Introduction: democracy, citizenship, sovereignty, politics

Book Section

How to cite:

For guidance on citations see FAQs.

© [not recorded]
Version: [not recorded]

Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://www.routledge.com/books/Democracy-Citizenship-and-the-Global-City-isbn9780415216685

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page.
Introduction

Democracy, citizenship and the city

Engin F. Isin

The solution of the problems of democratic government rests in the cities. ... The political problem of the modern city is the problem of democracy. ... The fanaticism of party, religion, race, professions, nationalism, and militarism must somehow be met in the government of the city first and last and after that little is left of world problems.

(Innis, 1945, pp. 482, 485, 486)

This volume is concerned with the question of the impact of post-modernization and globalization on the government of cities and citizens in western democracies, especially in predominantly English-speaking states such as Canada, America, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. 'Government' implies not only the institutions and organizations of city government but also the governmental practices as conduct of conduct, and hence its analysis involves considering citizenship. If we define post-modernization as both a process of fragmentation through which various group identities have been formed, and discourses through which 'difference' has become a dominant strategy, its effect on citizenship has been twofold. On the one hand, various groups that have been marginalized and excluded from modern citizenship have been able to seek recognition (Fraser, 1997; Young, 1990). Groups based upon ethnic, 'racial', ecological and sexual identities have articulated claims for citizenship to include group-differentiated rights. Women have fought to expand their citizenship rights to include social rights such as access to childcare, pay equity and rights to safe cities; ethnic and racialized minorities have sought recognition and representation; aboriginal peoples have sought representation and self-government rights; gays and lesbians have struggled to claim rights that are already extended to heterosexual couples, such as spousal benefits and common-law arrangements; immigrants have struggled for naturalization and political rights; and various ability groups have demanded recognition of their needs to become fully functional citizens of their polities. These challenged one of the most venerable premises of modernization – universalization – by exposing its limits. On the other hand, these various claims have strained the boundaries of citizenship and pitted group against group in the search for identity and recognition. As a result, while ostensibly
making claims to citizenship, some members of these groups have become trapped or encased within specific identities, unable to move beyond the straitjacket that they have unintentionally created. This called into question another venerable premise of modernization that would have us believe in the disappearance of such allegiances. Either way, post-modernization of politics has, therefore, stretched the capacity of the modern nation-state and citizenship to accommodate and recognize these diverse and conflicting demands, but it has also posed intractable dilemmas about how to conduct ourselves (Rose, 1999, pp. 194–6).

If we define globalization as both a process by which the increasing interconnectedness of places becomes the defining moment and as a discourse through which ‘globalism’ becomes a dominant strategy, its effect on citizenship has also been twofold. On the one hand, with the rise of global flows of capital, images, ideas, labour, crime, music and regimes of governance, the sources of authority of citizenship rights and obligations have expanded from the nation-state to other international organizations, corporations and agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, IBM, the internet, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Microsoft and Coca-Cola. On the other hand, the dominance of such global agents was accompanied by the decline of the capacity of the nation-states to set sovereign policies. In a very complex relay of events, nation-states have retrenched from certain citizenship rights and instead imposed new obligations on their citizens, which has in turn intensified tensions within states where taken-for-granted citizenship rights began to disappear (e.g. unemployment insurance, welfare or right to legal counsel) and new obligations (e.g. workfare) were implemented. Similarly, increased international migration has raised the question of the rights and responsibilities of aliens, immigrants and refugees (Cohen, 1999).

While some believe that globalization means the rise of the world as one single place, others refute whether globalization has become as widespread as claimed and point to increased post-modernization of culture and politics in which diversity, fragmentation and difference dominate. But few would disagree that post-modernization and globalization are occurring simultaneously and are engendering new patterns of global differentiation in which some states, societies and social groups are becoming increasingly enmeshed with each other, while others are becoming increasingly marginalized. A new configuration of power relations is crystallizing as the old geographical divisions rapidly give way to new spaces which the familiar constructs of core–periphery, North–South, First World and Third World no longer represent. Globalization has recast modern patterns of inclusion and exclusion between nation-states by forging new hierarchies which cut across and penetrate all regions of the world (Held et al., 1999, p. 8). North and South, First World and Third World are no longer ‘out there’ but nestled together within global cities. It is doubtful whether we can any longer divide the world into discrete, contiguous and contained territorial zones as a representation of reality. Instead, the socio-political geography of the world seems to be crystallizing into overlapping
networks of various flows of intensity, extensity and velocity in which global city-regions are the primary nodes. These complex and overlapping networks connect the fate of one global city-region to the fate of another in distant parts of the world and increasingly concentrate and intensify various activities in these nodes. Events that take place in these nodes resonate beyond their immediate spheres precisely because they are nodes within highly complex and overlapping networks rather than self-contained and isolated territories.

