Governing Toronto without government: Liberalism and Neoliberalism

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The recent creation of the new city of Toronto exemplifies the implications of contemporary changes in "urban governmentality." This article argues that the amalgamation of the old constituent municipalities of Metro Toronto must be understood in the context of broader transformations of liberal regimes of government and the success of advanced liberalism in Europe, North America and Australia. Before examining the changes brought about and resisted in Toronto, it briefly outlines the development of the currently dominant neoliberal form of governmentality.

Since the nineteenth century the liberal conception of municipal government constituted the city as a space of government and liberty. This was captured by perhaps one of the most revealing phrases of liberalism, "local self-government" or "local democracy," a concept which embodied two seemingly contradictory movements. First, it expressed autonomy exercised by municipal governments, in that cities were accorded powers to manage their "local" affairs. It was a political space in which the bourgeois man, as owner of property and head of household, learned how to participate in the democratic process and practice his citizenship. Second, the municipality was constituted as a space of government in which groups were subjected to discipline via requirements placed upon municipal government. Hospitals, prisons, schools, policing, and correctional institutions were operated and maintained by municipal governments. There is a telling symbolism in the...
fact that Tocqueville came to America to study the penitentiary system and wrote an influential book about the need for local self-government.¹

Behind the celebrated arrival of individual liberty in the nineteenth century, there arose a bewildering array of practices that governed the conduct of individuals and groups. It seems as if liberty meant only the emancipation of bourgeois man from the shackles of aristocracy; for groups of individuals, which the bourgeoisie depended upon it meant a new tangled web of obligations. While the nineteenth century is replete with the talk of the liberty of bourgeois man (never specified but always universalized), an immense machinery of regulation was put in place that acted upon the conduct of “subaltern” groups. For labouring men and women, children, youth, the poor, the destitute, and the mentally ill, the world of freedom was as abstract as the brave new world of wealth, colonialism and imperialism. In Canada, France, Germany, Britain and the United States the resolution of the conflict between these two “contradictory” principles within liberal rationalities of government, liberty and order, followed different paths. Municipal government in the United States showed the most entrepreneurial zeal in addressing the conflict through creating spaces of liberty and order simultaneously by building up a massive disciplinary infrastructure layered upon the autonomous space of expression and investment. However, in France and Britain the relics of past municipal governments required the heavier hand of states to introduce legislation and open up new spaces of discipline and freedom.²

If we refuse to regard liberalism as a philosophy but as an assemblage of practices of government, how can we describe it?³ Nikolas Rose has suggested that liberalism was a response to a series of problems about the governability of individuals, families, markets and populations in the nineteenth century.⁴ The question that was faced was how to resolve the tension between the need to govern in the interests of order while, at the same time, advocating liberty. This question was framed by a growing number of experts — claiming authority on the basis of knowledge, neutrality and efficacy — who asserted that they could provide solutions to the tension between liberty and order. By a sheer explosion of statistical and other forms of knowledge, these experts described in detail how the lifestyles of various groups (e.g., the mentally ill, immigrants, hysterical women, and unruly children) and the working classes departed from expected and useful norms. The rise of sites for correcting such departures from the norm such as hospitals, correctional facilities, prisons, housing projects and other institutions marked the characteristic form of liberal government. What made liberalism governmental rather than philosophical, was its wish to make itself practical; to connect itself up with various procedures and apparatuses of correction, inculcation and disposition.

