Racism, criminalisation and the development of night-time economies: two case studies in London and Manchester

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Abstract

Nightlife has historically been identified as a social problem. In the contemporary context, however, this perspective competes with the promotion of the ‘night-time economy’ as a source of economic regeneration and extended licensing as a means to establish a more genteel ‘café society’. However, these changes have concealed a reconfiguration of differentiating strategies. This paper explores this neglected issue through two cases studies, one based in London and one in Manchester, and examines the fate of black cultural forms, venues and licensees in contemporary nightlife. It will argue that, due to the historical criminalisation of black youth, music and residential areas, black cultural spaces have been subject to a process of exclusion in the new playgrounds of the night-time economy. The implications of this for social cohesion will be examined.
Introduction

Contemporary discourses surrounding the contemporary night-time economy illustrate a dual narrative. On the one hand, government (as represented by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport who since June 2002 held responsibility for the passing of the Licensing Act 2003) and big business is concerned to highlight the benefits of a ‘café and wine bar’ lifestyle. As such, neo-liberal concepts such as the ‘24 hour economy’ have become common currency, manifesting itself in the limited and staggered extended licensing hours, the growth of supply and a new Act that is assumed to deregulate hours further. These trends have widespread currency because of changing economies, culture and lifestyle patterns and in particular the need to regenerate, by any means, deprived inner city neighbourhoods (Lovatt 1996, O’Connor and Wynne 1996).

On the other hand, concerns have been raised about implications for social order of such changes. Historically of course, popular night-time activities have always been a focus for governmental and intellectual concern (Schlör 1998, Kohn 1992). What is new, however, is that the governance of the night-time economy, rather than criminalising popular entertainment and the spaces in which it operates per se, differentiates between acceptable chain-led, café style and family orientated cultural spaces, and those deemed unacceptable or ‘dangerous’ (Thomas and Bromley 2000, Chatterton and Hollands 2002). In
particular, as analysed elsewhere (Zukin 1989), it is precisely the process of social differentiation exemplified in the concept of gentrification (Smith 1996, Zukin 1989), which has driven cultural differentiation in the night-time economy (Chatterton and Hollands 2003). Amin, Massey and Thrift (2000), for example, point to the way in which the new urban cultural economy exemplified in the New Labour/Rogers axis is being built around the interests and concerns of the middle-classes to the exclusion of the actual diversity of city life. Chatterton and Hollands (2002) similarly point to the dominance of young professionals in the city ‘playscapes’ (2002:95) and the closure of ‘alternative’ spaces not dominated by the logic of consumption (Chatterton and Hollands 2003).

The aim of the two cases discussed in this paper was to consider the location or position of black cultural spaces (1) within this new locus of differentiation, and in particular the process by which, in certain localities, black cultural forms have, through either direct or institutionally racist means, become signifiers of dangerousness perpetuated through institutional practices. In this, it is recognised that black and minority ethnic communities and indeed the nature of local economic and social development itself have been uniquely affected by local institutional practices that are mediated through the subjectivity of racial discrimination (Rex and Moore 1967) and the spaces of the night peculiarly so given their historically marginalisation in political configurations.
Historically, there has been a long association of black cultural forms with perceived ‘dangerousness’ (Becker 1963, Gilroy 1987, Kohn 1992, Back & Keith 1999) and an association of black culture with criminality (Hall et. al. 1978, Gilroy 1987, Keith 1993, Griffin 1993). This latter manifestation of criminalisation was connected to the so-called ‘race riots’ (2) that occurred in various cities in the UK in the 1980s, despite the official analysis of causation lying in social deprivation and community-police relations (Scarman Report 1981). ‘Black music’ – and what has been labelled as such (3) - has occupied the position as a symbol of riot, resistance and violence for a long time (Chambers 1985, Gilroy 1987, Hebdige 1987) and has therefore served as one of the targets of authority. From calypso and Rastafarian culture to rap and jungle, all these genres have been subjected to a conflation of culture with criminality (Baker 1993, Gilroy 1987, Hebdige 1987, Rose 1994, Neal 1999). As became clear during the Brixton Inquiry, black musical venues were seen as a causative factor in criminality (Scarman Report 1981). Historically, at least, black cultural forms were regularly clearly differentiated as ‘dangerous’, either in themselves, or through those associated with them (Kohn 1992).

Such debates continue as a ‘historical residue’ of institutional practice is being overlaid with the ideology of multiculturalism and the partial cooption of black cultural forms or symbols into popular culture, whilst continuing to deny opportunities in practice (Solomos and Back 1995). As Banerjea (2000) points out, the formal celebration of difference and the fascination with ‘otherness’ is a
symbolic displacement of transgression and a continuance of the ‘Orientalist’ perspective that consolidates and contains, rather than mitigates, racialised power structures. In this sense, the mainstreaming of black and minority cultural forms does not mean mainstreaming in socio-economic terms; their appropriation does not necessarily imply an increase in the power or income on behalf of their authors and practitioners (Hutnyk 2000, Negus 2002). Basu’s and Werbner’s (2001) claim for a recognition of successful ‘black entrepreneurship’, which they make in relation to hip hop production in the US, can only be supported alongside their argument against the castigation of black commercial involvement in cultural production by some cultural critics. However, this shall not distract from the urgency of recognizing the prevalence of racist discrimination met by many black cultural producers at more local levels of the cultural industries.

The institutional and structural problems faced by black cultural producers in the night-time economy form the focus of the two area case studies examined in this paper. In particular, it explores the inability of the historically prominent Afro-Caribbean communities to take advantage of cultural regeneration due to the interrelated process of gentrification and the practice of licensing, largely because of institutionally racist practices in the regulation of nightlife. This has had particular crucial implications for the politically relevant issue of freedom of cultural expression in the night-time economy (Chevigny 1991, Street 1997) and, ironically, for the problem of disorder itself (4).
This paper will firstly outline methodological issues surrounding these two projects before going on to consider the interrelated areas of culture, economic development, regulation and racism in relation to the place of these cultural forms in the night-time economy. In the conclusion the paper will examine why exclusion from the new ‘night-time economy’ matters.

