Frankish, Keith (2009). How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2), pp. 145–146.
Full text available as:
![[img]](http://oro.open.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
| PDF (Version of Record) - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader Download (625Kb) | Preview |
| DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: | http://dx.doi.org/doi:1017/S0140525X09000636 |
|---|---|
| Google Scholar | Look up in Google Scholar |
Abstract
Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright Holders: | 2009 Cambridge University Press |
| ISSN: | 0140-525X |
| Academic Unit/Department: | Arts > Philosophy |
| Item ID: | 22117 |
| Depositing User: | Jean Fone |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Jun 2010 09:51 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Dec 2010 14:04 |
| URI: | http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/22117 |
| Repository Staff Only: edit this item | |
| Public: Report issue/request change | |