As a result many argue that post-modernization and globalization are not simply a continuation of modern capitalism on a global scale but political, economic and cultural transformations of modern capitalism into new regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation (Hoogvelt, 1997). That cities and regions, or, more precisely, global city-regions, are the fundamental spaces of this emerging political economy further erodes the credibility of modernization theories that would have us believe in national trajectories that will follow the disappearance of religion, tradition and particularism. Instead, in global city-regions we are witnessing a general trend towards the proliferation of identities and projects, and an overall incredulity towards grand narratives. Global city-regions give us not only the geographic metaphors with which we think about the social world, but also the concrete sites in which to investigate the complex relays of post-modernization and globalization that engender spaces for new identities and projects which modernization either contained or prohibited, and generate new citizenship rights and obligations. But these processes are not unfolding according to immutable logic or necessary laws. Rather, each node, whether it is Bombay, Istanbul, Shanghai, Mexico City, New York or London, is drawn into these overlapping networks of flows in different ways and articulates very different patterns of inclusion, exclusion, rights, obligations and social struggles depending on its national, regional, social and political trajectories. Moreover, while the metaphors of North and South, centre and periphery may no longer capture these processes, it does not mean that inequalities and differences brought about and institutionalized by such older divisions have suddenly ceased to exist. Rather, we observe strange multiplicities and events: in some global cities as even basic civil or political rights are trampled upon by authorities, new rights, for example sexual or technological rights, are also being claimed. To appreciate how these complex transformations affect citizenship we need to reflect briefly on its modernity.

The modernity of citizenship

Modern citizenship was born of the nation-state in which certain rights and obligations are allocated to individuals under its authority. Modern citizenship rights that draw from the nation-state typically include civil rights (free speech and movement, rule of law), political rights (voting, seeking electoral office) and social rights (welfare, unemployment insurance and health care). The precise combination and depth of such rights vary from one state to another but a modern democratic state is expected to uphold a combination of citizenship
rights and obligations. That said, however, three points must be borne in mind to avoid the assumption that citizenship rights and obligations are 'natural'. First, while under some states civil rights such as bodily control rights (medical and sexual control over the body) are guaranteed, other states deny their citizens even basic civil rights such as the rights of access to courts and counsel. Similarly, while some states guarantee political rights and go so far as to franchise prisoners, others deny even the most basic refugee or naturalization rights. Citizenship obligations vary too, ranging from states in which military service is required to those states where jury duty and taxes are the only responsibilities. Second, while many nation-states have elaborate rules and criteria for 'naturalization', the granting of citizenship to those not born in their territories, such rules and criteria are often contested and debated, and vary widely. Third, some of the most fundamental citizenship rights are remarkably recent. We would be well served to remember that the basic political right to franchise was extended to all adult men without property qualifications as recently as, for example, 1920 in Canada, 1918 in Britain and 1901 in Australia. The term 'all' should be interpreted cautiously too, as it did not include aboriginals in settler societies. Similarly, the franchise was only extended to all women as recently as 1918 in Canada, 1928 in Britain and 1902 in Australia. French women have been able to vote since 1944 and American women since 1920.

Thus, what determines the composition of rights and obligations that pertains to a given nation-state depends on its historical trajectory. The typologies developed by Esping-Anderson (1990) and Janoski (1998) to classify citizenship rights according to these trajectories are useful. Esping-Anderson (1990) distinguishes between liberal, corporatist and social democratic states, each of which rests upon a different interpretation of citizenship. While warning that there is no pure example of each, Esping-Anderson argues that in liberal democracies such as America, Switzerland and Australia, the state relies on markets to allocate social rights, and emphasizes civil and political rights. In corporatist states such as Austria, France, Germany and Italy, social rights are accorded a greater role but are not available universally. By contrast, in social democratic states such as Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, social rights are given the highest priority and the state provides universal benefits such as the right to free vocational or higher education. There are, of course, states that do not neatly fit into these types. Canada, for example, combines a liberal emphasis on individual rights with a social democratic tradition of social rights, especially in the areas of health and education. Britain also combines liberal and social democratic traditions.

Modern political theories about citizenship - liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism - have grown out of these trajectories and roughly correspond to these three types of states. Liberalism puts a strong emphasis on the individual, and most rights involve liberties that adhere to each and every person. Communitarianism puts strong emphasis on the community (or the society or the nation), whose primary concern is with the cohesive and just
functioning of society. Republican theories in both their social and radical variants put emphasis on both individual and group rights and underline the role of conflict and contest in the expansion or construction of such rights. While communitarian theories emphasize obligations, democratic theories focus on the importance of rights. Further, not all theories fit into these types. Prominent theorists such as Will Kymlicka (1995) and Charles Taylor (1994), because they reflect Canadian dispositions, combine liberalism and communitarianism, which may appear contradictory to outsiders but sensible to Canadians. At any rate, in many democracies in the postwar era the debate and struggles over citizenship rights and obligations have been waged over either expansion or protection of rights. The expansion of the following rights have been most prominent: civil rights, such as medical and sexual control over the body; political rights, such as the rights to naturalization, to aboriginal self-government as well as social movement or protest rights; social rights, such as old age pensions, unemployment insurance, health and education; and participation rights, reflected in job placement programs, affirmative action for minorities, collective bargaining, wage earner and union investment funds. The protection of the following rights has occupied governmental agendas: civil rights, such as the right of aliens to immigrate; political rights, such as minority rights to equal and fair treatment; social rights, such as welfare; and participation rights such as job security and workers' compensation. These debates and struggles have been mostly directed via the nation-state as both the source of authority and arbiter of justice.

