Governing the mobility of skills


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Governing the mobility of skills

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Governing the Mobility of Skills

As the processes of selection and management of migration have increasingly differentiated between those with skills and those without, skills have become one of the most significant vectors in contemporary migratory regimes (Lavenex 2007). The language of skills permeates immigration policy in a number of receiving countries such as Canada (Man 2004), Australia (Hawthorne 2005), New Zealand (Spoonley 2006) and the United Kingdom (Home Office 2006). They have all opened up immigration for the highly skilled while limiting opportunities for migration by the lesser skilled. The large number of changes to immigration regulations in these countries in response variously to the securitisation of migration (Walters 2004), to attempt to use migration to address the implications of the demographic deficit in selected parts of the labour market (OECD 2002; Lewis and Neale 2005) and to respond to the 'global' competition for skilled labour in the knowledge economy has meant that the issue of immigration has provided fertile ground for researchers. The UK alone has seen a range of changes to its mode of selection and incorporation of skilled migrants and the meteoric rise of migration on the political agenda has been paralleled in the world of research (see for instance, the special issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies edited by Lewis and Neale (2005)).

Most research on skilled migration has focused either on processes of skills selectivity in the countries of destination (Flavell et al. 2005) or the impact of immigration of skilled migrants from selected sectors of the labour market such as health on countries that migrants leave behind (Ray et al. 2006). Although this research has contributed much to recording and interpreting how skilled labour migration is (and should be)
governed, the foci of the debate remains somewhat limited. Thus, there is some recognition of the importance of both emigrating and immigrating contexts in shaping migration streams, but there has so far been no attempt to bring the regulatory frameworks governing migration in these two contexts together. Moreover, although there is a growing literature on skills there is little recognition of the multiple ways in which migrants’ skills are produced and their mobility governed. In this paper I attempt to set out an agenda for such a fuller analysis of skilled migration. The first section of the paper provides a brief overview of the existing literature with regard to the intermeshing of emigration and immigration and the regulation of skills and highlights some lacunae in this literature. The second section outlines some of the sites and spaces of governance of skilled migration that do not make it into existing narratives of skilled migration. Because of the prominence of Indians amongst skilled migrants globally I have used the example of skilled Indian emigration to the UK in this section. The paper concludes by suggesting that a more thorough-going analysis of these sites and spaces offers an important first step towards unpicking the social and economic inequalities that are carried within and are bolstered by skilled migratory regimes.

CONCEPTUAL LEGACIES

Although much of the debate around migration continues to be haunted by the understandable desire to improve the lives of poorly paid migrant workers who enter the lesser skilled sectors of the labour market, the pressing reality of the growth in skilled migration has meant that the study of skilled migration has become a rapidly expanding field. In brief, skilled migration has been viewed through the spatial lenses of national gains and losses or brain gain and brain drain (Bauder 2003; Chikanda
2006) especially in the context of health workers, global mobility and circular
migrations amongst corporate workers (Beaverstock 2005) and as accounts of
transnationalism (Voigt-Graf 2004) and multiple spatialities. Together they provide an
overview of the multidirectionality and diversity of skilled migration. Yet this
literature misses many things as I explore below.

**Linking emigration and immigration**

Most analysis of the governance of skilled migration typically begins and ends with
the receiving state and therefore focuses on immigration regulations as the primary
filter of selectivity. Emigration regulations escape all attention. In particular,
discursive frameworks of emigration and immigration regulations are rarely linked.

Yet, there have been increasing pressures to bring together narratives from sending
and receiving contexts. One of the most significant frameworks of integration that
knits emigration and immigration together is that offered by the push-pull models of
neo-classical approaches to migration\(^2\). These approaches attempt to locate this
particular dialectic within economic, political and environmental frameworks. The
same push-pull model is often scripted as brain drain when those who move are
skilled, especially if they work in the health sector (Chikanda 2006), science and
technology (Khadria 2004a, 2004b) or are students (Ziguras and Law 2006). A range
of terms have been adopted to understand this migration depending on the degree of
recognition that the skills receive in destination areas (brain waste or brain gain) and
the temporalities of such migration (brain circulation). Framed in the language of
choice, the push-pull framework fails to adequately take account of the limits to
migration such as the social, economic and institutional barriers that some migrants
face or the discursive production of migration as a possibility for some and not others (Portes 2003). It posits migration as an outcome of individual rational decisions based on wage differentials. The complex social networks that facilitate or limit migration are often ignored. Moreover, who is kept out of a country and who is not appears to depend on the ‘abilities’ of migrants, and does not recognise the contexts within which these abilities are fostered.

