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11 The City as the Site of the Social

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Admittedly, the city is difficult to define, and there are three reasons for this: historical, geographical, and theoretical. Each interpreter is embedded in an historical period that provides the perspective from which the city is seen. An Athenian in 594 BCE would likely have seen the city from the dominant perspective of that time – and thus would surely have been quite concerned about the struggle between aristocrats and peasants. As soon as there are epochal changes, however, the grounds shift and perspectives change. That same Athenian would have seen the city quite differently in 322 BCE and been for less certain about the meaning of being Athenian when the ancient Greek city began losing its identity. Imagine the city as seen during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Europe. A ‘European’ would certainly expect some form of corporate existence, as symbolized by a charter and guildhall, and perhaps a territorial jurisdiction, symbolized most typically by an encircling wall. By the eighteenth century, however, that European would have been astonished to observe that most cities had lost their charters and their walls had crumbled away. Meanwhile, our trusty Athenian, who would most likely have been searching for some form of citizenship to define the city, would have been astounded by the city of seventeenth-century Europe by its lack of citizenship. Seeing all this from our own epoch, what qualities or properties would we say define the city as such? Historical variations create difficulties in defining the city.

The variations, however, are not only attributable to historical epochs, for there are significant differences across geographies within any given epoch. Returning to our Athenian, in 594 BCE she or he certainly would have recognized Sparta as a city, but as a different kind of
city from Athens. The European in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries would have understood the profound differences between Lübeck and Padua. Expanding the scope towards ancient Mayan cities, if indeed the inhabitants of Tikal knew about Teotihuacán, they would have considered Tikal to be a very different city from Teotihuacán. Similarly, there is no reason to imagine that someone of Nara, in eighth-century Japan, would have seen Bianzhou, in China, as similar (Southall 1998).

While describing the difficulties of defining the city and some historical and geographical problem in doing so, we are nonetheless at the same referring to an entity that is called 'the city.' While arguing difficulties of definition, we seem to hold an understanding of the city as such. How is this possible? That brings us to the theoretical reasons for the difficulty of defining the city. The assumption so far has been that in each epoch or region there was a unified understanding of the city and that the variations were across these epochs and regions. That assumption must now be called into question. In any given historical and geographical moment of the city, identified as ancient Athens during the reign of Cleisthenes, say, or Bianzhou during the T’ang Dynasty, the city actually remained indefinable because of the contesting and contestable perspectives from which to define it. The Athens of Cleisthenes is difficult to define because Athens itself was an object of struggle among oligarchs, warriors, tyrants, and peasants (Lévi-Adam and Vidal-Naquet 1964). Each and any combination thereof would produce a particular viewpoint on the events and forces defining the city at that moment. The accounts that we have inherited bear all the marks of these struggles. According to such accounts, Bianzhou during the T’ang Dynasty was an object of struggle at least between aristocrats and bureaucrats (Heng 1999). It is not possible to inherit an account that will have somehow jumped outside history, and it is impossible to jump outside our own history. This double articulation—investment of accounts that we have inherited and our own investment in those accounts—constitutes a theoretical perspective from which we see the city and that theoretical perspective is impossibly partial and invariably fragmented.

Yet, just because the city is difficult to define for these historical, geographical, and theoretical reasons does not mean that we have not attempted to understand the city as such. Indeed, the city as such has been defined as 'war machine,' 'space of citizenship,' 'cradle of democracy,' 'dense and heterogeneous settlement,' 'space of accumulation,' 'text,' 'sign' and so on. These 'as such' conceptions represent both the need to impose an order on cities and also a unified understanding of what is impossibly partial and invariably fragmented— the city. That our understandings are partial and fragmented does not mean that they are without value. It does, however, mean that often the failure to recognize their partiality, either by the producers or users of these concepts, results in misunderstanding their limits. Yet, the question remains: despite these difficulties, how do we understand the city as such? Three modern scholars of the city, Fustel de Coulanges, Max Weber, and Lewis Mumford, each in his own way, struggled to hold an understanding of the city as such. What unites them is the struggle itself and the distinction they made between the city as civitas (virtual) and as urbs (actual).

Civitas and Urbs

Fustel was the first modern scholar to make a distinction between civitas and urbs. It is not that he believed he was the first. His argument was that this distinction was inherent in Greek and Roman thought. Fustel identified civitas as the religious and political association of families and tribes (1864: 126ff), while urbs was the actual place of assembly, the dwelling place and, above all, the sanctuary. For Fustel the ancients were deliberate and consistent in making this distinction, and they never reduced civitas to urbs. What is the importance of this distinction? The ancients maintained their belief in the existence of the city as an association, even if it did not have a corresponding spatial form to it. But the city's existence as association was much more than symbolic or 'ideal.' Because of this fundamental difference, Fustel believed that we could not infer the city as such from its spatial characteristics like concentration, arrangements, and elements of its buildings, bridges, and walls. Fustel investigated the city as both civitas and urbs.