Methodology

The data discussed in this paper is drawn from two doctoral research projects, conducted independently yet in roughly the same period in London and Manchester. The research in London took place between 1998 and 2000, although it also examined retrospectively the impact of regeneration projects, licensing and policing from 1993 to 1998 and sought earlier documentation concerning the post-war period in general. The research in Manchester took place between January 1999 and May 2001.

In Manchester, the research focused on the position of black practitioners in the city’s night-time economy, their employment context and experiences of exclusion, while in the London case study, emphasis was given to the spaces of nightlife and the forces – cultural, economic and legal – that shaped them, in the context of the changing nature cultural spaces. Both studies used participant
observation in nightclubs and local spaces and semi-structured interviews, supplemented by documentation particularly in the case of the London study. There were key differences in the two cases relating to those interviewed. In the Manchester study, the respondents were night-time economy practitioners, cultural producers in a narrow sense, arts administrators and managers of cultural industry initiatives. In the London case, those interviewed consisted of: board members of the Southview Challenge Company Limited (SCCL) which included representatives of the Executive, big business, the Small (Black) Business Forum, the Tenants Forum and the Community Forum; individuals involved in planning and regeneration in Southview Borough Council, members of the Borough Licensing Committee, officers from the Metropolitan Police and club owners or licensees.

A central concern that needed to be addressed with relation to both research projects, given the focus of the research, was the white ethnicity of both researchers (Gunaratnam 2003). Both researchers found that access was not denied to them for a variety of reasons. While the research carried out in Manchester was conducted by a stranger not only to the city, but also to the country, the distance purchased by being a foreigner, might have helped to compensate in some way for the problematic position of being white and inquiring about experiences of racist exclusion. Furthermore, access was facilitated through local cultural practitioners. In the London case, the researcher had lived in the area, knew it well, and also access was facilitated by ‘guides’.
However, it is important to acknowledge that this particular constellation influenced both access to the interviewed subjects and data partly as advantage (for example in interviews with regulatory agencies), partly as disadvantage (for example in the case of ‘black only’ events). While the issue of legitimisation to interpret the experience of racism on behalf of black people remains contentious, the support granted to this research by its participants can be interpreted as a welcoming gesture.

An additional issue of note in the London study was the use of an area pseudonym (‘Southview’). While this was necessary to facilitate access to fearful respondents and protect the area from press intrusion, it is important to note the obvious limitations to offering guarantees of anonymity as shown in previous case studies (Lynd and Lynd 1929).

Although these two research projects used slightly different methods and focused on differing actors, commonalities were found in the narrative and experiences of exclusion. In particular, both studies found the relationship between culture, economic development and regulation to be key in terms of understanding the development of nightlife in general and the experience of black cultural actors in particular. Hence, it has been possible to cross-reference findings in three key areas to be examined in the following sections of this paper: cultural change and criminalisation; economic development strategies; and social differentiation in licensing and policing and policing practices.
Cultural change and criminalisation

In both case studies the popular cultural forms that had developed in the retrospective areas had been shaped by discrimination and criminalisation of the incoming West Indian population. In Southview, particularly from the 1960s, many blues clubs or ‘shebeens’ had sprung up (illegal or semi-illegal venues or private parties), which had developed in response to a ‘colour bar’ in West End entertainment spaces (Patterson 1963, Kettle and Hodges 1982, Gilroy 1987, Keith 1993). These venues, along with more legal West Indian owned premises, had been subject to varying pressure from residents, the council and the police, according to local and London-wide records. Shebeens have also played a central role for the practice of black cultural forms in Manchester, even more so since black people experienced increasing exclusion from many local clubs and pubs in the 1950s. Similar to Southview, these parties attracted police attention yet managed to emerge and survive for a long time (Champion 1990, Haslam 1999).

However, it was also the case that all ‘alternative’ cultural forms were subject to institutional pressure with concerns seemingly centring on cross-cultural association. For example, across London in the 1960s jazz or beat clubs were a focus for political discussion in so far as they were perceived to be having a detrimental impact on young people. Fears in particular centred on contact with
drugs and ‘undesirable persons’ (Public Records HO300/8). The 1960s in Manchester also saw an increasing emergence of bars, clubs and cafes more generally, many of which were unlicensed and closed by the police or the city council. In Manchester, this proliferation of unlicensed venues was a key target in the Chief Constable’s reports in the mid 1960s and then of the Manchester Corporation Bill 1965 that granted extended powers to Greater Manchester Police in the regulation of so-called ‘entertainment clubs’. Clubs appealing to young people and ‘men of colour’ were particularly pathologized by the police (Lee 1996).

During the 1970s and 1980s night venues in Southview and Moss Side were affected by the social conflict between ethnically defined minority populations and the police resulting from racialised and aggressive policing practices (Hall et.al.1978, Gilroy 1987, Keith 1993). In particular, national and local discourses centred on an association between young black males and criminality, and, in turn, an association of criminality with black venues and parties in both areas. The raids and generalised police harassment culminated in street fighting and in the aftermath established in the national imagination an association of Southview and Moss Side with crime, fear and disorder. It was an association that shaped the architecture, culture, economy (Sparks et al. 2001) and local spaces of these areas, thus reflecting the impact of local politics on popular culture (Street 1997).
In Southview, the impact of the moral panic had differential consequences in terms of attitudes and cultural patterning, which became particularly marked in the 1990s push towards gentrification. From the 1970s onwards, for example, the peculiar combination of rebellion and black cultural development attracted political radicals, ‘bohemia’ (Gilroy 1987, Back 1996) and cultural entrepreneurs, who additionally set up local projects in the area, a key venue being a local art house cinema. These cultural entrepreneurs attempted to appreciate and tolerate the ‘special’ character of Southview, and when interviewed exhibited a high level of concern and the importance of inculcating good community relations. The process may be equated with Thornton’s (1995) concept of ‘subcultural capital’, which described a situation where individuals were able to access economic capital through their presumed connection with alternative or bohemian sections of society.