Citizenship unbound

While useful in the understanding of various theories and practices of citizenship rights and obligations across various postwar democratic states, these typologies can no longer capture the changing nature of citizenship at the dawn of the twenty-first century (Isin and Wood, 1999). In the last two decades of the twentieth century, post-modernization and globalization have challenged the nation-state as the sole source of authority of citizenship and democracy. Under the twin pressures of post-modernization and globalization, the blurred boundaries of citizenship rights and obligations and the forms of democracy associated with them brought citizenship on to the political and intellectual agendas. This has also broadened the way in which citizenship is understood and debated. Rather than merely focusing on citizenship as legal rights, there is now agreement that citizenship must also be defined as a social process through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights. Being politically engaged means practising substantive citizenship, which in turn implies that members of a polity always struggle to shape its fate. This can be considered as the sociological definition of citizenship in that the emphasis is less on legal rules and more on norms, practices, meanings and identities.
There is no doubt that the debates and struggles over citizenship rights and obligations will intensify not only at the level of the state where, as we have seen, many of these rights are defined, enacted and allocated, but also at other levels. On the global or international level, there is already a lively debate and struggle over cosmopolitan citizenship and democracy (see Hutchings and Dannreuther, 1999; Held, 1995). At sub-national levels, the renewed emphasis on citizenship not only as legal rights and obligations but also as social practices through which citizens make themselves has heightened the role of the city in democracy once again.

The work of cities: modernity of city government

The premise of this volume is that if post-modernization and globalization have brought citizenship on to the political and theoretical agendas, they have also intensified the role of the city in democracy (Garcia, 1996; Holston, 1999; Isin, 1999). Global cities are spaces where the very meaning, content and extent of citizenship are being made and transformed. Being at the interstices of global networks of flows of commodities, services, capital, labour, images and ideas, the global city, both as a milieu and object of struggles for recognition, engenders new political groups that claim either new types of rights or seek to expand modern civil, political and social rights (Sandercock, 1998). In an evocative phrase, Sassen (1996) describes global cities as places where ‘the work of globalization gets done’. We can extend her phrasing and describe cities as places where the work of post-modernization also gets done. Many social groups have effectively demonstrated that modern civil, political and social rights do not adequately address their needs and so claim new rights on the basis of such identities as gender, ethnicity, ecology and sexuality. Their struggles for recognition and social justice revolve around new claims to citizenship, inclusion and engagement with the polity to which they seek membership in a qualitatively different way. While these groups seek rights allocated by senior levels of government such as states and provinces, their organizations, symbols and other resources draw upon the city and use it as an organizing principle. Similarly, as Clarke and Gaile (1998, pp. 211–12) illustrate, the work of globalization results in reduced real wages and social benefits, limited job retraining opportunities, lack of affordable housing, discriminatory housing and employment practices, environmental hazards, inaccessible and unaccountable political processes, unhealthy work conditions and restricted educational opportunities, which are all confronted and contested in cities.

How is the role of the city in democracy different under the twin pressures of post-modernization and globalization? 'The solution of the problems of democratic government rests in the cities. ... The political problem of the modern city is the problem of democracy' (Innis, 1945, pp. 482, 485). So said Harold Innis in 1945 in an address reflecting on the problems of democracy. A Canadian political economist, Innis is known for his studies on the fur trade,
cod fisheries and the lumber industry, which in his later work were linked up with broader processes of imperial and colonial political economy and with even broader civilizational processes of writing, communication and dialogue. It was his ability to explore specific problems within broader processes that perhaps allowed him to see the city as a microcosm in which ‘city’ became synonymous with ‘democracy’. Ambiguously, Innis was both traditional and prescient in his observation. Traditional in the sense that he appears to have been merely expressing a modern liberal faith in city government as a locus of democracy, and prescient in the sense that, now at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are reconsidering the problems of democracy being entangled with the city. But this is where his prescience becomes particularly poignant and less ambiguous. For Innis the city was not merely a locus of democracy but its vanguard: ‘The fanaticism of party, religion, race, professions, nationalism, and militarism must somehow be met in the government of the city first and last and after that little is left of world problems’ (Innis, 1945, p. 486). Innis was already thinking differently from the liberal or modern tradition about the city, and seeing it as the concentration of and the solution to the problems of the world arising from difference. Unfortunately, Innis never expanded on his reflections on city government, but he left us the modernity of the work of cities as a question.

To begin to answer that question, we must first outline the rationalities of modern city government. However, one of the thorniest problems besetting thought on city government is its modernity. Beginning with its first advocates such as Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) and John Stuart Mill (1861), historicism has been a prevalent aspect of thinking about city government (Stoker, 1996; Magnusson, 1986). The glorious images of ‘ancient institutions’ and ‘tradition’ have always dominated thought on city government. There are understandable genealogical reasons why the dominant groups in the nineteenth century made such historical linkages but we cannot explore them here (Isin, 1995). It is, nevertheless, important to emphasize that the modern democratic conception of the city that emerged in the early nineteenth century expressed a particular conception of local government which became synonymous with democracy. While citizenship originated in the city and played an important role in the history of citizenship in western civilization (Heater, 1990; Riesenberg, 1992), the significance of the city as a milieu cultivating and engendering citizenship does not derive from this history. It is beyond doubt that the relationship between the city and citizenship has a venerable and inextricable history. The western historical imagination is full of images of the birth of democracy and citizenship in ancient Greek cities, its republican transformations in ancient Roman cities, and its revival in medieval European cities. But these images obfuscate and obscure rather than reveal and expose the modernity of city government.