Fustel considered the essence of the city to be 'religious.' When various tribes agreed to 'unite' and have the same worship, they founded the city as a sanctuary for this common worship. We may well disagree with Fustel, but his distinction between civitas and urbs points to the recognition of the difficulty of defining the city if we reduce various properties of the city to its definition or deduce its definition from those various properties. This distinction recognizes that the city cannot be defined by the properties of various cities but that the city as such can be grasped. But then what do we do when we disagree with
an interpretation of the city and yet agree that it cannot be revealed merely by properties of various cities? On what basis can we have a dialogue on the city as such?

Max Weber (1909, 1921) tackled this problem with his analytical tool, the 'ideal type,' which recognizes that concepts are heuristic devices to order various empirical materials. Weber (1909: 385) argued that 'a genuinely analytic study comparing the stages of development of the ancient polis with those of the medieval city would be welcome and productive ... Of course ... such a comparative study would not aim at finding "analogies" and "parallels," as is done by those engrossed in the currently fashionable enterprise of constructing general schemes of development. The aim should, rather, be precisely the opposite: to identify and define the individuality of each development, the characteristics which made the one conclude in a manner so different from that of the other. This done, one can then determine the causes which led to these differences.' Here Weber was clearly opposed to the collection of comparative empirical data to fill a universal and development scheme. More emphatically, Weber (1921) insisted that specific qualities such as the presence of the wall or the autonomous administration of autonomous lawmaking couldn't be taken as qualities that define the city as such. It is evident that Weber saw the question of defining the city to be different from the question of developing ideal types. While developing various typologies of the city such as 'consumer city,' 'producer city,' Weber still insisted that these do not define the city but provided heuristic concepts with which to develop interpretations. If these types did not define the city as such, how did Weber define the city?

Weber used the distinction that Fustel emphasized between civitas and urbs and argued that the city was not only an association but it had developed a collective identity represented and embodied by citizenship (Weber 1921: 1243). The city was the city only insofar as it developed, cultivated, and made possible a legal and political status of belonging, that is, citizenship. It is in that sense that Weber argued that only the occidental city could be called the city since the oriental city lacked a corporate identity embodied in citizenship. For Weber the occidental city as such was citizenship. Although Weber can be questioned about this distinction between the occidental and oriental city (Isin 2002b), his theoretical insistence is unmistakable: while it is difficult to define the city by comparing empirical properties, it is still possible, if not worthwhile, to understand the city as such.

In *City in History*, Lewis Mumford (1961) maintained a Weberian understanding of the essence of the city as citizenship. He also used the distinction made by Fustel between civitas and urbs. Moreover, Mumford also implicitly endorsed the Weberian distinction between the occidental and oriental city, associating the latter with oriental despotism. (We don't need to deal with sociological orientalism here.) Thus, Mumford argued, the modern occidental city had resuscitated the despotic and oriental city by reducing citizens to subjects. His portrayal of the metropolis and megapolis in *City in History* maintained his basic typology in *The Culture of Cities* (1938). Mumford was able to see the emerging outlines of the megapolis because of his insistence on the essence of the city as civitas rather than a focus on urbs. Mumford (1961) was critical of Louis Wirth (1938), who in his view, attempted to deduce civitas from urbs.

What Fustel, Weber, and Mumford demonstrate is not the difficulty of defining the city but the significance of focusing on its essence in a *longue durée* history. If indeed the essence of the city is citizenship, as Weber argued, then the question remains whether the occidental city is the only city that can claim to have invented citizenship, as Weber also argued, or that the oriental city can also make an alternative claim. The answer to that question will unfold only through civilizational *longue durée* histories.

What I draw from Fustel, Weber, and Mumford is the distinction they made between civitas and urbs. When we speak about 'the city' often what we invoke is civitas. When we speak about cities we often invoke their specific characteristics. While civitas and urbs are irreducible to each other, they are also co-dependent: we cannot understand one without the other. I am convinced that the problem of civitas and urbs that Fustel, Weber, and Mumford articulated is akin to the philosophical problem of ontological difference as developed by Heidegger and taken up by Deleuze as the difference between the virtual and the actual (see Isin 2007). When we speak about 'cities' we refer to actual places. Clearly, 'the city' incorporates what we know about specific cities but it is somehow not reducible to them. Put another way, the city is more than the sum of its parts (cities).