There is certainly an affinity between liberalism, as described above, and capitalism. But liberalism as an assemblage of governing practices cannot be read off from the interests of capital or from the dictates of capitalism. To assume a straightforward causal homology between liberalism and capitalism overlooks the fact that governing practices embody their own histories and develop their own rationalities which may or may not link up with the dictates of capital. Moreover, as much as capitalism needed liberal technologies for the discipline of labour, the rise of these technologies also made capitalism possible. For example, well before the rise of factory discipline, the early modern workhouses were crucial in disciplining the poor by inculcating time discipline, responsiveness, and the precise handling of bodies. To be blunt, “the working class” was not simply found in cities looking for jobs; it was physically made into a disciplined class through technologies of power. In other words, liberalism relied on strategies, techniques and procedures through which different state authorities sought to enact programmes of government in relation to different groups and classes. These technologies of power were also crucial in anticipating and encountering resistances and oppositions.⁵ These technologies of power did not derive from a formula but were invented throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe and America. Thus, the more there was talk about the liberty of the bourgeois man, the more there was a proliferation of such techniques which constituted groups as targets of discipline. The constitution
of the self as an object of liberty was linked up with the constitution of groups as objects of discipline.

The tension between order and liberty, between the necessity of making individuals conducive to moral order and the opening up of a space of freedom in which individuals govern themselves, was nowhere more clear than in municipal government. Nineteenth-century liberalism inherited a conception of municipal government which followed the principles of state sovereignty: the municipality was a site of the absolute exercise of power over groups of individuals. For example, the sixteenth and seventeenth century poor laws, under which beggars, vagabonds and other groups were subjected to brutal and punitive power and the cities were ruled by self-perpetuating oligarchies drawn from aristocracy.6 The state of cities in early modern Europe became a major target of reform for liberalism. For example, in England, the bourgeoisie lacked representation in cities, and cities had not yet become technologies of power to target the working classes. However, a series of liberal reforms including the Reform Act (1832) and Municipal Corporations Act (1835), dramatically altered the conception of municipal government. By the second half of the twentieth century, with the rise of the welfare state and the expansion of government services, municipal government increasingly played a more significant role in the provision and delivery of these services. In addition to providing policing, education, hospitals, and prisons, welfare and housing were the most important functions cities assumed. The introduction of metropolitan or regional governments to coordinate, rationalize and provide new soft and hard services such as public transportation, housing, and social services became a widely-used experiment within the liberal rationalities of government7 and municipal government was subsumed within the welfare state.

Neoliberalism, New Classes, and Municipal Government
In the late-twentieth century, from Sweden to New Zealand, we have experienced the rise of new rationalities of government. The primary focus of which has been to "re-engineer" the welfare state through the privatization of utilities and welfare functions; the opening up of health services, social insurance and pension schemes to markets; educational reforms to introduce competition between colleges and universities; the introduction of new forms of management into the civil service modelled upon an image of methods in the private sector; new contractual relations between agencies and service providers and between professionals and clients; and a new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals, their families and their communities to take active steps to secure their own future well-being. In other words, we are seeing the emergence of a new "governmentality:" the deliberations, strategies, tactics and devices employed by authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to ensure effective governance.8

The rise of a new regime of governmentality has been called "advanced liberalism" and its tactics, strategies and rationalities "neoliberal." Consistent with the view that considers liberalism a philosophy, neoliberalism has been defined by its fiscal conservatism, its reduction of the budget deficits that have been the hallmark of the activist welfare state and, therefore, the reduction of the role of government in markets. The problem with this definition is that it focuses upon justifications rather than practices. Some studies have shown, for example, that despite severe cutbacks in the public sector, government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product has actually continued to increase.9 However, if we consider neoliberalism as a series of technologies of power, this apparently paradoxical empirical record may make more sense. In other words, it can be argued that neoliberalism has not been about less government but about shifting the techniques, focus and priorities of government.

Although various neo-conservative regimes have been elected in Britain, the United States, Canada and New Zealand since the 1970s, it would be misleading to suggest that these regimes had a clear political ideology or programme at the outset which they then implemented. Rather, these regimes initially sought to solve some perceived and real problems associated with finance, services and capital accumulation. But gradually, these diverse experiments were
rationalized within a relatively coherent rationality of govern-ment that can be described as advanced liberalism. Despite all the rhetoric of the reduction of government and the rollback of the state, advanced liberalism has not abandoned its will to govern but merely shifted its focus and, more importantly, rationalized some old and invented some new techniques of government. Therefore, the state in liberal democracies is perhaps stronger and more effective in more sectors than it was in the 1970s, and yet, the image that persists is the decline, or even death, of the state. This stems from the fact that many associate the state with its institutions rather than considering it a field of governmental practices in which the government is an agent among others.