The modernity of local government is a relatively recent concept. In Britain, America and Canada its emergence can be traced from the period after 1835 in which a reformed framework for local government was gradually put in place.
Moreover, it was not until the early decades of the twentieth century that the institution in its modern form could be said to have been established. Although by the end of the nineteenth century the basic structures had crystallized, the capacity of local government was still restricted by a heavy dependence on local rates for finance, and it was not until the 1920s that any scheme for state support for local services was provided on any significant scale (Loughlin, 1996, p. 79). What emerged in the twentieth century was that local government was locked into a network of government that operated at various scales (nation, region, city) and capacities. Neither autonomous nor subordinate, modern city government was a technology defined by a tension between state and local authorities (Isin, 1992). The modern city government that crystallized in the twentieth century therefore had no functional affinity with historical forms of city government either in medieval European or ancient Greek and Roman cities. After the nineteenth-century reforms and the twentieth-century transformations, any appeal to a tradition of local self-government could no longer comfortably rest on ancient tradition and history. The various shifts in the patterns of life and work and the comprehensive nature of the institutional reforms make such claims highly implausible. Nor can such appeals be based on some authoritative constitutional norms in Britain, America, Australia or Canada. If tradition is to be invented it must now be found to rest on modern practices and thus on a set of political understandings which have commanded widespread support throughout the twentieth century.

Moreover, throughout the twentieth century local government has been subjected to almost continuous review and change. Major responsibilities have been removed from local government, new powers and duties have been given, a variety of new checks and control mechanisms have been devised, and reforms have been made to the structure of the institution.

Given this process of more or less continuous change, it might plausibly be argued that there is no basic institutional identity to local government and that local authorities have simply been shaped in accordance with specific functional requirements of the central State.

(Loughlin, 1996, p. 79)

As Loughlin says, however, this view of modern local government is also misguided in that while it is not autonomous, neither is it a subordinate government; it is an agency that is equipped with a considerable capacity for independent action while being locked into an extensive network of government (Loughlin, 1996, p. 80). Since the early nineteenth century there has always been a productive tension between local and central authorities regarding appropriate governmental capacities and practices. It is this tension that produces a continuous incitement to government.

Modern local government embodies complex organizations equipped with a capacity for effective governance and vested with a degree of political legitimacy which justifies its discretionary power. It is because of this tradition
that the formal legal status of local government presents a potentially distortive picture. British local government, for example, while constrained in principle by the *ultra vires* doctrine, 'has in fact been vested with considerable autonomy. Although formally subordinate, local government has, as a result of the changes in government during the twentieth century, acquired a relatively important position in an interdependent network government' (Loughlin, 1996, p. 83). This pattern of governmental practice suggests that the modern institution of local government exists not simply because it is the agency which is able most efficiently to deliver particular services. While local government strives to achieve efficiency, its status also serves to reflect certain basic political values. Modern local government is not only an agency for service delivery but also an institution of democratic governance. The inefficiencies that accrue from that function are viewed in balance with its efficient service delivery function. Some degree of inefficiency is accepted for maintaining robust local institutions which are able to mediate between the individual and state and which are responsive to the interests of locality (Loughlin, 1996, p. 83).

The essential features of modern local government are often identified as democracy and efficiency as though they are contradictory functions (Stoker, 1996; Sharpe, 1970; Loughlin, 1996, pp. 80–2). Thus, the emphasis on the authority (ability to perform governmental functions), autonomy (capacity to deliver services according to local needs), taxation (powers to raise revenue) and representation (legitimacy for accountability) functions of modern local government have received widespread attention and, depending on political persuasion, scorn or admiration. However, the exclusive focus on authority, autonomy, taxation and representation resulted in too much emphasis on institutional and organizational arrangements of local government as opposed to its rationalities within the broader network of government. Given these considerations, let me emphasize the following rationalities of modern local government: loyalty, virtue, civics, discipline and subsidiarity. We cannot explore them in detail here but a brief outline will be useful to evaluate whether post-modernization and globalization have issued fundamental changes in them.

**Loyalty**

The city in modern democracy is simultaneously the milieu and object of loyalty. The citizen as a man (later also woman) of property constitutes himself (later also herself) as an agent capable of political judgement while at the same time investing himself in the city, which becomes his work. The citizen identifies with the city and owes allegiance and loyalty to it. But this identification does not contradict with his identification with the nation. Rather, it becomes the foundation of the nation-state. By using our new language we can say that the work of modern nationalism actually got done in the city in the sense that the loyalty to the nation-state was bred and nurtured in the city via the bourgeois public sphere. While considering loyalty a fundamental aspect of
the city, the sociological tradition arose out of a concern with the relationship between loyalty and citizenship and the city as an intermediate association between the individual and the state (Durkheim, 1890, 1894; Tönnies, 1887).

**Virtue**

The city is also where the citizen becomes *virtuous* through his (later also her) engagements in politics, defined as a broad field in which a citizen conducts himself (later also herself) upon the conduct of others. The civic virtue of the citizen consists in the fact that his conduct oriented toward the city is not only his right but also his obligation. The city becomes a space of government in the sense that the citizen constitutes himself as both subject and object of conduct in the public sphere. The exercise of this right and obligation can be as passive as simply voting, or as active as taking part in the everyday life of politics. For the political tradition this was a fundamental aspect of the city fostering democracy (Mill, 1861; de Tocqueville, 1835).