This chapter argues for theorizing the city as such as the site of the social. If we are recasting the social in citizenship, the city cannot be a background or foreground of our investigations but it must be the ground on which citizenship is reconstituted. We now need to discuss some basic ideas about conceptualizing the city as such as the site of the social. We then need a brief history (or more accurately historical ontology) of the city to
illustrate two essential rights: rights of the city and rights to the city. Then we can draw some practical conclusions for policy and politics and juxtapose the idea of ‘local’ citizenship (rights of the city) against ‘translocal’ citizenship (rights to the city).

The City as the Site of the Social

Understanding the city as such is always under the shadow of Aristotle. (Politics is about the city as the site of the social despite the ideological translation of polis as ‘the state’ in modern languages.) Aristotle arrives at the essence of ‘man’ as being political by interpreting the ‘constituents’ of various cities. His focus is on the city as a site that makes things possible rather than as a space in which things happen. The city is the site of the social insofar as it enables the social formation of citizens as rights-claimants (capable of being governed and to govern). Yet, as Arendt (1951) argued, the social and political mean radically different things for ancients and moderns. How does the modern city enable the social formation of rights-claimants capable of articulating rights? How does the modern city, for example, enable the formation of a subject who demands access to public places for people with disabilities? How does the city cultivate a subject who demands the right to be in public when wearing a veil or turban or carrying a ceremonial dagger? These may be modern questions but both ancient and modern questions presuppose and produce citizens as rights-claimants, and this is what I want to draw attention to with the city as such.

The city as the site of the social is key to understanding the formation of the kind of political subject that is a citizen who is the nucleus of political life. The city is the site through which the lives of people are organized, assembled together, and rendered meaningful. The city is the site through which socialization into various identities occurs, and it is the site through which individuals develop both their individuality and their sociality. I am using the term through which rather than there to indicate that the conception of the city as the site of the social does not only refer to its actual form with a spatially enclosed structure (urbs) but also includes its virtual form as relations, symbols, imaginaries, representations, categories, ideas, and ideals (civitas). The city is not a container in which social relations happen. I am concerned about the city as a site through which social relations are produced, reproduced, and transformed. This is akin to ‘the city as a difference machine,’ which I developed elsewhere (Isin 2002b). I have aimed to historically demonstrate how the city has been a battleground for various social groups that come into existence through it, and I call that battleground ‘the site of the social’ (cf. Isin 2005, 2007; Schatzki 2002).

It is impossible to develop the idea of citizens as rights-claimants without considering a history of the ancient Greek city and its subsequent Roman, medieval, and early modern variations. In much of that history, citizenship was articulated as belonging to the city and the social and political rights that derived from that belonging. In other words, rights of citizens who belonged to the city were derived from the rights of the city itself. The exact nature and extent of the rights of the city were matters of struggle throughout history up to and including the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While the rights of the city continued to be contested matters in the twentieth century, various social, economic, and political transformations engendered new kinds of rights where claiming rights to the city became dominant modes of inclusion, belonging, and democratic engagement. The difference between rights of the city (involving attributes of loyalty, virtue, civism, discipline, and subsidiarity) and rights to the city (involving attributes of autonomy, appropriation, difference, security) is key to understanding the city as the site that enables the social formation of citizens as rights-claimants (Isin 2000a, 2002b, 2006).

The City and Citizenship

Although it is quite well known, it is worthwhile to visit briefly the historical relationship between citizenship and the city. There are different ways of visiting this relationship, but in my view the scholar who understood this relationship best and moved it to the centre of his thought was Max Weber (1921). By investigating the history of the city ranging from Mesopotamian and Egyptian cities to Chinese and Indian cities, Weber concluded that the associational character of the city was the foundation of citizenship. It was through the city that humans developed their associational dispositions of solidarity and the government that enabled them to develop the city itself as an association. But whereas in Greece and Rome this associational character evolved into the city as a legal corporation, other civilizations such as Indian, Chinese, and Islamic did not manage to transform the city into a legal entity. (The sociological orientalism of this thesis is not our concern here.) Thus, Weber concluded, and it has been the received view ever since, that it was in Greek and Roman cities that the special status of being of
the city emerged: citizenship. In other words, those who have this special status acquire it only by belonging to the city. Other features that are necessary but not sufficient conditions of being citizens such as being male, eighteen years of age, and a warrior would mean nothing if one did not belong to the city. Belonging to the city, and belonging to the city alone, was the necessary condition of being a citizen. Certain virtues of belonging to the city came to be valued more than others such as sacrificing oneself for the city, working for the city, and participating in governing the city. How these virtues were articulated and how they evolved were, of course, different in both Greek and Roman cities, but the essential element of the relationship between the city and citizenship was such that the latter as status was intimately linked to the former.

