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Moral perception

Chappell, Timothy (2008). Moral perception. Philosophy, 83(4) pp. 421–437.

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DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: http://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819108000818
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Abstract

I develop an account of moral perception which is able to deal well with familiar naturalistic non-realist complaints about ontological extravagance and ‘queerness’. I show how this account can also ground a cogent response to familiar objections presented by Simon Blackburn (about supervenience) and J.L. Mackie (about motivation). The familiar realist's problem about relativism, however, remains.

Item Type: Journal Article
ISSN: 0031-8191
Academic Unit/Department: Arts > Philosophy
Arts
Item ID: 15809
Depositing User: Colin Smith
Date Deposited: 22 Apr 2009 14:26
Last Modified: 24 Feb 2016 01:50
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/15809
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