In Southview however, early direct association with local black community forms and local engagement gave way to a plethora superimposed culture of dance bars, where individuals would still claim a subcultural status despite being a non-organic cultural form. Throughout the 1990s the old cultural forms described above had given way almost entirely to the undercapitalised (5) trendy bars of the predominantly white twenty-something cultural economy, and with it, a new generation of incomers (6).
The new generation of incomers contrasted starkly with the older generations, being more affluent and socially transient ‘cultural tourists’ (7). Despite new waves of incomers who, as was noted throughout the research, were attracted by the special character of Southview, it was noted locally by one study that older residents were unhappy about the willingness of the younger population to report problems to the police and other authorities (Butler & Robson 2001). This new population pattern influenced both property prices, the nature of the local cultural economy, and spatial patterning. It has been noted that people employ strategies of risk avoidance in their choice of living areas, travel and cultural choices - a pattern noted by Thomas (2000) in his study of Butetown in Cardiff and echoed in a recent study on leisure patterns by Back, Crabbe and Solomos (2001) which indicated that these choices are racialised. Southview was no exception to this trend, with the multi-coloured undercapitalised spaces of the dance bars being dominated almost entirely by white clientele while the three upmarket venues that deliberately styled themselves to appeal to a more racially mixed clientele attracted just that. One black venue owner, for example, complained that Southview felt like a safari park in which visitors would seek sanctuary in their taxis and “scuttle from one bar to the next whilst looking at the dangerous beasts outside”.

As such, Southview has been shaped by a racial dynamic, which was one of economic racial segregation and discrimination productive of increasing violence overlaid by the fact of, and the mythology of, political and
countercultural expression, a dualism that accounted for both its ‘frisson’ and an image that was central to funding strategies. As one community organiser put it:

…in Southview its because we must have this myth of badness because if we don’t have this myth of badness what else have we got but a load of poor people who are badly educated. We have no other image and we would just be basically the ugliest of the working class and that’s not an image anybody would be happy to settle with. So they go for this violent, dangerous thing, and its been a winner up to now because we’ve got Challenge money out of it, we’ve got Estate Action out of it, we’ve got European money out of it…” (Southview Challenge Tenants Forum).

However, what this entailed in relation to the night-time economy was a perspective of spatial change in local economic and regulatory strategies. Whilst making use of subcultural rhetoric that was strongly related to the achievements expressed historically through the Afro-Caribbean population, a process of change was taking place that effectively altered the nature of nightlife in the area. This will be explored in the following sections.

In the case of Manchester, the discursive construct of ‘Gun-Chester’ that emerged in the early 1990s denoted the spatialization of violence and the criminalisation of night time culture particularly well. Opposed to the hedonistic representation of the city in notions such as ‘Gaychester’ and ‘Madchester’
(Fitzpatrick and Ryan 1996), ‘Gunchester’ was a spatialized reference to gun-supported violence that was staged in several city centre clubs at the beginning of the 1990s. While the term was dismissed as media construct (Collin 1997, p.179), it had significant effects particularly on black practitioners in the nightlife economy.

A crucial element of the Gunchester narrative was violence related to territorial clashes of drug suppliers, more commonly referred to as ‘turf war between rival gangs’. Significantly, this narrative was spatialized through various interpretations of the gangs’ origins in Manchester, which always included Moss Side (Savage 1992), alongside other working class areas. Manchester chronicler and DJ Dave Haslam considered the ‘breakdown of the neighbourhood territories’ of gangs in neighbourhood dancehalls as the source of conflict in the city centre, while ‘subsequent gang violence in Manchester clubs has continued to be drawn from gangs based on localities: Cheetham Hill, Salford, Moss Side’ (Haslam 1999: 74-5). This narrative was complemented by the qualification of Manchester’s showcase club Haçienda as the ‘jewel of the crown’ (Savage 1992, 50), surrounded by ‘dangerous suburbs’. The manager of Manchester’s former showcase club, the Haçienda, offered the following analysis in the early 1990s:

*It had to do with the geographical make up of Manchester, this big city in a small city. You’ve got these three suburbs, Moss Side, Cheetham Hill and...*
The few existing café and club venues in Moss Side became increasingly stigmatised, even by those who used to frequent them still in the 1980s. A long-standing DJ at the Haçienda argued that the mentioned areas were ghettoised through the 1980s and a ‘more lawless attitude’ emerged, which he contrasted to the early 1980s where he would still take visiting people to the ‘very integrated’ club Reno in Moss Side (Pickering quoted in Savage 1992: 32). This and a few other local venues in Moss Side were closed down in the course of regeneration developments in the 1990s.

One of the problems that most interviewed cultural practitioners pinpointed was the related conflation of the security problems emerging in Manchester’s city centre clubs in the early 1990s with the particular criminalisation of Moss Side and its inhabitants. Frustration about the moral panics that imbued reports on criminal incidents in Moss Side were found in the accounts of present and former residents of Moss Side, many of whom left the area if they could, often in order to escape the long existing phenomenon of ‘post-code discrimination’ (Mellor 1997, Bauder 2002):

… you can have a shooting in Preston, which might make third page of the Manchester Evening News. But if someone stubbed their toe in Moss Side, it
makes front page news you know. If there is a shot, a bullet shot in Moss Side, then it's: oh! Its drugs, its culture, its part of the drug culture. And that unfortunately - that's what it is! I mean, ages ago, years ago we had people from the Bronx on a cultural exchange. (. ..) And they were saying: Oh God, Moss Side! We heard about you guys! And we said: no no no. We've heard about YOU! So the perception is very different. It just takes a few isolated incidents to make an area bad! [Black Arts Development project manager]

As a place to work in the night-time economy, to set up a club or promote a night, Moss Side bore little attraction for most interviewed practitioners, because of the perceived flaws of the area. The existing venues, such as a few pubs, the West Indian Centre or the local youth centre, were considered as ‘community venues’, to be used as a training ground for emerging DJs or promoters, but were seen as no valid alternative to the clubs and bars in Manchester’s city centre.

In her analysis of residential segregation and the politics of racialisation, Smith (1993) drew attention to the imagery of racial segregation as ‘as bounded in space…linked primarily to the physically decaying areas of the so-called inner city areas’ (Smith 1993, 134). This spatial segregation had a particular impact on the development of culture in the two areas examined. In Southview, the panic concerning race, crime and disorder had a differential impact of attraction and avoidance, which entailed a drift towards inculcating an image of subcultural-ness whilst marginalising Afro-Caribbean night spaces, the dynamics of which
will be examined next. In Manchester, however, similar discourses of racial fear manifested itself in an emphasis on the cultural importance of the City Centre besieged by the criminality of the margins, versus the stigmatisation and cultural residue of Moss Side. These cultural forces, therefore, are part of need to be taken into account to understanding the dynamic of racial exclusion in the night-time economy. This paper, however, will now turn to the second important influence – the impact of regeneration strategies on the development of nightlife.

