Environmental ethics

Book Chapter


For guidance on citations see FAQs

© 2009 Zed Books and The Open University
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://www.zedbooks.co.uk/book.asp?bookdetail=4295

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page.

oro.open.ac.uk
Reynolds highlights three dimensions of environmental ethics – normative, philosophical and political – in the context of a long-standing controversial development initiative for dam constructions in the Narmada river valley in India. In discussing these three dimensions, he promotes the importance of environmental ethics in fostering responsible development intervention. A version of this reading can be found in Environment, Development and Sustainability in the 21st Century: Perspectives and cases from around the world, edited by Gordon Wilson, Pam Furniss and Richard Kimbowa (2009), published by the Open University and Oxford University Press, for which the reading was originally commissioned.

Introduction

More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly. – Woody Allen, American humorist, quoted in Westley et al. (2006: 90)

Humour often provides respite in a perceived world of intractable dilemmas. Local issues such as access to clean water or availability of food can be driven by, as well as contribute to, global issues such as climate change and the global economy. Take for example the issues around constructing large-scale dams. The Narmada Dam Project in India is one of the longest-standing development and environmental controversies of its kind (see Figure 1). Box 1 summarises the history and some key issues. These issues are complex and they also generate some questions of responsibility.

The conflicts are formidable. Large-scale dam construction like other big socio-economic developments such as air-travel expansion have been subject to criticism, both through extensive consultant reporting and strong activism and protest. But often there is a sense of inevitability about such projects. Decisions appear to be made through some inescapable march of so-called progress. So perhaps Woody Allen is right to be cynical. But cynicism belies a wealth of opportunities for seeing and doing things differently.

An ethical outlook on such issues can help to realise such opportunities. For example, looking behind Woody Allen’s acerbic observation, some basic ethical questions might be asked to reveal areas of responsibility that need to be and can be managed more constructively.

1 What are the particular issues that need attention? Does global warming deserve more attention than longer standing issues of abject poverty in the world? Or should we just despair at the magnitude and complexity of issues confronting us?

2 How might these issues be attended to and by whom? Is it just ‘them’ out there or is it also you/me/‘us’? Or should we just resort to fatalism, nurturing a general sense of apathy and blame?

3 Why are some issues privileged more than others, and some ways of dealing with them prioritised over others? What opportunities are there for challenging mainstream ways of dealing with harmfulness and wrongdoing? Or should we just remain cynical of human nature and the prospects to realise alternative ways of doing things?

Despair, apathy and cynicism are all too prevalent in modern society. Moreover they are human attributes sometimes encouraged by those with an interest in keeping things as they are – contributing to vicious cycles of business-as-usual and the type of eco-social collapse invoked by cynics. In what follows I’ll use each of the three sets of questions above in turn to explain how ideas from environmental ethics can help guide more purposeful engagement with environment and development dilemmas. The Narmada Dam Project is used to ground the discussion.
**Despair? Issues and values: normative ethics**

Ethics concern contrasting questions of ‘is’ with questions of ‘ought’. This is sometimes referred to as normative ethics. The ‘is’ comprises a descriptive world of *issues* that are experienced by different stakeholders.

The ‘ought’ comprises a normative world of *values* – often multiple and conflicting – which are used by stakeholders to make judgements on the realities they experience. Many issues relating to environment and development are experienced as complex questions requiring continual attention to value judgements on what ought to be.

So what role do value judgements play? Arguments for and against the Narmada Project can be considered as expressions of *value* judgements: arguments ‘for’ construction based on judgements on what ought to be the outcome, and arguments ‘against’ based on judgements regarding what ought not to be the outcome (Box 2).

One of the key problems arising from any controversial issue is sorting out judgements of ‘fact’ from value judgements. Scientific information on levels of domestic water supply, power generation, agricultural production, estimated numbers of poor and underprivileged communities being dispossessed of their livelihood, and ecological impacts, are vital. However, professed levels of impact, both positive and negative, are often contested even amongst scientists. ‘Fact’ and value are inextricably linked. So being aware of accompanying value judgements is also very important. Ethics makes values explicit. Box 3 provides an understanding of different types of value and different perspectives.

Arguments in support of the Narmada Dam Project can be said to have an anthropocentric perspective with a dominant, instrumental value judgement on water as a resource. Few would deny this as an important value judgement, particularly in a context of poor access to clean water. From a more ecocentric perspective, claims are made of providing flood protection for ecosystems, and offering compensation to support sanctuaries for endangered species.