**Civics**

That a subject becomes a citizen by developing loyalty and virtue toward the city means that the city becomes a breeding ground for active citizenship and democracy. Virtue of the modern citizen is *civic* precisely because it is expressed through a loyalty to his (later also her) city as a particular place rather than an idea. The city is where citizens are habituated into democratic imagination by practice, experience and education. But *civics* is not taught in the city as though it is a course but is learned and bred as a disposition, a habitus. The citizen makes himself in the city by learning how to orient himself toward others through everyday experience. The city makes man governable. For the philosophical tradition this was a fundamental aspect of the relationship between city and citizenship (Arkes, 1981; Rousseau, 1762; Strauss, 1964).

**Discipline**

While the city is constituted as a space of liberty for the citizen, it is also constituted as a space of *discipline* for strangers and outsiders – non-citizens. It is not that liberty does not require discipline. On the contrary, breeding the loyalty, virtue and civics in constituting citizens as capable subjects requires conduct upon conduct and discipline. In fact, liberty and discipline presuppose each other. But those who lack certain attributes of citizens – strangers and outsiders – are subject to further institutions of discipline such as prisons and asylums. The city may be a space where the citizen conducts himself in public as a political agent with rights and liberties, but it is also a space where those who lack or are denied such citizenship rights are subjected to discipline and punishment. The tensions between liberty and order, and between discipline and civility in the modern city constitute citizenship as a space where the
‘normalcy’ of citizens is articulated against the ‘pathologies’ of non-citizens. As the legal tradition emphasized, modernity of the city as a corporation consisted precisely in the public rights of self-government vested in it by the modern nation-state to act on the conduct of its subjects (Frug, 1980; Gierke, 1900; 1934; Maitland, 1898).

**Subsidiarity**

The modern city is also the space where it is most appropriate to deliver public services such as education, welfare, parks, prisons, recreation and the like. The city is the closest level of government to the citizen and is approachable and direct. The *subsidiarity* of the city consists in the fact that there is a shared relationship between the state and the city in delivering public services to the citizen. While there is always a tension in terms of allocating resources to the city to deliver services, and the exact nature, extent and combination of these services, the city is the appropriate level of government to deliver these services because these matters arise and can be decided locally. The economic tradition on the city highlighted this aspect of local government as its essence (Tiebout, 1956; Boyne, 1998).

**Post-modernization, globalization and modern city government**

While these rationalities of modern local government can be related to its democracy and efficiency roles, and are expressed in its institutions, they are not reducible to them. Neither are they reducible to one another. Loyalty, virtue, civics, discipline and subsidiarity are distinct but related rationalities of modern local government. Moreover, they are neither coherent nor complementary aspects of city government in that there is always a competition among them. Finally, institutional arrangements such as authority, autonomy, taxation and representation derive from these broader rationalities of local government rather than being its constitutive aspects. Thus, considering institutions of modern local government in isolation from its broader rationalities results in a distorted view of the modern city government. Accordingly, we must now answer the question whether post-modernization and globalization have transformed modern city government by exploring these transformations in its rationalities rather than its institutions or organizations.

While certain features of city, government and citizenship changed throughout the twentieth century (women and the poor, for example, won the franchise and subsidiarity changed after the Great Depression), have post-modernization and globalization in the late twentieth century radically altered these formative features? At first glance, despite post-modernization and globalization, it may appear that all five rationalities of the modern city government remain relatively the same. One could argue that, while the city may no longer be the only object of loyalty, the majority of citizens still spend
their everyday lives in the city and develop certain affinities with it. The city may no longer be the only place in which citizens practice virtue, yet the institutions of 'civil society' still form and operate within and through the city. The city may no longer be the milieu where citizens learn civics, but the public spaces of the city, from streets to squares, are still where citizens enact their public selves. The city may no longer appear the most appropriate level of government according to the principle of subsidiarity, but essential public services, especially for real property, are still delivered by city governments. The city may no longer be the space of discipline, in the operation of schools, hospitals, prisons and asylums, but it still takes care of imposing law and order on the everyday lives of its unruly and on dangerous strangers and outsiders. So while its modern rationalities may have weakened, the city may still be the place where the problem of government is being posed and articulated.