Regeneration and governance of the night-time economy: the re-colonisation of space and cultural exclusion

Regeneration and in particular ‘cultural regeneration’ became a popular buzzword in many English and continental European cities in the course of the 1990s (Bianchini & Parkinson 1993). The recognition of popular culture as a symbolic and economic resource in the reinvention of post-Fordist cities found its regular place in New Labour discourses on the ‘creative industries’ in the late 1990s (DCMS 2001). Both in terms of providing employment and company investment, a ‘cultural’ or ‘creative’ city image seemed to promise the regeneration particularly of post-industrial areas and cities, considered ‘problematic’ (DETR 2000). Although in many areas this was interpreted
conservatively as a need for more theatres, cinemas and other ‘socially acceptable’ cultural forms, in some areas the development of a ‘night-time economy’ interpreted as the encouragement of clubs and bars was promoted as part of an overall economic regeneration strategy (Lovatt and O’Connor 1995).

In stark contrast to previous conceptions of spaces of nocturnal consumption as ‘vile’ and ‘dangerous’, consumption in the ‘night-time economy’ slowly began to gain a new economic meaning. Rather than considering the respective subjects, producers and consumers alike, as ‘undesirable elements’, they were re-defined as the avant garde of gentrification, helping to bring about the much desired ‘renaissance’ of the formerly deserted city centre (O’Connor and Wynne 1996). This incorporation of popular culture as part of the mainstream, however, was not universal. Indeed, as other theorists have noted (Chatterton and Hollands 2002), the development of the ‘night-time economy’ merely gave rise to a new form of governance that simply differentiated between acceptable and unacceptable forms of night entertainment and conduct, a pattern of inclusion and exclusion explored elsewhere (Young 1999, Garland 2000).

In Southview, the development of the ‘night-time economy’ (as opposed to nightlife which, as previously seen, was already thriving albeit in often unregulated forms) was pursued by the Board of Southview Challenge Company Limited (SCCL), an independent body set up to manage City Challenge funding from 1993 onwards. The Executive of the Board set out from the beginning,
according to their accounts, to alter local arrangements of governance and the delivery of funding. In particular, it sought to prevent local businesses and community groups from automatically accessing funding (a practice which had been instituted from the 1981 conflict) and in addition to rectify, in the Executive’s view, the local borough council’s inability to deliver services. Both strategies did not endear the Executive to the local community nor the borough council, and SCCL was continually mired in publicly aired conflicts concerning bureaucratic arrangements and funding (see Talbot 2004).

SCCL, however, had a particular impact on the nature of the development of the night-time economy. While here is not the space to go into this in detail, this impact was relevant in two ways. First, SCCL openly promoted the importance of a ‘multicultural’ night-time economy, albeit only substantially after a commissioned report on the branding of Southview by the Civic Trust emphasized its importance. Second, it channelled funding into night venues. Although these were relatively small amounts, aimed mostly at décor and external renovation, it set up a critical mass of stylistic venues run by, in the main, three independent management teams, which prompted other venues to ‘ride the wave’. Although not all of the key nightlife syndicates or businesses in the area received SCCL funding, a key factor in the development of the night-time economy’, as exemplified in this research, was the prior existence of a thriving and organic nightlife and the identity of an area as subcultural. However, the night-time economy was established and promoted in Southview
in such a way as to largely neglect its organic base as a centre for Afro-Caribbean and black British cultural forms. In this respect SCCL was partially culpable, albeit through neglect rather than design. The role of licensing and policing as part of this narrative will be explored in the following section. The following paragraph, however, will outline the impact of SCCL on this transformation.

As noted previously, local business and community groups were not the immediate beneficiaries of SCCL funding. This was partly due to a high public/private match-funding ratio of 1:3. It was also a product of the Executive of SCCL’s orientation towards bringing in external investment rather than relying on local resources. A particular example of how this worked in practice was to be found in the example of the transformation of the Mango public house (a famous West Indian ‘watering hole’) to the StarBar, a venue that typified the new style of bar in London and elsewhere and explored in the previous section. The Mango was closed by agreement between the police and the brewery after it acquired a reputation as a centre for criminal activity including drugs, and the managers, both black, were seen by the police to have “lost control”. The venue was reopened as the Star Bar after the police interviewed five prospective managers, choosing a syndicate (white) with a business plan who agreed to install CCTV and discourage the previous “element” (Interviewee for the StarBar). This syndicate accessed SCCL funding to renovate the exterior, viewed by many locally as a “suspicious” arrangement. This suspicion had been
aroused by the inability of the previous managers to buy the lease from the brewery, which they had felt was racially motivated, and the ease with which the new managers attracted funding. In addition, it indicated the fear black licensees had with approaching the police with problems of crime and disorder. As the ex-Planning Office put it:

*When it comes to these kinds of syndicates, you have to fight fire with fire. You can’t say nicely, can you please not do this on my premises. That’s not how it works. You could mention it to the police, but you’d get into trouble here.*

In 1995 the Star Bar was burnt and looted, then rebuilt. However, the Star Bar syndicate, as indicated previously, took over at least two other premises that similarly had problems with the police; this, while residents and those initially involved with the syndicate discussed the drug problems associated with this bar. Suspicions were expressed by respondents that the police wanted to cleanse the area of ‘black culture’ and moreover, that the funding strategies developed by SCCL had aided this process. However, others claimed that this process of change was going to happen anyway. For example, commenting on the demise of the Mango, the ex-Planning Officer argued as follows:

* …the hard facts are, that the issue of modernisation had to come, and it was resisted, due to, how can I put it…it was the way it came about…it was just that*
it was an important part of the local tapestry. It was the front line, and now, what’s happened to the front line; it’s no longer the front line anymore…

Members of the Board expressed similar views to the effect that if economic development were to be successful, it needed to be from a broader base than the black population. However, another argued that Southview could have been branded as a centre for black culture, and, it might be possible to add, rather than criminalising venues under pressure from gangsters, police support and trust may have been a more appropriate response. This, and many other stories, however, illustrate that underlying the economic problems black cultural venues faced was unreasonable police suspicion and pressure. This will be explored in the following section.