Anthropocentric arguments can also be made against the project. The displacement of communities, loss of livelihood, and diminished access to water amongst vulnerable groups are particularly significant. The possible loss of biodiversity through deforestation and increased salinisation will have aesthetic disadvantages which can also be factored in from an anthropocentric perspective. Many of the arguments against such projects, however, derive from a more ecocentric perspective, bringing attention to wider and longer term ecological impacts.

But values and perspectives are not fixed entities. They vary and develop according to the context and time in which they are applied. This is evident with the Narmada case study. As time has moved on, protest around Narmada has become symbolic of a global concern for how we engage with nature and the long-term consequences. Environmental ethics helps to explain such changes in terms of different types of value judgements.

---

**Box 1 Narmada Dam Project**

The Narmada Dam Project in India involves the construction of 30 large, 135 medium and 3000 small dams to exploit the waters of the river Narmada and its tributaries for better irrigated agricultural practice to produce more food, and the generation of hydroelectric power. The idea was first conceived in the 1940s by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, but it was not until 1979 that the project took form. Of the 30 large dams, Sardar Sarovar is the largest and most controversial. In 1979, the Sardar Sarovar Project was proposed and attracted initial support from international financial institutions including the World Bank. But after much controversy and protest, particularly since the late 1980s, many financial institutions withdrew support. Protest was led by Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), a national coalition movement including people affected by the project, environmental and human rights activists, scientists and academics.

The construction of Sardar Sarovar dam itself was stopped in the mid 1990s. However, in October 2000, the Indian Supreme Court gave a go-ahead again for the construction of the dam. Other dams associated with the wider Narmada project have likewise been developing, come under criticism and have been the subject of protest.

Four general issues can be summarised in relation to the Narmada Project:

- Water access and quality (e.g. water-borne diseases from stagnant reservoir waters)
- Urban and rural economic development (e.g. displaced populations from rural areas)
- Change in agricultural practices (e.g. shift towards large-scale irrigated farming)
- Ecological impacts (e.g. loss of biodiversity in previously rich hydrological systems)

*Source: Friends of River Narmada (2008)*
Box 2 Narmada Dam Project: value judgements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes judged to be good/right/valuable (arguments for construction)</th>
<th>Outcomes judged to be bad/wrong/worthless (arguments against construction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water access and quality</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply water to 30m people including drinking water facilities</td>
<td>Increase prospect of insect-borne diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigate crops to feed another 20m people covering 17,920 km² of land</td>
<td>Inundate areas causing salinisation of land alongside canals through build up of salts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban and rural economic development</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide hydroelectric power</td>
<td>Dispossess large numbers of poor and underprivileged communities of their land as a source of livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve access to electricity in remote villages</td>
<td>Provide inadequate compensation and rehabilitation for resettled people as with previous experiences in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop facilities for sophisticated communication systems in the project areas</td>
<td>Over-estimate power generated and under-estimate likely long-term dependence on private trans-national companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase employment both in construction and post construction maintenance</td>
<td>Prompt excessive profiteering amongst private contractors and possible corruption in dispensing large budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural practice and technological development</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernise agricultural practices using irrigated farming</td>
<td>Lose skills in more sustainable farming practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide irrigation infrastructure for biofuel agricultural production (and other genetically modified crops)</td>
<td>Undermine expert confidence (even the World Bank withdrew from the Narmada project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop fisheries industry</td>
<td>Give false promises regarding main tenance of dams given seemingly disorganised State infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ecological impacts</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect against advancement of desert and provision of flood protection to riverine reaches</td>
<td>Diminish biodiversity through monoculture irrigated farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish wildlife sanctuaries protecting rare species (e.g., Sloth Bear, Wild Ass, Kutch Bustard)</td>
<td>Devastate existing riverine ecosystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submerge current forest farmland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ignore possible long-term impacts (e.g. large reservoirs could cause’ earthquakes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box 3 Values and perspectives on environment and development

Values are an assessment or measure of the worth of something. Two types of value can be distinguished in environmental ethics.

1. **Instrumental** is the value that something has as a means to an end. So money might be good only because it leads to other good things (purchase of ‘goods’). Putting monetary value on environmental ‘goods’, or considering nature in terms of natural ‘resources’, and ecosystem ‘services’, are typical expressions of instrumental value in relation to nature.

2. **Intrinsic** is the value that a thing has ‘in itself,’ or ‘for its own sake,’ or ‘in its own right.’ Money for example is not intrinsically good (unless you are a collector of historic or different currencies) whereas most other goods might arguably be considered as having some intrinsic value. Environmentalism as a social movement in the mid-twentieth century grew from an appreciation of intrinsic value for nature.

