How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts

Frankish, Keith (2009). How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2) pp. 145–146.

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DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09000636
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Abstract

Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.

Item Type:	Journal Item
Copyright Holders:	2009 Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	1469-1825
Academic Unit/School:	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > History, Religious Studies, Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
Item ID:	22117
Depositing User:	Jean Fone
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2010 08:51
Last Modified:	13 Aug 2017 03:49
URI:	http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/22117
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