In Manchester a similar change in the process of differentiation occurred, although again with differences in the spatial relationship of the centre to the margins. In addition, unlike Southview, the development of the night-time economy in Manchester cannot be described as a top-down process, but as one mediated to a considerable extent by considerable battling and lobbying from the city’s ‘pop community’ (Milestone 1996). This community consisting not only of local cultural producers, but various ‘intermediaries’, including the research centre institutions such as the Manchester Institute for Popular Culture (O’Connor 1999).
The establishment of the most well-known landmarks of Manchester’s bar and club culture was driven by local cultural entrepreneurs with a strong commitment to the city and its vernacular cultural production, such as most prominently the founders of the city’s best-known night club, the Haçienda, opened in 1983. After the late 1980s had seen the activities of several local investors into Manchester’s night-time economy, the shift from demonising cultural forms such as raves to incorporating the city’s pop cultural production as a marketing resource by the ‘official’ city began in the early 1990s. It was then that the Haçienda became recognized as the driving force and symbolic centre of ‘Mad-Chester’. Thanks to the support by one particular councillor – nicknamed ‘Councillor of Fun’, the survival of the club was secured at a time where its end loomed due to a series of drug related violent incidents, which had caused the managers to temporarily shut the doors of the club (Savage 1992) (8). This Councillor also promoted the familiarisation of city officials with the workings of the night-time economy through seminars and tours in nocturnal Manchester. He acted as an ‘internal collaborator’ of the lobbyists for deregulation and thereby as essential figure in an emergent ‘advocacy coalition’ which was vital in affecting political change (Street 1997). The night-time economy was finally repackaged as a playground, promising ‘limitless nights of fun in the city’ (9). However, given the traditional association of the night-time economy with crime and illegality (Redhead 1995) it was hardly surprising that the depicted shifts from
demonising to advertising the nocturnal life of the city were accompanied by carefully
devised strategies to render the workings of the involved industries more transparent
and more secure. The concern for ‘safer cities’ became a central theme in the course of
the reinvention of cities and interurban competition in the 1980s and 1990s (Taylor
et al. 1996, Taylor 1997, Belina and Helms 2003), and the preoccupation over safety
played a major role in shaping a response to black cultural forms. In addition, while
capital investments into residential developments in the city centre have certainly
accentuated the role of the night-time economy in the city’s transformation in the
1990s, it is the often-underestimated role of a local critical infrastructure and their
cultural capital that shall be emphasized here.

It was in the process of Manchester’s bid for the Olympic Games in 1993 that
the city council’s interest in the deregulation of the night-time economy became
particularly strong. Cultural producers and intermediaries were increasingly
incorporated into partnerships and strategic alliances, most of them belonging
however to networks of white, college-educated males. For example, the
manager of the Haçienda became chair of Manchester’s Pub and Club Watch.
Calls for a liberalisation of regulation were epitomized by the slogan of the ‘24
hour city’ (Lovatt and O’Conner 1995), and in 1993 and 1996, experiments of
temporary liquor licensing extensions were another sign of the readiness for
rendering the night-time economy more accommodating. The principal rationale
behind the strive towards reform and deregulation on behalf of the city council
was the interest in Manchester’s image as a ‘vibrant, modern European city’, not least as incentive for local investment.

However, consistent with the traditional association of the night-time economy with crime and illegality (Redhead 1995), the depicted shifts from demonising to advertising the nocturnal life of the city were accompanied by carefully devised strategies to render the workings of the involved industries more transparent and more secure. The concern for ‘safer cities’ became a central theme in the course of the reinvention of cities and interurban competition in the 1980s and 1990s (Taylor 1997, Belina and Helms 2003), and the preoccupation over safety played a major role in shaping a response particularly to black cultural forms.

The depicted All these developments towards a reform and re-packaging of the night-time economy coincided therefore hence with a period of closures, affecting in particular venues popular with a ‘mixed’ audience, and/ or known for ‘Black music’, both in Moss Side and in the city centre of Manchester.

An example from Moss Side was the Reno, a bar located in a cellar below another venue, called The Nile, which was known as a hangout of reggae listeners. The significance of the Reno as a local venue was evident in the following characterisation of one of its former DJs:

*Moss Side had a club, called the Reno. Everybody in Moss Side knows the Reno. It was a really dingy underground club, holding about 300 people. But it was*
open every night till about 6 in the morning. And the music in there was excellent! Really, really good! It was a brilliant club. It was a really nice club. It had been going for years. I know about it since the 50s. I had elderly people in Moss Side telling me that it was still there in the 50s, going through the different transitions. In the 60s it was a jazz club and in the 70s and 80s it became a soul club, and R'n B. And it's legendary in Moss Side. (DJ)

While some of its former visitors considered the Reno as ‘about as far from a corporate, clean, mainstream nightclub as you can get it’ (Haslam 1999: 220), it seemed at the same time ‘safe’ from police intervention. However, its closure occurred when the area underwent major regeneration.

Another example from the city centre of Manchester was a nightclub called Konspiracy, which attracted visitors both locally and from other cities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Located in a street that does not exist any more in the restructured present day city, the club attracted far more people than it was permitted to accommodate. Its music programming was more diverse and its crowd more ‘mixed’ than the Haçienda’s, whose initially diverse clientele had ‘whitened’ in the course of its changing music policy at the end of the 1980s, as most respondents observed. The closure of Konspiracy in 1990 was based on the Manchester Corporation Bill (1965) and the declaration that its licensee was not ‘a fit and proper person to hold a license’ based on the consumption of drugs on the premises. While this applied likewise to the well-established Haçienda, the
latter received the earlier mentioned special support from the City Council to survive the security problems associated not least with the trading of drugs on the premises.