This shortcoming is however addressed by macro-level political-economy approaches such as world-systems and dependency theory. For instance, a much more contextualised understanding of who migrates and why is offered by Saskia Sassen’s global circuits model (2000) where she offers an insight into the mechanisms that create the poorly paid half of Castells' (1996) hypermobile landscape. People respond to the increasing divergence between the economies of sending and receiving countries by moving. This personal response to globally created and fostered inequalities is also a mark of the failure of states to enable development and to redress these inequalities. Sassen thus successfully incorporates women into theories of international mobility but does so across the economic and geopolitical formations of the First and Third Worlds. However, focusing on survival limits the scope of Saskia Sassen’s argument. She fails to recognise that these problems are not merely those of differential wages or earning power between receiving and sending countries but are also influenced by the globalisation of aspiration, by increasing convergence in what we want to consume and what we think we need to survive. It is therefore difficult to apply this framework to the migration of skilled workers. Globalisation has not merely squeezed the ability of some people to earn but also (and more importantly) increased people's expectations of what is 'necessary' to live. Migration is not, then, a
route to survival (we know that it is never the poorest who migrate), but to class mobility not merely for the poor, but also for the relatively well-off.

The growing literature on ‘diasporas’ offers another set of concepts that destabilise territorial identification, residentiality and nationality (Basch et al., 1994; Bhabha, 1993; Brah, 1996; Hall, 1996) and thus enable a simultaneous analysis of emigration and immigration contexts. This body of literature has been picked up through the frame of transnationalism within migration studies. Originating from the anthropological literature and its particular scalar emphases - the level of the individual, household and community - the framework of transnationalism has been able to capture a sense of how migration is experienced across two countries (Boyd 1989; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Yeoh et al. 2002). Its emphasis on agency means that transnationalism is seen as a way of combating exclusion from dominant structures but also of validating alternative spaces that both provide a sense of belonging and facilitate inclusion into dominant structures. However, as Bailey has argued much of the current literature on transnational migration has been 'agency-heavy' and 'structure-light' (Bailey 2001: 421). In their attempt to overturn the methodological nationalism inherent in understanding the lives of migrants, national institutional frameworks have been relegated to a back-seat. For instance, a fruitful avenue for research that has not widely been addressed is 'how do the structures within the receiving countries shape transnational migration and to what extent are the strategies of continuing affiliation with a home territory fashioned by immigration regulations in the receiving country'. Monisha Das Gupta (1997) addresses some of these issues in her study of the ways in which immigration regulations altered the socio-economic profiles of Indian migrants to the US through the last century. She suggests
that both changing regulations and shifts in the home countries in the period between different waves of immigration mean that members of the Indian diaspora were differently positioned even within the one receiving country, in this instance, the US. She highlights the ways in which wider discourses and practices of selection within the process of migration influence who can migrate and become transnational, and of how transnational communities are therefore constantly being reconstituted. However, the fact that transnational strategies are also 'influenced by the structures of power that lie within the territory and legal systems of more than one state, with each state limiting, disciplining, and shaping the personal activities' of the migrant (Fouron and Schiller 2001: 545) is slowly beginning to be addressed in discussions of state-led transnationalism (Margheritis 2007).

**Producing skills**

The processes through which 'skills' are produced have only recently begun to be folded into the analysis of skilled migration. This disjuncture between the literature on knowledge economy and that on migration (Kofman 2004) is surprising given that so much skilled migration is being encouraged primarily because it is seen as critical to the knowledge economy. Rather, what we have are three specific ways of addressing the intersection of skills and migration. The first arises largely from a liberal agenda of removing barriers to ‘full participation’ of migrants in the labour market to improve the competitiveness of the economy. Set within the literature on integration, the transferability of skills is pared down to equivalence of accreditation of skills and qualification, particularly in free trade and free mobility areas (Laslett, 1990). Governance policies aim to bolster economic integration of migrants, and thus to limit ‘brain waste’ (Iredale, 1997). Individualised skills are seen as human capital and
governance regimes aim to make these rational economic actors subject to, and subjects of, capital.