With the decline of Greek cities and later of Roman cities the status that derived from being of the city also declined. In European history, therefore, the period in which various Germanic tribes ruled is considered a "regress" or "recess" of the city in history. As Weber (1921), Henri Pirenne (1923), and Lewis Mumford (1938) have told us, it was only when the city revived in the tenth and eleventh centuries that the special status of citizenship became possible. The importance of this argument is that the origins of citizenship do not only go back to ancient Greeks and Romans but also to medieval European cities. This is often overlooked since medieval citizenship never reached the lofty images of Greek and Roman citizenship. Yet, as Weber was the first to emphasize, modern European citizenship may well owe more to modest and mundane citizenship practices in medieval cities, guilds, universities, and corporations than anything else. But this was not without a struggle between the city and the nascent state, and it has been told and retold ever since as the struggle for a special form of citizenship, of the city versus the state. Fernand Braudel (1988) and Charles Tilly (1992, 1994) have told these struggles with specific inflections of their own. Braudel saw the struggle as a specific version of a universal battle between the city and the state, while Tilly focused more on the relationship with European capitalism and militarism. Anyway, it is impossible to agree on a singular interpretation of the struggle between the city and the state in European history between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries. It was during that period that many southern European but also some northern European cities developed certain rights and privileges that were wrested from the state such as taxation, minting coins, trade, and even maintaining armed forces. The specific combination of these rights varied from region to region and city to city, if not from state to state, but gradually the state became the triumphant political form that usurped all of these various rights and combined them within a territorial sovereign system by the seventeenth century (Poggi 1978, 1990).

The story of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the age of absolutist states always features how the privileges of cities and by extension the privileges of those who resided in them were curtailed. All the various forms of association that had emerged in cities such as guilds, universities, companies, and cities themselves were brought under the government of the state as a sovereign entity. But the corporation as the expressive form of city privileges also made an ineluctable entry into history, which was eventually revived. Otto Gierke (1934), Fredric Maitland (2003), Anthony Black (1984), and Gerald Frug (1980) have provided eminent histories of these corporations. The upshot of those histories is that legal thought invented the corporation and literally incorporated the city into the state. Obviously, the rights and privileges of the city were formulated in legal practice as de facto rights of the city through which its residents – citizens – gained special status and thus rights. It was these rights that were usurped by the state through incorporation.

When in the nineteenth century various legal reforms came into being in both northern and southern European states, these by and large focused on realigning the privileges of the city and its relations with the state. There was no turning back to the arrangement where there were virtual if not actual sovereign rights and privileges of the city expressed in its corporate forms, but there was also no turning back to the era of the absolutist state, as it proved impossible to govern the growing complexities of the city. Thus, the city was reconceived increasingly in governmental terms within the state, and the struggles shifted their focus from rights and privileges to powers of the city as a corporation within the state. Still, in essence, those who resided in the city were deeply intertwined with its powers in such a way that the city prescribed, to an extent, their citizenship. However, that citizenship as a status of rights and privileges was no longer lodged in the city as their locus but in the sovereign state. Once the city was invented as a legal corporation combining its virtual and actual properties, the rights of the city became determinant elements of the rights of its inhabitants. Therefore, struggling for the rights of inhabitants automatically meant struggling for the rights of the city.
Since the nineteenth century the situation and the legal alignment between the city and the state have remained stable. While the struggles continued and the powers of the city were always at the forefront of these struggles, the alignment and the relationship remained the same in many legal systems and achieved a rather universal status. This does not mean that the distribution and allocation of powers between the state and the city are the same everywhere, but it does mean that despite differences, some arrangement between the city and the state exists to allocate differentiated powers (Loughlin 1986, 1996a, 1996b).