In the cases of Southview and Manchester, therefore, while regeneration and the development of the night-time economy occurred through the grassroots participation of ‘subcultural entrepreneurs’ at least initially, and as such was seen to have authenticity and legitimacy (Lovatt 1996), these developments took place outside of and possibly against the needs and demands of the local Black community people. In this respect, while the inclusion of popular culture into a regeneration agenda tends to signal a democratization of city cultures (Street 1997), ‘regeneration’ in the case of the night-time economy stood primarily for the removal of venues and business opportunities in both of the cases examined, and in Manchester: a ‘clearing of the city centre from Black people’. This will be further explored in the next section.

**Licensing, policing and social differentiation**

As a consequence of the emphasis given to the ‘night-time economy’ in regeneration strategies, in both Manchester and London as well as elsewhere, local entrepreneurs and sympathetic local politicians needed to find a way to alter ‘Fordist’ licensing regulation, widely viewed as moralistic and rigid (Lovatt
1994, 1996, Lovatt and O’Connor 1995). In Southview, the council’s Licensing Committee, the Directorate of Regulation (composed of council officers), and the Southview Metropolitan Police Licensing Department had been won, by design or default, to the concept of late licensing, albeit with political resistance from councillors and residents and disgruntlement from the police, through the efforts of ‘responsible’ licensees and a local councillor. In Manchester, the role of the ‘Councillor of Fun’ was pivotal in pushing the move towards deregulation, and in Southview similarly the impulse towards deregulation found political representation on the Licensing Committee. The licensing authorities in Southview declared themselves to be business-friendly by attempting to formalise and make accountable and ‘reasonable’ the practice of licensing (as opposed to the ‘ad hoc’ and subjective decision making process described by the Borough Solicitor as operating in the 1980s). Moreover, the council argued that they were increasingly reluctant to apply moral considerations to notions of a ‘fit and proper’ person. In Manchester, authority for licensing decisions shifted away from magistrates and the police towards the more sympathetic local council (Lovatt 1996).

However, this change did not entail liberalisation per se, as new practices arose or were re-emphasised as a means of controlling local nightlife. In Southview, ‘deregulation’ of hours was followed by a responsibilisation (Garland 2000) strategy. This was expressed in two interrelated ways: first, the extent to which a licensee was perceived to be able to control his or her premises – in other words,
keep the premises free of crime and disorder influences; second, the extent to which the licensee had business competence – an idea taken forward in the Licensing Act 2003 guidelines on licensee training. As seen in the case of the Mango, and observed in other examples, this impacted upon black licensees in particular because of the perception that these businesses did not operate according to the norms of acceptable business practice.

The perception of the ‘responsible licensee impacted upon the ability to run businesses in a number of ways: the ability to gain a late licence; the kinds of conditions that were imposed upon the licensee; the ability to retain a licence; and the ability to retain autonomy over working practices. The issue of ‘trust’ was not lost on licensees, who went out of their way to develop and maintain good relations. Co-operative licensees explained that they received such benefits as autonomy and trust in dealing with problems of violence and drugs, an informal acceptance of after hours alcohol sales, and an ‘early-warning system’ for police inspections or infrequent inspections. However, licensees had to go to great lengths to achieve such trust by following every recommendation of the council and the police, such as installing CCTV.

In Southview, despite these obvious anomalies, however, the practices of the borough licensing committee were fairly open and aimed to be accountable or in the words of the Chair at the time of the research, “quasi-judicial”. In particular, some members of the committee interviewed expressed support for some local
licensees and their attempts to stimulate local economic development. In effect, the problems identified in the practices of the licensing committee arose generally by default – an inability to consider the wider impact of licensing decisions on in particular black licensees and businesses. Specifically, the Licensing Committee had no mechanisms either for specific support for black licensees should they require it (for example, grants, training or police support to prevent criminal intrusion), or to investigate the basis for objections particularly those made by the police. This latter issue will be revisited shortly.

Unlike Southview, licensing strategy in Manchester was more preoccupied with experimenting with new crime prevention strategies in the night-time economy in order to mitigate against the impact of disorder. Examples of this included the Safe Door scheme, concerned with the training and registration of door staff (10), Local Area Partnerships and the ‘Pub and Club Watch Organisation’. The approach was – at least in theory – conversational, preventive and partnership-based rather than confrontational, sanctioning and hierarchically regulatory; bottom-up rather than top-down; and supportive rather than sanctioning. However, these more recent strategies in providing security did not altogether replace old forms of authority-operated surveillance strategies, such as the infiltration of venues with undercover officers.

The manner in which particular effect of these new strategies affected on ‘black culture’ or ‘black nights’ in particular, combined emerged through the
A combination of responsibilisation strategies with a history of prejudice against practitioners and forms of black popular culture with responsibilisation strategies that signified a shift of responsibility for crime prevention and control from the state to private subjects. An example that pinpointed the differential treatment of so-called ‘black venues’ was the security set up of the only ‘black-owned’ venue (at the time of this research) in the city centre of Manchester. The venue’s owner had installed CCTV and, moreover, turnstiles at the entrance in order to earn the trust and support of the council and the police. While the licensee signalled satisfaction with the club’s safety, his ostentatious investment into security measures was widely interpreted as discriminatory against the club’s diverse clientele and as a tacit confirmation of criminalizing stereotypes against black people.

Policing strategies relating to the night-time economy had a disproportionate effect on black communities in both Southview and Manchester, and were a significant factor in licensing decisions. In Southview, for example, the MET police department responsible for licensing had the power to make objections to the Licensing Committee around issues of crime and disorder, objections that the Committee were reluctant to challenge. According to the Licensing Committee minutes from 1992-9, only one police objection was challenged and that related to an established club owned by a long-standing, trusted and influential white businessman. So on what basis did the police decide that there was a crime and disorder problem relating to a particular venue?
Part of the problem related to limited resources, which entailed that venues were categorised according to their propensity to attract ‘trouble’. Evidence for this was based on the number of complaints and visitations by the police, and could precipitate an objection to the Licensing Committee. This in itself could be more troublesome for black licensees in so far as they were more likely to attract police attention than white licensees who were trusted. For example, two white licensees interviewed said that they were given autonomy to deal with fights themselves because they had established ‘trusting’ relationships with the council and the police.

