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Frankish, Keith
(2007).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x
Abstract
The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non-physicalist view of consciousness. This paper seeks to turn the tables on defenders of the argument ('zombists') by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. The argument invokes what I call anti-zombies – purely physical creatures that are nonetheless conscious. I show that, using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti-zombies to the truth of physicalism. l go on to defend the claim that anti-zombies are conceivable and to argue that the anti-zombie argument can be defeated only at the cost of rendering the zombie argument itself redundant. The moral of the paper is that dualists should not be zombists.
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 2191
- Item Type
- Journal Item
- ISSN
- 0031-8094
- Keywords
- consciousness; zombie argument; zombies; conceivability; physicalism; property dualism
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) - Copyright Holders
- © 2007 The Author
- Depositing User
- Keith Frankish