Frankish, Keith
(2009).
How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2),
pp. 145–146.
Full text available as:
Abstract
Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
| Item Type: |
Journal Article
|
| Copyright Holders: |
2009 Cambridge University Press |
| ISSN: |
0140-525X |
| Academic Unit/Department: |
Arts > Philosophy |
| Item ID: |
22117 |
| Depositing User: |
Jean Fone
|
| Date Deposited: |
29 Jun 2010 08:51 |
| Last Modified: |
25 Oct 2012 06:43 |
| URI: |
http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/22117 |
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