What was crucial however was that some local police had distinct ideas on the nature of criminality, which had a disproportionate impact on licensing. In a discussion with the local MET Licensing Officer who, according to his superior, had 100% responsibility for licensing matters due to his experience, he argued that black venues and parties were overcrowded and had a tendency towards violence given that “blacks” were more prone to sudden, extreme acts of violence. His views were shared by some white licensees who said they would never hold reggae or rap nights because punters would let off guns, abuse the staff and had bad attitudes towards women. This was compared to raves, which was, according to one licensee, “easier to control”, a view shared by the MET Licensing Officer. Another licensee additionally made clear distinctions between “civilised” black punters with money and “roughnecks”. These views were
particularly important given the objections process described above but also the informal system of interviewing established by the local MET Licensing department, whereby it would be impossible to gain a licence unless the police had agreed to it prior to an application and with conditions. According to interviews and Licensing Committee minutes, some of the few black licensees had lost their licenses due to objections by the police on the grounds of perceived crime and disorder, mainly surrounding drug dealing.

For many people living in Southview and who viewed themselves as members of the ‘black community’, the idea that young black males suffering the results of three generations of discrimination and deprivation could be the cause of drug dealing, violence and disorder in venues and on the streets was not particularly controversial. The problem lay in the double standards involved and the lack of support therefore given to black licensees. Drugs were an intrinsic part of all venues, not just black cultural venues, and local residents were quick to point out the impact of ‘anti-social behaviour’ perpetrated by well-off visitors to the local nightlife as well as the impact of street dealing. Stories of punters being offered or directed to drugs by security of ‘white’ venues were frequent and known to the licensees of those venues, according to two respondents. Indeed, one middle-ranking cocaine dealer claimed that the police turned a blind eye to illegalities and dealing in one particular ‘white’ venue because the manager/licensee was “someone they could work with”. There was little hesitation, however, in targeting black licensees with perceived drugs problems.
Black licensees with perceived drug problems, however, were seen as invariably closed down or denied late licenses.

Similar observations have been made in Manchester, where a licensing officer illustrated this differentiation by racializing and culturalizing the consumers of different drugs. For example, cannabis (B-rated at the time of the research and—B-rated at the time of this research—presented as a ‘black drug’) was associated with an anti-authoritarian attitudes compared to – A-rated – chemical drugs used at raves, and this view combined with the former drug’s visibility played a central role in the policing of night-time economy venues. This affected not only the licensee, for whom the putting on of different nights bore differential risks in terms of inviting police controls, but also the punters who attended these nights. As interviewees in Manchester reported, stereotypical suspicion tended to target the black rather than the white patter when both were in proximity to the smell of cannabis.

Again, as in Southview, the police response to emerging violence in the night-time economy in Manchester was to close down, rather than support, a venue after violence had occurred. While the emergence of armed violence was not restricted to these clubs, clubs associated with ‘black music’ and/or ‘black crowds’ were increasingly considered as a cause of trouble (Böse 2003). This generalisation guided not only the selective raiding of clubs, but also such interventions that related specifically to the musical programming of the venue.
Many club owners and managers adapted their music policy to this discriminating practice and avoided putting nights on or taking promoters or DJs on board that might attract police attention. The resulting situation was summarized as follows:

.. you get the situation where the club owners might be willing to let you (put the night on) but once the police finds out that it's soul, R&B and stuff, they would get on the club owners case. I have been DJing in Manchester for so long. I know most of the club owners cause I worked in most of them. I asked: would it be possible to do a soul night? And they are like: I'd love to. I can't! They just get harassment from the police. You know even to the point of taking their license off them. [DJ]

Venue owners developed novel strategies to deal with these racially discriminatory policing practices. While the police explicitly advised one venue owner to avoid certain club nights and artists, when she opened the club, she decided to follow this advice initially until the club became established. The music genres to be avoided were typically those associated with a significantly black crowd. After some months she started introducing presumably ‘dangerous nights’ such as UK Garage events. However, she only did so by restricting them to weekdays as opposed to the weekend in order to minimize the assumed security risk. Among all interviewees, however, this was however the only practitioner to enter into such negotiations with the police. Most others tended to
follow the explicit or implicit regulations in relation to the music policy simply in order to avoid drawing police attention to their venue.

As can be seen in these cases, although drugs, violence and disorder is still an associated part of nightlife, the contemporary regulatory approach has become more differentiated as different elements of night culture, popular culture have been incorporated into the ‘night-time economy’. Regulatory authorities, particularly the police, have sought to retain control over criminal activity in this sphere by demarcating safe and dangerous crowds and cultural forms. As is pointed out elsewhere, (Whilst as Chatterton and Holland’s (2002) study of Newcastle has pointed out, these such demarcations are not only racialised, but interlink with class-related differentiations. However, the two case studies examined here identified a strong significant association by the authorities between black culture and perceptions of dangerousness and black culture in particular, on behalf of the authorities. Understandably crime, violence, disorder and hence also fear (Thomas and Bromley 2000) are a feature of the landscape of the social relations of these spaces - however, they are not confined to black cultural forms. In the cases of Southview and Manchester, however, it is these cultural forms that tend to be criminalised. The wider implications of this trend and the failure to address them will be discussed in the concluding section. and the problem occurs in the fact that the impact of that criminalisation has not been thought through. The conclusion, therefore, will turn to this issue.
Conclusion: the social impact of the criminalisation of black spaces

According to the discussed findings, there was and is an intimate connection between the governance of nightlife and is intimately linked with discriminatory practices towards black communities both in Southview and Manchester. In terms of cultural change, economic development, licensing practice and policing, these communities and the spaces of their cultural expression entertainment offered within them have, by design or default, been marginalised. While criminality and deprivation exist in these areas (Young 2003) they cannot serve as a valid explanation for this exclusion. Many ‘black venues’ in the researched locations, whether defined ‘black’ in terms of their ownership, their music policy and/or their clientele, have attracting police attention in the researched locations were while being up-market, while In contrast, ‘white’ venues that also experienced problems with drugs and criminality which were not highlighted in the licensing process. As such, the tendency towards cultural pathologization, which equated crime with black culture, led to differing perceptions of who was included or excluded in ideas of dangerousness.

