PDF (Not Set)
- Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
|Google Scholar:||Look up in Google Scholar|
This chapter outlines a new argument for the view that language has a cognitive role. I suggest that humans exhibit two distinct kinds of belief state, one passively formed, the other actively formed. I argue that actively formed beliefs (virtual beliefs, as I call them) can be identified with premising policies, and that forming them typically involves certain linguistic operations. I conclude that natural language has at least a limited cognitive role in the formation and manipulation of virtual beliefs.
|Item Type:||Book Chapter|
|Copyright Holders:||1998 Cambridge University Press|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Arts > Philosophy
|Depositing User:||Users 12 not found.|
|Date Deposited:||30 May 2006|
|Last Modified:||14 Jan 2016 10:31|
|Share this page:|
Download history for this item
These details should be considered as only a guide to the number of downloads performed manually. Algorithmic methods have been applied in an attempt to remove automated downloads from the displayed statistics but no guarantee can be made as to the accuracy of the figures.