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For a long time British success in Malaya seemed to show how insurgency could be defeated by Western-led forces, even in inhospitable terrain. The campaign was plundered for ‘lessons’ – for Vietnam in particular. After Vietnam was lost, however, critics argued that Malaya was a special case which did not offer transferable ‘lessons’ An analysis of the general principles underlying British success in Malaya can nevertheless still provide important policy implications for Afghanistan.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Copyright Holders:||2009 The Author|
|Keywords:||Afghanistan; counterinsurgency; Malaya; emergency|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > History, Religious Studies, Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
|Depositing User:||Karl Hack|
|Date Deposited:||02 Dec 2009 14:39|
|Last Modified:||05 Oct 2016 09:28|
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