Rights of the City

It is this relationship that I would like to describe as the rights of the city. The city defined as association acquires its legal and political existence and status and it is from this that the status of those who belong to and reside in it is derived. The rights of the city as a sovereign and autarkic entity confer upon those who belong to it rights that otherwise would not accrue. This principle of the rights of the city continued to be invented and reinvented in modern legal history. When we investigate the struggles between states and cities in medieval societies, for example, we observe that the principles of sovereignty and autarky were objects of the most intense contestations in legal and political if not military fields. As mentioned earlier, these struggles were particularly intense between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the ascendency of the European state was prominent. These struggles are well documented and constitute some of the liveliest debates among prominent nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians such as Fuscul de Coulange (1864), Lewis Mumford (1961), Charles Tilly (1992, 1994), Fernand Braudel (1988), and others (Spruyt 1994). These struggles between the city and the state about the rights of the city and the status of those who belong to it continued through modernity and the ascendency of the modern state. Throughout the twentieth century loyalty, virtue, civism, discipline, and subsidiarity emerged as fundamental principles of the rights of the city within states (Isin 2000a). The city then emerged as that space where loyalty, virtue, civism, and the discipline of citizens were cultivated with the appropriate measure of its rights (subsidiarity). Many struggles we are familiar with ranging from traditional struggles such as governmental powers of cities to more recent struggles over amalgamations of various municipalities by senior levels of government can be considered examples of such struggles over the rights of the city. Citizenship in this mode was (and is) very much understood as the rights that the citizen derived from belonging to the city as a legal association. Even in its modern form, where belonging to the city does not confer any formal rights or status to the citizen (as belonging to the state does), belonging to the city confers substantive rights by virtue of being a space with a special government and legal jurisdiction. In fact, much of the debate over the decline of civic engagement in the twentieth century concerns the rights of the city. The assumption is that the decline in interest in city government is a reflection of the decline of the rights of the city as a municipal corporation and thus its ability to cultivate loyalty, virtue, civism, and discipline.

Rights to the City

While struggles over the rights of the city continued to evolve and were various, the rights to the city can be said to have existed from the very beginning but have received much less attention especially in the way I have formulated it. I have studied many cases of cities in history where various social groups while being outside the city still waged and won struggles for rights to the city—by maintaining property and other rights. In medieval cities, for example, itinerant merchants or scholars held special rights not of any specific city but rights to the city as such no matter where the city happened to exist. Similarly, in Greek and Roman cities there were practices through which citizens held certain rights to the city rather than any specific city such as Athens or Sparta. Admittedly, these rights not only received scant attention but also were themselves scant. Nonetheless, we can argue that the movement of rights to the city is not a contemporary issue alone. Yet, I believe that with those processes that came to be called, with all their attendant difficulties, postmodernization, globalization, and neoliberalization, we are witnessing the transformation of various social struggles into struggles over rights to the city.

These struggles can be seen through four distinct but interrelated themes: autonomy, appropriation, difference, and security (Isin 2006). The theme of autonomy that runs through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries becomes not only a perspective from which to see the city at present but also to interpret the city in history. While the theme of autonomy highlights the independence of the city from the state in making certain decisions, it also comes to mean some form of determination by those who claim rights to the city. It often takes the form of
creating ‘temporary autonomous zones’ in and through which certain rights—claims are made whose source of legal authority is neither the state nor the municipality. Take, for example, the two major issues of city declarations against the nuclear arms race and the proliferation or provision of sanctuary rights for refugees such as cities of refuge (Nyers 2008a). Anne McNevin, for example, argues that the struggles of Sans-Papiers (those without papers) involved the articulation of such rights (to the city) that did not exist before (2006a). As McNevin says, ‘the strategies of the Sans-Papiers reflect the reconfigured spatial practices in and through which their identities as immanent outsiders have been constructed. In this respect their struggle is in, of and for the city. The dimensions of this city are cast in the context of a global political economy and the transnational practices of a colonial and neoliberal state’ (147). Similarly, the appropriation of different forms of capital in and through the city or, rather, the city as a space of appropriation is also a strong theme of modern social and political thought on the city (Varsanyi 2006). Such appropriation again involved more than struggling for rights of the city but of rights of social groups appropriating spaces of the city. The movements about squatting rights and No One Is Illegal are examples of such rights to the city (Nyser 2003). Moreover, that the city, especially the modern city, was the gathering together of different social groups and the successful, that is, democratic, negotiation of their differences is among the most enduring but also recent examples of rights to the city (Isin and Siemiatycki 2002). Finally, the security of groups in the city also involved more than rights of the city but featured rights to the city in the sense of its security and freedom from arbitrary and precarious domination. Likewise, the secularization of states is by and large played and worked out through the city (Isin and Rygili 2007).

I suggest that autonomy, appropriation, difference, and security remain essential attributes of the rights to the city. Yet, these attributes are not necessarily harmonious attributes. They engender tensions and conflicts. The autonomy that certain social groups seek threatens the appropriations of already formed social groups. (Consider struggles over ‘gentrification’ and ‘gated communities.’) The valorization of difference and diversity results in increased tensions around security. (Consider struggles over the building of mosques and their increasing entanglement with ‘secularization.’) It is through these tensions that the city becomes a site of struggles whose aim is to become articulating rights to the city. To understand the city at any given moment involves an attempt to grasp the seemingly infinite multiplicity of fractures opened by these tensions inherent in the city as a site of the social.

