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|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||http://doi.org/10.1080/09515089808573271|
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This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of human psychology. It takes its start from Daniel Dennett's distinction between belief and opinion, arguing that it has the power to account for a number of tensions within our commonsense concept of belief. It argues, however, that Dennett's account is seriously inadequate, particularly in its treatment of the role of opinion in practical reasoning. The paper goes on to sketch an alternative proposal which retains the virtues of Dennett's suggestion, while providing a richer and more satisfying account of the cognitive role of opinion.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Keywords:||practical reasoning; belief and opinion|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Arts > Philosophy
|Depositing User:||Users 12 not found.|
|Date Deposited:||14 Nov 2006|
|Last Modified:||25 Feb 2016 13:49|
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