In considering the rise of advanced liberalism as an invention of new technologies of power rather than as a decline of the state, three characteristic shifts have been suggested. The first shift concerns a new relationship between expertise and politics. While in liberalism knowledge had come to occupy a central role in government by virtue of its ability to raise claims to truth and validity in fields such as education, health, and cities, the legitimacy and authority of new knowledges do not derive from their truth and validity but from their ability to gauge performance. Accordingly, there has been a shift from the older occupations of law, medicine and academia to the newer occupations of expert consultancy, accountancy, and audit. If the modes of circulation of knowledges that animated liberal technologies of power were verity, validity and reliability, the new modes of circulation are enumeration, calculation, monitoring, and evaluation. With this shift from older occupations to new ones, there is also a shift in the sites where education, training and certification take place. Universities that traditionally educated and trained cadres of public sector professionals in law, medicine and administration are now pressured to shift to new occupations. As well, the new occupations shift their focus from the patient, and the poor to the client and consumer, who are constituted as autonomous individuals capable of making the right choices. Risk reduction has become an individual responsibility rather than a collective or state responsibility. Neoliberalism therefore constitutes the individual not as a subject of intervention but as an active agent of decision and choice. This is a significant shift in the production of subjectivities in that instead of disciplines, the field of choices and its structure becomes a contested arena of political struggle.

The second shift concerns the proliferation of new technologies of power. Evidenced by the increase in quasi-autonomous “non-governmental” organizations, the new technologies emerge out of the shifting of responsibilities from governmental agencies and authorities to organizations without electoral accountability and responsibility (for example, the “privatization” of “public” utilities, civil service, prisons, insurance and security). Again, with the proliferation of these technologies neither the government, its size, nor its will to govern declines. Rather, what shifts is the manner in which individuals are constituted as subjects of government and the agents who are invested with the responsibility of governing.

The third shift concerns a new specification of the subject of government. The rise of the powers of the individual as client or customer of services specifies the subjects of government in a new way. Individuals are now constituted as active purchasers and enterprises in pursuit of their own choices: vouchers in education, housing and other services replace “paternal” forms of distribution. As much as avoiding risk becomes the responsibility of individuals as authors of their own destiny, ill-fate and misfortune also become the responsibility of individuals. In this way, the unemployed, the homeless, and the poor are constituted as responsible for their own condition. Effective governance of such individuals does not necessarily require governmental intervention only a new subjectification.

Just as there were affinities between the rise of liberalism and capitalism, there are affinities between neoliberalism and the rise of new groups and classes and different forms of capital in the late twentieth century. This has been associated with the development of new classes variously described as the “new class,” the professional class or the information bourgeoisie. Sociologists such as Gouldner and Bourdieu argued that the emergence of new groups and classes based
on the accumulation of cultural capital (skills and expertise) has changed the political arrangements and institutions in liberal democracies. The widespread adoption of neoliberal technologies of power undoubtedly favours private sector professionals. Harold Perkin, for example, has argued that the main conflict in liberal democracies today is between public sector and private sector professionals.

Many aspects of the various neoliberal technologies shift responsibilities from the paternalistic state or public professions (such as law, medicine, and academe) toward entrepreneurial professions that emphasize client and consumer control: subjects become consumers who are invested with capacities for making choices and agents are no longer state officials exercising authority over them but experts assisting subjects in making these choices. Again, much of the shift toward privatization does not really cost less in terms of delivering government services but shifts control to these new professions. Brint has characterized this shift as that from “social trustee professions” to “expert professionals.” In short, in advanced liberalism, while the agents of power undergo alteration and begin to deploy new technologies of power, the exercise of power shifts from government as an authority to governance practices that operate throughout the social body — hence governance without government.