A third type of value can be associated with the valuer as against the valued. Here, value is linked with obligations and the boundaries of the *moral community* – who or what is worthy of respect (past, present, future generations? other animals? all living organisms? ecosystems? biosphere? universe? multiverse?)

3. **Personal (or individual)** is the internally held value of the valuer usually attached to character traits such as having ‘integrity’. Behind any value is a valuer with particular perspectives on the world guided by personal values. Two perspectives on the environment based on personal values can be distinguished – anthropocentric and ecocentric.

**Anthropocentric perspective** places humans in a privileged position over nature. An extreme position of anthropocentrism – egocentrism – privileges *individual* humans. Other extremes assume that the destiny of humanity is to conquer and master the forces of nature. Such a perspective assumes that nature is only valuable insofar as humans have a use for it, in terms of human needs (i.e. instrumental valuation).

**Ecocentric perspective** regards human beings as simply one part of a moral community consisting of all living things as well as non-living natural objects (rivers, mountains etc.). Humans no longer occupy a privileged position on top of the moral community.
and perspectives. Environmental ethics therefore help to make sense of arguments for and against a project, and to respond effectively to such arguments using the appropriate language of value and perspective. In short, rather than despair at the complexity of issues arising, environmental ethics provides a handle – a vocabulary around value judgements – for appreciating and dealing with issues more constructively.

So with a means of surfacing value judgements, what guidance might be given towards using those judgements for responsible action?

**Apathy? How to do ethics and be ethical: philosophical ethics**

Whilst *normative* ethics helps in revealing the interplay of value judgements, more specific questions on what to do can draw on traditions of moral philosophy. *Philosophical* ethics is about searching for answers to questions about:

i) *doing what’s good (or harmful)*, and ii) *doing what’s right (or wrong)*

The first question invites consideration of the consequence of a decision and appropriate ways of measuring the consequences. The second invites consideration to the *intention* behind any decision and any particular obligations behind such intention. Table 1 provides some ideas about the kinds of benefit/harm and rights/wrongs that might be looked at in association with each of the four main issues arising from the Narmada Dam Project. (It should be noted that, as with any philosophical abstraction, the categorisation into ‘good’ or ‘right’ is a slightly artificial one and there is not always a clear distinction between them.)

The responses to each question – what’s good and what’s right – in relation to any issue can be contested. For example, on the issue of agricultural practice some might suggest that a more appropriate ‘good’ from an anthropocentric perspective would be to improve intensity of production. Further contestation may arise in privileging one type of question over another. Should a focus on ‘rights’ and obligations be advanced in spite of the effects of action, or vice versa? An obligation to respect nature may for example be inappropriate in circumstances where the effect is to further human impoverishment. Similarly, a focus on maximising human welfare may infringe on the rights of other life-forms to flourish. Reference to value judgements and associated perspectives (Box 2) can help make sense of these conflicts.

Environmental ethics also addresses character attributes around ‘being’ ethical or environmentally responsible. This invokes a third tradition in philosophical ethics drawing upon Western (e.g. Ancient Greek) and Eastern (e.g. Buddhism and Taoism) philosophy:
It would be foolish to pretend that groups with more radicalised anthropocentric and ecocentric perspectives have ‘won’ the battle in Narmada against conventionally dominant economic interests. But it would also be misleading to underestimate the political space nurtured through the engagement of environmental ethics with social and political theory, policy advisors, and activist groupings.

**Summary**

Environmental ethics can provide support towards seemingly intractable questions of environmental responsibility that otherwise can lead to despair, apathy and cynicism. An understanding of normative values and perspectives – normative ethics – can help surmount a sense of despair. Practice in thinking about doing what’s good, doing what’s right, and being responsible – philosophical ethics – can help to overcome apathy.
And cynicism needs to be continually checked through creating space for engaging more passionately with normative and philosophical ethics. Vandana Shiva provides a helpful riposte to cynicism:

The big transformations always seem to move in the direction of destruction. But if you look at the small actions, the hundreds of people saying ‘I will speak against human rights violations, I will be part of the voice’; at the thousands of farmers who work with us who have created an alternative agriculture in spite of the dominant policy; that’s where change is happening, and that change will continue to grow. (Vandana Shiva in Davis 2008: 29)

Shiva surfaces three important virtues: Hope in countering the despair of real world violations; purposefulness in countering an understandable apathy of a farming community subjected to industrialised agricultural policy; and trust in countering the cynicism that change to business-as-usual is unattainable due to ‘human nature’. Environmental ethics alone is not ‘the’ answer, but it can provide precious support in guiding and keeping alive the right questions.

References