Frankish, Keith
(2007).
| URL: | http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463... |
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| DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: | https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm523 |
| Google Scholar: | Look up in Google Scholar |
Abstract
This paper defends direct activism – the view that it is possible to form beliefs in a causally direct way. In particular, it addresses the charge that direct activism entails voluntarism – the thesis that we can form beliefs at will. It distinguishes weak and strong varieties of voluntarism and argues that, while direct activism may entail the weak variety, it does not entail the strong one. The paper goes on to argue that strong voluntarism is non-contingently false, sketching a new argument for that conclusion. This argument does not tell against the weak form of voluntarism, however, and the final part of the paper argues that weak voluntarism, and consequently direct activism, remains a coherent and defensible position.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| ISSN: | 0026-4423 |
| Keywords: | Belief; deciding to believe; direct activism; doxastic voluntarism |
| Academic Unit/School: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > History, Religious Studies, Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) |
| Item ID: | 2258 |
| Depositing User: | Keith Frankish |
| Date Deposited: | 29 May 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2016 09:46 |
| URI: | http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/2258 |
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