How does neoliberalism constitute municipal government? What role does the municipality play in neoliberal technologies of power? Amidst much talk about liberty, markets and consumerism, there is an increasing and parallel emphasis on communities as means of government: Rose argues that consonant with the emphasis of neoliberalism on conceiving individuals as active participants in their own government, the relations of obligation shifted from citizens and society, mediated and regulated by the state, to relations between active individuals and their immediate communities of allegiance and care. The interesting aspect of the increasing emphasis on community, in the neoliberal grammar of government and politics, is that the term itself originated as a critique of bureaucratic and rational government. Nonetheless, it has been now incorporated into a neoliberalism that constitutes various communities: moral (religious, ecological, feminist), lifestyle (taste, style and modes of life), and activist. Such communities are construed as heterogeneous, overlapping and multiple, commanding unstable and ephemeral allegiances and existing “only to the extent that their constituents are linked together through identifications constructed in the non-geographic spaces of activist discourses, cultural products and media images.” From the point of view of this new conception of community, the subject is addressed as a moral individual with bonds of obligation and responsibilities for conduct that are assembled in a way that traverses established boundaries including those of cities. Thus, rights are not given today to municipal governments but to groups that define their own moral and geographic boundaries that do not match the fixed boundaries of municipal governments.

Modern municipal government does not fit the image of deterritorialized communities that are spread across boundaries and interconnected via a variety of geographic and non-geographic links. Municipal governments, with fixed boundaries and self-enclosed spaces of regulation are unable
Studies in Political Economy

...to meet the new specification of the subject and its government. In other words, municipal government becomes one agent among other technologies of power. As we have seen, many of the functions of modern municipal government such as housing, hospitals, prisons, schools and correctional institutions have either already shifted to the senior levels of government or have been privatized. Modern city government is increasingly like an empty shell whose territory marks out the once-meaningful boundaries of the political. I have called elsewhere the rise of this new urban form the “cosmopolis.”¹⁶ In my view, all those who argue for metropolitan forms of government and other political and institutional arrangements are trying to impose a solution to a problem that has already disappeared from neoliberal thought.

In the last two decades in the UK, the US and New Zealand, municipal government reforms converged on a few elements: forced reduction in municipal expenditures, via a combination of controls on municipal budgets and reduction in transfers; downloading and decentralizing services, via enabling municipal governments to privatize; reforming and consolidating property tax by centralizing its control; radical education reforms which introduced central control and abolished local control; radical public health reforms to centralize control; forcing municipal governments to abandon services such as housing and sell local authority owned dwellings; and, centralizing and/or privatizing correctional and punitive institutions. Admittedly, each of these elements worked out rather differently in each jurisdiction. Nevertheless, to varying degrees each neoliberal regime sought to implement these and to do so very quickly. Obviously taken together, or in any combination, these elements go far beyond “municipal restructuring” as they constitute a radical restructuring of political economy.¹⁷

More recently, these elements were implemented by various governments in Canada, notably the conservative governments in Alberta and Ontario and “left” governments in Quebec and British Columbia. In Ontario, these elements found their expression in a remarkable small document that was initially ridiculed by many on the left but which became the campaign platform for the Progressive Conservative Party in the 1995 provincial election: the Common Sense Revolution (CSR). Although arguments were made that the CSR had not made promises for restructuring, or even amalgamating, municipal government an examination of its premises reveals that the seismic legislation the Harris government introduced in the first two years of its mandate (1995-97) stems from its zeal to implement the CSR, a neoliberal programme.