(That did not necessarily correspond to real patterns of criminality. Could this be taken out, as I think the ‘not necessarily’ might undermine the principal contention of pathologizing ideas?)
It is also important to take account of the way that the stigmatisation of black cultural venues and forms shaped the landscape of both Southview and Manchester. In Moss Side, local ‘community spaces’ were neglected in favour of the dominance of the centre and there was a clear inability to find venues where black musical forms could be developed and expressed. In Southview, various strategies and social trends congealed to produce a marginalisation of black venues, and, indeed, to little effect. Although from the perspective of 2005 this marginalisation is still written in the landscape of the night-time economy, the impact of gentrification has been limited.

Both studies point to a duality-contradiction in the interrelationship between gentrification processes and the Afro-Caribbean communities in Southview and Manchester. On the one hand, superficial aspects of black culture have been co-opted in youth culture and the language of multiculturalism rhetorically displayed in promotional literature; on the other, the ability of the residing black community to write itself culturally and politically into the local landscape has been resisted (Solomos and Back 1995). Whilst culture and racial identity is fluid (Nayak 2003) and as such it is impossible to advocate an ossified view of post-war Afro-Caribbean cultural forms and spaces, nevertheless the process of change and exclusion observable in Manchester and Southview serves on the one hand as an exemplar of the fate of alternative cultural spaces in general (Chatterton and Hollands 2003) and raises, on the other hand, important specific questions issues regarding the relationship between the governance of
cultural economies and racial exclusion for the regulators of city spaces as well as those concerned with social cohesion.

The debate around the Licensing Act 2003 and the recently published guidance by the DMCS has mainly preoccupied itself with issues of legal regulation and the necessity of controlling problematic behaviour. Does this narrative of discrimination and exclusion hold any lessons for the regulator? The argument of this paper is that the failure to consider issues of discrimination holds consequences for social cohesion.

Firstly, the cases of Southview and Manchester illustrate that the preoccupations of regulators with crime and disorder related to ‘black culture’ have to be viewed in the light of a history of criminalizing black cultural forms and particularly ‘black music’ in all its diversity. Regeneration strategies that incorporate night-time economies cannot turn a blind eye to this racial inflection of prejudice against popular cultural practices in the nocturnal city, if they aim at achieving social cohesion, as is promised in much governmental discourse.

Secondly, if popular cultural practices, their spaces and economies are viewed in the context of civil rights, specifically the freedom of expression (Chevigny 1991), then the discrimination in ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘safe’ cultural practices and practitioners cannot be as easily justified as suggested by some governing and regulating agencies in the discussed research. From these points it follows, that a socially just ‘cultural regeneration’ cannot follow from leaving the market, in this case the night-time economy, to
itself and thereby to competitively minded private actors, but demands a more determined policy of cultural integration by a regulatory approach that concerns itself with questions of exclusion as well as safety. A failure to do so does not ‘only’ deprive some already marginalized and often racially defined social groups from a ‘bit of fun’, but has long-term consequences on the social make up and cohesion within urban spaces.

Notes

I have attempted to rewrite this last section in the light of the focus on ‘race’ and ethnicity, as I think the referees did not appreciate the more general recommendations re: regeneration so much.

First, these cases illustrate that the preoccupations of regulators with crime and disorder amongst other issues cannot be dealt with outside of notions of social justice and inclusiveness. For example, regeneration strategies need to be accompanied by a sense of ownership if they are not to provoke conflict, powerlessness and alienation—all of which were in abundant supply in Southview and Moss Side. In addition, if there is a serious problem of infiltration by gangs or criminals in the night-time economy, the
automatic assumption of culpability should be questioned. Second, a consideration of how public space is shaped and used is of pivotal importance for theorists of crime. The effects of transformations of urban areas need therefore to be considered in terms of the displacement and exclusion they cause. Are regeneration strategies leading to more social cohesion, as promised in much governmental discourse, or are they generating more exclusion through the creation of ‘playgrounds’ for young urban professionals? Additionally, what happens to communities when the members of some social groups or aspirant cultural producers are denied access to mainstream spaces, either ‘by-design’ (Zukin 1995), through-price, door policy, domination of ‘safe’ cultural forms or by dint of up-market or exclusive norms? Where do these young people then go? It seems important, in inner city spaces, to not let the market rule the cultural economy but instead have a more determined policy of cultural integration (making spaces that are available and desirable to everyone) by a regulatory approach that concerns itself with justice as well as safety. A failure to do so does not ‘only’ deprive some already marginalized social groups from a ‘bit of fun’, but has long-term consequences on the social make-up and cohesion within urban spaces.

1. By ‘black cultural spaces’ we mean night spaces owned, managed and predominantly although not exclusively visited by, the local Afro-Caribbean population. While doing so we do not fail to recognise cultural or social hybridity (Nayak 2003), which have always been evident in night and popular cultures (Hebdige 1987). We are focusing, rather, on institutional subjectivities and their impact upon processes of social, cultural and spatial change in the two localities concerned.
2. The term ‘race riots’ has long been recognised as a problematic concept in the context of 1981 and beyond (Gilroy 1987, Hebdige 1987).

3. While the category ‘black music’ has been defied as having ‘little descriptive value’ (Pickering/ Negus 1998) by some theorists, it is widely used within and outside of the music industry, where it is used as a genre label (Negus 1999). It is due to the social currency of the category, not least among the respondents in the discussed research, that it is used in this article.

4. Hobbs et al (2003), in their study of bouncers, discuss the relationship between diverse cultural forms and social order, although this diversity is not viewed as a social issue but one of planning; that is, eliminating the dominance of nightclubs and bars in the night-time economy.

5. In that the facelift was conducted through paint, hardwood and an aggressive door policy – cultural change ‘on the cheap’.

6. From 1992 over ten ‘dance bars’ and clubs opened in and around Southview. However, not all survived and indeed recent history suggests that the rapid cultural change witnessed in the 1990s has not been sustainable, at least culturally if not spatially and economically.

7. One respondent described this social group as “early twenties, middle-class, drug culture aesthetic, low-income fabulous, anorak wearing, black culturally illiterate provincial innocents” both attracted and repelled by Southview’s “frisson”.

8. This councillor argued, that ‘the Haçienda made a “significant contribution to active use of the city centre core”, actively helping the governments’ own policy of regenerating the inner city through “arts and culture”’ (Savage 1992, p. 73).


10. This replaced an earlier scheme abolished because of large-scale corruption particularly in the context of the circulation of drugs.

References


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