political communities, and which govern the opportunities for individuals and groups to claim their rights to participation and resources.
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