Tanasescu, Vlad and Domingue, John
(2008).
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| URL: | http://en.scientificcommons.org/47680853 |
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| Google Scholar: | Look up in Google Scholar |
Abstract
The goal of General Spatial Intelligence is to present a unified theory to support the various aspects of spatial experience, whether physical or cognitive. We acknowledge the fact that GIScience has to assume a particular worldview, resulting from specific positions regarding metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, mind, language, cognition and representation. Implicit positions regarding these domains may allow solutions to isolated problems but often hamper a more encompassing approach. We argue that explicitly defining a worldview allows the grounding and derivation of multi-modal models, establishing precise problems, allowing falsifiability. We present an example of such a theory founded on process metaphysics, where the ontological elements are called differences. We show that a worldview has implications regarding the nature of space and, in the case of the chosen metaphysical layer, favours a model of space as true spacetime, i.e. four-dimensionality. Finally we illustrate the approach using a scenario from psychology and AI based planning.
| Item Type: | Conference Item |
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| Copyright Holders: | 2008 The Authors |
| Academic Unit/Department: | Faculty of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) > Knowledge Media Institute (KMi) Faculty of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) |
| Interdisciplinary Research Centre: | Centre for Research in Computing (CRC) |
| Item ID: | 24462 |
| Depositing User: | Kay Dave |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Nov 2010 11:19 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Aug 2016 16:57 |
| URI: | http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/24462 |
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