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the significant transformations that post-modernization and globalization have wrought on the rationalities of the modern city as a milieu and object of citizenship and democracy. Let us consider each in turn. There has been a widespread decline in loyalty to and identification of citizens with their city governments in the past twenty years. Three main reasons have been suggested for this decline: (1) there are other sources of identification such as occupation and consumption that are not territorialized and are extensively organized stretching across fixed borders; (2) the city has become fragmented both territorially and governmentally and is more difficult to identify with than its modern counterpart; and (3) the increased spatial mobility of certain segments of the citizen body loosens and stratifies such loyalties to place. Thus, the citizen is able to conduct himself or herself in various domains, such as the professions, the workplace, the shopping mall and the internet, that are more dominant spheres of virtue and loyalty than the city. The citizen learns to create himself or herself in a multiply situated manner rather than in a singular place or mode. Moreover, many services that the city used to deliver according to the subsidiarity principle are either privatized or shifted to other levels and types of government such as quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental bodies). This has led some to argue that it is more appropriate to speak about local governance than local government (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998; Wilson, 1998). In addition, the institutions of the discipline of citizens, strangers and outsiders have either shifted elsewhere or transformed into new modes of control and surveillance (Jones, 1998). As a result, has the modern city government become an empty shell whose territory marks out the once-meaningful boundaries of the political? This volume explores this question from a variety of perspectives. Each chapter takes the city as its theoretical object and addresses the question of democratic government and citizenship through the city. But this does not mean that this book is driven by a nostalgic view of the city as a replica of the autonomous Greek polis, the medieval commune or the New England town. Nor is it driven by a belief in the death of the nation-state. On the contrary, each chapter attends seriously to matters relating to post-modernization and globalization,
and considers the nation-state not as a disappearing but perhaps as a strengthening institution that allocates citizenship rights and responsibilities. At the same time, however, the chapters recognize the changing nature of state sovereignty and its impact on the city, and begin to articulate the global city as a new space of politics in which new rights-claims are made, and in which new ways of being political/being a citizen are forged, experimented with and enacted.

**Making claims on the city: rights to the global city**

That the claims for group-differentiated rights actually arise out of the city and are connected with post-modernization and globalization is fairly easy to illustrate. Consider the question of immigrants in North America and Europe and their political status. While the debate rages over the national issues of whether immigrants should be given political and social rights, the majority of immigrants settle in cities and use urban resources to mobilize and articulate their demands for recognition. In Germany it is impossible to understand citizenship rights for Turks without examining their spatial concentrations in major cities such as Berlin or Frankfurt (Barbieri, 1998). Similarly, it is impossible to understand the complexities that arise from Latino citizenship in America without understanding the settlement patterns and forms such groups have engendered (Rocco, 1996). Cities, particularly global cities, have therefore become political spaces where the concentration of different groups and their identities are intertwined with the articulation of various claims to citizenship rights (Sassen, 1996). It is within this domain of groups and identities that the appropriation and use of urban space is articulated, which in turn constitutes urban citizenship as a field of debate and struggle.

This was defined above as the *work* of cities. It is useful at this point to draw upon the work of Henri Lefebvre, who was concerned with establishing an analytical approach to the city within the framework of his theory of social space, in which the city was a political space for claiming rights for social groups. In the late 1960s, he articulated his concept of the right to the city and the city as work, as *œuvre*, which was the dominant mode of its production in western history. By contrast, modern capitalism constituted the city as a product. While the emphasis was on the city's use value in the former, it was on the city's exchange value in the latter. Lefebvre believed that to claim the rights of ages, sexes, conditions of work, training, education, culture, leisure, health and housing, it was imperative to think through the city (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 157). The recognition of these rights required the pluralization of groups whose everyday lives were bound up with the city. The struggle to define and appropriate the spaces of the city was crucial in claiming these rights (Lefebvre, 1974, pp. 410–11). For Lefebvre, 'the right to the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: right to freedom, to individualization and socialization, to habitat and to inhabit' (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 173). Accordingly, 'the right to the *œuvre* [the city as a work of art], to participation and
appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property), are implied in the right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 174). Neither a natural nor a contractual right, the right to the city ‘signifies the rights of citizens and city dwellers, and of groups they (on the basis of social relations) constitute, to appear on all the networks and circuits of communication, information and exchange’ (Lefebvre, 1996, pp. 194–5). It follows that,

To exclude the urban from groups, classes, individuals, is also to exclude them from civilization, if from not society itself. The right to the city legitimates the refusal to allow oneself to be removed from urban reality by a discriminatory and segregative organization.

(Lefebvre, 1996, p. 195)

Thus

This right of the citizen ... proclaims the inevitable crisis of city centres based upon segregation and establishing it: centres of decision-making, wealth, power, of information and knowledge, which reject towards peripheral spaces all those who do not participate in political privileges. Equally, it stipulates the right to meetings and gathering ...

(Lefebvre, 1996, p. 195)

It is noteworthy that Lefebvre identified the dominant groups in the contemporary city as the 'new masters' (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 161). He observed that they already claimed the central areas of New York, Paris and other major cities, and he described the new global city as 'New Athens'. What he is referencing here is not the glorious ancient Athens as the birthplace of democracy but the ancient Athens of deep class and group cleavages between citizens and slaves, outsiders and oppressed groups. It is not that the New Athens had slaves in the ancient sense of that term, but that in the global city the new masters created a social space that catered to their exclusive use while surrounding them with masses to provide services. Lefebvre observed that the new masters were made up of a very small minority, as in ancient Athens, and were comprised of 'directors, heads, presidents of this and that, elites, leading writers and artists, well-known entertainers and media people ...' (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 161). Underneath this layer were 'executives, administrators, professionals and scholars'. He was particularly concerned with the rise of this secondary layer of the dominant groups – in the intriguing parlance of Bourdieu (1979), the dominated fraction of the dominant class – because their interests diverged not only from the working classes and the subjugated groups but also from the bourgeoisie. For Lefebvre the right to the city was the right to claim presence in the city, to wrest the use of the city from the privileged new masters and democratize its spaces. Lefebvre saw the rights to the city as an expression of urban citizenship, understood not as membership in a polity – let alone the
nation-state – but as a practice of articulating, claiming and renewing group rights in and through the appropriation and creation of spaces in the city.