**Governing Toronto without Government** It is against this background of the precise transformations of liberal regimes of government and the rise of advanced liberalism, that the creation of the new city of Toronto must be understood. The amalgamation of the constituent municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto has sharpened, and brought to the fore, the main political fault lines in the city. The inner city constituency of public sector professional-managerial classes reacted defensively, invoking a rhetoric of democracy and citizenship. By contrast, the immigrant groups, visible minorities and working classes largely watched all this with indifference, perhaps corroborating my earlier suggestion that modern city government is increasingly like an empty shell whose territory marks out the once-meaningful boundaries of the political. These groups remained on the sidelines during the fight against amalgamation and, during the subsequent election in November 1997, they actively forged ahead with an agenda — new voices for the new city — which saw amalgamation as an opportunity to secure rights for immigrant groups. This was a major defeat for the public sector professional-managerial classes that coalesced under the banner of Citizens for Local Democracy — affectionately known as C4LD — coming at the end of an arduous fight to stop amalgamation.

At first, C4LD appeared to be heading for success. There were two reasons for this. First, when the proposed amalgamation of the constituent municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto was announced in October 1996, the opposition against the Harris government had been building in Ontario for more than 16 months since it was elected in June 1995.
Beginning with the swearing-in ceremony on June 26, the Harris government had been greeted with protests by various social justice groups such as the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty and Metro Network for Social Justice. These protests were widened by the labour movement via a series of “days of action” in which London, Hamilton, Kitchener-Waterloo, Peterborough and, finally, on October 26, Toronto had become the sites of massive demonstrations and strikes. Although, and expectedly, downplayed by the government, the impact of these demonstrations was beyond doubt, at least in raising the profile of opposition in the media. Although organized labour remained skeptical of municipal politics and kept its distance from C4LD, when C4LD began its agitation to organize, it was addressing already-politicized Torontonians.

Second was the class composition of C4LD. The Harris government was conceived right from the beginning as a movement against public-sector professionals, social-interest groups, public-sector unions who staffed provincial and municipal bureaucracies, and professionals in education, the arts, media and government; essentially groups that are concentrated in large cities of the province. As shown in Table 2, Toronto is the largest and the most concentrated city of the new class. The Harris government targeted the public sector segment of the new class from the day it gained power. Not only did it pass legislation to dramatically reduce the provincial government workforce (leading to the first-ever strike by the union of provincial employees in February-March 1996) but it also systematically targeted lawyers and doctors, though with limited success. While the government opened these fronts all at once, these groups did not coalesce until the very city in which they lived became itself the target. The proposed amalgamation of the city with its post-war suburbs would potentially unleash an intellectual assault that probably few governments have ever endured. The more than 500 deputants of the hearings on Bill 103 (the City of Toronto Act) included the critical voices of prominent urbanists such as Jane Jacobs, artists, less well-known historians, constitutional experts, economists, political scientists, sociologists, planners, journalists and other very eloquent and not so ordinary citizens. Although expecting, in fact almost reveling in, opposition, there is no doubt that the Harris government was still startled by the depth, sophistication, and strength of this uproar.

**TABLE 2**

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<th>Occupational Concentration in Toronto Against Ontario and Canada, 1991</th>
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Source: Statistics Canada, Catalogue 93-3520XP

A “rebellion” march, the referendums and its incredible skills in commanding symbolic capital throughout February and March made it all look like perhaps the Harris government was about to suffer its first loss and humiliation in the hands of the very class that it targeted. The Harris government had looked quite powerful until that moment when even its officials complained that they were unable to get their message across. To counteract the symbolic domination of the public sector professionals, the Harris government itself embarked upon an embarrassing and desperate media campaign. The downloading, privatization, and the contempt of the Harris government for democratic process had never been so clearly and forcefully exposed and some citizens really believed that the success of the Stop Spadina protest was about to repeat itself.

Nonetheless, C4LD lost the battle. As much as C4LD achieved a certain political mobilization in the city of Toronto, its grammar of politics and its tactics also failed as a movement. At one level, its failure was obvious: despite all the activities of C4LD, the Harris government pressed
on with its agenda with little alteration and little concern for the resistance and opposition. The City of Toronto Act passed in April 1997 with little change and the government continued its “downloading” of services to the municipalities across the province. It also moved ahead with its other policies including centralizing the property taxation system and its overtake of the education system. Meanwhile, C4LD, on the one hand was tangled up in a futile Citizens’ legal challenge to Bill 103 (led by a smaller group), and, on the other, had shrunk back to a handful of citizens who were becoming increasingly despondent.

