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How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts

Frankish, Keith (2009). How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2) pp. 145–146.

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Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.

Item Type: Journal Article
Copyright Holders: 2009 Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 1469-1825
Academic Unit/Department: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > History, Religious Studies, Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
Item ID: 22117
Depositing User: Jean Fone
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2010 08:51
Last Modified: 05 Oct 2016 12:42
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