A second perspective focuses on the limits to labour market participation of skilled workers that arise from migrants’ social positionings. This body of work seeks to explain the transferability of skills as a vector of the social characteristics of migrants and of labour market needs focusing especially on the role of gender in filtering and refracting the ability to transfer accreditations across national borders and to make them matter in access to jobs (Iredale 2005). For instance, a number of feminist migration researchers have highlighted the ways in which migrant women, despite having skills, are unable to get access to jobs that value those skills because of an eclectic mix of the effects of immigration regulations that limit spousal employment, gender stereotyping in the labour market or gendered negotiations within households around division of household labour and childcare which occurs without the supportive network of families or paid assistants (Man 2004; Salaff and Greve 2003). These lead to what Ho (2006) identifies as the feminising effect of migration. Points of intervention often revolve around provision of good childcare, a long-standing feminist demand.

While trying to make room for women at the ‘table of knowledge’ feminists are also attempting to reshape the nature of that table. They attempt to get skills that are often seen as feminine and therefore ‘intuitive’ or ‘natural’ classified as ‘proper’ skills, as learned and productive (also see Williams and Baláž, 2005; Williams, 2006, 2007). Such work has moved towards altering the nature of skills that are seen to count or are accounted for in these accreditation exercises. Despite these contextualising moves by
feminists much of the literature is limited to the transferability of skills already obtained to the labour market. There is little account of the conditions that made such skills acquisition possible. A question that is rarely asked is ‘How did some men and some women come to be the repositories of such skills’?

A third strand of the literature embeds skills in transnational social formations and in the different forms of capital that skilled persons accrue. The quality of Western education lies as much in its accreditability as its symbolic force, as a marker of cultural traits that are seen as essential in smoothing global economic processes (Mitchell, 1997). Middle and upper class people in some countries access this education for their children, allowing them to accrue the cultural capital that Western education offers and enabling them to use this to reproduce and even enhance their social class positionings (Waters, 2006). At the same time the lack of recognition of some qualifications may be read as a more or less systematic attempt to draw boundaries around who is seen as having the requisite skills for a labour market. It is an attempt to reproduce a professional class (Bauder, 2003) so that some others are prevented from accessing this form of capital. Kelly and Lusis (2006) explore these issues in an insightful article on migration from the Philippines to Canada, where they remark that the forms of capital that migrants bring with them are embedded in transnational social fields and are contingent and convertible. They attempt not merely to record which forms of skills are accredited but to ‘explore how such valuations are being arrived at, by whom, and in whose interests. Therein lies the possibility of retaining a sense of the structural power involved’ (p.837) Here the structures of governance themselves come under the spotlight.
An analysis of the transnational habitus goes far towards interrogating the language of skills, and questioning the power relations within which skills are embedded. Crucially, it moves the literature of skills away from an almost exclusive focus on entry. For instance, it makes some moves towards recognising that the possession of skills also has a class bias, although how these skills come to be possessed by some rather than others is yet to be interrogated. It does, however, situate skilled migration not only in countries of destination but also in particular social and cultural formations in the countries of origin. It also helps to recognise the ways in which entry and exit of skills are intercalated in other processes that do not easily seem to fall within the remit of skilled migration.

**REGULATING SKILLED MIGRATION**

In the previous section I argued that despite the growing literature on skilled migration there has been little attempt thus far to juxtapose narratives of emigration with those of immigration amongst the skilled. There is also little research on forms of governance of skills at entry or before exit or on the governance of emigration. Finally, there is also little recognition of how the ‘skills’ of skilled migrants are actually produced and circulated through migratory flows although recent work which draws on Bourdieu’s concepts of capital have begun to address both this lacuna (Kelly and Lusis 2006).

In the rest of the paper I want to contribute to and extend this last move in the literature on skilled migration by highlighting some ‘moments’ where the processes of skilled migration are shaped and where such migration is governed, but which rarely
appear in narratives of skilled migration. The most common way in which skills are treated in the migration literature, is as a filter for entry (Hawthorne 2005). This is because it is such a major divider in the way in which migration regulations are created and justified in receiving countries (Kanbur and Rapoport, 2005). However, the emerging migratory regime, i.e. the institutional regulations and legislation that are being put into place to oversee that migration, also reflect the negotiations between different interest groups that have come together in order to produce the framework. Skills too form a point of governance in the entry of skilled migrants. And in sending countries, regulations governing both emigration and acquisition of skills suggest that who becomes a skilled migrant is hugely complex. Hence, there are many sites and spaces where skilled migration is governed but which do not enter into dominant narratives of the governance of skilled migration.

