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|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||http://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819108000818|
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I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and ‘queerness’. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn (about supervenience) and J.L. Mackie (about motivation). The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Arts > Philosophy
|Depositing User:||Colin Smith|
|Date Deposited:||22 Apr 2009 14:26|
|Last Modified:||24 Feb 2016 01:50|
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