At another level, the failure has been even deeper. From the beginning, C4LD appealed to and was led by the new class, which was, compared to Toronto’s ethnic, racial and class profile, strikingly homogenous. Although it was not expected that C4LD would appeal to organized labour — which remained skeptical of not only C4LD but of other social movements — there was a real expectation or hope that it would appeal to the “new social movements.” Instead, the movement for local democracy failed to appeal to the mass of ethnic, immigrant, low-income service workers, tradesmen and other political groups that are spread around Metropolitan Toronto. Moreover, C4LD and its grammar of politics was increasingly interpreted as the voice of the self-interested professional class in the inner city of Toronto with little regard for its “suburban” counterparts (see Figure 1). As well, while, to a certain extent, it attempted to align with other groups on issues of social welfare and social justice, their interests were often too far apart. The supporters of the government used this to their advantage.

To declare C4LD as a failure may be considered a harsh judgement. The movement against the Harris government, that was accelerated by the amalgamation of Toronto and joined by the province’s teachers and unions against Bill 136 (which attempted to roll back the right to strike), would appear to have won certain concessions from the government, at least in making it pause, even if only for publicity and re-election reasons. The role of C4LD in this broader movement should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the grammar of politics that revolved around local democracy
and citizenship fell upon deaf ears and failed to achieve either concrete results or concessions from the government and failed to attract broader groups. This lesson was pain-
fully brought home during the municipal elections in which the “suburban” vote brought Mel Lastman into power, a polit-
tician held in contempt and ridiculed by the city elite. Yet, his message, “freeze the taxes,” was heard loud and clear by the groups that surround the city. Not because these groups were well-off suburbanites “who liked their lawns,” as the city elite would like to think of them, but because they were the groups made up of immigrants, refugees, the working poor, non-unionized and low income service work-
ers and tradesmen, who felt the most adverse impacts of the declining real wages in Ontario in the last decade. It is these groups that, perhaps, the old City of Toronto’s new class never understood.

Neoliberalism, Movements, Resistance Although there are several specific and contingent reasons behind the amalga-
mation of Toronto, it must, nevertheless, be understood against the background of a shift toward advanced liberalism. The Harris government felt very little affinity for local dem-
ocracy or local government not because it is “anti-demo-
cratic” but because the rationalities it represents are those of advanced liberalism. There is no doubt that the Harris government reached its conclusion to amalgamate Toronto as a result of its broader policies to centralize property taxa-
tion; restructure and centralize education; rationalize and download services; and force municipalities to reduce ex-
penditures and privatize. Much has been said about the fact that the introduction of the amalgamation of municipalities was inconsistent with the traditional Tory philosophy. This view misses the fact that municipal government has a very limited role in neoliberal programmes. The new city of Toronto has so few powers that it is really nothing more than a board of the provincial government. However, seeking new powers for municipal government should not be the aim of progressive politics.

Under advanced liberalism the focus of urban politics has shifted from municipal government as a locus of power to diverse sites of power such as private and nongovernmental provision and delivery of services. The new subjects of gov-
ernment — clients, customers, consumers, users — govern themselves everyday in the face of growing complexity and uncertainty, seeking the best possible alternatives and choices. This has resulted in a growing polarization in the distribution of not only economic capital but also of social and cultural capital. While there are those who are increas-
ingly at liberty to create options in terms of where they live, work, play and seek health and educational services for themselves and their children, there are those for whom such choices are becoming ever more limited. To participate in the game of “conduit of conduct” and self-constitution requires not only economic capital but also social and cultural capital in the form of linguistic ability, educational resources and social competence. In fact, the lack of cultural and social capital often blocks access to economic capital. The aim of progressive politics must be, while questioning the formation of subjects as merely customers, clients and consumers, to seek new group rights for those unable to compete in the market due to lack of economic, social and cultural capital, and who increasingly find themselves under oppressive conditions. If the city is the space of the struggles for these rights, the state still remains as the source and granter of them.

