The anti-zombie argument

Frankish, Keith (2007). The anti-zombie argument. Philosophical Quarterly, 57(229) pp. 650–666.

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DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:	http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x
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Abstract

The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non-physicalist view of consciousness. This paper seeks to turn the tables on defenders of the argument ('zombists') by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. The argument invokes what I call anti-zombies – purely physical creatures that are nonetheless conscious. I show that, using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti-zombies to the truth of physicalism. l go on to defend the claim that anti-zombies are conceivable and to argue that the anti-zombie argument can be defeated only at the cost of rendering the zombie argument itself redundant. The moral of the paper is that dualists should not be zombists.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Copyright Holders:	2007 The Author
ISSN:	0031-8094
Keywords:	consciousness; zombie argument; zombies; conceivability; physicalism; property dualism
Academic Unit/Department:	Arts > Philosophy
Item ID:	2191
Depositing User:	Keith Frankish
Date Deposited:	29 May 2007
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2012 20:24
URI:	http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/2191

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