Frankish, Keith (2004). Mind and supermind. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term ‘belief’ refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception, and first-person authority. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists.
|Item Type:||Authored Book|
|Keywords:||action; acceptance; akrasia; autism; belief; belief and acceptance; belief-desire psychology; Bayesian challenge; Bayesianism; behaviourism; concept possession; conceptual modularity; conscious thought; dual-process theory; eliminativism; first-person authority; flat-out belief; folk psychology; functionalism; intention; Joycean machine; language and thought; occurrent thought; opinion; partial belief; policy adoption; premising; propositional modularity; reasons and causes; reasoning; self-deception; supermind; voluntarism|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Arts > Philosophy|
|Depositing User:||Keith Frankish|
|Date Deposited:||07 Jun 2006|
|Last Modified:||02 Dec 2010 19:46|
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