It has become the self-fulfilling prophecy of the profes-
sional classes that the state is dead. It is said that with glo-
balization of the world economy and the rise of transnational organizations and markets, the state is neither capable of delivering services nor of responding to new rights-claims. Not only is there evidence that the state has become larger, stronger and more effective but also, if the analysis of neolib-
eralism is correct, it has shifted its emphasis and priorities. The will to govern the conduct of individuals and groups has not disappeared but it has become more widespread. Every neoconservative government that has been associated with the neoliberal technologies of power in Britain, America, Europe and Canada has passed more legislation and regulation than its predecessors have. The irony, that should not be lost on anyone, is that the implementation of neoliberalism probably
required more legislation, regulation and state resources than that of social democracy.

Instead of accepting the “death of the state” as a self-evident and inevitable truth there is a need to rethink ways in which the state can be invoked as an agent of a new series of social, cultural, political, and group rights. Instead of seeking rights for municipal government as territorial polities, deterritorialized group rights must be taken seriously. As Warren Magnusson has recently argued, one of the promising aspects of the new social movements in the last twenty years is to have opened up new political spaces other than the self-enclosed spaces of the municipal government. Magnusson has illustrated how the municipality has been reclaimed by various social movements (a category which Magnusson retains despite some concerns) such as feminism, environmentalism and that of the First Nations. Magnusson has convincingly argued that the municipality is neither an apparatus of the state nor an autonomous (sovereign) entity. Rather, it is a liminal or marginal space where identities are contested, negotiated and remade through the flow of ideas, practices and struggles. The municipality is thus neither a self-enclosed nor a self-sufficient space but is an open space of flows. As such, it has been the site and incubator of the most critical and progressive movements in the last two decades ranging from the sanctuary movements to free nuclear zones, from local socialism to aboriginal claims.

Being narrowly focused on municipal government as a container of politics, C4LD has fashioned an old style of politics for newly emerging realities. While the Harris government simply regarded the current municipal institutions as at best irrelevant and at worst an impediment to implementing the CSR, C4LD increasingly relied on a liberal grammar of politics that invoked “democracy,” “due process,” “citizenship” and “public good.” The Harris government was well aware that it was not simply implementing a revolution forged in the backrooms of politics, but that it was giving a programmatic form to technologies, techniques, mentalities and rationalities that have been emerging in the social body along with the new alignment of groups and classes. The Harris government also knew who its constituency was: the rising new professional and para-professional classes in the non-public sectors of the economy, largely in managerial, executive, media, high-technology and technical service industries, whose lives are already ordered in a different way and who accept the technologies of neoliberal government as rational and necessary. As consumers and customers, they constitute themselves as active purchasers of services in the market. The Harris government presented itself effectively as the voice of a new rationality; one on the side of history.

Resistance movements are making two mistakes. The first is to assume that a new provincial government will do things differently. Even if the Harris government does not manage to forge a second term the revolution it has initiated will by and large remain. This happened in Britain, America, and New Zealand. In fact, the left governments that replaced the radical right governments have continued with neoliberal programmes with even more success. The second is to refuse to delineate the new technologies of power in all their precision and exactitude. Governing Toronto without government means that neoliberal technologies of power are not invented and implemented in a top-down hierarchical way and implemented via government but are rationalizations of emerging practices throughout the social body. The left rhetoric of a “corporate or global agenda” is far too simplistic to capture this complex change.