I explore some of these issues as they pertain to emigration from India to the UK4 to look at how power operates in multiple registers at particular points in time in order to produce these skills, the kinds of settlements that are made and some of the negotiations and contradictions that are involved in this process.5 India is widely acknowledged as a major sending country of skilled migrants globally. In many countries significant proportions of skilled migrants are Indians, or of Indian origin. In the US, Indians are now the largest recipients of H1-B visas, which are granted to temporary labour migrants. The Indian-American population doubled between 1990 and 2004 and is now 1.7 million. They are seen to have 'integrated' well into the labour market as 43.6% of Indian Americans are employed as managers or professionals (Gupta 2004: 3). Their economic success has meant that they are often held up as a model minority (Parshad 2000). There is also an increasing inflow of
Indian labour inflows into Canada so that the statistics on stocks of migrants show that Indians now form the second largest group (after the Chinese) among permanent residents who have settled in Canada. They also form a large proportion of the skilled migrants entering the country. Between 1994 and 2001, the number of Indians migrating to Canada in the skilled class had increased six-fold from 2,126 to 13,140 (Walton-Roberts, 2003: 243). And in the UK, Indians have overtaken Americans as the recipients of the largest number of work permits. It may be surmised that most recent Indian labour migrants to the UK have come in to provide skilled labour as work permits are primarily reserved for those with skills. They therefore offer an important exemplar for studies of governance of skilled migration.6

**Regulating skills at points of entry**

The direction of governance is never wholly fixed. Much depends on negotiations between interest groups with varying perspectives on skilled migration. For instance, organisations such as CBI (2002) have published pro-skilled migration papers in an attempt to influence the UK government while a more cautious endorsement is espoused by the trade unions who fear that the constituency they represent - current workers - will lose out through the influx of cheaper labour. In response to these pressures, the government too recognises that hand-in-hand with the facilitation of skilled migration is the need to skill one's own population and a range of government initiatives have been set up to achieve this aim (see for instance, *The Leitch Report: Prosperity For All In The Global Economy: World Class Skills, December 2006*; *Skills: Getting on in business, getting on at work, March 2005*; and 'A strategy for women in science, engineering and technology', the Greenfield report7). The import of skills can then be seen as a relatively temporary measure that is necessary to tide over
a shortage while the local population is being trained. This is one context within which the interface between skills and migration is being regulated.

Governance of skills requires the regulation of the 'intrinsic' quality of the skill (Middlehurst and Campbell 2004). However, this intrinsic quality is itself increasingly defined through a complex relationship with mobility whereby mobility is seen as essential for developing some skills but also skills are necessary for mobility. The importance of mobile skills has meant that organisations such as the European Network of Information Centres (ENIC) and the National Recognition Information Centre for the UK (NARIC, under the purview of the Department for Employment and Skills in the UK), which aims to cross-accredit skills obtained in over 180 other countries, are being strengthened. The work of NARIC is based on the possibility that people from over 180 countries might come to the UK, i.e. the global dimension of the labour market. In particular, it involves a detailed recognition of how the stretch of the British Empire left behind educational systems compatible to the UK system. Importantly, these aspects are also interrelated so that, for instance, the UK is aiming to ensure that its own accreditation policies can more significantly influence the Bologna process. It wants to play a role in setting standards, procedures and guidelines on quality assurance and to become a key player in the formation of the European Higher Education Area. But it is working across two political imaginaries (Karvounis et al. 2003) - retaining the benefits of the imperial legacy of educational structures and the power this bestows in the higher education market, while manoeuvring a favourable position within the European area, which has a significantly different way of assessing and managing the development of skills. It thus draws upon the trappings of past and present resources to confer legitimacy
(Allen 2003: 169) on what constitutes appropriate skills. And the regulation of skills is being defined through both the history and the prospect of mobility.

Skills are also assessed for their desirability within the UK labour market context. A new skills advisory board\textsuperscript{11} is co-ordinating the efforts of existing organisations such as Skills for Business Network and together they identify shortages in parts of the labour market seen as essential to economic growth and regulate immigration in line with this demand. However shortages and the economy are narrowly defined, ignoring, for instance, requirements for socially reproductive labour. The frameworks for governance of skills are thus already set.