What is the essence of the difference between rights of the city (loyalty, virtue, civicism, discipline, and subsidiarity) and rights to the city (autonomy, appropriation, difference, and security)? The articulation and claiming of rights of the city and rights to the city demand different practices. While rights of the city essentially revolve around legal rights and changes in law, rights to the city involve social rights and changes in norms. The city is the site of the social in this precise sense of both enabling the formation of social groups as claimants of rights that are not necessarily restricted to the rights of the city and of making use of rights that originate from the city. The city as the site of the social combines two distinct but related set of rights that I am describing as rights of the city and rights to the city. This is a fundamental difference that enables us to see how the struggles for redistribution and recognition (which are the foundations of citizenship as claims to justice) are essentially intertwined with struggles for the rights of and to the city as the site of the social. To understand the city as the site of the social is to investigate the concrete ways in which struggles for redistribution and recognition take shape through the articulations of these rights.

**Struggles beyond Redistribution and Recognition**

We have already suggested in this book that perhaps it is time to reverse the Marshallian sequence of rights as civil, political, and social and argue that citizenship is social before it is civil and political. Citizenship is social in the deep sense of that term as involving a way of co-existing that is inextricably co-dependent. If the city is the site of the social, as I suggest, then the city and citizenship are related and this is more than a historical contingency. I have already suggested that the city as a site of the social works insofar as it enables the social formation of rights-claimants capable of articulating entitlements and demands. The thematics of the city and rights to the city then are essential elements of the city as the site of the social. It is through the city that individuals become social (understanding the self as a co-dependent entity coexistent with others), and becoming social is the ground on which civil and political rights become possible. In turn, it is a civil and political existence that presents justice as questions. Since coexistence both presupposes and engenders solidarity as well as conflict and competition, questions of justice are inherent in social existence.
It is against this background that we need to revisit the widely recognized argument that civic and political engagement has declined. Often, three reasons dominate the argument that the loyalty to and identification of citizens with the city has declined: (1) there are other sources of identification such as professional occupation and consumption that are not territorially contained and are extensively organized stretching across delimited borders; (2) the city has both morphologically and governmentally become fragmented and is more difficult to identify with; (3) the increased spatial mobility of certain segments of the citizen body has reduced loyalty and identification to any one city. As a result of these three, it is argued that the citizen is able to conduct herself in various sites such as the professions, the workplace, and the Internet that have become more dominating spheres of virtue than the city. The citizen learns to create herself in a multiply situated manner rather than in a singular place or mode through mobility, cyberspace, and differentiated media. Moreover, many services that the city used to deliver according to the subsidiarity principle have either been privatized or shifted to other levels and types of government. As well, the institutions of the discipline of strangers and outsiders have either been shifted elsewhere or transformed into new modes of control and surveillance. As a result, the city may have become an empty shell whose territory marks out what were once meaningful boundaries of the political. I shall argue that rather than becoming an empty shell, the city has become a medium through which rights to the city are still negotiated. That is why a distinction between rights of the city and rights to the city is crucial. It enables us to differentiate the city as a legal entity with fixed territorial boundaries and as a non-legal site for the condensation of social relations. If the former gets tangled in issues of the rights of the city (e.g., taxation, voting, participation, service delivery), the latter redefines civic and political engagement across a wide variety of issues and boundaries (e.g., gentrification, building mosques, surveillance).

We have stated in chapter 1 that "when people mobilize for legalization of same-sex marriage, rally for social housing, protest welfare cuts, debate employment insurance, advocate for the decriminalization of marijuana, wear attire such as turbans or headscarves in public spaces, seek affirmative action programs, or demand better healthcare, access and services, they do not imagine themselves as struggling for the maintenance or expansion of social, cultural, or sexual citizenship rights. Instead, they invest in whatever means seem most related and closest to their social lives, and dedicate their time and energy accordingly." We drew two conclusions from this. First, these were irreducibly social struggles and were cast against economism and culturalism. Second, such social struggles enable people to enact themselves as citizens as well as engage in questions of justice. Now, I can add a third conclusion by stating that these struggles are impossible to wage without the city as the site of the social.