Neoliberalism has potentially useful aspects for the new social movements precisely because it has accelerated the acknowledgement that power has shifted from municipal government as a self-enclosed, territorial jurisdiction, to manifold sites of power in which municipal government is one actor among others. Its emphasis on breaking dependence on the public professions, and its attack on at least certain fields of professional expertise, can also be turned into advantage for the very groups that it disciplines such as the poor, youth, homeless, welfare recipients and criminals. A new grammar of politics and a new set of tactics and strategies are needed to counteract neoliberalism. Those who want to resist the policies of the Harris government,
which aim to eliminate various labour, gender, ethnic and other group and class rights, must not seek to reconstitute these groups as victims. Instead, a new progressive politics must allow the formation of deterritorialized group identities (youth, students, immigrants, visible minorities, jobless) as active forces by creating platforms and forums for their articulation, proliferation and recognition.

Notes

I am grateful to Evelyn Ruppert, Greg Albo, Warren Magnusson, Myer Siemiatycki, Frances Frisken and Alette Willis for providing critical comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am indebted to Warren Magnusson for pointing out to me the symbolism in Tocqueville’s works. I would also like to acknowledge that the map and data used for this paper are drawn from a large scale research project on urban citizenship and immigration in the Greater Toronto Area. I would like to thank my co-researcher Myer Siemiatycki and the Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement (CERIS) for their support.


3. Following Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality, a number of authors have suggested a rather different usage based on the idea of a liberal mode of government Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Graham Burchell, “Liberal Government and Techniques of Self,” in Foucault and Political Reason, ed. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). The term government follows Foucault in that it does not refer simply to governing insti-

...tutions, and less so to the party in power, but to different modes through which individuals affect the conduct of other individuals. On this view of government, the rules and principles that regulate a household, neighbourhood, municipality, or state all embody government. On this usage, then, liberalism refers not to a political ideology or doctrine but the assemblage of techniques, rationalities, methods and instruments of government that constitutes individuals and influences their conduct.


17. In Britain, the Thatcher and major governments introduced and implemented almost all these elements. Brian D. Jacobs, Fractured Cities: Capitalism, Community and Empowerment in Britain and America (London: Routledge, 1992).

18. Jon Caulfield, City Form and Everyday Life: Toronto’s Gentrification and Critical Social Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). In 1991, Statistics Canada began collecting data on occupations based on a new national occupational classification system (NOC). The two major attributes of jobs, which were used as classification criteria in developing the NOC, are skill level and skill type. Other factors, such as industry and occupational mobility, were also taken into consideration. Skill level is defined generally as the amount and type of education and training required to enter and perform the duties of an occupation. Four major categories of NOC are: A (professional occupations requiring university degree including bachelor’s, master’s or post-graduate); B (para-professional and technical occupations requiring two to three years of post secondary education at community college or institute of technology or two to four years of apprenticeship training or three to four years of secondary school and more than two years of on-the-job training, training courses or specific work experience); C (routine occupations requiring one to four years of secondary school education, up to two years of on-the-job training, training courses or specific work experience); D (manual occupations up to two years of secondary school and short work demonstration or on-the-job training); and M (managerial occupations). These groups roughly correspond to major classes. See J. Ben-David, “Professions in the Class System of Present-Day Societies,” Current Sociology 12 (1964): 247-330; Harriet Bradley, Fractured Identities: Changing Patterns of Inequality (London: Polity Press, 1996); Brint, In an Age of Experts; Val Burris, “The Discovery of the New Middle Classes,” in The New Middle Classes: Life-Styles, Status Claims and Political Orientations, ed. Arthur J. Vidich, Main Trends in the Modern World (New York: New York University Press, 1993); Tim Butler and Mike Savage, eds., Social Change and the Middle Classes (London: UCL Press, 1995); Clement and Myles, Relations of Ruling; Rosemary Crompton, Class and Stratification: An Introduction to Current Debates (London: Polity Press, 1993); Gosta Esping-Andersen, “Post-industrial Class Structures: An Analytical Framework,” in Changing Classes, ed. Gosta Esping-Andersen (London: Sage, 1995); Wright, Class Counts; John Scott, Stratification and Power: Structures of Class, Status and Command (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); David J. Lee and Bryan S. Turner, eds., Conflicts About Class: Debating Inequality in Late Industrialism (London: Longman, 1996).