\textit{Regulating immigration}

The second aspect of this governance is the 'control' of migration, which presumes that the number of people who want to enter are greater than those who can be let in, necessitating a process of selectivity. Although much of the selectivity is based on notions not only of intrinsic value, but to value as it relates to the labour market requirements a number of other social and cultural criteria too are increasingly coming into play, some of which can be more easily enunciated than others. For instance, selectivity around skills also intersects with other narratives such as that of cohesion as acceptance of immigration becomes more and more important in the domestic political agenda. Although the public focus of these concerns has been on asylum-seekers and their dependence on the welfare state, the new regulations also stoke earlier divisions. The riots of the summer of 2001, when Asian youths clashed with local police over what they perceived as double standards on the part of the police in failing to respond to their concerns of attacks by white racists and the
subsequent manipulation of this along with local issues by the British National Party in Oldham in the 2001 general elections suggested that immigration policy had to more comprehensively link with issues of race, particularly as it intersected with class. The Ouseley Report, ‘Community Pride, Not Prejudice’ (2001), was launched just after the riots in Bradford. It stressed the issue of citizenship education, identifying the material bases for disaffection amongst youth in some Northern cities in England (Ahmad 2003; ERS special issue, 2005). The public, and especially the media response, to the issue of 'integration' of those caught at this particular intersection of race and class (and religion) has led to government anxieties about public backlash to immigrants and helped to shape the Government's separation between desirable migrants and less desirable ones. These moves have been strengthened since the London bombing of July 7, 2005 when the discovery that the bombers were all British citizens accentuated concerns over British authenticity, nationalism and immigration.

As a result alongside entry there has been an attempt to enforce a form of overt and often exclusionary forms of territorial identification on its citizens so that, not only who can enter but how they identify is increasingly coming under the purview of the state. The state is determining not only the general conditions of entry and work, but also the terms of residence. The formalisation of the requirements for obtaining citizenship and the processes through which it is obtained implies an attempt by the state to regulate the conditions under which people remain. The skilled, are therefore not only being offered rights to enter, but also stay and develop 'permanent' links with the receiving country. These links are to be cemented by strong territorial identification and a public allegiance to the receiving state, with citizenship
ceremonies marking the rites of passage from one territorially based national identity to another. While skills are a major passport to mobility, affecting both entry and conditions of settlement, the point of governance is increasingly moving towards an assimilationist model. And assimilation is being reserved for those who not only offer economic advantage (albeit narrowly defined) but also fit into the nation’s imaginary of an ‘unthreatening’ migrant. It is questionable how far governance of skilled migration is then still about the governance of skills. Where else is the entry of skilled migrants being governed? To what extent is the governance of skilled migration really about the governance of the non-migrant population and their imaginaries of who should be let in, who is threatening, who is assimilable? These are urgent questions that need addressing if we are not to be beguiled by the notion of skilled migration.

**Regulating emigration**

Traversing boundaries requires the migrant not only to negotiate entry but also to exit and they are therefore caught simultaneously both within the discourses of emigration and reception. The overwhelming importance given to frameworks of immigration recognises the fact that much immigration is indeed framed through the limits of entry rather than controls around exit. Pressures on countries to control and monitor exit too come from countries that are receiving migrants and form part of both bilateral and multilateral settlements. The language of managing migration is therefore reserved for policies of immigration rather than those of emigration (Spencer 2003).

This is not to say that there is no management of migration in sending countries. As Laczko and Wijkstrom (2004) suggest countries of emigration tend to focus their research and policy making on labour migration, worker entitlements, diasporas and
remittance issues. Elaborate preparation for exit may be offered through labour export councils, training schools and schemes, reworking legislation to protect migrants abroad and so on. Moreover, controls over emigration are also in place in some countries. For instance, in India women below the age of 30 are not permitted to migrate to take up domestic work and those above the age of 30 and must get clearance from the office of the Protector of Emigrants for which she must be accompanied by the husband (if married) or parent of the domestic worker. This practice removes the responsibility of the domestic worker from the office of the Protector to the accompanying person, i.e. the powers of the patriarchal state are to be both moved sideways and enacted through patriarchal households (Raghuram 2005).