Lefebvre wrote at a time in which the new politics of the city was just crystallizing (Shields, 1999). Since then, the global flows of ideas, images, sound and capital and labour both emanating from and concentrating in global cities have become the defining moments of our age. Today, the rights of immigrants, ethnic and racialized groups, gays and lesbians, women, the poor and other groups are by and large fought for in global cities. Yet these struggles are not waged on a binary plane against a common adversary, but instead pit groups against groups, and divide, fragment, confuse and shatter identities, rights, sensibilities, loyalties and obligations. The articulation of the right to the city, not as a right to property but as a right to appropriate the city, is a fruitful way of thinking about the rights that arise in the city. But the task of disentangling the interests of various groups and mapping power relations in the global city is intensely difficult. And the conceptual and analytical tools that we inherit from the nineteenth-century sociological, political, philosophical and economic traditions of thought as outlined above are scarcely adequate to the task. The nineteenth-century conception of rights in the city were closely associated with the property rights of the bourgeois man. The city as a corporation institutionalized property rights and incorporated the city into the realm of the state with its rationalities of loyalty, virtue, civics, discipline and subsidiarity. Rethinking rights that arise in the age of the global city requires the articulation of rights to the city rather than rights of the city as a container of politics. It also requires rethinking citizenship beyond the confines of the city government and ‘local’ politics. This volume is a contribution to that theoretical and political task.

Overview of this book

This book has four parts. Part I focuses on how globalization affects democracy, citizenship and the city. Dagg focuses on the city as a breeding ground of citizenship and argues that the modern metropolis as it clearly emerged in the second part of the twentieth century is too large, fragmented and its residents too mobile to allow for the creation of collective memory around which citizens can narrate their sense of identity as citizens. Arguing that the modern metropolis cannot serve as a breeding ground for citizenship, Dagg explores the conditions necessary for re-linking the modern metropolis with citizenship. Sassen draws attention to the fact that the so-called ‘dual city’ hypothesis (the polarization of life chances in the global city) is not an accidental but a rational consequence of globalization: both the centralization of powers and marginalization of groups in the global city represent a joint presence of globalization. But this joint presence is brought into focus by the increasing distance between the two. While Sassen examines globalization as a form of urbanization, Urry is concerned with what happens to the identities and loyalties of groups whose lives are bound up with the global city. After effectively illustrating how the
state-centric conception of citizenship runs up against globalization, Urry articulates ‘citizenship of flows’ as a concept through which rights and responsibilities are defined according to access to flows rather than according to fixed property or location. While he does not draw out the implications of this conception for the global city, following Sassen, citizenship of flows is perhaps most appropriate for thinking about government and the global city. Delanty develops the idea of ‘discursive space’ to designate the European global city as a space of flows and considers its implications for the European project of citizenship. Emphasizing that discursive space is less a particular place than a network of relationships (a field in Bourdieu’s sense), Delanty argues that spaces in which European citizenship is being formed are more like the citizenship of flows described by Urry.

What brings Rose, Brodie, Turner and Isin together in Part II is their concern with government and virtue. Rose and Brodie are concerned about neo-liberal technologies of government that constitute the active citizen as an object of government. Turner is concerned about the changing conceptions of virtue under post-modernization and globalization. Rose situates his reflections on citizenship within the ambiguous tension between the city as a space of and incitement to government. The modern city has been constantly defined as a problem of and incitement to government. While, however, the dream of a rational city (in which all vice, disorder, squalor and crime have been eliminated) dominated most of the twentieth century, it has now been abandoned in favour of the dream of a city that governs itself. But self-government refers here to something fundamentally different from the liberal constitution of the city as municipal government. While the liberal conception of government constituted itself via the unified entity of the municipal corporation, under the advanced liberal dream the unit itself is the individual: the active citizen. Citizenship emerges in the city as a game of practices that make certain actions thinkable, possible and meaningful. Rose is concerned with identifying the various logics of these practices rather than the ostensible meanings ascribed to citizenship. Using ‘neo-liberalism’ in a more traditional sense, as a governmental regime rather than as technologies of power, Brodie echoes Rose in warning against a possible nostalgia for grounding politics in the local. She urges us to think of glocal citizenship not as a bundle of rights but as a struggle for expanding the public sphere. In turn, by tracing the trajectory of citizenship from the city-state to nation-state and cosmopolitan-state, Turner explores the possible meaning of cosmopolitan virtue as an ironic, post-emotional stance towards loyalty, obligation and responsibility. Such a stance is most compatible with the complexity and differentiation typically found in global cities. Isin tries to make sense of the major reforms enacted recently to govern Toronto. Isin agrees with Rose that under advanced liberal regimes active citizens have been invited to identify themselves with various communities of identity rather than the city as such, which partly explains why the movement in Toronto against those reforms failed rather rapidly. But Isin also brings a sociology of the professions to bear on governing Toronto: he argues
that the shift from public-sector professions to private-sector professions, and their interests for a privatized, marketized and managerial city, is capable of imposing a particular order in the city as an effective regime of economic and cultural capital accumulation.

