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Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought

Frankish, Keith (2002). Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(6) pp. 685–686.

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Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he argues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech.

Item Type: Journal Article
Copyright Holders: 2002 Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 1469-1825
Keywords: conscious thought; cross-modular thought; modularity; nonconscious thought
Academic Unit/Department: Arts > Philosophy
Item ID: 2264
Depositing User: Keith Frankish
Date Deposited: 09 Jun 2006
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2016 03:39
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