However, the emigration of skilled workers is rarely regulated. In India the pre-Independence tendency of seeing the importance of travel in producing the modern subject, and importantly as a site for producing a nationalist sentiment meant that internationalism and nationalism were never seen to be at odds. Thus it was presumed that the upper classes who left would return to the project of nation building, so that fluidity of travel became part of the nationalist project. Although cursory attempts to regulate such emigration were introduced in the Emigration Act of 1922, the first set of changes to emigration regulations in post-Independence India (Emigration Act 1983) removed these controls on skilled labour (Lall 2001). Since then everyone with a graduate degree, with some wealth (i.e. are income-tax payers), those working in skilled and semi-skilled sectors, in diplomatic service and those employed as Gazetted government servants are not required to obtain emigration clearance. The class assumptions that underlie emigration control are clear.
**Regulating the production of skills**

The main reasons that are offered for the significant importance of Indians in skilled migration stream is their proficiency in English and a relatively 'advanced' higher education system which produces a relatively high level of skills, the large size of the population and especially of the skilled class, in comparison to the size of the economy, which means that there is underemployment of skilled people in India. Connections with Western companies established by earlier migrant professionals facilitate further skill circulation. Of course, intimately tied to this is the fact that the Indians form a cheap and flexible labour force. On the other hand, why do Indians move abroad? Khadria suggests that 'young IT professionals as well as the medical professionals want to go abroad mainly to gain professional experience, which they think will be highly valued in India when they come back. In addition, they are encouraged by higher earnings, perks and high quality of life in the host country. The majority of prospective nurses on the other 'want to settle down abroad permanently, because they hardly perceive their career prospects to be bright in India' (Khadria 2004a: 3). In this narrative, it is the match between demand and supply that decides who migrates and how they become placed within migration stories. Their terms of reception, skilled/lesser skilled become a product of the interweaving between individual attributes and individual aspirations.\(^\text{12}\)

However, a longer temporal perspective highlights the nuances and complexities that shape this production of skills and I draw here on the work of Kamat, Mir and Matthew (2004). 'India emerged from its nationalist movement not as a bourgeois democratic nation-state in the image of the Euro-American capitalist democracies but as a ‘coalitional’ State—where the State drew its mandate from multiple forces such
as its caste and class elites alongside a mobilized stratum of subaltern communities that constituted the struggle for independence. The upper caste political elite that came to operate the State structures held in place what in hindsight was an impossible coalition— one fraught with irresolvable contradictions. The developmentalist regime that was inaugurated within the logic of Nehruvian modernity operated primarily through the idea of State socialism, that seemed to respond to the aspirations of both the national bourgeoisie on the one hand and the large segment of lower caste and Dalit communities on the other' (Kamat, Mir and Matthew, 2004: 8). The cultural authority of certain groups translated into educational advantage.

These class-caste alliances have shaped access to education. For instance, an emphasis on modernising India and faith in the power of science to catapult India into modernity meant that science and scientific education came to be highly valued (Prakash, 1999). This was fostered through preferential funding of tertiary education. Thus institutions such as the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) set up in different cities since 1950 became the flag-bearers of national scientific achievement. The internal bias towards higher education rather than an expansion of primary education has led to the creation of an educated middle and upper-class who have scientific education set up within a secular English-language education system so the benefits of this education are creamed off by a few (Khadria, 2003?).

In addressing the question of social exclusion (Parkins, 1979) argues that " in modern capitalist society, the two main exclusionary devices by which the bourgeoisie constructs and maintains itself as a class are first, those surrounding the institutions of property, and second, academic or professional qualifications and credentials. Each
represents a set of legal arrangements to restrict access to reward and privileges.

Property ownership is a form of closure designed to prevent general access to the means of production and its outcomes; credentials is a form of closure designed to control and monitor entry to key positions in the division of labour”. And we can still see this at play today. Thus, in a study of IT students in Andhra Pradesh, Nagaraju and Haribabu (2003) found that 58 per cent of their students were upper caste and 88 per cent of the students identified themselves as middle-class (also see Upadhya, 2007).