We can give examples from struggles over same-sex marriage to the rights of patients that are not simply struggles over redistribution or recognition but struggles over rights to the city and are organized, enacted, performed, and articulated throughout the city. Some of those examples are already in this book especially exemplified in chapters by Cowen, Bilge, Latta, and Pygmal. I would argue that many social struggles are now significantly struggles over rights to the city (Bell and Binnie 2004, Fenster 2005, Mitchell 2003, Ruppert 2006, Socor 2003). Rather than struggles over rights that derive from belonging to the city, many social groups have struggled over rights to the city by what I would call, staging or enacting themselves through the city. For groups to enact themselves through the city means to organize, assemble, appropriate, stage, symbolize, and imagine themselves, in short, constitute themselves as social groups, by claiming rights to and through the city and using various technologies that bridge the gap between their actual and virtual presences. (The dichotomies such as city against countryside, city against nature, and urban against rural, are not sensible or helpful. Social struggles involving the countryside, the rural, nature or urban are organized and enacted through the city and are mediated by it.)

The effect of these struggles is that they are not only about loyalty, virtue, civicism, discipline and subsidiarity (rights of the city) but more about autonomy, appropriation, difference, and security (rights to the city). This has implications for recasting the social in citizenship.

**Translocal Citizenship**

The city as such is the site of the social. The city produces citizens as rights-claimants. These rights are of two kinds: rights of the city and rights to the city. The rights of the city are articulated through five distinct but interrelated themes of loyalty, virtue, civicism, discipline, and subsidiarity. These rights define local citizenship, which is bounded by, contained in, and expressed through a territorial jurisdiction. By contrast the rights to the city are expressed through four, also distinct and
interrelated themes of autonomy, appropriation, difference, and security. These rights define translocal citizenship, which is unbounded, unbundled, and extraterritorial. These themes of the rights of the city and rights to the city are neither mutually exclusive nor complementary but often-conflictual ‘goods’ of the city that make it the social site par excellence. Today, those involved in the politics of and policy towards the city practically and intuitively understand these goods and work through them. The task of social and political thought is to express and describe that practical and intuitive understanding. What are the implications of such an understanding of the city and recasting the social in citizenship?

Throughout this book the chapter authors articulate different ways of tackling the conflict between redistribution and recognition and stress the difficulty of maintaining such a distinct analytical difference in social struggles concerning rights and citizenship. By considering the city as the site of the social, I have aimed to demonstrate that the city is fundamental in recasting the social in citizenship. Now I wish to turn to a few concrete examples.

Consider housing as a policy site. Such a policy site rarely, if at all, is considered to be an aspect of social citizenship, let alone citizenship. Various activist groups have argued in the past that housing should be considered a social right but that has always faced stiff resistance. What if we expand the notion of housing from being merely a shelter into a right that defines not only a right to housing (politics) but also a right to housing that is, let’s say, environmentally sustainable (ethics), and even socially pleasurable (aesthetics)? Here we see social, environmental, and cultural rights colliding through politics, aesthetics, and ethics and various scales of policy that are currently kept discrete and contiguous. Similarly, when immigration policy is defined as a state policy, the housing of immigrants is then left to ‘lower’ scales of government. Yet, if the right to housing, and more importantly, the right to environmentally sustainable and socially pleasurable housing is considered to be a class of rights, which that I have described as rights to the city, then we begin to see that compartmental policy and politics, which consider immigration as a state-level policy and housing as local-level, are deeply inadequate and inhibiting. Why should immigrants not have the right to housing that eliminates automobile dependency, reduces energy consumption, cuts greenhouse emissions, and facilitates access to social amenities and everyday pleasures, by virtue of its actual design? That these policy sites are kept separate results in desocialization: the demands that citizens (in this case ‘immigrants’) make about housing, commuting, and consumption are considered private and separate claims to markets. Moreover, policies act as containers they contain issues and subjects within territorial, cultural, ethnic, and other boundaries. If indeed the city is the site through which human lives hang together, the coexistence and co-dependence that this implies belies such demands being private and market-based claims. They are indeed social demands, arising from social situations of citizens and producing social consequences. These situations and consequences are inherently translocal and overflow the boundaries that are set up to contain them (Ma 2002).

Similarly, consider the controversy over wearing certain symbolically charged attire in public places. To split such acts into redistribution or recognition and interpret them as demands for tolerance, accommodation, or recognition belies the fact that these acts may well have originated from social inequalities such as lack of access to social services and the attendant consequences of alienation, disfranchisement, and misrecognition. Not investigating the social foundation and social consequences of social acts and interpreting them as ‘religious,’ ‘cultural,’ or ‘ethnic’ acts not only desocializes but also essentializes them. Thus, translocal and multiply situated identities are contained within boundaries. This often results in irresolvable political (and policy) debates over where to ‘draw the line’ concerning such acts, which displaces social and political questions onto other disconnected, hopelessly reductionist, and essentialist debates. When such acts make claims on the city as the site of the social, they ought to be interpreted as rights to the city in the forms of appropriation, autonomy, difference, and security. What that means is that such acts and the way in which they have been interpreted have to be understood within the context of the practices that constitute the city as the site of the social. Such investigations would not always begin with already accepted terms and categories that contain acts. Rather, they would focus on why such terms and categories have come to acquire strategic values of containment for specific groups involved in the struggle and how these values are produced through actual spaces.

