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|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X02340123|
|Google Scholar:||Look up in Google Scholar|
Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he argues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Copyright Holders:||2002 Cambridge University Press|
|Keywords:||conscious thought; cross-modular thought; modularity; nonconscious thought|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Arts > Philosophy
|Depositing User:||Keith Frankish|
|Date Deposited:||09 Jun 2006|
|Last Modified:||24 Feb 2016 04:02|
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