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|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x|
|Google Scholar:||Look up in Google Scholar|
The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non-physicalist view of consciousness. This paper seeks to turn the tables on defenders of the argument ('zombists') by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. The argument invokes what I call anti-zombies – purely physical creatures that are nonetheless conscious. I show that, using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti-zombies to the truth of physicalism. l go on to defend the claim that anti-zombies are conceivable and to argue that the anti-zombie argument can be defeated only at the cost of rendering the zombie argument itself redundant. The moral of the paper is that dualists should not be zombists.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Copyright Holders:||2007 The Author|
|Keywords:||consciousness; zombie argument; zombies; conceivability; physicalism; property dualism|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Arts > Philosophy
|Depositing User:||Keith Frankish|
|Date Deposited:||29 May 2007|
|Last Modified:||23 Feb 2016 19:45|
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