Clearly, the current organizational structure of policy and politics does not correspond with the complexities of the intersections between the social and the political, and the properties of the city as the site of the social and its translocal relationships. Recasting the social in citizenship is the minimum means to investigate not only traditional rights
of the city in constituting citizens but also their rights to the city as a constitutive element of citizenship.

If indeed existing structures and institutions are inadequate to conceive the city as the site of the social and to differentiate between rights of the city and rights to the city, how can we imagine institutions and structures that are more appropriate? I will end this chapter with a proposal on translocal citizenship and the formation of translocal authorities. I have mentioned that often debates over the rights of the city get displaced into the sharing and distribution of powers between central and local (or municipal) authorities. Since the sovereignty of the state is organized as an exclusive and hierarchical territory, the rights of the city are always constituted within that framework as a territorial container. The language of central versus local authorities and centralization versus decentralization dominates such debates. While local authorities constituted as territorial containers may serve to deliver certain services that are inherently local such as infrastructure, many other services are translocal in character. This is, of course, the well-known subsidiarity principle: the service is delivered at the most appropriate scale. This principle assumes a hierarchical and exclusive relationship between various ‘scales’ of government (Isin 2007). Since the rights to such services also inherit a translocal character, they often take the form of rights to the city as such rather than to a specific city or locality. For such rights it might be more appropriate to create ‘translocal authorities.’ Such authorities could come into being when a social group constitutes itself by appropriating the city as the site of the social and whose claims involve translocal rights: rights that cannot be granted by the existing territorial jurisdictions (Isin and Turner 2007). Marisol Garcia (2006: 753), for example, argues that for this reason we cannot place too much emphasis on ‘urban citizenship.’ As long as we understand urban citizenship as being solely about rights of the city she is certainly right. But if we differentiate rights of the city from rights to the city, then urban citizenship can surely include translocal rights that cannot be obtained through or contained by the rights of the city (i.e., the rights that the city can confer within its jurisdiction). If we conceive translocal citizenship as those rights that are articulated as rights to the city, then new avenues begin to open up. Those social groups that can constitute themselves as translocal, can claim both representation and taxation powers. In modern states all deliberative assemblies are structured on the basis of territorial containers. The representation and taxation of translocal authorities would, however, radically alter the constitution of deliberative politics. Translocal authorities do not need to be contained within states either. As such organizations as Doctors Without Borders or Reporters Without Borders illustrate, translocal forms of citizenship organized through the city as the site of the social transcend state boundaries. But currently such organizations remain as ‘charity’ organizations, and there are no formal ways of recognizing them with taxation and representation. Similarly, one can argue that homelessness is a translocal phenomenon. If there is a social group that constitutes itself as a translocal authority then it can use resources that come from various scales to address the issue of homelessness. Those activists who spend considerable energies and investment in various scales of government find themselves being shifted from scale to scale. Instead, they can focus those energies and investments on the translocal authority constituted to deal with it. Of course, how certain groups should be recognized and legally constituted as translocal authorities, what powers of representation and taxation they should have, and their longevity are immensely complex issues and should be properly the objects of political negotiation and deliberation.

Are there historical examples of translocal authorities? We might think of guilds, universities, chapters, associations, and unions as examples of translocal authorities, but the legal framework in which they are created and the traditions that they follow make it impossible for them to act as translocal authorities. Thus, while it is important that the legal tradition, which has been traced by Frug (1980), has to be recognized and understood, to create such authorities we also need to invent a new legal form that goes beyond the theory of corporations that dominated political thought since at least the fourteenth century. It would also go beyond conceiving associational life only through intermediate institutions between the individual and the state – as a tradition of social and political thought ranging from Alexis de Tocqueville to Émile Durkheim has understood since the nineteenth century. Many will object that the formation of such translocal authorities is unwieldy and likely to generate more bureaucracy and confusion. But such deliberation and negotiation and the formation of new authorities may well invigorate citizenship politics much more than the incessant repetition about the decline of active citizenship. In fact, rather than a decline of citizenship there has been a considerable proliferation and multiplication of citizenship politics that does not find expression in the arcane sovereign structures of the state that are built on territorial appropriations and its machinations.
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