In Part III Yuval-Davis, Holton, Wekerle and Rocco explore how various groups that constitute citizens as active in their own government can be harnessed for the radical and progressive claiming of rights. In other words, taking warnings by Rose, Brodie, Turner and Isin to heart, these chapters illustrate how neo-liberal technologies of government can also be taken in different directions. These chapters are concerned with illustrating how the consequences of post-modernization are being harnessed by various social groups to articulate and claim progressive group rights successfully. Wekerle illustrates with empirical cases how the women’s movement has exercised a pluralistic or group-differentiated citizenship. Through a range of global and local practices, women articulated and claimed rights under a variety of identities, as mothers, sisters and workers, and at a variety of spatial levels. They expressed their rights to the city as claims to space and to inclusion in the practices that make those spaces. But how can these practices acquire legitimacy and power? Holton critically examines the challenges posed to liberal conceptions of citizenship based upon individual rights by radical democratic theories arguing for a group-differentiated conception of citizenship. Holton is sympathetic to group-differentiated citizenship, but also draws attention to the dilemma of difference that arises from treating people the same: while such treatment is likely to be insensitive to the particularity, to treat each other as different may equally stigmatize and constrain the other. He is sceptical as to whether such a dilemma can be solved theoretically and wonders if faced with such a dilemma, poetry may play a more active role. Yuval-Davis is confident that group-differentiated citizenship, or what she calls multi-layered citizenship, is not a theoretical luxury but a pragmatic necessity in the face of the complexity that arises in global cities. Once the underlying spatiality of citizenship is recognized, she argues, it becomes obvious that the state or nation cannot deal with the complex ways in which difference is constructed via imaginary and material boundaries and territories. For Rocco, claims to space must be simultaneously associational and spatial. In other words, in order effectively to articulate claims and demand rights, marginal and disfranchised groups must form associations that gain durability, relative permanence and continuity, and making claims to space is a symbolic and material part of this permanence and durability.

Part IV concludes the volume with chapters that critically engage the concepts with which we think about democracy, citizenship and the city. It opens with a proposal for a distinct urban citizenship that bypasses local government institutions. Beauregard and Bounds argue that urban citizenship does not need to be in conflict with other forms of citizenship defined on other scales, such as global or national. They then consider rights and responsibilities that are specific to the urban public realm, which are grouped around the
themes of safety, tolerance, political engagement, recognition and freedom. Ruppert illustrates that theoretical articulations about the global city, democracy and citizenship often come up against the messy realities of politics which involve much more than tidy concepts. Ruppert argues that, while the global city literature is becoming increasingly focused on the marginalized and disfranchised and the global city declared as a possible site in which to articulate and claim rights, there is very little concern about specific tactics and strategies that dominant groups use to bypass democratic procedures, institutions and traditions. The governance of global cities has become increasingly managerial, professional, marketized and privatized. Enacting citizenship and making claims in the global city would be difficult if the institutions that allow subjects to become political agents were to disappear. This final part of the volume includes two chapters, which represent a perhaps distinctly Canadian approach to urban studies. Garber and Magnusson question the metaphorical uses of space and urge us to think about the global city politically. Garber makes an important distinction between material and metaphorical space, and wonders what claiming spaces for citizenship would mean in material terms. She takes the post-modern view of the public sphere as metaphorical space to task and argues that a central feature of citizenship as it is enacted in the global city is its intensely concrete character. When individuals and groups articulate and demand rights, they are not simply contesting meanings or representations but also engaging in physical activities of assembling and protesting. These activities generate not a singular, abstract public sphere but plural public spaces, in that they act from, on and in space and make spaces. Without attention to the concrete activities of creating spaces, it becomes very difficult to understand what is political about the use of ‘politics of space’ as a metaphor. Similarly, Magnusson argues that, despite an overuse of the term ‘politics of space’, contemporary social and political sciences are intensely apolitical in the sense that they constitute their objects of analysis in chaotic abstractions which naturalize the practices of political agents. Magnusson works his way toward an ontology of space in which the global city no longer refers to a place but to the materialization of specific flows. To that end he recovers ‘urbanism as a way of life’ and defends it as a stronger conception of the city as specific place.

Conclusion

This volume is at once a challenge and an invitation to think about the city politically, which means to think about democracy and citizenship spatially. The chapters illustrate how our categories and concepts encase our thoughts in particular ways of seeing and hinder our ability to make connections and establish relationships. Refusing, for example, to consider globalization as a monolithic phenomenon, the volume treats it as both a process captured in the term ‘time-space compression’ and a discourse. It also considers globalization as a sufficiently complex phenomenon, involving not only economic but also at least cultural and social forms. Similarly, democracy in this volume does not
appear as merely a deliberative institution or as procedural rules but also as a substantive form of government that allows groups to articulate and claim rights and govern themselves. We have already alluded to how citizenship is also understood as embodying social, legal and cultural forms, and not as a unitary construct.

The volume is able to work through such complexities in part because its object, the city, is itself such a complex, diverse and mysterious construct. It is perhaps through this complexity and mysteriousness that the city teaches humility and care to its students. It is perhaps because of its multifarious, confusing and bewildering array of practices that the city is able to teach more about the flows and fleeting images of life than any other object. It is perhaps for these reasons that its students have something unique to contribute to an understanding of politics, democracy and citizenship.

Bibliography