These figures are played out in migration stories too. A lot of the emigration happens from the apex organisations where the percentage of those who leave is very high. Various studies show that between 22 per cent and 33 per cent of graduates from the Indian Institutes of Technology emigrate, and up to 58 per cent from the premier medical college 'All India Institute of Medical Sciences' too emigrate (Khadria 1999). However, it is not restricted to this group - there are others too (Khadria 2004a). The processes of exclusion and inclusion experienced at the ports of entry, thus have long institutional histories.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I outline a method for obtaining a complex understanding of the turf on which migration is discussed and the exclusions/inclusions that this already contains. This involves three moves. First, it requires bringing immigration and emigration literatures together. Secondly, it involves unpacking the notion of skills so that the process of formation of skills can be understood as it is produced at the intersections of political, cultural and social privilege. And finally, a critical look at skills also
necessarily brings the lesser skilled into the fray as the notion of skills is divested of some of its cultural capital.

The discussion above juxtaposes the institutional frameworks that shape exclusion and inclusion post-entry alongside, how this is produced pre-exit, as it is played out around the migration of skilled Indians to the UK. The processes of exclusion and inclusion in terms of emigration arise from a complex interplay of educational opportunities and emigration possibilities which reflect sedimented power, accrued over time. Caste and class privilege give some people greater access to the education that is transferable in the global landscape of skills. Transitions therefore appear to be easier for some than for others. However, the language of skills provides a meritocratic gloss on immigration and emigration policies. Skills provide migration policies with a thin veneer of gender, class and race neutrality (Puwar 2004). A critical purchase on the governance of skilled migration must always attempt to tear away that veneer and show the multiple negotiations, legacies and futures that are being imagined and played out in this process. Focusing on the many modes of governance that have produced skills can be an important first step in this process.

Mobility too is arranged in the context of past as well as emerging power relations. The UK attempts to woo migrants who will help bolster its global economic position, but in doing so defines the acceptable migrant as an assimilable migrant, one who can be easily (even exclusively) scripted as British. The modes of governance of who migrates are also however set within the context of European agendas for regulation of skills, so that the multiple spatialities within which skilled migration is governed can be seen as sometimes overlapping and at other times contradictory. In this
chapter I have therefore argued that in order to take account of this complexity the language of governance needs to be sharpened and its use filtered out to the many other sites which are implicated in the circulation of skilled migrants.
Reference


Castells (1996) – this might be cited on page 5 – please see comment in text.


Although most of this selection is supposed to operate amongst the labour market migrants, increasingly, the packages offered to skilled family and skilled asylum-seekers too are different from those who are lesser skilled. Skills thus act as axes of differentiation even in non-labour migration categories.

And for arguments about how some integrative approaches miss the diversification and stratification that marks contemporary female migration see Kofman (2005).

And for race see for instance, Purkayastha 2005.

The New Labour government came into office in 1997 and since then has instituted a large number of changes to immigration rules. By 2003 these regulations came to be packaged as managing migration and the purpose of management was to focus all new migration on meeting UK’s economic needs.

What I offer here then is a detailed example of a method that may be reworked for other contexts.

Although UK data does not allow us to breakdown this data, it may be surmised from evidence of countries where such data is available (such as Canada and Australia) that skills selectivity amongst labour migrants will lead to increased skilling amongst family migrants.

The shortage of professionals in some key sectors can be traced to the devaluation of certain kinds of training, a lack of expansion in numbers being trained in line with changing demands, extant shortages that are created by limits on immigration despite the fact that the system has historically had internal tendencies to depend on immigrant labour. However, there is political amnesia about this historical dependence on certain categories of skilled migration.
Interestingly, in these narratives both ethnic minorities and women are particularly seen as requiring 'skilling' and targeted as possible alternative sources of certain forms of skilled labour (Rollason, 2002; see NSF, 2003 for parallel arguments in the case of the U.S.).

The Bologna Process is an intergovernmental initiative which aims to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010 and to promote the European system of higher education worldwide.

And if the Bologna Declaration and the Prague Communique are interpreted correctly, there are only three major results, or aims, to be achieved: (i) academic quality, which not only covers excellence in terms of research and teaching and in promulgating knowledge and truth but also covers the contribution to personal development; (ii) employability in a transnational context and with lifelong sustainability; and (iii) mobility in all aspects, i.e., in terms of space, of time (Kohler, 2003: 318).

The sectoral panels that were set up since 1997 to advise the government on intake of migrant labour may arguably be said to have already been performing this function.

Although it is recognised that the emigration environment, which 'encompasses the social, economic and political context which is largely common to all members of the community' too shapes individual aspirations (Carling 2002: 13). Thus migration is seen by some as a socially constructed project.'